security_file_set_fowner always returns 0, so make it f_setown and
__f_setown void return functions and fix up the error handling in the
callers.
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
The kernel print macros use the KBUILD_MODNAME, which is initialized
to the module name. The current integrity/Makefile makes every file
as its own module, so pr_xxx messages are prefixed with the file name
instead of the module. Similar to the evm/Makefile and ima/Makefile,
this patch fixes the integrity/Makefile to use the single name
'integrity'.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The integrity subsystem has lots of options and takes more than
half of the security menu. This patch consolidates the options
under "integrity", which are hidden if not enabled. This change
does not affect existing configurations. Re-configuration is not
needed.
Changes v4:
- no need to change "integrity subsystem" to menuconfig as
options are hidden, when not enabled. (Mimi)
- add INTEGRITY Kconfig help description
Changes v3:
- dependency to INTEGRITY removed when behind 'if INTEGRITY'
Changes v2:
- previous patch moved integrity out of the 'security' menu.
This version keeps integrity as a security option (Mimi).
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
For better visual appearance it is better to co-locate
asymmetric key options together with signature support.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
IMA uses only one template. This patch initializes only required
template to avoid unnecessary memory allocations.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
In all cases except ima_bprm_check() the filename was not defined
and ima_d_path() was used to find the full path. Unfortunately,
the bprm filename is a relative pathname (eg. ./<dir>/filename).
ima_bprm_check() selects between bprm->interp and bprm->filename.
The following dump demonstrates the differences between using
filename and interp.
bprm->filename
filename: ./foo.sh, pathname: /root/bin/foo.sh
filename: ./foo.sh, pathname: /bin/dash
bprm->interp
filename: ./foo.sh, pathname: /root/bin/foo.sh
filename: /bin/sh, pathname: /bin/dash
In both cases the pathnames are currently the same. This patch
removes usage of filename and interp in favor of d_absolute_path.
Changes v3:
- 11 extra bytes for "deleted" not needed (Mimi)
- purpose "replace relative bprm filename with full pathname" (Mimi)
Changes v2:
- use d_absolute_path() instead of d_path to work in chroot environments.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
ima_get_action() sets the "action" flags based on policy.
Before collecting, measuring, appraising, or auditing the
file, the "action" flag is updated based on the cached
iint->flags.
This patch removes the subsequent unnecessary appraisal
test in ima_appraise_measurement().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Add missing keywords to the function definition to cleanup
to discard initialization code.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
'function' variable value can be changed instead of
allocating extra '_func' variable.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Precede bit testing before string comparison makes code
faster. Also refactor statement as a single line pointer
assignment. Logic is following: we set 'xattr_ptr' to read
xattr value when we will do appraisal or in any case when
measurement template is other than 'ima'.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Commit f381c27 "integrity: move ima inode integrity data management"
(re)moved few functions but left their declarations in header files.
This patch removes them and also removes duplicated declaration of
integrity_iint_find().
Commit c7de7ad "ima: remove unused cleanup functions". This patch
removes these definitions as well.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
If file has IMA signature, IMA in enforce mode, but key is missing
then file access is blocked and single error message is printed.
If IMA appraisal is enabled in fix mode, then system runs as usual
but might produce tons of 'Request for unknown key' messages.
This patch switches 'pr_warn' to 'pr_err_ratelimited'.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Empty files and missing xattrs do not guarantee that a file was
just created. This patch passes FILE_CREATED flag to IMA to
reliably identify new files.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> 3.14+
Unless an LSM labels a file during d_instantiate(), newly created
files are not labeled with an initial security.evm xattr, until
the file closes. EVM, before allowing a protected, security xattr
to be written, verifies the existing 'security.evm' value is good.
For newly created files without a security.evm label, this
verification prevents writing any protected, security xattrs,
until the file closes.
Following is the example when this happens:
fd = open("foo", O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0644);
setxattr("foo", "security.SMACK64", value, sizeof(value), 0);
close(fd);
While INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS status is handled in other places, such
as evm_inode_setattr(), it does not handle it in all cases in
evm_protect_xattr(). By limiting the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to
newly created files, we can now allow setting "protected" xattrs.
Changelog:
- limit the use of INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS to IMA identified new files
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> 3.14+
This patch fix spelling typo found in DocBook/kernel-api.xml.
It is because the file is generated from the source comments,
I have to fix the comments in source codes.
Signed-off-by: Masanari Iida <standby24x7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Push ipv4 and ipv6 nf hooks into single array and register/unregister
them via single call.
Signed-off-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
On ima_file_free(), newly created empty files are not labeled with
an initial security.ima value, because the iversion did not change.
Commit dff6efc "fs: fix iversion handling" introduced a change in
iversion behavior. To verify this change use the shell command:
$ (exec >foo)
$ getfattr -h -e hex -d -m security foo
This patch defines the IMA_NEW_FILE flag. The flag is initially
set, when IMA detects that a new file is created, and subsequently
checked on the ima_file_free() hook to set the initial security.ima
value.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> 3.14+
This patch fixes a bug, where evm_verify_hmac() returns INTEGRITY_PASS
if inode->i_op->getxattr() returns an error in evm_find_protected_xattrs.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
A previous commit c0828e5048 ("selinux:
process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in
selinux_ip_postroute()") mistakenly left out a 'break' from a switch
statement which caused problems with IPv6 traffic.
Thanks to Florian Westphal for reporting and debugging the issue.
Reported-by: Florian Westphal <fwestpha@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Now that NFS client uses the kernel key ring facility to store the NFSv4
id/gid mappings, the defaults for root_maxkeys and root_maxbytes need to be
substantially increased.
These values have been soak tested:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033708#c73
Signed-off-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
This patch fixes checkpatch 'return' warnings introduced with commit
9819cf2 "checkpatch: warn on unnecessary void function return statements".
Use scripts/checkpatch.pl --file security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
to produce the warnings.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
3.16 commit aad4f8bb42
'switch simple generic_file_aio_read() users to ->read_iter()'
replaced ->aio_read with ->read_iter in most of the file systems
and introduced new_sync_read() as a replacement for do_sync_read().
Most of file systems set '->read' and ima_kernel_read is not affected.
When ->read is not set, this patch adopts fallback call changes from the
vfs_read.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> 3.16+
This patch fixes the case where the file's signature/hash xattr contains
an invalid hash algorithm. Although we can not verify the xattr, we still
need to measure the file. Use the default IMA hash algorithm.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The patch 3bcced39ea7d: "ima: use ahash API for file hash
calculation" from Feb 26, 2014, leads to the following static checker
warning:
security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c:204 ima_alloc_atfm()
error: buffer overflow 'hash_algo_name' 17 <= 17
Unlike shash tfm memory, which is allocated on initialization, the
ahash tfm memory allocation is deferred until needed.
This patch fixes the case where ima_ahash_tfm has not yet been
allocated and the file's signature/hash xattr contains an invalid hash
algorithm. Although we can not verify the xattr, we still need to
measure the file. Use the default IMA hash algorithm.
Changelog:
- set valid algo before testing tfm - based on Dmitry's comment
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Smack used to use a mix of smack_known struct and char* throughout its
APIs and implementation. This patch unifies the behaviour and makes it
store and operate exclusively on smack_known struct pointers when managing
labels.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
Conflicts:
security/smack/smack_access.c
security/smack/smack_lsm.c
The 54e70ec5eb commit introduced a
bidirectional check that should have checked for mutual WRITE access
between two labels. Due to a typo the second check was incorrect.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@samsung.com>
People keep asking me for permissive mode, and I keep saying "no".
Permissive mode is wrong for more reasons than I can enumerate,
but the compelling one is that it's once on, never off.
Nonetheless, there is an argument to be made for running a
process with lots of permissions, logging which are required,
and then locking the process down. There wasn't a way to do
that with Smack, but this provides it.
The notion is that you start out by giving the process an
appropriate Smack label, such as "ATBirds". You create rules
with a wide range of access and the "b" mode. On Tizen it
might be:
ATBirds System rwxalb
ATBirds User rwxalb
ATBirds _ rwxalb
User ATBirds wb
System ATBirds wb
Accesses that fail will generate audit records. Accesses
that succeed because of rules marked with a "b" generate
log messages identifying the rule, the program and as much
object information as is convenient.
When the system is properly configured and the programs
brought in line with the labeling scheme the "b" mode can
be removed from the rules. When the system is ready for
production the facility can be configured out.
This provides the developer the convenience of permissive
mode without creating a system that looks like it is
enforcing a policy while it is not.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
If the callee SID is bounded by the caller SID, then allowing
the transition to occur poses no risk of privilege escalation and we can
therefore safely allow the transition to occur. Add this exemption
for both the case where a transition was explicitly requested by the
application and the case where an automatic transition is defined in
policy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Make it clear this is about kernel_param_ops, not kernel_param (which
will soon have a flags field of its own). No functional changes.
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Cc: Jean Delvare <khali@linux-fr.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Li Zhong <zhong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jon Mason <jon.mason@intel.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Signed-off-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Commit 7177a9c4b5 ("fs: call rename2 if exists") changed
"struct inode_operations"->rename == NULL if
"struct inode_operations"->rename2 != NULL .
TOMOYO needs to check for both ->rename and ->rename2 , or
a system on (e.g.) ext4 filesystem won't boot.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
While opening with CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE file label is not set.
Other calls may access it after CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE is dropped from process.
Signed-off-by: Marcin Niesluchowski <m.niesluchow@samsung.com>
Pull SElinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two small patches to fix a couple of build warnings in SELinux and
NetLabel. The patches are obvious enough that I don't think any
additional explanation is necessary, but it basically boils down to
the usual: I was stupid, and these patches fix some of the stupid.
Both patches were posted earlier this week to the SELinux list, and
that is where they sat as I didn't think there were noteworthy enough
to go upstream at this point in time, but DaveM would rather see them
upstream now so who am I to argue. As the patches are both very
small"
* 'stable-3.17' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: remove unused variabled in the netport, netnode, and netif caches
netlabel: fix the netlbl_catmap_setlong() dummy function
Values of extended attributes are stored as binary blobs. NULL-termination
of them isn't required. It just wastes disk space and confuses command-line
tools like getfattr because they have to print that zero byte at the end.
This patch removes terminating zero byte from initial security label in
smack_inode_init_security and cuts it out in function smack_inode_getsecurity
which is used by syscall getxattr. This change seems completely safe, because
function smk_parse_smack ignores everything after first zero byte.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
Zero-length security labels are invalid but kernel should handle them.
This patch fixes kernel panic after setting zero-length security labels:
# attr -S -s "SMACK64" -V "" file
And after writing zero-length string into smackfs files syslog and onlycp:
# python -c 'import os; os.write(1, "")' > /smack/syslog
The problem is caused by brain-damaged logic in function smk_parse_smack()
which takes pointer to buffer and its length but if length below or equal zero
it thinks that the buffer is zero-terminated. Unfortunately callers of this
function are widely used and proper fix requires serious refactoring.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
Security operation ->inode_listsecurity is used for generating list of
available extended attributes for syscall listxattr. Currently it's used
only in nfs4 or if filesystem doesn't provide i_op->listxattr.
The list is the set of NULL-terminated names, one after the other.
This method must include zero byte at the and into result.
Also this function must return length even if string does not fit into
output buffer or it is NULL, see similar method in selinux and man listxattr.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
This patch removes the unused return code variable in the netport,
netnode, and netif initialization functions.
Reported-by: fengguang.wu@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this release:
- PKCS#7 parser for the key management subsystem from David Howells
- appoint Kees Cook as seccomp maintainer
- bugfixes and general maintenance across the subsystem"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (94 commits)
X.509: Need to export x509_request_asymmetric_key()
netlabel: shorter names for the NetLabel catmap funcs/structs
netlabel: fix the catmap walking functions
netlabel: fix the horribly broken catmap functions
netlabel: fix a problem when setting bits below the previously lowest bit
PKCS#7: X.509 certificate issuer and subject are mandatory fields in the ASN.1
tpm: simplify code by using %*phN specifier
tpm: Provide a generic means to override the chip returned timeouts
tpm: missing tpm_chip_put in tpm_get_random()
tpm: Properly clean sysfs entries in error path
tpm: Add missing tpm_do_selftest to ST33 I2C driver
PKCS#7: Use x509_request_asymmetric_key()
Revert "selinux: fix the default socket labeling in sock_graft()"
X.509: x509_request_asymmetric_keys() doesn't need string length arguments
PKCS#7: fix sparse non static symbol warning
KEYS: revert encrypted key change
ima: add support for measuring and appraising firmware
firmware_class: perform new LSM checks
security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook
PKCS#7: Missing inclusion of linux/err.h
...
Pull timer and time updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"A rather large update of timers, timekeeping & co
- Core timekeeping code is year-2038 safe now for 32bit machines.
Now we just need to fix all in kernel users and the gazillion of
user space interfaces which rely on timespec/timeval :)
- Better cache layout for the timekeeping internal data structures.
- Proper nanosecond based interfaces for in kernel users.
- Tree wide cleanup of code which wants nanoseconds but does hoops
and loops to convert back and forth from timespecs. Some of it
definitely belongs into the ugly code museum.
- Consolidation of the timekeeping interface zoo.
- A fast NMI safe accessor to clock monotonic for tracing. This is a
long standing request to support correlated user/kernel space
traces. With proper NTP frequency correction it's also suitable
for correlation of traces accross separate machines.
- Checkpoint/restart support for timerfd.
- A few NOHZ[_FULL] improvements in the [hr]timer code.
- Code move from kernel to kernel/time of all time* related code.
- New clocksource/event drivers from the ARM universe. I'm really
impressed that despite an architected timer in the newer chips SoC
manufacturers insist on inventing new and differently broken SoC
specific timers.
[ Ed. "Impressed"? I don't think that word means what you think it means ]
- Another round of code move from arch to drivers. Looks like most
of the legacy mess in ARM regarding timers is sorted out except for
a few obnoxious strongholds.
- The usual updates and fixlets all over the place"
* 'timers-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (114 commits)
timekeeping: Fixup typo in update_vsyscall_old definition
clocksource: document some basic timekeeping concepts
timekeeping: Use cached ntp_tick_length when accumulating error
timekeeping: Rework frequency adjustments to work better w/ nohz
timekeeping: Minor fixup for timespec64->timespec assignment
ftrace: Provide trace clocks monotonic
timekeeping: Provide fast and NMI safe access to CLOCK_MONOTONIC
seqcount: Add raw_write_seqcount_latch()
seqcount: Provide raw_read_seqcount()
timekeeping: Use tk_read_base as argument for timekeeping_get_ns()
timekeeping: Create struct tk_read_base and use it in struct timekeeper
timekeeping: Restructure the timekeeper some more
clocksource: Get rid of cycle_last
clocksource: Move cycle_last validation to core code
clocksource: Make delta calculation a function
wireless: ath9k: Get rid of timespec conversions
drm: vmwgfx: Use nsec based interfaces
drm: i915: Use nsec based interfaces
timekeeping: Provide ktime_get_raw()
hangcheck-timer: Use ktime_get_ns()
...
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar:
- Move the nohz kick code out of the scheduler tick to a dedicated IPI,
from Frederic Weisbecker.
