Commit Graph

153 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Linus Torvalds 6c32978414 Notifications over pipes + Keyring notifications
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Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull notification queue from David Howells:
 "This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event
  source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and
  changing their attributes.

  Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a
  problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time:

     https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47

  Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos
  cache to find out if kinit has changed anything.

  [ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications
    for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and
    Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how
    this one works first ]

  LSM hooks are included:

   - A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or
     not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different
     "watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The
     LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack]

   - A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a
     particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is
     given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the
     system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack]

  I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these
  hooks.

  WHY
  ===

  Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your
  kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor
  that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials
  cache changes.

  However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in
  the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around
  on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently
  be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not
  so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the
  need to poll.

  DESIGN DECISIONS
  ================

   - The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages
     are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag:

        pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);

     The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem
     like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up
     front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing
     the pipe.

     [?] Should this be done some other way?  I'd rather not use up a new
         O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call
         instead?

     The pipe is then configured::

        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth);
        ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);

     Messages are then read out of the pipe using read().

   - It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the
     notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the
     kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without*
     holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful
     auditing.

   - sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification
     pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they
     sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more
     notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring.

   - The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This
     means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock
     to update the queue pointers.

   - Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that
     they can be of varying size.

     This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common
     buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used
     just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be
     specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the
     sources.

   - Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be
     individually filtered. Other filtration is also available.

   - Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be
     bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification
     will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it
     - and only those that are watching for it.

   - When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will
     rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's
     insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification
     message at an appropriate point later.

   - The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached
     to it, using one of:

        keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);
        watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02);
        watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03);

     where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is
     a tag between 0 and 255.

   - Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or
     the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will
     be generated indicating the enforced watch removal.

  Things I want to avoid:

   - Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the
     network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink).

   - Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits
     there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the
     responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling
     namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be
     inaccessible inside a container.

   - Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see.

  TESTING AND MANPAGES
  ====================

   - The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands
     for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be
     found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to
     the main manpages repository instead.

     If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make
     test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn
     a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe
     for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll
     all be checked off to make sure they happened.

        https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch

   - A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that
     can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events.
     Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout"

* tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks
  selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook
  keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask
  pipe: Add notification lossage handling
  pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications
  Add sample notification program
  watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
  security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch
  pipe: Add general notification queue support
  pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE
  security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion
  uapi: General notification queue definitions
2020-06-13 09:56:21 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 6d62c5b211 A handful of late-arriving docs fixes, along with a patch changing a lot of
HTTP links to HTTPS that had to be yanked and redone before the first
 pull.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.8-2' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull more documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "A handful of late-arriving docs fixes, along with a patch changing a
  lot of HTTP links to HTTPS that had to be yanked and redone before the
  first pull"

* tag 'docs-5.8-2' of git://git.lwn.net/linux:
  docs/memory-barriers.txt/kokr: smp_mb__{before,after}_atomic(): update Documentation
  Documentation: devres: add missing entry for devm_platform_get_and_ioremap_resource()
  Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: documentation
  docs: it_IT: address invalid reference warnings
  doc: zh_CN: use doc reference to resolve undefined label warning
  docs: Update the location of the LF NDA program
  docs: dev-tools: coccinelle: underlines
2020-06-10 14:12:15 -07:00
Alexander A. Klimov 93431e0607 Replace HTTP links with HTTPS ones: documentation
Rationale:
Reduces attack surface on kernel devs opening the links for MITM
as HTTPS traffic is much harder to manipulate.

Deterministic algorithm:
For each file:
  For each line:
    If doesn't contain `\bxmlns\b`:
      For each link, `\bhttp://[^# \t\r\n]*(?:\w|/)`:
        If both the HTTP and HTTPS versions
        return 200 OK and serve the same content:
          Replace HTTP with HTTPS.

Signed-off-by: Alexander A. Klimov <grandmaster@al2klimov.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200526060544.25127-1-grandmaster@al2klimov.de
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2020-06-08 09:30:19 -06:00
Linus Torvalds a484a497c9 Keyrings changes
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Merge tag 'keys-next-20200602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs

Pull keyring updates from David Howells:

 - Fix a documentation warning.

 - Replace a zero-length array with a flexible one

 - Make the big_key key type use ChaCha20Poly1305 and use the crypto
   algorithm directly rather than going through the crypto layer.

 - Implement the update op for the big_key type.

* tag 'keys-next-20200602' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
  keys: Implement update for the big_key type
  security/keys: rewrite big_key crypto to use library interface
  KEYS: Replace zero-length array with flexible-array
  Documentation: security: core.rst: add missing argument
2020-06-04 10:27:07 -07:00
Ben Boeckel 352780b61e Documentation: security: core.rst: add missing argument
This argument was just never documented in the first place.

Signed-off-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2020-06-02 17:22:31 +01:00
Linus Torvalds b23c4771ff A fair amount of stuff this time around, dominated by yet another massive
set from Mauro toward the completion of the RST conversion.  I *really*
 hope we are getting close to the end of this.  Meanwhile, those patches
 reach pretty far afield to update document references around the tree;
 there should be no actual code changes there.  There will be, alas, more of
 the usual trivial merge conflicts.
 
