mirror of https://gitee.com/openkylin/linux.git
16 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date |
|---|---|---|---|
Mickaël Salaün
|
d02d8986a7 |
bpf: Always test unprivileged programs
If selftests are run as root, then execute the unprivileged checks as well. This switch from 243 to 368 tests. The test numbers are suffixed with "/u" when executed as unprivileged or with "/p" when executed as privileged. The geteuid() check is replaced with a capability check. Handling capabilities requires the libcap dependency. Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
|
|
William Tu
|
63dfef75ed |
bpf: enable verifier to add 0 to packet ptr
The patch fixes the case when adding a zero value to the packet
pointer. The zero value could come from src_reg equals type
BPF_K or CONST_IMM. The patch fixes both, otherwise the verifer
reports the following error:
[...]
R0=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0
R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=4)
R2=pkt_end R3=fp-12
R4=imm4,min_value=4,max_value=4
R5=pkt(id=0,off=4,r=4)
269: (bf) r2 = r0 // r2 becomes imm0
270: (77) r2 >>= 3
271: (bf) r4 = r1 // r4 becomes pkt ptr
272: (0f) r4 += r2 // r4 += 0
addition of negative constant to packet pointer is not allowed
Signed-off-by: William Tu <u9012063@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mihai Budiu <mbudiu@vmware.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
|
|
Josef Bacik
|
29200c199c |
bpf: test for AND edge cases
These two tests are based on the work done for
|
|
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
3fadc80115 |
bpf: enable verifier to better track const alu ops
William reported couple of issues in relation to direct packet
access. Typical scheme is to check for data + [off] <= data_end,
where [off] can be either immediate or coming from a tracked
register that contains an immediate, depending on the branch, we
can then access the data. However, in case of calculating [off]
for either the mentioned test itself or for access after the test
in a more "complex" way, then the verifier will stop tracking the
CONST_IMM marked register and will mark it as UNKNOWN_VALUE one.
Adding that UNKNOWN_VALUE typed register to a pkt() marked
register, the verifier then bails out in check_packet_ptr_add()
as it finds the registers imm value below 48. In the first below
example, that is due to evaluate_reg_imm_alu() not handling right
shifts and thus marking the register as UNKNOWN_VALUE via helper
__mark_reg_unknown_value() that resets imm to 0.
In the second case the same happens at the time when r4 is set
to r4 &= r5, where it transitions to UNKNOWN_VALUE from
evaluate_reg_imm_alu(). Later on r4 we shift right by 3 inside
evaluate_reg_alu(), where the register's imm turns into 3. That
is, for registers with type UNKNOWN_VALUE, imm of 0 means that
we don't know what value the register has, and for imm > 0 it
means that the value has [imm] upper zero bits. F.e. when shifting
an UNKNOWN_VALUE register by 3 to the right, no matter what value
it had, we know that the 3 upper most bits must be zero now.
This is to make sure that ALU operations with unknown registers
don't overflow. Meaning, once we know that we have more than 48
upper zero bits, or, in other words cannot go beyond 0xffff offset
with ALU ops, such an addition will track the target register
as a new pkt() register with a new id, but 0 offset and 0 range,
so for that a new data/data_end test will be required. Is the source
register a CONST_IMM one that is to be added to the pkt() register,
or the source instruction is an add instruction with immediate
value, then it will get added if it stays within max 0xffff bounds.
>From there, pkt() type, can be accessed should reg->off + imm be
within the access range of pkt().
