mirror of https://gitee.com/openkylin/linux.git
335 Commits
Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
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Wolffhardt Schwabe | 8b2770a4e1 |
fix typo in assignment of fs default overflow gid
The patch remains without practical effect since both macros carry identical values. Still, it might become a problem in the future if (for whatever reason) the default overflow uid and gid differ. The DEFAULT_FS_OVERFLOWGID macro was previously unused. Signed-off-by: Wolffhardt Schwabe <wolffhardt.schwabe@fau.de> Signed-off-by: Anatoliy Cherepantsev <anatoliy.cherepantsev@fau.de> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
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Linus Torvalds | c9b012e5f4 |
arm64 updates for 4.15
Plenty of acronym soup here: - Initial support for the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) - Improved handling for SError interrupts (required to handle RAS events) - Enable GCC support for 128-bit integer types - Remove kernel text addresses from backtraces and register dumps - Use of WFE to implement long delay()s - ACPI IORT updates from Lorenzo Pieralisi - Perf PMU driver for the Statistical Profiling Extension (SPE) - Perf PMU driver for Hisilicon's system PMUs - Misc cleanups and non-critical fixes -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1 iQEcBAABCgAGBQJaCcLqAAoJELescNyEwWM0JREH/2FbmD/khGzEtP8LW+o9D8iV TBM02uWQxS1bbO1pV2vb+512YQO+iWfeQwJH9Jv2FZcrMvFv7uGRnYgAnJuXNGrl W+LL6OhN22A24LSawC437RU3Xe7GqrtONIY/yLeJBPablfcDGzPK1eHRA0pUzcyX VlyDruSHWX44VGBPV6JRd3x0vxpV8syeKOjbRvopRfn3Nwkbd76V3YSfEgwoTG5W ET1sOnXLmHHdeifn/l1Am5FX1FYstpcd7usUTJ4Oto8y7e09tw3bGJCD0aMJ3vow v1pCUWohEw7fHqoPc9rTrc1QEnkdML4vjJvMPUzwyTfPrN+7uEuMIEeJierW+qE= =0qrg -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Merge tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux Pull arm64 updates from Will Deacon: "The big highlight is support for the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) which required extensive ABI work to ensure we don't break existing applications by blowing away their signal stack with the rather large new vector context (<= 2 kbit per vector register). There's further work to be done optimising things like exception return, but the ABI is solid now. Much of the line count comes from some new PMU drivers we have, but they're pretty self-contained and I suspect we'll have more of them in future. Plenty of acronym soup here: - initial support for the Scalable Vector Extension (SVE) - improved handling for SError interrupts (required to handle RAS events) - enable GCC support for 128-bit integer types - remove kernel text addresses from backtraces and register dumps - use of WFE to implement long delay()s - ACPI IORT updates from Lorenzo Pieralisi - perf PMU driver for the Statistical Profiling Extension (SPE) - perf PMU driver for Hisilicon's system PMUs - misc cleanups and non-critical fixes" * tag 'arm64-upstream' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/arm64/linux: (97 commits) arm64: Make ARMV8_DEPRECATED depend on SYSCTL arm64: Implement __lshrti3 library function arm64: support __int128 on gcc 5+ arm64/sve: Add documentation arm64/sve: Detect SVE and activate runtime support arm64/sve: KVM: Hide SVE from CPU features exposed to guests arm64/sve: KVM: Treat guest SVE use as undefined instruction execution arm64/sve: KVM: Prevent guests from using SVE arm64/sve: Add sysctl to set the default vector length for new processes arm64/sve: Add prctl controls for userspace vector length management arm64/sve: ptrace and ELF coredump support arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around EFI runtime service calls arm64/sve: Preserve SVE registers around kernel-mode NEON use arm64/sve: Probe SVE capabilities and usable vector lengths arm64: cpufeature: Move sys_caps_initialised declarations arm64/sve: Backend logic for setting the vector length arm64/sve: Signal handling support arm64/sve: Support vector length resetting for new processes arm64/sve: Core task context handling arm64/sve: Low-level CPU setup ... |
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Dave Martin | 2d2123bc7c |
arm64/sve: Add prctl controls for userspace vector length management
This patch adds two arm64-specific prctls, to permit userspace to control its vector length: * PR_SVE_SET_VL: set the thread's SVE vector length and vector length inheritance mode. * PR_SVE_GET_VL: get the same information. Although these prctls resemble instruction set features in the SVE architecture, they provide additional control: the vector length inheritance mode is Linux-specific and nothing to do with the architecture, and the architecture does not permit EL0 to set its own vector length directly. Both can be used in portable tools without requiring the use of SVE instructions. Signed-off-by: Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org> [will: Fixed up prctl constants to avoid clash with PDEATHSIG] Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> |
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Greg Kroah-Hartman | b24413180f |
License cleanup: add SPDX GPL-2.0 license identifier to files with no license
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license. By default all files without license information are under the default license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2. Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0' SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text. This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and Philippe Ombredanne. How this work was done: Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of the use cases: - file had no licensing information it it. - file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it, - file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information, Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords. The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files. The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s) to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was: - Files considered eligible had to be source code files. - Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5 lines of source - File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5 lines). All documentation files were explicitly excluded. The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license identifiers to apply. - when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was considered to have no license information in it, and the top level COPYING file license applied. For non */uapi/* files that summary was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 11139 and resulted in the first patch in this series. If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------- GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930 and resulted in the second patch in this series. - if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in it (per prior point). Results summary: SPDX license identifier # files ---------------------------------------------------|------ GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270 GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17 LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15 GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14 ((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5 LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4 LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3 ((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1 and that resulted in the third patch in this series. - when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became the concluded license(s). - when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a license but the other didn't, or they both detected different licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred. - In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics). - When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. - If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier, the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later in time. In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation. Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so they are related. Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks in about 15000 files. In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the correct identifier. Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch version early this week with: - a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected license ids and scores - reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+ files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct - reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the different types of files to be modified. These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to generate the patches. Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> |
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Kirill Tkhai | 4d28df6152 |
prctl: Allow local CAP_SYS_ADMIN changing exe_file
During checkpointing and restore of userspace tasks we bumped into the situation, that it's not possible to restore the tasks, which user namespace does not have uid 0 or gid 0 mapped. People create user namespace mappings like they want, and there is no a limitation on obligatory uid and gid "must be mapped". So, if there is no uid 0 or gid 0 in the mapping, it's impossible to restore mm->exe_file of the processes belonging to this user namespace. Also, there is no a workaround. It's impossible to create a temporary uid/gid mapping, because only one write to /proc/[pid]/uid_map and gid_map is allowed during a namespace lifetime. If there is an entry, then no more mapings can't be written. If there isn't an entry, we can't write there too, otherwise user task won't be able to do that in the future. The patch changes the check, and looks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN instead of zero uid and gid. This allows to restore a task independently of its user namespace mappings. Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> CC: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> CC: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> CC: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> CC: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> CC: Andrei Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> CC: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> CC: Stanislav Kinsburskiy <skinsbursky@virtuozzo.com> CC: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> Reviewed-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
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Al Viro | 58c7ffc074 |
fix a braino in compat_sys_getrlimit()
Reported-and-tested-by: Meelis Roos <mroos@linux.ee>
Fixes: commit
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Michal Hocko | 1860033237 |
mm: make PR_SET_THP_DISABLE immediately active
PR_SET_THP_DISABLE has a rather subtle semantic. It doesn't affect any
existing mapping because it only updated mm->def_flags which is a
template for new mappings.