This necessiated quite some background infrastructure rework,
including:
* Clean up some irq-work internals
* Implement remote irq-work
* Implement nohz kick on top of remote irq-work
* Move full dynticks timer enqueue notification to new kick
* Move multi-task notification to new kick
* Remove unecessary barriers on multi-task notification
- Remove proliferation of wait_on_bit() action functions and allow
wait_on_bit_action() functions to support a timeout. (Neil Brown)
- Another round of sched/numa improvements, cleanups and fixes. (Rik
van Riel)
- Implement fast idling of CPUs when the system is partially loaded,
for better scalability. (Tim Chen)
- Restructure and fix the CPU hotplug handling code that may leave
cfs_rq and rt_rq's throttled when tasks are migrated away from a dead
cpu. (Kirill Tkhai)
- Robustify the sched topology setup code. (Peterz Zijlstra)
- Improve sched_feat() handling wrt. static_keys (Jason Baron)
- Misc fixes.
* 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (37 commits)
sched/fair: Fix 'make xmldocs' warning caused by missing description
sched: Use macro for magic number of -1 for setparam
sched: Robustify topology setup
sched: Fix sched_setparam() policy == -1 logic
sched: Allow wait_on_bit_action() functions to support a timeout
sched: Remove proliferation of wait_on_bit() action functions
sched/numa: Revert "Use effective_load() to balance NUMA loads"
sched: Fix static_key race with sched_feat()
sched: Remove extra static_key*() function indirection
sched/rt: Fix replenish_dl_entity() comments to match the current upstream code
sched: Transform resched_task() into resched_curr()
sched/deadline: Kill task_struct->pi_top_task
sched: Rework check_for_tasks()
sched/rt: Enqueue just unthrottled rt_rq back on the stack in __disable_runtime()
sched/fair: Disable runtime_enabled on dying rq
sched/numa: Change scan period code to match intent
sched/numa: Rework best node setting in task_numa_migrate()
sched/numa: Examine a task move when examining a task swap
sched/numa: Simplify task_numa_compare()
sched/numa: Use effective_load() to balance NUMA loads
...
Historically the NetLabel LSM secattr catmap functions and data
structures have had very long names which makes a mess of the NetLabel
code and anyone who uses NetLabel. This patch renames the catmap
functions and structures from "*_secattr_catmap_*" to just "*_catmap_*"
which improves things greatly.
There are no substantial code or logic changes in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The NetLabel secattr catmap functions, and the SELinux import/export
glue routines, were broken in many horrible ways and the SELinux glue
code fiddled with the NetLabel catmap structures in ways that we
probably shouldn't allow. At some point this "worked", but that was
likely due to a bit of dumb luck and sub-par testing (both inflicted
by yours truly). This patch corrects these problems by basically
gutting the code in favor of something less obtuse and restoring the
NetLabel abstractions in the SELinux catmap glue code.
Everything is working now, and if it decides to break itself in the
future this code will be much easier to debug than the code it
replaces.
One noteworthy side effect of the changes is that it is no longer
necessary to allocate a NetLabel catmap before calling one of the
NetLabel APIs to set a bit in the catmap. NetLabel will automatically
allocate the catmap nodes when needed, resulting in less allocations
when the lowest bit is greater than 255 and less code in the LSMs.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christian Evans <frodox@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The NetLabel category (catmap) functions have a problem in that they
assume categories will be set in an increasing manner, e.g. the next
category set will always be larger than the last. Unfortunately, this
is not a valid assumption and could result in problems when attempting
to set categories less than the startbit in the lowest catmap node.
In some cases kernel panics and other nasties can result.
This patch corrects the problem by checking for this and allocating a
new catmap node instance and placing it at the front of the list.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Christian Evans <frodox@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
This reverts commit 4da6daf4d3.
Unfortunately, the commit in question caused problems with Bluetooth
devices, specifically it caused them to get caught in the newly
created BUG_ON() check. The AF_ALG problem still exists, but will be
addressed in a future patch.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Commit fc7c70e "KEYS: struct key_preparsed_payload should have two
payload pointers" erroneously modified encrypted-keys. This patch
reverts the change to that file.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The "security: introduce kernel_fw_from_file hook" patch defined a
new security hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built
into the kernel.
This patch defines ima_fw_from_file(), which is called from the new
security hook, to measure and/or appraise the loaded firmware's
integrity.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
In order to validate the contents of firmware being loaded, there must be
a hook to evaluate any loaded firmware that wasn't built into the kernel
itself. Without this, there is a risk that a root user could load malicious
firmware designed to mount an attack against kernel memory (e.g. via DMA).
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565
plus fixing it a different way...
We found, when trying to run an application from an application which
had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined
capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those
undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status.
Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4
capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set
eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps
less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are
undefined future capabilities.
The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a
time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl()
we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task
which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all
things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits
higher than CAP_LAST_CAP.
So the 'parent' will look something like:
CapInh: 0000000000000000
CapPrm: 0000000000000000
CapEff: 0000000000000000
CapBnd: ffffffc000000000
All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that
aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do...
So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely
and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps
it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what
the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does.
They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of
you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve()
the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset
however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child
task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are
'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't
have.
The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a
subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a
subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that
the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It
also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity.
The solution here:
1) stop hiding capability bits in status
This makes debugging easier!
2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you
don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init
and you won't get them in any other task either.
This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which
made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other
things)
3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use
~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility.
This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run.
4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as
again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward
compatibility.
This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
In function cap_task_prctl(), we would allocate a credential
unconditionally and then check if we support the requested function.
If not we would release this credential with abort_creds() by using
RCU method. But on some archs such as powerpc, the sys_prctl is heavily
used to get/set the floating point exception mode. So the unnecessary
allocating/releasing of credential not only introduce runtime overhead
but also do cause OOM due to the RCU implementation.
This patch removes abort_creds() from cap_task_prctl() by calling
prepare_creds() only when we need to modify it.
Reported-by: Kevin Hao <haokexin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Provide key preparsing for the request_key_auth key type so that we can make
preparsing mandatory. This does nothing as this type can only be set up
internally to the kernel.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Provide key preparsing in the keyring so that we can make preparsing
mandatory. For keyrings, however, only an empty payload is permitted.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Make use of key preparsing in the big key type so that quota size determination
can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being added.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Make use of key preparsing in user-defined and logon keys so that quota size
determination can take place prior to keyring locking when a key is being
added.
Also the idmapper key types need to change to match as they use the
user-defined key type routines.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Call the ->free_preparse() key type op even after ->preparse() returns an
error as it does cleaning up type stuff.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Allow a key type's preparsing routine to set the expiry time for a key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
struct key_preparsed_payload should have two payload pointers to correspond
with those in struct key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Since seccomp transitions between threads requires updates to the
no_new_privs flag to be atomic, the flag must be part of an atomic flag
set. This moves the nnp flag into a separate task field, and introduces
accessors.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Provide a generic instantiation function for key types that use the preparse
hook. This makes it easier to prereserve key quota before keyrings get locked
to retain the new key.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@primarydata.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Special kernel keys, such as those used to hold DNS results for AFS, CIFS and
NFS and those used to hold idmapper results for NFS, used to be
'invalidateable' with key_revoke(). However, since the default permissions for
keys were reduced:
Commit: 96b5c8fea6
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
it has become impossible to do this.
Add a key flag (KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_INVAL) that will permit a key to be
invalidated by root. This should not be used for system keyrings as the
garbage collector will try and remove any invalidate key. For system keyrings,
KEY_FLAG_ROOT_CAN_CLEAR can be used instead.
After this, from userspace, keyctl_invalidate() and "keyctl invalidate" can be
used by any possessor of CAP_SYS_ADMIN (typically root) to invalidate DNS and
idmapper keys. Invalidated keys are immediately garbage collected and will be
immediately rerequested if needed again.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Steve Dickson <steved@redhat.com>
Require all keys added to the IMA keyring be signed by an
existing trusted key on the system trusted keyring.
Changelog v6:
- remove ifdef CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING in C code - Dmitry
- update Kconfig dependency and help
- select KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS - Dmitry
Changelog v5:
- Move integrity_init_keyring() to init_ima() - Dmitry
- reset keyring[id] on failure - Dmitry
Changelog v1:
- don't link IMA trusted keyring to user keyring
Changelog:
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() function (reported-by Fengguang Wu)
- differentiate between regular and trusted keyring names.
- replace printk with pr_info (D. Kasatkin)
- only make the IMA keyring a trusted keyring (reported-by D. Kastatkin)
- define stub integrity_init_keyring() definition based on
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE, not CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS.
(reported-by Jim Davis)
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Dot prefixed keyring names are supposed to be reserved for the
kernel, but add_key() calls key_get_type_from_user(), which
incorrectly verifies the 'type' field, not the 'description' field.
This patch verifies the 'description' field isn't dot prefixed,
when creating a new keyring, and removes the dot prefix test in
key_get_type_from_user().
Changelog v6:
- whitespace and other cleanup
Changelog v5:
- Only prevent userspace from creating a dot prefixed keyring, not
regular keys - Dmitry
Reported-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
The asynchronous hash API allows initiating a hash calculation and
then performing other tasks, while waiting for the hash calculation
to complete.
This patch introduces usage of double buffering for simultaneous
hashing and reading of the next chunk of data from storage.
Changes in v3:
- better comments
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Use of multiple-page collect buffers reduces:
1) the number of block IO requests
2) the number of asynchronous hash update requests
Second is important for HW accelerated hashing, because significant
amount of time is spent for preparation of hash update operation,
which includes configuring acceleration HW, DMA engine, etc...
Thus, HW accelerators are more efficient when working on large
chunks of data.
This patch introduces usage of multi-page collect buffers. Buffer size
can be specified using 'ahash_bufsize' module parameter. Default buffer
size is 4096 bytes.
Changes in v3:
- kernel parameter replaced with module parameter
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Async hash API allows the use of HW acceleration for hash calculation.
It may give significant performance gain and/or reduce power consumption,
which might be very beneficial for battery powered devices.
This patch introduces hash calculation using ahash API. ahash performance
depends on the data size and the particular HW. Depending on the specific
system, shash performance may be better.
This patch defines 'ahash_minsize' module parameter, which is used to
define the minimal file size to use with ahash. If this minimum file size
is not set or the file is smaller than defined by the parameter, shash will
be used.
Changes in v3:
- kernel parameter replaced with module parameter
- pr_crit replaced with pr_crit_ratelimited
- more comment changes - Mimi
Changes in v2:
- ima_ahash_size became as ima_ahash
- ahash pre-allocation moved out from __init code to be able to use
ahash crypto modules. Ahash allocated once on the first use.
- hash calculation falls back to shash if ahash allocation/calculation fails
- complex initialization separated from variable declaration
- improved comments
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Replace spaces in op keyword labels in log output since userspace audit tools
can't parse orphaned keywords.
Reported-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
process_measurement() always calls ima_template_desc_current(),
including when an IMA policy has not been defined.
This patch delays template descriptor lookup until action is
determined.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Before 2.6.39 inode->i_readcount was maintained by IMA. It was not atomic
and protected using spinlock. For 2.6.39, i_readcount was converted to
atomic and maintaining was moved VFS layer. Spinlock for some unclear
reason was replaced by i_mutex.
After analyzing the code, we came to conclusion that i_mutex locking is
unnecessary, especially when an IMA policy has not been defined.
This patch removes i_mutex locking from ima_rdwr_violation_check().
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'v3.16-rc5' into timers/core
Reason: Bring in upstream modifications, so the pending changes which
depend on them can be queued.
The current "wait_on_bit" interface requires an 'action'
function to be provided which does the actual waiting.
There are over 20 such functions, many of them identical.
Most cases can be satisfied by one of just two functions, one
which uses io_schedule() and one which just uses schedule().
So:
Rename wait_on_bit and wait_on_bit_lock to
wait_on_bit_action and wait_on_bit_lock_action
to make it explicit that they need an action function.
Introduce new wait_on_bit{,_lock} and wait_on_bit{,_lock}_io
which are *not* given an action function but implicitly use
a standard one.
The decision to error-out if a signal is pending is now made
based on the 'mode' argument rather than being encoded in the action
function.
All instances of the old wait_on_bit and wait_on_bit_lock which
can use the new version have been changed accordingly and their
action functions have been discarded.
wait_on_bit{_lock} does not return any specific error code in the
event of a signal so the caller must check for non-zero and
interpolate their own error code as appropriate.
The wait_on_bit() call in __fscache_wait_on_invalidate() was
ambiguous as it specified TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE but used
fscache_wait_bit_interruptible as an action function.
David Howells confirms this should be uniformly
"uninterruptible"
The main remaining user of wait_on_bit{,_lock}_action is NFS
which needs to use a freezer-aware schedule() call.
A comment in fs/gfs2/glock.c notes that having multiple 'action'
functions is useful as they display differently in the 'wchan'
field of 'ps'. (and /proc/$PID/wchan).
As the new bit_wait{,_io} functions are tagged "__sched", they
will not show up at all, but something higher in the stack. So
the distinction will still be visible, only with different
function names (gds2_glock_wait versus gfs2_glock_dq_wait in the
gfs2/glock.c case).
Since first version of this patch (against 3.15) two new action
functions appeared, on in NFS and one in CIFS. CIFS also now
uses an action function that makes the same freezer aware
schedule call as NFS.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> (fscache, keys)
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com> (gfs2)
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Steve French <sfrench@samba.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140707051603.28027.72349.stgit@notabene.brown
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Currently, cgroup_subsys->base_cftypes is used for both the unified
default hierarchy and legacy ones and subsystems can mark each file
with either CFTYPE_ONLY_ON_DFL or CFTYPE_INSANE if it has to appear
only on one of them. This is quite hairy and error-prone. Also, we
may end up exposing interface files to the default hierarchy without
thinking it through.
cgroup_subsys will grow two separate cftype arrays and apply each only
on the hierarchies of the matching type. This will allow organizing
cftypes in a lot clearer way and encourage subsystems to scrutinize
the interface which is being exposed in the new default hierarchy.
In preparation, this patch renames cgroup_subsys->base_cftypes to
cgroup_subsys->legacy_cftypes. This patch is pure rename.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
The sock_graft() hook has special handling for AF_INET, AF_INET, and
AF_UNIX sockets as those address families have special hooks which
label the sock before it is attached its associated socket.
Unfortunately, the sock_graft() hook was missing a default approach
to labeling sockets which meant that any other address family which
made use of connections or the accept() syscall would find the
returned socket to be in an "unlabeled" state. This was recently
demonstrated by the kcrypto/AF_ALG subsystem and the newly released
cryptsetup package (cryptsetup v1.6.5 and later).
This patch preserves the special handling in selinux_sock_graft(),
but adds a default behavior - setting the sock's label equal to the
associated socket - which resolves the problem with AF_ALG and
presumably any other address family which makes use of accept().
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>
When flushing the AVC, such as during a policy load, the various
network caches are also flushed, with each making a call to
synchronize_net() which has shown to be expensive in some cases.
This patch consolidates the network cache flushes into a single AVC
callback which only calls synchronize_net() once for each AVC cache
flush.
