General assumption is that single program can hold up to BPF_MAXINSNS,
that is, 4096 number of instructions. It is the case with cBPF and
that limit was carried over to eBPF. When recently testing digest, I
noticed that it's actually not possible to feed 4096 instructions
via bpf(2).
The check for > BPF_MAXINSNS was added back then to bpf_check() in
cbd3570086 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)").
However, 09756af468 ("bpf: expand BPF syscall with program load/unload")
added yet another check that comes before that into bpf_prog_load(),
but this time bails out already in case of >= BPF_MAXINSNS.
Fix it up and perform the check early in bpf_prog_load(), so we can drop
the second one in bpf_check(). It makes sense, because also a 0 insn
program is useless and we don't want to waste any resources doing work
up to bpf_check() point. The existing bpf(2) man page documents E2BIG
as the official error for such cases, so just stick with it as well.
Fixes: 09756af468 ("bpf: expand BPF syscall with program load/unload")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When loading a BPF program via bpf(2), calculate the digest over
the program's instruction stream and store it in struct bpf_prog's
digest member. This is done at a point in time before any instructions
are rewritten by the verifier. Any unstable map file descriptor
number part of the imm field will be zeroed for the hash.
fdinfo example output for progs:
# cat /proc/1590/fdinfo/5
pos: 0
flags: 02000002
mnt_id: 11
prog_type: 1
prog_jited: 1
prog_digest: b27e8b06da22707513aa97363dfb11c7c3675d28
memlock: 4096
When programs are pinned and retrieved by an ELF loader, the loader
can check the program's digest through fdinfo and compare it against
one that was generated over the ELF file's program section to see
if the program needs to be reloaded. Furthermore, this can also be
exposed through other means such as netlink in case of a tc cls/act
dump (or xdp in future), but also through tracepoints or other
facilities to identify the program. Other than that, the digest can
also serve as a base name for the work in progress kallsyms support
of programs. The digest doesn't depend/select the crypto layer, since
we need to keep dependencies to a minimum. iproute2 will get support
for this facility.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Occasionally, clang (e.g. version 3.8.1) translates a sum between two
constant operands using a BPF_OR instead of a BPF_ADD. The verifier is
currently not handling this scenario, and the destination register type
becomes UNKNOWN_VALUE even if it's still storing a constant. As a result,
the destination register cannot be used as argument to a helper function
expecting a ARG_CONST_STACK_*, limiting some use cases.
Modify the verifier to handle this case, and add a few tests to make sure
all combinations are supported, and stack boundaries are still verified
even with BPF_OR.
Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Couple conflicts resolved here:
1) In the MACB driver, a bug fix to properly initialize the
RX tail pointer properly overlapped with some changes
to support variable sized rings.
2) In XGBE we had a "CONFIG_PM" --> "CONFIG_PM_SLEEP" fix
overlapping with a reorganization of the driver to support
ACPI, OF, as well as PCI variants of the chip.
3) In 'net' we had several probe error path bug fixes to the
stmmac driver, meanwhile a lot of this code was cleaned up
and reorganized in 'net-next'.
4) The cls_flower classifier obtained a helper function in
'net-next' called __fl_delete() and this overlapped with
Daniel Borkamann's bug fix to use RCU for object destruction
in 'net'. It also overlapped with Jiri's change to guard
the rhashtable_remove_fast() call with a check against
tc_skip_sw().
5) In mlx4, a revert bug fix in 'net' overlapped with some
unrelated changes in 'net-next'.
6) In geneve, a stale header pointer after pskb_expand_head()
bug fix in 'net' overlapped with a large reorganization of
the same code in 'net-next'. Since the 'net-next' code no
longer had the bug in question, there was nothing to do
other than to simply take the 'net-next' hunks.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add new cgroup based program type, BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK. Similar to
BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB programs can be attached to a cgroup and run
any time a process in the cgroup opens an AF_INET or AF_INET6 socket.
Currently only sk_bound_dev_if is exported to userspace for modification
by a bpf program.
This allows a cgroup to be configured such that AF_INET{6} sockets opened
by processes are automatically bound to a specific device. In turn, this
enables the running of programs that do not support SO_BINDTODEVICE in a
specific VRF context / L3 domain.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Code move and rename only; no functional change intended.
Signed-off-by: David Ahern <dsa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Registers new BPF program types which correspond to the LWT hooks:
- BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_IN => dst_input()
- BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_OUT => dst_output()
- BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_XMIT => lwtunnel_xmit()
The separate program types are required to differentiate between the
capabilities each LWT hook allows:
* Programs attached to dst_input() or dst_output() are restricted and
may only read the data of an skb. This prevent modification and
possible invalidation of already validated packet headers on receive
and the construction of illegal headers while the IP headers are
still being assembled.
* Programs attached to lwtunnel_xmit() are allowed to modify packet
content as well as prepending an L2 header via a newly introduced
helper bpf_skb_change_head(). This is safe as lwtunnel_xmit() is
invoked after the IP header has been assembled completely.
All BPF programs receive an skb with L3 headers attached and may return
one of the following error codes:
BPF_OK - Continue routing as per nexthop
BPF_DROP - Drop skb and return EPERM
BPF_REDIRECT - Redirect skb to device as per redirect() helper.
(Only valid in lwtunnel_xmit() context)
The return codes are binary compatible with their TC_ACT_
relatives to ease compatibility.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If we have a branch that looks something like this
int foo = map->value;
if (condition) {
foo += blah;
} else {
foo = bar;
}
map->array[foo] = baz;
We will incorrectly assume that the !condition branch is equal to the condition
branch as the register for foo will be UNKNOWN_VALUE in both cases. We need to
adjust this logic to only do this if we didn't do a varlen access after we
processed the !condition branch, otherwise we have different ranges and need to
check the other branch as well.
Fixes: 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map value arrays")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
There's a 'not' missing in one paragraph. Add it.
Fixes: 3007098494 ("cgroup: add support for eBPF programs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Reported-by: Rami Rosen <roszenrami@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since we recently converted the BPF filesystem over to use mount_nodev(),
we now have the possibility to also hold mount options in sb's s_fs_info.
This work implements mount options support for specifying permissions on
the sb's inode, which will be used by tc when it manually needs to mount
the fs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Allow for checking the owner_prog_type of a program array map. In some
cases bpf(2) can return -EINVAL /after/ the verifier passed and did all
the rewrites of the bpf program.
The reason that lets us fail at this late stage is that program array
maps are incompatible. Allow users to inspect this earlier after they
got the map fd through BPF_OBJ_GET command. tc will get support for this.
Also, display how much we charged the map with regards to RLIMIT_MEMLOCK.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Extend the bpf(2) syscall by two new commands, BPF_PROG_ATTACH and
BPF_PROG_DETACH which allow attaching and detaching eBPF programs
to a target.
On the API level, the target could be anything that has an fd in
userspace, hence the name of the field in union bpf_attr is called
'target_fd'.
When called with BPF_ATTACH_TYPE_CGROUP_INET_{E,IN}GRESS, the target is
expected to be a valid file descriptor of a cgroup v2 directory which
has the bpf controller enabled. These are the only use-cases
implemented by this patch at this point, but more can be added.
If a program of the given type already exists in the given cgroup,
the program is swapped automically, so userspace does not have to drop
an existing program first before installing a new one, which would
otherwise leave a gap in which no program is attached.
For more information on the propagation logic to subcgroups, please
refer to the bpf cgroup controller implementation.
The API is guarded by CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds two sets of eBPF program pointers to struct cgroup.
One for such that are directly pinned to a cgroup, and one for such
that are effective for it.
To illustrate the logic behind that, assume the following example
cgroup hierarchy.
A - B - C
\ D - E
If only B has a program attached, it will be effective for B, C, D
and E. If D then attaches a program itself, that will be effective for
both D and E, and the program in B will only affect B and C. Only one
program of a given type is effective for a cgroup.
Attaching and detaching programs will be done through the bpf(2)
syscall. For now, ingress and egress inet socket filtering are the
only supported use-cases.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
All conflicts were simple overlapping changes except perhaps
for the Thunder driver.
That driver has a change_mtu method explicitly for sending
a message to the hardware. If that fails it returns an
error.
Normally a driver doesn't need an ndo_change_mtu method becuase those
are usually just range changes, which are now handled generically.
But since this extra operation is needed in the Thunder driver, it has
to stay.
However, if the message send fails we have to restore the original
MTU before the change because the entire call chain expects that if
an error is thrown by ndo_change_mtu then the MTU did not change.
Therefore code is added to nicvf_change_mtu to remember the original
MTU, and to restore it upon nicvf_update_hw_max_frs() failue.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In mlx5e_create_rq(), when creating a new queue, we call bpf_prog_add() but
without checking the return value. bpf_prog_add() can fail since 92117d8443
("bpf: fix refcnt overflow"), so we really must check it. Take the reference
right when we assign it to the rq from priv->xdp_prog, and just drop the
reference on error path. Destruction in mlx5e_destroy_rq() looks good, though.
Fixes: 86994156c7 ("net/mlx5e: XDP fast RX drop bpf programs support")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Saeed Mahameed <saeedm@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I made some invalid assumptions with BPF_AND and BPF_MOD that could result in
invalid accesses to bpf map entries. Fix this up by doing a few things
1) Kill BPF_MOD support. This doesn't actually get used by the compiler in real
life and just adds extra complexity.
2) Fix the logic for BPF_AND, don't allow AND of negative numbers and set the
minimum value to 0 for positive AND's.
3) Don't do operations on the ranges if they are set to the limits, as they are
by definition undefined, and allowing arithmetic operations on those values
could make them appear valid when they really aren't.
This fixes the testcase provided by Jann as well as a few other theoretical
problems.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
gcc-6.2.1 gives the following warning:
kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c: In function ‘__bpf_lru_list_rotate_inactive.isra.3’:
kernel/bpf/bpf_lru_list.c:201:28: warning: ‘next’ may be used uninitialized in this function [-Wmaybe-uninitialized]
The "next" is currently initialized in the while() loop which must have >=1
iterations.
This patch initializes next to get rid of the compiler warning.
Fixes: 3a08c2fd76 ("bpf: LRU List")
Reported-by: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Provide a LRU version of the existing BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Provide a LRU version of the existing BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Refactor the codes that populate the value
of a htab_elem in a BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH
typed bpf_map.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Instead of having a common LRU list, this patch allows a
percpu LRU list which can be selected by specifying a map
attribute. The map attribute will be added in the later
patch.
While the common use case for LRU is #reads >> #updates,
percpu LRU list allows bpf prog to absorb unusual #updates
under pathological case (e.g. external traffic facing machine which
could be under attack).
Each percpu LRU is isolated from each other. The LRU nodes (including
free nodes) cannot be moved across different LRU Lists.
Here are the update performance comparison between
common LRU list and percpu LRU list (the test code is
at the last patch):
[root@kerneltest003.31.prn1 ~]# for i in 1 4 8; do echo -n "$i cpus: "; \
./map_perf_test 16 $i | awk '{r += $3}END{print r " updates"}'; done
1 cpus: 2934082 updates
4 cpus: 7391434 updates
8 cpus: 6500576 updates
[root@kerneltest003.31.prn1 ~]# for i in 1 4 8; do echo -n "$i cpus: "; \
./map_perf_test 32 $i | awk '{r += $3}END{printr " updates"}'; done
1 cpus: 2896553 updates
4 cpus: 9766395 updates
8 cpus: 17460553 updates
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce bpf_lru_list which will provide LRU capability to
the bpf_htab in the later patch.
* General Thoughts:
1. Target use case. Read is more often than update.
(i.e. bpf_lookup_elem() is more often than bpf_update_elem()).
If bpf_prog does a bpf_lookup_elem() first and then an in-place
update, it still counts as a read operation to the LRU list concern.
2. It may be useful to think of it as a LRU cache
3. Optimize the read case
3.1 No lock in read case
3.2 The LRU maintenance is only done during bpf_update_elem()
4. If there is a percpu LRU list, it will lose the system-wise LRU
property. A completely isolated percpu LRU list has the best
performance but the memory utilization is not ideal considering
the work load may be imbalance.
5. Hence, this patch starts the LRU implementation with a global LRU
list with batched operations before accessing the global LRU list.
As a LRU cache, #read >> #update/#insert operations, it will work well.
6. There is a local list (for each cpu) which is named
'struct bpf_lru_locallist'. This local list is not used to sort
the LRU property. Instead, the local list is to batch enough
operations before acquiring the lock of the global LRU list. More
details on this later.
7. In the later patch, it allows a percpu LRU list by specifying a
map-attribute for scalability reason and for use cases that need to
prepare for the worst (and pathological) case like DoS attack.
The percpu LRU list is completely isolated from each other and the
LRU nodes (including free nodes) cannot be moved across the list. The
following description is for the global LRU list but mostly applicable
to the percpu LRU list also.
* Global LRU List:
1. It has three sub-lists: active-list, inactive-list and free-list.
2. The two list idea, active and inactive, is borrowed from the
page cache.
3. All nodes are pre-allocated and all sit at the free-list (of the
global LRU list) at the beginning. The pre-allocation reasoning
is similar to the existing BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH. However,
opting-out prealloc (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC) is not supported in
the LRU map.
* Active/Inactive List (of the global LRU list):
1. The active list, as its name says it, maintains the active set of
the nodes. We can think of it as the working set or more frequently
accessed nodes. The access frequency is approximated by a ref-bit.
The ref-bit is set during the bpf_lookup_elem().
2. The inactive list, as its name also says it, maintains a less
active set of nodes. They are the candidates to be removed
from the bpf_htab when we are running out of free nodes.
3. The ordering of these two lists is acting as a rough clock.
The tail of the inactive list is the older nodes and
should be released first if the bpf_htab needs free element.
* Rotating the Active/Inactive List (of the global LRU list):
1. It is the basic operation to maintain the LRU property of
the global list.
2. The active list is only rotated when the inactive list is running
low. This idea is similar to the current page cache.
Inactive running low is currently defined as
"# of inactive < # of active".
3. The active list rotation always starts from the tail. It moves
node without ref-bit set to the head of the inactive list.
It moves node with ref-bit set back to the head of the active
list and then clears its ref-bit.
4. The inactive rotation is pretty simply.
It walks the inactive list and moves the nodes back to the head of
active list if its ref-bit is set. The ref-bit is cleared after moving
to the active list.
If the node does not have ref-bit set, it just leave it as it is
because it is already in the inactive list.
* Shrinking the Inactive List (of the global LRU list):
1. Shrinking is the operation to get free nodes when the bpf_htab is
full.
2. It usually only shrinks the inactive list to get free nodes.
3. During shrinking, it will walk the inactive list from the tail,
delete the nodes without ref-bit set from bpf_htab.
4. If no free node found after step (3), it will forcefully get
one node from the tail of inactive or active list. Forcefully is
in the sense that it ignores the ref-bit.
* Local List:
1. Each CPU has a 'struct bpf_lru_locallist'. The purpose is to
batch enough operations before acquiring the lock of the
global LRU.
2. A local list has two sub-lists, free-list and pending-list.
3. During bpf_update_elem(), it will try to get from the free-list
of (the current CPU local list).
4. If the local free-list is empty, it will acquire from the
global LRU list. The global LRU list can either satisfy it
by its global free-list or by shrinking the global inactive
list. Since we have acquired the global LRU list lock,
it will try to get at most LOCAL_FREE_TARGET elements
to the local free list.
5. When a new element is added to the bpf_htab, it will
first sit at the pending-list (of the local list) first.
The pending-list will be flushed to the global LRU list
when it needs to acquire free nodes from the global list
next time.
* Lock Consideration:
The LRU list has a lock (lru_lock). Each bucket of htab has a
lock (buck_lock). If both locks need to be acquired together,
the lock order is always lru_lock -> buck_lock and this only
happens in the bpf_lru_list.c logic.
In hashtab.c, both locks are not acquired together (i.e. one
lock is always released first before acquiring another lock).
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Replace the custom u64_to_ptr() function with the u64_to_user_ptr()
macro.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit 67f8b1dcb9 ("net/mlx4_en: Refactor the XDP forwarding rings
scheme") added a bug in that the prog's reference count is not dropped
in the error path when mlx4_en_try_alloc_resources() is failing from
mlx4_xdp_set().
We previously took bpf_prog_add(prog, priv->rx_ring_num - 1), that we
need to release again. Earlier in the call path, dev_change_xdp_fd()
itself holds a reference to the prog as well (hence the '- 1' in the
bpf_prog_add()), so a simple atomic_sub() is safe to use here. When
an error is propagated, then bpf_prog_put() is called eventually from
dev_change_xdp_fd()
Fixes: 67f8b1dcb9 ("net/mlx4_en: Refactor the XDP forwarding rings scheme")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Remove the unused but set variables min_set and max_set in
adjust_reg_min_max_vals to fix the following warning when building with
'W=1':
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:1483:7: warning: variable ‘min_set’ set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
There is no warning about max_set being unused, but since it is only
used in the assignment of min_set it can be removed as well.
They were introduced in commit 484611357c ("bpf: allow access into map
value arrays") but seem to have never been used.
Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Tobias Klauser <tklauser@distanz.ch>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In map_create(), we first find and create the map, then once that
suceeded, we charge it to the user's RLIMIT_MEMLOCK, and then fetch
a new anon fd through anon_inode_getfd(). The problem is, once the
latter fails f.e. due to RLIMIT_NOFILE limit, then we only destruct
the map via map->ops->map_free(), but without uncharging the previously
locked memory first. That means that the user_struct allocation is
leaked as well as the accounted RLIMIT_MEMLOCK memory not released.
Make the label names in the fix consistent with bpf_prog_load().
Fixes: aaac3ba95e ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit a6ed3ea65d ("bpf: restore behavior of bpf_map_update_elem")
added an extra per-cpu reserve to the hash table map to restore old
behaviour from pre prealloc times. When non-prealloc is in use for a
map, then problem is that once a hash table extra element has been
linked into the hash-table, and the hash table is destroyed due to
refcount dropping to zero, then htab_map_free() -> delete_all_elements()
will walk the whole hash table and drop all elements via htab_elem_free().
The problem is that the element from the extra reserve is first fed
to the wrong backend allocator and eventually freed twice.
Fixes: a6ed3ea65d ("bpf: restore behavior of bpf_map_update_elem")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
While commit bb35a6ef7d ("bpf, inode: allow for rename and link ops")
added support for hard links that can be used for prog and map nodes,
this work adds simple symlink support, which can be used f.e. for
directories also when unpriviledged and works with cmdline tooling that
understands S_IFLNK anyway. Since the switch in e27f4a942a ("bpf: Use
mount_nodev not mount_ns to mount the bpf filesystem"), there can be
various mount instances with mount_nodev() and thus hierarchy can be
flattened to facilitate object sharing. Thus, we can keep bpf tooling
also working by repointing paths.
Most of the functionality can be used from vfs library operations. The
symlink is stored in the inode itself, that is in i_link, which is
sufficient in our case as opposed to storing it in the page cache.
While at it, I noticed that bpf_mkdir() and bpf_mkobj() don't update
the directories mtime and ctime, so add a common helper for it called
bpf_dentry_finalize() that takes care of it for all cases now.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The verifier currently prints raw function ids when printing CALL
instructions or when complaining:
5: (85) call 23
unknown func 23
print a meaningful function name instead:
5: (85) call bpf_redirect#23
unknown func bpf_redirect#23
Moves the function documentation to a single comment and renames all
helpers names in the list to conform to the bpf_ prefix notation so
they can be greped in the kernel source.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Use case is mainly for soreuseport to select sockets for the local
numa node, but since generic, lets also add this for other networking
and tracing program types.
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A BPF program is required to check the return register of a
map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps
track of this by converting the type of the result register from
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional
jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed
for the result register 0.
In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG
instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes
them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the
verifier objects when the register is accessed:
0: (b7) r1 = 10
1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1
2: (bf) r2 = r10
3: (07) r2 += -8
4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000
6: (85) call 1
7: (bf) r4 = r0
8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1
R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp
9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0
R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'
This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical
PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by
assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional
jump is observed.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull more vfs updates from Al Viro:
">rename2() work from Miklos + current_time() from Deepa"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
fs: Replace current_fs_time() with current_time()
fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME_SEC with current_time() for inode timestamps
fs: Replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time() for inode timestamps
fs: proc: Delete inode time initializations in proc_alloc_inode()
vfs: Add current_time() api
vfs: add note about i_op->rename changes to porting
fs: rename "rename2" i_op to "rename"
vfs: remove unused i_op->rename
fs: make remaining filesystems use .rename2
libfs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE in simple_rename()
fs: support RENAME_NOREPLACE for local filesystems
ncpfs: fix unused variable warning
Suppose you have a map array value that is something like this
struct foo {
unsigned iter;
int array[SOME_CONSTANT];
};
You can easily insert this into an array, but you cannot modify the contents of
foo->array[] after the fact. This is because we have no way to verify we won't
go off the end of the array at verification time. This patch provides a start
for this work. We accomplish this by keeping track of a minimum and maximum
value a register could be while we're checking the code. Then at the time we
try to do an access into a MAP_VALUE we verify that the maximum offset into that
region is a valid access into that memory region. So in practice, code such as
this
unsigned index = 0;
if (foo->iter >= SOME_CONSTANT)
foo->iter = index;
else
index = foo->iter++;
foo->array[index] = bar;
would be allowed, as we can verify that index will always be between 0 and
SOME_CONSTANT-1. If you wish to use signed values you'll have to have an extra
check to make sure the index isn't less than 0, or do something like index %=
SOME_CONSTANT.
