mirror of https://gitee.com/openkylin/linux.git
23 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
H. Peter Anvin
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0e2e160033 |
x86/asm: Add _ASM_ARG* constants for argument registers to <asm/asm.h>
i386 and x86-64 uses different registers for arguments; make them available so we don't have to #ifdef in the actual code. Native size and specified size (q, l, w, b) versions are provided. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com> Reviewed-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com> Acked-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: acme@redhat.com Cc: akataria@vmware.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: andrea.parri@amarulasolutions.com Cc: ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org Cc: arnd@arndb.de Cc: aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Cc: astrachan@google.com Cc: boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com Cc: brijesh.singh@amd.com Cc: caoj.fnst@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: geert@linux-m68k.org Cc: ghackmann@google.com Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Cc: jan.kiszka@siemens.com Cc: jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com Cc: joe@perches.com Cc: jpoimboe@redhat.com Cc: keescook@google.com Cc: kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com Cc: kstewart@linuxfoundation.org Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: manojgupta@google.com Cc: mawilcox@microsoft.com Cc: michal.lkml@markovi.net Cc: mjg59@google.com Cc: mka@chromium.org Cc: pombredanne@nexb.com Cc: rientjes@google.com Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org Cc: thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: tstellar@redhat.com Cc: tweek@google.com Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Cc: will.deacon@arm.com Cc: yamada.masahiro@socionext.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180621162324.36656-3-ndesaulniers@google.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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fd97d39b0a |
Revert "x86/asm: Allow again using asm.h when building for the 'bpf' clang target"
This reverts commit
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Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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ca26cffa4e |
x86/asm: Allow again using asm.h when building for the 'bpf' clang target
Up to
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
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b24413180f |
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Andrey Ryabinin
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196bd485ee |
x86/asm: Use register variable to get stack pointer value
Currently we use current_stack_pointer() function to get the value
of the stack pointer register. Since commit:
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Josh Poimboeuf
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520a13c530 |
x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for GCC 4.4
The kernel test bot (run by Xiaolong Ye) reported that the following commit: |
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Josh Poimboeuf
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f5caf621ee |
x86/asm: Fix inline asm call constraints for Clang
For inline asm statements which have a CALL instruction, we list the
stack pointer as a constraint to convince GCC to ensure the frame
pointer is set up first:
static inline void foo()
{
register void *__sp asm(_ASM_SP);
asm("call bar" : "+r" (__sp))
}
Unfortunately, that pattern causes Clang to corrupt the stack pointer.
The fix is easy: convert the stack pointer register variable to a global
variable.
It should be noted that the end result is different based on the GCC
version. With GCC 6.4, this patch has exactly the same result as
before:
defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp
before 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940
after 9820389 9491555 8816046 8516940
With GCC 7.2, however, GCC's behavior has changed. It now changes its
behavior based on the conversion of the register variable to a global.
That somehow convinces it to *always* set up the frame pointer before
inserting *any* inline asm. (Therefore, listing the variable as an
output constraint is a no-op and is no longer necessary.) It's a bit
overkill, but the performance impact should be negligible. And in fact,
there's a nice improvement with frame pointers disabled:
defconfig defconfig-nofp distro distro-nofp
before 9796316 9468236 9076191 8790305
after 9796957 9464267 9076381 8785949
So in summary, while listing the stack pointer as an output constraint
is no longer necessary for newer versions of GCC, it's still needed for
older versions.
