mirror of https://gitee.com/openkylin/linux.git
654 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
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Vlastimil Babka | a9f2a846f0 |
mm, slab: reschedule cache_reap() on the same CPU
cache_reap() is initially scheduled in start_cpu_timer() via schedule_delayed_work_on(). But then the next iterations are scheduled via schedule_delayed_work(), i.e. using WORK_CPU_UNBOUND. Thus since commit |
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Shakeel Butt | f9e13c0a5a |
slab, slub: skip unnecessary kasan_cache_shutdown()
The kasan quarantine is designed to delay freeing slab objects to catch use-after-free. The quarantine can be large (several percent of machine memory size). When kmem_caches are deleted related objects are flushed from the quarantine but this requires scanning the entire quarantine which can be very slow. We have seen the kernel busily working on this while holding slab_mutex and badly affecting cache_reaper, slabinfo readers and memcg kmem cache creations. It can easily reproduced by following script: yes . | head -1000000 | xargs stat > /dev/null for i in `seq 1 10`; do seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs mkdir) seq 500 | xargs -I{} sh -c 'echo $BASHPID > \ /cg/memory/{}/tasks && exec stat .' > /dev/null seq 500 | (cd /cg/memory && xargs rmdir) done The busy stack: kasan_cache_shutdown shutdown_cache memcg_destroy_kmem_caches mem_cgroup_css_free css_free_rwork_fn process_one_work worker_thread kthread ret_from_fork This patch is based on the observation that if the kmem_cache to be destroyed is empty then there should not be any objects of this cache in the quarantine. Without the patch the script got stuck for couple of hours. With the patch the script completed within a second. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180327230603.54721-1-shakeelb@google.com Signed-off-by: Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com> Reviewed-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan | be4a7988b3 |
kasan: make kasan_cache_create() work with 32-bit slab cache sizes
If SLAB doesn't support 4GB+ kmem caches (it never did), KASAN should not do it as well. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-20-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan | 0293d1fdd6 |
slab: make kmem_cache_flags accept 32-bit object size
Now that all sizes are properly typed, propagate "unsigned int" down the callgraph. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-19-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan | f4957d5bd0 |
slab: make kmem_cache_create() work with 32-bit sizes
struct kmem_cache::size and ::align were always 32-bit. Out of curiosity I created 4GB kmem_cache, it oopsed with division by 0. kmem_cache_create(1UL<<32+1) created 1-byte cache as expected. size_t doesn't work and never did. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180305200730.15812-6-adobriyan@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Shakeel Butt | 880cd276df |
mm, slab: memcg_link the SLAB's kmem_cache
All the root caches are linked into slab_root_caches which was introduced by the commit |
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Dmitry Vyukov | ee3ce779b5 |
kasan: don't use __builtin_return_address(1)
__builtin_return_address(1) is unreliable without frame pointers. With defconfig on kmalloc_pagealloc_invalid_free test I am getting: BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free in (null) Pass caller PC from callers explicitly. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/9b01bc2d237a4df74ff8472a3bf6b7635908de01.1514378558.git.dvyukov@google.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>a Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds | 617aebe6a9 |
Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab
cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the next several releases without breaking anyone's system. The series has roughly the following sections: - remove %p and improve reporting with offset - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc - update VFS subsystem with whitelists - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists - update network subsystem with whitelists - update process memory with whitelists - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net> iQIcBAABCgAGBQJabvleAAoJEIly9N/cbcAmO1kQAJnjVPutnLSbnUteZxtsv7W4 43Cggvokfxr6l08Yh3hUowNxZVKjhF9uwMVgRRg9Nl5WdYCN+vCQbHz+ZdzGJXKq cGqdKWgexMKX+aBdNDrK7BphUeD46sH7JWR+a/lDV/BgPxBCm9i5ZZCgXbPP89AZ NpLBji7gz49wMsnm/x135xtNlZ3dG0oKETzi7MiR+NtKtUGvoIszSKy5JdPZ4m8q 9fnXmHqmwM6uQFuzDJPt1o+D1fusTuYnjI7EgyrJRRhQ+BB3qEFZApXnKNDRS9Dm uB7jtcwefJCjlZVCf2+PWTOEifH2WFZXLPFlC8f44jK6iRW2Nc+wVRisJ3vSNBG1 gaRUe/FSge68eyfQj5OFiwM/2099MNkKdZ0fSOjEBeubQpiFChjgWgcOXa5Bhlrr C4CIhFV2qg/tOuHDAF+Q5S96oZkaTy5qcEEwhBSW15ySDUaRWFSrtboNt6ZVOhug d8JJvDCQWoNu1IQozcbv6xW/Rk7miy8c0INZ4q33YUvIZpH862+vgDWfTJ73Zy9H jR/8eG6t3kFHKS1vWdKZzOX1bEcnd02CGElFnFYUEewKoV7ZeeLsYX7zodyUAKyi Yp5CImsDbWWTsptBg6h9nt2TseXTxYCt2bbmpJcqzsqSCUwOQNQ4/YpuzLeG0ihc JgOmUnQNJWCTwUUw5AS1 =tzmJ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull hardened usercopy whitelisting from Kees Cook: "Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass all hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) This new check is WARN-by-default, so any mistakes can be found over the next several releases without breaking anyone's system. The series has roughly the following sections: - remove %p and improve reporting with offset - prepare infrastructure and whitelist kmalloc - update VFS subsystem with whitelists - update SCSI subsystem with whitelists - update network subsystem with whitelists - update process memory with whitelists - update per-architecture thread_struct with whitelists - update KVM with whitelists and fix ioctl bug - mark all other allocations as not whitelisted - update lkdtm for