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
put_cpu_var takes the percpu data, not the data returned from
get_cpu_var.
This doesn't change the behavior.
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CURRENT_TIME macro is not appropriate for filesystems as it
doesn't use the right granularity for filesystem timestamps.
Use current_time() instead.
CURRENT_TIME is also not y2038 safe.
This is also in preparation for the patch that transitions
vfs timestamps to use 64 bit time and hence make them
y2038 safe. As part of the effort current_time() will be
extended to do range checks. Hence, it is necessary for all
file system timestamps to use current_time(). Also,
current_time() will be transitioned along with vfs to be
y2038 safe.
Note that whenever a single call to current_time() is used
to change timestamps in different inodes, it is because they
share the same time granularity.
Signed-off-by: Deepa Dinamani <deepa.kernel@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ryusuke Konishi <konishi.ryusuke@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Acked-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
This prevent future potential pointer leaks when an unprivileged eBPF
program will read a pointer value from its context. Even if
is_valid_access() returns a pointer type, the eBPF verifier replace it
with UNKNOWN_VALUE. The register value that contains a kernel address is
then allowed to leak. Moreover, this fix allows unprivileged eBPF
programs to use functions with (legitimate) pointer arguments.
Not an issue currently since reg_type is only set for PTR_TO_PACKET or
PTR_TO_PACKET_END in XDP and TC programs that can only be loaded as
privileged. For now, the only unprivileged eBPF program allowed is for
socket filtering and all the types from its context are UNKNOWN_VALUE.
However, this fix is important for future unprivileged eBPF programs
which could use pointers in their context.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When running as parser interpret BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW
instructions as loading CONST_IMM with the value stored
in imm. The verifier will continue not recognizing those
due to concerns about search space/program complexity
increase.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Advanced JIT compilers and translators may want to use
eBPF verifier as a base for parsers or to perform custom
checks and validations.
Add ability for external users to invoke the verifier
and provide callbacks to be invoked for every intruction
checked. For now only add most basic callback for
per-instruction pre-interpretation checks is added. More
advanced users may also like to have per-instruction post
callback and state comparison callback.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Move verifier's internal structures to a header file and
prefix their names with bpf_ to avoid potential namespace
conflicts. Those structures will soon be used by external
analyzers.
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Storing state in reserved fields of instructions makes
it impossible to run verifier on programs already
marked as read-only. Allocate and use an array of
per-instruction state instead.
While touching the error path rename and move existing
jump target.
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This work implements direct packet access for helpers and direct packet
write in a similar fashion as already available for XDP types via commits
4acf6c0b84 ("bpf: enable direct packet data write for xdp progs") and
6841de8b0d ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), and as a
complementary feature to the already available direct packet read for tc
(cls/act) programs.
For enabling this, we need to introduce two helpers, bpf_skb_pull_data()
and bpf_csum_update(). The first is generally needed for both, read and
write, because they would otherwise only be limited to the current linear
skb head. Usually, when the data_end test fails, programs just bail out,
or, in the direct read case, use bpf_skb_load_bytes() as an alternative
to overcome this limitation. If such data sits in non-linear parts, we
can just pull them in once with the new helper, retest and eventually
access them.
At the same time, this also makes sure the skb is uncloned, which is, of
course, a necessary condition for direct write. As this needs to be an
invariant for the write part only, the verifier detects writes and adds
a prologue that is calling bpf_skb_pull_data() to effectively unclone the
skb from the very beginning in case it is indeed cloned. The heuristic
makes use of a similar trick that was done in 233577a220 ("net: filter:
constify detection of pkt_type_offset"). This comes at zero cost for other
programs that do not use the direct write feature. Should a program use
this feature only sparsely and has read access for the most parts with,
for example, drop return codes, then such write action can be delegated
to a tail called program for mitigating this cost of potential uncloning
to a late point in time where it would have been paid similarly with the
bpf_skb_store_bytes() as well. Advantage of direct write is that the
writes are inlined whereas the helper cannot make any length assumptions
and thus needs to generate a call to memcpy() also for small sizes, as well
as cost of helper call itself with sanity checks are avoided. Plus, when
direct read is already used, we don't need to cache or perform rechecks
on the data boundaries (due to verifier invalidating previous checks for
helpers that change skb->data), so more complex programs using rewrites
can benefit from switching to direct read plus write.
For direct packet access to helpers, we save the otherwise needed copy into
a temp struct sitting on stack memory when use-case allows. Both facilities
are enabled via may_access_direct_pkt_data() in verifier. For now, we limit
this to map helpers and csum_diff, and can successively enable other helpers
where we find it makes sense. Helpers that definitely cannot be allowed for
this are those part of bpf_helper_changes_skb_data() since they can change
underlying data, and those that write into memory as this could happen for
packet typed args when still cloned. bpf_csum_update() helper accommodates
for the fact that we need to fixup checksum_complete when using direct write
instead of bpf_skb_store_bytes(), meaning the programs can use available
helpers like bpf_csum_diff(), and implement csum_add(), csum_sub(),
csum_block_add(), csum_block_sub() equivalents in eBPF together with the
new helper. A usage example will be provided for iproute2's examples/bpf/
directory.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Current contract for the following two helper argument types is:
* ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE: passed argument pair must be (ptr, >0).
* ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO: passed argument pair can be either
(NULL, 0) or (ptr, >0).
With 6841de8b0d ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly"), we can
pass also raw packet data to helpers, so depending on the argument type
being PTR_TO_PACKET, we now either assert memory via check_packet_access()
or check_stack_boundary(). As a result, the tests in check_packet_access()
currently allow more than intended with regards to reg->imm.
Back in 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access"), check_packet_access()
was fine to ignore size argument since in check_mem_access() size was
bpf_size_to_bytes() derived and prior to the call to check_packet_access()
guaranteed to be larger than zero.
However, for the above two argument types, it currently means, we can have
a <= 0 size and thus breaking current guarantees for helpers. Enforce a
check for size <= 0 and bail out if so.
check_stack_boundary() doesn't have such an issue since it already tests
for access_size <= 0 and bails out, resp. access_size == 0 in case of NULL
pointer passed when allowed.
Fixes: 6841de8b0d ("bpf: allow helpers access the packet directly")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This work adds BPF_CALL_<n>() macros and converts all the eBPF helper functions
to use them, in a similar fashion like we do with SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>() macros
that are used today. Motivation for this is to hide all the register handling
and all necessary casts from the user, so that it is done automatically in the
background when adding a BPF_CALL_<n>() call.
This makes current helpers easier to review, eases to write future helpers,
avoids getting the casting mess wrong, and allows for extending all helpers at
once (f.e. build time checks, etc). It also helps detecting more easily in
code reviews that unused registers are not instrumented in the code by accident,
breaking compatibility with existing programs.
BPF_CALL_<n>() internals are quite similar to SYSCALL_DEFINE<n>() ones with some
fundamental differences, for example, for generating the actual helper function
that carries all u64 regs, we need to fill unused regs, so that we always end up
with 5 u64 regs as an argument.
I reviewed several 0-5 generated BPF_CALL_<n>() variants of the .i results and
they look all as expected. No sparse issue spotted. We let this also sit for a
few days with Fengguang's kbuild test robot, and there were no issues seen. On
s390, it barked on the "uses dynamic stack allocation" notice, which is an old
one from bpf_perf_event_output{,_tp}() reappearing here due to the conversion
to the call wrapper, just telling that the perf raw record/frag sits on stack
(gcc with s390's -mwarn-dynamicstack), but that's all. Did various runtime tests
and they were fine as well. All eBPF helpers are now converted to use these
macros, getting rid of a good chunk of all the raw castings.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Some minor misc cleanups, f.e. use sizeof(__u32) instead of hardcoding
and in __bpf_skb_max_len(), I missed that we always have skb->dev valid
anyway, so we can drop the unneeded test for dev; also few more other
misc bits addressed here.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
LLVM can generate code that tests for direct packet access via
skb->data/data_end in a way that currently gets rejected by the
verifier, example:
[...]
7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80)
8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76)
9: (bf) r2 = r9
10: (07) r2 += 54
11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12
R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx
R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp
12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a
14: (05) goto pc+430
[...]
from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv
R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp
24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1
25: (b7) r1 = 0
26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1
27: (b7) r2 = 40
28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20)
invalid access to packet, off=20 size=1, R9(id=0,off=0,r=0)
The reason why this gets rejected despite a proper test is that we
currently call find_good_pkt_pointers() only in case where we detect
tests like rX > pkt_end, where rX is of type pkt(id=Y,off=Z,r=0) and
derived, for example, from a register of type pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=0)
pointing to skb->data. find_good_pkt_pointers() then fills the range
in the current branch to pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) on success.
For above case, we need to extend that to recognize pkt_end >= rX
pattern and mark the other branch that is taken on success with the
appropriate pkt(id=Y,off=0,r=Z) type via find_good_pkt_pointers().
Since eBPF operates on BPF_JGT (>) and BPF_JGE (>=), these are the
only two practical options to test for from what LLVM could have
generated, since there's no such thing as BPF_JLT (<) or BPF_JLE (<=)
that we would need to take into account as well.
After the fix:
[...]
7: (61) r3 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80)
8: (61) r9 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76)
9: (bf) r2 = r9
10: (07) r2 += 54
11: (3d) if r3 >= r2 goto pc+12
R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=0) R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx
R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=0) R10=fp
12: (18) r4 = 0xffffff7a
14: (05) goto pc+430
[...]
from 11 to 24: R1=inv R2=pkt(id=0,off=54,r=54) R3=pkt_end R4=inv
R6=ctx R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp
24: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -40) = r1
25: (b7) r1 = 0
26: (63) *(u32 *)(r6 +56) = r1
27: (b7) r2 = 40
28: (71) r8 = *(u8 *)(r9 +20)
29: (bf) r1 = r8
30: (25) if r8 > 0x3c goto pc+47
R1=inv56 R2=imm40 R3=pkt_end R4=inv R6=ctx R8=inv56
R9=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=54) R10=fp
31: (b7) r1 = 1
[...]
Verifier test cases are also added in this work, one that demonstrates
the mentioned example here and one that tries a bad packet access for
the current/fall-through branch (the one with types pkt(id=X,off=Y,r=0),
pkt(id=X,off=0,r=0)), then a case with good and bad accesses, and two
with both test variants (>, >=).
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Make sure that BPF_PROG_TYPE_PERF_EVENT programs only use
preallocated hash maps, since doing memory allocation
in overflow_handler can crash depending on where nmi got triggered.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The verifier supported only 4-byte metafields in
struct __sk_buff and struct xdp_md. The metafields in upcoming
struct bpf_perf_event are 8-byte to match register width in struct pt_regs.
Teach verifier to recognize 8-byte metafield access.
The patch doesn't affect safety of sockets and xdp programs.
They check for 4-byte only ctx access before these conditions are hit.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Minor overlapping changes for both merge conflicts.
Resolution work done by Stephen Rothwell was used
as a reference.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The helper functions like bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key) were only
allowing 'key' to point to the initialized stack area.
That is causing performance degradation when programs need to process
millions of packets per second and need to copy contents of the packet
into the stack just to pass the stack pointer into the lookup() function.
Allow such helpers read from the packet directly.
All helpers that expect ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_KEY, ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE,
ARG_PTR_TO_STACK assume byte aligned pointer, so no alignment concerns,
only need to check that helper will not be accessing beyond
the packet range verified by the prior 'if (ptr < data_end)' condition.
For now allow this feature for XDP programs only. Later it can be
relaxed for the clsact programs as well.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
While hashing out BPF's current_task_under_cgroup helper bits, it came
to discussion that the skb_in_cgroup helper name was suboptimally chosen.
Tejun says:
So, I think in_cgroup should mean that the object is in that
particular cgroup while under_cgroup in the subhierarchy of that
cgroup. Let's rename the other subhierarchy test to under too. I
think that'd be a lot less confusing going forward.
[...]
It's more intuitive and gives us the room to implement the real
"in" test if ever necessary in the future.
Since this touches uapi bits, we need to change this as long as v4.8
is not yet officially released. Thus, change the helper enum and rename
related bits.
Fixes: 4a482f34af ("cgroup: bpf: Add bpf_skb_in_cgroup_proto")
Reference: http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/658500/
Suggested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
This adds a bpf helper that's similar to the skb_in_cgroup helper to check
whether the probe is currently executing in the context of a specific
subset of the cgroupsv2 hierarchy. It does this based on membership test
for a cgroup arraymap. It is invalid to call this in an interrupt, and
it'll return an error. The helper is primarily to be used in debugging
activities for containers, where you may have multiple programs running in
a given top-level "container".
Signed-off-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The introduction of pre-allocated hash elements inadvertently broke
the behavior of bpf hash maps where users expected to call
bpf_map_update_elem() without considering that the map can be full.
Some programs do:
old_value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key);
if (old_value) {
... prepare new_value on stack ...
bpf_map_update_elem(map, key, new_value);
}
Before pre-alloc the update() for existing element would work even
in 'map full' condition. Restore this behavior.
The above program could have updated old_value in place instead of
update() which would be faster and most programs use that approach,
but sometimes the values are large and the programs use update()
helper to do atomic replacement of the element.
Note we cannot simply update element's value in-place like percpu
hash map does and have to allocate extra num_possible_cpu elements
and use this extra reserve when the map is full.
Fixes: 6c90598174 ("bpf: pre-allocate hash map elements")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Using per-register incrementing ID can lead to
find_good_pkt_pointers() confusing registers which
have completely different values. Consider example:
0: (bf) r6 = r1
1: (61) r8 = *(u32 *)(r6 +76)
2: (61) r0 = *(u32 *)(r6 +80)
3: (bf) r7 = r8
4: (07) r8 += 32
5: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+9
R0=pkt_end R1=ctx R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=0,off=32,r=32) R10=fp
6: (bf) r8 = r7
7: (bf) r9 = r7
8: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +0)
9: (0f) r8 += r1
10: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r7 +1)
11: (0f) r9 += r1
12: (07) r8 += 32
13: (2d) if r8 > r0 goto pc+1
R0=pkt_end R1=inv56 R6=ctx R7=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=32) R8=pkt(id=1,off=32,r=32) R9=pkt(id=1,off=0,r=32) R10=fp
14: (71) r1 = *(u8 *)(r9 +16)
15: (b7) r7 = 0
16: (bf) r0 = r7
17: (95) exit
We need to get a UNKNOWN_VALUE with imm to force id
generation so lines 0-5 make r7 a valid packet pointer.
We then read two different bytes from the packet and
add them to copies of the constructed packet pointer.
r8 (line 9) and r9 (line 11) will get the same id of 1,
independently. When either of them is validated (line
13) - find_good_pkt_pointers() will also mark the other
as safe. This leads to access on line 14 being mistakenly
considered safe.
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <jakub.kicinski@netronome.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Unified UDP encapsulation offload methods for drivers, from
Alexander Duyck.
2) Make DSA binding more sane, from Andrew Lunn.
3) Support QCA9888 chips in ath10k, from Anilkumar Kolli.
4) Several workqueue usage cleanups, from Bhaktipriya Shridhar.
5) Add XDP (eXpress Data Path), essentially running BPF programs on RX
packets as soon as the device sees them, with the option to mirror
the packet on TX via the same interface. From Brenden Blanco and
others.
6) Allow qdisc/class stats dumps to run lockless, from Eric Dumazet.
7) Add VLAN support to b53 and bcm_sf2, from Florian Fainelli.
8) Simplify netlink conntrack entry layout, from Florian Westphal.
9) Add ipv4 forwarding support to mlxsw spectrum driver, from Ido
Schimmel, Yotam Gigi, and Jiri Pirko.
10) Add SKB array infrastructure and convert tun and macvtap over to it.
From Michael S Tsirkin and Jason Wang.
11) Support qdisc packet injection in pktgen, from John Fastabend.
12) Add neighbour monitoring framework to TIPC, from Jon Paul Maloy.
13) Add NV congestion control support to TCP, from Lawrence Brakmo.
14) Add GSO support to SCTP, from Marcelo Ricardo Leitner.
15) Allow GRO and RPS to function on macsec devices, from Paolo Abeni.
16) Support MPLS over IPV4, from Simon Horman.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1622 commits)
xgene: Fix build warning with ACPI disabled.
be2net: perform temperature query in adapter regardless of its interface state
l2tp: Correctly return -EBADF from pppol2tp_getname.
net/mlx5_core/health: Remove deprecated create_singlethread_workqueue
net: ipmr/ip6mr: update lastuse on entry change
macsec: ensure rx_sa is set when validation is disabled
tipc: dump monitor attributes
tipc: add a function to get the bearer name
tipc: get monitor threshold for the cluster
tipc: make cluster size threshold for monitoring configurable
tipc: introduce constants for tipc address validation
net: neigh: disallow transition to NUD_STALE if lladdr is unchanged in neigh_update()
MAINTAINERS: xgene: Add driver and documentation path
Documentation: dtb: xgene: Add MDIO node
dtb: xgene: Add MDIO node
drivers: net: xgene: ethtool: Use phy_ethtool_gset and sset
drivers: net: xgene: Use exported functions
drivers: net: xgene: Enable MDIO driver
drivers: net: xgene: Add backward compatibility
drivers: net: phy: xgene: Add MDIO driver
...
For forwarding to be effective, XDP programs should be allowed to
rewrite packet data.
This requires that the drivers supporting XDP must all map the packet
memory as TODEVICE or BIDIRECTIONAL before invoking the program.
Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a new bpf prog type that is intended to run in early stages of the
packet rx path. Only minimal packet metadata will be available, hence a
new context type, struct xdp_md, is exposed to userspace. So far only
expose the packet start and end pointers, and only in read mode.
An XDP program must return one of the well known enum values, all other
return codes are reserved for future use. Unfortunately, this
restriction is hard to enforce at verification time, so take the
approach of warning at runtime when such programs are encountered. Out
of bounds return codes should alias to XDP_ABORTED.
Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
A subsystem may need to store many copies of a bpf program, each
deserving its own reference. Rather than requiring the caller to loop
one by one (with possible mid-loop failure), add a bulk bpf_prog_add
api.
Signed-off-by: Brenden Blanco <bblanco@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Should have been obvious, only called from bpf() syscall via map_update_elem()
that calls bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem() under RCU read lock and thus this
must also be in GFP_ATOMIC, of course.
Fixes: 3b1efb196e ("bpf, maps: flush own entries on perf map release")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This work addresses a couple of issues bpf_skb_event_output()
helper currently has: i) We need two copies instead of just a
single one for the skb data when it should be part of a sample.
The data can be non-linear and thus needs to be extracted via
bpf_skb_load_bytes() helper first, and then copied once again
into the ring buffer slot. ii) Since bpf_skb_load_bytes()
currently needs to be used first, the helper needs to see a
constant size on the passed stack buffer to make sure BPF
verifier can do sanity checks on it during verification time.
Thus, just passing skb->len (or any other non-constant value)
wouldn't work, but changing bpf_skb_load_bytes() is also not
the proper solution, since the two copies are generally still
needed. iii) bpf_skb_load_bytes() is just for rather small
buffers like headers, since they need to sit on the limited
BPF stack anyway. Instead of working around in bpf_skb_load_bytes(),
this work improves the bpf_skb_event_output() helper to address
all 3 at once.
We can make use of the passed in skb context that we have in
the helper anyway, and use some of the reserved flag bits as
a length argument. The helper will use the new __output_custom()
facility from perf side with bpf_skb_copy() as callback helper
to walk and extract the data. It will pass the data for setup
to bpf_event_output(), which generates and pushes the raw record
with an additional frag part. The linear data used in the first
frag of the record serves as programmatically defined meta data
passed along with the appended sample.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The Kconfig currently controlling compilation of this code is:
init/Kconfig:config BPF_SYSCALL
init/Kconfig: bool "Enable bpf() system call"
...meaning that it currently is not being built as a module by anyone.
Lets remove the couple traces of modular infrastructure use, so that
when reading the driver there is no doubt it is builtin-only.
Note that MODULE_ALIAS is a no-op for non-modular code.
We replace module.h with init.h since the file does use __init.
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Adds a bpf helper, bpf_skb_in_cgroup, to decide if a skb->sk
belongs to a descendant of a cgroup2. It is similar to the
feature added in netfilter:
commit c38c4597e4 ("netfilter: implement xt_cgroup cgroup2 path match")
The user is expected to populate a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY
which will be used by the bpf_skb_in_cgroup.
