Commit Graph

216 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Xin Long 441ae65ae0 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_abort_chunk_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_abort_chunk_t, and
replace with struct sctp_abort_chunk in the places where it's
using this typedef.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-24 16:01:20 -07:00
Xin Long 38c00f7482 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_heartbeat_chunk_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_heartbeat_chunk_t, and
replace with struct sctp_heartbeat_chunk in the places where it's
using this typedef.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-24 16:01:20 -07:00
Xin Long 4d2dcdf4e0 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_heartbeathdr_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_heartbeathdr_t, and
replace with struct sctp_heartbeathdr in the places where it's
using this typedef.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-24 16:01:20 -07:00
Xin Long d4d6c61489 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_sack_chunk_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_sack_chunk_t, and
replace with struct sctp_sack_chunk in the places where it's
using this typedef.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-24 16:01:20 -07:00
Xin Long 787310859d sctp: remove the typedef sctp_sackhdr_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_sackhdr_t, and replace
with struct sctp_sackhdr in the places where it's using this
typedef.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-24 16:01:20 -07:00
Xin Long 62e6b7e4ee sctp: remove the typedef sctp_unrecognized_param_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_unrecognized_param_t, and
replace with struct sctp_unrecognized_param in the places where it's
using this typedef.

It is also to fix some indents in sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init() and
sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init().

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-24 16:01:19 -07:00
Xin Long cb1844c472 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_initack_chunk_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_initack_chunk_t, and
replace with struct sctp_initack_chunk in the places where it's
using this typedef.

It is also to use sizeof(variable) instead of sizeof(type).

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-24 16:01:19 -07:00
Xin Long 365ddb65e7 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_cookie_preserve_param_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_cookie_preserve_param_t, and
replace with struct sctp_cookie_preserve_param in the places where it's
using this typedef.

It is also to fix some indents in sctp_sf_do_5_2_6_stale().

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-16 20:52:13 -07:00
Xin Long 01a992bea5 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_init_chunk_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_init_chunk_t, and replace
with struct sctp_init_chunk in the places where it's using this
typedef.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-01 09:08:42 -07:00
Xin Long 4ae70c0845 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_inithdr_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_inithdr_t, and replace
with struct sctp_inithdr in the places where it's using this
typedef.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-01 09:08:42 -07:00
Xin Long 9f8d314715 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_data_chunk_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_data_chunk_t, and replace
with struct sctp_data_chunk in the places where it's using this
typedef.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-01 09:08:42 -07:00
Xin Long 3583df1a3d sctp: remove the typedef sctp_datahdr_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_datahdr_t, and replace with
struct sctp_datahdr in the places where it's using this typedef.

It is also to use izeof(variable) instead of sizeof(type).

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-01 09:08:41 -07:00
Xin Long 3c91870492 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_paramhdr_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_paramhdr_t, and replace
with struct sctp_paramhdr in the places where it's using this
typedef.

It is also to fix some indents and  use sizeof(variable) instead
of sizeof(type).

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-01 09:08:41 -07:00
Xin Long 922dbc5be2 sctp: remove the typedef sctp_chunkhdr_t
This patch is to remove the typedef sctp_chunkhdr_t, and replace
with struct sctp_chunkhdr in the places where it's using this
typedef.

It is also to fix some indents and use sizeof(variable) instead
of sizeof(type)., especially in sctp_new.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-07-01 09:08:41 -07:00
Johannes Berg d58ff35122 networking: make skb_push & __skb_push return void pointers
It seems like a historic accident that these return unsigned char *,
and in many places that means casts are required, more often than not.

Make these functions return void * and remove all the casts across
the tree, adding a (u8 *) cast only where the unsigned char pointer
was used directly, all done with the following spatch:

    @@
    expression SKB, LEN;
    typedef u8;
    identifier fn = { skb_push, __skb_push, skb_push_rcsum };
    @@
    - *(fn(SKB, LEN))
    + *(u8 *)fn(SKB, LEN)

    @@
    expression E, SKB, LEN;
    identifier fn = { skb_push, __skb_push, skb_push_rcsum };
    type T;
    @@
    - E = ((T *)(fn(SKB, LEN)))
    + E = fn(SKB, LEN)

    @@
    expression SKB, LEN;
    identifier fn = { skb_push, __skb_push, skb_push_rcsum };
    @@
    - fn(SKB, LEN)[0]
    + *(u8 *)fn(SKB, LEN)

Note that the last part there converts from push(...)[0] to the
more idiomatic *(u8 *)push(...).

Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-16 11:48:40 -04:00
Xin Long cee360ab4d sctp: define the member stream as an object instead of pointer in asoc
As Marcelo's suggestion, stream is a fixed size member of asoc and would
not grow with more streams. To avoid an allocation for it, this patch is
to define it as an object instead of pointer and update the places using
it, also create sctp_stream_update() called in sctp_assoc_update() to
migrate the stream info from one stream to another.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-06-02 13:56:26 -04:00
Xin Long 7e06297768 sctp: set new_asoc temp when processing dupcookie
After sctp changed to use transport hashtable, a transport would be
added into global hashtable when adding the peer to an asoc, then
the asoc can be got by searching the transport in the hashtbale.

The problem is when processing dupcookie in sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook,
a new asoc would be created. A peer with the same addr and port as
the one in the old asoc might be added into the new asoc, but fail
to be added into the hashtable, as they also belong to the same sk.

It causes that sctp's dupcookie processing can not really work.

Since the new asoc will be freed after copying it's information to
the old asoc, it's more like a temp asoc. So this patch is to fix
it by setting it as a temp asoc to avoid adding it's any transport
into the hashtable and also avoid allocing assoc_id.

An extra thing it has to do is to also alloc stream info for any
temp asoc, as sctp dupcookie process needs it to update old asoc.
But I don't think it would hurt something, as a temp asoc would
always be freed after finishing processing cookie echo packet.

Reported-by: Jianwen Ji <jiji@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-05-24 15:21:04 -04:00
David S. Miller 6f14f443d3 Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net
Mostly simple cases of overlapping changes (adding code nearby,
a function whose name changes, for example).

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-06 08:24:51 -07:00
Xin Long afe89962ee sctp: use right in and out stream cnt
Since sctp reconf was added in sctp, the real cnt of in/out stream
have not been c.sinit_max_instreams and c.sinit_num_ostreams any
more.

This patch is to replace them with stream->in/outcnt.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-04-01 20:12:30 -07:00
Xin Long 11ae76e67a sctp: implement receiver-side procedures for the Reconf Response Parameter
This patch is to implement Receiver-Side Procedures for the
Re-configuration Response Parameter in rfc6525 section 5.2.7.

sctp_process_strreset_resp would process the response for any
kind of reconf request, and the stream reconf is applied only
when the response result is success.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-12 23:22:24 -07:00
Xin Long c5c4ebb3ab sctp: implement receiver-side procedures for the Add Incoming Streams Request Parameter
This patch is to implement Receiver-Side Procedures for the Add Incoming
Streams Request Parameter described in rfc6525 section 5.2.6.

It is also to fix that it shouldn't have add streams when sending addstrm
in request, as the process in peer will handle it by sending a addstrm out
request back.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-12 23:22:24 -07:00
Xin Long 50a41591f1 sctp: implement receiver-side procedures for the Add Outgoing Streams Request Parameter
This patch is to add Receiver-Side Procedures for the Add Outgoing
Streams Request Parameter described in section 5.2.5.

It is also to improve sctp_chunk_lookup_strreset_param, so that it
can be used for processing addstrm_out request.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-12 23:22:23 -07:00
Xin Long 692787cef6 sctp: implement receiver-side procedures for the SSN/TSN Reset Request Parameter
This patch is to implement Receiver-Side Procedures for the SSN/TSN
Reset Request Parameter described in rfc6525 section 6.2.4.

The process is kind of complicate, it's wonth having some comments
from section 6.2.4 in the codes.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-03-12 23:22:23 -07:00
Xin Long 2040d3d7a3 sctp: add reconf chunk process
This patch is to add a function to process the incoming reconf chunk,
in which it verifies the chunk, and traverses the param and process
it with the right function one by one.

sctp_sf_do_reconf would be the process function of reconf chunk event.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-19 18:17:59 -05:00
Xin Long d15c9ede61 sctp: process fwd tsn chunk only when prsctp is enabled
This patch is to check if asoc->peer.prsctp_capable is set before
processing fwd tsn chunk, if not, it will return an ERROR to the
peer, just as rfc3758 section 3.3.1 demands.

Reported-by: Julian Cordes <julian.cordes@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-02-06 11:57:15 -05:00
Xin Long 7a090b0452 sctp: add stream reconf primitive
This patch is to add a primitive based on sctp primitive frame for
sending stream reconf request. It works as the other primitives,
and create a SCTP_CMD_REPLY command to send the request chunk out.

sctp_primitive_RECONF would be the api to send a reconf request
chunk.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-18 14:55:10 -05:00
Xin Long 7b9438de0c sctp: add stream reconf timer
This patch is to add a per transport timer based on sctp timer frame
for stream reconf chunk retransmission. It would start after sending
a reconf request chunk, and stop after receiving the response chunk.

