* Fixes for the new scalable MMU
* Fixes for migration of nested hypervisors on AMD
* Fix for clang integrated assembler
* Fix for left shift by 64 (UBSAN)
* Small cleanups
* Straggler SEV-ES patch
ARM:
* VM init cleanups
* PSCI relay cleanups
* Kill CONFIG_KVM_ARM_PMU
* Fixup __init annotations
* Fixup reg_to_encoding()
* Fix spurious PMCR_EL0 access
* selftests cleanups
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull kvm fixes from Paolo Bonzini:
"x86:
- Fixes for the new scalable MMU
- Fixes for migration of nested hypervisors on AMD
- Fix for clang integrated assembler
- Fix for left shift by 64 (UBSAN)
- Small cleanups
- Straggler SEV-ES patch
ARM:
- VM init cleanups
- PSCI relay cleanups
- Kill CONFIG_KVM_ARM_PMU
- Fixup __init annotations
- Fixup reg_to_encoding()
- Fix spurious PMCR_EL0 access
Misc:
- selftests cleanups"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (38 commits)
KVM: x86: __kvm_vcpu_halt can be static
KVM: SVM: Add support for booting APs in an SEV-ES guest
KVM: nSVM: cancel KVM_REQ_GET_NESTED_STATE_PAGES on nested vmexit
KVM: nSVM: mark vmcb as dirty when forcingly leaving the guest mode
KVM: nSVM: correctly restore nested_run_pending on migration
KVM: x86/mmu: Clarify TDP MMU page list invariants
KVM: x86/mmu: Ensure TDP MMU roots are freed after yield
kvm: check tlbs_dirty directly
KVM: x86: change in pv_eoi_get_pending() to make code more readable
MAINTAINERS: Really update email address for Sean Christopherson
KVM: x86: fix shift out of bounds reported by UBSAN
KVM: selftests: Implement perf_test_util more conventionally
KVM: selftests: Use vm_create_with_vcpus in create_vm
KVM: selftests: Factor out guest mode code
KVM/SVM: Remove leftover __svm_vcpu_run prototype from svm.c
KVM: SVM: Add register operand to vmsave call in sev_es_vcpu_load
KVM: x86/mmu: Optimize not-present/MMIO SPTE check in get_mmio_spte()
KVM: x86/mmu: Use raw level to index into MMIO walks' sptes array
KVM: x86/mmu: Get root level from walkers when retrieving MMIO SPTE
KVM: x86/mmu: Use -1 to flag an undefined spte in get_mmio_spte()
...
Typically under KVM, an AP is booted using the INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence,
where the guest vCPU register state is updated and then the vCPU is VMRUN
to begin execution of the AP. For an SEV-ES guest, this won't work because
the guest register state is encrypted.
Following the GHCB specification, the hypervisor must not alter the guest
register state, so KVM must track an AP/vCPU boot. Should the guest want
to park the AP, it must use the AP Reset Hold exit event in place of, for
example, a HLT loop.
First AP boot (first INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence):
Execute the AP (vCPU) as it was initialized and measured by the SEV-ES
support. It is up to the guest to transfer control of the AP to the
proper location.
Subsequent AP boot:
KVM will expect to receive an AP Reset Hold exit event indicating that
the vCPU is being parked and will require an INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence to
awaken it. When the AP Reset Hold exit event is received, KVM will place
the vCPU into a simulated HLT mode. Upon receiving the INIT-SIPI-SIPI
sequence, KVM will make the vCPU runnable. It is again up to the guest
to then transfer control of the AP to the proper location.
To differentiate between an actual HLT and an AP Reset Hold, a new MP
state is introduced, KVM_MP_STATE_AP_RESET_HOLD, which the vCPU is
placed in upon receiving the AP Reset Hold exit event. Additionally, to
communicate the AP Reset Hold exit event up to userspace (if needed), a
new exit reason is introduced, KVM_EXIT_AP_RESET_HOLD.