Modifications to the bpf verifier is to ensure BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY
and bpf_skb_in_cgroup() are always used together.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a BPF_MAP_TYPE_CGROUP_ARRAY and its bpf_map_ops's implementations.
To update an element, the caller is expected to obtain a cgroup2 backed
fd by open(cgroup2_dir) and then update the array with that fd.
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since bpf_prog_get() and program type check is used in a couple of places,
refactor this into a small helper function that we can make use of. Since
the non RO prog->aux part is not used in performance critical paths and a
program destruction via RCU is rather very unlikley when doing the put, we
shouldn't have an issue just doing the bpf_prog_get() + prog->type != type
check, but actually not taking the ref at all (due to being in fdget() /
fdput() section of the bpf fd) is even cleaner and makes the diff smaller
as well, so just go for that. Callsites are changed to make use of the new
helper where possible.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Jann Horn reported following analysis that could potentially result
in a very hard to trigger (if not impossible) UAF race, to quote his
event timeline:
- Set up a process with threads T1, T2 and T3
- Let T1 set up a socket filter F1 that invokes another filter F2
through a BPF map [tail call]
- Let T1 trigger the socket filter via a unix domain socket write,
don't wait for completion
- Let T2 call PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF with F2, don't wait for completion
- Now T2 should be behind bpf_prog_get(), but before bpf_prog_put()
- Let T3 close the file descriptor for F2, dropping the reference
count of F2 to 2
- At this point, T1 should have looked up F2 from the map, but not
finished executing it
- Let T3 remove F2 from the BPF map, dropping the reference count of
F2 to 1
- Now T2 should call bpf_prog_put() (wrong BPF program type), dropping
the reference count of F2 to 0 and scheduling bpf_prog_free_deferred()
via schedule_work()
- At this point, the BPF program could be freed
- BPF execution is still running in a freed BPF program
While at PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF time it's only guaranteed that the perf
event fd we're doing the syscall on doesn't disappear from underneath us
for whole syscall time, it may not be the case for the bpf fd used as
an argument only after we did the put. It needs to be a valid fd pointing
to a BPF program at the time of the call to make the bpf_prog_get() and
while T2 gets preempted, F2 must have dropped reference to 1 on the other
CPU. The fput() from the close() in T3 should also add additionally delay
to the reference drop via exit_task_work() when bpf_prog_release() gets
called as well as scheduling bpf_prog_free_deferred().
That said, it makes nevertheless sense to move the BPF prog destruction
generally after RCU grace period to guarantee that such scenario above,
but also others as recently fixed in ceb5607035 ("bpf, perf: delay release
of BPF prog after grace period") with regards to tail calls won't happen.
Integrating bpf_prog_free_deferred() directly into the RCU callback is
not allowed since the invocation might happen from either softirq or
process context, so we're not permitted to block. Reviewing all bpf_prog_put()
invocations from eBPF side (note, cBPF -> eBPF progs don't use this for
their destruction) with call_rcu() look good to me.
Since we don't know whether at the time of attaching the program, we're
already part of a tail call map, we need to use RCU variant. However, due
to this, there won't be severely more stress on the RCU callback queue:
situations with above bpf_prog_get() and bpf_prog_put() combo in practice
normally won't lead to releases, but even if they would, enough effort/
cycles have to be put into loading a BPF program into the kernel already.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Use smp_processor_id() for the generic helper bpf_get_smp_processor_id()
instead of the raw variant. This allows for preemption checks when we
have DEBUG_PREEMPT, and otherwise uses the raw variant anyway. We only
need to keep the raw variant for socket filters, but we can reuse the
helper that is already there from cBPF side.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Some minor cleanups: i) Remove the unlikely() from fd array map lookups
and let the CPU branch predictor do its job, scenarios where there is not
always a map entry are very well valid. ii) Move the attribute type check
in the bpf_perf_event_read() helper a bit earlier so it's consistent wrt
checks with bpf_perf_event_output() helper as well. iii) remove some
comments that are self-documenting in kprobe_prog_is_valid_access() and
therefore make it consistent to tp_prog_is_valid_access() as well.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Several cases of overlapping changes, except the packet scheduler
conflicts which deal with the addition of the free list parameter
to qdisc_enqueue().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The behavior of perf event arrays are quite different from all
others as they are tightly coupled to perf event fds, f.e. shown
recently by commit e03e7ee34f ("perf/bpf: Convert perf_event_array
to use struct file") to make refcounting on perf event more robust.
A remaining issue that the current code still has is that since
additions to the perf event array take a reference on the struct
file via perf_event_get() and are only released via fput() (that
cleans up the perf event eventually via perf_event_release_kernel())
when the element is either manually removed from the map from user
space or automatically when the last reference on the perf event
map is dropped. However, this leads us to dangling struct file's
when the map gets pinned after the application owning the perf
event descriptor exits, and since the struct file reference will
in such case only be manually dropped or via pinned file removal,
it leads to the perf event living longer than necessary, consuming
needlessly resources for that time.
Relations between perf event fds and bpf perf event map fds can be
rather complex. F.e. maps can act as demuxers among different perf
event fds that can possibly be owned by different threads and based
on the index selection from the program, events get dispatched to
one of the per-cpu fd endpoints. One perf event fd (or, rather a
per-cpu set of them) can also live in multiple perf event maps at
the same time, listening for events. Also, another requirement is
that perf event fds can get closed from application side after they
have been attached to the perf event map, so that on exit perf event
map will take care of dropping their references eventually. Likewise,
when such maps are pinned, the intended behavior is that a user
application does bpf_obj_get(), puts its fds in there and on exit
when fd is released, they are dropped from the map again, so the map
acts rather as connector endpoint. This also makes perf event maps
inherently different from program arrays as described in more detail
in commit c9da161c65 ("bpf: fix clearing on persistent program
array maps").
To tackle this, map entries are marked by the map struct file that
added the element to the map. And when the last reference to that map
struct file is released from user space, then the tracked entries
are purged from the map. This is okay, because new map struct files
instances resp. frontends to the anon inode are provided via
bpf_map_new_fd() that is called when we invoke bpf_obj_get_user()
for retrieving a pinned map, but also when an initial instance is
created via map_create(). The rest is resolved by the vfs layer
automatically for us by keeping reference count on the map's struct
file. Any concurrent updates on the map slot are fine as well, it
just means that perf_event_fd_array_release() needs to delete less
of its own entires.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch extends map_fd_get_ptr() callback that is used by fd array
maps, so that struct file pointer from the related map can be passed
in. It's safe to remove map_update_elem() callback for the two maps since
this is only allowed from syscall side, but not from eBPF programs for these
two map types. Like in per-cpu map case, bpf_fd_array_map_update_elem()
needs to be called directly here due to the extra argument.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a release callback for maps that is invoked when the last
reference to its struct file is gone and the struct file about
to be released by vfs. The handler will be used by fd array maps.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The ctx structure passed into bpf programs is different depending on bpf
program type. The verifier incorrectly marked ctx->data and ctx->data_end
access based on ctx offset only. That caused loads in tracing programs
int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx) { .. ctx->ax .. }
to be incorrectly marked as PTR_TO_PACKET which later caused verifier
to reject the program that was actually valid in tracing context.
Fix this by doing program type specific matching of ctx offsets.
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Reported-by: Sasha Goldshtein <goldshtn@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Fix negative error code usage in ATM layer, from Stefan Hajnoczi.
2) If CONFIG_SYSCTL is disabled, the default TTL is not initialized
properly. From Ezequiel Garcia.
3) Missing spinlock init in mvneta driver, from Gregory CLEMENT.
4) Missing unlocks in hwmb error paths, also from Gregory CLEMENT.
5) Fix deadlock on team->lock when propagating features, from Ivan
Vecera.
6) Work around buffer offset hw bug in alx chips, from Feng Tang.
7) Fix double listing of SCTP entries in sctp_diag dumps, from Xin
Long.
8) Various statistics bug fixes in mlx4 from Eric Dumazet.
9) Fix some randconfig build errors wrt fou ipv6 from Arnd Bergmann.
10) All of l2tp was namespace aware, but the ipv6 support code was not
doing so. From Shmulik Ladkani.
11) Handle on-stack hrtimers properly in pktgen, from Guenter Roeck.
12) Propagate MAC changes properly through VLAN devices, from Mike
Manning.
13) Fix memory leak in bnx2x_init_one(), from Vitaly Kuznetsov.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (62 commits)
sfc: Track RPS flow IDs per channel instead of per function
usbnet: smsc95xx: fix link detection for disabled autonegotiation
virtio_net: fix virtnet_open and virtnet_probe competing for try_fill_recv
bnx2x: avoid leaking memory on bnx2x_init_one() failures
fou: fix IPv6 Kconfig options
openvswitch: update checksum in {push,pop}_mpls
sctp: sctp_diag should dump sctp socket type
net: fec: update dirty_tx even if no skb
vlan: Propagate MAC address to VLANs
atm: iphase: off by one in rx_pkt()
atm: firestream: add more reserved strings
vxlan: Accept user specified MTU value when create new vxlan link
net: pktgen: Call destroy_hrtimer_on_stack()
timer: Export destroy_hrtimer_on_stack()
net: l2tp: Make l2tp_ip6 namespace aware
Documentation: ip-sysctl.txt: clarify secure_redirects
sfc: use flow dissector helpers for aRFS
ieee802154: fix logic error in ieee802154_llsec_parse_dev_addr
net: nps_enet: Disable interrupts before napi reschedule
net/lapb: tuse %*ph to dump buffers
...
Additionally to being able to control the system wide maximum depth via
/proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack, now we are able to ask for
different depths per event, using perf_event_attr.sample_max_stack for
that.
This uses an u16 hole at the end of perf_event_attr, that, when
perf_event_attr.sample_type has the PERF_SAMPLE_CALLCHAIN, if
sample_max_stack is zero, means use perf_event_max_stack, otherwise
it'll be bounds checked under callchain_mutex.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-kolmn1yo40p7jhswxwrc7rrd@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Pull perf updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Mostly tooling and PMU driver fixes, but also a number of late updates
such as the reworking of the call-chain size limiting logic to make
call-graph recording more robust, plus tooling side changes for the
new 'backwards ring-buffer' extension to the perf ring-buffer"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (34 commits)
perf record: Read from backward ring buffer
perf record: Rename variable to make code clear
perf record: Prevent reading invalid data in record__mmap_read
perf evlist: Add API to pause/resume
perf trace: Use the ptr->name beautifier as default for "filename" args
perf trace: Use the fd->name beautifier as default for "fd" args
perf report: Add srcline_from/to branch sort keys
perf evsel: Record fd into perf_mmap
perf evsel: Add overwrite attribute and check write_backward
perf tools: Set buildid dir under symfs when --symfs is provided
perf trace: Only auto set call-graph to "dwarf" when syscalls are being traced
perf annotate: Sort list of recognised instructions
perf annotate: Fix identification of ARM blt and bls instructions
perf tools: Fix usage of max_stack sysctl
perf callchain: Stop validating callchains by the max_stack sysctl
perf trace: Fix exit_group() formatting
perf top: Use machine->kptr_restrict_warned
perf trace: Warn when trying to resolve kernel addresses with kptr_restrict=1
perf machine: Do not bail out if not managing to read ref reloc symbol
perf/x86/intel/p4: Trival indentation fix, remove space
...
Follow-up to commit e27f4a942a ("bpf: Use mount_nodev not mount_ns
to mount the bpf filesystem"), which removes the FS_USERNS_MOUNT flag.
The original idea was to have a per mountns instance instead of a
single global fs instance, but that didn't work out and we had to
switch to mount_nodev() model. The intent of that middle ground was
that we avoid users who don't play nice to create endless instances
of bpf fs which are difficult to control and discover from an admin
point of view, but at the same time it would have allowed us to be
more flexible with regard to namespaces.
Therefore, since we now did the switch to mount_nodev() as a fix
where individual instances are created, we also need to remove userns
mount flag along with it to avoid running into mentioned situation.
I don't expect any breakage at this early point in time with removing
the flag and we can revisit this later should the requirement for
this come up with future users. This and commit e27f4a942a have
been split to facilitate tracking should any of them run into the
unlikely case of causing a regression.
Fixes: b2197755b2 ("bpf: add support for persistent maps/progs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Humans don't write C code like:
u8 *ptr = skb->data;
int imm = 4;
imm += ptr;
but from llvm backend point of view 'imm' and 'ptr' are registers and
imm += ptr may be preferred vs ptr += imm depending which register value
will be used further in the code, while verifier can only recognize ptr += imm.
That caused small unrelated changes in the C code of the bpf program to
trigger rejection by the verifier. Therefore teach the verifier to recognize
both ptr += imm and imm += ptr.
For example:
when R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=imm22
after r7 += r6 instruction
will be R6=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=62) R7=pkt(id=0,off=22,r=62)
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
when packet headers are accessed in 'decreasing' order (like TCP port
may be fetched before the program reads IP src) the llvm may generate
the following code:
[...] // R7=pkt(id=0,off=22,r=70)
r2 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access
[...]
r7 += 40 // R7=pkt(id=0,off=62,r=70)
r8 = *(u32 *)(r7 +0) // good access
[...]
r1 = *(u32 *)(r7 -20) // this one will fail though it's within a safe range
// it's doing *(u32*)(skb->data + 42)
Fix verifier to recognize such code pattern
Alos turned out that 'off > range' condition is not a verifier bug.
It's a buggy program that may do something like:
if (ptr + 50 > data_end)
return 0;
ptr += 60;
*(u32*)ptr;
in such case emit
"invalid access to packet, off=0 size=4, R1(id=0,off=60,r=50)" error message,
so all information is available for the program author to fix the program.
Fixes: 969bf05eb3 ("bpf: direct packet access")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
While reviewing the filesystems that set FS_USERNS_MOUNT I spotted the
bpf filesystem. Looking at the code I saw a broken usage of mount_ns
with current->nsproxy->mnt_ns. As the code does not acquire a
reference to the mount namespace it can not possibly be correct to
store the mount namespace on the superblock as it does.
Replace mount_ns with mount_nodev so that each mount of the bpf
filesystem returns a distinct instance, and the code is not buggy.
In discussion with Hannes Frederic Sowa it was reported that the use
of mount_ns was an attempt to have one bpf instance per mount
namespace, in an attempt to keep resources that pin resources from
hiding. That intent simply does not work, the vfs is not built to
allow that kind of behavior. Which means that the bpf filesystem
really is buggy both semantically and in it's implemenation as it does
not nor can it implement the original intent.
This change is userspace visible, but my experience with similar
filesystems leads me to believe nothing will break with a model of each
mount of the bpf filesystem is distinct from all others.
Fixes: b2197755b2 ("bpf: add support for persistent maps/progs")
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Start address randomization and blinding in BPF currently use
prandom_u32(). prandom_u32() values are not exposed to unpriviledged
user space to my knowledge, but given other kernel facilities such as
ASLR, stack canaries, etc make use of stronger get_random_int(), we
better make use of it here as well given blinding requests successively
new random values. get_random_int() has minimal entropy pool depletion,
is not cryptographically secure, but doesn't need to be for our use
cases here.
Suggested-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull misc vfs cleanups from Al Viro:
"Assorted cleanups and fixes all over the place"
* 'work.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs:
coredump: only charge written data against RLIMIT_CORE
coredump: get rid of coredump_params->written
ecryptfs_lookup(): try either only encrypted or plaintext name
ecryptfs: avoid multiple aliases for directories
bpf: reject invalid names right in ->lookup()
__d_alloc(): treat NULL name as QSTR("/", 1)
mtd: switch ubi_open_volume_path() to vfs_stat()
mtd: switch open_mtd_by_chdev() to use of vfs_stat()
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
"Highlights:
1) Support SPI based w5100 devices, from Akinobu Mita.
2) Partial Segmentation Offload, from Alexander Duyck.
3) Add GMAC4 support to stmmac driver, from Alexandre TORGUE.
4) Allow cls_flower stats offload, from Amir Vadai.
5) Implement bpf blinding, from Daniel Borkmann.
6) Optimize _ASYNC_ bit twiddling on sockets, unless the socket is
actually using FASYNC these atomics are superfluous. From Eric
Dumazet.
7) Run TCP more preemptibly, also from Eric Dumazet.
8) Support LED blinking, EEPROM dumps, and rxvlan offloading in mlx5e
driver, from Gal Pressman.
9) Allow creating ppp devices via rtnetlink, from Guillaume Nault.
10) Improve BPF usage documentation, from Jesper Dangaard Brouer.
11) Support tunneling offloads in qed, from Manish Chopra.
12) aRFS offloading in mlx5e, from Maor Gottlieb.
13) Add RFS and RPS support to SCTP protocol, from Marcelo Ricardo
Leitner.
14) Add MSG_EOR support to TCP, this allows controlling packet
coalescing on application record boundaries for more accurate
socket timestamp sampling. From Martin KaFai Lau.
15) Fix alignment of 64-bit netlink attributes across the board, from
Nicolas Dichtel.
16) Per-vlan stats in bridging, from Nikolay Aleksandrov.
17) Several conversions of drivers to ethtool ksettings, from Philippe
Reynes.
18) Checksum neutral ILA in ipv6, from Tom Herbert.
19) Factorize all of the various marvell dsa drivers into one, from
Vivien Didelot
20) Add VF support to qed driver, from Yuval Mintz"
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1649 commits)
Revert "phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m"
Revert "phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional"
r8169: default to 64-bit DMA on recent PCIe chips
phy dp83867: Make rgmii parameters optional
phy dp83867: Fix compilation with CONFIG_OF_MDIO=m
bpf: arm64: remove callee-save registers use for tmp registers
asix: Fix offset calculation in asix_rx_fixup() causing slow transmissions
switchdev: pass pointer to fib_info instead of copy
net_sched: close another race condition in tcf_mirred_release()
tipc: fix nametable publication field in nl compat
drivers: net: Don't print unpopulated net_device name
qed: add support for dcbx.
ravb: Add missing free_irq() calls to ravb_close()
qed: Remove a stray tab
net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings
net: ethernet: fec-mpc52xx: use phydev from struct net_device
bpf, doc: fix typo on bpf_asm descriptions
stmmac: hardware TX COE doesn't work when force_thresh_dma_mode is set
net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phy_ethtool_{get|set}_link_ksettings
net: ethernet: fs-enet: use phydev from struct net_device
...
This makes perf_callchain_{user,kernel}() receive the max stack
as context for the perf_callchain_entry, instead of accessing
the global sysctl_perf_event_max_stack.
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-kolmn1yo40p7jhswxwrc7rrd@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
This work adds a generic facility for use from eBPF JIT compilers
that allows for further hardening of JIT generated images through
blinding constants. In response to the original work on BPF JIT
spraying published by Keegan McAllister [1], most BPF JITs were
changed to make images read-only and start at a randomized offset
in the page, where the rest was filled with trap instructions. We
have this nowadays in x86, arm, arm64 and s390 JIT compilers.
Additionally, later work also made eBPF interpreter images read
only for kernels supporting DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX, that is, x86,
arm, arm64 and s390 archs as well currently. This is done by
default for mentioned JITs when JITing is enabled. Furthermore,
we had a generic and configurable constant blinding facility on our
todo for quite some time now to further make spraying harder, and
first implementation since around netconf 2016.
We found that for systems where untrusted users can load cBPF/eBPF
code where JIT is enabled, start offset randomization helps a bit
to make jumps into crafted payload harder, but in case where larger
programs that cross page boundary are injected, we again have some
part of the program opcodes at a page start offset. With improved
guessing and more reliable payload injection, chances can increase
to jump into such payload. Elena Reshetova recently wrote a test
case for it [2, 3]. Moreover, eBPF comes with 64 bit constants, which
can leave some more room for payloads. Note that for all this,
additional bugs in the kernel are still required to make the jump
(and of course to guess right, to not jump into a trap) and naturally
the JIT must be enabled, which is disabled by default.
For helping mitigation, the general idea is to provide an option
bpf_jit_harden that admins can tweak along with bpf_jit_enable, so
that for cases where JIT should be enabled for performance reasons,
the generated image can be further hardened with blinding constants
for unpriviledged users (bpf_jit_harden == 1), with trading off
performance for these, but not for privileged ones. We also added
the option of blinding for all users (bpf_jit_harden == 2), which
is quite helpful for testing f.e. with test_bpf.ko. There are no
further e.g. hardening levels of bpf_jit_harden switch intended,
rationale is to have it dead simple to use as on/off. Since this
functionality would need to be duplicated over and over for JIT
compilers to use, which are already complex enough, we provide a
generic eBPF byte-code level based blinding implementation, which is
then just transparently JITed. JIT compilers need to make only a few
changes to integrate this facility and can be migrated one by one.