Suggested-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reported-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Miguel Bernal Marin <miguel.bernal.marin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3db862e970c432ae823cf515c52b54fec8270e0e.1505942196.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Kees Cook
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7a46ec0e2f |
locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
This implements refcount_t overflow protection on x86 without a noticeable performance impact, though without the fuller checking of REFCOUNT_FULL. This is done by duplicating the existing atomic_t refcount implementation but with normally a single instruction added to detect if the refcount has gone negative (e.g. wrapped past INT_MAX or below zero). When detected, the handler saturates the refcount_t to INT_MIN / 2. With this overflow protection, the erroneous reference release that would follow a wrap back to zero is blocked from happening, avoiding the class of refcount-overflow use-after-free vulnerabilities entirely. Only the overflow case of refcounting can be perfectly protected, since it can be detected and stopped before the reference is freed and left to be abused by an attacker. There isn't a way to block early decrements, and while REFCOUNT_FULL stops increment-from-zero cases (which would be the state _after_ an early decrement and stops potential double-free conditions), this fast implementation does not, since it would require the more expensive cmpxchg loops. Since the overflow case is much more common (e.g. missing a "put" during an error path), this protection provides real-world protection. For example, the two public refcount overflow use-after-free exploits published in 2016 would have been rendered unexploitable: http://perception-point.io/2016/01/14/analysis-and-exploitation-of-a-linux-kernel-vulnerability-cve-2016-0728/ http://cyseclabs.com/page?n=02012016 This implementation does, however, notice an unchecked decrement to zero (i.e. caller used refcount_dec() instead of refcount_dec_and_test() and it resulted in a zero). Decrements under zero are noticed (since they will have resulted in a negative value), though this only indicates that a use-after-free may have already happened. Such notifications are likely avoidable by an attacker that has already exploited a use-after-free vulnerability, but it's better to have them reported than allow such conditions to remain universally silent. On first overflow detection, the refcount value is reset to INT_MIN / 2 (which serves as a saturation value) and a report and stack trace are produced. When operations detect only negative value results (such as changing an already saturated value), saturation still happens but no notification is performed (since the value was already saturated). On the matter of races, since the entire range beyond INT_MAX but before 0 is negative, every operation at INT_MIN / 2 will trap, leaving no overflow-only race condition. As for performance, this implementation adds a single "js" instruction to the regular execution flow of a copy of the standard atomic_t refcount operations. (The non-"and_test" refcount_dec() function, which is uncommon in regular refcount design patterns, has an additional "jz" instruction to detect reaching exactly zero.) Since this is a forward jump, it is by default the non-predicted path, which will be reinforced by dynamic branch prediction. The result is this protection having virtually no measurable change in performance over standard atomic_t operations. The error path, located in .text.unlikely, saves the refcount location and then uses UD0 to fire a refcount exception handler, which resets the refcount, handles reporting, and returns to regular execution. This keeps the changes to .text size minimal, avoiding return jumps and open-coded calls to the error reporting routine. Example assembly comparison: refcount_inc() before: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) refcount_inc() after: .text: ffffffff81546149: f0 ff 45 f4 lock incl -0xc(%rbp) ffffffff8154614d: 0f 88 80 d5 17 00 js ffffffff816c36d3 ... .text.unlikely: ffffffff816c36d3: 48 8d 4d f4 lea -0xc(%rbp),%rcx ffffffff816c36d7: 0f ff (bad) These are the cycle counts comparing a loop of refcount_inc() from 1 to INT_MAX and back down to 0 (via refcount_dec_and_test()), between unprotected refcount_t (atomic_t), fully protected REFCOUNT_FULL (refcount_t-full), and this overflow-protected refcount (refcount_t-fast): 2147483646 refcount_inc()s and 2147483647 refcount_dec_and_test()s: cycles protections atomic_t 82249267387 none refcount_t-fast 82211446892 overflow, untested dec-to-zero refcount_t-full 144814735193 overflow, untested dec-to-zero, inc-from-zero This code is a modified version of the x86 PAX_REFCOUNT atomic_t overflow defense from the last public patch of PaX/grsecurity, based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Thanks to PaX Team for various suggestions for improvement for repurposing this code to be a refcount-only protection. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net> Cc: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com> Cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Hans Liljestrand <ishkamiel@gmail.com> Cc: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: arozansk@redhat.com Cc: axboe@kernel.dk Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Cc: linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170815161924.GA133115@beast Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Matthias Kaehlcke