 Beyond that we have more translations, improvements to the sphinx
 scripting, a number of additions to the sysctl documentation, and lots of
 fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.8' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "A fair amount of stuff this time around, dominated by yet another
  massive set from Mauro toward the completion of the RST conversion. I
  *really* hope we are getting close to the end of this. Meanwhile,
  those patches reach pretty far afield to update document references
  around the tree; there should be no actual code changes there. There
  will be, alas, more of the usual trivial merge conflicts.

  Beyond that we have more translations, improvements to the sphinx
  scripting, a number of additions to the sysctl documentation, and lots
  of fixes"

* tag 'docs-5.8' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (130 commits)
  Documentation: fixes to the maintainer-entry-profile template
  zswap: docs/vm: Fix typo accept_threshold_percent in zswap.rst
  tracing: Fix events.rst section numbering
  docs: acpi: fix old http link and improve document format
  docs: filesystems: add info about efivars content
  Documentation: LSM: Correct the basic LSM description
  mailmap: change email for Ricardo Ribalda
  docs: sysctl/kernel: document unaligned controls
  Documentation: admin-guide: update bug-hunting.rst
  docs: sysctl/kernel: document ngroups_max
  nvdimm: fixes to maintainter-entry-profile
  Documentation/features: Correct RISC-V kprobes support entry
  Documentation/features: Refresh the arch support status files
  Revert "docs: sysctl/kernel: document ngroups_max"
  docs: move locking-specific documents to locking/
  docs: move digsig docs to the security book
  docs: move the kref doc into the core-api book
  docs: add IRQ documentation at the core-api book
  docs: debugging-via-ohci1394.txt: add it to the core-api book
  docs: fix references for ipmi.rst file
  ...
2020-06-01 15:45:27 -07:00
Casey Schaufler e2d467de34 Documentation: LSM: Correct the basic LSM description
This is a first pass at updating the basic documentation on
Linux Security Modules (LSM), which is frighteningly out of date.
Remove untrue statements about the LSM framework. Replace them
with true statements where it is convenient to do so. This is
the beginnig of a larger effort to bring the LSM documentation
up to date.

Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4c053d72-2d58-612f-6d6b-f04226d0181e@schaufler-ca.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2020-05-25 18:59:59 -06:00
David Howells f7e47677e3 watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility
Add a key/keyring change notification facility whereby notifications about
changes in key and keyring content and attributes can be received.

Firstly, an event queue needs to be created:

	pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE);
	ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, 256);

then a notification can be set up to report notifications via that queue:

	struct watch_notification_filter filter = {
		.nr_filters = 1,
		.filters = {
			[0] = {
				.type = WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY,
				.subtype_filter[0] = UINT_MAX,
			},
		},
	};
	ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter);
	keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01);

After that, records will be placed into the queue when events occur in
which keys are changed in some way.  Records are of the following format:

	struct key_notification {
		struct watch_notification watch;
		__u32	key_id;
		__u32	aux;
	} *n;

Where:

	n->watch.type will be WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY.

	n->watch.subtype will indicate the type of event, such as
	NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED.

	n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_LENGTH will indicate the length of the
	record.

	n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_ID will be the second argument to
	keyctl_watch_key(), shifted.

	n->key will be the ID of the affected key.

	n->aux will hold subtype-dependent information, such as the key
	being linked into the keyring specified by n->key in the case of
	NOTIFY_KEY_LINKED.

Note that it is permissible for event records to be of variable length -
or, at least, the length may be dependent on the subtype.  Note also that
the queue can be shared between multiple notifications of various types.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
2020-05-19 15:19:06 +01:00
Mauro Carvalho Chehab 9184027f0a docs: move digsig docs to the security book
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6af5365404c7bd9d008e7e3a77ba83587fd33012.1588345503.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2020-05-15 12:03:48 -06:00
Eric Biggers 6b0b0fa2bc crypto: lib/sha1 - rename "sha" to "sha1"
The library implementation of the SHA-1 compression function is
confusingly called just "sha_transform()".  Alongside it are some "SHA_"
constants and "sha_init()".  Presumably these are left over from a time
when SHA just meant SHA-1.  But now there are also SHA-2 and SHA-3, and
moreover SHA-1 is now considered insecure and thus shouldn't be used.

Therefore, rename these functions and constants to make it very clear
that they are for SHA-1.  Also add a comment to make it clear that these
shouldn't be used.

For the extra-misleadingly named "SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES", rename it to
SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE and define it to just '64' rather than '(512/8)' so that
it matches the same definition in <crypto/sha.h>.  This prepares for
merging <linux/cryptohash.h> into <crypto/sha.h>.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
2020-05-08 15:32:17 +10:00
Mauro Carvalho Chehab c44166fe5f docs: prevent warnings due to autosectionlabel
Changeset 58ad30cf91 ("docs: fix reference to core-api/namespaces.rst")
enabled a new feature at Sphinx: it will now generate index for each
document title, plus to each chapter inside it.

There's a drawback, though: one document cannot have two sections
with the same name anymore.

