Add support for the Adiantum encryption mode to fscrypt. Adiantum is a
tweakable, length-preserving encryption mode with security provably
reducible to that of XChaCha12 and AES-256, subject to a security bound.
It's also a true wide-block mode, unlike XTS. See the paper
"Adiantum: length-preserving encryption for entry-level processors"
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/720.pdf) for more details. Also see
commit 059c2a4d8e ("crypto: adiantum - add Adiantum support").
On sufficiently long messages, Adiantum's bottlenecks are XChaCha12 and
the NH hash function. These algorithms are fast even on processors
without dedicated crypto instructions. Adiantum makes it feasible to
enable storage encryption on low-end mobile devices that lack AES
instructions; currently such devices are unencrypted. On ARM Cortex-A7,
on 4096-byte messages Adiantum encryption is about 4 times faster than
AES-256-XTS encryption; decryption is about 5 times faster.
In fscrypt, Adiantum is suitable for encrypting both file contents and
names. With filenames, it fixes a known weakness: when two filenames in
a directory share a common prefix of >= 16 bytes, with CTS-CBC their
encrypted filenames share a common prefix too, leaking information.
Adiantum does not have this problem.
Since Adiantum also accepts long tweaks (IVs), it's also safe to use the
master key directly for Adiantum encryption rather than deriving
per-file keys, provided that the per-file nonce is included in the IVs
and the master key isn't used for any other encryption mode. This
configuration saves memory and improves performance. A new fscrypt
policy flag is added to allow users to opt-in to this configuration.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
These are unused, undesired, and have never actually been used by
anybody. The original authors of this code have changed their mind about
its inclusion. While originally proposed for disk encryption on low-end
devices, the idea was discarded [1] in favor of something else before
that could really get going. Therefore, this patch removes Speck.
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-crypto-vger&m=153359499015659
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
In this round, we've mainly focused on discard, aka unmap, control along with
fstrim for Android-specific usage model. In addition, we've fixed writepage flow
which returned EAGAIN previously resulting in EIO of fsync(2) due to mapping's
error state. In order to avoid old MM bug [1], we decided not to use __GFP_ZERO
for the mapping for node and meta page caches. As always, we've cleaned up many
places for future fsverity and symbol conflicts.
Enhancement:
- do discard/fstrim in lower priority considering fs utilization
- split large discard commands into smaller ones for better responsiveness
- add more sanity checks to address syzbot reports
- add a mount option, fsync_mode=nobarrier, which can reduce # of cache flushes
- clean up symbol namespace with modified function names
- be strict on block allocation and IO control in corner cases
Bug fix:
- don't use __GFP_ZERO for mappings
- fix error reports in writepage to avoid fsync() failure
- avoid selinux denial on CAP_RESOURCE on resgid/resuid
- fix some subtle race conditions in GC/atomic writes/shutdown
- fix overflow bugs in sanity_check_raw_super
- fix missing bits on get_flags
Clean-up:
- prepare the generic flow for future fsverity integration
- fix some broken coding standard
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/8/661
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Merge tag 'f2fs-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs
Pull f2fs updates from Jaegeuk Kim:
"In this round, we've mainly focused on discard, aka unmap, control
along with fstrim for Android-specific usage model. In addition, we've
fixed writepage flow which returned EAGAIN previously resulting in EIO
of fsync(2) due to mapping's error state. In order to avoid old MM bug
[1], we decided not to use __GFP_ZERO for the mapping for node and
meta page caches. As always, we've cleaned up many places for future
fsverity and symbol conflicts.