more sensible test overage" * tag 'usercopy-v4.16-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: (38 commits) lkdtm: Update usercopy tests for whitelisting usercopy: Restrict non-usercopy caches to size 0 kvm: x86: fix KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG ioctl kvm: whitelist struct kvm_vcpu_arch arm: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy arm64: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy x86: Implement thread_struct whitelist for hardened usercopy fork: Provide usercopy whitelisting for task_struct fork: Define usercopy region in thread_stack slab caches fork: Define usercopy region in mm_struct slab caches net: Restrict unwhitelisted proto caches to size 0 sctp: Copy struct sctp_sock.autoclose to userspace using put_user() sctp: Define usercopy region in SCTP proto slab cache caif: Define usercopy region in caif proto slab cache ip: Define usercopy region in IP proto slab cache net: Define usercopy region in struct proto slab cache scsi: Define usercopy region in scsi_sense_cache slab cache cifs: Define usercopy region in cifs_request slab cache vxfs: Define usercopy region in vxfs_inode slab cache ufs: Define usercopy region in ufs_inode_cache slab cache ... |
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Oscar Salvador | 84ebb5827d |
mm/slab.c: remove redundant assignments for slab_state
slab_state is being set to "UP" in create_kmalloc_caches(), and later on we set it again in kmem_cache_init_late(), but slab_state does not change in the meantime. Remove the redundant assignment from kmem_cache_init_late(). And unless I overlooked anything, the same goes for "slab_state = FULL". slab_state is set to "FULL" in kmem_cache_init_late(), but it is later being set again in cpucache_init(), which gets called from do_initcall_level(). So remove the assignment from cpucache_init() as well. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171215134452.GA1920@techadventures.net Signed-off-by: Oscar Salvador <osalvador@techadventures.net> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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David Windsor | 6c0c21adc7 |
usercopy: Mark kmalloc caches as usercopy caches
Mark the kmalloc slab caches as entirely whitelisted. These caches are frequently used to fulfill kernel allocations that contain data to be copied to/from userspace. Internal-only uses are also common, but are scattered in the kernel. For now, mark all the kmalloc caches as whitelisted. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: merged in moved kmalloc hunks, adjust commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> |
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Kees Cook | 2d891fbc3b |
usercopy: Allow strict enforcement of whitelists
This introduces CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK to control the behavior of hardened usercopy whitelist violations. By default, whitelist violations will continue to WARN() so that any bad or missing usercopy whitelists can be discovered without being too disruptive. If this config is disabled at build time or a system is booted with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=0", usercopy whitelists will BUG() instead of WARN(). This is useful for admins that want to use usercopy whitelists immediately. Suggested-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
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Kees Cook | afcc90f862 |
usercopy: WARN() on slab cache usercopy region violations
This patch adds checking of usercopy cache whitelisting, and is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. The SLAB and SLUB allocators are modified to WARN() on all copy operations in which the kernel heap memory being modified falls outside of the cache's defined usercopy region. Based on an earlier patch from David Windsor. Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
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David Windsor | 8eb8284b41 |
usercopy: Prepare for usercopy whitelisting
This patch prepares the slab allocator to handle caches having annotations (useroffset and usersize) defining usercopy regions. This patch is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's PAX_USERCOPY whitelisting code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on my understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are mine and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Currently, hardened usercopy performs dynamic bounds checking on slab cache objects. This is good, but still leaves a lot of kernel memory available to be copied to/from userspace in the face of bugs. To further restrict what memory is available for copying, this creates a way to whitelist specific areas of a given slab cache object for copying to/from userspace, allowing much finer granularity of access control. Slab caches that are never exposed to userspace can declare no whitelist for their objects, thereby keeping them unavailable to userspace via dynamic copy operations. (Note, an implicit form of whitelisting is the use of constant sizes in usercopy operations and get_user()/put_user(); these bypass hardened usercopy checks since these sizes cannot change at runtime.) To support this whitelist annotation, usercopy region offset and size members are added to struct kmem_cache. The slab allocator receives a new function, kmem_cache_create_usercopy(), that creates a new cache with a usercopy region defined, suitable for declaring spans of fields within the objects that get copied to/from userspace. In this patch, the default kmem_cache_create() marks the entire allocation as whitelisted, leaving it semantically unchanged. Once all fine-grained whitelists have been added (in subsequent patches), this will be changed to a usersize of 0, making caches created with kmem_cache_create() not copyable to/from userspace. After the entire usercopy