Reported-by: Jaejyn Shin <flagon22bass@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
With the introduction of fair queued rwlock, recursive read_lock()
may hang the offending process if there is a write_lock() somewhere
in between.
With recursive read_lock checking enabled, the following error was
reported:
=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.16.0-rc1 #2 Tainted: G E
---------------------------------------------
load_policy/708 is trying to acquire lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b32a>]
security_genfs_sid+0x3a/0x170
but task is already holding lock:
(policy_rwlock){.+.+..}, at: [<ffffffff8125b48c>]
security_fs_use+0x2c/0x110
other info that might help us debug this:
Possible unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0
----
lock(policy_rwlock);
lock(policy_rwlock);
This patch fixes the occurrence of recursive read_lock() of
policy_rwlock by adding a helper function __security_genfs_sid()
which requires caller to take the lock before calling it. The
security_fs_use() was then modified to call the new helper function.
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The cond_read_node() should free the given node on error path as it's
not linked to p->cond_list yet. This is done via cond_node_destroy()
but it's not called when next_entry() fails before the expr loop.
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The node->cur_state and len can be read in a single call of next_entry().
And setting len before reading is a dead write so can be eliminated.
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
(Minor tweak to the length parameter in the call to next_entry())
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
To increase compiler portability there is <linux/compiler.h> which
provides convenience macros for various gcc constructs. Eg: __packed
for __attribute__((packed)).
This patch is part of a large task I've taken to clean the gcc
specific attributes and use the the macros instead.
Signed-off-by: Gideon Israel Dsouza <gidisrael@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
There're some code duplication for reading a string value during
policydb_read(). Add str_read() helper to fix it.
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
ARRAY_SIZE is more concise to use when the size of an array is divided
by the size of its type or the size of its first element.
The Coccinelle semantic patch that makes this change is as follows:
// <smpl>
@@
type T;
T[] E;
@@
- (sizeof(E)/sizeof(E[...]))
+ ARRAY_SIZE(E)
// </smpl>
Signed-off-by: Himangi Saraogi <himangi774@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull more security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
"A few more commits had previously failed to make it through
security-next into linux-next but this week made it into linux-next.
At least commit "ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()" was deemed critical
by Mimi to make this merge window.
This is a temporary tree just for this request. Mimi has pointed me
to some previous threads about keeping maintainer trees at the
previous release, which I'll certainly do for anything long-term,
after talking with James"
* 'serge-next-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
ima: introduce ima_kernel_read()
evm: prohibit userspace writing 'security.evm' HMAC value
ima: check inode integrity cache in violation check
ima: prevent unnecessary policy checking
evm: provide option to protect additional SMACK xattrs
evm: replace HMAC version with attribute mask
ima: prevent new digsig xattr from being replaced
Calculating the 'security.evm' HMAC value requires access to the
EVM encrypted key. Only the kernel should have access to it. This
patch prevents userspace tools(eg. setfattr, cp --preserve=xattr)
from setting/modifying the 'security.evm' HMAC value directly.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
When IMA did not support ima-appraisal, existance of the S_IMA flag
clearly indicated that the file was measured. With IMA appraisal S_IMA
flag indicates that file was measured and/or appraised. Because of
this, when measurement is not enabled by the policy, violations are
still reported.
To differentiate between measurement and appraisal policies this
patch checks the inode integrity cache flags. The IMA_MEASURED
flag indicates whether the file was actually measured, while the
IMA_MEASURE flag indicates whether the file should be measured.
Unfortunately, the IMA_MEASURED flag is reset to indicate the file
needs to be re-measured. Thus, this patch checks the IMA_MEASURE
flag.
This patch limits the false positive violation reports, but does
not fix it entirely. The IMA_MEASURE/IMA_MEASURED flags are
indications that, at some point in time, the file opened for read
was in policy, but might not be in policy now (eg. different uid).
Other changes would be needed to further limit false positive
violation reports.
Changelog:
- expanded patch description based on conversation with Roberto (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
ima_rdwr_violation_check is called for every file openning.
The function checks the policy even when violation condition
is not met. It causes unnecessary policy checking.
This patch does policy checking only if violation condition is met.
Changelog:
- check writecount is greater than zero (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Newer versions of SMACK introduced following security xattrs:
SMACK64EXEC, SMACK64TRANSMUTE and SMACK64MMAP.
To protect these xattrs, this patch includes them in the HMAC
calculation. However, for backwards compatibility with existing
labeled filesystems, including these xattrs needs to be
configurable.
Changelog:
- Add SMACK dependency on new option (Mimi)
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Using HMAC version limits the posibility to arbitrarily add new
attributes such as SMACK64EXEC to the hmac calculation.
This patch replaces hmac version with attribute mask.
Desired attributes can be enabled with configuration parameter.
It allows to build kernels which works with previously labeled
filesystems.
Currently supported attribute is 'fsuuid' which is equivalent of
the former version 2.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Even though a new xattr will only be appraised on the next access,
set the DIGSIG flag to prevent a signature from being replaced with
a hash on file close.
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Seccomp BPF filters can now be JIT'd, from Alexei Starovoitov.
2) Multiqueue support in xen-netback and xen-netfront, from Andrew J
Benniston.
3) Allow tweaking of aggregation settings in cdc_ncm driver, from Bjørn
Mork.
4) BPF now has a "random" opcode, from Chema Gonzalez.
5) Add more BPF documentation and improve test framework, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Support TCP fastopen over ipv6, from Daniel Lee.
7) Add software TSO helper functions and use them to support software
TSO in mvneta and mv643xx_eth drivers. From Ezequiel Garcia.
8) Support software TSO in fec driver too, from Nimrod Andy.
9) Add Broadcom SYSTEMPORT driver, from Florian Fainelli.
10) Handle broadcasts more gracefully over macvlan when there are large
numbers of interfaces configured, from Herbert Xu.
11) Allow more control over fwmark used for non-socket based responses,
from Lorenzo Colitti.
12) Do TCP congestion window limiting based upon measurements, from Neal
Cardwell.
13) Support busy polling in SCTP, from Neal Horman.
14) Allow RSS key to be configured via ethtool, from Venkata Duvvuru.
15) Bridge promisc mode handling improvements from Vlad Yasevich.
16) Don't use inetpeer entries to implement ID generation any more, it
performs poorly, from Eric Dumazet.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1522 commits)
rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0
tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery
net: fec: Add software TSO support
net: fec: Add Scatter/gather support
net: fec: Increase buffer descriptor entry number
net: fec: Factorize feature setting
net: fec: Enable IP header hardware checksum
net: fec: Factorize the .xmit transmit function
bridge: fix compile error when compiling without IPv6 support
bridge: fix smatch warning / potential null pointer dereference
via-rhine: fix full-duplex with autoneg disable
bnx2x: Enlarge the dorq threshold for VFs
bnx2x: Check for UNDI in uncommon branch
bnx2x: Fix 1G-baseT link
bnx2x: Fix link for KR with swapped polarity lane
sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem
net/core: Add VF link state control policy
net/fsl: xgmac_mdio is dependent on OF_MDIO
net/fsl: Make xgmac_mdio read error message useful
net_sched: drr: warn when qdisc is not work conserving
...
There is no point in calling gettimeofday if only the seconds part of
the timespec is used. Use get_seconds() instead. It's not only the
proper interface it's also faster.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Acked-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140611234607.775273584@linutronix.de
Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
"This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"
* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
Warning in scanf string typing
Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
bugfix patch for SMACK
Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
smack: fix key permission verification
KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
"A lot of activities on cgroup side. Heavy restructuring including
locking simplification took place to improve the code base and enable
implementation of the unified hierarchy, which currently exists behind
a __DEVEL__ mount option. The core support is mostly complete but
individual controllers need further work. To explain the design and
rationales of the the unified hierarchy
Documentation/cgroups/unified-hierarchy.txt
is added.
Another notable change is css (cgroup_subsys_state - what each
controller uses to identify and interact with a cgroup) iteration
update. This is part of continuing updates on css object lifetime and
visibility. cgroup started with reference count draining on removal
way back and is now reaching a point where csses behave and are
iterated like normal refcnted objects albeit with some complexities to
allow distinguishing the state where they're being deleted. The css
iteration update isn't taken advantage of yet but is planned to be
used to simplify memcg significantly"
* 'for-3.16' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (77 commits)
cgroup: disallow disabled controllers on the default hierarchy
cgroup: don't destroy the default root
cgroup: disallow debug controller on the default hierarchy
cgroup: clean up MAINTAINERS entries
cgroup: implement css_tryget()
device_cgroup: use css_has_online_children() instead of has_children()
cgroup: convert cgroup_has_live_children() into css_has_online_children()
cgroup: use CSS_ONLINE instead of CGRP_DEAD
cgroup: iterate cgroup_subsys_states directly
cgroup: introduce CSS_RELEASED and reduce css iteration fallback window
cgroup: move cgroup->serial_nr into cgroup_subsys_state
cgroup: link all cgroup_subsys_states in their sibling lists
cgroup: move cgroup->sibling and ->children into cgroup_subsys_state
cgroup: remove cgroup->parent
device_cgroup: remove direct access to cgroup->children
memcg: update memcg_has_children() to use css_next_child()
memcg: remove tasks/children test from mem_cgroup_force_empty()
cgroup: remove css_parent()
cgroup: skip refcnting on normal root csses and cgrp_dfl_root self css
cgroup: use cgroup->self.refcnt for cgroup refcnting
...
Files are measured or appraised based on the IMA policy. When a
file, in policy, is opened with the O_DIRECT flag, a deadlock
occurs.
The first attempt at resolving this lockdep temporarily removed the
O_DIRECT flag and restored it, after calculating the hash. The
second attempt introduced the O_DIRECT_HAVELOCK flag. Based on this
flag, do_blockdev_direct_IO() would skip taking the i_mutex a second
time. The third attempt, by Dmitry Kasatkin, resolves the i_mutex
locking issue, by re-introducing the IMA mutex, but uncovered
another problem. Reading a file with O_DIRECT flag set, writes
directly to userspace pages. A second patch allocates a user-space
like memory. This works for all IMA hooks, except ima_file_free(),
which is called on __fput() to recalculate the file hash.
Until this last issue is addressed, do not 'collect' the
measurement for measuring, appraising, or auditing files opened
with the O_DIRECT flag set. Based on policy, permit or deny file
access. This patch defines a new IMA policy rule option named
'permit_directio'. Policy rules could be defined, based on LSM
or other criteria, to permit specific applications to open files
with the O_DIRECT flag set.
Changelog v1:
- permit or deny file access based IMA policy rules
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started
seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c
drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_msgdma.c
drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c
net/ipv6/xfrm6_output.c
Several cases of overlapping changes.
The xfrm6_output.c has a bug fix which overlaps the renaming
of skb->local_df to skb->ignore_df.
In the Altera TSE driver cases, the register access cleanups
in net-next overlapped with bug fixes done in net.
Similarly a bug fix to send ALB packets in the bonding driver using
the right source address overlaps with cleanups in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
devcgroup_update_access() wants to know whether there are child
cgroups which are online and visible to userland and has_children()
may return false positive. Replace it with css_has_online_children().
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Currently, devcg::has_children() directly tests cgroup->children for
list emptiness. The field is not a published field and scheduled to
go away. In addition, the test isn't strictly correct as devcg should
only care about children which are visible to userland.
This patch converts has_children() to use css_next_child() instead.
The subtle incorrectness is noted and will be dealt with later.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
cgroup in general is moving towards using cgroup_subsys_state as the
fundamental structural component and css_parent() was introduced to
convert from using cgroup->parent to css->parent. It was quite some
time ago and we're moving forward with making css more prominent.
This patch drops the trivial wrapper css_parent() and let the users
dereference css->parent. While at it, explicitly mark fields of css
which are public and immutable.
v2: New usage from device_cgroup.c converted.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
After silencing the sleeping warning in mls_convert_context() I started
seeing similar traces from hashtab_insert. Do a cond_resched there too.
Signed-off-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
We presently prevent processes from using setexecon() to set the
security label of exec()'d processes when NO_NEW_PRIVS is enabled by
returning an error; however, we silently ignore setexeccon() when
exec()'ing from a nosuid mounted filesystem. This patch makes things
a bit more consistent by returning an error in the setexeccon()/nosuid
case.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Convert all cftype->write_string() users to the new cftype->write()
which maps directly to kernfs write operation and has full access to
kernfs and cgroup contexts. The conversions are mostly mechanical.
* @css and @cft are accessed using of_css() and of_cft() accessors
respectively instead of being specified as arguments.
* Should return @nbytes on success instead of 0.
* @buf is not trimmed automatically. Trim if necessary. Note that
blkcg and netprio don't need this as the parsers already handle
whitespaces.
cftype->write_string() has no user left after the conversions and
removed.
While at it, remove unnecessary local variable @p in
cgroup_subtree_control_write() and stale comment about
CGROUP_LOCAL_BUFFER_SIZE in cgroup_freezer.c.
This patch doesn't introduce any visible behavior changes.
v2: netprio was missing from conversion. Converted.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull cgroup fixes from Tejun Heo:
"During recent restructuring, device_cgroup unified config input check
and enforcement logic; unfortunately, it turned out to share too much.
Aristeu's patches fix the breakage and marked for -stable backport.
The other two patches are fallouts from kernfs conversion. The blkcg
change is temporary and will go away once kernfs internal locking gets
simplified (patches pending)"
* 'for-3.15-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup:
blkcg: use trylock on blkcg_pol_mutex in blkcg_reset_stats()
device_cgroup: check if exception removal is allowed
device_cgroup: fix the comment format for recently added functions
device_cgroup: rework device access check and exception checking
cgroup: fix the retry path of cgroup_mount()
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/altera/altera_sgdma.c
net/netlink/af_netlink.c
net/sched/cls_api.c
net/sched/sch_api.c
The netlink conflict dealt with moving to netlink_capable() and
netlink_ns_capable() in the 'net' tree vs. supporting 'tc' operations
in non-init namespaces. These were simple transformations from
netlink_capable to netlink_ns_capable.
The Altera driver conflict was simply code removal overlapping some
void pointer cast cleanups in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull vfs fixes from Al Viro:
"dcache fixes + kvfree() (uninlined, exported by mm/util.c) + posix_acl
bugfix from hch"
The dcache fixes are for a subtle LRU list corruption bug reported by
Miklos Szeredi, where people inside IBM saw list corruptions with the
LTP/host01 test.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
nick kvfree() from apparmor
posix_acl: handle NULL ACL in posix_acl_equiv_mode
dcache: don't need rcu in shrink_dentry_list()
more graceful recovery in umount_collect()
don't remove from shrink list in select_collect()
dentry_kill(): don't try to remove from shrink list
expand the call of dentry_lru_del() in dentry_kill()
new helper: dentry_free()
fold try_prune_one_dentry()
fold d_kill() and d_free()
fix races between __d_instantiate() and checks of dentry flags
[PATCH v3 1/2] device_cgroup: check if exception removal is allowed
When the device cgroup hierarchy was introduced in
bd2953ebbb - devcg: propagate local changes down the hierarchy
a specific case was overlooked. Consider the hierarchy bellow:
A default policy: ALLOW, exceptions will deny access
\
B default policy: ALLOW, exceptions will deny access
There's no need to verify when an new exception is added to B because
in this case exceptions will deny access to further devices, which is
always fine. Hierarchy in device cgroup only makes sure B won't have
more access than A.