A followup patch will change the logic of autosectionlabel to
avoid most creating references for every single section title,
but still we need to be able to reference the chapters inside
a document.

There are a few places where there are two chapters with the
same name. This patch renames one of the chapters, in order to
avoid symbol conflict within the same document.

PS.: as I don't speach Chinese, I had some help from a friend
(Wen Liu) at the Chinese translation for "publishing patches"
for this document:

	Documentation/translations/zh_CN/process/5.Posting.rst

Fixes: 58ad30cf91 ("docs: fix reference to core-api/namespaces.rst")
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2bffb91e4a63d41bf5fae1c23e1e8b3bba0b8806.1584716446.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2020-03-20 17:01:29 -06:00
Daniel W. S. Almeida 402613f3ef Documentation: security: core.rst: fix warnings
Fix warnings due to missing markup, no change in content otherwise.

Signed-off-by: Daniel W. S. Almeida <dwlsalmeida@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191122041806.68650-1-dwlsalmeida@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-11-22 10:01:47 -07:00
Brendan Jackman 6795b29c1c docs: security: fix section hyperlink
The reStructuredText syntax is wrong here; not sure how it was
intended but we can just use the section header as an implicit
hyperlink target, with a single "outward" underscore.

Signed-off-by: Brendan Jackman <bhenryj0117@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-10-01 06:47:37 -06:00
Linus Torvalds f1f2f614d5 Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "The major feature in this time is IMA support for measuring and
  appraising appended file signatures. In addition are a couple of bug
  fixes and code cleanup to use struct_size().

  In addition to the PE/COFF and IMA xattr signatures, the kexec kernel
  image may be signed with an appended signature, using the same
  scripts/sign-file tool that is used to sign kernel modules.

  Similarly, the initramfs may contain an appended signature.

  This contained a lot of refactoring of the existing appended signature
  verification code, so that IMA could retain the existing framework of
  calculating the file hash once, storing it in the IMA measurement list
  and extending the TPM, verifying the file's integrity based on a file
  hash or signature (eg. xattrs), and adding an audit record containing
  the file hash, all based on policy. (The IMA support for appended
  signatures patch set was posted and reviewed 11 times.)

  The support for appended signature paves the way for adding other
  signature verification methods, such as fs-verity, based on a single
  system-wide policy. The file hash used for verifying the signature and
  the signature, itself, can be included in the IMA measurement list"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  ima: ima_api: Use struct_size() in kzalloc()
  ima: use struct_size() in kzalloc()
  sefltest/ima: support appended signatures (modsig)
  ima: Fix use after free in ima_read_modsig()
  MODSIGN: make new include file self contained
  ima: fix freeing ongoing ahash_request
  ima: always return negative code for error
  ima: Store the measurement again when appraising a modsig
  ima: Define ima-modsig template
  ima: Collect modsig
  ima: Implement support for module-style appended signatures
  ima: Factor xattr_verify() out of ima_appraise_measurement()
  ima: Add modsig appraise_type option for module-style appended signatures
  integrity: Select CONFIG_KEYS instead of depending on it
  PKCS#7: Introduce pkcs7_get_digest()
  PKCS#7: Refactor verify_pkcs7_signature()
  MODSIGN: Export module signature definitions
  ima: initialize the "template" field with the default template
2019-09-27 19:37:27 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 7c672abc12 It's a somewhat calmer cycle for docs this time, as the churn of the mass
RST conversion is happily mostly behind us.
 
  - A new document on reproducible builds.
 
  - We finally got around to zapping the documentation for hardware support
    that was removed in 2004; one doesn't want to rush these things.
 
  - The usual assortment of fixes, typo corrections, etc.
 
 You'll still find a handful of annoying conflicts against other trees,
 mostly tied to the last RST conversions; resolutions are straightforward
 and the linux-next ones are good.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.4' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "It's a somewhat calmer cycle for docs this time, as the churn of the
  mass RST conversion is happily mostly behind us.

   - A new document on reproducible builds.

   - We finally got around to zapping the documentation for hardware
     support that was removed in 2004; one doesn't want to rush these
     things.

   - The usual assortment of fixes, typo corrections, etc"

* tag 'docs-5.4' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (67 commits)
  Documentation: kbuild: Add document about reproducible builds
  docs: printk-formats: Stop encouraging use of unnecessary %h[xudi] and %hh[xudi]
  Documentation: Add "earlycon=sbi" to the admin guide
  doc🔒 remove reference to clever use of read-write lock
  devices.txt: improve entry for comedi (char major 98)
  docs: mtd: Update spi nor reference driver
  doc: arm64: fix grammar dtb placed in no attributes region
  Documentation: sysrq: don't recommend 'S' 'U' before 'B'
  mailmap: Update email address for Quentin Perret
  docs: ftrace: clarify when tracing is disabled by the trace file
  docs: process: fix broken link
  Documentation/arm/samsung-s3c24xx: Remove stray U+FEFF character to fix title
  Documentation/arm/sa1100/assabet: Fix 'make assabet_defconfig' command
  Documentation/arm/sa1100: Remove some obsolete documentation
  docs/zh_CN: update Chinese howto.rst for latexdocs making
  Documentation: virt: Fix broken reference to virt tree's index
  docs: Fix typo on pull requests guide
  kernel-doc: Allow anonymous enum
  Documentation: sphinx: Don't parse socket() as identifier reference
  Documentation: sphinx: Add missing comma to list of strings
  ...
2019-09-17 16:22:26 -07:00
Sasha Levin e8bd417aab tpm/tpm_ftpm_tee: Document fTPM TEE driver
Documentation briefly the new fTPM driver running inside TEE.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
2019-09-02 17:08:35 +03:00
Thiago Jung Bauermann 3878d505aa ima: Define ima-modsig template
Define new "d-modsig" template field which holds the digest that is
expected to match the one contained in the modsig, and also new "modsig"
template field which holds the appended file signature.

