The access() (and faccessat()) credentials change can cause an
unnecessary load on the RCU machinery because every access() call ends
up freeing the temporary access credential using RCU.
This isn't really noticeable on small machines, but if you have hundreds
of cores you can cause huge slowdowns due to RCU storms.
It's easy to avoid: the temporary access crededntials aren't actually
normally accessed using RCU at all, so we can avoid the whole issue by
just marking them as such.
* access-creds:
access: avoid the RCU grace period for the temporary subjective credentials
It turns out that 'access()' (and 'faccessat()') can cause a lot of RCU
work because it installs a temporary credential that gets allocated and
freed for each system call.
The allocation and freeing overhead is mostly benign, but because
credentials can be accessed under the RCU read lock, the freeing
involves a RCU grace period.
Which is not a huge deal normally, but if you have a lot of access()
calls, this causes a fair amount of seconday damage: instead of having a
nice alloc/free patterns that hits in hot per-CPU slab caches, you have
all those delayed free's, and on big machines with hundreds of cores,
the RCU overhead can end up being enormous.
But it turns out that all of this is entirely unnecessary. Exactly
because access() only installs the credential as the thread-local
subjective credential, the temporary cred pointer doesn't actually need
to be RCU free'd at all. Once we're done using it, we can just free it
synchronously and avoid all the RCU overhead.
So add a 'non_rcu' flag to 'struct cred', which can be set by users that
know they only use it in non-RCU context (there are other potential
users for this). We can make it a union with the rcu freeing list head
that we need for the RCU case, so this doesn't need any extra storage.
Note that this also makes 'get_current_cred()' clear the new non_rcu
flag, in case we have filesystems that take a long-term reference to the
cred and then expect the RCU delayed freeing afterwards. It's not
entirely clear that this is required, but it makes for clear semantics:
the subjective cred remains non-RCU as long as you only access it
synchronously using the thread-local accessors, but you _can_ use it as
a generic cred if you want to.
It is possible that we should just remove the whole RCU markings for
->cred entirely. Only ->real_cred is really supposed to be accessed
through RCU, and the long-term cred copies that nfs uses might want to
explicitly re-enable RCU freeing if required, rather than have
get_current_cred() do it implicitly.
But this is a "minimal semantic changes" change for the immediate
problem.
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Jan Glauber <jglauber@marvell.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Jayachandran Chandrasekharan Nair <jnair@marvell.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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Merge tag 'keys-request-20190626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull request_key improvements from David Howells:
"These are all request_key()-related, including a fix and some improvements:
- Fix the lack of a Link permission check on a key found by
request_key(), thereby enabling request_key() to link keys that
don't grant this permission to the target keyring (which must still
grant Write permission).
Note that the key must be in the caller's keyrings already to be
found.
- Invalidate used request_key authentication keys rather than
revoking them, so that they get cleaned up immediately rather than
hanging around till the expiry time is passed.
- Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so
that a request_key_rcu() can be provided. This can be called in RCU
mode, so it can't sleep and can't upcall - but it can be called
from LOOKUP_RCU pathwalk mode.
- Cache the latest positive result of request_key*() temporarily in
task_struct so that filesystems that make a lot of request_key()
calls during pathwalk can take advantage of it to avoid having to
redo the searching. This requires CONFIG_KEYS_REQUEST_CACHE=y.
It is assumed that the key just found is likely to be used multiple
times in each step in an RCU pathwalk, and is likely to be reused
for the next step too.
Note that the cleanup of the cache is done on TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME,
just before userspace resumes, and on exit"
* tag 'keys-request-20190626' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}
keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_struct
keys: Provide request_key_rcu()
keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions
keys: Invalidate used request_key authentication keys
keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found key
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Merge tag 'keys-misc-20190619' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs
Pull misc keyring updates from David Howells:
"These are some miscellaneous keyrings fixes and improvements:
- Fix a bunch of warnings from sparse, including missing RCU bits and
kdoc-function argument mismatches
- Implement a keyctl to allow a key to be moved from one keyring to
another, with the option of prohibiting key replacement in the
destination keyring.
- Grant Link permission to possessors of request_key_auth tokens so
that upcall servicing daemons can more easily arrange things such
that only the necessary auth key is passed to the actual service
program, and not all the auth keys a daemon might possesss.