This option is for eBPF JITs and will be used in x86, arm64, s390
without too much effort, and soon ppc64 JITs, thus that native eBPF
can be blinded as well as cBPF to eBPF migrations, so that both can
be covered with a single implementation. The rule for JITs is that
bpf_jit_blind_constants() must be called from bpf_int_jit_compile(),
and in case blinding is disabled, we follow normally with JITing the
passed program. In case blinding is enabled and we fail during the
process of blinding itself, we must return with the interpreter.
Similarly, in case the JITing process after the blinding failed, we
return normally to the interpreter with the non-blinded code. Meaning,
interpreter doesn't change in any way and operates on eBPF code as
usual. For doing this pre-JIT blinding step, we need to make use of
a helper/auxiliary register, here BPF_REG_AX. This is strictly internal
to the JIT and not in any way part of the eBPF architecture. Just like
in the same way as JITs internally make use of some helper registers
when emitting code, only that here the helper register is one
abstraction level higher in eBPF bytecode, but nevertheless in JIT
phase. That helper register is needed since f.e. manually written
program can issue loads to all registers of eBPF architecture.
The core concept with the additional register is: blind out all 32
and 64 bit constants by converting BPF_K based instructions into a
small sequence from K_VAL into ((RND ^ K_VAL) ^ RND). Therefore, this
is transformed into: BPF_REG_AX := (RND ^ K_VAL), BPF_REG_AX ^= RND,
and REG <OP> BPF_REG_AX, so actual operation on the target register
is translated from BPF_K into BPF_X one that is operating on
BPF_REG_AX's content. During rewriting phase when blinding, RND is
newly generated via prandom_u32() for each processed instruction.
64 bit loads are split into two 32 bit loads to make translation and
patching not too complex. Only basic thing required by JITs is to
call the helper bpf_jit_blind_constants()/bpf_jit_prog_release_other()
pair, and to map BPF_REG_AX into an unused register.
Small bpf_jit_disasm extract from [2] when applied to x86 JIT:
echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden
ffffffffa034f5e9 + <x>:
[...]
39: mov $0xa8909090,%eax
3e: mov $0xa8909090,%eax
43: mov $0xa8ff3148,%eax
48: mov $0xa89081b4,%eax
4d: mov $0xa8900bb0,%eax
52: mov $0xa810e0c1,%eax
57: mov $0xa8908eb4,%eax
5c: mov $0xa89020b0,%eax
[...]
echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden
ffffffffa034f1e5 + <x>:
[...]
39: mov $0xe1192563,%r10d
3f: xor $0x4989b5f3,%r10d
46: mov %r10d,%eax
49: mov $0xb8296d93,%r10d
4f: xor $0x10b9fd03,%r10d
56: mov %r10d,%eax
59: mov $0x8c381146,%r10d
5f: xor $0x24c7200e,%r10d
66: mov %r10d,%eax
69: mov $0xeb2a830e,%r10d
6f: xor $0x43ba02ba,%r10d
76: mov %r10d,%eax
79: mov $0xd9730af,%r10d
7f: xor $0xa5073b1f,%r10d
86: mov %r10d,%eax
89: mov $0x9a45662b,%r10d
8f: xor $0x325586ea,%r10d
96: mov %r10d,%eax
[...]
As can be seen, original constants that carry payload are hidden
when enabled, actual operations are transformed from constant-based
to register-based ones, making jumps into constants ineffective.
Above extract/example uses single BPF load instruction over and
over, but of course all instructions with constants are blinded.
Performance wise, JIT with blinding performs a bit slower than just
JIT and faster than interpreter case. This is expected, since we
still get all the performance benefits from JITing and in normal
use-cases not every single instruction needs to be blinded. Summing
up all 296 test cases averaged over multiple runs from test_bpf.ko
suite, interpreter was 55% slower than JIT only and JIT with blinding
was 8% slower than JIT only. Since there are also some extremes in
the test suite, I expect for ordinary workloads that the performance
for the JIT with blinding case is even closer to JIT only case,
f.e. nmap test case from suite has averaged timings in ns 29 (JIT),
35 (+ blinding), and 151 (interpreter).
BPF test suite, seccomp test suite, eBPF sample code and various
bigger networking eBPF programs have been tested with this and were
running fine. For testing purposes, I also adapted interpreter and
redirected blinded eBPF image to interpreter and also here all tests
pass.
[1] http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html
[2] https://github.com/01org/jit-spray-poc-for-ksp/
[3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/05/03/5
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Reviewed-by: Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since the blinding is strictly only called from inside eBPF JITs,
we need to change signatures for bpf_int_jit_compile() and
bpf_prog_select_runtime() first in order to prepare that the
eBPF program we're dealing with can change underneath. Hence,
for call sites, we need to return the latest prog. No functional
change in this patch.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Move the functionality to patch instructions out of the verifier
code and into the core as the new bpf_patch_insn_single() helper
will be needed later on for blinding as well. No changes in
functionality.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Besides others, remove redundant comments where the code is self
documenting enough, and properly indent various bpf_verifier_ops
and bpf_prog_type_list declarations. Moreover, remove two exports
that actually have no module user.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
since UNKNOWN_VALUE type is weaker than CONST_IMM we can un-teach
verifier its recognition of constants in conditional branches
without affecting safety.
Ex:
if (reg == 123) {
.. here verifier was marking reg->type as CONST_IMM
instead keep reg as UNKNOWN_VALUE
}
Two verifier states with UNKNOWN_VALUE are equivalent, whereas
CONST_IMM_X != CONST_IMM_Y, since CONST_IMM is used for stack range
verification and other cases.
So help search pruning by marking registers as UNKNOWN_VALUE
where possible instead of CONST_IMM.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Extended BPF carried over two instructions from classic to access
packet data: LD_ABS and LD_IND. They're highly optimized in JITs,
but due to their design they have to do length check for every access.
When BPF is processing 20M packets per second single LD_ABS after JIT
is consuming 3% cpu. Hence the need to optimize it further by amortizing
the cost of 'off < skb_headlen' over multiple packet accesses.
One option is to introduce two new eBPF instructions LD_ABS_DW and LD_IND_DW
with similar usage as skb_header_pointer().
The kernel part for interpreter and x64 JIT was implemented in [1], but such
new insns behave like old ld_abs and abort the program with 'return 0' if
access is beyond linear data. Such hidden control flow is hard to workaround
plus changing JITs and rolling out new llvm is incovenient.
Therefore allow cls_bpf/act_bpf program access skb->data directly:
int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
struct iphdr *ip;
if (skb->data + sizeof(struct iphdr) + ETH_HLEN > skb->data_end)
/* packet too small */
return 0;
ip = skb->data + ETH_HLEN;
/* access IP header fields with direct loads */
if (ip->version != 4 || ip->saddr == 0x7f000001)
return 1;
[...]
}
This solution avoids introduction of new instructions. llvm stays
the same and all JITs stay the same, but verifier has to work extra hard
to prove safety of the above program.
For XDP the direct store instructions can be allowed as well.
The skb->data is NET_IP_ALIGNED, so for common cases the verifier can check
the alignment. The complex packet parsers where packet pointer is adjusted
incrementally cannot be tracked for alignment, so allow byte access in such cases
and misaligned access on architectures that define efficient_unaligned_access
[1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ast/bpf.git/?h=ld_abs_dw
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
cleanup verifier code and prepare it for addition of "pointer to packet" logic
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
net/ipv4/ip_gre.c
Minor conflicts between tunnel bug fixes in net and
ipv6 tunnel cleanups in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The commit 35578d7984 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter")
introduced clever way to check bpf_helper<->map_type compatibility.
Later on commit a43eec3042 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper") adjusted
the logic and inadvertently broke it.
Get rid of the clever bool compare and go back to two-way check
from map and from helper perspective.
Fixes: a43eec3042 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d16 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Minor overlapping changes in the conflicts.
In the macsec case, the change of the default ID macro
name overlapped with the 64-bit netlink attribute alignment
fixes in net-next.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The default remains 127, which is good for most cases, and not even hit
most of the time, but then for some cases, as reported by Brendan, 1024+
deep frames are appearing on the radar for things like groovy, ruby.
And in some workloads putting a _lower_ cap on this may make sense. One
that is per event still needs to be put in place tho.
The new file is:
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
127
Chaging it:
# echo 256 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
256
But as soon as there is some event using callchains we get:
# echo 512 > /proc/sys/kernel/perf_event_max_stack
-bash: echo: write error: Device or resource busy
#
Because we only allocate the callchain percpu data structures when there
is a user, which allows for changing the max easily, its just a matter
of having no callchain users at that point.
Reported-and-Tested-by: Brendan Gregg <brendan.d.gregg@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Ahern <dsahern@gmail.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: He Kuang <hekuang@huawei.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Milian Wolff <milian.wolff@kdab.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Cc: Zefan Li <lizefan@huawei.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160426002928.GB16708@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
When bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, ...) was invoked with a BPF program whose bytecode
references a non-map file descriptor as a map file descriptor, the error
handling code called fdput() twice instead of once (in __bpf_map_get() and
in replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr()). If the file descriptor table of the
current task is shared, this causes f_count to be decremented too much,
allowing the struct file to be freed while it is still in use
(use-after-free). This can be exploited to gain root privileges by an
unprivileged user.
This bug was introduced in
commit 0246e64d9a ("bpf: handle pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insn"), but is only
exploitable since
commit 1be7f75d16 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") because
previously, CAP_SYS_ADMIN was required to reach the vulnerable code.
(posted publicly according to request by maintainer)
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts were two cases of simple overlapping changes,
nothing serious.
In the UDP case, we need to add a hlist_add_tail_rcu()
to linux/rculist.h, because we've moved UDP socket handling
away from using nulls lists.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds a new helper for cls/act programs that can push events
to user space applications. For networking, this can be f.e. for sampling,
debugging, logging purposes or pushing of arbitrary wake-up events. The
idea is similar to a43eec3042 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output()
helper") and 39111695b1 ("samples: bpf: add bpf_perf_event_output example").
The eBPF program utilizes a perf event array map that user space populates
with fds from perf_event_open(), the eBPF program calls into the helper
f.e. as skb_event_output(skb, &my_map, BPF_F_CURRENT_CPU, raw, sizeof(raw))
so that the raw data is pushed into the fd f.e. at the map index of the
current CPU.
User space can poll/mmap/etc on this and has a data channel for receiving
events that can be post-processed. The nice thing is that since the eBPF
program and user space application making use of it are tightly coupled,
they can define their own arbitrary raw data format and what/when they
want to push.
While f.e. packet headers could be one part of the meta data that is being
pushed, this is not a substitute for things like packet sockets as whole
packet is not being pushed and push is only done in a single direction.
Intention is more of a generically usable, efficient event pipe to applications.
Workflow is that tc can pin the map and applications can attach themselves
e.g. after cls/act setup to one or multiple map slots, demuxing is done by
the eBPF program.
Adding this facility is with minimal effort, it reuses the helper
introduced in a43eec3042 ("bpf: introduce bpf_perf_event_output() helper")
and we get its functionality for free by overloading its BPF_FUNC_ identifier
for cls/act programs, ctx is currently unused, but will be made use of in
future. Example will be added to iproute2's BPF example files.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch converts all helpers that can use ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK as argument
type. For tc programs this is bpf_skb_load_bytes(), bpf_skb_get_tunnel_key(),
bpf_skb_get_tunnel_opt(). For tracing, this optimizes bpf_get_current_comm()
and bpf_probe_read(). The check in bpf_skb_load_bytes() for MAX_BPF_STACK can
also be removed since the verifier already makes sure we stay within bounds
on stack buffers.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When passing buffers from eBPF stack space into a helper function, we have
ARG_PTR_TO_STACK argument type for helpers available. The verifier makes sure
that such buffers are initialized, within boundaries, etc.
However, the downside with this is that we have a couple of helper functions
such as bpf_skb_load_bytes() that fill out the passed buffer in the expected
success case anyway, so zero initializing them prior to the helper call is
unneeded/wasted instructions in the eBPF program that can be avoided.
Therefore, add a new helper function argument type called ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK.
The idea is to skip the STACK_MISC check in check_stack_boundary() and color
the related stack slots as STACK_MISC after we checked all call arguments.
Helper functions using ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK must make sure that every path of
the helper function will fill the provided buffer area, so that we cannot leak
any uninitialized stack memory. This f.e. means that error paths need to
memset() the buffers, but the expected fast-path doesn't have to do this
anymore.
Since there's no such helper needing more than at most one ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK
argument, we can keep it simple and don't need to check for multiple areas.
Should in future such a use-case really appear, we have check_raw_mode() that
will make sure we implement support for it first.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, when the verifier checks calls in check_call() function, we
call check_func_arg() for all 5 arguments e.g. to make sure expected types
are correct. In some cases, we collect meta data (here: map pointer) to
perform additional checks such as checking stack boundary on key/value
sizes for subsequent arguments. As we're going to extend the meta data,
add a generic struct bpf_call_arg_meta that we can use for passing into
check_func_arg().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
verifier must check for reserved size bits in instruction opcode and
reject BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_DW and BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_DW instructions,
otherwise interpreter will WARN_RATELIMIT on them during execution.
Fixes: ddd872bc30 ("bpf: verifier: add checks for BPF_ABS | BPF_IND instructions")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
verifier is using the following structure to track the state of registers:
struct reg_state {
enum bpf_reg_type type;
union {
int imm;
struct bpf_map *map_ptr;
};
};
and later on in states_equal() does memcmp(&old->regs[i], &cur->regs[i],..)
to find equivalent states.
Throughout the code of verifier there are assignements to 'imm' and 'map_ptr'
fields and it's not obvious that most of the assignments into 'imm' don't
need to clear extra 4 bytes (like mark_reg_unknown_value() does) to make sure
that memcmp doesn't go over junk left from 'map_ptr' assignment.
Simplify the code by converting 'int' into 'long'
Suggested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The verifier needs to go through every path of the program in
order to check that it terminates safely, which can be quite a
lot of instructions that need to be processed f.e. in cases with
more branchy programs. With search pruning from f1bca824da ("bpf:
add search pruning optimization to verifier") the search space can
already be reduced significantly when the verifier detects that
a previously walked path with same register and stack contents
terminated already (see verifier's states_equal()), so the search
can skip walking those states.
When working with larger programs of > ~2000 (out of max 4096)
insns, we found that the current limit of 32k instructions is easily
hit. For example, a case we ran into is that the search space cannot
be pruned due to branches at the beginning of the program that make
use of certain stack space slots (STACK_MISC), which are never used
in the remaining program (STACK_INVALID). Therefore, the verifier
needs to walk paths for the slots in STACK_INVALID state, but also
all remaining paths with a stack structure, where the slots are in
STACK_MISC, which can nearly double the search space needed. After
various experiments, we find that a limit of 64k processed insns is
a more reasonable choice when dealing with larger programs in practice.
This still allows to reject extreme crafted cases that can have a
much higher complexity (f.e. > ~300k) within the 4096 insns limit
due to search pruning not being able to take effect.
Furthermore, we found that a lot of states can be pruned after a
call instruction, f.e. we were able to reduce the search state by
~35% in some cases with this heuristic, trade-off is to keep a bit
more states in env->explored_states. Usually, call instructions
have a number of preceding register assignments and/or stack stores,
where search pruning has a better chance to suceed in states_equal()
test. The current code marks the branch targets with STATE_LIST_MARK
in case of conditional jumps, and the next (t + 1) instruction in
case of unconditional jump so that f.e. a backjump will walk it. We
also did experiments with using t + insns[t].off + 1 as a marker in
the unconditionally jump case instead of t + 1 with the rationale
that these two branches of execution that converge after the label
might have more potential of pruning. We found that it was a bit
better, but not necessarily significantly better than the current
state, perhaps also due to clang not generating back jumps often.
Hence, we left that as is for now.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
during bpf program loading remember the last byte of ctx access
and at the time of attaching the program to tracepoint check that
the program doesn't access bytes beyond defined in tracepoint fields
This also disallows access to __dynamic_array fields, but can be
relaxed in the future.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
needs two wrapper functions to fetch 'struct pt_regs *' to convert
tracepoint bpf context into kprobe bpf context to reuse existing
helper functions
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add map_flags attribute to bpf_map_show_fdinfo(), so that tools like
tc can check for them when loading objects from a pinned entry, e.g.
if user intent wrt allocation (BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC) is different to the
pinned object, it can bail out. Follow-up to 6c90598174 ("bpf:
pre-allocate hash map elements"), so that tc can still support this
with v4.6.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull 'objtool' stack frame validation from Ingo Molnar:
"This tree adds a new kernel build-time object file validation feature
(ONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION=y): kernel stack frame correctness validation.
It was written by and is maintained by Josh Poimboeuf.
The motivation: there's a category of hard to find kernel bugs, most
of them in assembly code (but also occasionally in C code), that
degrades the quality of kernel stack dumps/backtraces. These bugs are
hard to detect at the source code level. Such bugs result in
incorrect/incomplete backtraces most of time - but can also in some
rare cases result in crashes or other undefined behavior.
The build time correctness checking is done via the new 'objtool'
user-space utility that was written for this purpose and which is
hosted in the kernel repository in tools/objtool/. The tool's (very
simple) UI and source code design is shaped after Git and perf and
shares quite a bit of infrastructure with tools/perf (which tooling
infrastructure sharing effort got merged via perf and is already
upstream). Objtool follows the well-known kernel coding style.
Objtool does not try to check .c or .S files, it instead analyzes the
resulting .o generated machine code from first principles: it decodes
the instruction stream and interprets it. (Right now objtool supports
the x86-64 architecture.)
From tools/objtool/Documentation/stack-validation.txt:
"The kernel CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option enables a host tool named
objtool which runs at compile time. It has a "check" subcommand
which analyzes every .o file and ensures the validity of its stack
metadata. It enforces a set of rules on asm code and C inline
assembly code so that stack traces can be reliable.
Currently it only checks frame pointer usage, but there are plans to
add CFI validation for C files and CFI generation for asm files.
For each function, it recursively follows all possible code paths
and validates the correct frame pointer state at each instruction.
It also follows code paths involving special sections, like
.altinstructions, __jump_table, and __ex_table, which can add
alternative execution paths to a given instruction (or set of
instructions). Similarly, it knows how to follow switch statements,
for which gcc sometimes uses jump tables."
When this new kernel option is enabled (it's disabled by default), the
tool, if it finds any suspicious assembly code pattern, outputs
warnings in compiler warning format:
warning: objtool: rtlwifi_rate_mapping()+0x2e7: frame pointer state mismatch
warning: objtool: cik_tiling_mode_table_init()+0x6ce: call without frame pointer save/setup
warning: objtool:__schedule()+0x3c0: duplicate frame pointer save
warning: objtool:__schedule()+0x3fd: sibling call from callable instruction with changed frame pointer
... so that scripts that pick up compiler warnings will notice them.
All known warnings triggered by the tool are fixed by the tree, most
of the commits in fact prepare the kernel to be warning-free. Most of
them are bugfixes or cleanups that stand on their own, but there are
also some annotations of 'special' stack frames for justified cases
such entries to JIT-ed code (BPF) or really special boot time code.
There are two other long-term motivations behind this tool as well:
- To improve the quality and reliability of kernel stack frames, so
that they can be used for optimized live patching.
- To create independent infrastructure to check the correctness of
CFI stack frames at build time. CFI debuginfo is notoriously
unreliable and we cannot use it in the kernel as-is without extra
checking done both on the kernel side and on the build side.
The quality of kernel stack frames matters to debuggability as well,
so IMO we can merge this without having to consider the live patching
or CFI debuginfo angle"
* 'core-objtool-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (52 commits)
objtool: Only print one warning per function
objtool: Add several performance improvements
tools: Copy hashtable.h into tools directory
objtool: Fix false positive warnings for functions with multiple switch statements
objtool: Rename some variables and functions
objtool: Remove superflous INIT_LIST_HEAD
objtool: Add helper macros for traversing instructions
objtool: Fix false positive warnings related to sibling calls
objtool: Compile with debugging symbols
objtool: Detect infinite recursion
objtool: Prevent infinite recursion in noreturn detection
objtool: Detect and warn if libelf is missing and don't break the build
tools: Support relative directory path for 'O='
objtool: Support CROSS_COMPILE
x86/asm/decoder: Use explicitly signed chars
objtool: Enable stack metadata validation on 64-bit x86
objtool: Add CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION option
objtool: Add tool to perform compile-time stack metadata validation
x86/kprobes: Mark kretprobe_trampoline() stack frame as non-standard
sched: Always inline context_switch()
...
Lots of places in the kernel use memcpy(buf, comm, TASK_COMM_LEN); but
the result is typically passed to print("%s", buf) and extra bytes
after zero don't cause any harm.
In bpf the result of bpf_get_current_comm() is used as the part of
map key and was causing spurious hash map mismatches.
Use strlcpy() to guarantee zero-terminated string.
bpf verifier checks that output buffer is zero-initialized,
so even for short task names the output buffer don't have junk bytes.
Note it's not a security concern, since kprobe+bpf is root only.