Enhancements:
- do discard/fstrim in lower priority considering fs utilization
- split large discard commands into smaller ones for better responsiveness
- add more sanity checks to address syzbot reports
- add a mount option, fsync_mode=nobarrier, which can reduce # of cache flushes
- clean up symbol namespace with modified function names
- be strict on block allocation and IO control in corner cases
Bug fixes:
- don't use __GFP_ZERO for mappings
- fix error reports in writepage to avoid fsync() failure
- avoid selinux denial on CAP_RESOURCE on resgid/resuid
- fix some subtle race conditions in GC/atomic writes/shutdown
- fix overflow bugs in sanity_check_raw_super
- fix missing bits on get_flags
Clean-ups:
- prepare the generic flow for future fsverity integration
- fix some broken coding standard"
[1] https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/4/8/661
* tag 'f2fs-for-4.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jaegeuk/f2fs: (79 commits)
f2fs: fix to clear FI_VOLATILE_FILE correctly
f2fs: let sync node IO interrupt async one
f2fs: don't change wbc->sync_mode
f2fs: fix to update mtime correctly
fs: f2fs: insert space around that ':' and ', '
fs: f2fs: add missing blank lines after declarations
fs: f2fs: changed variable type of offset "unsigned" to "loff_t"
f2fs: clean up symbol namespace
f2fs: make set_de_type() static
f2fs: make __f2fs_write_data_pages() static
f2fs: fix to avoid accessing cross the boundary
f2fs: fix to let caller retry allocating block address
disable loading f2fs module on PAGE_SIZE > 4KB
f2fs: fix error path of move_data_page
f2fs: don't drop dentry pages after fs shutdown
f2fs: fix to avoid race during access gc_thread pointer
f2fs: clean up with clear_radix_tree_dirty_tag
f2fs: fix to don't trigger writeback during recovery
f2fs: clear discard_wake earlier
f2fs: let discard thread wait a little longer if dev is busy
...
fscrypt currently only supports AES encryption. However, many low-end
mobile devices have older CPUs that don't have AES instructions, e.g.
the ARMv8 Cryptography Extensions. Currently, user data on such devices
is not encrypted at rest because AES is too slow, even when the NEON
bit-sliced implementation of AES is used. Unfortunately, it is
infeasible to encrypt these devices at all when AES is the only option.
Therefore, this patch updates fscrypt to support the Speck block cipher,
which was recently added to the crypto API. The C implementation of
Speck is not especially fast, but Speck can be implemented very
efficiently with general-purpose vector instructions, e.g. ARM NEON.
For example, on an ARMv7 processor, we measured the NEON-accelerated
Speck128/256-XTS at 69 MB/s for both encryption and decryption, while
AES-256-XTS with the NEON bit-sliced implementation was only 22 MB/s
encryption and 19 MB/s decryption.
There are multiple variants of Speck. This patch only adds support for
Speck128/256, which is the variant with a 128-bit block size and 256-bit
key size -- the same as AES-256. This is believed to be the most secure
variant of Speck, and it's only about 6% slower than Speck128/128.
Speck64/128 would be at least 20% faster because it has 20% rounds, and
it can be even faster on CPUs that can't efficiently do the 64-bit
operations needed for Speck128. However, Speck64's 64-bit block size is
not preferred security-wise. ARM NEON also supports the needed 64-bit
operations even on 32-bit CPUs, resulting in Speck128 being fast enough
for our targeted use cases so far.
The chosen modes of operation are XTS for contents and CTS-CBC for
filenames. These are the same modes of operation that fscrypt defaults
to for AES. Note that as with the other fscrypt modes, Speck will not
be used unless userspace chooses to use it. Nor are any of the existing
modes (which are all AES-based) being removed, of course.
We intentionally don't make CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION select
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SPECK, so people will have to enable Speck support
themselves if they need it. This is because we shouldn't bloat the
FS_ENCRYPTION dependencies with every new cipher, especially ones that
aren't recommended for most users. Moreover, CRYPTO_SPECK is just the
generic implementation, which won't be fast enough for many users; in
practice, they'll need to enable CRYPTO_SPECK_NEON to get acceptable
performance.
More details about our choice of Speck can be found in our patches that
added Speck to the crypto API, and the follow-on discussion threads.
We're planning a publication that explains the choice in more detail.
But briefly, we can't use ChaCha20 as we previously proposed, since it
would be insecure to use a stream cipher in this context, with potential
IV reuse during writes on f2fs and/or on wear-leveling flash storage.