A new x86 ops function is introduced, vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector, in order
to accomplish AP booting. For VMX, vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector is set to the
original SIPI delivery function, kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(). SVM adds
a new function that, for non SEV-ES guests, invokes the original SIPI
delivery function, kvm_vcpu_deliver_sipi_vector(), but for SEV-ES guests,
implements the logic above.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e8fbebe8eb161ceaabdad7c01a5859a78b424d5e.1609791600.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
It is possible to exit the nested guest mode, entered by
svm_set_nested_state prior to first vm entry to it (e.g due to pending event)
if the nested run was not pending during the migration.
In this case we must not switch to the nested msr permission bitmap.
Also add a warning to catch similar cases in the future.
Fixes: a7d5c7ce41 ("KVM: nSVM: delay MSR permission processing to first nested VM run")
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210107093854.882483-2-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
We overwrite most of vmcb fields while doing so, so we must
mark it as dirty.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210107093854.882483-5-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The code to store it on the migration exists, but no code was restoring it.
One of the side effects of fixing this is that L1->L2 injected events
are no longer lost when migration happens with nested run pending.
Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210107093854.882483-3-mlevitsk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Many TDP MMU functions which need to perform some action on all TDP MMU
roots hold a reference on that root so that they can safely drop the MMU
lock in order to yield to other threads. However, when releasing the
reference on the root, there is a bug: the root will not be freed even
if its reference count (root_count) is reduced to 0.
To simplify acquiring and releasing references on TDP MMU root pages, and
to ensure that these roots are properly freed, move the get/put operations
into another TDP MMU root iterator macro.
Moving the get/put operations into an iterator macro also helps
simplify control flow when a root does need to be freed. Note that using
the list_for_each_entry_safe macro would not have been appropriate in
this situation because it could keep a pointer to the next root across
an MMU lock release + reacquire, during which time that root could be
freed.
Reported-by: Maciej S. Szmigiero <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>
Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Fixes: faaf05b00a ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support zapping SPTEs in the TDP MMU")
Fixes: 063afacd87 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support invalidate range MMU notifier for TDP MMU")
Fixes: a6a0b05da9 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support dirty logging for the TDP MMU")
Fixes: 1488199856 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support disabling dirty logging for the tdp MMU")
Signed-off-by: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Message-Id: <20210107001935.3732070-1-bgardon@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Zhang <stephenzhangzsd@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <1608277897-1932-1-git-send-email-stephenzhangzsd@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since we know that e >= s, we can reassociate the left shift,
changing the shifted number from 1 to 2 in exchange for
decreasing the right hand side by 1.
Reported-by: syzbot+e87846c48bf72bc85311@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Commit 16809ecdc1 moved __svm_vcpu_run the prototype to svm.h,
but forgot to remove the original from svm.c.
Fixes: 16809ecdc1 ("KVM: SVM: Provide an updated VMRUN invocation for SEV-ES guests")
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Uros Bizjak <ubizjak@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20201220200339.65115-1-ubizjak@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When using LLVM's integrated assembler (LLVM_IAS=1) while building
x86_64_defconfig + CONFIG_KVM=y + CONFIG_KVM_AMD=y, the following build
error occurs:
$ make LLVM=1 LLVM_IAS=1 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.o
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:2004:15: error: too few operands for instruction
asm volatile(__ex("vmsave") : : "a" (__sme_page_pa(sd->save_area)) : "memory");
^
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:28:17: note: expanded from macro '__ex'
#define __ex(x) __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot(x)
^
./arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h:1646:10: note: expanded from macro '__kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot'
"666: \n\t" \
^
<inline asm>:2:2: note: instantiated into assembly here
vmsave
^
1 error generated.
This happens because LLVM currently does not support calling vmsave
without the fixed register operand (%rax for 64-bit and %eax for
32-bit). This will be fixed in LLVM 12 but the kernel currently supports
LLVM 10.0.1 and newer so this needs to be handled.
Add the proper register using the _ASM_AX macro, which matches the
vmsave call in vmenter.S.
Fixes: 861377730a ("KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loading")
Link: https://reviews.llvm.org/D93524
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1216
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Message-Id: <20201219063711.3526947-1-natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Check only the terminal leaf for a "!PRESENT || MMIO" SPTE when looking
for reserved bits on valid, non-MMIO SPTEs. The get_walk() helpers
terminate their walks if a not-present or MMIO SPTE is encountered, i.e.
the non-terminal SPTEs have already been verified to be regular SPTEs.