Fixes: ffeedafbf0 ("bpf: introduce current->pid, tgid, uid, gid, comm accessors")
Reported-by: Tobias Waldekranz <tobias@waldekranz.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
0-day bot reported build error:
kernel/built-in.o: In function `map_lookup_elem':
>> kernel/bpf/.tmp_syscall.o:(.text+0x329b3c): undefined reference to `bpf_stackmap_copy'
when CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL is set and CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS is not.
Add weak definition to resolve it.
This code path in map_lookup_elem() is never taken
when CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS is not set.
Fixes: 557c0c6e7d ("bpf: convert stackmap to pre-allocation")
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
It was observed that calling bpf_get_stackid() from a kprobe inside
slub or from spin_unlock causes similar deadlock as with hashmap,
therefore convert stackmap to use pre-allocated memory.
The call_rcu is no longer feasible mechanism, since delayed freeing
causes bpf_get_stackid() to fail unpredictably when number of actual
stacks is significantly less than user requested max_entries.
Since elements are no longer freed into slub, we can push elements into
freelist immediately and let them be recycled.
However the very unlikley race between user space map_lookup() and
program-side recycling is possible:
cpu0 cpu1
---- ----
user does lookup(stackidX)
starts copying ips into buffer
delete(stackidX)
calls bpf_get_stackid()
which recyles the element and
overwrites with new stack trace
To avoid user space seeing a partial stack trace consisting of two
merged stack traces, do bucket = xchg(, NULL); copy; xchg(,bucket);
to preserve consistent stack trace delivery to user space.
Now we can move memset(,0) of left-over element value from critical
path of bpf_get_stackid() into slow-path of user space lookup.
Also disallow lookup() from bpf program, since it's useless and
program shouldn't be messing with collected stack trace.
Note that similar race between user space lookup and kernel side updates
is also present in hashmap, but it's not a new race. bpf programs were
always allowed to modify hash and array map elements while user space
is copying them.
Fixes: d5a3b1f691 ("bpf: introduce BPF_MAP_TYPE_STACK_TRACE")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
If kprobe is placed on spin_unlock then calling kmalloc/kfree from
bpf programs is not safe, since the following dead lock is possible:
kfree->spin_lock(kmem_cache_node->lock)...spin_unlock->kprobe->
bpf_prog->map_update->kmalloc->spin_lock(of the same kmem_cache_node->lock)
and deadlocks.
The following solutions were considered and some implemented, but
eventually discarded
- kmem_cache_create for every map
- add recursion check to slow-path of slub
- use reserved memory in bpf_map_update for in_irq or in preempt_disabled
- kmalloc via irq_work
At the end pre-allocation of all map elements turned out to be the simplest
solution and since the user is charged upfront for all the memory, such
pre-allocation doesn't affect the user space visible behavior.
Since it's impossible to tell whether kprobe is triggered in a safe
location from kmalloc point of view, use pre-allocation by default
and introduce new BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC flag.
While testing of per-cpu hash maps it was discovered
that alloc_percpu(GFP_ATOMIC) has odd corner cases and often
fails to allocate memory even when 90% of it is free.
The pre-allocation of per-cpu hash elements solves this problem as well.
Turned out that bpf_map_update() quickly followed by
bpf_map_lookup()+bpf_map_delete() is very common pattern used
in many of iovisor/bcc/tools, so there is additional benefit of
pre-allocation, since such use cases are must faster.
Since all hash map elements are now pre-allocated we can remove
atomic increment of htab->count and save few more cycles.
Also add bpf_map_precharge_memlock() to check rlimit_memlock early to avoid
large malloc/free done by users who don't have sufficient limits.
Pre-allocation is done with vmalloc and alloc/free is done
via percpu_freelist. Here are performance numbers for different
pre-allocation algorithms that were implemented, but discarded
in favor of percpu_freelist:
1 cpu:
pcpu_ida 2.1M
pcpu_ida nolock 2.3M
bt 2.4M
kmalloc 1.8M
hlist+spinlock 2.3M
pcpu_freelist 2.6M
4 cpu:
pcpu_ida 1.5M
pcpu_ida nolock 1.8M
bt w/smp_align 1.7M
bt no/smp_align 1.1M
kmalloc 0.7M
hlist+spinlock 0.2M
pcpu_freelist 2.0M
8 cpu:
pcpu_ida 0.7M
bt w/smp_align 0.8M
kmalloc 0.4M
pcpu_freelist 1.5M
32 cpu:
kmalloc 0.13M
pcpu_freelist 0.49M
pcpu_ida nolock is a modified percpu_ida algorithm without
percpu_ida_cpu locks and without cross-cpu tag stealing.
It's faster than existing percpu_ida, but not as fast as pcpu_freelist.
bt is a variant of block/blk-mq-tag.c simlified and customized
for bpf use case. bt w/smp_align is using cache line for every 'long'
(similar to blk-mq-tag). bt no/smp_align allocates 'long'
bitmasks continuously to save memory. It's comparable to percpu_ida
and in some cases faster, but slower than percpu_freelist
hlist+spinlock is the simplest free list with single spinlock.
As expeceted it has very bad scaling in SMP.
kmalloc is existing implementation which is still available via
BPF_F_NO_PREALLOC flag. It's significantly slower in single cpu and
in 8 cpu setup it's 3 times slower than pre-allocation with pcpu_freelist,
but saves memory, so in cases where map->max_entries can be large
and number of map update/delete per second is low, it may make
sense to use it.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce simple percpu_freelist to keep single list of elements
spread across per-cpu singly linked lists.
/* push element into the list */
void pcpu_freelist_push(struct pcpu_freelist *, struct pcpu_freelist_node *);
/* pop element from the list */
struct pcpu_freelist_node *pcpu_freelist_pop(struct pcpu_freelist *);
The object is pushed to the current cpu list.
Pop first trying to get the object from the current cpu list,
if it's empty goes to the neigbour cpu list.
For bpf program usage pattern the collision rate is very low,
since programs push and pop the objects typically on the same cpu.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
if kprobe is placed within update or delete hash map helpers
that hold bucket spin lock and triggered bpf program is trying to
grab the spinlock for the same bucket on the same cpu, it will
deadlock.
Fix it by extending existing recursion prevention mechanism.
Note, map_lookup and other tracing helpers don't have this problem,
since they don't hold any locks and don't modify global data.
bpf_trace_printk has its own recursive check and ok as well.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
objtool reports the following false positive warnings:
kernel/bpf/core.o: warning: objtool: __bpf_prog_run()+0x5c: sibling call from callable instruction with changed frame pointer
kernel/bpf/core.o: warning: objtool: __bpf_prog_run()+0x60: function has unreachable instruction
kernel/bpf/core.o: warning: objtool: __bpf_prog_run()+0x64: function has unreachable instruction
[...]
It's confused by the following dynamic jump instruction in
__bpf_prog_run()::
jmp *(%r12,%rax,8)
which corresponds to the following line in the C code:
goto *jumptable[insn->code];
There's no way for objtool to deterministically find all possible
branch targets for a dynamic jump, so it can't verify this code.
In this case the jumps all stay within the function, and there's nothing
unusual going on related to the stack, so we can whitelist the function.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Bernd Petrovitsch <bernd@petrovitsch.priv.at>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Chris J Arges <chris.j.arges@canonical.com>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.cz>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@gmail.com>
Cc: Pedro Alves <palves@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/b90e6bf3fdbfb5c4cc1b164b965502e53cf48935.1456719558.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/phy/bcm7xxx.c
drivers/net/phy/marvell.c
drivers/net/vxlan.c
All three conflicts were cases of simple overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, when we pass a buffer from the eBPF stack into a helper
function, the function proto indicates argument types as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK
and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE pair. If R<X> contains the former, then R<X+1>
must be of the latter type. Then, verifier checks whether the buffer
points into eBPF stack, is initialized, etc. The verifier also guarantees
that the constant value passed in R<X+1> is greater than 0, so helper
functions don't need to test for it and can always assume a non-NULL
initialized buffer as well as non-0 buffer size.
This patch adds a new argument types ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO that
allows to also pass NULL as R<X> and 0 as R<X+1> into the helper function.
Such helper functions, of course, need to be able to handle these cases
internally then. Verifier guarantees that either R<X> == NULL && R<X+1> == 0
or R<X> != NULL && R<X+1> != 0 (like the case of ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE), any
other combinations are not possible to load.
I went through various options of extending the verifier, and introducing
the type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO seems to have most minimal changes
needed to the verifier.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
add new map type to store stack traces and corresponding helper
bpf_get_stackid(ctx, map, flags) - walk user or kernel stack and return id
@ctx: struct pt_regs*
@map: pointer to stack_trace map
@flags: bits 0-7 - numer of stack frames to skip
bit 8 - collect user stack instead of kernel
bit 9 - compare stacks by hash only
bit 10 - if two different stacks hash into the same stackid
discard old
other bits - reserved
Return: >= 0 stackid on success or negative error
stackid is a 32-bit integer handle that can be further combined with
other data (including other stackid) and used as a key into maps.
Userspace will access stackmap using standard lookup/delete syscall commands to
retrieve full stack trace for given stackid.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
bpf_percpu_hash_update() expects rcu lock to be held and warns if it's not,
which pointed out a missing rcu read lock.
Fixes: 15a07b338 ("bpf: add lookup/update support for per-cpu hash and array maps")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When ctx access is used, the kernel often needs to expand/rewrite
instructions, so after that patching, branch offsets have to be
adjusted for both forward and backward jumps in the new eBPF program,
but for backward jumps it fails to account the delta. Meaning, for
example, if the expansion happens exactly on the insn that sits at
the jump target, it doesn't fix up the back jump offset.
Analysis on what the check in adjust_branches() is currently doing:
/* adjust offset of jmps if necessary */
if (i < pos && i + insn->off + 1 > pos)
insn->off += delta;
else if (i > pos && i + insn->off + 1 < pos)
insn->off -= delta;
First condition (forward jumps):
Before: After:
insns[0] insns[0]
insns[1] <--- i/insn insns[1] <--- i/insn
insns[2] <--- pos insns[P] <--- pos
insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta
insns[4] <--- target_X insns[P] `-----|
insns[5] insns[3]
insns[4] <--- target_X
insns[5]
First case is if we cross pos-boundary and the jump instruction was
before pos. This is handeled correctly. I.e. if i == pos, then this
would mean our jump that we currently check was the patchlet itself
that we just injected. Since such patchlets are self-contained and
have no awareness of any insns before or after the patched one, the
delta is correctly not adjusted. Also, for the second condition in
case of i + insn->off + 1 == pos, means we jump to that newly patched
instruction, so no offset adjustment are needed. That part is correct.
Second condition (backward jumps):
Before: After:
insns[0] insns[0]
insns[1] <--- target_X insns[1] <--- target_X
insns[2] <--- pos <-- target_Y insns[P] <--- pos <-- target_Y
insns[3] insns[P] `------| delta
insns[4] <--- i/insn insns[P] `-----|
insns[5] insns[3]
insns[4] <--- i/insn
insns[5]
Second interesting case is where we cross pos-boundary and the jump
instruction was after pos. Backward jump with i == pos would be
impossible and pose a bug somewhere in the patchlet, so the first
condition checking i > pos is okay only by itself. However, i +
insn->off + 1 < pos does not always work as intended to trigger the
adjustment. It works when jump targets would be far off where the
delta wouldn't matter. But, for example, where the fixed insn->off
before pointed to pos (target_Y), it now points to pos + delta, so
that additional room needs to be taken into account for the check.
This means that i) both tests here need to be adjusted into pos + delta,
and ii) for the second condition, the test needs to be <= as pos
itself can be a target in the backjump, too.
Fixes: 9bac3d6d54 ("bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The functions bpf_map_lookup_elem(map, key, value) and
bpf_map_update_elem(map, key, value, flags) need to get/set
values from all-cpus for per-cpu hash and array maps,
so that user space can aggregate/update them as necessary.
Example of single counter aggregation in user space:
unsigned int nr_cpus = sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_CONF);
long values[nr_cpus];
long value = 0;
bpf_lookup_elem(fd, key, values);
for (i = 0; i < nr_cpus; i++)
value += values[i];
The user space must provide round_up(value_size, 8) * nr_cpus
array to get/set values, since kernel will use 'long' copy
of per-cpu values to try to copy good counters atomically.
It's a best-effort, since bpf programs and user space are racing
to access the same memory.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Primary use case is a histogram array of latency
where bpf program computes the latency of block requests or other
events and stores histogram of latency into array of 64 elements.
All cpus are constantly running, so normal increment is not accurate,
bpf_xadd causes cache ping-pong and this per-cpu approach allows
fastest collision-free counters.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_HASH map type which is used to do
accurate counters without need to use BPF_XADD instruction which turned
out to be too costly for high-performance network monitoring.
In the typical use case the 'key' is the flow tuple or other long
living object that sees a lot of events per second.
bpf_map_lookup_elem() returns per-cpu area.
Example:
struct {
u32 packets;
u32 bytes;
} * ptr = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&map, &key);
/* ptr points to this_cpu area of the value, so the following
* increments will not collide with other cpus
*/
ptr->packets ++;
ptr->bytes += skb->len;
bpf_update_elem() atomically creates a new element where all per-cpu
values are zero initialized and this_cpu value is populated with
given 'value'.
Note that non-per-cpu hash map always allocates new element
and then deletes old after rcu grace period to maintain atomicity
of update. Per-cpu hash map updates element values in-place.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
On ARM64, a BUG() is triggered in the eBPF JIT if a filter with a
constant shift that can't be encoded in the immediate field of the
UBFM/SBFM instructions is passed to the JIT. Since these shifts
amounts, which are negative or >= regsize, are invalid, reject them in
the eBPF verifier and the classic BPF filter checker, for all
architectures.
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Both htab_map_update_elem() and htab_map_delete_elem() can be
called from eBPF program, and they may be in kernel hot path,
so it isn't efficient to use a per-hashtable lock in this two
helpers.
The per-hashtable spinlock is used for protecting bucket's
hlist, and per-bucket lock is just enough. This patch converts
the per-hashtable lock into per-bucket spinlock, so that
contention can be decreased a lot.
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The spinlock is just used for protecting the per-bucket
hlist, so it isn't needed for selecting bucket.
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Preparing for removing global per-hashtable lock, so
the counter need to be defined as aotmic_t first.
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <tom.leiming@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Back in the days where eBPF (or back then "internal BPF" ;->) was not
exposed to user space, and only the classic BPF programs internally
translated into eBPF programs, we missed the fact that for classic BPF
A and X needed to be cleared. It was fixed back then via 83d5b7ef99
("net: filter: initialize A and X registers"), and thus classic BPF
specifics were added to the eBPF interpreter core to work around it.
This added some confusion for JIT developers later on that take the
eBPF interpreter code as an example for deriving their JIT. F.e. in
f75298f5c3 ("s390/bpf: clear correct BPF accumulator register"), at
least X could leak stack memory. Furthermore, since this is only needed
for classic BPF translations and not for eBPF (verifier takes care
that read access to regs cannot be done uninitialized), more complexity
is added to JITs as they need to determine whether they deal with
migrations or native eBPF where they can just omit clearing A/X in
their prologue and thus reduce image size a bit, see f.e. cde66c2d88
("s390/bpf: Only clear A and X for converted BPF programs"). In other
cases (x86, arm64), A and X is being cleared in the prologue also for
eBPF case, which is unnecessary.
Lets move this into the BPF migration in bpf_convert_filter() where it
actually belongs as long as the number of eBPF JITs are still few. It
can thus be done generically; allowing us to remove the quirk from
__bpf_prog_run() and to slightly reduce JIT image size in case of eBPF,
while reducing code duplication on this matter in current(/future) eBPF
JITs.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com>
Cc: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Yang Shi <yang.shi@linaro.org>
Acked-by: Zi Shen Lim <zlim.lnx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add support for renaming and hard links to the fs. Most of this can be
implemented by using simple library operations under the same constraints
that we don't use a reserved name like elsewhere. Linking can be useful
to share/manage things like maps across subsystem users. It works within
the file system boundary, but is not allowed for directories.
Symbolic links are explicitly not implemented here, as it can be better
done already by doing bind mounts inside bpf fs to set up shared directories
f.e. useful when using volumes in docker containers that map a private
working directory into /sys/fs/bpf/ which contains itself a bind mounted
path from the host's /sys/fs/bpf/ mount that is shared among multiple
containers. For single maps instead of whole directory, hard links can
be easily used to do the same.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
drivers/net/ethernet/renesas/ravb_main.c
kernel/bpf/syscall.c
net/ipv4/ipmr.c
All three conflicts were cases of overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
For large map->value_size the user space can trigger memory allocation warnings like:
WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 11122 at mm/page_alloc.c:2989
__alloc_pages_nodemask+0x695/0x14e0()
Call Trace:
[< inline >] __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff82743b56>] dump_stack+0x68/0x92 lib/dump_stack.c:50
[<ffffffff81244ec9>] warn_slowpath_common+0xd9/0x140 kernel/panic.c:460
[<ffffffff812450f9>] warn_slowpath_null+0x29/0x30 kernel/panic.c:493
[< inline >] __alloc_pages_slowpath mm/page_alloc.c:2989
[<ffffffff81554e95>] __alloc_pages_nodemask+0x695/0x14e0 mm/page_alloc.c:3235
[<ffffffff816188fe>] alloc_pages_current+0xee/0x340 mm/mempolicy.c:2055
[< inline >] alloc_pages include/linux/gfp.h:451
[<ffffffff81550706>] alloc_kmem_pages+0x16/0xf0 mm/page_alloc.c:3414
[<ffffffff815a1c89>] kmalloc_order+0x19/0x60 mm/slab_common.c:1007
[<ffffffff815a1cef>] kmalloc_order_trace+0x1f/0xa0 mm/slab_common.c:1018
[< inline >] kmalloc_large include/linux/slab.h:390
[<ffffffff81627784>] __kmalloc+0x234/0x250 mm/slub.c:3525
[< inline >] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:463
[< inline >] map_update_elem kernel/bpf/syscall.c:288
[< inline >] SYSC_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:744
To avoid never succeeding kmalloc with order >= MAX_ORDER check that
elem->value_size and computed elem_size are within limits for both hash and
array type maps.
Also add __GFP_NOWARN to kmalloc(value_size | elem_size) to avoid OOM warnings.
Note kmalloc(key_size) is highly unlikely to trigger OOM, since key_size <= 512,
so keep those kmalloc-s as-is.
Large value_size can cause integer overflows in elem_size and map.pages
formulas, so check for that as well.
Fixes: aaac3ba95e ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
During own review but also reported by Dmitry's syzkaller [1] it has been
noticed that we trigger a heap out-of-bounds access on eBPF array maps
when updating elements. This happens with each map whose map->value_size
(specified during map creation time) is not multiple of 8 bytes.
In array_map_alloc(), elem_size is round_up(attr->value_size, 8) and
used to align array map slots for faster access. However, in function
array_map_update_elem(), we update the element as ...
memcpy(array->value + array->elem_size * index, value, array->elem_size);
... where we access 'value' out-of-bounds, since it was allocated from
map_update_elem() from syscall side as kmalloc(map->value_size, GFP_USER)
and later on copied through copy_from_user(value, uvalue, map->value_size).
Thus, up to 7 bytes, we can access out-of-bounds.
Same could happen from within an eBPF program, where in worst case we
access beyond an eBPF program's designated stack.
Since 1be7f75d16 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs") didn't hit an
official release yet, it only affects priviledged users.
In case of array_map_lookup_elem(), the verifier prevents eBPF programs
from accessing beyond map->value_size through check_map_access(). Also
from syscall side map_lookup_elem() only copies map->value_size back to
user, so nothing could leak.
[1] http://github.com/google/syzkaller
Fixes: 28fbcfa08d ("bpf: add array type of eBPF maps")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, when having map file descriptors pointing to program arrays,
there's still the issue that we unconditionally flush program array
contents via bpf_fd_array_map_clear() in bpf_map_release(). This happens
when such a file descriptor is released and is independent of the map's
refcount.
Having this flush independent of the refcount is for a reason: there
can be arbitrary complex dependency chains among tail calls, also circular
ones (direct or indirect, nesting limit determined during runtime), and
we need to make sure that the map drops all references to eBPF programs
it holds, so that the map's refcount can eventually drop to zero and
initiate its freeing. Btw, a walk of the whole dependency graph would
not be possible for various reasons, one being complexity and another
one inconsistency, i.e. new programs can be added to parts of the graph
at any time, so there's no guaranteed consistent state for the time of
such a walk.
Now, the program array pinning itself works, but the issue is that each
derived file descriptor on close would nevertheless call unconditionally
into bpf_fd_array_map_clear(). Instead, keep track of users and postpone
this flush until the last reference to a user is dropped. As this only
concerns a subset of references (f.e. a prog array could hold a program
that itself has reference on the prog array holding it, etc), we need to
track them separately.
Short analysis on the refcounting: on map creation time usercnt will be
one, so there's no change in behaviour for bpf_map_release(), if unpinned.