If the timer expires, besides retransmitting the reconf request chunk,
it would also do the same thing with data RTO timer. like to increase
the appropriate error counts, and perform threshold management, possibly
destroying the asoc if sctp retransmission thresholds are exceeded, just
as section 5.1.1 describes.

This patch is also to add asoc strreset_chunk, it is used to save the
reconf request chunk, so that it can be retransmitted, and to check if
the response is really for this request by comparing the information
inside with the response chunk as well.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-18 14:55:10 -05:00
Xin Long a83863174a sctp: prepare asoc stream for stream reconf
sctp stream reconf, described in RFC 6525, needs a structure to
save per stream information in assoc, like stream state.

In the future, sctp stream scheduler also needs it to save some
stream scheduler params and queues.

This patchset is to prepare the stream array in assoc for stream
reconf. It defines sctp_stream that includes stream arrays inside
to replace ssnmap.

Note that we use different structures for IN and OUT streams, as
the members in per OUT stream will get more and more different
from per IN stream.

v1->v2:
  - put these patches into a smaller group.
v2->v3:
  - define sctp_stream to contain stream arrays, and create stream.c
    to put stream-related functions.
  - merge 3 patches into 1, as new sctp_stream has the same name
    with before.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-01-06 21:07:26 -05:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 509e7a311f sctp: sctp_chunk_length_valid should return bool
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-28 14:06:31 -05:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 66b91d2cd0 sctp: remove return value from sctp_packet_init/config
There is no reason to use this cascading. It doesn't add anything.
Let's remove it and simplify.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-28 14:06:31 -05:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 1ff0156167 sctp: reduce indent level in sctp_sf_shut_8_4_5
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-28 14:06:30 -05:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner eab59075d3 sctp: reduce indent level at sctp_sf_tabort_8_4_8
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-12-28 14:06:30 -05:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner bf911e985d sctp: validate chunk len before actually using it
Andrey Konovalov reported that KASAN detected that SCTP was using a slab
beyond the boundaries. It was caused because when handling out of the
blue packets in function sctp_sf_ootb() it was checking the chunk len
only after already processing the first chunk, validating only for the
2nd and subsequent ones.

The fix is to just move the check upwards so it's also validated for the
1st chunk.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-10-29 12:00:10 -04:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner e2f036a972 sctp: rename WORD_TRUNC/ROUND macros
To something more meaningful these days, specially because this is
working on packet headers or lengths and which are not tied to any CPU
arch but to the protocol itself.

So, WORD_TRUNC becomes SCTP_TRUNC4 and WORD_ROUND becomes SCTP_PAD4.

Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>
Reported-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-22 03:13:26 -04:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 2d47fd120d sctp: only check for ECN if peer is using it
Currently only read-only checks are performed up to the point on where
we check if peer is ECN capable, checks which we can avoid otherwise.
The flag ecn_ce_done is only used to perform this check once per
incoming packet, and nothing more.

Thus this patch moves the peer check up.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-13 18:10:14 -07:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner e7487c86dc sctp: avoid identifying address family many times for a chunk
Identifying address family operations during rx path is not something
expensive but it's ugly to the eye to have it done multiple times,
specially when we already validated it during initial rx processing.

This patch takes advantage of the now shared sctp_input_cb and make the
pointer to the operations readily available.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-13 18:10:14 -07:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 1f45f78f8e sctp: allow GSO frags to access the chunk too
SCTP will try to access original IP headers on sctp_recvmsg in order to
copy the addresses used. There are also other places that do similar access
to IP or even SCTP headers. But after 90017accff ("sctp: Add GSO
support") they aren't always there because they are only present in the
header skb.

SCTP handles the queueing of incoming data by cloning the incoming skb
and limiting to only the relevant payload. This clone has its cb updated
to something different and it's then queued on socket rx queue. Thus we
need to fix this in two moments.

For rx path, not related to socket queue yet, this patch uses a
partially copied sctp_input_cb to such GSO frags. This restores the
ability to access the headers for this part of the code.

Regarding the socket rx queue, it removes iif member from sctp_event and
also add a chunk pointer on it.

With these changes we're always able to reach the headers again.

The biggest change here is that now the sctp_chunk struct and the
original skb are only freed after the application consumed the buffer.
Note however that the original payload was already like this due to the
skb cloning.

For iif, SCTP's IPv4 code doesn't use it, so no change is necessary.
IPv6 now can fetch it directly from original's IPv6 CB as the original
skb is still accessible.