But when an exception is removed (by writing devices.allow), it isn't
checked if the user is in fact removing an inherited exception from A,
thus giving more access to B.
Example:
# echo 'a' >A/devices.allow
# echo 'c 1:3 rw' >A/devices.deny
# echo $$ >A/B/tasks
# echo >/dev/null
-bash: /dev/null: Operation not permitted
# echo 'c 1:3 w' >A/B/devices.allow
# echo >/dev/null
#
This shouldn't be allowed and this patch fixes it by making sure to never allow
exceptions in this case to be removed if the exception is partially or fully
present on the parent.
v3: missing '*' in function description
v2: improved log message and formatting fixes
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Moving more extensive explanations to the end of the comment.
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The cgroup filesystem isn't ready for an LSM to
properly use extented attributes. This patch makes
files created in the cgroup filesystem usable by
a system running Smack and systemd.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Smack believes that many of the operatons that can
be performed on an open file descriptor are read operations.
The fstat and lseek system calls are examples.
An implication of this is that files shouldn't be open
if the task doesn't have read access even if it has
write access and the file is being opened write only.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace
process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
File-private locks have been merged into Linux for v3.15, and *now*
people are commenting that the name and macro definitions for the new
file-private locks suck.
...and I can't even disagree. The names and command macros do suck.
We're going to have to live with these for a long time, so it's
important that we be happy with the names before we're stuck with them.
The consensus on the lists so far is that they should be rechristened as
"open file description locks".
The name isn't a big deal for the kernel, but the command macros are not
visually distinct enough from the traditional POSIX lock macros. The
glibc and documentation folks are recommending that we change them to
look like F_OFD_{GETLK|SETLK|SETLKW}. That lessens the chance that a
programmer will typo one of the commands wrong, and also makes it easier
to spot this difference when reading code.
This patch makes the following changes that I think are necessary before
v3.15 ships:
1) rename the command macros to their new names. These end up in the uapi
headers and so are part of the external-facing API. It turns out that
glibc doesn't actually use the fcntl.h uapi header, but it's hard to
be sure that something else won't. Changing it now is safest.
2) make the the /proc/locks output display these as type "OFDLCK"
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
Cc: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Frank Filz <ffilzlnx@mindspring.com>
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Whenever a device file is opened and checked against current device
cgroup rules, it uses the same function (may_access()) as when a new
exception rule is added by writing devices.{allow,deny}. And in both
cases, the algorithm is the same, doesn't matter the behavior.
First problem is having device access to be considered the same as rule
checking. Consider the following structure:
A (default behavior: allow, exceptions disallow access)
\
B (default behavior: allow, exceptions disallow access)
A new exception is added to B by writing devices.deny:
c 12:34 rw
When checking if that exception is allowed in may_access():
if (dev_cgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
if (behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) {
/* the exception will deny access to certain devices */
return true;
Which is ok, since B is not getting more privileges than A, it doesn't
matter and the rule is accepted
Now, consider it's a device file open check and the process belongs to
cgroup B. The access will be generated as:
behavior: allow
exception: c 12:34 rw
The very same chunk of code will allow it, even if there's an explicit
exception telling to do otherwise.
A simple test case:
# mkdir new_group
# cd new_group
# echo $$ >tasks
# echo "c 1:3 w" >devices.deny
# echo >/dev/null
# echo $?
0
This is a serious bug and was introduced on
c39a2a3018 devcg: prepare may_access() for hierarchy support
To solve this problem, the device file open function was split from the
new exception check.
Second problem is how exceptions are processed by may_access(). The
first part of the said function tries to match fully with an existing
exception:
list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &dev_cgroup->exceptions, list) {
if ((refex->type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK))
continue;
if ((refex->type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR))
continue;
if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != refex->major)
continue;
if (ex->minor != ~0 && ex->minor != refex->minor)
continue;
if (refex->access & (~ex->access))
continue;
match = true;
break;
}
That means the new exception should be contained into an existing one to
be considered a match:
New exception Existing match? notes
b 12:34 rwm b 12:34 rwm yes
b 12:34 r b *:34 rw yes
b 12:34 rw b 12:34 w no extra "r"
b *:34 rw b 12:34 rw no too broad "*"
b *:34 rw b *:34 rwm yes
Which is fine in some cases. Consider:
A (default behavior: deny, exceptions allow access)
\
B (default behavior: deny, exceptions allow access)
In this case the full match makes sense, the new exception cannot add
more access than the parent allows
But this doesn't always work, consider:
A (default behavior: allow, exceptions disallow access)
\
B (default behavior: deny, exceptions allow access)
In this case, a new exception in B shouldn't match any of the exceptions
in A, after all you can't allow something that was forbidden by A. But
consider this scenario:
New exception Existing in A match? outcome
b 12:34 rw b 12:34 r no exception is accepted
Because the new exception has "w" as extra, it doesn't match, so it'll
be added to B's exception list.
The same problem can happen during a file access check. Consider a
cgroup with allow as default behavior:
Access Exception match?
b 12:34 rw b 12:34 r no
In this case, the access didn't match any of the exceptions in the
cgroup, which is required since exceptions will disallow access.
To solve this problem, two new functions were created to match an
exception either fully or partially. In the example above, a partial
check will be performed and it'll produce a match since at least
"b 12:34 r" from "b 12:34 rw" access matches.
Cc: cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
This typedef is unnecessary and should just be removed.
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Pull vfs updates from Al Viro:
"The first vfs pile, with deep apologies for being very late in this
window.
Assorted cleanups and fixes, plus a large preparatory part of iov_iter
work. There's a lot more of that, but it'll probably go into the next
merge window - it *does* shape up nicely, removes a lot of
boilerplate, gets rid of locking inconsistencie between aio_write and
splice_write and I hope to get Kent's direct-io rewrite merged into
the same queue, but some of the stuff after this point is having
(mostly trivial) conflicts with the things already merged into
mainline and with some I want more testing.
This one passes LTP and xfstests without regressions, in addition to
usual beating. BTW, readahead02 in ltp syscalls testsuite has started
giving failures since "mm/readahead.c: fix readahead failure for
memoryless NUMA nodes and limit readahead pages" - might be a false
positive, might be a real regression..."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (63 commits)
missing bits of "splice: fix racy pipe->buffers uses"
cifs: fix the race in cifs_writev()
ceph_sync_{,direct_}write: fix an oops on ceph_osdc_new_request() failure
kill generic_file_buffered_write()
ocfs2_file_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
ceph_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
xfs_file_buffered_aio_write(): switch to generic_perform_write()
export generic_perform_write(), start getting rid of generic_file_buffer_write()
generic_file_direct_write(): get rid of ppos argument
btrfs_file_aio_write(): get rid of ppos
kill the 5th argument of generic_file_buffered_write()
kill the 4th argument of __generic_file_aio_write()
lustre: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
ocfs2: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
drbd: don't open-code kernel_recvmsg()
constify blk_rq_map_user_iov() and friends
lustre: switch to kernel_sendmsg()
ocfs2: don't open-code kernel_sendmsg()
take iov_iter stuff to mm/iov_iter.c
process_vm_access: tidy up a bit
...
Pull audit updates from Eric Paris.
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (28 commits)
AUDIT: make audit_is_compat depend on CONFIG_AUDIT_COMPAT_GENERIC
audit: renumber AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE into the 1300 range
audit: do not cast audit_rule_data pointers pointlesly
AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespaces
audit: define audit_is_compat in kernel internal header
kernel: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in audit.c
sched: declare pid_alive as inline
audit: use uapi/linux/audit.h for AUDIT_ARCH declarations
syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments
audit: remove stray newline from audit_log_execve_info() audit_panic() call
audit: remove stray newlines from audit_log_lost messages
audit: include subject in login records
audit: remove superfluous new- prefix in AUDIT_LOGIN messages
audit: allow user processes to log from another PID namespace
audit: anchor all pid references in the initial pid namespace
audit: convert PPIDs to the inital PID namespace.
pid: get pid_t ppid of task in init_pid_ns
audit: rename the misleading audit_get_context() to audit_take_context()
audit: Add generic compat syscall support
audit: Add CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
...
Smack IPC policy requires that the sender have write access
to the receiver. UDS streams don't do per-packet checks. The
only check is done at connect time. The existing code checks
if the connecting process can write to the other, but not the
other way around. This change adds a check that the other end
can write to the connecting process.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schuafler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Sam Henderson points out that removing the SMACK64TRANSMUTE
attribute from a directory does not result in the directory
transmuting. This is because the inode flag indicating that
the directory is transmuting isn't cleared. The fix is a tad
less than trivial because smk_task and smk_mmap should have
been broken out, too.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The function `smack_inode_post_setxattr` is called each
time that a setxattr is done, for any value of name.
The kernel allow to put value==NULL when size==0
to set an empty attribute value. The systematic
call to smk_import_entry was causing the dereference
of a NULL pointer hence a KERNEL PANIC!
The problem can be produced easily by issuing the
command `setfattr -n user.data file` under bash prompt
when SMACK is active.
Moving the call to smk_import_entry as proposed by this
patch is correcting the behaviour because the function
smack_inode_post_setxattr is called for the SMACK's
attributes only if the function smack_inode_setxattr validated
the value and its size (what will not be the case when size==0).
It also has a benefical effect to not fill the smack hash
with garbage values coming from any extended attribute
write.
Change-Id: Iaf0039c2be9bccb6cee11c24a3b44d209101fe47
Signed-off-by: José Bollo <jose.bollo@open.eurogiciel.org>
1. In order to remove any SMACK extended attribute from a file, a user
should have CAP_MAC_ADMIN capability. But user without having this
capability is able to remove SMACK64MMAP security attribute.
2. While validating size and value of smack extended attribute in
smack_inode_setsecurity hook, wrong error code is returned.
Signed-off-by: Pankaj Kumar <pamkaj.k2@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Himanshu Shukla <himanshu.sh@samsung.com>
This allows to limit ptrace beyond the regular smack access rules.
It adds a smackfs/ptrace interface that allows smack to be configured
to require equal smack labels for PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH access.
See the changes in Documentation/security/Smack.txt below for details.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
The decision whether we can trace a process is made in the following
functions:
smack_ptrace_traceme()
smack_ptrace_access_check()
smack_bprm_set_creds() (in case the proces is traced)
This patch unifies all those decisions by introducing one function that
checks whether ptrace is allowed: smk_ptrace_rule_check().
This makes possible to actually trace with TRACEME where first the
TRACEME itself must be allowed and then exec() on a traced process.
Additional bugs fixed:
- The decision is made according to the mode parameter that is now correctly
translated from PTRACE_MODE_* to MAY_* instead of being treated 1:1.
PTRACE_MODE_READ requires MAY_READ.
PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH requires MAY_READWRITE.
- Add a smack audit log in case of exec() refused by bprm_set_creds().
- Honor the PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT flag and don't put smack audit info
in case this flag is set.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
The order of subject/object is currently reversed in
smack_ptrace_traceme(). It is currently checked if the tracee has a
capability to trace tracer and according to this rule a decision is made
whether the tracer will be allowed to trace tracee.
Signed-off-by: Lukasz Pawelczyk <l.pawelczyk@partner.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafal Krypa <r.krypa@samsung.com>
Pull file locking updates from Jeff Layton:
"Highlights:
- maintainership change for fs/locks.c. Willy's not interested in
maintaining it these days, and is OK with Bruce and I taking it.
- fix for open vs setlease race that Al ID'ed
- cleanup and consolidation of file locking code
- eliminate unneeded BUG() call
- merge of file-private lock implementation"
* 'locks-3.15' of git://git.samba.org/jlayton/linux:
locks: make locks_mandatory_area check for file-private locks
locks: fix locks_mandatory_locked to respect file-private locks
locks: require that flock->l_pid be set to 0 for file-private locks
locks: add new fcntl cmd values for handling file private locks
locks: skip deadlock detection on FL_FILE_PVT locks
locks: pass the cmd value to fcntl_getlk/getlk64
locks: report l_pid as -1 for FL_FILE_PVT locks
locks: make /proc/locks show IS_FILE_PVT locks as type "FLPVT"
locks: rename locks_remove_flock to locks_remove_file
locks: consolidate checks for compatible filp->f_mode values in setlk handlers
locks: fix posix lock range overflow handling
locks: eliminate BUG() call when there's an unexpected lock on file close
locks: add __acquires and __releases annotations to locks_start and locks_stop
locks: remove "inline" qualifier from fl_link manipulation functions
locks: clean up comment typo
locks: close potential race between setlease and open
MAINTAINERS: update entry for fs/locks.c
Pull renameat2 system call from Miklos Szeredi:
"This adds a new syscall, renameat2(), which is the same as renameat()
but with a flags argument.
The purpose of extending rename is to add cross-rename, a symmetric
variant of rename, which exchanges the two files. This allows
interesting things, which were not possible before, for example
atomically replacing a directory tree with a symlink, etc... This
also allows overlayfs and friends to operate on whiteouts atomically.
Andy Lutomirski also suggested a "noreplace" flag, which disables the
overwriting behavior of rename.
These two flags, RENAME_EXCHANGE and RENAME_NOREPLACE are only
implemented for ext4 as an example and for testing"
* 'cross-rename' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mszeredi/vfs:
ext4: add cross rename support
ext4: rename: split out helper functions
ext4: rename: move EMLINK check up
ext4: rename: create ext4_renament structure for local vars
vfs: add cross-rename
vfs: lock_two_nondirectories: allow directory args
security: add flags to rename hooks
vfs: add RENAME_NOREPLACE flag
vfs: add renameat2 syscall
vfs: rename: use common code for dir and non-dir
vfs: rename: move d_move() up
vfs: add d_is_dir()
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
"A lot updates for cgroup:
- The biggest one is cgroup's conversion to kernfs. cgroup took
after the long abandoned vfs-entangled sysfs implementation and
made it even more convoluted over time. cgroup's internal objects
were fused with vfs objects which also brought in vfs locking and
object lifetime rules. Naturally, there are places where vfs rules
don't fit and nasty hacks, such as credential switching or lock
dance interleaving inode mutex and cgroup_mutex with object serial
number comparison thrown in to decide whether the operation is
actually necessary, needed to be employed.
After conversion to kernfs, internal object lifetime and locking
rules are mostly isolated from vfs interactions allowing shedding
of several nasty hacks and overall simplification. This will also
allow implmentation of operations which may affect multiple cgroups
which weren't possible before as it would have required nesting
i_mutexes.
- Various simplifications including dropping of module support,
easier cgroup name/path handling, simplified cgroup file type
handling and task_cg_lists optimization.
- Prepatory changes for the planned unified hierarchy, which is still
a patchset away from being actually operational. The dummy
hierarchy is updated to serve as the default unified hierarchy.
Controllers which aren't claimed by other hierarchies are
associated with it, which BTW was what the dummy hierarchy was for
anyway.