[...]
from 28 to 30: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1
R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=22) R2=pkt_end
R3=imm144,min_value=144,max_value=144
R4=imm0,min_value=0,max_value=0
R5=inv48,min_value=2054,max_value=2054 R10=fp
30: (bf) r5 = r3
31: (07) r5 += 23
32: (77) r5 >>= 3
33: (bf) r6 = r1
34: (0f) r6 += r5
cannot add integer value with 0 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet
[...]
from 52 to 80: R0=imm1,min_value=1,max_value=1
R1=pkt(id=0,off=0,r=34) R2=pkt_end R3=inv
R4=imm272 R5=inv56,min_value=17,max_value=17
R6=pkt(id=0,off=26,r=34) R10=fp
80: (07) r4 += 71
81: (18) r5 = 0xfffffff8
83: (5f) r4 &= r5
84: (77) r4 >>= 3
85: (0f) r1 += r4
cannot add integer value with 3 upper zero bits to ptr_to_packet
Thus to get above use-cases working, evaluate_reg_imm_alu() has
been extended for further ALU ops. This is fine, because we only
operate strictly within realm of CONST_IMM types, so here we don't
care about overflows as they will happen in the simulated but also
real execution and interaction with pkt() in check_packet_ptr_add()
will check actual imm value once added to pkt(), but it's irrelevant
before.
With regards to
|
|
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
62c7989b24 |
bpf: allow b/h/w/dw access for bpf's cb in ctx
When structs are used to store temporary state in cb[] buffer that is used with programs and among tail calls, then the generated code will not always access the buffer in bpf_w chunks. We can ease programming of it and let this act more natural by allowing for aligned b/h/w/dw sized access for cb[] ctx member. Various test cases are attached as well for the selftest suite. Potentially, this can also be reused for other program types to pass data around. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
|
|
Gianluca Borello
|
06c1c04972 |
bpf: allow helpers access to variable memory
Currently, helpers that read and write from/to the stack can do so using a pair of arguments of type ARG_PTR_TO_STACK and ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE. ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE accepts a constant register of type CONST_IMM, so that the verifier can safely check the memory access. However, requiring the argument to be a constant can be limiting in some circumstances. Since the current logic keeps track of the minimum and maximum value of a register throughout the simulated execution, ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE can be changed to also accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register in case its boundaries have been set and the range doesn't cause invalid memory accesses. One common situation when this is useful: int len; char buf[BUFSIZE]; /* BUFSIZE is 128 */ if (some_condition) len = 42; else len = 84; some_helper(..., buf, len & (BUFSIZE - 1)); The compiler can often decide to assign the constant values 42 or 48 into a variable on the stack, instead of keeping it in a register. When the variable is then read back from stack into the register in order to be passed to the helper, the verifier will not be able to recognize the register as constant (the verifier is not currently tracking all constant writes into memory), and the program won't be valid. However, by allowing the helper to accept an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, this program will work because the bitwise AND operation will set the range of possible values for the UNKNOWN_VALUE register to [0, BUFSIZE), so the verifier can guarantee the helper call will be safe (assuming the argument is of type ARG_CONST_STACK_SIZE_OR_ZERO, otherwise one more check against 0 would be needed). Custom ranges can be set not only with ALU operations, but also by explicitly comparing the UNKNOWN_VALUE register with constants. Another very common example happens when intercepting system call arguments and accessing user-provided data of variable size using bpf_probe_read(). One can load at runtime the user-provided length in an UNKNOWN_VALUE register, and then read that exact amount of data up to a compile-time determined limit in order to fit into the proper local storage allocated on the stack, without having to guess a suboptimal access size at compile time. Also, in case the helpers accepting the UNKNOWN_VALUE register operate in raw mode, disable the raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all memory, since there is no guarantee the helper will fill it completely, leaving possibilities for data leak (just relevant when the memory used by the helper is the stack, not when using a pointer to map element value or packet). In other words, ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK will be treated as ARG_PTR_TO_STACK. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
|
|
Gianluca Borello
|
f0318d01b6 |
bpf: allow adjusted map element values to spill
commit
|
|
|
Gianluca Borello
|
5722569bb9 |
bpf: allow helpers access to map element values
Enable helpers to directly access a map element value by passing a
register type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE (or PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_ADJ) to helper
arguments ARG_PTR_TO_STACK or ARG_PTR_TO_RAW_STACK.