whitelist series is applied, less than 15% of the slab cache memory remains exposed to potential usercopy bugs after a fresh boot: Total Slab Memory: 48074720 Usercopyable Memory: 6367532 13.2% task_struct 0.2% 4480/1630720 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 269760/8740224 dentry 11.1% 585984/5273856 mm_struct 29.1% 54912/188448 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 81920/81920 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 167936/167936 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 455616/455616 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 812032/812032 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1310720/1310720 After some kernel build workloads, the percentage (mainly driven by dentry and inode caches expanding) drops under 10%: Total Slab Memory: 95516184 Usercopyable Memory: 8497452 8.8% task_struct 0.2% 4000/1456000 RAW 0.3% 300/96000 RAWv6 2.1% 1408/64768 ext4_inode_cache 3.0% 1217280/39439872 dentry 11.1% 1623200/14608800 mm_struct 29.1% 73216/251264 kmalloc-8 100.0% 24576/24576 kmalloc-16 100.0% 28672/28672 kmalloc-32 100.0% 94208/94208 kmalloc-192 100.0% 96768/96768 kmalloc-128 100.0% 143360/143360 names_cache 100.0% 163840/163840 kmalloc-64 100.0% 245760/245760 kmalloc-256 100.0% 339968/339968 kmalloc-512 100.0% 350720/350720 kmalloc-96 100.0% 563520/563520 kmalloc-8192 100.0% 655360/655360 kmalloc-1024 100.0% 794624/794624 kmalloc-4096 100.0% 819200/819200 kmalloc-2048 100.0% 1257472/1257472 Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dave@nullcore.net> [kees: adjust commit log, split out a few extra kmalloc hunks] [kees: add field names to function declarations] [kees: convert BUGs to WARNs and fail closed] [kees: add attack surface reduction analysis to commit log] Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-xfs@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> |
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Kees Cook | f4e6e289cb |
usercopy: Include offset in hardened usercopy report
This refactors the hardened usercopy code so that failure reporting can happen within the checking functions instead of at the top level. This simplifies the return value handling and allows more details and offsets to be included in the report. Having the offset can be much more helpful in understanding hardened usercopy bugs. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> |
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Geert Uytterhoeven | 85c3e4a5a1 |
mm/slab.c: do not hash pointers when debugging slab
If CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB/CONFIG_DEBUG_SLAB_LEAK are enabled, the slab code
prints extra debug information when e.g. corruption is detected. This
includes pointers, which are not very useful when hashed.
Fix this by using %px to print unhashed pointers instead where it makes
sense, and by removing the printing of a last user pointer referring to
code.
[geert+renesas@glider.be: v2]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513179267-2509-1-git-send-email-geert+renesas@glider.be
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1512641861-5113-1-git-send-email-geert+renesas@glider.be
Fixes:
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Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin) | 75f296d93b |
kmemcheck: stop using GFP_NOTRACK and SLAB_NOTRACK
Convert all allocations that used a NOTRACK flag to stop using it. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-3-alexander.levin@verizon.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Levin, Alexander (Sasha Levin) | 4950276672 |
kmemcheck: remove annotations
Patch series "kmemcheck: kill kmemcheck", v2. As discussed at LSF/MM, kill kmemcheck. KASan is a replacement that is able to work without the limitation of kmemcheck (single CPU, slow). KASan is already upstream. We are also not aware of any users of kmemcheck (or users who don't consider KASan as a suitable replacement). The only objection was that since KASAN wasn't supported by all GCC versions provided by distros at that time we should hold off for 2 years, and try again. Now that 2 years have passed, and all distros provide gcc that supports KASAN, kill kmemcheck again for the very same reasons. This patch (of 4): Remove kmemcheck annotations, and calls to kmemcheck from the kernel. [alexander.levin@verizon.com: correctly remove kmemcheck call from dma_map_sg_attrs] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171012192151.26531-1-alexander.levin@verizon.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171007030159.22241-2-alexander.levin@verizon.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Tim Hansen <devtimhansen@gmail.com> Cc: Vegard Nossum <vegardno@ifi.uio.no> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan | 4fd0b46e89 |
slab, slub, slob: convert slab_flags_t to 32-bit
struct kmem_cache::flags is "unsigned long" which is unnecessary on 64-bit as no flags are defined in the higher bits. Switch the field to 32-bit and save some space on x86_64 until such flags appear: add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 0/107 up/down: 0/-657 (-657) function old new delta sysfs_slab_add 720 719 -1 ... check_object 699 676 -23 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix printk warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171021100635.GA8287@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Alexey Dobriyan | d50112edde |
slab, slub, slob: add slab_flags_t
Add sparse-checked slab_flags_t for struct kmem_cache::flags (SLAB_POISON, etc). SLAB is bloated temporarily by switching to "unsigned long", but only temporarily. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171021100225.GA22428@avx2 Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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David Rientjes | a3ba074447 |
mm/slab.c: only set __GFP_RECLAIMABLE once