- Various fixes from Li and others. This pull request includes some
patches to add missing slab.h to various subsystems. This was
triggered xattr.h include removal from cgroup.h. cgroup.h
indirectly got included a lot of files which brought in xattr.h
which brought in slab.h.
There are several merge commits - one to pull in kernfs updates
necessary for converting cgroup (already in upstream through
driver-core), others for interfering changes in the fixes branch"
* 'for-3.15' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (74 commits)
cgroup: remove useless argument from cgroup_exit()
cgroup: fix spurious lockdep warning in cgroup_exit()
cgroup: Use RCU_INIT_POINTER(x, NULL) in cgroup.c
cgroup: break kernfs active_ref protection in cgroup directory operations
cgroup: fix cgroup_taskset walking order
cgroup: implement CFTYPE_ONLY_ON_DFL
cgroup: make cgrp_dfl_root mountable
cgroup: drop const from @buffer of cftype->write_string()
cgroup: rename cgroup_dummy_root and related names
cgroup: move ->subsys_mask from cgroupfs_root to cgroup
cgroup: treat cgroup_dummy_root as an equivalent hierarchy during rebinding
cgroup: remove NULL checks from [pr_cont_]cgroup_{name|path}()
cgroup: use cgroup_setup_root() to initialize cgroup_dummy_root
cgroup: reorganize cgroup bootstrapping
cgroup: relocate setting of CGRP_DEAD
cpuset: use rcu_read_lock() to protect task_cs()
cgroup_freezer: document freezer_fork() subtleties
cgroup: update cgroup_transfer_tasks() to either succeed or fail
cgroup: drop task_lock() protection around task->cgroups
cgroup: update how a newly forked task gets associated with css_set
...
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"Apart from reordering the SELinux mmap code to ensure DAC is called
before MAC, these are minor maintenance updates"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (23 commits)
selinux: correctly label /proc inodes in use before the policy is loaded
selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls
selinux: fix the output of ./scripts/get_maintainer.pl for SELinux
evm: enable key retention service automatically
ima: skip memory allocation for empty files
evm: EVM does not use MD5
ima: return d_name.name if d_path fails
integrity: fix checkpatch errors
ima: fix erroneous removal of security.ima xattr
security: integrity: Use a more current logging style
MAINTAINERS: email updates and other misc. changes
ima: reduce memory usage when a template containing the n field is used
ima: restore the original behavior for sending data with ima template
Integrity: Pass commname via get_task_comm()
fs: move i_readcount
ima: use static const char array definitions
security: have cap_dentry_init_security return error
ima: new helper: file_inode(file)
kernel: Mark function as static in kernel/seccomp.c
capability: Use current logging styles
...
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Here is my initial pull request for the networking subsystem during
this merge window:
1) Support for ESN in AH (RFC 4302) from Fan Du.
2) Add full kernel doc for ethtool command structures, from Ben
Hutchings.
3) Add BCM7xxx PHY driver, from Florian Fainelli.
4) Export computed TCP rate information in netlink socket dumps, from
Eric Dumazet.
5) Allow IPSEC SA to be dumped partially using a filter, from Nicolas
Dichtel.
6) Convert many drivers to pci_enable_msix_range(), from Alexander
Gordeev.
7) Record SKB timestamps more efficiently, from Eric Dumazet.
8) Switch to microsecond resolution for TCP round trip times, also
from Eric Dumazet.
9) Clean up and fix 6lowpan fragmentation handling by making use of
the existing inet_frag api for it's implementation.
10) Add TX grant mapping to xen-netback driver, from Zoltan Kiss.
11) Auto size SKB lengths when composing netlink messages based upon
past message sizes used, from Eric Dumazet.
12) qdisc dumps can take a long time, add a cond_resched(), From Eric
Dumazet.
13) Sanitize netpoll core and drivers wrt. SKB handling semantics.
Get rid of never-used-in-tree netpoll RX handling. From Eric W
Biederman.
14) Support inter-address-family and namespace changing in VTI tunnel
driver(s). From Steffen Klassert.
15) Add Altera TSE driver, from Vince Bridgers.
16) Optimizing csum_replace2() so that it doesn't adjust the checksum
by checksumming the entire header, from Eric Dumazet.
17) Expand BPF internal implementation for faster interpreting, more
direct translations into JIT'd code, and much cleaner uses of BPF
filtering in non-socket ocntexts. From Daniel Borkmann and Alexei
Starovoitov"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1976 commits)
netpoll: Use skb_irq_freeable to make zap_completion_queue safe.
net: Add a test to see if a skb is freeable in irq context
qlcnic: Fix build failure due to undefined reference to `vxlan_get_rx_port'
net: ptp: move PTP classifier in its own file
net: sxgbe: make "core_ops" static
net: sxgbe: fix logical vs bitwise operation
net: sxgbe: sxgbe_mdio_register() frees the bus
Call efx_set_channels() before efx->type->dimension_resources()
xen-netback: disable rogue vif in kthread context
net/mlx4: Set proper build dependancy with vxlan
be2net: fix build dependency on VxLAN
mac802154: make csma/cca parameters per-wpan
mac802154: allow only one WPAN to be up at any given time
net: filter: minor: fix kdoc in __sk_run_filter
netlink: don't compare the nul-termination in nla_strcmp
can: c_can: Avoid led toggling for every packet.
can: c_can: Simplify TX interrupt cleanup
can: c_can: Store dlc private
can: c_can: Reduce register access
can: c_can: Make the code readable
...
If flags contain RENAME_EXCHANGE then exchange source and destination files.
There's no restriction on the type of the files; e.g. a directory can be
exchanged with a symlink.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Add flags to security_path_rename() and security_inode_rename() hooks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Pull s390 compat wrapper rework from Heiko Carstens:
"S390 compat system call wrapper simplification work.
The intention of this work is to get rid of all hand written assembly
compat system call wrappers on s390, which perform proper sign or zero
extension, or pointer conversion of compat system call parameters.
Instead all of this should be done with C code eg by using Al's
COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() macro.
Therefore all common code and s390 specific compat system calls have
been converted to the COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINEx() macro.
In order to generate correct code all compat system calls may only
have eg compat_ulong_t parameters, but no unsigned long parameters.
Those patches which change parameter types from unsigned long to
compat_ulong_t parameters are separate in this series, but shouldn't
cause any harm.
The only compat system calls which intentionally have 64 bit
parameters (preadv64 and pwritev64) in support of the x86/32 ABI
haven't been changed, but are now only available if an architecture
defines __ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_SYS_PREADV64/PWRITEV64.
System calls which do not have a compat variant but still need proper
zero extension on s390, like eg "long sys_brk(unsigned long brk)" will
get a proper wrapper function with the new s390 specific
COMPAT_SYSCALL_WRAPx() macro:
COMPAT_SYSCALL_WRAP1(brk, unsigned long, brk);
which generates the following code (simplified):
asmlinkage long sys_brk(unsigned long brk);
asmlinkage long compat_sys_brk(long brk)
{
return sys_brk((u32)brk);
}
Given that the C file which contains all the COMPAT_SYSCALL_WRAP lines
includes both linux/syscall.h and linux/compat.h, it will generate
build errors, if the declaration of sys_brk() doesn't match, or if
there exists a non-matching compat_sys_brk() declaration.
In addition this will intentionally result in a link error if
somewhere else a compat_sys_brk() function exists, which probably
should have been used instead. Two more BUILD_BUG_ONs make sure the
size and type of each compat syscall parameter can be handled
correctly with the s390 specific macros.
I converted the compat system calls step by step to verify the
generated code is correct and matches the previous code. In fact it
did not always match, however that was always a bug in the hand
written asm code.
In result we get less code, less bugs, and much more sanity checking"
* 'compat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux: (44 commits)
s390/compat: add copyright statement
compat: include linux/unistd.h within linux/compat.h
s390/compat: get rid of compat wrapper assembly code
s390/compat: build error for large compat syscall args
mm/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE with changing parameter types
kexec/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE with changing parameter types
net/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE with changing parameter types
ipc/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE with changing parameter types
fs/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE with changing parameter types
ipc/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
fs/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
security/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
mm/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
net/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
kernel/compat: convert to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE
fs/compat: optional preadv64/pwrite64 compat system calls
ipc/compat_sys_msgrcv: change msgtyp type from long to compat_long_t
s390/compat: partial parameter conversion within syscall wrappers
s390/compat: automatic zero, sign and pointer conversion of syscalls
s390/compat: add sync_file_range and fallocate compat syscalls
...
Due to some unfortunate history, POSIX locks have very strange and
unhelpful semantics. The thing that usually catches people by surprise
is that they are dropped whenever the process closes any file descriptor
associated with the inode.
This is extremely problematic for people developing file servers that
need to implement byte-range locks. Developers often need a "lock
management" facility to ensure that file descriptors are not closed
until all of the locks associated with the inode are finished.
Additionally, "classic" POSIX locks are owned by the process. Locks
taken between threads within the same process won't conflict with one
another, which renders them useless for synchronization between threads.
This patchset adds a new type of lock that attempts to address these
issues. These locks conflict with classic POSIX read/write locks, but
have semantics that are more like BSD locks with respect to inheritance
and behavior on close.
This is implemented primarily by changing how fl_owner field is set for
these locks. Instead of having them owned by the files_struct of the
process, they are instead owned by the filp on which they were acquired.
Thus, they are inherited across fork() and are only released when the
last reference to a filp is put.
These new semantics prevent them from being merged with classic POSIX
locks, even if they are acquired by the same process. These locks will
also conflict with classic POSIX locks even if they are acquired by
the same process or on the same file descriptor.
The new locks are managed using a new set of cmd values to the fcntl()
syscall. The initial implementation of this converts these values to
"classic" cmd values at a fairly high level, and the details are not
exposed to the underlying filesystem. We may eventually want to push
this handing out to the lower filesystem code but for now I don't
see any need for it.
Also, note that with this implementation the new cmd values are only
available via fcntl64() on 32-bit arches. There's little need to
add support for legacy apps on a new interface like this.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Conflicts:
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ks8851.txt
net/core/netpoll.c
The net/core/netpoll.c conflict is a bug fix in 'net' happening
to code which is completely removed in 'net-next'.
In micrel-ks8851.txt we simply have overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Store and log all PIDs with reference to the initial PID namespace and
use the access functions task_pid_nr() and task_tgid_nr() for task->pid
and task->tgid.
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
(informed by ebiederman's c776b5d2)
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:
"If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy
load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes
in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (opt_dentry) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
isec->sclass,
&sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
isec->sid = sid;
}
}
Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look
for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the
inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."
On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
Example:
# cat mmap_test.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int rc;
void *mem;
mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
return errno;
printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
munmap(mem, 4096);
return 0;
}
# gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
# ./mmap_test
mem = (nil)
# ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero }
for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=memprotect
This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
cftype->write_string() just passes on the writeable buffer from kernfs
and there's no reason to add const restriction on the buffer. The
only thing const achieves is unnecessarily complicating parsing of the
buffer. Drop const from @buffer.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Steffen Klassert says:
====================
1) Fix a sleep in atomic when pfkey_sadb2xfrm_user_sec_ctx()
is called from pfkey_compile_policy().
Fix from Nikolay Aleksandrov.
2) security_xfrm_policy_alloc() can be called in process and atomic
context. Add an argument to let the callers choose the appropriate
way. Fix from Nikolay Aleksandrov.
====================
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/usb/r8152.c
drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c
Both the r8152 and netback conflicts were simple overlapping
changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
For any keyring access type SMACK always used MAY_READWRITE access check.
It prevents reading the key with label "_", which should be allowed for anyone.
This patch changes default access check to MAY_READ and use MAY_READWRITE in only
appropriate cases.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h as the perm
parameter of security_key_permission() is in terms of them - and not the
permissions mask flags used in key->perm.
Whilst we're at it:
(1) Rename them to be KEY_NEED_xxx rather than KEY_xxx to avoid collisions
with symbols in uapi/linux/input.h.
(2) Don't use key_perm_t for a mask of required permissions, but rather limit
it to the permissions mask attached to the key and arguments related
directly to that.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
This fixes CVE-2014-0102.
The following command sequence produces an oops:
keyctl new_session
i=`keyctl newring _ses @s`
keyctl link @s $i
The problem is that search_nested_keyrings() sees two keyrings that have
matching type and description, so keyring_compare_object() returns true.
s_n_k() then passes the key to the iterator function -
keyring_detect_cycle_iterator() - which *should* check to see whether this is
the keyring of interest, not just one with the same name.
Because assoc_array_find() will return one and only one match, I assumed that
the iterator function would only see an exact match or never be called - but
the iterator isn't only called from assoc_array_find()...
The oops looks something like this:
kernel BUG at /data/fs/linux-2.6-fscache/security/keys/keyring.c:1003!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
...
RIP: keyring_detect_cycle_iterator+0xe/0x1f
...
Call Trace:
search_nested_keyrings+0x76/0x2aa
__key_link_check_live_key+0x50/0x5f
key_link+0x4e/0x85
keyctl_keyring_link+0x60/0x81
SyS_keyctl+0x65/0xe4
tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
The fix is to make keyring_detect_cycle_iterator() check that the key it
has is the key it was actually looking for rather than calling BUG_ON().
A testcase has been included in the keyutils testsuite for this:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/commit/?id=891f3365d07f1996778ade0e3428f01878a1790b
Reported-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
If keys are not enabled, EVM is not visible in the configuration menu.
It may be difficult to figure out what to do unless you really know.
Other subsystems as NFS, CIFS select keys automatically. This patch does
the same.
This patch also removes '(TRUSTED_KEYS=y || TRUSTED_KEYS=n)' dependency,
which is unnecessary. EVM does not depend on trusted keys, but on
encrypted keys. evm.h provides compile time dependency.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Memory allocation is unnecessary for empty files.
This patch calculates the hash without memory allocation.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
EVM does not use MD5 HMAC. Selection of CRYPTO_MD5 can be safely removed.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This is a small refactoring so ima_d_path() returns dentry name
if path reconstruction fails. It simplifies callers actions
and removes code duplication.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Between checkpatch changes (eg. sizeof) and inconsistencies between
Lindent and checkpatch, unfixed checkpatch errors make it difficult
to see new errors. This patch fixes them. Some lines with over 80 chars
remained unchanged to improve code readability.
The "extern" keyword is removed from internal evm.h to make it consistent
with internal ima.h.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
ima_inode_post_setattr() calls ima_must_appraise() to check if the
file needs to be appraised. If it does not then it removes security.ima
xattr. With original policy matching code it might happen that even
file needs to be appraised with FILE_CHECK hook, it might not be
for POST_SETATTR hook. 'security.ima' might be erronously removed.
This patch treats POST_SETATTR as special wildcard function and will
cause ima_must_appraise() to be true if any of the hooks rules matches.
security.ima will not be removed if any of the hooks would require
appraisal.
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
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Merge tag 'v3.13' into for-3.15
Linux 3.13
Conflicts:
include/net/xfrm.h
Simple merge where v3.13 removed 'extern' from definitions and the audit
tree did s/u32/unsigned int/ to the same definitions.