The mappings created after prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE) have VM_NOHUGEPAGE
flag set. This can be quite surprising for all those applications which
do not do prctl(); fork() & exec() and want to control their own THP
behavior.
Another usecase when the immediate semantic of the prctl might be useful
is a combination of pre- and post-copy migration of containers with
CRIU. In this case CRIU populates a part of a memory region with data
that was saved during the pre-copy stage. Afterwards, the region is
registered with userfaultfd and CRIU expects to get page faults for the
parts of the region that were not yet populated. However, khugepaged
collapses the pages and the expected page faults do not occur.
In more general case, the prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE) could be used as a
temporary mechanism for enabling/disabling THP process wide.
Implementation wise, a new MMF_DISABLE_THP flag is added. This flag is
tested when decision whether to use huge pages is taken either during
page fault of at the time of THP collapse.
It should be noted, that the new implementation makes PR_SET_THP_DISABLE
master override to any per-VMA setting, which was not the case
previously.
Fixes:
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Linus Torvalds | c856863988 |
Merge branch 'misc.compat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull misc compat stuff updates from Al Viro: "This part is basically untangling various compat stuff. Compat syscalls moved to their native counterparts, getting rid of quite a bit of double-copying and/or set_fs() uses. A lot of field-by-field copyin/copyout killed off. - kernel/compat.c is much closer to containing just the copyin/copyout of compat structs. Not all compat syscalls are gone from it yet, but it's getting there. - ipc/compat_mq.c killed off completely. - block/compat_ioctl.c cleaned up; floppy compat ioctls moved to drivers/block/floppy.c where they belong. Yes, there are several drivers that implement some of the same ioctls. Some are m68k and one is 32bit-only pmac. drivers/block/floppy.c is the only one in that bunch that can be built on biarch" * 'misc.compat' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: mqueue: move compat syscalls to native ones usbdevfs: get rid of field-by-field copyin compat_hdio_ioctl: get rid of set_fs() take floppy compat ioctls to sodding floppy.c ipmi: get rid of field-by-field __get_user() ipmi: get COMPAT_IPMICTL_RECEIVE_MSG in sync with the native one rt_sigtimedwait(): move compat to native select: switch compat_{get,put}_fd_set() to compat_{get,put}_bitmap() put_compat_rusage(): switch to copy_to_user() sigpending(): move compat to native getrlimit()/setrlimit(): move compat to native times(2): move compat to native compat_{get,put}_bitmap(): use unsafe_{get,put}_user() fb_get_fscreeninfo(): don't bother with do_fb_ioctl() do_sigaltstack(): lift copying to/from userland into callers take compat_sys_old_getrlimit() to native syscall trim __ARCH_WANT_SYS_OLD_GETRLIMIT |
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Al Viro | d9e968cb9f |
getrlimit()/setrlimit(): move compat to native
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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Al Viro | ca2406ed58 |
times(2): move compat to native
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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Al Viro | 613763a1f0 |
take compat_sys_old_getrlimit() to native syscall
... and sanitize the ifdefs in there Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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Al Viro | ce72a16fa7 |
wait4(2)/waitid(2): separate copying rusage to userland
New helpers: kernel_waitid() and kernel_wait4(). sys_waitid(), sys_wait4() and their compat variants switched to those. Copying struct rusage to userland is left to syscall itself. For compat_sys_wait4() that eliminates the use of set_fs() completely. For compat_sys_waitid() it's still needed (for siginfo handling); that will change shortly. Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> |
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Linus Torvalds | e579dde654 |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "This is a set of small fixes that were mostly stumbled over during more significant development. This proc fix and the fix to posix-timers are the most significant of the lot. There is a lot of good development going on but unfortunately it didn't quite make the merge window" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: proc: Fix unbalanced hard link numbers signal: Make kill_proc_info static rlimit: Properly call security_task_setrlimit signal: Remove unused definition of sig_user_definied ia64: Remove unused IA64_TASK_SIGHAND_OFFSET and IA64_SIGHAND_SIGLOCK_OFFSET ipc: Remove unused declaration of recompute_msgmni posix-timers: Correct sanity check in posix_cpu_nsleep sysctl: Remove dead register_sysctl_root |
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Eric W. Biederman | cad4ea546b |
rlimit: Properly call security_task_setrlimit
Modify do_prlimit to call security_task_setrlimit passing the task whose rlimit we are changing not the tsk->group_leader. In general this should not matter as the lsms implementing security_task_setrlimit apparmor and selinux both examine the task->cred to see what should be allowed on the destination task. That task->cred is shared between tasks created with CLONE_THREAD unless thread keyrings are in play, in which case both apparmor and selinux create duplicate security contexts. So the only time when it will matter which thread is passed to security_task_setrlimit is if one of the threads of a process performs an operation that changes only it's credentials. At which point if a thread has done that we don't want to hide that information from the lsms. So fix the call of security_task_setrlimit. With the removal of tsk->group_leader this makes the code slightly faster, more comprehensible and maintainable. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
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Stephen Smalley | 791ec491c3 |
prlimit,security,selinux: add a security hook for prlimit
When SELinux was first added to the kernel, a process could only get and set its own resource limits via getrlimit(2) and setrlimit(2), so no MAC checks were required for those operations, and thus no security hooks were defined for them. Later, SELinux introduced a hook for setlimit(2) with a check if the hard limit was being changed in order to be able to rely on the hard limit value as a safe reset point upon context transitions. Later on, when prlimit(2) was added to the kernel with the ability to get or set resource limits (hard or soft) of another process, LSM/SELinux was not updated other than to pass the target process to the setrlimit hook. This resulted in incomplete control over both getting and setting the resource limits of another process. Add a new security_task_prlimit() hook to the check_prlimit_permission() function to provide complete mediation. The hook is only called when acting on another task, and only if the existing DAC/capability checks would allow access. Pass flags down to the hook to indicate whether the prlimit(2) call will read, write, or both read and write the resource limits of the target process. The existing security_task_setrlimit() hook is left alone; it continues to serve a purpose in supporting the ability to make decisions based on the old and/or new resource limit values when setting limits. This is consistent with the DAC/capability logic, where check_prlimit_permission() performs generic DAC/capability checks for acting on another task, while do_prlimit() performs a capability check based on a comparison of the old and new resource limits. Fix the inline documentation for the hook to match the code. Implement the new hook for SELinux. For setting resource limits, we reuse the existing setrlimit permission. Note that this does overload the setrlimit permission to mean the ability to set the resource limit (soft or hard) of another process or the ability to change one's own hard limit. For getting resource limits, a new getrlimit permission is defined. This was not originally defined since getrlimit(2) could only be used to obtain a process' own limits. Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> |