SLAB_RECLAIM_ACCOUNT is a permanent attribute of a slab cache. Set __GFP_RECLAIMABLE as part of its ->allocflags rather than check the cachep flag on every page allocation. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1710171527560.140898@chino.kir.corp.google.com Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Yang Shi | 5b36577109 |
mm: slabinfo: remove CONFIG_SLABINFO
According to discussion with Christoph (https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=150695909709711&w=2), it sounds like it is pointless to keep CONFIG_SLABINFO around. This patch removes the CONFIG_SLABINFO config option, but /proc/slabinfo is still available. [yang.s@alibaba-inc.com: v11] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507656303-103845-3-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1507152550-46205-3-git-send-email-yang.s@alibaba-inc.com Signed-off-by: Yang Shi <yang.s@alibaba-inc.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Greg Kroah-Hartman | b24413180f |
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Johannes Weiner | 7779f21236 |
mm: memcontrol: account slab stats per lruvec
Josef's redesign of the balancing between slab caches and the page cache requires slab cache statistics at the lruvec level. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530181724.27197-7-hannes@cmpxchg.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Johannes Weiner | 385386cff4 |
mm: vmstat: move slab statistics from zone to node counters
Patch series "mm: per-lruvec slab stats" Josef is working on a new approach to balancing slab caches and the page cache. For this to work, he needs slab cache statistics on the lruvec level. These patches implement that by adding infrastructure that allows updating and reading generic VM stat items per lruvec, then switches some existing VM accounting sites, including the slab accounting ones, to this new cgroup-aware API. I'll follow up with more patches on this, because there is actually substantial simplification that can be done to the memory controller when we replace private memcg accounting with making the existing VM accounting sites cgroup-aware. But this is enough for Josef to base his slab reclaim work on, so here goes. This patch (of 5): To re-implement slab cache vs. page cache balancing, we'll need the slab counters at the lruvec level, which, ever since lru reclaim was moved from the zone to the node, is the intersection of the node, not the zone, and the memcg. We could retain the per-zone counters for when the page allocator dumps its memory information on failures, and have counters on both levels - which on all but NUMA node 0 is usually redundant. But let's keep it simple for now and just move them. If anybody complains we can restore the per-zone counters. [hannes@cmpxchg.org: fix oops] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170605183511.GA8915@cmpxchg.org Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170530181724.27197-3-hannes@cmpxchg.org Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Canjiang Lu | e077195029 |
mm/slab.c: replace open-coded round-up code with ALIGN
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170616072918epcms5p4ff16c24ef8472b4c3b4371823cd87856@epcms5p4 Signed-off-by: Canjiang Lu <canjiang.lu@samsung.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds | de4d195308 |
Merge branch 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull RCU updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main changes are: - Debloat RCU headers - Parallelize SRCU callback handling (plus overlapping patches) - Improve the performance of Tree SRCU on a CPU-hotplug stress test - Documentation updates - Miscellaneous fixes" * 'core-rcu-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (74 commits) rcu: Open-code the rcu_cblist_n_lazy_cbs() function rcu: Open-code the rcu_cblist_n_cbs() function rcu: Open-code the rcu_cblist_empty() function rcu: Separately compile large rcu_segcblist functions srcu: Debloat the <linux/rcu_segcblist.h> header srcu: Adjust default auto-expediting holdoff srcu: Specify auto-expedite holdoff time srcu: Expedite first synchronize_srcu() when idle srcu: Expedited grace periods with reduced memory contention srcu: Make rcutorture writer stalls print SRCU GP state srcu: Exact tracking of srcu_data structures containing callbacks srcu: Make SRCU be built by default srcu: Fix Kconfig botch when SRCU not selected rcu: Make non-preemptive schedule be Tasks RCU quiescent state srcu: Expedite srcu_schedule_cbs_snp() callback invocation srcu: Parallelize callback handling kvm: Move srcu_struct fields to end of struct kvm rcu: Fix typo in PER_RCU_NODE_PERIOD header comment rcu: Use true/false in assignment to bool rcu: Use bool value directly ... |
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Greg Thelen | a87c75fbcc |
slab: avoid IPIs when creating kmem caches
Each slab kmem cache has per cpu array caches. The array caches are created when the kmem_cache is created, either via kmem_cache_create() or lazily when the first object is allocated in context of a kmem enabled memcg. Array caches are replaced by writing to /proc/slabinfo. Array caches are protected by holding slab_mutex or disabling interrupts. Array cache allocation and replacement is done by __do_tune_cpucache() which holds slab_mutex and calls kick_all_cpus_sync() to interrupt all remote processors which confirms there are no references to the old array caches. IPIs are needed when replacing array caches. But when creating a new array cache, there's no need to send IPIs because there cannot be any references to the new cache. Outside of memcg kmem accounting these IPIs occur at boot time, so they're not a problem. But with memcg kmem accounting each container can create kmem caches, so the IPIs are wasteful. Avoid unnecessary IPIs when creating array caches. Test which reports the IPI count of allocating