In the future we probably can simplify sctp_v*_skb_iif() stuff, as
sctp_v4_skb_iif() was called but it's return value not used, and now
it's not even called, but such cleanup is out of scope for this change.

Fixes: 90017accff ("sctp: Add GSO support")
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-07-13 18:10:14 -07:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner 649621e3d5 sctp: fix use-after-free in pr_debug statement
Dmitry Vyukov reported a use-after-free in the code expanded by the
macro debug_post_sfx, which is caused by the use of the asoc pointer
after it was freed within sctp_side_effect() scope.

This patch fixes it by allowing sctp_side_effect to clear that asoc
pointer when the TCB is freed.

As Vlad explained, we also have to cover the SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT case
because it will trigger DELETE_TCB too on that same loop.

Also, there were places issuing SCTP_CMD_INIT_FAILED and ASSOC_FAILED
but returning SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME, which would fool the scheme
above. Fix it by returning SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT instead.

The macro is already prepared to handle such NULL pointer.

Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-01-11 17:13:01 -05:00
Xin Long 068d8bd338 sctp: sctp should release assoc when sctp_make_abort_user return NULL in sctp_close
In sctp_close, sctp_make_abort_user may return NULL because of memory
allocation failure. If this happens, it will bypass any state change
and never free the assoc. The assoc has no chance to be freed and it
will be kept in memory with the state it had even after the socket is
closed by sctp_close().

So if sctp_make_abort_user fails to allocate memory, we should abort
the asoc via sctp_primitive_ABORT as well. Just like the annotation in
sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_abort and sctp_sf_do_9_1_prm_abort said,
"Even if we can't send the ABORT due to low memory delete the TCB.
This is a departure from our typical NOMEM handling".

But then the chunk is NULL (low memory) and the SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd would
dereference the chunk pointer, and system crash. So we should add
SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd only when the chunk is not NULL, just like other
places where it adds SCTP_CMD_REPLY cmd.

Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-12-30 16:57:16 -05:00
lucien 8a0d19c5ed sctp: start t5 timer only when peer rwnd is 0 and local state is SHUTDOWN_PENDING
when A sends a data to B, then A close() and enter into SHUTDOWN_PENDING
state, if B neither claim his rwnd is 0 nor send SACK for this data, A
will keep retransmitting this data until t5 timeout, Max.Retrans times
can't work anymore, which is bad.

if B's rwnd is not 0, it should send abort after Max.Retrans times, only
when B's rwnd == 0 and A's retransmitting beyonds Max.Retrans times, A
will start t5 timer, which is also commit f8d9605243 ("sctp: Enforce
retransmission limit during shutdown") means, but it lacks the condition
peer rwnd == 0.

so fix it by adding a bit (zero_window_announced) in peer to record if
the last rwnd is 0. If it was, zero_window_announced will be set. and use
this bit to decide if start t5 timer when local.state is SHUTDOWN_PENDING.

Fixes: commit f8d9605243 ("sctp: Enforce retransmission limit during shutdown")
Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-12-06 22:31:51 -05:00
Arnd Bergmann 3ef0a25bf9 net: sctp: avoid incorrect time_t use
We want to avoid using time_t in the kernel because of the y2038
overflow problem. The use in sctp is not for storing seconds at
all, but instead uses microseconds and is passed as 32-bit
on all machines.

This patch changes the type to u32, which better fits the use.

Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Cc: linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-10-05 03:16:48 -07:00
Marcelo Ricardo Leitner b52effd263 sctp: fix cut and paste issue in comment
Cookie ACK is always received by the association initiator, so fix the
comment to avoid confusion.

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2015-07-21 00:21:32 -07:00
Daniel Borkmann 26b87c7881 net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing
This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
in the form of ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
  [...]
  ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>

... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
chunks which it eats up one by one.

We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].

The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
2e3216cd54 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.

In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
side-effect interpreter run.

One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
look good now.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: 2e3216cd54 ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-14 12:46:22 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann 9de7922bc7 net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks
Commit 6f4c618ddb ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:

skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
 end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
 ------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
[...]
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
 [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
 [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
 [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60

This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
example, ...

  -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
  <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
  ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>

... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...

  1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
  2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)

... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
could be used just as well.

The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.

In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
address that is also the source address of the packet containing
the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
skb.

When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
with ...

  length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
  asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;

... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.

Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
missized addresses.

Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.

Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-14 12:46:22 -04:00
Vlad Yasevich bdf6fa52f0 sctp: handle association restarts when the socket is closed.
Currently association restarts do not take into consideration the
state of the socket.  When a restart happens, the current assocation
simply transitions into established state.  This creates a condition
where a remote system, through a the restart procedure, may create a
local association that is no way reachable by user.  The conditions
to trigger this are as follows:
  1) Remote does not acknoledge some data causing data to remain
     outstanding.
  2) Local application calls close() on the socket.  Since data
     is still outstanding, the association is placed in SHUTDOWN_PENDING
     state.  However, the socket is closed.
  3) The remote tries to create a new association, triggering a restart
     on the local system.  The association moves from SHUTDOWN_PENDING
     to ESTABLISHED.  At this point, it is no longer reachable by
     any socket on the local system.

This patch addresses the above situation by moving the newly ESTABLISHED
association into SHUTDOWN-SENT state and bundling a SHUTDOWN after
the COOKIE-ACK chunk.  This way, the restarted associate immidiately
enters the shutdown procedure and forces the termination of the
unreachable association.

Reported-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-06 00:21:45 -04:00
Fabian Frederick 138ce91024 net: sctp: remove unnecessary break after return/goto
Signed-off-by: Fabian Frederick <fabf@skynet.be>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-07-15 16:27:01 -07:00
Vlad Yasevich b14878ccb7 net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint
Currently, it is possible to create an SCTP socket, then switch
auth_enable via sysctl setting to 1 and crash the system on connect:

Oops[#1]:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 3.14.1-mipsgit-20140415 #1
task: ffffffff8056ce80 ti: ffffffff8055c000 task.ti: ffffffff8055c000
[...]
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff8043c4e8>] sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac+0x68/0x80
[<ffffffff8042b300>] sctp_process_init+0x5e0/0x8a4
[<ffffffff8042188c>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x234/0x34c
[<ffffffff804228c8>] sctp_do_sm+0xb4/0x1e8
[<ffffffff80425a08>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1c4/0x214
[<ffffffff8043af68>] sctp_rcv+0x588/0x630
[<ffffffff8043e8e8>] sctp6_rcv+0x10/0x24
[<ffffffff803acb50>] ip6_input+0x2c0/0x440
[<ffffffff8030fc00>] __netif_receive_skb_core+0x4a8/0x564
[<ffffffff80310650>] process_backlog+0xb4/0x18c
[<ffffffff80313cbc>] net_rx_action+0x12c/0x210
[<ffffffff80034254>] __do_softirq+0x17c/0x2ac
[<ffffffff800345e0>] irq_exit+0x54/0xb0
[<ffffffff800075a4>] ret_from_irq+0x0/0x4
[<ffffffff800090ec>] rm7k_wait_irqoff+0x24/0x48
[<ffffffff8005e388>] cpu_startup_entry+0xc0/0x148
[<ffffffff805a88b0>] start_kernel+0x37c/0x398
Code: dd0900b8  000330f8  0126302d <dcc60000> 50c0fff1  0047182a  a48306a0
03e00008  00000000
---[ end trace b530b0551467f2fd ]---
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

What happens while auth_enable=0 in that case is, that
ep->auth_hmacs is initialized to NULL in sctp_auth_init_hmacs()
when endpoint is being created.

After that point, if an admin switches over to auth_enable=1,
the machine can crash due to NULL pointer dereference during
reception of an INIT chunk. When we enter sctp_process_init()
via sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() in order to respond to an INIT chunk,
the INIT verification succeeds and while we walk and process
all INIT params via sctp_process_param() we find that
net->sctp.auth_enable is set, therefore do not fall through,
but invoke sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac() instead, and thus,
dereference what we have set to NULL during endpoint
initialization phase.

The fix is to make auth_enable immutable by caching its value
during endpoint initialization, so that its original value is
being carried along until destruction. The bug seems to originate
from the very first days.

Fix in joint work with Daniel Borkmann.

Reported-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Tested-by: Joshua Kinard <kumba@gentoo.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-18 18:32:00 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann 362d52040c Revert "net: sctp: Fix a_rwnd/rwnd management to reflect real state of the receiver's buffer"
This reverts commit ef2820a735 ("net: sctp: Fix a_rwnd/rwnd management
to reflect real state of the receiver's buffer") as it introduced a
serious performance regression on SCTP over IPv4 and IPv6, though a not
as dramatic on the latter. Measurements are on 10Gbit/s with ixgbe NICs.