Before this change, to correctly calculate the template digest for the
'ima' template, the event name field (id: 'n') length was set to the fixed
size of 256 bytes.
This patch reduces the length of the event name field to the string
length incremented of one (to make room for the termination character '\0')
and handles the specific case of the digest calculation for the 'ima'
template directly in ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm().
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
With the new template mechanism introduced in IMA since kernel 3.13,
the format of data sent through the binary_runtime_measurements interface
is slightly changed. Now, for a generic measurement, the format of
template data (after the template name) is:
template_len | field1_len | field1 | ... | fieldN_len | fieldN
In addition, fields containing a string now include the '\0' termination
character.
Instead, the format for the 'ima' template should be:
SHA1 digest | event name length | event name
It must be noted that while in the IMA 3.13 code 'event name length' is
'IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1' (256 bytes), so that the template digest
is calculated correctly, and 'event name' contains '\0', in the pre 3.13
code 'event name length' is exactly the string length and 'event name'
does not contain the termination character.
The patch restores the behavior of the IMA code pre 3.13 for the 'ima'
template so that legacy userspace tools obtain a consistent behavior
when receiving data from the binary_runtime_measurements interface
regardless of which kernel version is used.
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.3.13: 3ce1217 ima: define template fields library
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
When we pass task->comm to audit_log_untrustedstring(), we need to pass it
via get_task_comm() because task->comm can be changed to contain untrusted
string by other threads after audit_log_untrustedstring() confirmed that
task->comm does not contain untrusted string.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
A const char pointer allocates memory for a pointer as well as for
a string, This patch replaces a number of the const char pointers
throughout IMA, with a static const char array.
Suggested-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Currently, cap_dentry_init_security returns 0 without actually
initializing the security label. This confuses its only caller
(nfs4_label_init_security) which expects an error in that situation, and
causes it to end up sending out junk onto the wire instead of simply
suppressing the label in the attributes sent.
When CONFIG_SECURITY is disabled, security_dentry_init_security returns
-EOPNOTSUPP. Have cap_dentry_init_security do the same.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Convert all compat system call functions where all parameter types
have a size of four or less than four bytes, or are pointer types
to COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE.
The implicit casts within COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE will perform proper
zero and sign extension to 64 bit of all parameters if needed.
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/recv.c
drivers/net/wireless/mwifiex/pcie.c
net/ipv6/sit.c
The SIT driver conflict consists of a bug fix being done by hand
in 'net' (missing u64_stats_init()) whilst in 'net-next' a helper
was created (netdev_alloc_pcpu_stats()) which takes care of this.
The two wireless conflicts were overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch is based on an earlier patch by Eric Paris, he describes
the problem below:
"If an inode is accessed before policy load it will get placed on a
list of inodes to be initialized after policy load. After policy
load we call inode_doinit() which calls inode_doinit_with_dentry()
on all inodes accessed before policy load. In the case of inodes
in procfs that means we'll end up at the bottom where it does:
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
if (opt_dentry) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(...)
rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(opt_dentry,
isec->sclass,
&sid);
if (rc)
goto out_unlock;
isec->sid = sid;
}
}
Since opt_dentry is null, we'll never call selinux_proc_get_sid()
and will leave the inode labeled with the label on the superblock.
I believe a fix would be to mimic the behavior of xattrs. Look
for an alias of the inode. If it can't be found, just leave the
inode uninitialized (and pick it up later) if it can be found, we
should be able to call selinux_proc_get_sid() ..."
On a system exhibiting this problem, you will notice a lot of files in
/proc with the generic "proc_t" type (at least the ones that were
accessed early in the boot), for example:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:proc_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
However, with this patch in place we see the expected result:
# ls -Z /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax | awk '{ print $4 " " $5 }'
system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t:s0 /proc/sys/kernel/shmmax
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the
DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches
as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the
memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by
the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
Example:
# cat mmap_test.c
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int rc;
void *mem;
mem = mmap(0x0, 4096,
PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0);
if (mem == MAP_FAILED)
return errno;
printf("mem = %p\n", mem);
munmap(mem, 4096);
return 0;
}
# gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c
# ./mmap_test
mem = (nil)
# ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero
type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero }
for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test"
scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
tclass=memprotect
This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a
user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as
the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
When writing policy via /sys/fs/selinux/policy I wrote the type and class
of filename trans rules in CPU endian instead of little endian. On
x86_64 this works just fine, but it means that on big endian arch's like
ppc64 and s390 userspace reads the policy and converts it from
le32_to_cpu. So the values are all screwed up. Write the values in le
format like it should have been to start.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The Makefiles in security/ uses a non-standard way to
specify sub-directories for building.
Fix it up so the normal (and documented) approach is used.
Signed-off-by: Sam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Inserting a entry into flowcache, or flushing flowcache should be based
on per net scope. The reason to do so is flushing operation from fat
netns crammed with flow entries will also making the slim netns with only
a few flow cache entries go away in original implementation.
Since flowcache is tightly coupled with IPsec, so it would be easier to
put flow cache global parameters into xfrm namespace part. And one last
thing needs to do is bumping flow cache genid, and flush flow cache should
also be made in per net style.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
cgroup_subsys is a bit messier than it needs to be.
* The name of a subsys can be different from its internal identifier
defined in cgroup_subsys.h. Most subsystems use the matching name
but three - cpu, memory and perf_event - use different ones.
* cgroup_subsys_id enums are postfixed with _subsys_id and each
cgroup_subsys is postfixed with _subsys. cgroup.h is widely
included throughout various subsystems, it doesn't and shouldn't
have claim on such generic names which don't have any qualifier
indicating that they belong to cgroup.
* cgroup_subsys->subsys_id should always equal the matching
cgroup_subsys_id enum; however, we require each controller to
initialize it and then BUG if they don't match, which is a bit
silly.
This patch cleans up cgroup_subsys names and initialization by doing
the followings.
* cgroup_subsys_id enums are now postfixed with _cgrp_id, and each
cgroup_subsys with _cgrp_subsys.
* With the above, renaming subsys identifiers to match the userland
visible names doesn't cause any naming conflicts. All non-matching
identifiers are renamed to match the official names.
cpu_cgroup -> cpu
mem_cgroup -> memory
perf -> perf_event
* controllers no longer need to initialize ->subsys_id and ->name.
They're generated in cgroup core and set automatically during boot.
* Redundant cgroup_subsys declarations removed.
* While updating BUG_ON()s in cgroup_init_early(), convert them to
WARN()s. BUGging that early during boot is stupid - the kernel
can't print anything, even through serial console and the trap
handler doesn't even link stack frame properly for back-tracing.
This patch doesn't introduce any behavior changes.
v2: Rebased on top of fe1217c4f3 ("net: net_cls: move cgroupfs
classid handling into core").
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Acked-by: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <aris@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
The usage of strict_strto*() is not preferred, because
strict_strto*() is obsolete. Thus, kstrto*() should be
used.
Signed-off-by: Jingoo Han <jg1.han@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Setting an empty security context (length=0) on a file will
lead to incorrectly dereferencing the type and other fields
of the security context structure, yielding a kernel BUG.
As a zero-length security context is never valid, just reject
all such security contexts whether coming from userspace
via setxattr or coming from the filesystem upon a getxattr
request by SELinux.
Setting a security context value (empty or otherwise) unknown to
SELinux in the first place is only possible for a root process
(CAP_MAC_ADMIN), and, if running SELinux in enforcing mode, only
if the corresponding SELinux mac_admin permission is also granted
to the domain by policy. In Fedora policies, this is only allowed for
specific domains such as livecd for setting down security contexts
that are not defined in the build host policy.
Reproducer:
su
setenforce 0
touch foo
setfattr -n security.selinux foo
Caveat:
Relabeling or removing foo after doing the above may not be possible
without booting with SELinux disabled. Any subsequent access to foo
after doing the above will also trigger the BUG.
BUG output from Matthew Thode:
[ 473.893141] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 473.962110] kernel BUG at security/selinux/ss/services.c:654!
[ 473.995314] invalid opcode: 0000 [#6] SMP
[ 474.027196] Modules linked in:
[ 474.058118] CPU: 0 PID: 8138 Comm: ls Tainted: G D I
3.13.0-grsec #1
[ 474.116637] Hardware name: Supermicro X8ST3/X8ST3, BIOS 2.0
07/29/10
[ 474.149768] task: ffff8805f50cd010 ti: ffff8805f50cd488 task.ti:
ffff8805f50cd488
[ 474.183707] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff814681c7>] [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 474.219954] RSP: 0018:ffff8805c0ac3c38 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 474.252253] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8805c0ac3d94 RCX:
0000000000000100
[ 474.287018] RDX: ffff8805e8aac000 RSI: 00000000ffffffff RDI:
ffff8805e8aaa000
[ 474.321199] RBP: ffff8805c0ac3cb8 R08: 0000000000000010 R09:
0000000000000006
[ 474.357446] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8805c567a000 R12:
0000000000000006
[ 474.419191] R13: ffff8805c2b74e88 R14: 00000000000001da R15:
0000000000000000
[ 474.453816] FS: 00007f2e75220800(0000) GS:ffff88061fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 474.489254] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 474.522215] CR2: 00007f2e74716090 CR3: 00000005c085e000 CR4:
00000000000207f0
[ 474.556058] Stack:
[ 474.584325] ffff8805c0ac3c98 ffffffff811b549b ffff8805c0ac3c98
ffff8805f1190a40
[ 474.618913] ffff8805a6202f08 ffff8805c2b74e88 00068800d0464990
ffff8805e8aac860
[ 474.653955] ffff8805c0ac3cb8 000700068113833a ffff880606c75060
ffff8805c0ac3d94
[ 474.690461] Call Trace:
[ 474.723779] [<ffffffff811b549b>] ? lookup_fast+0x1cd/0x22a
[ 474.778049] [<ffffffff81468824>] security_compute_av+0xf4/0x20b
[ 474.811398] [<ffffffff8196f419>] avc_compute_av+0x2a/0x179
[ 474.843813] [<ffffffff8145727b>] avc_has_perm+0x45/0xf4
[ 474.875694] [<ffffffff81457d0e>] inode_has_perm+0x2a/0x31
[ 474.907370] [<ffffffff81457e76>] selinux_inode_getattr+0x3c/0x3e
[ 474.938726] [<ffffffff81455cf6>] security_inode_getattr+0x1b/0x22
[ 474.970036] [<ffffffff811b057d>] vfs_getattr+0x19/0x2d
[ 475.000618] [<ffffffff811b05e5>] vfs_fstatat+0x54/0x91
[ 475.030402] [<ffffffff811b063b>] vfs_lstat+0x19/0x1b
[ 475.061097] [<ffffffff811b077e>] SyS_newlstat+0x15/0x30
[ 475.094595] [<ffffffff8113c5c1>] ? __audit_syscall_entry+0xa1/0xc3
[ 475.148405] [<ffffffff8197791e>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[ 475.179201] Code: 00 48 85 c0 48 89 45 b8 75 02 0f 0b 48 8b 45 a0 48
8b 3d 45 d0 b6 00 8b 40 08 89 c6 ff ce e8 d1 b0 06 00 48 85 c0 49 89 c7
75 02 <0f> 0b 48 8b 45 b8 4c 8b 28 eb 1e 49 8d 7d 08 be 80 01 00 00 e8
[ 475.255884] RIP [<ffffffff814681c7>]
context_struct_compute_av+0xce/0x308
[ 475.296120] RSP <ffff8805c0ac3c38>
[ 475.328734] ---[ end trace f076482e9d754adc ]---
Reported-by: Matthew Thode <mthode@mthode.org>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'v3.13' into stable-3.14
Linux 3.13
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Trivial merge issue in selinux_inet_conn_request() likely due to me
including patches that I sent to the stable folks in my next tree
resulting in the patch hitting twice (I think). Thankfully it was an
easy fix this time, but regardless, lesson learned, I will not do that
again.
Binaries compiled for arm may run on arm64 if CONFIG_COMPAT is
selected. Set LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR to 32768 if ARM64 && COMPAT to
prevent selinux failures launching 32-bit static executables that
are mapped at 0x8000.
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
Acked-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Pull audit update from Eric Paris:
"Again we stayed pretty well contained inside the audit system.
Venturing out was fixing a couple of function prototypes which were
inconsistent (didn't hurt anything, but we used the same value as an
int, uint, u32, and I think even a long in a couple of places).
We also made a couple of minor changes to when a couple of LSMs called
the audit system. We hoped to add aarch64 audit support this go
round, but it wasn't ready.
I'm disappearing on vacation on Thursday. I should have internet
access, but it'll be spotty. If anything goes wrong please be sure to
cc rgb@redhat.com. He'll make fixing things his top priority"
* git://git.infradead.org/users/eparis/audit: (50 commits)
audit: whitespace fix in kernel-parameters.txt
audit: fix location of __net_initdata for audit_net_ops
audit: remove pr_info for every network namespace
audit: Modify a set of system calls in audit class definitions
audit: Convert int limit uses to u32
audit: Use more current logging style
audit: Use hex_byte_pack_upper
audit: correct a type mismatch in audit_syscall_exit()
audit: reorder AUDIT_TTY_SET arguments
audit: rework AUDIT_TTY_SET to only grab spin_lock once
audit: remove needless switch in AUDIT_SET
audit: use define's for audit version
audit: documentation of audit= kernel parameter
audit: wait_for_auditd rework for readability
audit: update MAINTAINERS
audit: log task info on feature change
audit: fix incorrect set of audit_sock
audit: print error message when fail to create audit socket
audit: fix dangling keywords in audit_log_set_loginuid() output
audit: log on errors from filter user rules
...
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Merge tag 'v3.13' into next
Linux 3.13
Minor fixup needed in selinux_inet_conn_request()
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Pull cgroup updates from Tejun Heo:
"The bulk of changes are cleanups and preparations for the upcoming
kernfs conversion.
- cgroup_event mechanism which is and will be used only by memcg is
moved to memcg.
- pidlist handling is updated so that it can be served by seq_file.
Also, the list is not sorted if sane_behavior. cgroup
documentation explicitly states that the file is not sorted but it
has been for quite some time.
- All cgroup file handling now happens on top of seq_file. This is
to prepare for kernfs conversion. In addition, all operations are
restructured so that they map 1-1 to kernfs operations.
- Other cleanups and low-pri fixes"
* 'for-3.14' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/cgroup: (40 commits)
cgroup: trivial style updates
cgroup: remove stray references to css_id
doc: cgroups: Fix typo in doc/cgroups
cgroup: fix fail path in cgroup_load_subsys()
cgroup: fix missing unlock on error in cgroup_load_subsys()
cgroup: remove for_each_root_subsys()
cgroup: implement for_each_css()
cgroup: factor out cgroup_subsys_state creation into create_css()
cgroup: combine css handling loops in cgroup_create()
cgroup: reorder operations in cgroup_create()
cgroup: make for_each_subsys() useable under cgroup_root_mutex
cgroup: css iterations and css_from_dir() are safe under cgroup_mutex
cgroup: unify pidlist and other file handling
cgroup: replace cftype->read_seq_string() with cftype->seq_show()
cgroup: attach cgroup_open_file to all cgroup files
cgroup: generalize cgroup_pidlist_open_file
cgroup: unify read path so that seq_file is always used
cgroup: unify cgroup_write_X64() and cgroup_write_string()
cgroup: remove cftype->read(), ->read_map() and ->write()
hugetlb_cgroup: convert away from cftype->read()
...