slab in 10000 memcg: import os def ipi_count(): with open("/proc/interrupts") as f: for l in f: if 'Function call interrupts' in l: return int(l.split()[1]) def echo(val, path): with open(path, "w") as f: f.write(val) n = 10000 os.chdir("/mnt/cgroup/memory") pid = str(os.getpid()) a = ipi_count() for i in range(n): os.mkdir(str(i)) echo("1G\n", "%d/memory.limit_in_bytes" % i) echo("1G\n", "%d/memory.kmem.limit_in_bytes" % i) echo(pid, "%d/cgroup.procs" % i) open("/tmp/x", "w").close() os.unlink("/tmp/x") b = ipi_count() print "%d loops: %d => %d (+%d ipis)" % (n, a, b, b-a) echo(pid, "cgroup.procs") for i in range(n): os.rmdir(str(i)) patched: 10000 loops: 1069 => 1170 (+101 ipis) unpatched: 10000 loops: 1192 => 48933 (+47741 ipis) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170416214544.109476-1-gthelen@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Paul E. McKenney | 5f0d5a3ae7 |
mm: Rename SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU
A group of Linux kernel hackers reported chasing a bug that resulted from their assumption that SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU provided an existence guarantee, that is, that no block from such a slab would be reallocated during an RCU read-side critical section. Of course, that is not the case. Instead, SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU only prevents freeing of an entire slab of blocks. However, there is a phrase for this, namely "type safety". This commit therefore renames SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU to SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU in order to avoid future instances of this sort of confusion. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: <linux-mm@kvack.org> Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> [ paulmck: Add comments mentioning the old name, as requested by Eric Dumazet, in order to help people familiar with the old name find the new one. ] Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> |
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Ingo Molnar | 3f8c24529b |
sched/headers: Prepare to move kstack_end() from <linux/sched.h> to <linux/sched/task_stack.h>
But first update the usage sites with the new header dependency. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Tejun Heo | c9fc586403 |
slab: introduce __kmemcg_cache_deactivate()
__kmem_cache_shrink() is called with %true @deactivate only for memcg caches. Remove @deactivate from __kmem_cache_shrink() and introduce __kmemcg_cache_deactivate() instead. Each memcg-supporting allocator should implement it and it should deactivate and drain the cache. This is to allow memcg cache deactivation behavior to further deviate from simple shrinking without messing up __kmem_cache_shrink(). This is pure reorganization and doesn't introduce any observable behavior changes. v2: Dropped unnecessary ifdef in mm/slab.h as suggested by Vladimir. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170117235411.9408-8-tj@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Tejun Heo | 290b6a58b7 |
Revert "slub: move synchronize_sched out of slab_mutex on shrink"
Patch series "slab: make memcg slab destruction scalable", v3.
With kmem cgroup support enabled, kmem_caches can be created and
destroyed frequently and a great number of near empty kmem_caches can
accumulate if there are a lot of transient cgroups and the system is not
under memory pressure. When memory reclaim starts under such
conditions, it can lead to consecutive deactivation and destruction of
many kmem_caches, easily hundreds of thousands on moderately large
systems, exposing scalability issues in the current slab management
code.
I've seen machines which end up with hundred thousands of caches and
many millions of kernfs_nodes. The current code is O(N^2) on the total
number of caches and has synchronous rcu_barrier() and
synchronize_sched() in cgroup offline / release path which is executed
while holding cgroup_mutex. Combined, this leads to very expensive and
slow cache destruction operations which can easily keep running for half
a day.
This also messes up /proc/slabinfo along with other cache iterating
operations. seq_file operates on 4k chunks and on each 4k boundary
tries to seek to the last position in the list. With a huge number of
caches on the list, this becomes very slow and very prone to the list
content changing underneath it leading to a lot of missing and/or
duplicate entries.
This patchset addresses the scalability problem.
* Add root and per-memcg lists. Update each user to use the
appropriate list.
* Make rcu_barrier() for SLAB_DESTROY_BY_RCU caches globally batched
and asynchronous.
* For dying empty slub caches, remove the sysfs files after
deactivation so that we don't end up with millions of sysfs files
without any useful information on them.
This patchset contains the following nine patches.
0001-Revert-slub-move-synchronize_sched-out-of-slab_mutex.patch
0002-slub-separate-out-sysfs_slab_release-from-sysfs_slab.patch
0003-slab-remove-synchronous-rcu_barrier-call-in-memcg-ca.patch
0004-slab-reorganize-memcg_cache_params.patch
0005-slab-link-memcg-kmem_caches-on-their-associated-memo.patch
0006-slab-implement-slab_root_caches-list.patch
0007-slab-introduce-__kmemcg_cache_deactivate.patch
0008-slab-remove-synchronous-synchronize_sched-from-memcg.patch
0009-slab-remove-slub-sysfs-interface-files-early-for-emp.patch
0010-slab-use-memcg_kmem_cache_wq-for-slab-destruction-op.patch
0001 reverts an existing optimization to prepare for the following
changes. 0002 is a prep patch. 0003 makes rcu_barrier() in release
path batched and asynchronous. 0004-0006 separate out the lists.
0007-0008 replace synchronize_sched() in slub destruction path with
call_rcu_sched(). 0009 removes sysfs files early for empty dying
caches. 0010 makes destruction work items use a workqueue with limited
concurrency.