- Improvement in lookup_user_key().
- Implement a keyctl to allow keyrings subsystem capabilities to be
queried.
The keyutils next branch has commits to make available, document and
test the move-key and capabilities code:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log
They're currently on the 'next' branch"
* tag 'keys-misc-20190619' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs:
keys: Add capability-checking keyctl function
keys: Reuse keyring_index_key::desc_len in lookup_user_key()
keys: Grant Link permission to possessers of request_key auth keys
keys: Add a keyctl to move a key between keyrings
keys: Hoist locking out of __key_link_begin()
keys: Break bits out of key_unlink()
keys: Change keyring_serialise_link_sem to a mutex
keys: sparse: Fix kdoc mismatches
keys: sparse: Fix incorrect RCU accesses
keys: sparse: Fix key_fs[ug]id_changed()
If a filesystem uses keys to hold authentication tokens, then it needs a
token for each VFS operation that might perform an authentication check -
either by passing it to the server, or using to perform a check based on
authentication data cached locally.
For open files this isn't a problem, since the key should be cached in the
file struct since it represents the subject performing operations on that
file descriptor.
During pathwalk, however, there isn't anywhere to cache the key, except
perhaps in the nameidata struct - but that isn't exposed to the
filesystems. Further, a pathwalk can incur a lot of operations, calling
one or more of the following, for instance:
->lookup()
->permission()
->d_revalidate()
->d_automount()
->get_acl()
->getxattr()
on each dentry/inode it encounters - and each one may need to call
request_key(). And then, at the end of pathwalk, it will call the actual
operation:
->mkdir()
->mknod()
->getattr()
->open()
...
which may need to go and get the token again.
However, it is very likely that all of the operations on a single
dentry/inode - and quite possibly a sequence of them - will all want to use
the same authentication token, which suggests that caching it would be a
good idea.
To this end:
(1) Make it so that a positive result of request_key() and co. that didn't
require upcalling to userspace is cached temporarily in task_struct.
(2) The cache is 1 deep, so a new result displaces the old one.
(3) The key is released by exit and by notify-resume.
(4) The cache is cleared in a newly forked process.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Pull ptrace fixes from Eric Biederman:
"This is just two very minor fixes:
- prevent ptrace from reading unitialized kernel memory found twice
by syzkaller
- restore a missing smp_rmb in ptrace_may_access and add comment tp
it so it is not removed by accident again.
Apologies for being a little slow about getting this to you, I am
still figuring out how to develop with a little baby in the house"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
ptrace: restore smp_rmb() in __ptrace_may_access()
signal/ptrace: Don't leak unitialized kernel memory with PTRACE_PEEK_SIGINFO
Restore the read memory barrier in __ptrace_may_access() that was deleted
a couple years ago. Also add comments on this barrier and the one it pairs
with to explain why they're there (as far as I understand).
Fixes: bfedb58925 ("mm: Add a user_ns owner to mm_struct and fix ptrace permission checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Based on 1 normalized pattern(s):
this program is free software you can redistribute it and or modify
it under the terms of the gnu general public licence as published by
the free software foundation either version 2 of the licence or at
your option any later version
extracted by the scancode license scanner the SPDX license identifier
GPL-2.0-or-later
has been chosen to replace the boilerplate/reference in 114 file(s).
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Allison Randal <allison@lohutok.net>
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: linux-spdx@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190520170857.552531963@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Sparse warnings are incurred by key_fs[ug]id_changed() due to unprotected
accesses of tsk->cred, which is marked __rcu.
Fix this by passing the new cred struct to these functions from
commit_creds() rather than the task pointer.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
The SELinux specific credential poisioning only makes sense
if SELinux is managing the credentials. As the intent of this
patch set is to move the blob management out of the modules
and into the infrastructure, the SELinux specific code has
to go. The poisioning could be introduced into the infrastructure
at some later date.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
There is no reason that modules should not be able
to use this, and NFS will need it when converted to
use 'struct cred'.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Sometimes we want to opportunistically get a
ref to a cred in an rcu_read_lock protected section.
get_task_cred() does this, and NFS does as similar thing
with its own credential structures.
To prepare for NFS converting to use 'struct cred' more
uniformly, define get_cred_rcu(), and use it in
get_task_cred().