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Ingo Molnar | 32ef5517c2 |
sched/headers: Prepare to move cputime functionality from <linux/sched.h> into <linux/sched/cputime.h>
Introduce a trivial, mostly empty <linux/sched/cputime.h> header to prepare for the moving of cputime functionality out of sched.h. Update all code that relies on these facilities. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ingo Molnar | 299300258d |
sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/task.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/task.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/task.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ingo Molnar | 03441a3482 |
sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/stat.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/stat.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/stat.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ingo Molnar | f7ccbae45c |
sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/coredump.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/coredump.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/coredump.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ingo Molnar | 6e84f31522 |
sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/mm.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/mm.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/mm.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. The APIs that are going to be moved first are: mm_alloc() __mmdrop() mmdrop() mmdrop_async_fn() mmdrop_async() mmget_not_zero() mmput() mmput_async() get_task_mm() mm_access() mm_release() Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ingo Molnar | 4eb5aaa3af |
sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/autogroup.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/autogroup.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from other headers and a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/autogroup.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Ingo Molnar | 4f17722c72 |
sched/headers: Prepare for new header dependencies before moving code to <linux/sched/loadavg.h>
We are going to split <linux/sched/loadavg.h> out of <linux/sched.h>, which will have to be picked up from a couple of .c files. Create a trivial placeholder <linux/sched/topology.h> file that just maps to <linux/sched.h> to make this patch obviously correct and bisectable. Include the new header in the files that are going to need it. Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Linus Torvalds | f1ef09fde1 |
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull namespace updates from Eric Biederman: "There is a lot here. A lot of these changes result in subtle user visible differences in kernel behavior. I don't expect anything will care but I will revert/fix things immediately if any regressions show up. From Seth Forshee there is a continuation of the work to make the vfs ready for unpriviled mounts. We had thought the previous changes prevented the creation of files outside of s_user_ns of a filesystem, but it turns we missed the O_CREAT path. Ooops. Pavel Tikhomirov and Oleg Nesterov worked together to fix a long standing bug in the implemenation of PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER where only children that are forked after the prctl are considered and not children forked before the prctl. The only known user of this prctl systemd forks all children after the prctl. So no userspace regressions will occur. Holding earlier forked children to the same rules as later forked children creates a semantic that is sane enough to allow checkpoing of processes that use this feature. There is a long delayed change by Nikolay Borisov to limit inotify instances inside a user namespace. Michael Kerrisk extends the API for files used to maniuplate namespaces with two new trivial ioctls to allow discovery of the hierachy and properties of namespaces. Konstantin Khlebnikov with the help of Al Viro adds code that when a network namespace exits purges it's sysctl entries from the dcache. As in some circumstances this could use a lot of memory. Vivek Goyal fixed a bug with stacked filesystems where the permissions on the wrong inode were being checked. I continue previous work on ptracing across exec. Allowing a file to be setuid across exec while being ptraced if the tracer has enough credentials in the user namespace, and if the process has CAP_SETUID in it's own namespace. Proc files for setuid or otherwise undumpable executables are now owned by the root in the user namespace of their mm. Allowing debugging of setuid applications in containers to work better. A bug I introduced with permission checking and automount is now fixed. The big change is to mark the mounts that the kernel initiates as a result of an automount. This allows the permission checks in sget to be safely suppressed for this kind of mount. As the permission check happened when the original filesystem was mounted. Finally a special case in the mount namespace is removed preventing unbounded chains in the mount hash table, and making the semantics simpler which benefits CRIU. The vfs fix along with related work in ima and evm I believe makes us ready to finish developing and merge fully unprivileged mounts of the fuse filesystem. The cleanups of the mount namespace makes discussing how to fix the worst case complexity of umount. The stacked filesystem fixes pave the way for adding multiple mappings for the filesystem uids so that efficient and safer containers can be implemented" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: proc/sysctl: Don't grab i_lock under sysctl_lock. vfs: Use upper filesystem inode in bprm_fill_uid() proc/sysctl: prune stale dentries during unregistering mnt: Tuck mounts under others instead of creating shadow/side mounts. prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant introduce the walk_process_tree() helper nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return owner UID of a userns fs: Better permission checking for submounts exit: fix the setns() && PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER interaction vfs: open() with O_CREAT should not create inodes with unknown ids nsfs: Add an ioctl() to return the namespace type proc: Better ownership of files for non-dumpable tasks in user namespaces exec: Remove LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP exec: Test the ptracer's saved cred to see if the tracee can gain caps exec: Don't reset euid and egid when the tracee has CAP_SETUID inotify: Convert to using per-namespace limits |
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Pavel Tikhomirov | 749860ce24 |
prctl: propagate has_child_subreaper flag to every descendant
If process forks some children when it has is_child_subreaper
flag enabled they will inherit has_child_subreaper flag - first
group, when is_child_subreaper is disabled forked children will
not inherit it - second group. So child-subreaper does not reparent
all his descendants when their parents die. Having these two
differently behaving groups can lead to confusion. Also it is
a problem for CRIU, as when we restore process tree we need to
somehow determine which descendants belong to which group and
much harder - to put them exactly to these group.
To simplify these we can add a propagation of has_child_subreaper
flag on PR_SET_CHILD_SUBREAPER, walking all descendants of child-
subreaper to setup has_child_subreaper flag.
In common cases when process like systemd first sets itself to
be a child-subreaper and only after that forks its services, we will
have zero-length list of descendants to walk. Testing with binary
subtree of 2^15 processes prctl took < 0.007 sec and has shown close
to linear dependency(~0.2 * n * usec) on lower numbers of processes.
Moreover, I doubt someone intentionaly pre-forks the children whitch
should reparent to init before becoming subreaper, because some our
ancestor migh have had is_child_subreaper flag while forking our
sub-tree and our childs will all inherit has_child_subreaper flag,
and we have no way to influence it. And only way to check if we have
no has_child_subreaper flag is to create some childs, kill them and
see where they will reparent to.
Using walk_process_tree helper to walk subtree, thanks to Oleg! Timing
seems to be the same.