If we already fail in map_create(), we are immediately freed, and no
file descriptor has been made public yet. In bpf_obj_pin_user(), we need
to probe for a possible map in bpf_fd_probe_obj() already with a usercnt
reference, so before we drop the reference on the fd with fdput().
Therefore, if actual pinning fails, we need to drop that reference again
in bpf_any_put(), otherwise we keep holding it. When last reference
drops on the inode, the bpf_any_put() in bpf_evict_inode() will take
care of dropping the usercnt again. In the bpf_obj_get_user() case, the
bpf_any_get() will grab a reference on the usercnt, still at a time when
we have the reference on the path. Should we later on fail to grab a new
file descriptor, bpf_any_put() will drop it, otherwise we hold it until
bpf_map_release() time.
Joint work with Alexei.
Fixes: b2197755b2 ("bpf: add support for persistent maps/progs")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a handler for show_fdinfo() to be used by the anon-inodes
backend for eBPF maps, and dump the map specification there. Not
only useful for admins, but also it provides a minimal way to
compare specs from ELF vs pinned object.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
The verbose() printer dumps the verifier state to user space, so let gcc
take care to check calls to verbose() for (future) errors. make with W=1
correctly suggests: function might be possible candidate for 'gnu_printf'
format attribute [-Wsuggest-attribute=format].
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This work adds support for "persistent" eBPF maps/programs. The term
"persistent" is to be understood that maps/programs have a facility
that lets them survive process termination. This is desired by various
eBPF subsystem users.
Just to name one example: tc classifier/action. Whenever tc parses
the ELF object, extracts and loads maps/progs into the kernel, these
file descriptors will be out of reach after the tc instance exits.
So a subsequent tc invocation won't be able to access/relocate on this
resource, and therefore maps cannot easily be shared, f.e. between the
ingress and egress networking data path.
The current workaround is that Unix domain sockets (UDS) need to be
instrumented in order to pass the created eBPF map/program file
descriptors to a third party management daemon through UDS' socket
passing facility. This makes it a bit complicated to deploy shared
eBPF maps or programs (programs f.e. for tail calls) among various
processes.
We've been brainstorming on how we could tackle this issue and various
approches have been tried out so far, which can be read up further in
the below reference.
The architecture we eventually ended up with is a minimal file system
that can hold map/prog objects. The file system is a per mount namespace
singleton, and the default mount point is /sys/fs/bpf/. Any subsequent
mounts within a given namespace will point to the same instance. The
file system allows for creating a user-defined directory structure.
The objects for maps/progs are created/fetched through bpf(2) with
two new commands (BPF_OBJ_PIN/BPF_OBJ_GET). I.e. a bpf file descriptor
along with a pathname is being passed to bpf(2) that in turn creates
(we call it eBPF object pinning) the file system nodes. Only the pathname
is being passed to bpf(2) for getting a new BPF file descriptor to an
existing node. The user can use that to access maps and progs later on,
through bpf(2). Removal of file system nodes is being managed through
normal VFS functions such as unlink(2), etc. The file system code is
kept to a very minimum and can be further extended later on.
The next step I'm working on is to add dump eBPF map/prog commands
to bpf(2), so that a specification from a given file descriptor can
be retrieved. This can be used by things like CRIU but also applications
can inspect the meta data after calling BPF_OBJ_GET.
Big thanks also to Alexei and Hannes who significantly contributed
in the design discussion that eventually let us end up with this
architecture here.
Reference: https://lkml.org/lkml/2015/10/15/925
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We currently have duplicated cleanup code in bpf_prog_put() and
bpf_prog_put_rcu() cleanup paths. Back then we decided that it was
not worth it to make it a common helper called by both, but with
the recent addition of resource charging, we could have avoided
the fix in commit ac00737f4e ("bpf: Need to call bpf_prog_uncharge_memlock
from bpf_prog_put") if we would have had only a single, common path.
We can simplify it further by assigning aux->prog only once during
allocation time.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a bpf_map_get() function that we're going to use later on and
align/clean the remaining helpers a bit so that we have them a bit
more consistent:
- __bpf_map_get() and __bpf_prog_get() that both work on the fd
struct, check whether the descriptor is eBPF and return the
pointer to the map/prog stored in the private data.
Also, we can return f.file->private_data directly, the function
signature is enough of a documentation already.
- bpf_map_get() and bpf_prog_get() that both work on u32 user fd,
call their respective __bpf_map_get()/__bpf_prog_get() variants,
and take a reference.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since we're going to use anon_inode_getfd() invocations in more than just
the current places, make a helper function for both, so that we only need
to pass a map/prog pointer to the helper itself in order to get a fd. The
new helpers are called bpf_map_new_fd() and bpf_prog_new_fd().
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fix safety checks for bpf_perf_event_read():
- only non-inherited events can be added to perf_event_array map
(do this check statically at map insertion time)
- dynamically check that event is local and !pmu->count
Otherwise buggy bpf program can cause kernel splat.
Also fix error path after perf_event_attrs()
and remove redundant 'extern'.
Fixes: 35578d7984 ("bpf: Implement function bpf_perf_event_read() that get the selected hardware PMU conuter")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This helper is used to send raw data from eBPF program into
special PERF_TYPE_SOFTWARE/PERF_COUNT_SW_BPF_OUTPUT perf_event.
User space needs to perf_event_open() it (either for one or all cpus) and
store FD into perf_event_array (similar to bpf_perf_event_read() helper)
before eBPF program can send data into it.
Today the programs triggered by kprobe collect the data and either store
it into the maps or print it via bpf_trace_printk() where latter is the debug
facility and not suitable to stream the data. This new helper replaces
such bpf_trace_printk() usage and allows programs to have dedicated
channel into user space for post-processing of the raw data collected.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently, is only called from __prog_put_rcu in the bpf_prog_release
path. Need this to call this from bpf_prog_put also to get correct
accounting.
Fixes: aaac3ba95e ("bpf: charge user for creation of BPF maps and programs")
Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
since eBPF programs and maps use kernel memory consider it 'locked' memory
from user accounting point of view and charge it against RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit.
This limit is typically set to 64Kbytes by distros, so almost all
bpf+tracing programs would need to increase it, since they use maps,
but kernel charges maximum map size upfront.
For example the hash map of 1024 elements will be charged as 64Kbyte.
It's inconvenient for current users and changes current behavior for root,
but probably worth doing to be consistent root vs non-root.
Similar accounting logic is done by mmap of perf_event.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In order to let unprivileged users load and execute eBPF programs
teach verifier to prevent pointer leaks.
Verifier will prevent
- any arithmetic on pointers
(except R10+Imm which is used to compute stack addresses)
- comparison of pointers
(except if (map_value_ptr == 0) ... )
- passing pointers to helper functions
- indirectly passing pointers in stack to helper functions
- returning pointer from bpf program
- storing pointers into ctx or maps
Spill/fill of pointers into stack is allowed, but mangling
of pointers stored in the stack or reading them byte by byte is not.
Within bpf programs the pointers do exist, since programs need to
be able to access maps, pass skb pointer to LD_ABS insns, etc
but programs cannot pass such pointer values to the outside
or obfuscate them.
Only allow BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER unprivileged programs,
so that socket filters (tcpdump), af_packet (quic acceleration)
and future kcm can use it.
tracing and tc cls/act program types still require root permissions,
since tracing actually needs to be able to see all kernel pointers
and tc is for root only.
For example, the following unprivileged socket filter program is allowed:
int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol));
u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index);
if (value)
*value += skb->len;
return 0;
}
but the following program is not:
int bpf_prog1(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
u32 index = load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol));
u64 *value = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&my_map, &index);
if (value)
*value += (u64) skb;
return 0;
}
since it would leak the kernel address into the map.
Unprivileged socket filter bpf programs have access to the
following helper functions:
- map lookup/update/delete (but they cannot store kernel pointers into them)
- get_random (it's already exposed to unprivileged user space)
- get_smp_processor_id
- tail_call into another socket filter program
- ktime_get_ns
The feature is controlled by sysctl kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled.
This toggle defaults to off (0), but can be set true (1). Once true,
bpf programs and maps cannot be accessed from unprivileged process,
and the toggle cannot be set back to false.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
eBPF socket filter programs may see junk in 'u32 cb[5]' area,
since it could have been used by protocol layers earlier.
For socket filter programs used in af_packet we need to clean
20 bytes of skb->cb area if it could be used by the program.
For programs attached to TCP/UDP sockets we need to save/restore
these 20 bytes, since it's used by protocol layers.
Remove SK_RUN_FILTER macro, since it's no longer used.
Long term we may move this bpf cb area to per-cpu scratch, but that
requires addition of new 'per-cpu load/store' instructions,
so not suitable as a short term fix.
Fixes: d691f9e8d4 ("bpf: allow programs to write to certain skb fields")
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
While recently arguing on a seccomp discussion that raw prandom_u32()
access shouldn't be exposed to unpriviledged user space, I forgot the
fact that SKF_AD_RANDOM extension actually already does it for some time
in cBPF via commit 4cd3675ebf ("filter: added BPF random opcode").
Since prandom_u32() is being used in a lot of critical networking code,
lets be more conservative and split their states. Furthermore, consolidate
eBPF and cBPF prandom handlers to use the new internal PRNG. For eBPF,
bpf_get_prandom_u32() was only accessible for priviledged users, but
should that change one day, we also don't want to leak raw sequences
through things like eBPF maps.
One thought was also to have own per bpf_prog states, but due to ABI
reasons this is not easily possible, i.e. the program code currently
cannot access bpf_prog itself, and copying the rnd_state to/from the
stack scratch space whenever a program uses the prng seems not really
worth the trouble and seems too hacky. If needed, taus113 could in such
cases be implemented within eBPF using a map entry to keep the state
space, or get_random_bytes() could become a second helper in cases where
performance would not be critical.
Both sides can trigger a one-time late init via prandom_init_once() on
the shared state. Performance-wise, there should even be a tiny gain
as bpf_user_rnd_u32() saves one function call. The PRNG needs to live
inside the BPF core since kernels could have a NET-less config as well.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Chema Gonzalez <chema@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Commit ea317b267e ("bpf: Add new bpf map type to store the pointer
to struct perf_event") added perf_event.h to the main eBPF header, so
it gets included for all users. perf_event.h is actually only needed
from array map side, so lets sanitize this a bit.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Using routing realms as part of the classifier is quite useful, it
can be viewed as a tag for one or multiple routing entries (think of
an analogy to net_cls cgroup for processes), set by user space routing
daemons or via iproute2 as an indicator for traffic classifiers and
later on processed in the eBPF program.
Unlike actions, the classifier can inspect device flags and enable
netif_keep_dst() if necessary. tc actions don't have that possibility,
but in case people know what they are doing, it can be used from there
as well (e.g. via devs that must keep dsts by design anyway).
If a realm is set, the handler returns the non-zero realm. User space
can set the full 32bit realm for the dst.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As we need to add further flags to the bpf_prog structure, lets migrate
both bools to a bitfield representation. The size of the base structure
(excluding insns) remains unchanged at 40 bytes.
Add also tags for the kmemchecker, so that it doesn't throw false
positives. Even in case gcc would generate suboptimal code, it's not
being accessed in performance critical paths.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
when the verifier log is enabled the print_bpf_insn() is doing
bpf_alu_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4]
and
bpf_jmp_string[BPF_OP(insn->code) >> 4]
where BPF_OP is a 4-bit instruction opcode.
Malformed insns can cause out of bounds access.
Fix it by sizing arrays appropriately.
The bug was found by clang address sanitizer with libfuzzer.
Reported-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We may already have gotten a proper fd struct through fdget(), so
whenever we return at the end of an map operation, we need to call
fdput(). However, each map operation from syscall side first probes
CHECK_ATTR() to verify that unused fields in the bpf_attr union are
zero.
In case of malformed input, we return with error, but the lookup to
the map_fd was already performed at that time, so that we return
without an corresponding fdput(). Fix it by performing an fdget()
only right before bpf_map_get(). The fdget() invocation on maps in
the verifier is not affected.
Fixes: db20fd2b01 ("bpf: add lookup/update/delete/iterate methods to BPF maps")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
According to the perf_event_map_fd and index, the function
bpf_perf_event_read() can convert the corresponding map
value to the pointer to struct perf_event and return the
Hardware PMU counter value.
Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduce a new bpf map type 'BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERF_EVENT_ARRAY'.
This map only stores the pointer to struct perf_event. The
user space event FDs from perf_event_open() syscall are converted
to the pointer to struct perf_event and stored in map.
Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
All the map backends are of generic nature. In order to avoid
adding much special code into the eBPF core, rewrite part of
the bpf_prog_array map code and make it more generic. So the
new perf_event_array map type can reuse most of code with
bpf_prog_array map and add fewer lines of special code.
Signed-off-by: Wang Nan <wangnan0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Kaixu Xia <xiakaixu@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
mov %rsp, %r1 ; r1 = rsp
add $-8, %r1 ; r1 = rsp - 8
store_q $123, -8(%rsp) ; *(u64*)r1 = 123 <- valid
store_q $123, (%r1) ; *(u64*)r1 = 123 <- previously invalid
mov $0, %r0
exit ; Always need to exit
And we'd get the following error:
0: (bf) r1 = r10
1: (07) r1 += -8
2: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 999
3: (7a) *(u64 *)(r1 +0) = 999
R1 invalid mem access 'fp'
Unable to load program
We already know that a register is a stack address and the appropriate
offset, so we should be able to validate those references as well.
Signed-off-by: Alex Gartrell <agartrell@fb.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
improve accuracy of timing in test_bpf and add two stress tests:
- {skb->data[0], get_smp_processor_id} repeated 2k times
- {skb->data[0], vlan_push} x 68 followed by {skb->data[0], vlan_pop} x 68
1st test is useful to test performance of JIT implementation of BPF_LD_ABS
together with BPF_CALL instructions.
2nd test is stressing skb_vlan_push/pop logic together with skb->data access
via BPF_LD_ABS insn which checks that re-caching of skb->data is done correctly.
In order to call bpf_skb_vlan_push() from test_bpf.ko have to add
three export_symbol_gpl.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ARG1 = BPF_R1 as it stands, evaluates to regs[BPF_REG_1] = regs[BPF_REG_1]
and thus has no effect. Add a comment instead, explaining what happens and
why it's okay to just remove it. Since from user space side, a tail call is
invoked as a pseudo helper function via bpf_tail_call_proto, the verifier
checks the arguments just like with any other helper function and makes
sure that the first argument (regs[BPF_REG_1])'s type is ARG_PTR_TO_CTX.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
bpf_trace_printk() is a helper function used to debug eBPF programs.
Let socket and TC programs use it as well.
Note, it's DEBUG ONLY helper. If it's used in the program,
the kernel will print warning banner to make sure users don't use
it in production.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
eBPF programs attached to kprobes need to filter based on
current->pid, uid and other fields, so introduce helper functions:
u64 bpf_get_current_pid_tgid(void)
Return: current->tgid << 32 | current->pid
u64 bpf_get_current_uid_gid(void)
Return: current_gid << 32 | current_uid
bpf_get_current_comm(char *buf, int size_of_buf)
stores current->comm into buf
They can be used from the programs attached to TC as well to classify packets
based on current task fields.
Update tracex2 example to print histogram of write syscalls for each process
instead of aggregated for all.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
allow programs read/write skb->mark, tc_index fields and
((struct qdisc_skb_cb *)cb)->data.
mark and tc_index are generically useful in TC.
cb[0]-cb[4] are primarily used to pass arguments from one
program to another called via bpf_tail_call() which can
be seen in sockex3_kern.c example.
All fields of 'struct __sk_buff' are readable to socket and tc_cls_act progs.
mark, tc_index are writeable from tc_cls_act only.
cb[0]-cb[4] are writeable by both sockets and tc_cls_act.
Add verifier tests and improve sample code.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Besides others, move bpf_tail_call_proto to the remaining definitions
of other protos, improve comments a bit (i.e. remove some obvious ones,
where the code is already self-documenting, add objectives for others),
simplify bpf_prog_array_compatible() a bit.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As this is already exported from tracing side via commit d9847d310a
("tracing: Allow BPF programs to call bpf_ktime_get_ns()"), we might
as well want to move it to the core, so also networking users can make
use of it, e.g. to measure diffs for certain flows from ingress/egress.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Normally the program attachment place (like sockets, qdiscs) takes
care of rcu protection and calls bpf_prog_put() after a grace period.
The programs stored inside prog_array may not be attached anywhere,
so prog_array needs to take care of preserving rcu protection.
Otherwise bpf_tail_call() will race with bpf_prog_put().
To solve that introduce bpf_prog_put_rcu() helper function and use
it in 3 places where unattached program can decrement refcnt:
closing program fd, deleting/replacing program in prog_array.
Fixes: 04fd61ab36 ("bpf: allow bpf programs to tail-call other bpf programs")
Reported-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
introduce bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index) helper function
which can be used from BPF programs like:
int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
...
bpf_tail_call(ctx, &jmp_table, index);
...
}
that is roughly equivalent to:
int bpf_prog(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
...
if (jmp_table[index])
return (*jmp_table[index])(ctx);
...
}
The important detail that it's not a normal call, but a tail call.
The kernel stack is precious, so this helper reuses the current
stack frame and jumps into another BPF program without adding
extra call frame.
It's trivially done in interpreter and a bit trickier in JITs.
In case of x64 JIT the bigger part of generated assembler prologue
is common for all programs, so it is simply skipped while jumping.
Other JITs can do similar prologue-skipping optimization or
do stack unwind before jumping into the next program.
bpf_tail_call() arguments:
ctx - context pointer
jmp_table - one of BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY maps used as the jump table
index - index in the jump table
Since all BPF programs are idenitified by file descriptor, user space
need to populate the jmp_table with FDs of other BPF programs.
If jmp_table[index] is empty the bpf_tail_call() doesn't jump anywhere
and program execution continues as normal.
New BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY map type is introduced so that user space can
populate this jmp_table array with FDs of other bpf programs.
Programs can share the same jmp_table array or use multiple jmp_tables.
The chain of tail calls can form unpredictable dynamic loops therefore
tail_call_cnt is used to limit the number of calls and currently is set to 32.
Use cases:
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
==========
- simplify complex programs by splitting them into a sequence of small programs
- dispatch routine
For tracing and future seccomp the program may be triggered on all system
calls, but processing of syscall arguments will be different. It's more
efficient to implement them as:
int syscall_entry(struct seccomp_data *ctx)
{
bpf_tail_call(ctx, &syscall_jmp_table, ctx->nr /* syscall number */);
... default: process unknown syscall ...
}
int sys_write_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...}
int sys_read_event(struct seccomp_data *ctx) {...}
syscall_jmp_table[__NR_write] = sys_write_event;
syscall_jmp_table[__NR_read] = sys_read_event;
For networking the program may call into different parsers depending on
packet format, like:
int packet_parser(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
... parse L2, L3 here ...
__u8 ipproto = load_byte(skb, ... offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol));
bpf_tail_call(skb, &ipproto_jmp_table, ipproto);
... default: process unknown protocol ...
}
int parse_tcp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...}
int parse_udp(struct __sk_buff *skb) {...}
ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_TCP] = parse_tcp;
ipproto_jmp_table[IPPROTO_UDP] = parse_udp;
- for TC use case, bpf_tail_call() allows to implement reclassify-like logic
- bpf_map_update_elem/delete calls into BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY jump table
are atomic, so user space can build chains of BPF programs on the fly
Implementation details:
=======================
- high performance of bpf_tail_call() is the goal.
It could have been implemented without JIT changes as a wrapper on top of
BPF_PROG_RUN() macro, but with two downsides:
. all programs would have to pay performance penalty for this feature and
tail call itself would be slower, since mandatory stack unwind, return,
stack allocate would be done for every tailcall.
. tailcall would be limited to programs running preempt_disabled, since
generic 'void *ctx' doesn't have room for 'tail_call_cnt' and it would
need to be either global per_cpu variable accessed by helper and by wrapper
or global variable protected by locks.
In this implementation x64 JIT bypasses stack unwind and jumps into the
callee program after prologue.
- bpf_prog_array_compatible() ensures that prog_type of callee and caller
are the same and JITed/non-JITed flag is the same, since calling JITed
program from non-JITed is invalid, since stack frames are different.
Similarly calling kprobe type program from socket type program is invalid.
- jump table is implemented as BPF_MAP_TYPE_PROG_ARRAY to reuse 'map'
abstraction, its user space API and all of verifier logic.
It's in the existing arraymap.c file, since several functions are
shared with regular array map.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
ALU64_DIV instruction should be dividing 64-bit by 64-bit,
whereas do_div() does 64-bit by 32-bit divide.
x64 and arm64 JITs correctly implement 64 by 64 unsigned divide.
llvm BPF backend emits code assuming that ALU64_DIV does 64 by 64.
Fixes: 89aa075832 ("net: sock: allow eBPF programs to be attached to sockets")
Reported-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
1.
first bug is a silly mistake. It broke tracing examples and prevented
simple bpf programs from loading.