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121843eb02 |
x86/mm/kaslr: Use the _ASM_MUL macro for multiplication to work around Clang incompatibility
The constraint "rm" allows the compiler to put mix_const into memory. When the input operand is a memory location then MUL needs an operand size suffix, since Clang can't infer the multiplication width from the operand. Add and use the _ASM_MUL macro which determines the operand size and resolves to the NUL instruction with the corresponding suffix. This fixes the following error when building with clang: CC arch/x86/lib/kaslr.o /tmp/kaslr-dfe1ad.s: Assembler messages: /tmp/kaslr-dfe1ad.s:182: Error: no instruction mnemonic suffix given and no register operands; can't size instruction Signed-off-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org> Cc: Grant Grundler <grundler@chromium.org> Cc: Greg Hackmann <ghackmann@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Michael Davidson <md@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170501224741.133938-1-mka@chromium.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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H. Peter Anvin
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ff3554b409 |
x86, asm: define CC_SET() and CC_OUT() macros
The CC_SET() and CC_OUT() macros can be used together to take advantage of the new __GCC_ASM_FLAG_OUTPUTS__ feature in gcc 6+ while remaining backwards compatible. CC_SET() generates a SET instruction on older compilers; CC_OUT() makes sure the output is received in the correct variable. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465414726-197858-5-git-send-email-hpa@linux.intel.com Reviewed-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org> |
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Tony Luck
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548acf1923 |
x86/mm: Expand the exception table logic to allow new handling options
Huge amounts of help from Andy Lutomirski and Borislav Petkov to
produce this. Andy provided the inspiration to add classes to the
exception table with a clever bit-squeezing trick, Boris pointed
out how much cleaner it would all be if we just had a new field.
Linus Torvalds blessed the expansion with:
' I'd rather not be clever in order to save just a tiny amount of space
in the exception table, which isn't really criticial for anybody. '
The third field is another relative function pointer, this one to a
handler that executes the actions.
We start out with three handlers:
1: Legacy - just jumps the to fixup IP
2: Fault - provide the trap number in %ax to the fixup code
3: Cleaned up legacy for the uaccess error hack
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/f6af78fcbd348cf4939875cfda9c19689b5e50b8.1455732970.git.tony.luck@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
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Borislav Petkov
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9e6b13f761 |
x86/asm/uaccess: Unify the ALIGN_DESTINATION macro
Pull it up into the header and kill duplicate versions. Separately, both macros are identical: 35948b2bd3431aee7149e85cfe4becbc /tmp/a 35948b2bd3431aee7149e85cfe4becbc /tmp/b Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1431538944-27724-3-git-send-email-bp@alien8.de Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Masami Hiramatsu
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376e242429 |
kprobes: Introduce NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macro to maintain kprobes blacklist
Introduce NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() macro which builds a kprobes blacklist at kernel build time. The usage of this macro is similar to EXPORT_SYMBOL(), placed after the function definition: NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(function); Since this macro will inhibit inlining of static/inline functions, this patch also introduces a nokprobe_inline macro for static/inline functions. In this case, we must use NOKPROBE_SYMBOL() for the inline function caller. When CONFIG_KPROBES=y, the macro stores the given function address in the "_kprobe_blacklist" section. Since the data structures are not fully initialized by the macro (because there is no "size" information), those are re-initialized at boot time by using kallsyms. Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140417081705.26341.96719.stgit@ltc230.yrl.intra.hitachi.co.jp Cc: Alok Kataria <akataria@vmware.com> Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Christopher Li <sparse@chrisli.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Jan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Cc: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-sparse@vger.kernel.org Cc: virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Jan-Simon Möller
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3e9b2327b5 |
x86, asm: Extend definitions of _ASM_* with a raw format