Optimize:
a) When descendant already has has_child_subreaper flag all his subtree
has it too already.
* for a) to be true need to move has_child_subreaper inheritance under
the same tasklist_lock with adding task to its ->real_parent->children
as without it process can inherit zero has_child_subreaper, then we
set 1 to it's parent flag, check that parent has no more children, and
only after child with wrong flag is added to the tree.
* Also make these inheritance more clear by using real_parent instead of
current, as on clone(CLONE_PARENT) if current has is_child_subreaper
and real_parent has no is_child_subreaper or has_child_subreaper, child
will have has_child_subreaper flag set without actually having a
subreaper in it's ancestors.
b) When some descendant is child_reaper, it's subtree is in different
pidns from us(original child-subreaper) and processes from other pidns
will never reparent to us.
So we can skip their(a,b) subtree from walk.
v2: switch to walk_process_tree() general helper, move
has_child_subreaper inheritance
v3: remove csr_descendant leftover, change current to real_parent
in has_child_subreaper inheritance
v4: small commit message fix
Fixes:
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Frederic Weisbecker | 5613fda9a5 |
sched/cputime: Convert task/group cputime to nsecs
Now that most cputime readers use the transition API which return the task cputime in old style cputime_t, we can safely store the cputime in nsecs. This will eventually make cputime statistics less opaque and more granular. Back and forth convertions between cputime_t and nsecs in order to deal with cputime_t random granularity won't be needed anymore. Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com> Cc: Stanislaw Gruszka <sgruszka@redhat.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485832191-26889-8-git-send-email-fweisbec@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Linus Torvalds | 7c0f6ba682 |
Replace <asm/uaccess.h> with <linux/uaccess.h> globally
This was entirely automated, using the script by Al: PATT='^[[:blank:]]*#[[:blank:]]*include[[:blank:]]*<asm/uaccess.h>' sed -i -e "s!$PATT!#include <linux/uaccess.h>!" \ $(git grep -l "$PATT"|grep -v ^include/linux/uaccess.h) to do the replacement at the end of the merge window. Requested-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds | e34bac726d |
Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge updates from Andrew Morton: - various misc bits - most of MM (quite a lot of MM material is awaiting the merge of linux-next dependencies) - kasan - printk updates - procfs updates - MAINTAINERS - /lib updates - checkpatch updates * emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (123 commits) init: reduce rootwait polling interval time to 5ms binfmt_elf: use vmalloc() for allocation of vma_filesz checkpatch: don't emit unified-diff error for rename-only patches checkpatch: don't check c99 types like uint8_t under tools checkpatch: avoid multiple line dereferences checkpatch: don't check .pl files, improve absolute path commit log test scripts/checkpatch.pl: fix spelling checkpatch: don't try to get maintained status when --no-tree is given lib/ida: document locking requirements a bit better lib/rbtree.c: fix typo in comment of ____rb_erase_color lib/Kconfig.debug: make CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM depend on CONFIG_DEVMEM MAINTAINERS: add drm and drm/i915 irc channels MAINTAINERS: add "C:" for URI for chat where developers hang out MAINTAINERS: add drm and drm/i915 bug filing info MAINTAINERS: add "B:" for URI where to file bugs get_maintainer: look for arbitrary letter prefixes in sections printk: add Kconfig option to set default console loglevel printk/sound: handle more message headers printk/btrfs: handle more message headers printk/kdb: handle more message headers ... |
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Stanislav Kinsburskiy | 3fb4afd9a5 |
prctl: remove one-shot limitation for changing exe link
This limitation came with the reason to remove "another way for malicious code to obscure a compromised program and masquerade as a benign process" by allowing "security-concious program can use this prctl once during its early initialization to ensure the prctl cannot later be abused for this purpose": http://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=133160684517468&w=2 This explanation doesn't look sufficient. The only thing "exe" link is indicating is the file, used to execve, which is basically nothing and not reliable immediately after process has returned from execve system call. Moreover, to use this feture, all the mappings to previous exe file have to be unmapped and all the new exe file permissions must be satisfied. Which means, that changing exe link is very similar to calling execve on the binary. The need to remove this limitations comes from migration of NFS mount point, which is not accessible during restore and replaced by other file system. Because of this exe link has to be changed twice. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix up comment] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160927153755.9337.69650.stgit@localhost.localdomain Signed-off-by: Stanislav Kinsburskiy <skinsbursky@virtuozzo.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Matt Helsley <matthltc@us.ibm.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@virtuozzo.com> Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Nicolas Pitre | baa73d9e47 |
posix-timers: Make them configurable
Some embedded systems have no use for them. This removes about 25KB from the kernel binary size when configured out. Corresponding syscalls are routed to a stub logging the attempt to use those syscalls which should be enough of a clue if they were disabled without proper consideration. They are: timer_create, timer_gettime: timer_getoverrun, timer_settime, timer_delete, clock_adjtime, setitimer, getitimer, alarm. The clock_settime, clock_gettime, clock_getres and clock_nanosleep syscalls are replaced by simple wrappers compatible with CLOCK_REALTIME, CLOCK_MONOTONIC and CLOCK_BOOTTIME only which should cover the vast majority of use cases with very little code. Signed-off-by: Nicolas Pitre <nico@linaro.org> Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Acked-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Cc: Paul Bolle <pebolle@tiscali.nl> Cc: linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org Cc: Michal Marek <mmarek@suse.com> Cc: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1478841010-28605-7-git-send-email-nicolas.pitre@linaro.org Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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Michal Hocko | 17b0573d77 |
prctl: make PR_SET_THP_DISABLE wait for mmap_sem killable