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
NFS needs to compare to credentials, to see if they can
be treated the same w.r.t. filesystem access. Sometimes
an ordering is needed when credentials are used as a key
to an rbtree.
NFS currently has its own private credential management from
before 'struct cred' existed. To move it over to more consistent
use of 'struct cred' we need a comparison function.
This patch adds that function.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
This updates the credentials API documentation to ReST markup and moves
it under the security subsection of kernel API documentation.
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
We are going to split <linux/sched/coredump.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which
will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files.
Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/coredump.h> file that just
maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and
bisectable.
Include the new header in the files that are going to need it.
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Using INVALID_[UG]ID for the LSM file creation context doesn't
make sense, so return an error if the inode passed to
set_create_file_as() has an invalid id.
Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Mark those kmem allocations that are known to be easily triggered from
userspace as __GFP_ACCOUNT/SLAB_ACCOUNT, which makes them accounted to
memcg. For the list, see below:
- threadinfo
- task_struct
- task_delay_info
- pid
- cred
- mm_struct
- vm_area_struct and vm_region (nommu)
- anon_vma and anon_vma_chain
- signal_struct
- sighand_struct
- fs_struct
- files_struct
- fdtable and fdtable->full_fds_bits
- dentry and external_name
- inode for all filesystems. This is the most tedious part, because
most filesystems overwrite the alloc_inode method.
The list is far from complete, so feel free to add more objects.
Nevertheless, it should be close to "account everything" approach and
keep most workloads within bounds. Malevolent users will be able to
breach the limit, but this was possible even with the former "account
everything" approach (simply because it did not account everything in
fact).
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov@virtuozzo.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com>
Cc: Pekka Enberg <penberg@kernel.org>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Commit e0e817392b ("CRED: Add some configurable debugging [try #6]")
added the kdebug mechanism to this file back in 2009.
The kdebug macro calls no_printk which always evaluates arguments.
Most of the kdebug uses have an unnecessary call of
atomic_read(&cred->usage)
Make the kdebug macro do nothing by defining it with
do { if (0) no_printk(...); } while (0)
when not enabled.
$ size kernel/cred.o* (defconfig x86-64)
text data bss dec hex filename
2748 336 8 3092 c14 kernel/cred.o.new
2788 336 8 3132 c3c kernel/cred.o.old
Miscellanea:
o Neaten the #define kdebug macros while there
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their
functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems,
supporting multiple users is not necessary.
This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for
non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled
under CONFIG_EXPERT menu.
When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case
and processes always have all capabilities.
The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid,
setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups,
getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset.
Also, groups.c is compiled out completely.
In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid
adding two ifdef blocks.
This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal
kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than
low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much.
The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work.
Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS.
Bloat-o-meter output:
add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Pull (again) user namespace infrastructure changes from Eric Biederman:
"Those bugs, those darn embarrasing bugs just want don't want to get
fixed.
Linus I just updated my mirror of your kernel.org tree and it appears
you successfully pulled everything except the last 4 commits that fix
those embarrasing bugs.
When you get a chance can you please repull my branch"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace:
userns: Fix typo in description of the limitation of userns_install
userns: Add a more complete capability subset test to commit_creds
userns: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for most uses of setns.
Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps.
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"A quiet cycle for the security subsystem with just a few maintenance
updates."
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: create a sysfs mount point for smackfs
Smack: use select not depends in Kconfig
Yama: remove locking from delete path
Yama: add RCU to drop read locking
drivers/char/tpm: remove tasklet and cleanup
KEYS: Use keyring_alloc() to create special keyrings
KEYS: Reduce initial permissions on keys
KEYS: Make the session and process keyrings per-thread
seccomp: Make syscall skipping and nr changes more consistent
key: Fix resource leak
keys: Fix unreachable code
KEYS: Add payload preparsing opportunity prior to key instantiate or update
When unsharing a user namespace we reduce our credentials to just what
can be done in that user namespace. This is a subset of the credentials
we previously had. Teach commit_creds to recognize this is a subset
of the credentials we have had before and don't clear the dumpability flag.
This allows an unprivileged program to do:
unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER);
fd = open("/proc/self/uid_map", O_RDWR);
Where previously opening the uid_map writable would fail because
the the task had been made non-dumpable.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Make the session keyring per-thread rather than per-process, but still
inherited from the parent thread to solve a problem with PAM and gdm.