We also evaluated many other lightweight and/or ARX-based block ciphers
such as Chaskey-LTS, RC5, LEA, CHAM, Threefish, RC6, NOEKEON, SPARX, and
XTEA. However, all had disadvantages vs. Speck, such as insufficient
performance with NEON, much less published cryptanalysis, or an
insufficient security level. Various design choices in Speck make it
perform better with NEON than competing ciphers while still having a
security margin similar to AES, and in the case of Speck128 also the
same available security levels. Unfortunately, Speck does have some
political baggage attached -- it's an NSA designed cipher, and was
rejected from an ISO standard (though for context, as far as I know none
of the above-mentioned alternatives are ISO standards either).
Nevertheless, we believe it is a good solution to the problem from a
technical perspective.
Certain algorithms constructed from ChaCha or the ChaCha permutation,
such as MEM (Masked Even-Mansour) or HPolyC, may also meet our
performance requirements. However, these are new constructions that
need more time to receive the cryptographic review and acceptance needed
to be confident in their security. HPolyC hasn't been published yet,
and we are concerned that MEM makes stronger assumptions about the
underlying permutation than the ChaCha stream cipher does. In contrast,
the XTS mode of operation is relatively well accepted, and Speck has
over 70 cryptanalysis papers. Of course, these ChaCha-based algorithms
can still be added later if they become ready.
The best known attack on Speck128/256 is a differential cryptanalysis
attack on 25 of 34 rounds with 2^253 time complexity and 2^125 chosen
plaintexts, i.e. only marginally faster than brute force. There is no
known attack on the full 34 rounds.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Use a common function for fscrypt warning and error messages so that all
the messages are consistently ratelimited, include the "fscrypt:"
prefix, and include the filesystem name if applicable.
Also fix up a few of the log messages to be more descriptive.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
With one exception, the internal key size constants such as
FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE are only used for the 'available_modes' array,
where they really only serve to obfuscate what the values are. Also
some of the constants are unused, and the key sizes tend to be in the
names of the algorithms anyway. In the past these values were also
misused, e.g. we used to have FS_AES_256_XTS_KEY_SIZE in places that
technically should have been FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE.
The exception is that FS_AES_128_ECB_KEY_SIZE is used for key
derivation. But it's more appropriate to use
FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE for that instead.
Thus, just put the sizes directly in the 'available_modes' array.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Now that all filesystems have been converted to use
fscrypt_prepare_lookup(), we can remove the fscrypt_set_d_op() and
fscrypt_set_encrypted_dentry() functions as well as un-export
fscrypt_d_ops.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Currently, fscrypt provides fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages() which decrypts a
bio's pages asynchronously, then unlocks them afterwards. But, this
assumes that decryption is the last "postprocessing step" for the bio,
so it's incompatible with additional postprocessing steps such as
authenticity verification after decryption.
Therefore, rename the existing fscrypt_decrypt_bio_pages() to
fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_bio(). Then, add fscrypt_decrypt_bio() which
decrypts the pages in the bio synchronously without unlocking the pages,
nor setting them Uptodate; and add fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(), which
enqueues work on the fscrypt_read_workqueue. The new functions will be
used by filesystems that support both fscrypt and fs-verity.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Filesystems don't need fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() anymore, so
unexport it and move it to fscrypt_private.h.
We also never calculate the encrypted size of a filename without having
the fscrypt_info present since it is needed to know the amount of
NUL-padding which is determined by the encryption policy, and also we
will always truncate the NUL-padding to the maximum filename length.
Therefore, also make fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size() assume that the
fscrypt_info is present, and make it truncate the returned length to the
specified max_len.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Currently, when encrypting a filename (either a real filename or a
symlink target) we calculate the amount of NUL-padding twice: once
before encryption and once during encryption in fname_encrypt(). It is
needed before encryption to allocate the needed buffer size as well as
calculate the size the symlink target will take up on-disk before
creating the symlink inode. Calculating the size during encryption as
well is redundant.