PR_SET_THP_DISABLE requires mmap_sem for write. If the waiting task gets killed by the oom killer it would block oom_reaper from asynchronous address space reclaim and reduce the chances of timely OOM resolving. Wait for the lock in the killable mode and return with EINTR if the task got killed while waiting. Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz> Acked-by: Alex Thorlton <athorlton@sgi.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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John Stultz | da8b44d5a9 |
timer: convert timer_slack_ns from unsigned long to u64
This patchset introduces a /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns interface which would allow controlling processes to be able to set the timerslack value on other processes in order to save power by avoiding wakeups (Something Android currently does via out-of-tree patches). The first patch tries to fix the internal timer_slack_ns usage which was defined as a long, which limits the slack range to ~4 seconds on 32bit systems. It converts it to a u64, which provides the same basically unlimited slack (500 years) on both 32bit and 64bit machines. The second patch introduces the /proc/<pid>/timerslack_ns interface which allows the full 64bit slack range for a task to be read or set on both 32bit and 64bit machines. With these two patches, on a 32bit machine, after setting the slack on bash to 10 seconds: $ time sleep 1 real 0m10.747s user 0m0.001s sys 0m0.005s The first patch is a little ugly, since I had to chase the slack delta arguments through a number of functions converting them to u64s. Let me know if it makes sense to break that up more or not. Other than that things are fairly straightforward. This patch (of 2): The timer_slack_ns value in the task struct is currently a unsigned long. This means that on 32bit applications, the maximum slack is just over 4 seconds. However, on 64bit machines, its much much larger (~500 years). This disparity could make application development a little (as well as the default_slack) to a u64. This means both 32bit and 64bit systems have the same effective internal slack range. Now the existing ABI via PR_GET_TIMERSLACK and PR_SET_TIMERSLACK specify the interface as a unsigned long, so we preserve that limitation on 32bit systems, where SET_TIMERSLACK can only set the slack to a unsigned long value, and GET_TIMERSLACK will return ULONG_MAX if the slack is actually larger then what can be stored by an unsigned long. This patch also modifies hrtimer functions which specified the slack delta as a unsigned long. Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Oren Laadan <orenl@cellrox.com> Cc: Ruchi Kandoi <kandoiruchi@google.com> Cc: Rom Lemarchand <romlem@android.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Android Kernel Team <kernel-team@android.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Mateusz Guzik | ddf1d398e5 |
prctl: take mmap sem for writing to protect against others
An unprivileged user can trigger an oops on a kernel with CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE. proc_pid_cmdline_read takes mmap_sem for reading and obtains args + env start/end values. These get sanity checked as follows: BUG_ON(arg_start > arg_end); BUG_ON(env_start > env_end); These can be changed by prctl_set_mm. Turns out also takes the semaphore for reading, effectively rendering it useless. This results in: kernel BUG at fs/proc/base.c:240! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP Modules linked in: virtio_net CPU: 0 PID: 925 Comm: a.out Not tainted 4.4.0-rc8-next-20160105dupa+ #71 Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011 task: ffff880077a68000 ti: ffff8800784d0000 task.ti: ffff8800784d0000 RIP: proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x520/0x530 RSP: 0018:ffff8800784d3db8 EFLAGS: 00010206 RAX: ffff880077c5b6b0 RBX: ffff8800784d3f18 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 00007f78e8857000 RDI: 0000000000000246 RBP: ffff8800784d3e40 R08: 0000000000000008 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000050 R13: 00007f78e8857800 R14: ffff88006fcef000 R15: ffff880077c5b600 FS: 00007f78e884a740(0000) GS:ffff88007b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b CR2: 00007f78e8361770 CR3: 00000000790a5000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 Call Trace: __vfs_read+0x37/0x100 vfs_read+0x82/0x130 SyS_read+0x58/0xd0 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x76 Code: 4c 8b 7d a8 eb e9 48 8b 9d 78 ff ff ff 4c 8b 7d 90 48 8b 03 48 39 45 a8 0f 87 f0 fe ff ff e9 d1 fe ff ff 4c 8b 7d 90 eb c6 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 0b 66 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 RIP proc_pid_cmdline_read+0x520/0x530 ---[ end trace 97882617ae9c6818 ]--- Turns out there are instances where the code just reads aformentioned values without locking whatsoever - namely environ_read and get_cmdline. Interestingly these functions look quite resilient against bogus values, but I don't believe this should be relied upon. The first patch gets rid of the oops bug by grabbing mmap_sem for writing. The second patch is optional and puts locking around aformentioned consumers for safety. Consumers of other fields don't seem to benefit from similar treatment and are left untouched. This patch (of 2): The code was taking the semaphore for reading, which does not protect against readers nor concurrent modifications. The problem could cause a sanity checks to fail in procfs's cmdline reader, resulting in an OOPS. Note that some functions perform an unlocked read of various mm fields, but they seem to be fine despite possible modificaton. Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.linux@gmail.com> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Ben Segall | 8639b46139 |
pidns: fix set/getpriority and ioprio_set/get in PRIO_USER mode
setpriority(PRIO_USER, 0, x) will change the priority of tasks outside of the current pid namespace. This is in contrast to both the other modes of setpriority and the example of kill(-1). Fix this. getpriority and ioprio have the same failure mode, fix them too. Eric said: : After some more thinking about it this patch sounds justifiable. : : My goal with namespaces is not to build perfect isolation mechanisms : as that can get into ill defined territory, but to build well defined : mechanisms. And to handle the corner cases so you can use only : a single namespace with well defined results. : : In this case you have found the two interfaces I am aware of that : identify processes by uid instead of by pid. Which quite frankly is : weird. Unfortunately the weird unexpected cases are hard to handle : in the usual way. : : I was hoping for a little more information. Changes like this one we : have to be careful of because someone might be depending on the current : behavior. I don't think they are and I do think this make sense as part : of the pid namespace. Signed-off-by: Ben Segall <bsegall@google.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Ambrose Feinstein <ambrose@google.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Eric W. Biederman | 90f8572b0f |
vfs: Commit to never having exectuables on proc and sysfs.