The problem is that join_session_keyring() will reject attempts to change the
session keyring of a multithreaded program but gdm is now multithreaded before
it gets to the point of starting PAM and running pam_keyinit to create the
session keyring. See:
https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=49211
The reason that join_session_keyring() will only change the session keyring
under a single-threaded environment is that it's hard to alter the other
thread's credentials to effect the change in a multi-threaded program. The
problems are such as:
(1) How to prevent two threads both running join_session_keyring() from
racing.
(2) Another thread's credentials may not be modified directly by this process.
(3) The number of threads is uncertain whilst we're not holding the
appropriate spinlock, making preallocation slightly tricky.
(4) We could use TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and key_replace_session_keyring() to get
another thread to replace its keyring, but that means preallocating for
each thread.
A reasonable way around this is to make the session keyring per-thread rather
than per-process and just document that if you want a common session keyring,
you must get it before you spawn any threads - which is the current situation
anyway.
Whilst we're at it, we can the process keyring behave in the same way. This
means we can clean up some of the ickyness in the creds code.
Basically, after this patch, the session, process and thread keyrings are about
inheritance rules only and not about sharing changes of keyring.
Reported-by: Mantas M. <grawity@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
Kill the no longer used task_struct->replacement_session_keyring, update
copy_creds() and exit_creds().
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Alexander Gordeev <agordeev@redhat.com>
Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net>
Cc: David Smith <dsmith@redhat.com>
Cc: "Frank Ch. Eigler" <fche@redhat.com>
Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman:
"This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can
reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete
implementation.
Highlights:
- Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and
code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe.
- Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the
config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable
user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission
checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe.
- All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial
user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add
an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared
uids remains the same.
- With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or
better than it is today.
- For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or
operationally with the user namespace enabled.
- The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1
billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code
enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to
164ns per stat operation).
- (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value.
Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially
anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause
entertaining failures in userspace.
- If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails.
I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I
could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and
handle the case where setuid fails.
- If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which
we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS
experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be
better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I
can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we
can't map.
- Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it
safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities.
My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core
kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1."
Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits)
userns: Silence silly gcc warning.
cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock
userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq
userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate
userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids.
userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate.
userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate
userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe
userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns
userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces.
userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids
userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid
userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs
...
cred.h and a few trivial users of struct cred are changed. The rest of the users
of struct cred are left for other patches as there are too many changes to make
in one go and leave the change reviewable. If the user namespace is disabled and
CONFIG_UIDGID_STRICT_TYPE_CHECKS are disabled the code will contiue to compile
and behave correctly.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
keyctl_session_to_parent(task) sets ->replacement_session_keyring,
it should be processed and cleared by key_replace_session_keyring().
However, this task can fork before it notices TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME and
the new child gets the bogus ->replacement_session_keyring copied by
dup_task_struct(). This is obviously wrong and, if nothing else, this
leads to put_cred(already_freed_cred).
change copy_creds() to clear this member. If copy_process() fails
before this point the wrong ->replacement_session_keyring doesn't
matter, exit_creds() won't be called.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
struct user_struct will shortly loose it's user_ns reference
so make the cred user_ns reference a proper reference complete
with reference counting.
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
The changed files were only including linux/module.h for the
EXPORT_SYMBOL infrastructure, and nothing else. Revector them
onto the isolated export header for faster compile times.
Nothing to see here but a whole lot of instances of:
-#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/export.h>
This commit is only changing the kernel dir; next targets
will probably be mm, fs, the arch dirs, etc.
Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com>
* 'next' of git://selinuxproject.org/~jmorris/linux-security: (95 commits)
TOMOYO: Fix incomplete read after seek.
Smack: allow to access /smack/access as normal user
TOMOYO: Fix unused kernel config option.
Smack: fix: invalid length set for the result of /smack/access
Smack: compilation fix
Smack: fix for /smack/access output, use string instead of byte
Smack: domain transition protections (v3)
Smack: Provide information for UDS getsockopt(SO_PEERCRED)
Smack: Clean up comments
Smack: Repair processing of fcntl
Smack: Rule list lookup performance
Smack: check permissions from user space (v2)
TOMOYO: Fix quota and garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Remove redundant tasklist_lock.