Add a new "ima-modsig" defined template descriptor with the new fields as
well as the ones from the "ima-sig" descriptor.

Change ima_store_measurement() to accept a struct modsig * argument so that
it can be passed along to the templates via struct ima_event_data.

Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Thiago Jung Bauermann <bauerman@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-08-05 18:40:25 -04:00
Jarkko Sakkinen 2ef5a7f148 tpm: Document UEFI event log quirks
There are some weird quirks when it comes to UEFI event log. Provide a
brief introduction to TPM event log mechanism and describe the quirks
and how they can be sorted out.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-07-31 13:37:29 -06:00
Mauro Carvalho Chehab 4d3beaa06d docs: security: move some books to it and update
The following files belong to security:

  Documentation/security/LSM.rst -> Documentation/security/lsm-development.rst
  Documentation/lsm.txt -> Documentation/security/lsm.rst
  Documentation/SAK.txt -> Documentation/security/sak.rst
  Documentation/siphash.txt -> Documentation/security/siphash.rst

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
2019-07-15 11:03:01 -03:00
Mauro Carvalho Chehab 675aaf05d8 docs: xen-tpmfront.txt: convert it to .rst
In order to be able to add this file to the security book,
we need first to convert it to reST.

While this is not part of any book, mark it as :orphan:, in order
to avoid build warnings.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
2019-07-15 09:20:24 -03:00
Linus Torvalds 028db3e290 Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs"
This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9c (and thus
effectively commits

   7a1ade8475 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION")
   2e12256b9a ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL")

that the merge brought in).

It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric
biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of
in-kernel X.509 certificates [2].

The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells
is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in
order to not impact the rest of the merge window.

 [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/
 [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/
Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-07-10 18:43:43 -07:00
Linus Torvalds e9a83bd232 It's been a relatively busy cycle for docs:
- A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro.  These create more
    than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with other
    trees, unfortunately.  He has a lot more of these waiting on the wings
    that, I think, will go to you directly later on.
 
  - A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos, and one
    on Spectre vulnerabilities.
 
  - Various improvements to the build system, including automatic markup of
    function() references because some people, for reasons I will never
    understand, were of the opinion that :c:func:``function()`` is
    unattractive and not fun to type.
 
  - We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.
 
  - Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull Documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "It's been a relatively busy cycle for docs:

   - A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more
     than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with
     other trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on
     the wings that, I think, will go to you directly later on.

   - A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos,
     and one on Spectre vulnerabilities.

   - Various improvements to the build system, including automatic
     markup of function() references because some people, for reasons I
     will never understand, were of the opinion that
     :c:func:``function()`` is unattractive and not fun to type.

   - We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4.

   - Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc"

* tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (129 commits)
  docs: automarkup.py: ignore exceptions when seeking for xrefs
  docs: Move binderfs to admin-guide
  Disable Sphinx SmartyPants in HTML output
  doc: RCU callback locks need only _bh, not necessarily _irq
  docs: format kernel-parameters -- as code
  Doc : doc-guide : Fix a typo
  platform: x86: get rid of a non-existent document
  Add the RCU docs to the core-api manual
  Documentation: RCU: Add TOC tree hooks
  Documentation: RCU: Rename txt files to rst
  Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU UP systems to reST
  Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU linked list to reST
  Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU basic concepts to reST
  docs: filesystems: Remove uneeded .rst extension on toctables
  scripts/sphinx-pre-install: fix out-of-tree build
  docs: zh_CN: submitting-drivers.rst: Remove a duplicated Documentation/
  Documentation: PGP: update for newer HW devices
  Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre
  Documentation: platform: Delete x86-laptop-drivers.txt
  docs: Note that :c:func: should no longer be used
  ...
2019-07-09 12:34:26 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 8b68150883 Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
 "Bug fixes, code clean up, and new features:

   - IMA policy rules can be defined in terms of LSM labels, making the
     IMA policy dependent on LSM policy label changes, in particular LSM
     label deletions. The new environment, in which IMA-appraisal is
     being used, frequently updates the LSM policy and permits LSM label
     deletions.

   - Prevent an mmap'ed shared file opened for write from also being
     mmap'ed execute. In the long term, making this and other similar
     changes at the VFS layer would be preferable.

   - The IMA per policy rule template format support is needed for a
     couple of new/proposed features (eg. kexec boot command line
     measurement, appended signatures, and VFS provided file hashes).