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"Changes for this kernel include maintenance updates for Smack, SELinux
(and several networking fixes), IMA and TPM"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
tpm/tpm-sysfs: active_show() can be static
tpm: tpm_tis: Fix compile problems with CONFIG_PM_SLEEP/CONFIG_PNP
tpm: Make tpm-dev allocate a per-file structure
tpm: Use the ops structure instead of a copy in tpm_vendor_specific
tpm: Create a tpm_class_ops structure and use it in the drivers
tpm: Pull all driver sysfs code into tpm-sysfs.c
tpm: Move sysfs functions from tpm-interface to tpm-sysfs
tpm: Pull everything related to /dev/tpmX into tpm-dev.c
char: tpm: nuvoton: remove unused variable
tpm: MAINTAINERS: Cleanup TPM Maintainers file
tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel: fix coccinelle warnings
tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm: fix unreachable code warning (smatch warning)
tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Check return code of get_burstcount
tpm/tpm_ppi: Check return value of acpi_get_name
tpm/tpm_ppi: Do not compare strcmp(a,b) == -1
ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common()
ima: update IMA-templates.txt documentation
ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init()
ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init()
...
Remove the call to audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with
the errors in the caller, logging only once if the condition is met. Calling
audit_log_start() in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more
complicated in the calling tree (audit_filter_user()).
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Two of the conditions in selinux_audit_rule_match() should never happen and
the third indicates a race that should be retried. Remove the calls to
audit_log() (which call audit_log_start()) and deal with the errors in the
caller, logging only once if the condition is met. Calling audit_log_start()
in this location makes buffer allocation and locking more complicated in the
calling tree (audit_filter_user()).
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
Call Trace:
security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
__inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
inode_permission+0x18/0x50
link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
CR2: 0000000000000020
Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.
in selinux_inode_permission():
isec = inode->i_security;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not
sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.
What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().
The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).
Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Hello.
I got below leak with linux-3.10.0-54.0.1.el7.x86_64 .
[ 681.903890] kmemleak: 5538 new suspected memory leaks (see /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak)
Below is a patch, but I don't know whether we need special handing for undoing
ebitmap_set_bit() call.
----------
>>From fe97527a90fe95e2239dfbaa7558f0ed559c0992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Date: Mon, 6 Jan 2014 16:30:21 +0900
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
Commit 2463c26d "SELinux: put name based create rules in a hashtable" did not
check return value from hashtab_insert() in filename_trans_read(). It leaks
memory if hashtab_insert() returns error.
unreferenced object 0xffff88005c9160d0 (size 8):
comm "systemd", pid 1, jiffies 4294688674 (age 235.265s)
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
57 0b 00 00 6b 6b 6b a5 W...kkk.
backtrace:
[<ffffffff816604ae>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
[<ffffffff811cba5e>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x12e/0x360
[<ffffffff812aec5d>] policydb_read+0xd1d/0xf70
[<ffffffff812b345c>] security_load_policy+0x6c/0x500
[<ffffffff812a623c>] sel_write_load+0xac/0x750
[<ffffffff811eb680>] vfs_write+0xc0/0x1f0
[<ffffffff811ec08c>] SyS_write+0x4c/0xa0
[<ffffffff81690419>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
[<ffffffffffffffff>] 0xffffffffffffffff
However, we should not return EEXIST error to the caller, or the systemd will
show below message and the boot sequence freezes.
systemd[1]: Failed to load SELinux policy. Freezing.
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This patch removes the 'size_limit' argument from
ima_eventdigest_init_common(). Since the 'd' field will never include
the hash algorithm as prefix and the 'd-ng' will always have it, we can
use the hash algorithm to differentiate the two cases in the modified
function (it is equal to HASH_ALGO__LAST in the first case, the opposite
in the second).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Replace the '-1' value with HASH_ALGO__LAST in ima_eventdigest_init()
as the called function ima_eventdigest_init_common() expects an unsigned
char.
Fix commit:
4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Replace HASH_ALGO__LAST with HASH_ALGO_SHA1 as the initial value of
the hash algorithm so that the prefix 'sha1:' is added to violation
digests.
Fix commit:
4d7aeee ima: define new template ima-ng and template fields d-ng and n-ng
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.13.x
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Eric Paris politely points out:
Inside smack_file_receive() it seems like you are initting the audit
field with LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK. And then use
smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path().
Seems like LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH would make more sense. (and depending
on how it's used fix a crash...)
He is correct. This puts things in order.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The mount restrictions imposed by Smack rely heavily on the
use of the filesystem "floor", which is the label that all
processes writing to the filesystem must have access to. It
turns out that while the "floor" notion is sound, it has yet
to be fully implemented and has never been used.
The sb_mount and sb_umount hooks only make sense if the
filesystem floor is used actively, and it isn't. They can
be reintroduced if a rational restriction comes up. Until
then, they get removed.
The sb_kern_mount hook is required for the option processing.
It is too permissive in the case of unprivileged mounts,
effectively bypassing the CAP_MAC_ADMIN restrictions if
any of the smack options are specified. Unprivileged mounts
are no longer allowed to set Smack filesystem options.
Additionally, the root and default values are set to the
label of the caller, in keeping with the policy that objects
get the label of their creator.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
smk_write_change_rule() is calling capable rather than
the more correct smack_privileged(). This allows for setting
rules in violation of the onlycap facility. This is the
simple repair.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
The syslog control requires that the calling proccess
have the floor ("_") Smack label. Tizen does not run any
processes except for kernel helpers with the floor label.
This changes allows the admin to configure a specific
label for syslog. The default value is the star ("*")
label, effectively removing the restriction. The value
can be set using smackfs/syslog for anyone who wants
a more restrictive behavior.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().
And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Smack prohibits processes from using the star ("*") and web ("@") labels
because we don't want files with those labels getting created implicitly.
All setting of those labels should be done explicitly. The trouble is that
there is no check for these labels in the processing of SMACK64EXEC. That
is repaired.
Targeted for git://git.gitorious.org/smack-next/kernel.git
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
selinux_setprocattr() does ptrace_parent(p) under task_lock(p),
but task_struct->alloc_lock doesn't pin ->parent or ->ptrace,
this looks confusing and triggers the "suspicious RCU usage"
warning because ptrace_parent() does rcu_dereference_check().
And in theory this is wrong, spin_lock()->preempt_disable()
doesn't necessarily imply rcu_read_lock() we need to access
the ->parent.
Reported-by: Evan McNabb <emcnabb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull SELinux fixes from James Morris.
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
selinux: process labeled IPsec TCP SYN-ACK packets properly in selinux_ip_postroute()
selinux: look for IPsec labels on both inbound and outbound packets
selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_postroute()
selinux: handle TCP SYN-ACK packets correctly in selinux_ip_output()
selinux: fix possible memory leak
This reverts commit 102aefdda4.
Tom London reports that it causes sync() to hang on Fedora rawhide:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1033965
and Josh Boyer bisected it down to this commit. Reverting the commit in
the rawhide kernel fixes the problem.
Eric Paris root-caused it to incorrect subtype matching in that commit
breaking fuse, and has a tentative patch, but by now we're better off
retrying this in 3.14 rather than playing with it any more.
Reported-by: Tom London <selinux@gmail.com>
Bisected-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Anand Avati <avati@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Revert "selinux: consider filesystem subtype in policies"
This reverts commit 102aefdda4.
Explanation from Eric Paris:
SELinux policy can specify if it should use a filesystem's
xattrs or not. In current policy we have a specification that
fuse should not use xattrs but fuse.glusterfs should use
xattrs. This patch has a bug in which non-glusterfs
filesystems would match the rule saying fuse.glusterfs should
use xattrs. If both fuse and the particular filesystem in
question are not written to handle xattr calls during the mount
command, they will deadlock.
I have fixed the bug to do proper matching, however I believe a
revert is still the correct solution. The reason I believe
that is because the code still does not work. The s_subtype is
not set until after the SELinux hook which attempts to match on
the ".gluster" portion of the rule. So we cannot match on the
rule in question. The code is useless.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.
See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.
Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
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Merge tag 'keys-devel-20131210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull misc keyrings fixes from David Howells:
"These break down into five sets:
- A patch to error handling in the big_key type for huge payloads.
If the payload is larger than the "low limit" and the backing store
allocation fails, then big_key_instantiate() doesn't clear the
payload pointers in the key, assuming them to have been previously
cleared - but only one of them is.
Unfortunately, the garbage collector still calls big_key_destroy()
when sees one of the pointers with a weird value in it (and not
NULL) which it then tries to clean up.
- Three patches to fix the keyring type:
* A patch to fix the hash function to correctly divide keyrings off
from keys in the topology of the tree inside the associative
array. This is only a problem if searching through nested
keyrings - and only if the hash function incorrectly puts the a
keyring outside of the 0 branch of the root node.
* A patch to fix keyrings' use of the associative array. The
__key_link_begin() function initially passes a NULL key pointer
to assoc_array_insert() on the basis that it's holding a place in
the tree whilst it does more allocation and stuff.
This is only a problem when a node contains 16 keys that match at
that level and we want to add an also matching 17th. This should
easily be manufactured with a keyring full of keyrings (without
chucking any other sort of key into the mix) - except for (a)
above which makes it on average adding the 65th keyring.
* A patch to fix searching down through nested keyrings, where any
keyring in the set has more than 16 keyrings and none of the
first keyrings we look through has a match (before the tree
iteration needs to step to a more distal node).
Test in keyutils test suite:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/commit/?id=8b4ae963ed92523aea18dfbb8cab3f4979e13bd1
- A patch to fix the big_key type's use of a shmem file as its
backing store causing audit messages and LSM check failures. This
is done by setting S_PRIVATE on the file to avoid LSM checks on the
file (access to the shmem file goes through the keyctl() interface
and so is gated by the LSM that way).
This isn't normally a problem if a key is used by the context that
generated it - and it's currently only used by libkrb5.
Test in keyutils test suite:
http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/commit/?id=d9a53cbab42c293962f2f78f7190253fc73bd32e
- A patch to add a generated file to .gitignore.
- A patch to fix the alignment of the system certificate data such
that it it works on s390. As I understand it, on the S390 arch,
symbols must be 2-byte aligned because loading the address discards
the least-significant bit"
* tag 'keys-devel-20131210' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
KEYS: correct alignment of system_certificate_list content in assembly file
Ignore generated file kernel/x509_certificate_list
security: shmem: implement kernel private shmem inodes
KEYS: Fix searching of nested keyrings
KEYS: Fix multiple key add into associative array
KEYS: Fix the keyring hash function
KEYS: Pre-clear struct key on allocation
Fix a broken networking check. Return an error if peer recv fails. If
secmark is active and the packet recv succeeds the peer recv error is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Chad Hanson <chanson@trustedcs.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This is a regression caused by f7112e6c. When either subject or
object is not found the answer for access should be no. This
patch fixes the situation. '0' is written back instead of failing
with -EINVAL.
v2: cosmetic style fixes
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Due to difficulty in arriving at the proper security label for
TCP SYN-ACK packets in selinux_ip_postroute(), we need to check packets
while/before they are undergoing XFRM transforms instead of waiting
until afterwards so that we can determine the correct security label.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In preparation of conversion to kernfs, cgroup file handling is
updated so that it can be easily mapped to kernfs. This patch
replaces cftype->read_seq_string() with cftype->seq_show() which is
not limited to single_open() operation and will map directcly to
kernfs seq_file interface.
The conversions are mechanical. As ->seq_show() doesn't have @css and
@cft, the functions which make use of them are converted to use
seq_css() and seq_cft() respectively. In several occassions, e.f. if
it has seq_string in its name, the function name is updated to fit the
new method better.
This patch does not introduce any behavior changes.
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Aristeu Rozanski <arozansk@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Daniel Wagner <daniel.wagner@bmw-carit.de>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Cc: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
We don't need to inspect the packet to determine if the packet is an
IPv4 packet arriving on an IPv6 socket when we can query the
request_sock directly.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid() we leverage a cached NetLabel
secattr whenever possible. However, we never check to ensure that
the desired SID matches the cached NetLabel secattr. This patch
checks the SID against the secattr before use and only uses the
cached secattr when the SID values match.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_postroute() we perform access checks based on the
packet's security label. For locally generated traffic we get the
packet's security label from the associated socket; this works in all
cases except for TCP SYN-ACK packets. In the case of SYN-ACK packet's
the correct security label is stored in the connection's request_sock,
not the server's socket. Unfortunately, at the point in time when
selinux_ip_postroute() is called we can't query the request_sock
directly, we need to recreate the label using the same logic that
originally labeled the associated request_sock.
See the inline comments for more explanation.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
In selinux_ip_output() we always label packets based on the parent
socket. While this approach works in almost all cases, it doesn't
work in the case of TCP SYN-ACK packets when the correct label is not
the label of the parent socket, but rather the label of the larval
socket represented by the request_sock struct.
Unfortunately, since the request_sock isn't queued on the parent
socket until *after* the SYN-ACK packet is sent, we can't lookup the
request_sock to determine the correct label for the packet; at this
point in time the best we can do is simply pass/NF_ACCEPT the packet.
It must be said that simply passing the packet without any explicit
labeling action, while far from ideal, is not terrible as the SYN-ACK
packet will inherit any IP option based labeling from the initial
connection request so the label *should* be correct and all our
access controls remain in place so we shouldn't have to worry about
information leaks.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Tested-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
The new templates management mechanism records information associated
to an event into an array of 'ima_field_data' structures and makes it
available through the 'template_data' field of the 'ima_template_entry'
structure (the element of the measurements list created by IMA).
Since 'ima_field_data' contains dynamically allocated data (which length
varies depending on the data associated to a selected template field),
it is not enough to just free the memory reserved for a
'ima_template_entry' structure if something goes wrong.
This patch creates the new function ima_free_template_entry() which
walks the array of 'ima_field_data' structures, frees the memory
referenced by the 'data' pointer and finally the space reserved for
the 'ima_template_entry' structure. Further, it replaces existing kfree()
that have a pointer to an 'ima_template_entry' structure as argument
with calls to the new function.
Fixes: a71dc65: ima: switch to new template management mechanism
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
7bc5f447ce (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to
API) moved the initialization of 'entry' in ima_add_boot_aggregate() a
bit more below, after the if (ima_used_chip).
So, 'entry' is not initialized while being inside this if-block. So, we
should not attempt to free it.