This eliminates an extra check-and-branch in a relatively hot loop.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20201218003139.2167891-5-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Bump the size of the sptes array by one and use the raw level of the
SPTE to index into the sptes array. Using the SPTE level directly
improves readability by eliminating the need to reason out why the level
is being adjusted when indexing the array. The array is on the stack
and is not explicitly initialized; bumping its size is nothing more than
a superficial adjustment to the stack frame.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20201218003139.2167891-4-seanjc@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Get the so called "root" level from the low level shadow page table
walkers instead of manually attempting to calculate it higher up the
stack, e.g. in get_mmio_spte(). When KVM is using PAE shadow paging,
the starting level of the walk, from the callers perspective, is not
the CR3 root but rather the PDPTR "root". Checking for reserved bits
from the CR3 root causes get_mmio_spte() to consume uninitialized stack
data due to indexing into sptes[] for a level that was not filled by
get_walk(). This can result in false positives and/or negatives
depending on what garbage happens to be on the stack.
Opportunistically nuke a few extra newlines.
Fixes: 95fb5b0258 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support MMIO in the TDP MMU")
Reported-by: Richard Herbert <rherbert@sympatico.ca>
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20201218003139.2167891-3-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Return -1 from the get_walk() helpers if the shadow walk doesn't fill at
least one spte, which can theoretically happen if the walk hits a
not-present PDPTR. Returning the root level in such a case will cause
get_mmio_spte() to return garbage (uninitialized stack data). In
practice, such a scenario should be impossible as KVM shouldn't get a
reserved-bit page fault with a not-present PDPTR.
Note, using mmu->root_level in get_walk() is wrong for other reasons,
too, but that's now a moot point.
Fixes: 95fb5b0258 ("kvm: x86/mmu: Support MMIO in the TDP MMU")
Cc: Ben Gardon <bgardon@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-Id: <20201218003139.2167891-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
* PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
* New exception injection code
* Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
* Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
* Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
* Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
* PV steal-time cleanups
* Allow function pointers at EL2
* Various host EL2 entry cleanups
* Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
s390:
* memcg accouting for s390 specific parts of kvm and gmap
* selftest for diag318
* new kvm_stat for when async_pf falls back to sync
x86:
* Tracepoints for the new pagetable code from 5.10
* Catch VFIO and KVM irqfd events before userspace
* Reporting dirty pages to userspace with a ring buffer
* SEV-ES host support
* Nested VMX support for wait-for-SIPI activity state
* New feature flag (AVX512 FP16)
* New system ioctl to report Hyper-V-compatible paravirtualization features
Generic:
* Selftest improvements
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm
Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
"Much x86 work was pushed out to 5.12, but ARM more than made up for it.
ARM:
- PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
- New exception injection code
- Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
- Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
- Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
- Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
- PV steal-time cleanups
- Allow function pointers at EL2
- Various host EL2 entry cleanups
- Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
s390:
- memcg accouting for s390 specific parts of kvm and gmap
- selftest for diag318
- new kvm_stat for when async_pf falls back to sync
x86:
- Tracepoints for the new pagetable code from 5.10
- Catch VFIO and KVM irqfd events before userspace
- Reporting dirty pages to userspace with a ring buffer
- SEV-ES host support
- Nested VMX support for wait-for-SIPI activity state
- New feature flag (AVX512 FP16)
- New system ioctl to report Hyper-V-compatible paravirtualization features
Generic:
- Selftest improvements"
* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (171 commits)
KVM: SVM: fix 32-bit compilation
KVM: SVM: Add AP_JUMP_TABLE support in prep for AP booting
KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Provide an updated VMRUN invocation for SEV-ES guests
KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loading
KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading
KVM: SVM: Update ASID allocation to support SEV-ES guests
KVM: SVM: Set the encryption mask for the SVM host save area
KVM: SVM: Add NMI support for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Guest FPU state save/restore not needed for SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Do not report support for SMM for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: x86: Update __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to support SEV-ES
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Support string IO operations for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest
KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT MSR protocol processing
KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT processing
...