Current state:

[root@Lab200slot2 ~]# iperf3 --sctp -4 -c 192.168.241.3 -V -l 1452 -t 60
iperf version 3.0.1 (10 January 2014)
Linux Lab200slot2 3.14.0 #1 SMP Thu Apr 3 23:18:29 EDT 2014 x86_64
Time: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 17:56:21 GMT
Connecting to host 192.168.241.3, port 5201
      Cookie: Lab200slot2.1397238981.812898.548918
[  4] local 192.168.241.2 port 38616 connected to 192.168.241.3 port 5201
Starting Test: protocol: SCTP, 1 streams, 1452 byte blocks, omitting 0 seconds, 60 second test
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bandwidth
[  4]   0.00-1.09   sec  20.8 MBytes   161 Mbits/sec
[  4]   1.09-2.13   sec  10.8 MBytes  86.8 Mbits/sec
[  4]   2.13-3.15   sec  3.57 MBytes  29.5 Mbits/sec
[  4]   3.15-4.16   sec  4.33 MBytes  35.7 Mbits/sec
[  4]   4.16-6.21   sec  10.4 MBytes  42.7 Mbits/sec
[  4]   6.21-6.21   sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]   6.21-7.35   sec  34.6 MBytes   253 Mbits/sec
[  4]   7.35-11.45  sec  22.0 MBytes  45.0 Mbits/sec
[  4]  11.45-11.45  sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]  11.45-11.45  sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]  11.45-11.45  sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]  11.45-12.51  sec  16.0 MBytes   126 Mbits/sec
[  4]  12.51-13.59  sec  20.3 MBytes   158 Mbits/sec
[  4]  13.59-14.65  sec  13.4 MBytes   107 Mbits/sec
[  4]  14.65-16.79  sec  33.3 MBytes   130 Mbits/sec
[  4]  16.79-16.79  sec  0.00 Bytes    0.00 bits/sec
[  4]  16.79-17.82  sec  5.94 MBytes  48.7 Mbits/sec
(etc)

[root@Lab200slot2 ~]#  iperf3 --sctp -6 -c 2001:db8:0:f101::1 -V -l 1400 -t 60
iperf version 3.0.1 (10 January 2014)
Linux Lab200slot2 3.14.0 #1 SMP Thu Apr 3 23:18:29 EDT 2014 x86_64
Time: Fri, 11 Apr 2014 19:08:41 GMT
Connecting to host 2001:db8:0:f101::1, port 5201
      Cookie: Lab200slot2.1397243321.714295.2b3f7c
[  4] local 2001:db8:0:f101::2 port 55804 connected to 2001:db8:0:f101::1 port 5201
Starting Test: protocol: SCTP, 1 streams, 1400 byte blocks, omitting 0 seconds, 60 second test
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bandwidth
[  4]   0.00-1.00   sec   169 MBytes  1.42 Gbits/sec
[  4]   1.00-2.00   sec   201 MBytes  1.69 Gbits/sec
[  4]   2.00-3.00   sec   188 MBytes  1.58 Gbits/sec
[  4]   3.00-4.00   sec   174 MBytes  1.46 Gbits/sec
[  4]   4.00-5.00   sec   165 MBytes  1.39 Gbits/sec
[  4]   5.00-6.00   sec   199 MBytes  1.67 Gbits/sec
[  4]   6.00-7.00   sec   163 MBytes  1.36 Gbits/sec
[  4]   7.00-8.00   sec   174 MBytes  1.46 Gbits/sec
[  4]   8.00-9.00   sec   193 MBytes  1.62 Gbits/sec
[  4]   9.00-10.00  sec   196 MBytes  1.65 Gbits/sec
[  4]  10.00-11.00  sec   157 MBytes  1.31 Gbits/sec
[  4]  11.00-12.00  sec   175 MBytes  1.47 Gbits/sec
[  4]  12.00-13.00  sec   192 MBytes  1.61 Gbits/sec
[  4]  13.00-14.00  sec   199 MBytes  1.67 Gbits/sec
(etc)

After patch:

[root@Lab200slot2 ~]#  iperf3 --sctp -4 -c 192.168.240.3 -V -l 1452 -t 60
iperf version 3.0.1 (10 January 2014)
Linux Lab200slot2 3.14.0+ #1 SMP Mon Apr 14 12:06:40 EDT 2014 x86_64
Time: Mon, 14 Apr 2014 16:40:48 GMT
Connecting to host 192.168.240.3, port 5201
      Cookie: Lab200slot2.1397493648.413274.65e131
[  4] local 192.168.240.2 port 50548 connected to 192.168.240.3 port 5201
Starting Test: protocol: SCTP, 1 streams, 1452 byte blocks, omitting 0 seconds, 60 second test
[ ID] Interval           Transfer     Bandwidth
[  4]   0.00-1.00   sec   240 MBytes  2.02 Gbits/sec
[  4]   1.00-2.00   sec   239 MBytes  2.01 Gbits/sec
[  4]   2.00-3.00   sec   240 MBytes  2.01 Gbits/sec
[  4]   3.00-4.00   sec   239 MBytes  2.00 Gbits/sec
[  4]   4.00-5.00   sec   245 MBytes  2.05 Gbits/sec
[  4]   5.00-6.00   sec   240 MBytes  2.01 Gbits/sec
[  4]   6.00-7.00   sec   240 MBytes  2.02 Gbits/sec
[  4]   7.00-8.00   sec   239 MBytes  2.01 Gbits/sec