This patch (of 10):
Revert
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Vlastimil Babka | af3b5f8764 |
mm, slab: rename kmalloc-node cache to kmalloc-<size>
SLAB as part of its bootstrap pre-creates one kmalloc cache that can fit the kmem_cache_node management structure, and puts it into the generic kmalloc cache array (e.g. for 128b objects). The name of this cache is "kmalloc-node", which is confusing for readers of /proc/slabinfo as the cache is used for generic allocations (and not just the kmem_cache_node struct) and it appears as the kmalloc-128 cache is missing. An easy solution is to use the kmalloc-<size> name when pre-creating the cache, which we can get from the kmalloc_info array. Example /proc/slabinfo before the patch: ... kmalloc-256 1647 1984 256 16 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 124 124 828 kmalloc-192 1974 1974 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 94 94 133 kmalloc-96 1332 1344 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 42 42 219 kmalloc-64 2505 5952 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 93 93 715 kmalloc-32 4278 4464 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 36 36 346 kmalloc-node 1352 1376 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 43 43 53 kmem_cache 132 147 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 7 7 0 After the patch: ... kmalloc-256 1672 2160 256 16 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 135 135 807 kmalloc-192 1992 2016 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 96 96 203 kmalloc-96 1159 1184 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 37 37 116 kmalloc-64 2561 4864 64 64 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 76 76 785 kmalloc-32 4253 4340 32 124 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 35 35 270 kmalloc-128 1256 1280 128 32 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 40 40 39 kmem_cache 125 147 192 21 1 : tunables 120 60 8 : slabdata 7 7 0 [vbabka@suse.cz: export the whole kmalloc_info structure instead of just a name accessor, per Christoph Lameter] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/54e80303-b814-4232-66d4-95b34d3eb9d0@suse.cz Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170203181008.24898-1-vbabka@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Reviewed-by: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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John Sperbeck | c4e490cf14 |
mm/slab.c: fix SLAB freelist randomization duplicate entries
This patch fixes a bug in the freelist randomization code. When a high
random number is used, the freelist will contain duplicate entries. It
will result in different allocations sharing the same chunk.
It will result in odd behaviours and crashes. It should be uncommon but
it depends on the machines. We saw it happening more often on some
machines (every few hours of running tests).
Fixes:
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Linus Torvalds | c11a6cfb01 |
Merge branch 'for-4.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq
Pull workqueue updates from Tejun Heo: "Mostly patches to initialize workqueue subsystem earlier and get rid of keventd_up(). The patches were headed for the last merge cycle but got delayed due to a bug found late minute, which is fixed now. Also, to help debugging, destroy_workqueue() is more chatty now on a sanity check failure." * 'for-4.10' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tj/wq: workqueue: move wq_numa_init() to workqueue_init() workqueue: remove keventd_up() debugobj, workqueue: remove keventd_up() usage slab, workqueue: remove keventd_up() usage power, workqueue: remove keventd_up() usage tty, workqueue: remove keventd_up() usage mce, workqueue: remove keventd_up() usage workqueue: make workqueue available early during boot workqueue: dump workqueue state on sanity check failures in destroy_workqueue() |
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David Rientjes | bf00bd3458 |
mm, slab: maintain total slab count instead of active count
Rather than tracking the number of active slabs for each node, track the total number of slabs. This is a minor improvement that avoids active slab tracking when a slab goes from free to partial or partial to free. For slab debugging, this also removes an explicit free count since it can easily be inferred by the difference in number of total objects and number of active objects. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.10.1612042020110.115755@chino.kir.corp.google.com Signed-off-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Suggested-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com> Cc: Aruna Ramakrishna <aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Greg Thelen | f728b0a5d7 |
mm, slab: faster active and free stats
Reading /proc/slabinfo or monitoring slabtop(1) can become very
expensive if there are many slab caches and if there are very lengthy
per-node partial and/or free lists.
Commit
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Vladimir Davydov | 89e364db71 |
slub: move synchronize_sched out of slab_mutex on shrink
synchronize_sched() is a heavy operation and calling it per each cache owned by a memory cgroup being destroyed may take quite some time. What is worse, it's currently called under the slab_mutex, stalling all works doing cache creation/destruction. Actually, there isn't much point in calling synchronize_sched() for each cache - it's enough to call it just once - after setting cpu_partial for all caches and before shrinking them. This way, we can also move it out of the slab_mutex, which we have to hold for iterating over the slab cache list. Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=172991 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/0a10d71ecae3db00fb4421bcd3f82bcc911f4be4.1475329751.git.vdavydov.dev@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com> Reported-by: Doug Smythies <dsmythies@telus.net> Acked-by: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Aruna Ramakrishna | 07a63c41fa |
mm/slab: improve performance of gathering slabinfo stats
On large systems, when some slab caches grow to millions of objects (and many gigabytes), running 'cat /proc/slabinfo' can take up to 1-2 seconds. During this time, interrupts are disabled while walking the slab lists (slabs_full, slabs_partial, and slabs_free) for each node, and this sometimes causes timeouts in other drivers (for instance, Infiniband). This patch optimizes 'cat /proc/slabinfo' by maintaining a counter for total number of allocated slabs per node, per cache. This counter is updated when a slab is created or destroyed. This enables us to skip traversing the slabs_full list while gathering slabinfo statistics, and since slabs_full tends to be the biggest list when the cache is large, it results in a dramatic performance improvement. Getting slabinfo statistics now only requires walking the slabs_free and slabs_partial lists, and those lists are usually much smaller than slabs_full. We tested this after growing the dentry cache to 70GB, and the performance improved from 2s to 5ms. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1472517876-26814-1-git-send-email-aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com Signed-off-by: Aruna Ramakrishna <aruna.ramakrishna@oracle.com> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Joonsoo Kim | 86d9f48534 |
mm/slab: fix kmemcg cache creation delayed issue
There is a bug report that SLAB makes extreme load average due to over
2000 kworker thread.