Remove this redundancy by always calculating the exact size beforehand,
and making fname_encrypt() just add as much NUL padding as is needed to
fill the output buffer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Now that all filesystems have been converted to use the symlink helper
functions, they no longer need the declaration of 'struct
fscrypt_symlink_data'. Move it from fscrypt.h to fscrypt_private.h.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Currently, filesystems supporting fscrypt need to implement some tricky
logic when creating encrypted symlinks, including handling a peculiar
on-disk format (struct fscrypt_symlink_data) and correctly calculating
the size of the encrypted symlink. Introduce helper functions to make
things a bit easier:
- fscrypt_prepare_symlink() computes and validates the size the symlink
target will require on-disk.
- fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() creates the encrypted target if needed.
The new helpers actually fix some subtle bugs. First, when checking
whether the symlink target was too long, filesystems didn't account for
the fact that the NUL padding is meant to be truncated if it would cause
the maximum length to be exceeded, as is done for filenames in
directories. Consequently users would receive ENAMETOOLONG when
creating symlinks close to what is supposed to be the maximum length.
For example, with EXT4 with a 4K block size, the maximum symlink target
length in an encrypted directory is supposed to be 4093 bytes (in
comparison to 4095 in an unencrypted directory), but in
FS_POLICY_FLAGS_PAD_32-mode only up to 4064 bytes were accepted.
Second, symlink targets of "." and ".." were not being encrypted, even
though they should be, as these names are special in *directory entries*
but not in symlink targets. Fortunately, we can fix this simply by
starting to encrypt them, as old kernels already accept them in
encrypted form.
Third, the output string length the filesystems were providing when
doing the actual encryption was incorrect, as it was forgotten to
exclude 'sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data)'. Fortunately though, this
bug didn't make a difference.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The encryption modes are validated by fs/crypto/, not by individual
filesystems. Therefore, move fscrypt_valid_enc_modes() from fscrypt.h
to fscrypt_private.h.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The fscrypt_info kmem_cache is internal to fscrypt; filesystems don't
need to access it. So move its declaration into fscrypt_private.h.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
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Merge tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt
Pull fscrypt updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Lots of cleanups, mostly courtesy by Eric Biggers"
* tag 'fscrypt-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/fscrypt:
fscrypt: lock mutex before checking for bounce page pool
fscrypt: add a documentation file for filesystem-level encryption
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_setattr()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_lookup()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_rename()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_prepare_link()
ext4: switch to fscrypt_file_open()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_setattr()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_lookup()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_rename()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_prepare_link()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_file_open()
fscrypt: new helper function - fscrypt_require_key()
fscrypt: remove unneeded empty fscrypt_operations structs
fscrypt: remove ->is_encrypted()
fscrypt: switch from ->is_encrypted() to IS_ENCRYPTED()
fs, fscrypt: add an S_ENCRYPTED inode flag
fscrypt: clean up include file mess
Pull crypto updates from Herbert Xu:
"Here is the crypto update for 4.15:
API:
- Disambiguate EBUSY when queueing crypto request by adding ENOSPC.
This change touches code outside the crypto API.
- Reset settings when empty string is written to rng_current.
Algorithms:
- Add OSCCA SM3 secure hash.
Drivers:
- Remove old mv_cesa driver (replaced by marvell/cesa).
- Enable rfc3686/ecb/cfb/ofb AES in crypto4xx.
- Add ccm/gcm AES in crypto4xx.
- Add support for BCM7278 in iproc-rng200.
- Add hash support on Exynos in s5p-sss.
- Fix fallback-induced error in vmx.
- Fix output IV in atmel-aes.
- Fix empty GCM hash in mediatek.
Others:
- Fix DoS potential in lib/mpi.