With the reverted patch applied, the SCTP/IPv4 performance is back
to normal on latest upstream for IPv4 and IPv6 and has same throughput
as 3.4.2 test kernel, steady and interval reports are smooth again.

Fixes: ef2820a735 ("net: sctp: Fix a_rwnd/rwnd management to reflect real state of the receiver's buffer")
Reported-by: Peter Butler <pbutler@sonusnet.com>
Reported-by: Dongsheng Song <dongsheng.song@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Peter Butler <pbutler@sonusnet.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Matija Glavinic Pecotic <matija.glavinic-pecotic.ext@nsn.com>
Cc: Alexander Sverdlin <alexander.sverdlin@nsn.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-04-14 16:26:48 -04:00
Daniel Borkmann c485658bae net: sctp: fix skb leakage in COOKIE ECHO path of chunk->auth_chunk
While working on ec0223ec48 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to
verify if we/peer is AUTH capable"), we noticed that there's a skb
memory leakage in the error path.

Running the same reproducer as in ec0223ec48 and by unconditionally
jumping to the error label (to simulate an error condition) in
sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() receive path lets kmemleak detector bark about
the unfreed chunk->auth_chunk skb clone:

Unreferenced object 0xffff8800b8f3a000 (size 256):
  comm "softirq", pid 0, jiffies 4294769856 (age 110.757s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    89 ab 75 5e d4 01 58 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..u^..X.........
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff816660be>] kmemleak_alloc+0x4e/0xb0
    [<ffffffff8119f328>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x210
    [<ffffffff81566929>] skb_clone+0x49/0xb0
    [<ffffffffa0467459>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x1d9/0x230 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa046fdbc>] sctp_inq_push+0x4c/0x70 [sctp]
    [<ffffffffa047e8de>] sctp_rcv+0x82e/0x9a0 [sctp]
    [<ffffffff815abd38>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xa8/0x210
    [<ffffffff815a64af>] nf_reinject+0xbf/0x180
    [<ffffffffa04b4762>] nfqnl_recv_verdict+0x1d2/0x2b0 [nfnetlink_queue]
    [<ffffffffa04aa40b>] nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x14b/0x250 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a3269>] netlink_rcv_skb+0xa9/0xc0
    [<ffffffffa04aa7cf>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x23f/0x408 [nfnetlink]
    [<ffffffff815a2bd8>] netlink_unicast+0x168/0x250
    [<ffffffff815a2fa1>] netlink_sendmsg+0x2e1/0x3f0
    [<ffffffff8155cc6b>] sock_sendmsg+0x8b/0xc0
    [<ffffffff8155d449>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x369/0x380

What happens is that commit bbd0d59809 clones the skb containing
the AUTH chunk in sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv() when having the edge case
that an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be authenticated:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

When we enter sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() and before we actually get to
the point where we process (and subsequently free) a non-NULL
chunk->auth_chunk, we could hit the "goto nomem_init" path from
an error condition and thus leave the cloned skb around w/o
freeing it.

The fix is to centrally free such clones in sctp_chunk_destroy()
handler that is invoked from sctp_chunk_free() after all refs have
dropped; and also move both kfree_skb(chunk->auth_chunk) there,
so that chunk->auth_chunk is either NULL (since sctp_chunkify()
allocs new chunks through kmem_cache_zalloc()) or non-NULL with
a valid skb pointer. chunk->skb and chunk->auth_chunk are the
only skbs in the sctp_chunk structure that need to be handeled.

While at it, we should use consume_skb() for both. It is the same
as dev_kfree_skb() but more appropriately named as we are not
a device but a protocol. Also, this effectively replaces the
kfree_skb() from both invocations into consume_skb(). Functions
are the same only that kfree_skb() assumes that the frame was
being dropped after a failure (e.g. for tools like drop monitor),
usage of consume_skb() seems more appropriate in function
sctp_chunk_destroy() though.