This enables several use cases. For example, a typical tracing program
might want to capture pathnames passed to sys_open() with:
struct trace_data {
char pathname[PATHLEN];
};
SEC("kprobe/sys_open")
void bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
struct trace_data data;
bpf_probe_read(data.pathname, sizeof(data.pathname), ctx->di);
/* consume data.pathname, for example via
* bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output()
*/
}
Such a program could easily hit the stack limit in case PATHLEN needs to
be large or more local variables need to exist, both of which are quite
common scenarios. Allowing direct helper access to map element values,
one could do:
struct bpf_map_def SEC("maps") scratch_map = {
.type = BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY,
.key_size = sizeof(u32),
.value_size = sizeof(struct trace_data),
.max_entries = 1,
};
SEC("kprobe/sys_open")
int bpf_sys_open(struct pt_regs *ctx)
{
int id = 0;
struct trace_data *p = bpf_map_lookup_elem(&scratch_map, &id);
if (!p)
return;
bpf_probe_read(p->pathname, sizeof(p->pathname), ctx->di);
/* consume p->pathname, for example via
* bpf_trace_printk() or bpf_perf_event_output()
*/
}
And wouldn't risk exhausting the stack.
Code changes are loosely modeled after commit
|
|
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
0eb6984f70 |
bpf, test_verifier: fix a test case error result on unprivileged
Running ./test_verifier as unprivileged lets 1 out of 98 tests fail: [...] #71 unpriv: check that printk is disallowed FAIL Unexpected error message! 0: (7a) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0 1: (bf) r1 = r10 2: (07) r1 += -8 3: (b7) r2 = 8 4: (bf) r3 = r1 5: (85) call bpf_trace_printk#6 unknown func bpf_trace_printk#6 [...] The test case is correct, just that the error outcome changed with |
|
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
a08dd0da53 |
bpf: fix regression on verifier pruning wrt map lookups
Commit |
|
|
Thomas Graf
|
3f731d89e4 |
bpf: add additional verifier tests for BPF_PROG_TYPE_LWT_*
- direct packet read is allowed for LWT_* - direct packet write for LWT_IN/LWT_OUT is prohibited - direct packet write for LWT_XMIT is allowed - access to skb->tc_classid is prohibited for LWT_* Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
|
|
Gianluca Borello
|
3c839744b3 |
bpf: Preserve const register type on const OR alu ops
Occasionally, clang (e.g. version 3.8.1) translates a sum between two constant operands using a BPF_OR instead of a BPF_ADD. The verifier is currently not handling this scenario, and the destination register type becomes UNKNOWN_VALUE even if it's still storing a constant. As a result, the destination register cannot be used as argument to a helper function expecting a ARG_CONST_STACK_*, limiting some use cases. Modify the verifier to handle this case, and add a few tests to make sure all combinations are supported, and stack boundaries are still verified even with BPF_OR. Signed-off-by: Gianluca Borello <g.borello@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
|
|
Josef Bacik
|
e95489010b |
bpf: add test for the verifier equal logic bug
This is a test to verify that bpf: fix states equal logic for varlen access actually fixed the problem. The problem was if the register we added to our map register was UNKNOWN in both the false and true branches and the only thing that changed was the range then we'd incorrectly assume that the true branch was valid, which it really wasnt. This tests this case and properly fails without my fix in place and passes with it in place. Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
|
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
e00c7b216f |
bpf: fix multiple issues in selftest suite and samples
1) The test_lru_map and test_lru_dist fails building on my machine since
the sys/resource.h header is not included.
2) test_verifier fails in one test case where we try to call an invalid
function, since the verifier log output changed wrt printing function
names.
3) Current selftest suite code relies on sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_CONF) for
retrieving the number of possible CPUs. This is broken at least in our
scenario and really just doesn't work.
glibc tries a number of things for retrieving _SC_NPROCESSORS_CONF.
First it tries equivalent of /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpu[0-9]* | wc -l,
if that fails, depending on the config, it either tries to count CPUs
in /proc/cpuinfo, or returns the _SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN value instead.