- Fix potential out-of-order issues with padata"
* 'linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/herbert/crypto-2.6: (162 commits)
lib/mpi: call cond_resched() from mpi_powm() loop
crypto: stm32/hash - Fix return issue on update
crypto: dh - Remove pointless checks for NULL 'p' and 'g'
crypto: qat - Clean up error handling in qat_dh_set_secret()
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'key' or 'g' size longer than 'p'
crypto: dh - Don't permit 'p' to be 0
crypto: dh - Fix double free of ctx->p
hwrng: iproc-rng200 - Add support for BCM7278
dt-bindings: rng: Document BCM7278 RNG200 compatible
crypto: chcr - Replace _manual_ swap with swap macro
crypto: marvell - Add a NULL entry at the end of mv_cesa_plat_id_table[]
hwrng: virtio - Virtio RNG devices need to be re-registered after suspend/resume
crypto: atmel - remove empty functions
crypto: ecdh - remove empty exit()
MAINTAINERS: update maintainer for qat
crypto: caam - remove unused param of ctx_map_to_sec4_sg()
crypto: caam - remove unneeded edesc zeroization
crypto: atmel-aes - Reset the controller before each use
crypto: atmel-aes - properly set IV after {en,de}crypt
hwrng: core - Reset user selected rng by writing "" to rng_current
...
fscrypt starts several async. crypto ops and waiting for them to
complete. Move it over to generic code doing the same.
Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad@benyossef.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Many source files in the tree are missing licensing information, which
makes it harder for compliance tools to determine the correct license.
By default all files without license information are under the default
license of the kernel, which is GPL version 2.
Update the files which contain no license information with the 'GPL-2.0'
SPDX license identifier. The SPDX identifier is a legally binding
shorthand, which can be used instead of the full boiler plate text.
This patch is based on work done by Thomas Gleixner and Kate Stewart and
Philippe Ombredanne.
How this work was done:
Patches were generated and checked against linux-4.14-rc6 for a subset of
the use cases:
- file had no licensing information it it.
- file was a */uapi/* one with no licensing information in it,
- file was a */uapi/* one with existing licensing information,
Further patches will be generated in subsequent months to fix up cases
where non-standard license headers were used, and references to license
had to be inferred by heuristics based on keywords.
The analysis to determine which SPDX License Identifier to be applied to
a file was done in a spreadsheet of side by side results from of the
output of two independent scanners (ScanCode & Windriver) producing SPDX
tag:value files created by Philippe Ombredanne. Philippe prepared the
base worksheet, and did an initial spot review of a few 1000 files.
The 4.13 kernel was the starting point of the analysis with 60,537 files
assessed. Kate Stewart did a file by file comparison of the scanner
results in the spreadsheet to determine which SPDX license identifier(s)
to be applied to the file. She confirmed any determination that was not
immediately clear with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Criteria used to select files for SPDX license identifier tagging was:
- Files considered eligible had to be source code files.
- Make and config files were included as candidates if they contained >5
lines of source
- File already had some variant of a license header in it (even if <5
lines).
All documentation files were explicitly excluded.
The following heuristics were used to determine which SPDX license
identifiers to apply.
- when both scanners couldn't find any license traces, file was
considered to have no license information in it, and the top level
COPYING file license applied.
For non */uapi/* files that summary was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 11139
and resulted in the first patch in this series.
If that file was a */uapi/* path one, it was "GPL-2.0 WITH
Linux-syscall-note" otherwise it was "GPL-2.0". Results of that was:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|-------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 930
and resulted in the second patch in this series.
- if a file had some form of licensing information in it, and was one
of the */uapi/* ones, it was denoted with the Linux-syscall-note if
any GPL family license was found in the file or had no licensing in
it (per prior point). Results summary:
SPDX license identifier # files
---------------------------------------------------|------
GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note 270
GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 169
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-2-Clause) 21
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 17
LGPL-2.1+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 15
GPL-1.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 14
((GPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR BSD-3-Clause) 5
LGPL-2.0+ WITH Linux-syscall-note 4
LGPL-2.1 WITH Linux-syscall-note 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) OR MIT) 3
((GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note) AND MIT) 1
and that resulted in the third patch in this series.
- when the two scanners agreed on the detected license(s), that became
the concluded license(s).
- when there was disagreement between the two scanners (one detected a
license but the other didn't, or they both detected different
licenses) a manual inspection of the file occurred.
- In most cases a manual inspection of the information in the file
resulted in a clear resolution of the license that should apply (and
which scanner probably needed to revisit its heuristics).