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=172981
This issue is caused by kmemcg feature that try to create new set of
kmem_caches for each memcg. Recently, kmem_cache creation is slowed by
synchronize_sched() and futher kmem_cache creation is also delayed since
kmem_cache creation is synchronized by a global slab_mutex lock. So,
the number of kworker that try to create kmem_cache increases quietly.
synchronize_sched() is for lockless access to node's shared array but
it's not needed when a new kmem_cache is created. So, this patch rules
out that case.
Fixes:
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Tejun Heo | 8bc4a04455 | Merge branch 'for-4.9' into for-4.10 | |
Tejun Heo | eac0337af1 |
slab, workqueue: remove keventd_up() usage
Now that workqueue can handle work item queueing from very early during boot, there is no need to gate schedule_delayed_work_on() while !keventd_up(). Remove it. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org |
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Sebastian Andrzej Siewior | 6731d4f123 |
slab: Convert to hotplug state machine
Install the callbacks via the state machine. Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: rt@linutronix.de Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160823125319.abeapfjapf2kfezp@linutronix.de Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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Linus Torvalds | 1eccfa090e |
Implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user/copy_from_user
bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and SLUB. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 Comment: Kees Cook <kees@outflux.net> iQIcBAABCgAGBQJXl9tlAAoJEIly9N/cbcAm5BoP/ikTtDp2bFw1sn92yHTnIWzl O+dcKVAeRgjfnSvPfb1JITpaM58exQSaDsPBeR0DbVzU1zDdhLcwHHiQupFh98Ka vBZthbrlL/u4NB26enEEW0iyA32BsxYBMnIu0z5ux9RbZflmQwGQ0c0rvy3dJ7/b FzB5ayVST5y/a0m6/sImeeExh78GU9rsMb1XmJRMwlJAy6miDz/F9TP0LnuW6PhG J5XC99ygNJS1pQBLACRsrZw6ImgBxXnWCok6tWPMxFfD+rJBU2//wqS+HozyMWHL iYP7+ytVo/ZVok4114X/V4Oof3a6wqgpBuYrivJ228QO+UsLYbYLo6sZ8kRK7VFm 9GgHo/8rWB1T9lBbSaa7UL5r0dVNNLjFGS42vwV+YlgUMQ1A35VRojO0jUnJSIQU Ug1IxKmylLd0nEcwD8/l3DXeQABsfL8GsoKW0OtdTZtW4RND4gzq34LK6t7hvayF kUkLg1OLNdUJwOi16M/rhugwYFZIMfoxQtjkRXKWN4RZ2QgSHnx2lhqNmRGPAXBG uy21wlzUTfLTqTpoeOyHzJwyF2qf2y4nsziBMhvmlrUvIzW1LIrYUKCNT4HR8Sh5 lC2WMGYuIqaiu+NOF3v6CgvKd9UW+mxMRyPEybH8mEgfm+FLZlWABiBjIUpSEZuB JFfuMv1zlljj/okIQRg8 =USIR -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux Pull usercopy protection from Kees Cook: "Tbhis implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user and copy_from_user bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and SLUB" * tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux: mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy mm: Hardened usercopy mm: Implement stack frame object validation mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page |
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Fabian Frederick | bd721ea73e |