A VCPU of a VM can allocate couple of pages which can be mmap'ed by the
user space application. At the moment this memory is not charged to the
memcg of the VMM. On a large machine running large number of VMs or
small number of VMs having large number of VCPUs, this unaccounted
memory can be very significant. So, charge this memory to the memcg of
the VMM. Please note that lifetime of these allocations corresponds to
the lifetime of the VMM.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20201106202923.2087414-1-shakeelb@google.com
Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
VCPU_REGS_R8...VCPU_REGS_R15 are not defined on 32-bit x86,
so cull them from the synchronization of the VMSA.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
- PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
- New exception injection code
- Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
- Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
- Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
- Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
- PV steal-time cleanups
- Allow function pointers at EL2
- Various host EL2 entry cleanups
- Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
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Merge tag 'kvmarm-5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD
KVM/arm64 updates for Linux 5.11
- PSCI relay at EL2 when "protected KVM" is enabled
- New exception injection code
- Simplification of AArch32 system register handling
- Fix PMU accesses when no PMU is enabled
- Expose CSV3 on non-Meltdown hosts
- Cache hierarchy discovery fixes
- PV steal-time cleanups
- Allow function pointers at EL2
- Various host EL2 entry cleanups
- Simplification of the EL2 vector allocation
The GHCB specification requires the hypervisor to save the address of an
AP Jump Table so that, for example, vCPUs that have been parked by UEFI
can be started by the OS. Provide support for the AP Jump Table set/get
exit code.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
An SEV-ES guest is started by invoking a new SEV initialization ioctl,
KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. This identifies the guest as an SEV-ES guest, which is
used to drive the appropriate ASID allocation, VMSA encryption, etc.
Before being able to run an SEV-ES vCPU, the vCPU VMSA must be encrypted
and measured. This is done using the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command after all
calls to LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA have been performed, but before LAUNCH_MEASURE
has been performed. In order to establish the encrypted VMSA, the current
(traditional) VMSA and the GPRs are synced to the page that will hold the
encrypted VMSA and then LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is invoked. The vCPU is then
marked as having protected guest state.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e9643245adb809caf3a87c09997926d2f3d6ff41.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The run sequence is different for an SEV-ES guest compared to a legacy or
even an SEV guest. The guest vCPU register state of an SEV-ES guest will
be restored on VMRUN and saved on VMEXIT. There is no need to restore the
guest registers directly and through VMLOAD before VMRUN and no need to
save the guest registers directly and through VMSAVE on VMEXIT.
Update the svm_vcpu_run() function to skip register state saving and
restoring and provide an alternative function for running an SEV-ES guest
in vmenter.S
Additionally, certain host state is restored across an SEV-ES VMRUN. As
a result certain register states are not required to be restored upon
VMEXIT (e.g. FS, GS, etc.), so only do that if the guest is not an SEV-ES
guest.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fb1c66d32f2194e171b95fc1a8affd6d326e10c1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB vCPU load/put requirements. SEV-ES
hardware will restore certain registers on VMEXIT, but not save them on
VMRUN (see Table B-3 and Table B-4 of the AMD64 APM Volume 2), so make the
following changes:
General vCPU load changes:
- During vCPU loading, perform a VMSAVE to the per-CPU SVM save area and
save the current values of XCR0, XSS and PKRU to the per-CPU SVM save
area as these registers will be restored on VMEXIT.
General vCPU put changes:
- Do not attempt to restore registers that SEV-ES hardware has already
restored on VMEXIT.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <019390e9cb5e93cd73014fa5a040c17d42588733.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
An SEV-ES vCPU requires additional VMCB initialization requirements for
vCPU creation and vCPU load/put requirements. This includes:
General VMCB initialization changes:
- Set a VMCB control bit to enable SEV-ES support on the vCPU.
- Set the VMCB encrypted VM save area address.
- CRx registers are part of the encrypted register state and cannot be
updated. Remove the CRx register read and write intercepts and replace
them with CRx register write traps to track the CRx register values.
- Certain MSR values are part of the encrypted register state and cannot
be updated. Remove certain MSR intercepts (EFER, CR_PAT, etc.).
- Remove the #GP intercept (no support for "enable_vmware_backdoor").
- Remove the XSETBV intercept since the hypervisor cannot modify XCR0.