   - Other than the "boot-aggregate" record in the IMA measuremeent
     list, all other measurements are of file data. Measuring and
     storing the kexec boot command line in the IMA measurement list is
     the first buffer based measurement included in the measurement
     list"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
  integrity: Introduce struct evm_xattr
  ima: Update MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN to fit largest reasonable definition
  KEXEC: Call ima_kexec_cmdline to measure the boot command line args
  IMA: Define a new template field buf
  IMA: Define a new hook to measure the kexec boot command line arguments
  IMA: support for per policy rule template formats
  integrity: Fix __integrity_init_keyring() section mismatch
  ima: Use designated initializers for struct ima_event_data
  ima: use the lsm policy update notifier
  LSM: switch to blocking policy update notifiers
  x86/ima: fix the Kconfig dependency for IMA_ARCH_POLICY
  ima: Make arch_policy_entry static
  ima: prevent a file already mmap'ed write to be mmap'ed execute
  x86/ima: check EFI SetupMode too
2019-07-08 20:28:59 -07:00
Prakhar Srivastava 86b4da8c0e IMA: Define a new template field buf
A buffer(kexec boot command line arguments) measured into IMA
measuremnt list cannot be appraised, without already being
aware of the buffer contents. Since hashes are non-reversible,
raw buffer is needed for validation or regenerating hash for
appraisal/attestation.

Add support to store/read the buffer contents in HEX.
The kexec cmdline hash is stored in the "d-ng" field of the
template data.  It can be verified using
sudo cat /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements |
  grep  kexec-cmdline | cut -d' ' -f 6 | xxd -r -p | sha256sum

- Add two new fields to ima_event_data to hold the buf and
buf_len
- Add a new template field 'buf' to be used to store/read
the buffer data.
- Updated process_buffer_meaurement to add the buffer to
ima_event_data. process_buffer_measurement added in
"Define a new IMA hook to measure the boot command line
 arguments"
- Add a new template policy name ima-buf to represent
'd-ng|n-ng|buf'

Signed-off-by: Prakhar Srivastava <prsriva02@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2019-06-30 17:53:45 -04:00
David Howells 2e12256b9a keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL
Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow
the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split.  This will also allow a
greater range of subjects to represented.

============
WHY DO THIS?
============

The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of
which should be grouped together.

For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a
key:

 (1) Changing a key's ownership.

 (2) Changing a key's security information.

 (3) Setting a keyring's restriction.

And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime:

 (4) Setting an expiry time.

 (5) Revoking a key.

and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache:

 (6) Invalidating a key.

Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with
controlling access to that key.

Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content
and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission.  It can, however,
be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token
for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a
key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is
probably okay.

As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers:

 (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search.

 (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined.

 (3) Invalidation.

But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really
need to be controlled separately.

Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the
administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like
to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks.


===============
WHAT IS CHANGED
===============

The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions:

 (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be
     changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring.

 (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked.

The SEARCH permission is split to create:

 (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found.

 (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring.

 (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated.

The WRITE permission is also split to create:

 (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be
     added, removed and replaced in a keyring.

 (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely.  This is
     split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator.

 (3) REVOKE - see above.


Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are
unioned together.  An ACE specifies a subject, such as:

 (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key
 (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner
 (*) Group - permitted to the key group
 (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone

Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that
you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to
everyone else.

Further subjects may be made available by later patches.

The ACE also specifies a permissions mask.  The set of permissions is now:

	VIEW		Can view the key metadata
	READ		Can read the key content
	WRITE		Can update/modify the key content
	SEARCH		Can find the key by searching/requesting
	LINK		Can make a link to the key
	SET_SECURITY	Can change owner, ACL, expiry
	INVAL		Can invalidate
	REVOKE		Can revoke
	JOIN		Can join this keyring
	CLEAR		Can clear this keyring


The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated.

The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set,
or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token.

The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL.

The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE.

The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an
existing keyring.

The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually
created keyrings only.


======================
BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY
======================

To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the
permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless
KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be
returned.

It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate
ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero.

SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY.  WRITE
permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR.  JOIN is turned
on if a keyring is being altered.

The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions
mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs.

It will make the following mappings:

 (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH

 (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR

 (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set

 (4) CLEAR -> WRITE

Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match
the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR.


=======
TESTING
=======

This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests:

 (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now
     returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed
     if the type doesn't have ->read().  You still can't actually read the
     key.

 (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't
     work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-27 23:03:07 +01:00
David Howells a58946c158 keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanism
Create a request_key_net() function and use it to pass the network
namespace domain tag into DNS revolver keys and rxrpc/AFS keys so that keys
for different domains can coexist in the same keyring.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
2019-06-27 23:02:12 +01:00
David Howells dcf49dbc80 keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches
Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted
and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be
searched and none of the children.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-26 21:02:32 +01:00
David Howells 3b8c4a08a4 keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}
Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}() as they're not currently used.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-26 20:58:13 +01:00
David Howells 7743c48e54 keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct
If a filesystem uses keys to hold authentication tokens, then it needs a
token for each VFS operation that might perform an authentication check -
either by passing it to the server, or using to perform a check based on
authentication data cached locally.