If /proc/cpuinfo has some issue, it returns just 1 worst case. This
oddity is nothing new [1], but semantics/behaviour seems to be settled.
_SC_NPROCESSORS_ONLN will parse /sys/devices/system/cpu/online, if
that fails it looks into /proc/stat for cpuX entries, and if also that
fails for some reason, /proc/cpuinfo is consulted (and returning 1 if
unlikely all breaks down).
While that might match num_possible_cpus() from the kernel in some
cases, it's really not guaranteed with CPU hotplugging, and can result
in a buffer overflow since the array in user space could have too few
number of slots, and on perpcu map lookup, the kernel will write beyond
that memory of the value buffer.
William Tu reported such mismatches:
[...] The fact that sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_CONF) != num_possible_cpu()
happens when CPU hotadd is enabled. For example, in Fusion when
setting vcpu.hotadd = "TRUE" or in KVM, setting ./qemu-system-x86_64
-smp 2, maxcpus=4 ... the num_possible_cpu() will be 4 and sysconf()
will be 2 [2]. [...]
Documentation/cputopology.txt says /sys/devices/system/cpu/possible
outputs cpu_possible_mask. That is the same as in num_possible_cpus(),
so first step would be to fix the _SC_NPROCESSORS_CONF calls with our
own implementation. Later, we could add support to bpf(2) for passing
a mask via CPU_SET(3), for example, to just select a subset of CPUs.
BPF samples code needs this fix as well (at least so that people stop
copying this). Thus, define bpf_num_possible_cpus() once in selftests
and import it from there for the sample code to avoid duplicating it.
The remaining sysconf(_SC_NPROCESSORS_CONF) in samples are unrelated.
After all three issues are fixed, the test suite runs fine again:
# make run_tests | grep self
selftests: test_verifier [PASS]
selftests: test_maps [PASS]
selftests: test_lru_map [PASS]
selftests: test_kmod.sh [PASS]
[1] https://www.sourceware.org/ml/libc-alpha/2011-06/msg00079.html
[2] https://www.mail-archive.com/netdev@vger.kernel.org/msg121183.html
Fixes:
|
|
|
Thomas Graf
|
57a09bf0a4 |
bpf: Detect identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers
A BPF program is required to check the return register of a map_elem_lookup() call before accessing memory. The verifier keeps track of this by converting the type of the result register from PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE after a conditional jump ensures safety. This check is currently exclusively performed for the result register 0. In the event the compiler reorders instructions, BPF_MOV64_REG instructions may be moved before the conditional jump which causes them to keep their type PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL to which the verifier objects when the register is accessed: 0: (b7) r1 = 10 1: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1 2: (bf) r2 = r10 3: (07) r2 += -8 4: (18) r1 = 0x59c00000 6: (85) call 1 7: (bf) r4 = r0 8: (15) if r0 == 0x0 goto pc+1 R0=map_value(ks=8,vs=8) R4=map_value_or_null(ks=8,vs=8) R10=fp 9: (7a) *(u64 *)(r4 +0) = 0 R4 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null' This commit extends the verifier to keep track of all identical PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL registers after a map_elem_lookup() by assigning them an ID and then marking them all when the conditional jump is observed. Signed-off-by: Thomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch> Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com> Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |
|
|
Daniel Borkmann
|
5aa5bd14c5 |
bpf: add initial suite for selftests
Add a start of a test suite for kernel selftests. This moves test_verifier and test_maps over to tools/testing/selftests/bpf/ along with various code improvements and also adds a script for invoking test_bpf module. The test suite can simply be run via selftest framework, f.e.: # cd tools/testing/selftests/bpf/ # make # make run_tests Both test_verifier and test_maps were kind of misplaced in samples/bpf/ directory and we were looking into adding them to selftests for a while now, so it can be picked up by kbuild bot et al and hopefully also get more exposure and thus new test case additions. Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> |