General vCPU creation changes:
- Set the initial GHCB gpa value as per the GHCB specification.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <3a8aef366416eddd5556dfa3fdc212aafa1ad0a2.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV and SEV-ES guests each have dedicated ASID ranges. Update the ASID
allocation routine to return an ASID in the respective range.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <d7aed505e31e3954268b2015bb60a1486269c780.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The SVM host save area is used to restore some host state on VMEXIT of an
SEV-ES guest. After allocating the save area, clear it and add the
encryption mask to the SVM host save area physical address that is
programmed into the VM_HSAVE_PA MSR.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <b77aa28af6d7f1a0cb545959e08d6dc75e0c3cba.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines how NMIs are to be handled for an SEV-ES
guest. To detect the completion of an NMI the hypervisor must not
intercept the IRET instruction (because a #VC while running the NMI will
issue an IRET) and, instead, must receive an NMI Complete exit event from
the guest.
Update the KVM support for detecting the completion of NMIs in the guest
to follow the GHCB specification. When an SEV-ES guest is active, the
IRET instruction will no longer be intercepted. Now, when the NMI Complete
exit event is received, the iret_interception() function will be called
to simulate the completion of the NMI.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5ea3dd69b8d4396cefdc9048ebc1ab7caa70a847.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The guest FPU state is automatically restored on VMRUN and saved on VMEXIT
by the hardware, so there is no reason to do this in KVM. Eliminate the
allocation of the guest_fpu save area and key off that to skip operations
related to the guest FPU state.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <173e429b4d0d962c6a443c4553ffdaf31b7665a4.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-ES guests do not currently support SMM. Update the has_emulated_msr()
kvm_x86_ops function to take a struct kvm parameter so that the capability
can be reported at a VM level.
Since this op is also called during KVM initialization and before a struct
kvm instance is available, comments will be added to each implementation
of has_emulated_msr() to indicate the kvm parameter can be null.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <75de5138e33b945d2fb17f81ae507bda381808e3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since many of the registers used by the SEV-ES are encrypted and cannot
be read or written, adjust the __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to take into
account whether the VMSA/guest state is encrypted.
For __get_sregs(), return the actual value that is in use by the guest
for all registers being tracked using the write trap support.
For __set_sregs(), skip setting of all guest registers values.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <23051868db76400a9b07a2020525483a1e62dbcf.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR8 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5a01033f4c8b3106ca9374b7cadf8e33da852df1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES guests introduce new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR4 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c3880bf2db8693aa26f648528fbc6e967ab46e25.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of control register write access
is not recommended. Control register interception occurs prior to the
control register being modified and the hypervisor is unable to modify
the control register itself because the register is located in the
encrypted register state.
SEV-ES support introduces new control register write traps. These traps
provide intercept support of a control register write after the control
register has been modified. The new control register value is provided in
the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the hypervisor to track the setting
of the guest control registers.
Add support to track the value of the guest CR0 register using the control
register write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating
mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <182c9baf99df7e40ad9617ff90b84542705ef0d7.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For SEV-ES guests, the interception of EFER write access is not
recommended. EFER interception occurs prior to EFER being modified and
the hypervisor is unable to modify EFER itself because the register is
located in the encrypted register state.
SEV-ES support introduces a new EFER write trap. This trap provides
intercept support of an EFER write after it has been modified. The new
EFER value is provided in the VMCB EXITINFO1 field, allowing the
hypervisor to track the setting of the guest EFER.
Add support to track the value of the guest EFER value using the EFER
write trap so that the hypervisor understands the guest operating mode.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8993149352a3a87cd0625b3b61bfd31ab28977e1.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For an SEV-ES guest, string-based port IO is performed to a shared
(un-encrypted) page so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or
write to it and each see the contents.
For string-based port IO operations, invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the operation using common KVM port IO support.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <9d61daf0ffda496703717218f415cdc8fd487100.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
For an SEV-ES guest, MMIO is performed to a shared (un-encrypted) page
so that both the hypervisor and guest can read or write to it and each
see the contents.