TOMOYO: Fix domain transition failure warning.
TOMOYO: Remove tomoyo_policy_memory_lock spinlock.
TOMOYO: Simplify garbage collector.
TOMOYO: Fix make namespacecheck warnings.
target: check hex2bin result
encrypted-keys: check hex2bin result
...
This patch adds CONFIG_KEYS guard for tgcred to fix below build error
if CONFIG_KEYS is not configured.
CC kernel/cred.o
kernel/cred.c: In function 'prepare_kernel_cred':
kernel/cred.c:657: error: 'tgcred' undeclared (first use in this function)
kernel/cred.c:657: error: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
kernel/cred.c:657: error: for each function it appears in.)
make[1]: *** [kernel/cred.o] Error 1
make: *** [kernel] Error 2
Signed-off-by: Axel Lin <axel.lin@gmail.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix prepare_kernel_cred() to provide a new, separate thread_group_cred struct
otherwise when using request_key() ____call_usermodehelper() calls
umh_keys_init() with the new creds pointing to init_tgcred, which
umh_keys_init() then blithely alters.
The problem can be demonstrated by:
# keyctl request2 user a debug:a @s
249681132
# grep req /proc/keys
079906a5 I--Q-- 1 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _req.249681132: 1/4
38ef1626 IR---- 1 expd 0b010000 0 0 .request_ key:ee1d4ec pid:4371 ci:1
The keyring _req.XXXX should have gone away, but something (init_tgcred) is
pinning it.
That key actually requested can then be removed and a new one created:
# keyctl unlink 249681132
1 links removed
[root@andromeda ~]# grep req /proc/keys
116cecac IR---- 1 expd 0b010000 0 0 .request_ key:eeb4911 pid:4379 ci:1
36d1cbf8 I--Q-- 1 perm 1f3f0000 0 0 keyring _req.250300689: 1/4
which causes the old _req keyring to go away and a new one to take its place.
This is a consequence of the changes in:
commit 879669961b
Author: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Jun 17 11:25:59 2011 +0100
KEYS/DNS: Fix ____call_usermodehelper() to not lose the session keyring
and:
commit 17f60a7da1
Author: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Date: Fri Apr 1 17:07:50 2011 -0400
capabilites: allow the application of capability limits to usermode helpers
After this patch is applied, the _req keyring and the .request_key key are
cleaned up.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The patch http://lkml.org/lkml/2003/7/13/226 introduced an RLIMIT_NPROC
check in set_user() to check for NPROC exceeding via setuid() and
similar functions.
Before the check there was a possibility to greatly exceed the allowed
number of processes by an unprivileged user if the program relied on
rlimit only. But the check created new security threat: many poorly
written programs simply don't check setuid() return code and believe it
cannot fail if executed with root privileges. So, the check is removed
in this patch because of too often privilege escalations related to
buggy programs.
The NPROC can still be enforced in the common code flow of daemons
spawning user processes. Most of daemons do fork()+setuid()+execve().
The check introduced in execve() (1) enforces the same limit as in
setuid() and (2) doesn't create similar security issues.
Neil Brown suggested to track what specific process has exceeded the
limit by setting PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED process flag. With the change only
this process would fail on execve(), and other processes' execve()
behaviour is not changed.
Solar Designer suggested to re-check whether NPROC limit is still
exceeded at the moment of execve(). If the process was sleeping for
days between set*uid() and execve(), and the NPROC counter step down
under the limit, the defered execve() failure because NPROC limit was
exceeded days ago would be unexpected. If the limit is not exceeded
anymore, we clear the flag on successful calls to execve() and fork().
The flag is also cleared on successful calls to set_user() as the limit
was exceeded for the previous user, not the current one.
Similar check was introduced in -ow patches (without the process flag).
v3 - clear PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED on successful calls to set_user().
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Acked-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'docs-move' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rdunlap/linux-docs:
Create Documentation/security/, move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/ to Documentation/security/, add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file> to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
move LSM-, credentials-, and keys-related files from Documentation/
to Documentation/security/,
add Documentation/security/00-INDEX, and
update all occurrences of Documentation/<moved_file>
to Documentation/security/<moved_file>.
If !CONFIG_USERNS, have current_user_ns() defined to (&init_user_ns).