For open files this isn't a problem, since the key should be cached in the
file struct since it represents the subject performing operations on that
file descriptor.

During pathwalk, however, there isn't anywhere to cache the key, except
perhaps in the nameidata struct - but that isn't exposed to the
filesystems.  Further, a pathwalk can incur a lot of operations, calling
one or more of the following, for instance:

	->lookup()
	->permission()
	->d_revalidate()
	->d_automount()
	->get_acl()
	->getxattr()

on each dentry/inode it encounters - and each one may need to call
request_key().  And then, at the end of pathwalk, it will call the actual
operation:

	->mkdir()
	->mknod()
	->getattr()
	->open()
	...

which may need to go and get the token again.

However, it is very likely that all of the operations on a single
dentry/inode - and quite possibly a sequence of them - will all want to use
the same authentication token, which suggests that caching it would be a
good idea.

To this end:

 (1) Make it so that a positive result of request_key() and co. that didn't
     require upcalling to userspace is cached temporarily in task_struct.

 (2) The cache is 1 deep, so a new result displaces the old one.

 (3) The key is released by exit and by notify-resume.

 (4) The cache is cleared in a newly forked process.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-19 16:10:15 +01:00
David Howells 896f1950e5 keys: Provide request_key_rcu()
Provide a request_key_rcu() function that can be used to request a key
under RCU conditions.  It can only search and check permissions; it cannot
allocate a new key, upcall or wait for an upcall to complete.  It may
return a partially constructed key.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-19 16:10:15 +01:00
David Howells e59428f721 keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions
Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it
will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key()
function in a later commit.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-19 16:10:15 +01:00
David Howells 504b69eb3c keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key
The request_key() syscall allows a process to gain access to the 'possessor'
permits of any key that grants it Search permission by virtue of request_key()
not checking whether a key it finds grants Link permission to the caller.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-06-19 16:10:15 +01:00
Mauro Carvalho Chehab 43415f1327 docs: security: core.rst: Fix several warnings
Multi-line literal markups only work when they're idented at the
same level, with is not the case here:

   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1598: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1598: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.
   Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string.

Fix it by using a code-block instead.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-06-08 13:42:11 -06:00
Mauro Carvalho Chehab 6ad8b21652 docs: security: trusted-encrypted.rst: fix code-block tag
The code-block tag is at the wrong place, causing those
warnings:

    Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:112: WARNING: Literal block expected; none found.
    Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:121: WARNING: Unexpected indentation.
    Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:122: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.
    Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:123: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent.

Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org>
Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-06-08 13:42:11 -06:00
David Howells ed0ac5c7ec keys: Add a keyctl to move a key between keyrings
Add a keyctl to atomically move a link to a key from one keyring to
another.  The key must exist in "from" keyring and a flag can be given to
cause the operation to fail if there's a matching key already in the "to"
keyring.

This can be done with:

	keyctl(KEYCTL_MOVE,
	       key_serial_t key,
	       key_serial_t from_keyring,
	       key_serial_t to_keyring,
	       unsigned int flags);

The key being moved must grant Link permission and both keyrings must grant
Write permission.

flags should be 0 or KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL, with the latter preventing
displacement of a matching key from the "to" keyring.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
2019-05-30 22:44:48 +01:00
Kees Cook 80fcc98711 doc: security: Add kern-doc for lsm_hooks.h
There is a lot of kern-doc for the LSM internals, but it wasn't visible
in the HTML output. This exposes some formatting flaws in lsm_hooks.h
that will be fixed in a later series of patches.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-02-22 08:54:09 -07:00
Kees Cook d61330c689 doc: sctp: Merge and clean up rst files
The SCTP sections were ending up at the top-level table of contents
under the security section when they should have be sections with the
SCTP chapters. In addition to correcting the section and subsection
headings, this merges the SCTP documents into a single file to organize
the chapters more clearly, internally linkifies them, and adds the
missing SPDX header.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2019-02-22 08:51:40 -07:00
Linus Torvalds f218a29c25 Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull integrity updates from James Morris:
 "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was
  upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.
  Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the
  kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent
  loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall,
  independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure
  boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included.

  In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named
  ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying
  the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA
  kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring.

  (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the
  preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different
  use case scenario, are included here)"

* 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
  integrity: Remove references to module keyring
  ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write
  ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal
  efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed
  efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot
  efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser
  efi: Add EFI signature data types
  integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring
  integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring
  selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test
  ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs
  x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode
  docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
  x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86
  ima: add support for arch specific policies
  ima: refactor ima_init_policy()
  ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag
  x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot
  integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
2019-01-02 09:43:14 -08:00
Linus Torvalds 3868772b99 A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new
document on perf security, more Italian translations, more
 improvements to the memory-management docs, improvements to the
 pathname lookup documentation, and the usual array of smaller
 fixes.
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Merge tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet:
 "A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new document
  on perf security, more Italian translations, more improvements to the
  memory-management docs, improvements to the pathname lookup
  documentation, and the usual array of smaller fixes.