In the following code:
if (insn->imm == 0 && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_W) {
} else if (...) {
// this part should have been executed when
// insn->code == BPF_W and insn->imm != 0
}
Obviously it's not doing that. So simple instructions like:
r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 8)
will be rejected. Note the comments in the code around these branches
were and still valid and indicate the true intent.
Replace it with:
if (BPF_SIZE(insn->code) != BPF_W)
continue;
if (insn->imm == 0) {
} else if (...) {
// now this code will be executed when
// insn->code == BPF_W and insn->imm != 0
}
2.
second bug is more subtle.
If malicious code is using the same dest register as source register,
the checks designed to prevent the same instruction to be used with different
pointer types will fail to trigger, since we were assigning src_reg_type
when it was already overwritten by check_mem_access().
The fix is trivial. Just move line:
src_reg_type = regs[insn->src_reg].type;
before check_mem_access().
Add new 'access skb fields bad4' test to check this case.
Fixes: 9bac3d6d54 ("bpf: allow extended BPF programs access skb fields")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Due to missing bounds check the DAG pass of the BPF verifier can corrupt
the memory which can cause random crashes during program loading:
[8.449451] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffffffffff
[8.451293] IP: [<ffffffff811de33d>] kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x8d/0x2f0
[8.452329] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[8.452329] Call Trace:
[8.452329] [<ffffffff8116cc82>] bpf_check+0x852/0x2000
[8.452329] [<ffffffff8116b7e4>] bpf_prog_load+0x1e4/0x310
[8.452329] [<ffffffff811b190f>] ? might_fault+0x5f/0xb0
[8.452329] [<ffffffff8116c206>] SyS_bpf+0x806/0xa30
Fixes: f1bca824da ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier")
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Add BQL support to via-rhine, from Tino Reichardt.
2) Integrate SWITCHDEV layer support into the DSA layer, so DSA drivers
can support hw switch offloading. From Floria Fainelli.
3) Allow 'ip address' commands to initiate multicast group join/leave,
from Madhu Challa.
4) Many ipv4 FIB lookup optimizations from Alexander Duyck.
5) Support EBPF in cls_bpf classifier and act_bpf action, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Remove the ugly compat support in ARP for ugly layers like ax25,
rose, etc. And use this to clean up the neigh layer, then use it to
implement MPLS support. All from Eric Biederman.
7) Support L3 forwarding offloading in switches, from Scott Feldman.
8) Collapse the LOCAL and MAIN ipv4 FIB tables when possible, to speed
up route lookups even further. From Alexander Duyck.
9) Many improvements and bug fixes to the rhashtable implementation,
from Herbert Xu and Thomas Graf. In particular, in the case where
an rhashtable user bulk adds a large number of items into an empty
table, we expand the table much more sanely.
10) Don't make the tcp_metrics hash table per-namespace, from Eric
Biederman.
11) Extend EBPF to access SKB fields, from Alexei Starovoitov.
12) Split out new connection request sockets so that they can be
established in the main hash table. Much less false sharing since
hash lookups go direct to the request sockets instead of having to
go first to the listener then to the request socks hashed
underneath. From Eric Dumazet.
13) Add async I/O support for crytpo AF_ALG sockets, from Tadeusz Struk.
14) Support stable privacy address generation for RFC7217 in IPV6. From
Hannes Frederic Sowa.
15) Hash network namespace into IP frag IDs, also from Hannes Frederic
Sowa.
16) Convert PTP get/set methods to use 64-bit time, from Richard
Cochran.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1816 commits)
fm10k: Bump driver version to 0.15.2
fm10k: corrected VF multicast update
fm10k: mbx_update_max_size does not drop all oversized messages
fm10k: reset head instead of calling update_max_size
fm10k: renamed mbx_tx_dropped to mbx_tx_oversized
fm10k: update xcast mode before synchronizing multicast addresses
fm10k: start service timer on probe
fm10k: fix function header comment
fm10k: comment next_vf_mbx flow
fm10k: don't handle mailbox events in iov_event path and always process mailbox
fm10k: use separate workqueue for fm10k driver
fm10k: Set PF queues to unlimited bandwidth during virtualization
fm10k: expose tx_timeout_count as an ethtool stat
fm10k: only increment tx_timeout_count in Tx hang path
fm10k: remove extraneous "Reset interface" message
fm10k: separate PF only stats so that VF does not display them
fm10k: use hw->mac.max_queues for stats
fm10k: only show actual queues, not the maximum in hardware
fm10k: allow creation of VLAN on default vid
fm10k: fix unused warnings
...
BPF programs, attached to kprobes, provide a safe way to execute
user-defined BPF byte-code programs without being able to crash or
hang the kernel in any way. The BPF engine makes sure that such
programs have a finite execution time and that they cannot break
out of their sandbox.
The user interface is to attach to a kprobe via the perf syscall:
struct perf_event_attr attr = {
.type = PERF_TYPE_TRACEPOINT,
.config = event_id,
...
};
event_fd = perf_event_open(&attr,...);
ioctl(event_fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_BPF, prog_fd);
'prog_fd' is a file descriptor associated with BPF program
previously loaded.
'event_id' is an ID of the kprobe created.
Closing 'event_fd':
close(event_fd);
... automatically detaches BPF program from it.
BPF programs can call in-kernel helper functions to:
- lookup/update/delete elements in maps
- probe_read - wraper of probe_kernel_read() used to access any
kernel data structures
BPF programs receive 'struct pt_regs *' as an input ('struct pt_regs' is
architecture dependent) and return 0 to ignore the event and 1 to store
kprobe event into the ring buffer.
Note, kprobes are a fundamentally _not_ a stable kernel ABI,
so BPF programs attached to kprobes must be recompiled for
every kernel version and user must supply correct LINUX_VERSION_CODE
in attr.kern_version during bpf_prog_load() call.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Reviewed-by: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1427312966-8434-4-git-send-email-ast@plumgrid.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
existing TC action 'pedit' can munge any bits of the packet.
Generalize it for use in bpf programs attached as cls_bpf and act_bpf via
bpf_skb_store_bytes() helper function.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
In order to prepare eBPF support for tc action, we need to add
sched_act_type, so that the eBPF verifier is aware of what helper
function act_bpf may use, that it can load skb data and read out
currently available skb fields.
This is bascially analogous to 96be4325f4 ("ebpf: add sched_cls_type
and map it to sk_filter's verifier ops").
BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS and BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_ACT need to be
separate since both will have a different set of functionality in
future (classifier vs action), thus we won't run into ABI troubles
when the point in time comes to diverge functionality from the
classifier.
The future plan for act_bpf would be that it will be able to write
into skb->data and alter selected fields mirrored in struct __sk_buff.
For an initial support, it's sufficient to map it to sk_filter_ops.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
introduce user accessible mirror of in-kernel 'struct sk_buff':
struct __sk_buff {
__u32 len;
__u32 pkt_type;
__u32 mark;
__u32 queue_mapping;
};
bpf programs can do:
int bpf_prog(struct __sk_buff *skb)
{
__u32 var = skb->pkt_type;
which will be compiled to bpf assembler as:
dst_reg = *(u32 *)(src_reg + 4) // 4 == offsetof(struct __sk_buff, pkt_type)
bpf verifier will check validity of access and will convert it to:
dst_reg = *(u8 *)(src_reg + offsetof(struct sk_buff, __pkt_type_offset))
dst_reg &= 7
since skb->pkt_type is a bitfield.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds the possibility to obtain raw_smp_processor_id() in
eBPF. Currently, this is only possible in classic BPF where commit
da2033c282 ("filter: add SKF_AD_RXHASH and SKF_AD_CPU") has added
facilities for this.
Perhaps most importantly, this would also allow us to track per CPU
statistics with eBPF maps, or to implement a poor-man's per CPU data
structure through eBPF maps.
Example function proto-type looks like:
u32 (*smp_processor_id)(void) = (void *)BPF_FUNC_get_smp_processor_id;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This work is similar to commit 4cd3675ebf ("filter: added BPF
random opcode") and adds a possibility for packet sampling in eBPF.
Currently, this is only possible in classic BPF and useful to
combine sampling with f.e. packet sockets, possible also with tc.
Example function proto-type looks like:
u32 (*prandom_u32)(void) = (void *)BPF_FUNC_get_prandom_u32;
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I noticed that a helper function with argument type ARG_ANYTHING does
not need to have an initialized value (register).
This can worst case lead to unintented stack memory leakage in future
helper functions if they are not carefully designed, or unintended
application behaviour in case the application developer was not careful
enough to match a correct helper function signature in the API.
The underlying issue is that ARG_ANYTHING should actually be split
into two different semantics:
1) ARG_DONTCARE for function arguments that the helper function
does not care about (in other words: the default for unused
function arguments), and
2) ARG_ANYTHING that is an argument actually being used by a
helper function and *guaranteed* to be an initialized register.
The current risk is low: ARG_ANYTHING is only used for the 'flags'
argument (r4) in bpf_map_update_elem() that internally does strict
checking.
Fixes: 17a5267067 ("bpf: verifier (add verifier core)")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Fengguang reported, that on openrisc and avr32 architectures, we
get the following linker errors on *_defconfig builds that have
no bpf syscall support:
net/built-in.o:(.rodata+0x1cd0): undefined reference to `bpf_map_lookup_elem_proto'
net/built-in.o:(.rodata+0x1cd4): undefined reference to `bpf_map_update_elem_proto'
net/built-in.o:(.rodata+0x1cd8): undefined reference to `bpf_map_delete_elem_proto'
Fix it up by providing built-in weak definitions of the symbols,
so they can be overridden when the syscall is enabled. I think
the issue might be that gcc is not able to optimize all that away.
This patch fixes the linker errors for me, tested with Fengguang's
make.cross [1] script.
[1] https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/wfg/lkp-tests.git/plain/sbin/make.cross
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Fixes: d4052c4aea ("ebpf: remove CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL ifdefs in socket filter code")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This work extends the "classic" BPF programmable tc classifier by
extending its scope also to native eBPF code!
This allows for user space to implement own custom, 'safe' C like
classifiers (or whatever other frontend language LLVM et al may
provide in future), that can then be compiled with the LLVM eBPF
backend to an eBPF elf file. The result of this can be loaded into
the kernel via iproute2's tc. In the kernel, they can be JITed on
major archs and thus run in native performance.
Simple, minimal toy example to demonstrate the workflow:
#include <linux/ip.h>
#include <linux/if_ether.h>
#include <linux/bpf.h>
#include "tc_bpf_api.h"
__section("classify")
int cls_main(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return (0x800 << 16) | load_byte(skb, ETH_HLEN + __builtin_offsetof(struct iphdr, tos));
}
char __license[] __section("license") = "GPL";
The classifier can then be compiled into eBPF opcodes and loaded
via tc, for example:
clang -O2 -emit-llvm -c cls.c -o - | llc -march=bpf -filetype=obj -o cls.o
tc filter add dev em1 parent 1: bpf cls.o [...]
As it has been demonstrated, the scope can even reach up to a fully
fledged flow dissector (similarly as in samples/bpf/sockex2_kern.c).
For tc, maps are allowed to be used, but from kernel context only,
in other words, eBPF code can keep state across filter invocations.
In future, we perhaps may reattach from a different application to
those maps e.g., to read out collected statistics/state.
Similarly as in socket filters, we may extend functionality for eBPF
classifiers over time depending on the use cases. For that purpose,
cls_bpf programs are using BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS program type, so
we can allow additional functions/accessors (e.g. an ABI compatible
offset translation to skb fields/metadata). For an initial cls_bpf
support, we allow the same set of helper functions as eBPF socket
filters, but we could diverge at some point in time w/o problem.
I was wondering whether cls_bpf and act_bpf could share C programs,
I can imagine that at some point, we introduce i) further common
handlers for both (or even beyond their scope), and/or if truly needed
ii) some restricted function space for each of them. Both can be
abstracted easily through struct bpf_verifier_ops in future.
The context of cls_bpf versus act_bpf is slightly different though:
a cls_bpf program will return a specific classid whereas act_bpf a
drop/non-drop return code, latter may also in future mangle skbs.
That said, we can surely have a "classify" and "action" section in
a single object file, or considered mentioned constraint add a
possibility of a shared section.
The workflow for getting native eBPF running from tc [1] is as
follows: for f_bpf, I've added a slightly modified ELF parser code
from Alexei's kernel sample, which reads out the LLVM compiled
object, sets up maps (and dynamically fixes up map fds) if any, and
loads the eBPF instructions all centrally through the bpf syscall.
The resulting fd from the loaded program itself is being passed down
to cls_bpf, which looks up struct bpf_prog from the fd store, and
holds reference, so that it stays available also after tc program
lifetime. On tc filter destruction, it will then drop its reference.
Moreover, I've also added the optional possibility to annotate an
eBPF filter with a name (e.g. path to object file, or something
else if preferred) so that when tc dumps currently installed filters,
some more context can be given to an admin for a given instance (as
opposed to just the file descriptor number).
Last but not least, bpf_prog_get() and bpf_prog_put() needed to be
exported, so that eBPF can be used from cls_bpf built as a module.
Thanks to 60a3b2253c ("net: bpf: make eBPF interpreter images
read-only") I think this is of no concern since anything wanting to
alter eBPF opcode after verification stage would crash the kernel.
[1] http://git.breakpoint.cc/cgit/dborkman/iproute2.git/log/?h=ebpf
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Jamal Hadi Salim <jhs@mojatatu.com>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <jiri@resnulli.us>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
is_gpl_compatible and prog_type should be moved directly into bpf_prog
as they stay immutable during bpf_prog's lifetime, are core attributes
and they can be locked as read-only later on via bpf_prog_select_runtime().
With a bit of rearranging, this also allows us to shrink bpf_prog_aux
to exactly 1 cacheline.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
As discussed recently and at netconf/netdev01, we want to prevent making
bpf_verifier_ops registration available for modules, but have them at a
controlled place inside the kernel instead.
The reason for this is, that out-of-tree modules can go crazy and define
and register any verfifier ops they want, doing all sorts of crap, even
bypassing available GPLed eBPF helper functions. We don't want to offer
such a shiny playground, of course, but keep strict control to ourselves
inside the core kernel.
This also encourages us to design eBPF user helpers carefully and
generically, so they can be shared among various subsystems using eBPF.
For the eBPF traffic classifier (cls_bpf), it's a good start to share
the same helper facilities as we currently do in eBPF for socket filters.
That way, we have BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS look like it's own type, thus
one day if there's a good reason to diverge the set of helper functions
from the set available to socket filters, we keep ABI compatibility.
In future, we could place all bpf_prog_type_list at a central place,
perhaps.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
We can move bpf_map_ops and bpf_verifier_ops and other structs into ro
section, bpf_map_type_list and bpf_prog_type_list into read mostly.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Now that we have BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER up and running, we can
remove the test stubs which were added to get the verifier suite up.
We can just let the test cases probe under socket filter type instead.
In the fill/spill test case, we cannot (yet) access fields from the
context (skb), but we may adapt that test case in future.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull networking fixes from David Miller:
1) Don't OOPS on socket AIO, from Christoph Hellwig.
2) Scheduled scans should be aborted upon RFKILL, from Emmanuel
Grumbach.
3) Fix sleep in atomic context in kvaser_usb, from Ahmed S Darwish.
4) Fix RCU locking across copy_to_user() in bpf code, from Alexei
Starovoitov.
5) Lots of crash, memory leak, short TX packet et al bug fixes in
sh_eth from Ben Hutchings.
6) Fix memory corruption in SCTP wrt. INIT collitions, from Daniel
Borkmann.
7) Fix return value logic for poll handlers in netxen, enic, and bnx2x.
From Eric Dumazet and Govindarajulu Varadarajan.
8) Header length calculation fix in mac80211 from Fred Chou.
9) mv643xx_eth doesn't handle highmem correctly in non-TSO code paths.
From Ezequiel Garcia.
10) udp_diag has bogus logic in it's hash chain skipping, copy same fix
tcp diag used. From Herbert Xu.
11) amd-xgbe programs wrong rx flow control register, from Thomas
Lendacky.
12) Fix race leading to use after free in ping receive path, from Subash
Abhinov Kasiviswanathan.
13) Cache redirect routes otherwise we can get a heavy backlog of rcu
jobs liberating DST_NOCACHE entries. From Hannes Frederic Sowa.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net: (48 commits)
net: don't OOPS on socket aio
stmmac: prevent probe drivers to crash kernel
bnx2x: fix napi poll return value for repoll
ipv6: replacing a rt6_info needs to purge possible propagated rt6_infos too
sh_eth: Fix DMA-API usage for RX buffers
sh_eth: Check for DMA mapping errors on transmit
sh_eth: Ensure DMA engines are stopped before freeing buffers
sh_eth: Remove RX overflow log messages
ping: Fix race in free in receive path
udp_diag: Fix socket skipping within chain
can: kvaser_usb: Fix state handling upon BUS_ERROR events
can: kvaser_usb: Retry the first bulk transfer on -ETIMEDOUT
can: kvaser_usb: Send correct context to URB completion
can: kvaser_usb: Do not sleep in atomic context
ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
samples: bpf: relax test_maps check
bpf: rcu lock must not be held when calling copy_to_user()
net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions
net: mv643xx_eth: Fix highmem support in non-TSO egress path
sh_eth: Fix serialisation of interrupt disable with interrupt & NAPI handlers
...
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at mm/memory.c:3732
in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 0, pid: 671, name: test_maps
1 lock held by test_maps/671:
#0: (rcu_read_lock){......}, at: [<0000000000264190>] map_lookup_elem+0xe8/0x260
Call Trace:
([<0000000000115b7e>] show_trace+0x12e/0x150)
[<0000000000115c40>] show_stack+0xa0/0x100
[<00000000009b163c>] dump_stack+0x74/0xc8
[<000000000017424a>] ___might_sleep+0x23a/0x248
[<00000000002b58e8>] might_fault+0x70/0xe8
[<0000000000264230>] map_lookup_elem+0x188/0x260
[<0000000000264716>] SyS_bpf+0x20e/0x840
Fix it by allocating temporary buffer to store map element value.
Fixes: db20fd2b01 ("bpf: add lookup/update/delete/iterate methods to BPF maps")
Reported-by: Michael Holzheu <holzheu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Nothing needs the module pointer any more, and the next patch will
call it from RCU, where the module itself might no longer exist.
Removing the arg is the safest approach.
This just codifies the use of the module_alloc/module_free pattern
which ftrace and bpf use.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com>
Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ley Foon Tan <lftan@altera.com>
Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: Ananth N Mavinakayanahalli <ananth@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Anil S Keshavamurthy <anil.s.keshavamurthy@intel.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com>
Cc: linux-cris-kernel@axis.com
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org
Cc: nios2-dev@lists.rocketboards.org
Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org
Cc: sparclinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
introduce program type BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER that is used
for attaching programs to sockets where ctx == skb.
add verifier checks for ABS/IND instructions which can only be seen
in socket filters, therefore the check:
if (env->prog->aux->prog_type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCKET_FILTER)
verbose("BPF_LD_ABS|IND instructions are only allowed in socket filters\n");
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
- fix NULL pointer dereference:
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:41 array_map_alloc() error: potential null dereference 'array'. (kzalloc returns null)
kernel/bpf/arraymap.c:41 array_map_alloc() error: we previously assumed 'array' could be null (see line 40)
- integer overflow check was missing in arraymap
(hashmap checks for overflow via kmalloc_array())
- arraymap can round_up(value_size, 8) to zero. check was missing.
- hashmap was missing zero size check as well, since roundup_pow_of_two() can
truncate into zero
- found a typo in the arraymap comment and unnecessary empty line
Fix all of these issues and make both overflow checks explicit U32 in size.
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
proper types and function helpers are ready. Use them in verifier testsuite.
Remove temporary stubs
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
expose bpf_map_lookup_elem(), bpf_map_update_elem(), bpf_map_delete_elem()
map accessors to eBPF programs
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
fix errno of BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM command as bpf manpage
described it in commit b4fc1a460f30("Merge branch 'bpf-next'"):
-----
BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM
int bpf_lookup_elem(int fd, void *key, void *value)
{
union bpf_attr attr = {
.map_fd = fd,
.key = ptr_to_u64(key),
.value = ptr_to_u64(value),
};
return bpf(BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM, &attr, sizeof(attr));
}
bpf() syscall looks up an element with given key in a map fd.
If element is found it returns zero and stores element's value
into value. If element is not found it returns -1 and sets
errno to ENOENT.
and further down in manpage:
ENOENT For BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM or BPF_MAP_DELETE_ELEM, indicates that
element with given key was not found.
-----
In general all BPF commands return ENOENT when map element is not found
(including BPF_MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY and BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM with
flags == BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ONLY)
Subsequent patch adds a testsuite to check return values for all of
these combinations.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
add new map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY and its implementation
- optimized for fastest possible lookup()
. in the future verifier/JIT may recognize lookup() with constant key
and optimize it into constant pointer. Can optimize non-constant
key into direct pointer arithmetic as well, since pointers and
value_size are constant for the life of the eBPF program.