treewide: replace obsolete _refok by __ref
There was only one use of __initdata_refok and __exit_refok
__init_refok was used 46 times against 82 for __ref.
Those definitions are obsolete since commit
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Andrey Ryabinin | b3cbd9bf77 |
mm/kasan: get rid of ->state in struct kasan_alloc_meta
The state of object currently tracked in two places - shadow memory, and the ->state field in struct kasan_alloc_meta. We can get rid of the latter. The will save us a little bit of memory. Also, this allow us to move free stack into struct kasan_alloc_meta, without increasing memory consumption. So now we should always know when the last time the object was freed. This may be useful for long delayed use-after-free bugs. As a side effect this fixes following UBSAN warning: UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in mm/kasan/quarantine.c:102:13 member access within misaligned address ffff88000d1efebc for type 'struct qlist_node' which requires 8 byte alignment Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1470062715-14077-5-git-send-email-aryabinin@virtuozzo.com Reported-by: kernel test robot <xiaolong.ye@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Wei Yongjun | de24baecd7 |
mm/slab: use list_move instead of list_del/list_add
Using list_move() instead of list_del() + list_add() to avoid needlessly poisoning the next and prev values. Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1468929772-9174-1-git-send-email-weiyj_lk@163.com Signed-off-by: Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Acked-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Michal Hocko | 72baeef0c2 |
slab: do not panic on invalid gfp_mask
Both SLAB and SLUB BUG() when a caller provides an invalid gfp_mask. This is a rather harsh way to announce a non-critical issue. Allocator is free to ignore invalid flags. Let's simply replace BUG() by dump_stack to tell the offender and fixup the mask to move on with the allocation request. This is an example for kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_HIGHMEM) from a test module: Unexpected gfp: 0x2 (__GFP_HIGHMEM). Fixing up to gfp: 0x24000c0 (GFP_KERNEL). Fix your code! CPU: 0 PID: 2916 Comm: insmod Tainted: G O 4.6.0-slabgfp2-00002-g4cdfc2ef4892-dirty #936 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Debian-1.8.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack+0x67/0x90 cache_alloc_refill+0x201/0x617 kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xa7/0x24a ? 0xffffffffa0005000 mymodule_init+0x20/0x1000 [test_slab] do_one_initcall+0xe7/0x16c ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x61/0x69 ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x197/0x24a do_init_module+0x5f/0x1d9 load_module+0x1a3d/0x1f21 ? retint_kernel+0x2d/0x2d SyS_init_module+0xe8/0x10e ? SyS_init_module+0xe8/0x10e do_syscall_64+0x68/0x13f entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25 Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465548200-11384-2-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Michal Hocko | bacdcb3460 |
slab: make GFP_SLAB_BUG_MASK information more human readable
printk offers %pGg for quite some time so let's use it to get a human readable list of invalid flags. The original output would be [ 429.191962] gfp: 2 after the change [ 429.191962] Unexpected gfp: 0x2 (__GFP_HIGHMEM) Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1465548200-11384-1-git-send-email-mhocko@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky.work@gmail.com> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Thomas Garnier | 7c00fce98c |
mm: reorganize SLAB freelist randomization
The kernel heap allocators are using a sequential freelist making their allocation predictable. This predictability makes kernel heap overflow easier to exploit. An attacker can careful prepare the kernel heap to control the following chunk overflowed. For example these attacks exploit the predictability of the heap: - Linux Kernel CAN SLUB overflow (https://goo.gl/oMNWkU) - Exploiting Linux Kernel Heap corruptions (http://goo.gl/EXLn95) ***Problems that needed solving: - Randomize the Freelist (singled linked) used in the SLUB allocator. - Ensure good performance to encourage usage. - Get best entropy in early boot stage. ***Parts: - 01/02 Reorganize the SLAB Freelist randomization to share elements with the SLUB implementation. - 02/02 The SLUB Freelist randomization implementation. Similar approach than the SLAB but tailored to the singled freelist used in SLUB. ***Performance data: slab_test impact is between 3% to 4% on average for 100000 attempts without smp. It is a very focused testing, kernbench show the overall impact on the system is way lower. Before: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 49 cycles kfree -> 77 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 51 cycles kfree -> 79 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 53 cycles kfree -> 83 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 62 cycles kfree -> 90 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 81 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 98 cycles kfree -> 121 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 95 cycles kfree -> 122 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 96 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 140 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 149 cycles kfree -> 171 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 69 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 70 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 73 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 72 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 71 cycles After: Single thread testing ===================== 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test 100000 times kmalloc(8) -> 57 cycles kfree -> 78 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16) -> 61 cycles kfree -> 81 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32) -> 76 cycles kfree -> 93 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64) -> 83 cycles kfree -> 94 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128) -> 106 cycles kfree -> 107 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 117 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512) -> 114 cycles kfree -> 116 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 115 cycles kfree -> 118 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 147 cycles kfree -> 131 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 214 cycles kfree -> 161 cycles 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test 100000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 66 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 65 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 64 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 67 cycles 100000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 67 cycles Kernbench, before: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 101.873 (1.16069) User Time 1045.22 (1.60447) System Time 88.969 (0.559195) Percent CPU 1112.9 (13.8279) Context Switches 189140 (2282.15) Sleeps 99008.6 (768.091) After: Average Optimal load -j 12 Run (std deviation): Elapsed Time 102.47 (0.562732) User Time 1045.3 (1.34263) System Time 88.311 (0.342554) Percent CPU 1105.8 (6.49444) Context Switches 189081 (2355.78) Sleeps 99231.5 (800.358) This patch (of 2): This commit reorganizes the previous SLAB freelist randomization to prepare for the SLUB implementation. It moves functions that will be shared to slab_common. The entropy functions are changed to align with the SLUB implementation, now using get_random_(int|long) functions. These functions were chosen because they provide a bit more entropy early on boot and better performance when specific arch instructions are not available. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464295031-26375-2-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier <thgarnie@google.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Kees Cook | 04385fc5e8 |
mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
Under CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY, this adds object size checking to the SLAB allocator to catch any copies that may span objects. Based on code from PaX and grsecurity. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Tested-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu> |