Get rid of _current_user_ns. This requires nsown_capable() to be
defined in capability.c rather than as static inline in capability.h,
so do that.
Request_key needs init_user_ns defined at current_user_ns if
!CONFIG_USERNS, so forward-declare that in cred.h if !CONFIG_USERNS
at current_user_ns() define.
Compile-tested with and without CONFIG_USERNS.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
[ This makes a huge performance difference for acl_permission_check(),
up to 30%. And that is one of the hottest kernel functions for loads
that are pathname-lookup heavy. ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The CAP_INIT macros of INH, BSET, and EFF made sense at one point in time,
but now days they aren't helping. Just open code the logic in the
init_cred.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
- Introduce ns_capable to test for a capability in a non-default
user namespace.
- Teach cap_capable to handle capabilities in a non-default
user namespace.
The motivation is to get to the unprivileged creation of new
namespaces. It looks like this gets us 90% of the way there, with
only potential uid confusion issues left.
I still need to handle getting all caps after creation but otherwise I
think I have a good starter patch that achieves all of your goals.
Changelog:
11/05/2010: [serge] add apparmor
12/14/2010: [serge] fix capabilities to created user namespaces
Without this, if user serge creates a user_ns, he won't have
capabilities to the user_ns he created. THis is because we
were first checking whether his effective caps had the caps
he needed and returning -EPERM if not, and THEN checking whether
he was the creator. Reverse those checks.
12/16/2010: [serge] security_real_capable needs ns argument in !security case
01/11/2011: [serge] add task_ns_capable helper
01/11/2011: [serge] add nsown_capable() helper per Bastian Blank suggestion
02/16/2011: [serge] fix a logic bug: the root user is always creator of
init_user_ns, but should not always have capabilities to
it! Fix the check in cap_capable().
02/21/2011: Add the required user_ns parameter to security_capable,
fixing a compile failure.
02/23/2011: Convert some macros to functions as per akpm comments. Some
couldn't be converted because we can't easily forward-declare
them (they are inline if !SECURITY, extern if SECURITY). Add
a current_user_ns function so we can use it in capability.h
without #including cred.h. Move all forward declarations
together to the top of the #ifdef __KERNEL__ section, and use
kernel-doc format.
02/23/2011: Per dhowells, clean up comment in cap_capable().
02/23/2011: Per akpm, remove unreachable 'return -EPERM' in cap_capable.
(Original written and signed off by Eric; latest, modified version
acked by him)
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: export current_user_ns() for ecryptfs]
[serge.hallyn@canonical.com: remove unneeded extra argument in selinux's task_has_capability]
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Lezcano <daniel.lezcano@free.fr>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In prepare_kernel_cred() since 2.6.29, put_cred(new) is called without
assigning new->usage when security_prepare_creds() returned an error. As a
result, memory for new and refcount for new->{user,group_info,tgcred} are
leaked because put_cred(new) won't call __put_cred() unless old->usage == 1.
Fix these leaks by assigning new->usage (and new->subscribers which was added
in 2.6.32) before calling security_prepare_creds().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In cred_alloc_blank() since 2.6.32, abort_creds(new) is called with
new->security == NULL and new->magic == 0 when security_cred_alloc_blank()
returns an error. As a result, BUG() will be triggered if SELinux is enabled
or CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y.
If CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS=y, BUG() is called from __invalid_creds() because
cred->magic == 0. Failing that, BUG() is called from selinux_cred_free()
because selinux_cred_free() is not expecting cred->security == NULL. This does
not affect smack_cred_free(), tomoyo_cred_free() or apparmor_cred_free().
Fix these bugs by
(1) Set new->magic before calling security_cred_alloc_blank().
(2) Handle null cred->security in creds_are_invalid() and selinux_cred_free().
Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Oleg Nesterov pointed out we have to prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec
itself and we can reuse ->cred_guard_mutex for it. Yes, concurrent
execve() has no worth.
Let's move ->cred_guard_mutex from task_struct to signal_struct. It
naturally prevent multiple-threads-inside-exec.
Signed-off-by: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a dummy printk function for the maintenance of unused printks through gcc
format checking, and also so that side-effect checking is maintained too.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
It's possible for get_task_cred() as it currently stands to 'corrupt' a set of
credentials by incrementing their usage count after their replacement by the
task being accessed.