In other words array_map_lookup_elem() may be 'inlined' by verifier/JIT
while preserving concurrent access to this map from user space
- two main use cases for array type:
. 'global' eBPF variables: array of 1 element with key=0 and value is a
collection of 'global' variables which programs can use to keep the state
between events
. aggregation of tracing events into fixed set of buckets
- all array elements pre-allocated and zero initialized at init time
- key as an index in array and can only be 4 byte
- map_delete_elem() returns EINVAL, since elements cannot be deleted
- map_update_elem() replaces elements in an non-atomic way
(for atomic updates hashtable type should be used instead)
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
add new map type BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH and its implementation
- maps are created/destroyed by userspace. Both userspace and eBPF programs
can lookup/update/delete elements from the map
- eBPF programs can be called in_irq(), so use spin_lock_irqsave() mechanism
for concurrent updates
- key/value are opaque range of bytes (aligned to 8 bytes)
- user space provides 3 configuration attributes via BPF syscall:
key_size, value_size, max_entries
- map takes care of allocating/freeing key/value pairs
- map_update_elem() must fail to insert new element when max_entries
limit is reached to make sure that eBPF programs cannot exhaust memory
- map_update_elem() replaces elements in an atomic way
- optimized for speed of lookup() which can be called multiple times from
eBPF program which itself is triggered by high volume of events
. in the future JIT compiler may recognize lookup() call and optimize it
further, since key_size is constant for life of eBPF program
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
the current meaning of BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM syscall command is:
either update existing map element or create a new one.
Initially the plan was to add a new command to handle the case of
'create new element if it didn't exist', but 'flags' style looks
cleaner and overall diff is much smaller (more code reused), so add 'flags'
attribute to BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM command with the following meaning:
#define BPF_ANY 0 /* create new element or update existing */
#define BPF_NOEXIST 1 /* create new element if it didn't exist */
#define BPF_EXIST 2 /* update existing element */
bpf_update_elem(fd, key, value, BPF_NOEXIST) call can fail with EEXIST
if element already exists.
bpf_update_elem(fd, key, value, BPF_EXIST) can fail with ENOENT
if element doesn't exist.
Userspace will call it as:
int bpf_update_elem(int fd, void *key, void *value, __u64 flags)
{
union bpf_attr attr = {
.map_fd = fd,
.key = ptr_to_u64(key),
.value = ptr_to_u64(value),
.flags = flags;
};
return bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM, &attr, sizeof(attr));
}
First two bits of 'flags' are used to encode style of bpf_update_elem() command.
Bits 2-63 are reserved for future use.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
verifier keeps track of register state spilled to stack.
registers are 8-byte wide and always aligned, so instead of tracking them
in every byte-sized stack slot, use MAX_BPF_STACK / 8 array to track
spilled register state.
Though verifier runs in user context and its state freed immediately
after verification, it makes sense to reduce its memory usage.
This optimization reduces sizeof(struct verifier_state)
from 12464 to 1712 on 64-bit and from 6232 to 1112 on 32-bit.
Note, this patch doesn't change existing limits, which are there to bound
time and memory during verification: 4k total number of insns in a program,
1k number of jumps (states to visit) and 32k number of processed insn
(since an insn may be visited multiple times). Theoretical worst case memory
during verification is 1712 * 1k = 17Mbyte. Out-of-memory situation triggers
cleanup and rejects the program.
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
introduce two configs:
- hidden CONFIG_BPF to select eBPF interpreter that classic socket filters
depend on
- visible CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL (default off) that tracing and sockets can use
that solves several problems:
- tracing and others that wish to use eBPF don't need to depend on NET.
They can use BPF_SYSCALL to allow loading from userspace or select BPF
to use it directly from kernel in NET-less configs.
- in 3.18 programs cannot be attached to events yet, so don't force it on
- when the rest of eBPF infra is there in 3.19+, it's still useful to
switch it off to minimize kernel size
bloat-o-meter on x64 shows:
add/remove: 0/60 grow/shrink: 0/2 up/down: 0/-15601 (-15601)
tested with many different config combinations. Hopefully didn't miss anything.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
while comparing for verifier state equivalency the comparison
was missing a check for uninitialized register.
Make sure it does so and add a testcase.
Fixes: f1bca824da ("bpf: add search pruning optimization to verifier")
Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
consider C program represented in eBPF:
int filter(int arg)
{
int a, b, c, *ptr;
if (arg == 1)
ptr = &a;
else if (arg == 2)
ptr = &b;
else
ptr = &c;
*ptr = 0;
return 0;
}
eBPF verifier has to follow all possible paths through the program
to recognize that '*ptr = 0' instruction would be safe to execute
in all situations.
It's doing it by picking a path towards the end and observes changes
to registers and stack at every insn until it reaches bpf_exit.
Then it comes back to one of the previous branches and goes towards
the end again with potentially different values in registers.
When program has a lot of branches, the number of possible combinations
of branches is huge, so verifer has a hard limit of walking no more
than 32k instructions. This limit can be reached and complex (but valid)
programs could be rejected. Therefore it's important to recognize equivalent
verifier states to prune this depth first search.
Basic idea can be illustrated by the program (where .. are some eBPF insns):
1: ..
2: if (rX == rY) goto 4
3: ..
4: ..
5: ..
6: bpf_exit
In the first pass towards bpf_exit the verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Since insn#2 is a branch the verifier will remember its state in verifier stack
to come back to it later.
Since insn#4 is marked as 'branch target', the verifier will remember its state
in explored_states[4] linked list.
Once it reaches insn#6 successfully it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and
will continue.
Without search pruning optimization verifier would have to walk 4, 5, 6 again,
effectively simulating execution of insns 1, 2, 4, 5, 6
With search pruning it will check whether state at #4 after jumping from #2
is equivalent to one recorded in explored_states[4] during first pass.
If there is an equivalent state, verifier can prune the search at #4 and declare
this path to be safe as well.
In other words two states at #4 are equivalent if execution of 1, 2, 3, 4 insns
and 1, 2, 4 insns produces equivalent registers and stack.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
1.
the library includes a trivial set of BPF syscall wrappers:
int bpf_create_map(int key_size, int value_size, int max_entries);
int bpf_update_elem(int fd, void *key, void *value);
int bpf_lookup_elem(int fd, void *key, void *value);
int bpf_delete_elem(int fd, void *key);
int bpf_get_next_key(int fd, void *key, void *next_key);
int bpf_prog_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
const struct sock_filter_int *insns, int insn_len,
const char *license);
bpf_prog_load() stores verifier log into global bpf_log_buf[] array
and BPF_*() macros to build instructions
2.
test stubs configure eBPF infra with 'unspec' map and program types.
These are fake types used by user space testsuite only.
3.
verifier tests valid and invalid programs and expects predefined
error log messages from kernel.
40 tests so far.
$ sudo ./test_verifier
#0 add+sub+mul OK
#1 unreachable OK
#2 unreachable2 OK
#3 out of range jump OK
#4 out of range jump2 OK
#5 test1 ld_imm64 OK
...
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This patch adds verifier core which simulates execution of every insn and
records the state of registers and program stack. Every branch instruction seen
during simulation is pushed into state stack. When verifier reaches BPF_EXIT,
it pops the state from the stack and continues until it reaches BPF_EXIT again.
For program:
1: bpf_mov r1, xxx
2: if (r1 == 0) goto 5
3: bpf_mov r0, 1
4: goto 6
5: bpf_mov r0, 2
6: bpf_exit
The verifier will walk insns: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6
then it will pop the state recorded at insn#2 and will continue: 5, 6
This way it walks all possible paths through the program and checks all
possible values of registers. While doing so, it checks for:
- invalid instructions
- uninitialized register access
- uninitialized stack access
- misaligned stack access
- out of range stack access
- invalid calling convention
- instruction encoding is not using reserved fields
Kernel subsystem configures the verifier with two callbacks:
- bool (*is_valid_access)(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type);
that provides information to the verifer which fields of 'ctx'
are accessible (remember 'ctx' is the first argument to eBPF program)
- const struct bpf_func_proto *(*get_func_proto)(enum bpf_func_id func_id);
returns argument constraints of kernel helper functions that eBPF program
may call, so that verifier can checks that R1-R5 types match the prototype
More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in kernel/bpf/verifier.c
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
check that control flow graph of eBPF program is a directed acyclic graph
check_cfg() does:
- detect loops
- detect unreachable instructions
- check that program terminates with BPF_EXIT insn
- check that all branches are within program boundary
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
eBPF programs passed from userspace are using pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions
to refer to process-local map_fd. Scan the program for such instructions and
if FDs are valid, convert them to 'struct bpf_map' pointers which will be used
by verifier to check access to maps in bpf_map_lookup/update() calls.
If program passes verifier, convert pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 into generic by dropping
BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD flag.
Note that eBPF interpreter is generic and knows nothing about pseudo insns.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
add optional attributes for BPF_PROG_LOAD syscall:
union bpf_attr {
struct {
...
__u32 log_level; /* verbosity level of eBPF verifier */
__u32 log_size; /* size of user buffer */
__aligned_u64 log_buf; /* user supplied 'char *buffer' */
};
};
when log_level > 0 the verifier will return its verification log in the user
supplied buffer 'log_buf' which can be used by program author to analyze why
verifier rejected given program.
'Understanding eBPF verifier messages' section of Documentation/networking/filter.txt
provides several examples of these messages, like the program:
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
BPF_CALL_FUNC(BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 1),
BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_0, 4, 0),
BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
will be rejected with the following multi-line message in log_buf:
0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0
1: (bf) r2 = r10
2: (07) r2 += -8
3: (b7) r1 = 0
4: (85) call 1
5: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1
R0=map_ptr R10=fp
6: (7a) *(u64 *)(r0 +4) = 0
misaligned access off 4 size 8
The format of the output can change at any time as verifier evolves.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
this patch adds all of eBPF verfier documentation and empty bpf_check()
The end goal for the verifier is to statically check safety of the program.
Verifier will catch:
- loops
- out of range jumps
- unreachable instructions
- invalid instructions
- uninitialized register access
- uninitialized stack access
- misaligned stack access
- out of range stack access
- invalid calling convention
More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
in native eBPF programs userspace is using pseudo BPF_CALL instructions
which encode one of 'enum bpf_func_id' inside insn->imm field.
Verifier checks that program using correct function arguments to given func_id.
If all checks passed, kernel needs to fixup BPF_CALL->imm fields by
replacing func_id with in-kernel function pointer.
eBPF interpreter just calls the function.
In-kernel eBPF users continue to use generic BPF_CALL.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
eBPF programs are similar to kernel modules. They are loaded by the user
process and automatically unloaded when process exits. Each eBPF program is
a safe run-to-completion set of instructions. eBPF verifier statically
determines that the program terminates and is safe to execute.
The following syscall wrapper can be used to load the program:
int bpf_prog_load(enum bpf_prog_type prog_type,
const struct bpf_insn *insns, int insn_cnt,
const char *license)
{
union bpf_attr attr = {
.prog_type = prog_type,
.insns = ptr_to_u64(insns),
.insn_cnt = insn_cnt,
.license = ptr_to_u64(license),
};
return bpf(BPF_PROG_LOAD, &attr, sizeof(attr));
}
where 'insns' is an array of eBPF instructions and 'license' is a string
that must be GPL compatible to call helper functions marked gpl_only
Upon succesful load the syscall returns prog_fd.
Use close(prog_fd) to unload the program.
User space tests and examples follow in the later patches
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
'maps' is a generic storage of different types for sharing data between kernel
and userspace.
The maps are accessed from user space via BPF syscall, which has commands:
- create a map with given type and attributes
fd = bpf(BPF_MAP_CREATE, union bpf_attr *attr, u32 size)
returns fd or negative error
- lookup key in a given map referenced by fd
err = bpf(BPF_MAP_LOOKUP_ELEM, union bpf_attr *attr, u32 size)
using attr->map_fd, attr->key, attr->value
returns zero and stores found elem into value or negative error
- create or update key/value pair in a given map
err = bpf(BPF_MAP_UPDATE_ELEM, union bpf_attr *attr, u32 size)
using attr->map_fd, attr->key, attr->value
returns zero or negative error
- find and delete element by key in a given map
err = bpf(BPF_MAP_DELETE_ELEM, union bpf_attr *attr, u32 size)
using attr->map_fd, attr->key
- iterate map elements (based on input key return next_key)
err = bpf(BPF_MAP_GET_NEXT_KEY, union bpf_attr *attr, u32 size)
using attr->map_fd, attr->key, attr->next_key
- close(fd) deletes the map
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
BPF syscall is a multiplexor for a range of different operations on eBPF.
This patch introduces syscall with single command to create a map.
Next patch adds commands to access maps.
'maps' is a generic storage of different types for sharing data between kernel
and userspace.
Userspace example:
/* this syscall wrapper creates a map with given type and attributes
* and returns map_fd on success.
* use close(map_fd) to delete the map
*/
int bpf_create_map(enum bpf_map_type map_type, int key_size,
int value_size, int max_entries)
{
union bpf_attr attr = {
.map_type = map_type,
.key_size = key_size,
.value_size = value_size,
.max_entries = max_entries
};
return bpf(BPF_MAP_CREATE, &attr, sizeof(attr));
}
'union bpf_attr' is backwards compatible with future extensions.
More details in Documentation/networking/filter.txt and in manpage
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Since BPF JIT depends on the availability of module_alloc() and
module_free() helpers (HAVE_BPF_JIT and MODULES), we better build
that code only in case we have BPF_JIT in our config enabled, just
like with other JIT code. Fixes builds for arm/marzen_defconfig
and sh/rsk7269_defconfig.
====================
kernel/built-in.o: In function `bpf_jit_binary_alloc':
/home/cwang/linux/kernel/bpf/core.c:144: undefined reference to `module_alloc'
kernel/built-in.o: In function `bpf_jit_binary_free':
/home/cwang/linux/kernel/bpf/core.c:164: undefined reference to `module_free'
make: *** [vmlinux] Error 1
====================
Reported-by: Fengguang Wu <fengguang.wu@intel.com>
Fixes: 738cbe72ad ("net: bpf: consolidate JIT binary allocator")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Introduced in commit 314beb9bca ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit
against spraying attacks") and later on replicated in aa2d2c73c2
("s390/bpf,jit: address randomize and write protect jit code") for
s390 architecture, write protection for BPF JIT images got added and
a random start address of the JIT code, so that it's not on a page
boundary anymore.
Since both use a very similar allocator for the BPF binary header,
we can consolidate this code into the BPF core as it's mostly JIT
independant anyway.
This will also allow for future archs that support DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX
to just reuse instead of reimplementing it.
JIT tested on x86_64 and s390x with BPF test suite.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
add BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction to load 64-bit immediate value into a register.
All previous instructions were 8-byte. This is first 16-byte instruction.
Two consecutive 'struct bpf_insn' blocks are interpreted as single instruction:
insn[0].code = BPF_LD | BPF_DW | BPF_IMM
insn[0].dst_reg = destination register
insn[0].imm = lower 32-bit
insn[1].code = 0
insn[1].imm = upper 32-bit
All unused fields must be zero.
Classic BPF has similar instruction: BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_IMM
which loads 32-bit immediate value into a register.
x64 JITs it as single 'movabsq %rax, imm64'
arm64 may JIT as sequence of four 'movk x0, #imm16, lsl #shift' insn
Note that old eBPF programs are binary compatible with new interpreter.
It helps eBPF programs load 64-bit constant into a register with one
instruction instead of using two registers and 4 instructions:
BPF_MOV32_IMM(R1, imm32)
BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_LSH, R1, 32)
BPF_MOV32_IMM(R2, imm32)
BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, R1, R2)
User space generated programs will use this instruction to load constants only.
To tell kernel that user space needs a pointer the _pseudo_ variant of
this instruction may be added later, which will use extra bits of encoding
to indicate what type of pointer user space is asking kernel to provide.
For example 'off' or 'src_reg' fields can be used for such purpose.
src_reg = 1 could mean that user space is asking kernel to validate and
load in-kernel map pointer.
src_reg = 2 could mean that user space needs readonly data section pointer
src_reg = 3 could mean that user space needs a pointer to per-cpu local data
All such future pseudo instructions will not be carrying the actual pointer
as part of the instruction, but rather will be treated as a request to kernel
to provide one. The kernel will verify the request_for_a_pointer, then
will drop _pseudo_ marking and will store actual internal pointer inside
the instruction, so the end result is the interpreter and JITs never
see pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 insns and only operate on generic BPF_LD_IMM64 that
loads 64-bit immediate into a register. User space never operates on direct
pointers and verifier can easily recognize request_for_pointer vs other
instructions.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
With eBPF getting more extended and exposure to user space is on it's way,
hardening the memory range the interpreter uses to steer its command flow
seems appropriate. This patch moves the to be interpreted bytecode to
read-only pages.
In case we execute a corrupted BPF interpreter image for some reason e.g.
caused by an attacker which got past a verifier stage, it would not only
provide arbitrary read/write memory access but arbitrary function calls
as well. After setting up the BPF interpreter image, its contents do not
change until destruction time, thus we can setup the image on immutable
made pages in order to mitigate modifications to that code. The idea
is derived from commit 314beb9bca ("x86: bpf_jit_comp: secure bpf jit
against spraying attacks").
This is possible because bpf_prog is not part of sk_filter anymore.
After setup bpf_prog cannot be altered during its life-time. This prevents
any modifications to the entire bpf_prog structure (incl. function/JIT
image pointer).
Every eBPF program (including classic BPF that are migrated) have to call
bpf_prog_select_runtime() to select either interpreter or a JIT image
as a last setup step, and they all are being freed via bpf_prog_free(),
including non-JIT. Therefore, we can easily integrate this into the
eBPF life-time, plus since we directly allocate a bpf_prog, we have no
performance penalty.
Tested with seccomp and test_bpf testsuite in JIT/non-JIT mode and manual
inspection of kernel_page_tables. Brad Spengler proposed the same idea
via Twitter during development of this patch.
Joint work with Hannes Frederic Sowa.
Suggested-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
clean up names related to socket filtering and bpf in the following way:
- everything that deals with sockets keeps 'sk_*' prefix
- everything that is pure BPF is changed to 'bpf_*' prefix
split 'struct sk_filter' into
struct sk_filter {
atomic_t refcnt;
struct rcu_head rcu;
struct bpf_prog *prog;
};
and
struct bpf_prog {
u32 jited:1,
len:31;
struct sock_fprog_kern *orig_prog;
unsigned int (*bpf_func)(const struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct bpf_insn *filter);
union {
struct sock_filter insns[0];
struct bpf_insn insnsi[0];
struct work_struct work;
};
};
so that 'struct bpf_prog' can be used independent of sockets and cleans up
'unattached' bpf use cases
split SK_RUN_FILTER macro into:
SK_RUN_FILTER to be used with 'struct sk_filter *' and
BPF_PROG_RUN to be used with 'struct bpf_prog *'
__sk_filter_release(struct sk_filter *) gains
__bpf_prog_release(struct bpf_prog *) helper function
also perform related renames for the functions that work
with 'struct bpf_prog *', since they're on the same lines:
sk_filter_size -> bpf_prog_size
sk_filter_select_runtime -> bpf_prog_select_runtime
sk_filter_free -> bpf_prog_free
sk_unattached_filter_create -> bpf_prog_create
sk_unattached_filter_destroy -> bpf_prog_destroy
sk_store_orig_filter -> bpf_prog_store_orig_filter
sk_release_orig_filter -> bpf_release_orig_filter
__sk_migrate_filter -> bpf_migrate_filter
__sk_prepare_filter -> bpf_prepare_filter
API for attaching classic BPF to a socket stays the same:
sk_attach_filter(prog, struct sock *)/sk_detach_filter(struct sock *)
and SK_RUN_FILTER(struct sk_filter *, ctx) to execute a program
which is used by sockets, tun, af_packet
API for 'unattached' BPF programs becomes:
bpf_prog_create(struct bpf_prog **)/bpf_prog_destroy(struct bpf_prog *)
and BPF_PROG_RUN(struct bpf_prog *, ctx) to execute a program
which is used by isdn, ppp, team, seccomp, ptp, xt_bpf, cls_bpf, test_bpf
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
to indicate that this function is converting classic BPF into eBPF
and not related to sockets
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
trivial rename to indicate that this functions performs classic BPF checking
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
eBPF is used by socket filtering, seccomp and soon by tracing and
exposed to userspace, therefore 'sock_filter_int' name is not accurate.
Rename it to 'bpf_insn'
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
BPF is used in several kernel components. This split creates logical boundary
between generic eBPF core and the rest
kernel/bpf/core.c: eBPF interpreter
net/core/filter.c: classic->eBPF converter, classic verifiers, socket filters
This patch only moves functions.
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Daniel Borkmann