  As is often the case, there are a few reaches outside of
  Documentation/ to adjust kerneldoc comments"

* tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (38 commits)
  docs: improve pathname-lookup document structure
  configfs: fix wrong name of struct in documentation
  docs/mm-api: link slab_common.c to "The Slab Cache" section
  slab: make kmem_cache_create{_usercopy} description proper kernel-doc
  doc:process: add links where missing
  docs/core-api: make mm-api.rst more structured
  x86, boot: documentation whitespace fixup
  Documentation: devres: note checking needs when converting
  doc🇮🇹 add some process/* translations
  doc🇮🇹 fixes in process/1.Intro
  Documentation: convert path-lookup from markdown to resturctured text
  Documentation/admin-guide: update admin-guide index.rst
  Documentation/admin-guide: introduce perf-security.rst file
  scripts/kernel-doc: Fix struct and struct field attribute processing
  Documentation: dev-tools: Fix typos in index.rst
  Correct gen_init_cpio tool's documentation
  Document /proc/pid PID reuse behavior
  Documentation: update path-lookup.md for parallel lookups
  Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst"
  dmaengine: Add mailing list address to the documentation
  ...
2018-12-29 11:21:49 -08:00
Dave Jiang 9db67581b9 keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys
Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size
of the key to 32bytes.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
2018-12-13 17:54:13 -08:00
Stefan Berger 4264f27a08 docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0
Extend the documentation for trusted keys with documentation for how to
set up a key for a TPM 2.0 so it can be used with a TPM 2.0 as well.

Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
2018-12-11 07:13:42 -05:00
Will Deacon 806654a966 Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst"
Whilst making an unrelated change to some Documentation, Linus sayeth:

  | Afaik, even in Britain, "whilst" is unusual and considered more
  | formal, and "while" is the common word.
  |
  | [...]
  |
  | Can we just admit that we work with computers, and we don't need to
  | use þe eald Englisc spelling of words that most of the world never
  | uses?

dictionary.com refers to the word as "Chiefly British", which is
probably an undesirable attribute for technical documentation.

Replace all occurrences under Documentation/ with "while".

Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Liam Girdwood <lgirdwood@gmail.com>
Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2018-11-20 09:30:43 -07:00
Linus Torvalds baa888d25e Merge branch 'next-keys2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull keys updates from James Morris:
 "Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to
  provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented
  for the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key
  retained in RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware.

     int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
                       struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
     int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
                        const void *in, void *out);
     int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
                                  const void *in, const void *in2);

  Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces,
  they're rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an
  operation ID in the params argument to distinguish them.

  Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature
  instead and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the
  expectation that this may well be how a hardware crypto device may
  work"

* 'next-keys2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (22 commits)
  KEYS: asym_tpm: Add support for the sign operation [ver ]
  KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_sign [ver ]
  KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification [ver ]
  KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement the decrypt operation [ver ]
  KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement tpm_unbind [ver ]
  KEYS: asym_tpm: Add loadkey2 and flushspecific [ver ]
  KEYS: Move trusted.h to include/keys [ver ]
  KEYS: trusted: Expose common functionality [ver ]
  KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement encryption operation [ver ]
  KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement pkey_query [ver ]
  KEYS: Add parser for TPM-based keys [ver ]
  KEYS: asym_tpm: extract key size & public key [ver ]
  KEYS: asym_tpm: add skeleton for asym_tpm [ver ]
  crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad: Allow hash to be optional [ver ]
  KEYS: Implement PKCS#8 RSA Private Key parser [ver ]
  KEYS: Implement encrypt, decrypt and sign for software asymmetric key [ver ]
  KEYS: Allow the public_key struct to hold a private key [ver ]
  KEYS: Provide software public key query function [ver ]
  KEYS: Make the X.509 and PKCS7 parsers supply the sig encoding type [ver ]
  KEYS: Provide missing asymmetric key subops for new key type ops [ver ]
  ...
2018-11-01 15:23:59 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 2d6bb6adb7 New gcc plugin: stackleak
- Introduces the stackleak gcc plugin ported from grsecurity by Alexander
   Popov, with x86 and arm64 support.
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Merge tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull stackleak gcc plugin from Kees Cook:
 "Please pull this new GCC plugin, stackleak, for v4.20-rc1. This plugin
  was ported from grsecurity by Alexander Popov. It provides efficient
  stack content poisoning at syscall exit. This creates a defense
  against at least two classes of flaws:

   - Uninitialized stack usage. (We continue to work on improving the
     compiler to do this in other ways: e.g. unconditional zero init was
     proposed to GCC and Clang, and more plugin work has started too).

   - Stack content exposure. By greatly reducing the lifetime of valid
     stack contents, exposures via either direct read bugs or unknown
     cache side-channels become much more difficult to exploit. This
     complements the existing buddy and heap poisoning options, but
     provides the coverage for stacks.

  The x86 hooks are included in this series (which have been reviewed by
  Ingo, Dave Hansen, and Thomas Gleixner). The arm64 hooks have already
  been merged through the arm64 tree (written by Laura Abbott and
  reviewed by Mark Rutland and Will Deacon).