Today proc and sysfs do not contain any executable files. Several applications today mount proc or sysfs without noexec and nosuid and then depend on there being no exectuables files on proc or sysfs. Having any executable files show on proc or sysfs would cause a user space visible regression, and most likely security problems. Therefore commit to never allowing executables on proc and sysfs by adding a new flag to mark them as filesystems without executables and enforce that flag. Test the flag where MNT_NOEXEC is tested today, so that the only user visible effect will be that exectuables will be treated as if the execute bit is cleared. The filesystems proc and sysfs do not currently incoporate any executable files so this does not result in any user visible effects. This makes it unnecessary to vet changes to proc and sysfs tightly for adding exectuable files or changes to chattr that would modify existing files, as no matter what the individual file say they will not be treated as exectuable files by the vfs. Not having to vet changes to closely is important as without this we are only one proc_create call (or another goof up in the implementation of notify_change) from having problematic executables on proc. Those mistakes are all too easy to make and would create a situation where there are security issues or the assumptions of some program having to be broken (and cause userspace regressions). Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> |
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Alexey Dobriyan | 4a00e9df29 |
prctl: more prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) checks
Individual prctl(PR_SET_MM_*) calls do some checking to maintain a consistent view of mm->arg_start et al fields, but not enough. In particular PR_SET_MM_ARG_START/PR_SET_MM_ARG_END/ R_SET_MM_ENV_START/ PR_SET_MM_ENV_END only check that the address lies in an existing VMA, but don't check that the start address is lower than the end address _at all_. Consolidate all consistency checks, so there will be no difference in the future between PR_SET_MM_MAP and individual PR_SET_MM_* calls. The program below makes both ARGV and ENVP areas be reversed. It makes /proc/$PID/cmdline show garbage (it doesn't oops by luck). #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <unistd.h> enum {PAGE_SIZE=4096}; int main(void) { void *p; p = mmap(NULL, PAGE_SIZE, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); #define PR_SET_MM 35 #define PR_SET_MM_ARG_START 8 #define PR_SET_MM_ARG_END 9 #define PR_SET_MM_ENV_START 10 #define PR_SET_MM_ENV_END 11 prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0); prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ARG_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0); prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_START, (unsigned long)p + PAGE_SIZE - 1, 0, 0); prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_ENV_END, (unsigned long)p, 0, 0); pause(); return 0; } [akpm@linux-foundation.org: tidy code, tweak comment] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Acked-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com> Cc: Jan Stancek <jstancek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Dave Hansen | 46a6e0cf1c |
x86/mpx: Clean up the code by not passing a task pointer around when unnecessary
The MPX code can only work on the current task. You can not, for instance, enable MPX management in another process or thread. You can also not handle a fault for another process or thread. Despite this, we pass a task_struct around prolifically. This patch removes all of the task struct passing for code paths where the code can not deal with another task (which turns out to be all of them). This has no functional changes. It's just a cleanup. Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: bp@alien8.de Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150607183702.6A81DA2C@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> |
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Davidlohr Bueso | 6e399cd144 |
prctl: avoid using mmap_sem for exe_file serialization
Oleg cleverly suggested using xchg() to set the new mm->exe_file instead of calling set_mm_exe_file() which requires some form of serialization -- mmap_sem in this case. For archs that do not have atomic rmw instructions we still fallback to a spinlock alternative, so this should always be safe. As such, we only need the mmap_sem for looking up the backing vm_file, which can be done sharing the lock. Naturally, this means we need to manually deal with both the new and old file reference counting, and we need not worry about the MMF_EXE_FILE_CHANGED bits, which can probably be deleted in the future anyway. Signed-off-by: Davidlohr Bueso <dbueso@suse.de> Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <khlebnikov@yandex-team.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Iulia Manda | 2813893f8b |
kernel: conditionally support non-root users, groups and capabilities
There are a lot of embedded systems that run most or all of their functionality in init, running as root:root. For these systems, supporting multiple users is not necessary. This patch adds a new symbol, CONFIG_MULTIUSER, that makes support for non-root users, non-root groups, and capabilities optional. It is enabled under CONFIG_EXPERT menu. When this symbol is not defined, UID and GID are zero in any possible case and processes always have all capabilities. The following syscalls are compiled out: setuid, setregid, setgid, setreuid, setresuid, getresuid, setresgid, getresgid, setgroups, getgroups, setfsuid, setfsgid, capget, capset. Also, groups.c is compiled out completely. In kernel/capability.c, capable function was moved in order to avoid adding two ifdef blocks. This change saves about 25 KB on a defconfig build. The most minimal kernels have total text sizes in the high hundreds of kB rather than low MB. (The 25k goes down a bit with allnoconfig, but not that much. The kernel was booted in Qemu. All the common functionalities work. Adding users/groups is not possible, failing with -ENOSYS. Bloat-o-meter output: add/remove: 7/87 grow/shrink: 19/397 up/down: 1675/-26325 (-24650) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Iulia Manda <iulia.manda21@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org> Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Tested-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Jon DeVree | 39afb5ee46 |
kernel/sys.c: fix UNAME26 for 4.0
There's a uname workaround for broken userspace which can't handle kernel versions of 3.x. Update it for 4.x. Signed-off-by: Jon DeVree <nuxi@vault24.org> Cc: Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Linus Torvalds | a135c717d5 |
Merge branch 'upstream' of git://git.linux-mips.org/pub/scm/ralf/upstream-linus
Pull MIPS updates from Ralf Baechle: "This is the main pull request for MIPS: - a number of fixes that didn't make the 3.19 release. - a number of cleanups. - preliminary support for Cavium's Octeon 3 SOCs which feature up to 48 MIPS64 R3 cores with FPU and hardware virtualization. - support for MIPS R6 processors. Revision 6 of the MIPS architecture is a major revision of the MIPS architecture which does away with many of original sins of the architecture such as branch delay slots. This and other changes in R6 require major changes throughout the entire MIPS core architecture code and make up for the lion share of this pull request. - finally some preparatory work for eXtendend Physical Address support, which allows support of up to 40 bit of physical address space on 32 bit processors" [ Ahh, MIPS can't leave the PAE brain damage alone. It's like every CPU architect has to make that mistake, but pee in the snow by changing the TLA. But whether it's called PAE, LPAE or XPA, it's horrid crud - Linus ] * 'upstream' of git://git.linux-mips.org/pub/scm/ralf/upstream-linus: (114 commits) MIPS: sead3: Corrected get_c0_perfcount_int MIPS: mm: Remove dead macro definitions MIPS: OCTEON: irq: add CIB and other fixes MIPS: OCTEON: Don't do acknowledge operations for level triggered irqs. MIPS: OCTEON: More OCTEONIII support MIPS: OCTEON: Remove setting of processor specific CVMCTL icache bits. MIPS: OCTEON: Core-15169 Workaround and general CVMSEG cleanup. MIPS: OCTEON: Update octeon-model.h code for new SoCs. MIPS: OCTEON: Implement DCache errata workaround for all CN6XXX MIPS: OCTEON: Add little-endian support to asm/octeon/octeon.h MIPS: OCTEON: Implement the core-16057 workaround MIPS: OCTEON: Delete unused COP2 saving code MIPS: OCTEON: Use correct instruction to read 64-bit COP0 register MIPS: OCTEON: Save and restore CP2 SHA3 state MIPS: OCTEON: Fix FP context save. MIPS: OCTEON: Save/Restore wider multiply registers in OCTEON III CPUs MIPS: boot: Provide more uImage options MIPS: Remove unneeded #ifdef __KERNEL__ from asm/processor.h MIPS: ip22-gio: Remove legacy suspend/resume support mips: pci: Add ifdef around pci_proc_domain ... |
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Paul Burton | 9791554b45 |
MIPS,prctl: add PR_[GS]ET_FP_MODE prctl options for MIPS
Userland code may be built using an ABI which permits linking to objects that have more restrictive floating point requirements. For example, userland code may be built to target the O32 FPXX ABI. Such code may be linked with other FPXX code, or code built for either one of the more restrictive FP32 or FP64. When linking with more restrictive code, the overall requirement of the process becomes that of the more restrictive code. The kernel has no way to know in advance which mode the process will need to be executed in, and indeed it may need to change during execution. The dynamic loader is the only code which will know the overall required mode, and so it needs to have a means to instruct the kernel to switch the FP mode of the process. This patch introduces 2 new options to the prctl syscall which provide such a capability. The FP mode of the process is represented as a simple bitmask combining a number of mode bits mirroring those present in the hardware. Userland can either retrieve the current FP mode of the process: mode = prctl(PR_GET_FP_MODE); or modify the current FP mode of the process: err = prctl(PR_SET_FP_MODE, new_mode); Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@imgtec.com> Cc: Matthew Fortune <matthew.fortune@imgtec.com> Cc: Markos Chandras <markos.chandras@imgtec.com> Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Patchwork: https://patchwork.linux-mips.org/patch/8899/ Signed-off-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> |
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Dave Hansen | e9d1b4f3c6 |
x86, mpx: Strictly enforce empty prctl() args
Description from Michael Kerrisk. He suggested an identical patch
to one I had already coded up and tested.