Fixes: bbd0d59809 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-05 20:40:25 -05:00
Daniel Borkmann ec0223ec48 net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if we/peer is AUTH capable
RFC4895 introduced AUTH chunks for SCTP; during the SCTP
handshake RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO are negotiated (CHUNKS
being optional though):

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

A special case is when an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO
chunks to be authenticated:

  ---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
  <------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
  ------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ECHO ---------------->
  <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------

RFC4895, section 6.3. Receiving Authenticated Chunks says:

  The receiver MUST use the HMAC algorithm indicated in
  the HMAC Identifier field. If this algorithm was not
  specified by the receiver in the HMAC-ALGO parameter in
  the INIT or INIT-ACK chunk during association setup, the
  AUTH chunk and all the chunks after it MUST be discarded
  and an ERROR chunk SHOULD be sent with the error cause
  defined in Section 4.1. [...] If no endpoint pair shared
  key has been configured for that Shared Key Identifier,
  all authenticated chunks MUST be silently discarded. [...]

  When an endpoint requires COOKIE-ECHO chunks to be
  authenticated, some special procedures have to be followed
  because the reception of a COOKIE-ECHO chunk might result
  in the creation of an SCTP association. If a packet arrives
  containing an AUTH chunk as a first chunk, a COOKIE-ECHO
  chunk as the second chunk, and possibly more chunks after
  them, and the receiver does not have an STCB for that
  packet, then authentication is based on the contents of
  the COOKIE-ECHO chunk. In this situation, the receiver MUST
  authenticate the chunks in the packet by using the RANDOM
  parameters, CHUNKS parameters and HMAC_ALGO parameters
  obtained from the COOKIE-ECHO chunk, and possibly a local
  shared secret as inputs to the authentication procedure
  specified in Section 6.3. If authentication fails, then
  the packet is discarded. If the authentication is successful,
  the COOKIE-ECHO and all the chunks after the COOKIE-ECHO
  MUST be processed. If the receiver has an STCB, it MUST
  process the AUTH chunk as described above using the STCB
  from the existing association to authenticate the
  COOKIE-ECHO chunk and all the chunks after it. [...]

Commit bbd0d59809 introduced the possibility to receive
and verification of AUTH chunk, including the edge case for
authenticated COOKIE-ECHO. On reception of COOKIE-ECHO,
the function sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() handles processing,
unpacks and creates a new association if it passed sanity
checks and also tests for authentication chunks being
present. After a new association has been processed, it
invokes sctp_process_init() on the new association and
walks through the parameter list it received from the INIT
chunk. It checks SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM, SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO
and SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS, and copies them into asoc->peer
meta data (peer_random, peer_hmacs, peer_chunks) in case
sysctl -w net.sctp.auth_enable=1 is set. If in INIT's
SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT parameter SCTP_CID_AUTH is set,
peer_random != NULL and peer_hmacs != NULL the peer is to be
assumed asoc->peer.auth_capable=1, in any other case
asoc->peer.auth_capable=0.

Now, if in sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce() chunk->auth_chunk is
available, we set up a fake auth chunk and pass that on to
sctp_sf_authenticate(), which at latest in
sctp_auth_calculate_hmac() reliably dereferences a NULL pointer
at position 0..0008 when setting up the crypto key in
crypto_hash_setkey() by using asoc->asoc_shared_key that is
NULL as condition key_id == asoc->active_key_id is true if
the AUTH chunk was injected correctly from remote. This
happens no matter what net.sctp.auth_enable sysctl says.

The fix is to check for net->sctp.auth_enable and for
asoc->peer.auth_capable before doing any operations like
sctp_sf_authenticate() as no key is activated in
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() for each case.

Now as RFC4895 section 6.3 states that if the used HMAC-ALGO
passed from the INIT chunk was not used in the AUTH chunk, we
SHOULD send an error; however in this case it would be better
to just silently discard such a maliciously prepared handshake
as we didn't even receive a parameter at all. Also, as our
endpoint has no shared key configured, section 6.3 says that
MUST silently discard, which we are doing from now onwards.

Before calling sctp_sf_pdiscard(), we need not only to free
the association, but also the chunk->auth_chunk skb, as
commit bbd0d59809 created a skb clone in that case.

I have tested this locally by using netfilter's nfqueue and
re-injecting packets into the local stack after maliciously
modifying the INIT chunk (removing RANDOM; HMAC-ALGO param)
and the SCTP packet containing the COOKIE_ECHO (injecting
AUTH chunk before COOKIE_ECHO). Fixed with this patch applied.

Fixes: bbd0d59809 ("[SCTP]: Implement the receive and verification of AUTH chunk")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <yasevich@gmail.com>
Cc: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-03-03 16:39:36 -05:00