The __ASM_* macros (e.g. __ASM_DX) are used to return the proper register name (e.g. edx for 32bit / rdx for 64bit). We want to use this also in arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h / get_user() . For this to work, we need a raw form as both gcc and clang choke on the whitespace in a register asm() statement, and the __ASM_FORM macro surrounds the argument with blanks. A new macro, __ASM_FORM_RAW was added and we change __ASM_REG to use the new RAW form. Signed-off-by: Jan-Simon Möller <dl9pf@gmx.de> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1377803585-5913-2-git-send-email-dl9pf@gmx.de Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> |
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H. Peter Anvin
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706276543b |
x86, extable: Switch to relative exception table entries
Switch to using relative exception table entries on x86. On i386, this has the advantage that the exception table entries don't need to be relocated; on x86-64 this means the exception table entries take up only half the space. In either case, a 32-bit delta is sufficient, as the range of kernel code addresses is limited. Since part of the goal is to avoid needing to adjust the entries when the kernel is relocated, the old trick of using addresses in the NULL pointer range to indicate uaccess_err no longer works (and unlike RISC architectures we can't use a flag bit); instead use an delta just below +2G to indicate these special entries. The reach is still limited to a single instruction. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFyijf43qSu3N9nWHEBwaGbb7T2Oq9A=9EyR=Jtyqfq_cQ@mail.gmail.com |
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H. Peter Anvin
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535c0c3469 |
x86, extable: Add _ASM_EXTABLE_EX() macro
Add _ASM_EXTABLE_EX() to generate the special extable entries that are associated with uaccess_err. This allows us to change the protocol associated with these special entries. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFyijf43qSu3N9nWHEBwaGbb7T2Oq9A=9EyR=Jtyqfq_cQ@mail.gmail.com |
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H. Peter Anvin
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447657e312 |
x86, extable: Remove the now-unused __ASM_EX_SEC macros
Nothing should use them anymore; only _ASM_EXTABLE() should ever be used. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFyijf43qSu3N9nWHEBwaGbb7T2Oq9A=9EyR=Jtyqfq_cQ@mail.gmail.com |
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H. Peter Anvin
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d4541805e8 |
x86, extable: Use .pushsection ... .popsection for _ASM_EXTABLE()
Instead of using .section ... .previous, use .pushsection ... .popsection; this is (hopefully) a bit more robust, especially in complex assembly code. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: David Daney <david.daney@cavium.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CA%2B55aFyijf43qSu3N9nWHEBwaGbb7T2Oq9A=9EyR=Jtyqfq_cQ@mail.gmail.com |
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Jan Beulich
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a750036f35 |
x86: Fix write lock scalability 64-bit issue
With the write lock path simply subtracting RW_LOCK_BIAS there is, on large systems, the theoretical possibility of overflowing the 32-bit value that was used so far (namely if 128 or more CPUs manage to do the subtraction, but don't get to do the inverse addition in the failure path quickly enough). A first measure is to modify RW_LOCK_BIAS itself - with the new value chosen, it is good for up to 2048 CPUs each allowed to nest over 2048 times on the read path without causing an issue. Quite possibly it would even be sufficient to adjust the bias a little further, assuming that allowing for significantly less nesting would suffice. However, as the original value chosen allowed for even more nesting levels, to support more than 2048 CPUs (possible currently only for 64-bit kernels) the lock itself gets widened to 64 bits. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4E258E0D020000780004E3F0@nat28.tlf.novell.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |
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Jan Beulich
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4625cd6379 |
x86: Unify rwlock assembly implementation
Rather than having two functionally identical implementations for 32- and 64-bit configurations, extend the existing assembly abstractions enough to fold the two rwlock implementations into a shared one. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4E258DD7020000780004E3EA@nat28.tlf.novell.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> |
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H. Peter Anvin
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709972b1f6 |
x86, asm: Make _ASM_EXTABLE() usable from assembly code
We have had this convenient macro _ASM_EXTABLE() to generate exception table entry in inline assembly. Make it also usable for pure assembly. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> |
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H. Peter Anvin
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1965aae3c9 |
x86: Fix ASM_X86__ header guards
Change header guards named "ASM_X86__*" to "_ASM_X86_*" since: a. the double underscore is ugly and pointless. b. no leading underscore violates namespace constraints. Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> |
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Al Viro
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bb8985586b |
x86, um: ... and asm-x86 move
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> |