commit
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Dave Hansen | fe3d197f84 |
x86, mpx: On-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables
This is really the meat of the MPX patch set. If there is one patch to review in the entire series, this is the one. There is a new ABI here and this kernel code also interacts with userspace memory in a relatively unusual manner. (small FAQ below). Long Description: This patch adds two prctl() commands to provide enable or disable the management of bounds tables in kernel, including on-demand kernel allocation (See the patch "on-demand kernel allocation of bounds tables") and cleanup (See the patch "cleanup unused bound tables"). Applications do not strictly need the kernel to manage bounds tables and we expect some applications to use MPX without taking advantage of this kernel support. This means the kernel can not simply infer whether an application needs bounds table management from the MPX registers. The prctl() is an explicit signal from userspace. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT is meant to be a signal from userspace to require kernel's help in managing bounds tables. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT is the opposite, meaning that userspace don't want kernel's help any more. With PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT, the kernel won't allocate and free bounds tables even if the CPU supports MPX. PR_MPX_ENABLE_MANAGEMENT will fetch the base address of the bounds directory out of a userspace register (bndcfgu) and then cache it into a new field (->bd_addr) in the 'mm_struct'. PR_MPX_DISABLE_MANAGEMENT will set "bd_addr" to an invalid address. Using this scheme, we can use "bd_addr" to determine whether the management of bounds tables in kernel is enabled. Also, the only way to access that bndcfgu register is via an xsaves, which can be expensive. Caching "bd_addr" like this also helps reduce the cost of those xsaves when doing table cleanup at munmap() time. Unfortunately, we can not apply this optimization to #BR fault time because we need an xsave to get the value of BNDSTATUS. ==== Why does the hardware even have these Bounds Tables? ==== MPX only has 4 hardware registers for storing bounds information. If MPX-enabled code needs more than these 4 registers, it needs to spill them somewhere. It has two special instructions for this which allow the bounds to be moved between the bounds registers and some new "bounds tables". They are similar conceptually to a page fault and will be raised by the MPX hardware during both bounds violations or when the tables are not present. This patch handles those #BR exceptions for not-present tables by carving the space out of the normal processes address space (essentially calling the new mmap() interface indroduced earlier in this patch set.) and then pointing the bounds-directory over to it. The tables *need* to be accessed and controlled by userspace because the instructions for moving bounds in and out of them are extremely frequent. They potentially happen every time a register pointing to memory is dereferenced. Any direct kernel involvement (like a syscall) to access the tables would obviously destroy performance. ==== Why not do this in userspace? ==== This patch is obviously doing this allocation in the kernel. However, MPX does not strictly *require* anything in the kernel. It can theoretically be done completely from userspace. Here are a few ways this *could* be done. I don't think any of them are practical in the real-world, but here they are. Q: Can virtual space simply be reserved for the bounds tables so that we never have to allocate them? A: As noted earlier, these tables are *HUGE*. An X-GB virtual area needs 4*X GB of virtual space, plus 2GB for the bounds directory. If we were to preallocate them for the 128TB of user virtual address space, we would need to reserve 512TB+2GB, which is larger than the entire virtual address space today. This means they can not be reserved ahead of time. Also, a single process's pre-popualated bounds directory consumes 2GB of virtual *AND* physical memory. IOW, it's completely infeasible to prepopulate bounds directories. Q: Can we preallocate bounds table space at the same time memory is allocated which might contain pointers that might eventually need bounds tables? A: This would work if we could hook the site of each and every memory allocation syscall. This can be done for small, constrained applications. But, it isn't practical at a larger scale since a given app has no way of controlling how all the parts of the app might allocate memory (think libraries). The kernel is really the only place to intercept these calls. Q: Could a bounds fault be handed to userspace and the tables allocated there in a signal handler instead of in the kernel? A: (thanks to tglx) mmap() is not on the list of safe async handler functions and even if mmap() would work it still requires locking or nasty tricks to keep track of the allocation state there. Having ruled out all of the userspace-only approaches for managing bounds tables that we could think of, we create them on demand in the kernel. Based-on-patch-by: Qiaowei Ren <qiaowei.ren@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-mips@linux-mips.org Cc: Dave Hansen <dave@sr71.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141114151829.AD4310DE@viggo.jf.intel.com Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> |
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Linus Torvalds | faafcba3b5 |
Merge branch 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull scheduler updates from Ingo Molnar: "The main changes in this cycle were: - Optimized support for Intel "Cluster-on-Die" (CoD) topologies (Dave Hansen) - Various sched/idle refinements for better idle handling (Nicolas Pitre, Daniel Lezcano, Chuansheng Liu, Vincent Guittot) - sched/numa updates and optimizations (Rik van Riel) - sysbench speedup (Vincent Guittot) - capacity calculation cleanups/refactoring (Vincent Guittot) - Various cleanups to thread group iteration (Oleg Nesterov) - Double-rq-lock removal optimization and various refactorings (Kirill Tkhai) - various sched/deadline fixes ... and lots of other changes" * 'sched-core-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (72 commits) sched/dl: Use dl_bw_of() under rcu_read_lock_sched() sched/fair: Delete resched_cpu() from idle_balance() sched, time: Fix build error with 64 bit cputime_t on 32 bit systems sched: Improve sysbench performance by fixing spurious active migration sched/x86: Fix up typo in topology detection x86, sched: Add new topology for multi-NUMA-node CPUs sched/rt: Use resched_curr() in task_tick_rt() sched: Use rq->rd in sched_setaffinity() under RCU read lock sched: cleanup: Rename 'out_unlock' to 'out_free_new_mask' sched: Use dl_bw_of() under RCU read lock sched/fair: Remove duplicate code from can_migrate_task() sched, mips, ia64: Remove __ARCH_WANT_UNLOCKED_CTXSW sched: print_rq(): Don't use tasklist_lock sched: normalize_rt_tasks(): Don't use _irqsave for tasklist_lock, use task_rq_lock() sched: Fix the task-group check in tg_has_rt_tasks() sched/fair: Leverage the idle state info when choosing the "idlest" cpu sched: Let the scheduler see CPU idle states sched/deadline: Fix inter- exclusive cpusets migrations sched/deadline: Clear dl_entity params when setscheduling to different class sched/numa: Kill the wrong/dead TASK_DEAD check in task_numa_fault() ... |
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Scotty Bauer | 0baae41ea8 |
kernel/sys.c: compat sysinfo syscall: fix undefined behavior