Found by Coverity (CID: 1131971)
Fixes: 7bc5f447ce (ima: define new function ima_alloc_init_template() to API)
Signed-off-by: Christoph Paasch <christoph.paasch@uclouvain.be>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
We have a problem where the big_key key storage implementation uses a
shmem backed inode to hold the key contents. Because of this detail of
implementation LSM checks are being done between processes trying to
read the keys and the tmpfs backed inode. The LSM checks are already
being handled on the key interface level and should not be enforced at
the inode level (since the inode is an implementation detail, not a
part of the security model)
This patch implements a new function shmem_kernel_file_setup() which
returns the equivalent to shmem_file_setup() only the underlying inode
has S_PRIVATE set. This means that all LSM checks for the inode in
question are skipped. It should only be used for kernel internal
operations where the inode is not exposed to userspace without proper
LSM checking. It is possible that some other users of
shmem_file_setup() should use the new interface, but this has not been
explored.
Reproducing this bug is a little bit difficult. The steps I used on
Fedora are:
(1) Turn off selinux enforcing:
setenforce 0
(2) Create a huge key
k=`dd if=/dev/zero bs=8192 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key test-key @s`
(3) Access the key in another context:
runcon system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 keyctl print $k >/dev/null
(4) Examine the audit logs:
ausearch -m AVC -i --subject httpd_t | audit2allow
If the last command's output includes a line that looks like:
allow httpd_t user_tmpfs_t:file { open read };
There was an inode check between httpd and the tmpfs filesystem. With
this patch no such denial will be seen. (NOTE! you should clear your
audit log if you have tested for this previously)
(Please return you box to enforcing)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
If a keyring contains more than 16 keyrings (the capacity of a single node in
the associative array) then those keyrings are split over multiple nodes
arranged as a tree.
If search_nested_keyrings() is called to search the keyring then it will
attempt to manually walk over just the 0 branch of the associative array tree
where all the keyring links are stored. This works provided the key is found
before the algorithm steps from one node containing keyrings to a child node
or if there are sufficiently few keyring links that the keyrings are all in
one node.
However, if the algorithm does need to step from a node to a child node, it
doesn't change the node pointer unless a shortcut also gets transited. This
means that the algorithm will keep scanning the same node over and over again
without terminating and without returning.
To fix this, move the internal-pointer-to-node translation from inside the
shortcut transit handler so that it applies it to node arrival as well.
This can be tested by:
r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s`
for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done
for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a %:ring$i; done
for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done
for ((i=17; i<=20; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done
The searches should all complete successfully (or with an error for 17-20),
but instead one or more of them will hang.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
If sufficient keys (or keyrings) are added into a keyring such that a node in
the associative array's tree overflows (each node has a capacity N, currently
16) and such that all N+1 keys have the same index key segment for that level
of the tree (the level'th nibble of the index key), then assoc_array_insert()
calls ops->diff_objects() to indicate at which bit position the two index keys
vary.
However, __key_link_begin() passes a NULL object to assoc_array_insert() with
the intention of supplying the correct pointer later before we commit the
change. This means that keyring_diff_objects() is given a NULL pointer as one
of its arguments which it does not expect. This results in an oops like the
attached.
With the previous patch to fix the keyring hash function, this can be forced
much more easily by creating a keyring and only adding keyrings to it. Add any
other sort of key and a different insertion path is taken - all 16+1 objects
must want to cluster in the same node slot.
This can be tested by:
r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s`
for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done
This should work fine, but oopses when the 17th keyring is added.
Since ops->diff_objects() is always called with the first pointer pointing to
the object to be inserted (ie. the NULL pointer), we can fix the problem by
changing the to-be-inserted object pointer to point to the index key passed
into assoc_array_insert() instead.
Whilst we're at it, we also switch the arguments so that they are the same as
for ->compare_object().
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000088
IP: [<ffffffff81191ee4>] hash_key_type_and_desc+0x18/0xb0
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81191ee4>] hash_key_type_and_desc+0x18/0xb0
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81191f9d>] keyring_diff_objects+0x21/0xd2
[<ffffffff811f09ef>] assoc_array_insert+0x3b6/0x908
[<ffffffff811929a7>] __key_link_begin+0x78/0xe5
[<ffffffff81191a2e>] key_create_or_update+0x17d/0x36a
[<ffffffff81192e0a>] SyS_add_key+0x123/0x183
[<ffffffff81400ddb>] tracesys+0xdd/0xe2
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
The keyring hash function (used by the associative array) is supposed to clear
the bottommost nibble of the index key (where the hash value resides) for
keyrings and make sure it is non-zero for non-keyrings. This is done to make
keyrings cluster together on one branch of the tree separately to other keys.
Unfortunately, the wrong mask is used, so only the bottom two bits are
examined and cleared and not the whole bottom nibble. This means that keys
and keyrings can still be successfully searched for under most circumstances
as the hash is consistent in its miscalculation, but if a keyring's
associative array bottom node gets filled up then approx 75% of the keyrings
will not be put into the 0 branch.
The consequence of this is that a key in a keyring linked to by another
keyring, ie.
keyring A -> keyring B -> key
may not be found if the search starts at keyring A and then descends into
keyring B because search_nested_keyrings() only searches up the 0 branch (as it
"knows" all keyrings must be there and not elsewhere in the tree).
The fix is to use the right mask.
This can be tested with:
r=`keyctl newring sandbox @s`
for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl newring ring$i $r; done
for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl add user a$i a %:ring$i; done
for ((i=0; i<=16; i++)); do keyctl search $r user a$i; done
This creates a sandbox keyring, then creates 17 keyrings therein (labelled
ring0..ring16). This causes the root node of the sandbox's associative array
to overflow and for the tree to have extra nodes inserted.
Each keyring then is given a user key (labelled aN for ringN) for us to search
for.
We then search for the user keys we added, starting from the sandbox. If
working correctly, it should return the same ordered list of key IDs as
for...keyctl add... did. Without this patch, it reports ENOKEY "Required key
not available" for some of the keys. Just which keys get this depends as the
kernel pointer to the key type forms part of the hash function.
Reported-by: Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
The second word of key->payload does not get initialised in key_alloc(), but
the big_key type is relying on it having been cleared. The problem comes when
big_key fails to instantiate a large key and doesn't then set the payload. The
big_key_destroy() op is called from the garbage collector and this assumes that
the dentry pointer stored in the second word will be NULL if instantiation did
not complete.
Therefore just pre-clear the entire struct key on allocation rather than trying
to be clever and only initialising to 0 only those bits that aren't otherwise
initialised.
The lack of initialisation can lead to a bug report like the following if
big_key failed to initialise its file:
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in: ...
CPU: 0 PID: 51 Comm: kworker/0:1 Not tainted 3.10.0-53.el7.x86_64 #1
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge 1955/0HC513, BIOS 1.4.4 12/09/2008
Workqueue: events key_garbage_collector
task: ffff8801294f5680 ti: ffff8801296e2000 task.ti: ffff8801296e2000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811b4a51>] dput+0x21/0x2d0
...
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff811a7b06>] path_put+0x16/0x30
[<ffffffff81235604>] big_key_destroy+0x44/0x60
[<ffffffff8122dc4b>] key_gc_unused_keys.constprop.2+0x5b/0xe0
[<ffffffff8122df2f>] key_garbage_collector+0x1df/0x3c0
[<ffffffff8107759b>] process_one_work+0x17b/0x460
[<ffffffff8107834b>] worker_thread+0x11b/0x400
[<ffffffff81078230>] ? rescuer_thread+0x3e0/0x3e0
[<ffffffff8107eb00>] kthread+0xc0/0xd0
[<ffffffff8107ea40>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x110/0x110
[<ffffffff815c4bec>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[<ffffffff8107ea40>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x110/0x110
Reported-by: Patrik Kis <pkis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Gallagher <sgallagh@redhat.com>
This patch stores the address of the 'template_fmt_copy' variable in a new
variable, called 'template_fmt_ptr', so that the latter is passed as an
argument of strsep() instead of the former. This modification is needed
in order to correctly free the memory area referenced by
'template_fmt_copy' (strsep() modifies the pointer of the passed string).
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Reported-by: Sebastian Ott <sebott@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Free 'ctx_str' when necessary.
Signed-off-by: Geyslan G. Bem <geyslan@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This patch defines a new value for the 'ima_show_type' enumerator
(IMA_SHOW_BINARY_NO_FIELD_LEN) to prevent that the field length
is transmitted through the 'binary_runtime_measurements' interface
for the digest field of the 'ima' template.
Fixes commit: 3ce1217 ima: define template fields library and new helpers
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To maintain compatibility with userspace tools, the field length must not
be included in the template digest calculation for the 'ima' template.
Fixes commit: a71dc65 ima: switch to new template management mechanism
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@polito.it>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
This reverts commit 217091dd7a, which
caused the following build error:
security/integrity/digsig.c:70:5: error: redefinition of ‘integrity_init_keyring’
security/integrity/integrity.h:149:12: note: previous definition of ‘integrity_init_keyring’ w
security/integrity/integrity.h:149:12: warning: ‘integrity_init_keyring’ defined but not used
reported by Krzysztof Kolasa. Mimi says:
"I made the classic mistake of requesting this patch to be upstreamed
at the last second, rather than waiting until the next open window.
At this point, the best course would probably be to revert the two
commits and fix them for the next open window"
Reported-by: Krzysztof Kolasa <kkolasa@winsoft.pl>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, we finally get an SELinux update, with Paul Moore
taking over as maintainer of that code.
Also a significant update for the Keys subsystem, as well as
maintenance updates to Smack, IMA, TPM, and Apparmor"
and since I wanted to know more about the updates to key handling,
here's the explanation from David Howells on that:
"Okay. There are a number of separate bits. I'll go over the big bits
and the odd important other bit, most of the smaller bits are just
fixes and cleanups. If you want the small bits accounting for, I can
do that too.
(1) Keyring capacity expansion.
KEYS: Consolidate the concept of an 'index key' for key access
KEYS: Introduce a search context structure
KEYS: Search for auth-key by name rather than target key ID
Add a generic associative array implementation.
KEYS: Expand the capacity of a keyring
Several of the patches are providing an expansion of the capacity of a
keyring. Currently, the maximum size of a keyring payload is one page.
Subtract a small header and then divide up into pointers, that only gives
you ~500 pointers on an x86_64 box. However, since the NFS idmapper uses
a keyring to store ID mapping data, that has proven to be insufficient to
the cause.
Whatever data structure I use to handle the keyring payload, it can only
store pointers to keys, not the keys themselves because several keyrings
may point to a single key. This precludes inserting, say, and rb_node
struct into the key struct for this purpose.
I could make an rbtree of records such that each record has an rb_node
and a key pointer, but that would use four words of space per key stored
in the keyring. It would, however, be able to use much existing code.
I selected instead a non-rebalancing radix-tree type approach as that
could have a better space-used/key-pointer ratio. I could have used the
radix tree implementation that we already have and insert keys into it by
their serial numbers, but that means any sort of search must iterate over
the whole radix tree. Further, its nodes are a bit on the capacious side
for what I want - especially given that key serial numbers are randomly
allocated, thus leaving a lot of empty space in the tree.
So what I have is an associative array that internally is a radix-tree
with 16 pointers per node where the index key is constructed from the key
type pointer and the key description. This means that an exact lookup by
type+description is very fast as this tells us how to navigate directly to
the target key.
I made the data structure general in lib/assoc_array.c as far as it is
concerned, its index key is just a sequence of bits that leads to a
pointer. It's possible that someone else will be able to make use of it
also. FS-Cache might, for example.
(2) Mark keys as 'trusted' and keyrings as 'trusted only'.
KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key
KEYS: Make the system 'trusted' keyring viewable by userspace
KEYS: Add a 'trusted' flag and a 'trusted only' flag
KEYS: Separate the kernel signature checking keyring from module signing
These patches allow keys carrying asymmetric public keys to be marked as
being 'trusted' and allow keyrings to be marked as only permitting the
addition or linkage of trusted keys.
Keys loaded from hardware during kernel boot or compiled into the kernel
during build are marked as being trusted automatically. New keys can be
loaded at runtime with add_key(). They are checked against the system
keyring contents and if their signatures can be validated with keys that
are already marked trusted, then they are marked trusted also and can
thus be added into the master keyring.
Patches from Mimi Zohar make this usable with the IMA keyrings also.
(3) Remove the date checks on the key used to validate a module signature.
X.509: Remove certificate date checks
It's not reasonable to reject a signature just because the key that it was
generated with is no longer valid datewise - especially if the kernel
hasn't yet managed to set the system clock when the first module is
loaded - so just remove those checks.
(4) Make it simpler to deal with additional X.509 being loaded into the kernel.
KEYS: Load *.x509 files into kernel keyring
KEYS: Have make canonicalise the paths of the X.509 certs better to deduplicate
The builder of the kernel now just places files with the extension ".x509"
into the kernel source or build trees and they're concatenated by the
kernel build and stuffed into the appropriate section.
(5) Add support for userspace kerberos to use keyrings.
KEYS: Add per-user_namespace registers for persistent per-UID kerberos caches
KEYS: Implement a big key type that can save to tmpfs
Fedora went to, by default, storing kerberos tickets and tokens in tmpfs.
We looked at storing it in keyrings instead as that confers certain
advantages such as tickets being automatically deleted after a certain
amount of time and the ability for the kernel to get at these tokens more
easily.
To make this work, two things were needed:
(a) A way for the tickets to persist beyond the lifetime of all a user's
sessions so that cron-driven processes can still use them.
The problem is that a user's session keyrings are deleted when the
session that spawned them logs out and the user's user keyring is
deleted when the UID is deleted (typically when the last log out
happens), so neither of these places is suitable.
I've added a system keyring into which a 'persistent' keyring is
created for each UID on request. Each time a user requests their
persistent keyring, the expiry time on it is set anew. If the user
doesn't ask for it for, say, three days, the keyring is automatically
expired and garbage collected using the existing gc. All the kerberos
tokens it held are then also gc'd.
(b) A key type that can hold really big tickets (up to 1MB in size).
The problem is that Active Directory can return huge tickets with lots
of auxiliary data attached. We don't, however, want to eat up huge
tracts of unswappable kernel space for this, so if the ticket is
greater than a certain size, we create a swappable shmem file and dump
the contents in there and just live with the fact we then have an
inode and a dentry overhead. If the ticket is smaller than that, we
slap it in a kmalloc()'d buffer"
* 'for-linus2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (121 commits)
KEYS: Fix keyring content gc scanner
KEYS: Fix error handling in big_key instantiation
KEYS: Fix UID check in keyctl_get_persistent()
KEYS: The RSA public key algorithm needs to select MPILIB
ima: define '_ima' as a builtin 'trusted' keyring
ima: extend the measurement list to include the file signature
kernel/system_certificate.S: use real contents instead of macro GLOBAL()
KEYS: fix error return code in big_key_instantiate()
KEYS: Fix keyring quota misaccounting on key replacement and unlink
KEYS: Fix a race between negating a key and reading the error set
KEYS: Make BIG_KEYS boolean
apparmor: remove the "task" arg from may_change_ptraced_domain()
apparmor: remove parent task info from audit logging
apparmor: remove tsk field from the apparmor_audit_struct
apparmor: fix capability to not use the current task, during reporting
Smack: Ptrace access check mode
ima: provide hash algo info in the xattr
ima: enable support for larger default filedata hash algorithms
ima: define kernel parameter 'ima_template=' to change configured default
ima: add Kconfig default measurement list template
...
Jeff Layton