The GHCB specification provides software-defined VMGEXIT exit codes to
indicate a request for an MMIO read or an MMIO write. Add support to
recognize the MMIO requests and invoke SEV-ES specific routines that
can complete the MMIO operation. These routines use common KVM support
to complete the MMIO operation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <af8de55127d5bcc3253d9b6084a0144c12307d4d.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT MSR protocol
processing. The vCPU will be common for the trace events. The MSR
protocol processing is guided by the GHCB GPA in the VMCB, so the GHCB
GPA will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively. Additionally, the exit event will contain the
return code for the event.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c5b3b440c3e0db43ff2fc02813faa94fa54896b0.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Add trace events for entry to and exit from VMGEXIT processing. The vCPU
id and the exit reason will be common for the trace events. The exit info
fields will represent the input and output values for the entry and exit
events, respectively.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <25357dca49a38372e8f483753fb0c1c2a70a6898.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x100 is a request for termination of the guest. The guest has
encountered some situation for which it has requested to be terminated.
The GHCB MSR value contains the reason for the request.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f3a1f7850c75b6ea4101e15bbb4a3af1a203f1dc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x004 is a request for CPUID information. Only a single CPUID
result register can be sent per invocation, so the protocol defines the
register that is requested. The GHCB MSR value is set to the CPUID
register value as per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <fd7ee347d3936e484c06e9001e340bf6387092cd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
The GHCB specification defines a GHCB MSR protocol using the lower
12-bits of the GHCB MSR (in the hypervisor this corresponds to the
GHCB GPA field in the VMCB).
Function 0x002 is a request to set the GHCB MSR value to the SEV INFO as
per the specification via the VMCB GHCB GPA field.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c23c163a505290a0d1b9efc4659b838c8c902cbc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
SEV-ES adds a new VMEXIT reason code, VMGEXIT. Initial support for a
VMGEXIT includes mapping the GHCB based on the guest GPA, which is
obtained from a new VMCB field, and then validating the required inputs
for the VMGEXIT exit reason.
Since many of the VMGEXIT exit reasons correspond to existing VMEXIT
reasons, the information from the GHCB is copied into the VMCB control
exit code areas and KVM register areas. The standard exit handlers are
invoked, similar to standard VMEXIT processing. Before restarting the
vCPU, the GHCB is updated with any registers that have been updated by
the hypervisor.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <c6a4ed4294a369bd75c44d03bd7ce0f0c3840e50.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This is a pre-patch to consolidate some exit handling code into callable
functions. Follow-on patches for SEV-ES exit handling will then be able
to use them from the sev.c file.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <5b8b0ffca8137f3e1e257f83df9f5c881c8a96a3.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When a SHUTDOWN VMEXIT is encountered, normally the VMCB is re-initialized
so that the guest can be re-launched. But when a guest is running as an
SEV-ES guest, the VMSA cannot be re-initialized because it has been
encrypted. For now, just return -EINVAL to prevent a possible attempt at
a guest reset.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <aa6506000f6f3a574de8dbcdab0707df844cb00c.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When a guest is running as an SEV-ES guest, it is not possible to emulate
instructions. Add support to prevent instruction emulation.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <f6355ea3024fda0a3eb5eb99c6b62dca10d792bd.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Since the guest register state of an SEV-ES guest is encrypted, debugging
is not supported. Update the code to prevent guest debugging when the
guest has protected state.
Additionally, an SEV-ES guest must only and always intercept DR7 reads and
writes. Update set_dr_intercepts() and clr_dr_intercepts() to account for
this.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <8db966fa2f9803d6454ce773863025d0e2e7f3cc.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
When a guest is running under SEV-ES, the hypervisor cannot access the
guest register state. There are numerous places in the KVM code where
certain registers are accessed that are not allowed to be accessed (e.g.
RIP, CR0, etc). Add checks to prevent register accesses and add intercept
update support at various points within the KVM code.
Also, when handling a VMGEXIT, exceptions are passed back through the
GHCB. Since the RDMSR/WRMSR intercepts (may) inject a #GP on error,
update the SVM intercepts to handle this for SEV-ES guests.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[Redo MSR part using the .complete_emulated_msr callback. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
This will be used by SEV-ES to inject MSR failure via the GHCB.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Simplify the four functions that handle {kernel,user} {rd,wr}msr, there
is still some repetition between the two instances of rdmsr but the
whole business of calling kvm_inject_gp and kvm_skip_emulated_instruction
can be unified nicely.
Because complete_emulated_wrmsr now becomes essentially a call to
kvm_complete_insn_gp, remove complete_emulated_msr.
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Linus Torvalds