Fix undefined behavior and compiler warning by replacing right shift 32 with upper_32_bits macro Signed-off-by: Scotty Bauer <sbauer@eng.utah.edu> Cc: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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vishnu.ps | ec94fc3d59 |
kernel/sys.c: whitespace fixes
Fix minor errors and warning messages in kernel/sys.c. These errors were reported by checkpatch while working with some modifications in sys.c file. Fixing this first will help me to improve my further patches. ERROR: trailing whitespace - 9 ERROR: do not use assignment in if condition - 4 ERROR: spaces required around that '?' (ctx:VxO) - 10 ERROR: switch and case should be at the same indent - 3 total 26 errors & 3 warnings fixed. Signed-off-by: vishnu.ps <vishnu.ps@samsung.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Sasha Levin | 96dad67ff2 |
mm: use VM_BUG_ON_MM where possible
Dump the contents of the relevant struct_mm when we hit the bug condition. Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Cyrill Gorcunov | f606b77f1a |
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- introduce PR_SET_MM_MAP operation
During development of c/r we've noticed that in case if we need to support user namespaces we face a problem with capabilities in prctl(PR_SET_MM, ...) call, in particular once new user namespace is created capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) no longer passes. A approach is to eliminate CAP_SYS_RESOURCE check but pass all new values in one bundle, which would allow the kernel to make more intensive test for sanity of values and same time allow us to support checkpoint/restore of user namespaces. Thus a new command PR_SET_MM_MAP introduced. It takes a pointer of prctl_mm_map structure which carries all the members to be updated. prctl(PR_SET_MM, PR_SET_MM_MAP, struct prctl_mm_map *, size) struct prctl_mm_map { __u64 start_code; __u64 end_code; __u64 start_data; __u64 end_data; __u64 start_brk; __u64 brk; __u64 start_stack; __u64 arg_start; __u64 arg_end; __u64 env_start; __u64 env_end; __u64 *auxv; __u32 auxv_size; __u32 exe_fd; }; All members except @exe_fd correspond ones of struct mm_struct. To figure out which available values these members may take here are meanings of the members. - start_code, end_code: represent bounds of executable code area - start_data, end_data: represent bounds of data area - start_brk, brk: used to calculate bounds for brk() syscall - start_stack: used when accounting space needed for command line arguments, environment and shmat() syscall - arg_start, arg_end, env_start, env_end: represent memory area supplied for command line arguments and environment variables - auxv, auxv_size: carries auxiliary vector, Elf format specifics - exe_fd: file descriptor number for executable link (/proc/self/exe) Thus we apply the following requirements to the values 1) Any member except @auxv, @auxv_size, @exe_fd is rather an address in user space thus it must be laying inside [mmap_min_addr, mmap_max_addr) interval. 2) While @[start|end]_code and @[start|end]_data may point to an nonexisting VMAs (say a program maps own new .text and .data segments during execution) the rest of members should belong to VMA which must exist. 3) Addresses must be ordered, ie @start_ member must not be greater or equal to appropriate @end_ member. 4) As in regular Elf loading procedure we require that @start_brk and @brk be greater than @end_data. 5) If RLIMIT_DATA rlimit is set to non-infinity new values should not exceed existing limit. Same applies to RLIMIT_STACK. 6) Auxiliary vector size must not exceed existing one (which is predefined as AT_VECTOR_SIZE and depends on architecture). 7) File descriptor passed in @exe_file should be pointing to executable file (because we use existing prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper it ensures that the file we are going to use as exe link has all required permission granted). Now about where these members are involved inside kernel code: - @start_code and @end_code are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output; - @start_data and @end_data are used in /proc/$pid/[stat|statm] output, also they are considered if there enough space for brk() syscall result if RLIMIT_DATA is set; - @start_brk shown in /proc/$pid/stat output and accounted in brk() syscall if RLIMIT_DATA is set; also this member is tested to find a symbolic name of mmap event for perf system (we choose if event is generated for "heap" area); one more aplication is selinux -- we test if a process has PROCESS__EXECHEAP permission if trying to make heap area being executable with mprotect() syscall; - @brk is a current value for brk() syscall which lays inside heap area, it's shown in /proc/$pid/stat. When syscall brk() succesfully provides new memory area to a user space upon brk() completion the mm::brk is updated to carry new value; Both @start_brk and @brk are actively used in /proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output to find a symbolic name "heap" for VMA being scanned; - @start_stack is printed out in /proc/$pid/stat and used to find a symbolic name "stack" for task and threads in /proc/$pid/maps and /proc/$pid/smaps output, and as the same as with @start_brk -- perf system uses it for event naming. Also kernel treat this member as a start address of where to map vDSO pages and to check if there is enough space for shmat() syscall; - @arg_start, @arg_end, @env_start and @env_end are printed out in /proc/$pid/stat. Another access to the data these members represent is to read /proc/$pid/environ or /proc/$pid/cmdline. Any attempt to read these areas kernel tests with access_process_vm helper so a user must have enough rights for this action; - @auxv and @auxv_size may be read from /proc/$pid/auxv. Strictly speaking kernel doesn't care much about which exactly data is sitting there because it is solely for userspace; - @exe_fd is referred from /proc/$pid/exe and when generating coredump. We uses prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked helper to update this member, so exe-file link modification remains one-shot action. Still note that updating exe-file link now doesn't require sys-resource capability anymore, after all there is no much profit in preventing setup own file link (there are a number of ways to execute own code -- ptrace, ld-preload, so that the only reliable way to find which exactly code is executed is to inspect running program memory). Still we require the caller to be at least user-namespace root user. I believe the old interface should be deprecated and ripped off in a couple of kernel releases if no one against. To test if new interface is implemented in the kernel one can pass PR_SET_MM_MAP_SIZE opcode and the kernel returns the size of currently supported struct prctl_mm_map. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix 80-col wordwrap in macro definitions] Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Acked-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Tested-by: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Cyrill Gorcunov | 71fe97e185 |
prctl: PR_SET_MM -- factor out mmap_sem when updating mm::exe_file
Instead of taking mm->mmap_sem inside prctl_set_mm_exe_file() move it out and rename the helper to prctl_set_mm_exe_file_locked(). This will allow to reuse this function in a next patch. Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |
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Cyrill Gorcunov | 8764b338b3 |
mm: use may_adjust_brk helper
Signed-off-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com> Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com> Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> |