What happens is that get_task_cred() can race with commit_creds():
TASK_1 TASK_2 RCU_CLEANER
-->get_task_cred(TASK_2)
rcu_read_lock()
__cred = __task_cred(TASK_2)
-->commit_creds()
old_cred = TASK_2->real_cred
TASK_2->real_cred = ...
put_cred(old_cred)
call_rcu(old_cred)
[__cred->usage == 0]
get_cred(__cred)
[__cred->usage == 1]
rcu_read_unlock()
-->put_cred_rcu()
[__cred->usage == 1]
panic()
However, since a tasks credentials are generally not changed very often, we can
reasonably make use of a loop involving reading the creds pointer and using
atomic_inc_not_zero() to attempt to increment it if it hasn't already hit zero.
If successful, we can safely return the credentials in the knowledge that, even
if the task we're accessing has released them, they haven't gone to the RCU
cleanup code.
We then change task_state() in procfs to use get_task_cred() rather than
calling get_cred() on the result of __task_cred(), as that suffers from the
same problem.
Without this change, a BUG_ON in __put_cred() or in put_cred_rcu() can be
tripped when it is noticed that the usage count is not zero as it ought to be,
for example:
kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:168!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run
CPU 0
Pid: 2436, comm: master Not tainted 2.6.33.3-85.fc13.x86_64 #1 0HR330/OptiPlex
745
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81069881>] [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP: 0018:ffff88019e7e9eb8 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880161514480 RCX: 00000000ffffffff
RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffff880140c690c0 RDI: ffff880140c690c0
RBP: ffff88019e7e9eb8 R08: 00000000000000d0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff880140c690c0
R13: ffff88019e77aea0 R14: 00007fff336b0a5c R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007f12f50d97c0(0000) GS:ffff880007400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f8f461bc000 CR3: 00000001b26ce000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process master (pid: 2436, threadinfo ffff88019e7e8000, task ffff88019e77aea0)
Stack:
ffff88019e7e9ec8 ffffffff810698cd ffff88019e7e9ef8 ffffffff81069b45
<0> ffff880161514180 ffff880161514480 ffff880161514180 0000000000000000
<0> ffff88019e7e9f28 ffffffff8106aace 0000000000000001 0000000000000246
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff810698cd>] put_cred+0x13/0x15
[<ffffffff81069b45>] commit_creds+0x16b/0x175
[<ffffffff8106aace>] set_current_groups+0x47/0x4e
[<ffffffff8106ac89>] sys_setgroups+0xf6/0x105
[<ffffffff81009b02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 48 8d 71 ff e8 7e 4e 15 00 85 c0 78 0b 8b 75 ec 48 89 df e8 ef 4a 15 00
48 83 c4 18 5b c9 c3 55 8b 07 8b 07 48 89 e5 85 c0 74 04 <0f> 0b eb fe 65 48 8b
04 25 00 cc 00 00 48 3b b8 58 04 00 00 75
RIP [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45
RSP <ffff88019e7e9eb8>
---[ end trace df391256a100ebdd ]---
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Now that nobody ever changes subprocess_info->cred we can kill this member
and related code. ____call_usermodehelper() always runs in the context of
freshly forked kernel thread, it has the proper ->cred copied from its
parent kthread, keventd.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (61 commits)
KEYS: Return more accurate error codes
LSM: Add __init to fixup function.
TOMOYO: Add pathname grouping support.
ima: remove ACPI dependency
TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
security/selinux/ss: Use kstrdup
TOMOYO: Use stack memory for pending entry.
Revert "ima: remove ACPI dependency"
Revert "TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal"
KEYS: Do preallocation for __key_link()
TOMOYO: Use mutex_lock_interruptible.
KEYS: Better handling of errors from construct_alloc_key()
KEYS: keyring_serialise_link_sem is only needed for keyring->keyring links
TOMOYO: Use GFP_NOFS rather than GFP_KERNEL.
ima: remove ACPI dependency
TPM: ACPI/PNP dependency removal
selinux: generalize disabling of execmem for plt-in-heap archs
LSM Audit: rename LSM_AUDIT_NO_AUDIT to LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE
CRED: Holding a spinlock does not imply the holding of RCU read lock
SMACK: Don't #include Ext2 headers
...
Linus Torvalds