  With VLAs having been removed this release, there is no need for
  alloca() protection, so it has been removed from the plugin"

* tag 'stackleak-v4.20-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  arm64: Drop unneeded stackleak_check_alloca()
  stackleak: Allow runtime disabling of kernel stack erasing
  doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
  fs/proc: Show STACKLEAK metrics in the /proc file system
  lkdtm: Add a test for STACKLEAK
  gcc-plugins: Add STACKLEAK plugin for tracking the kernel stack
  x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
2018-11-01 11:46:27 -07:00
David Howells 00d60fd3b9 KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver ]
Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new
key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys.

 (*) Query an asymmetric key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY,
		    key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved,
		    struct keyctl_pkey_query *info);

     Get information about an asymmetric key.  The information is returned
     in the keyctl_pkey_query struct:

	__u32	supported_ops;

     A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported.  This is
     constructed from a bitwise-OR of:

	KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY}

	__u32	key_size;

     The size in bits of the key.

	__u16	max_data_size;
	__u16	max_sig_size;
	__u16	max_enc_size;
	__u16	max_dec_size;

     The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature
     blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted.

     reserved must be set to 0.  This is intended for future use to hand
     over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key.

     If successful, 0 is returned.  If the key is not an asymmetric key,
     EOPNOTSUPP is returned.

 (*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key.

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    void *out);

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    void *out);

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    void *out);

	long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY,
		    const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params,
		    const char *info,
		    const void *in,
		    const void *in2);

     Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation
     a blob of data.

     The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer
     values:

	__s32		key_id;
	__u32		in_len;
	__u32		out_len;
	__u32		in2_len;

     For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows:

	Operation ID		in,in_len	out,out_len	in2,in2_len
	=======================	===============	===============	===========
	KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT	Raw data	Encrypted data	-
	KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT	Encrypted data	Raw data	-
	KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN	Raw data	Signature	-
	KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY	Raw data	-		Signature

     info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary
     information.

     The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0.  This is
     intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases
     required to unlock a key.

     If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data
     written into the output buffer.  Verification returns 0 on success.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
David Howells 70025f84e5 KEYS: Provide key type operations for asymmetric key ops [ver ]
Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to
provide access to asymmetric key operations.  These will be implemented for
the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key retained in
RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware.

     int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
		       struct kernel_pkey_query *info);
     int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
			const void *in, void *out);
     int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params,
			          const void *in, const void *in2);

Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces, they're
rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an operation ID
in the params argument to distinguish them.

Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature instead
and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the expectation that
this may well be how a hardware crypto device may work.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-26 09:30:46 +01:00
Linus Torvalds 01aa9d518e This is a fairly typical cycle for documentation. There's some welcome
readability improvements for the formatted output, some LICENSES updates
 including the addition of the ISC license, the removal of the unloved and
 unmaintained 00-INDEX files, the deprecated APIs document from Kees, more
 MM docs from Mike Rapoport, and the usual pile of typo fixes and
 corrections.
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Merge tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linux

Pull documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet:
 "This is a fairly typical cycle for documentation. There's some welcome
  readability improvements for the formatted output, some LICENSES
  updates including the addition of the ISC license, the removal of the
  unloved and unmaintained 00-INDEX files, the deprecated APIs document
  from Kees, more MM docs from Mike Rapoport, and the usual pile of typo
  fixes and corrections"

* tag 'docs-4.20' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (41 commits)
  docs: Fix typos in histogram.rst
  docs: Introduce deprecated APIs list
  kernel-doc: fix declaration type determination
  doc: fix a typo in adding-syscalls.rst
  docs/admin-guide: memory-hotplug: remove table of contents
  doc: printk-formats: Remove bogus kobject references for device nodes
  Documentation: preempt-locking: Use better example
  dm flakey: Document "error_writes" feature
  docs/completion.txt: Fix a couple of punctuation nits
  LICENSES: Add ISC license text
  LICENSES: Add note to CDDL-1.0 license that it should not be used
  docs/core-api: memory-hotplug: add some details about locking internals
  docs/core-api: rename memory-hotplug-notifier to memory-hotplug
  docs: improve readability for people with poorer eyesight
  yama: clarify ptrace_scope=2 in Yama documentation
  docs/vm: split memory hotplug notifier description to Documentation/core-api
  docs: move memory hotplug description into admin-guide/mm
  doc: Fix acronym "FEKEK" in ecryptfs
  docs: fix some broken documentation references
  iommu: Fix passthrough option documentation
  ...
2018-10-24 18:01:11 +01:00
Randy Dunlap e6123c5240 security: fix LSM description location
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Fix Documentation location reference for where LSM descriptions should
be placed.

Suggested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
2018-10-09 12:18:38 -07:00
Felix Eckhofer ff34876377 doc: Fix acronym "FEKEK" in ecryptfs
"FEFEK" was incorrectly used as acronym for "File Encryption Key
Encryption Key". This replaces all occurences with "FEKEK".

Signed-off-by: Felix Eckhofer <felix@eckhofer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
2018-09-20 11:11:48 -06:00
Alexander Popov ed535a2dae doc: self-protection: Add information about STACKLEAK feature
Add information about STACKLEAK feature to the "Memory poisoning"
section of self-protection.rst.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-09-04 10:35:48 -07:00