- When it was not immediately clear, the license identifier was
confirmed with lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
- If there was any question as to the appropriate license identifier,
the file was flagged for further research and to be revisited later
in time.
In total, over 70 hours of logged manual review was done on the
spreadsheet to determine the SPDX license identifiers to apply to the
source files by Kate, Philippe, Thomas and, in some cases, confirmation
by lawyers working with the Linux Foundation.
Kate also obtained a third independent scan of the 4.13 code base from
FOSSology, and compared selected files where the other two scanners
disagreed against that SPDX file, to see if there was new insights. The
Windriver scanner is based on an older version of FOSSology in part, so
they are related.
Thomas did random spot checks in about 500 files from the spreadsheets
for the uapi headers and agreed with SPDX license identifier in the
files he inspected. For the non-uapi files Thomas did random spot checks
in about 15000 files.
In initial set of patches against 4.14-rc6, 3 files were found to have
copy/paste license identifier errors, and have been fixed to reflect the
correct identifier.
Additionally Philippe spent 10 hours this week doing a detailed manual
inspection and review of the 12,461 patched files from the initial patch
version early this week with:
- a full scancode scan run, collecting the matched texts, detected
license ids and scores
- reviewing anything where there was a license detected (about 500+
files) to ensure that the applied SPDX license was correct
- reviewing anything where there was no detection but the patch license
was not GPL-2.0 WITH Linux-syscall-note to ensure that the applied
SPDX license was correct
This produced a worksheet with 20 files needing minor correction. This
worksheet was then exported into 3 different .csv files for the
different types of files to be modified.
These .csv files were then reviewed by Greg. Thomas wrote a script to
parse the csv files and add the proper SPDX tag to the file, in the
format that the file expected. This script was further refined by Greg
based on the output to detect more types of files automatically and to
distinguish between header and source .c files (which need different
comment types.) Finally Greg ran the script using the .csv files to
generate the patches.
Reviewed-by: Kate Stewart <kstewart@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Ombredanne <pombredanne@nexb.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Filesystems have to include different header files based on whether they
are compiled with encryption support or not. That's nasty and messy.
Instead, rationalise the headers so we have a single include fscrypt.h
and let it decide what internal implementation to include based on the
__FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION define. Filesystems set __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION to 1
before including linux/fscrypt.h if they are built with encryption
support. Otherwise, they must set __FS_HAS_ENCRYPTION to 0.
Add guards to prevent fscrypt_supp.h and fscrypt_notsupp.h from being
directly included by filesystems.
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
[EB: use 1 and 0 rather than defined/undefined]
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
fscrypt provides facilities to use different encryption algorithms which
are selectable by userspace when setting the encryption policy. Currently,
only AES-256-XTS for file contents and AES-256-CBC-CTS for file names are
implemented. This is a clear case of kernel offers the mechanism and
userspace selects a policy. Similar to what dm-crypt and ecryptfs have.
This patch adds support for using AES-128-CBC for file contents and
AES-128-CBC-CTS for file name encryption. To mitigate watermarking
attacks, IVs are generated using the ESSIV algorithm. While AES-CBC is
actually slightly less secure than AES-XTS from a security point of view,
there is more widespread hardware support. Using AES-CBC gives us the
acceptable performance while still providing a moderate level of security
for persistent storage.
Especially low-powered embedded devices with crypto accelerators such as
CAAM or CESA often only support AES-CBC. Since using AES-CBC over AES-XTS
is basically thought of a last resort, we use AES-128-CBC over AES-256-CBC
since it has less encryption rounds and yields noticeable better
performance starting from a file size of just a few kB.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Walter <dwalter@sigma-star.at>
[david@sigma-star.at: addressed review comments]
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Introduce a helper function fscrypt_match_name() which tests whether a
fscrypt_name matches a directory entry. Also clean up the magic numbers
and document things properly.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
This commit exposes the necessary constants and structures for a
userspace program to pass filesystem encryption keys into the keyring.
The fscrypt_key structure was already part of the kernel ABI, this
change just makes it so programs no longer have to redeclare these
structures (like e4crypt in e2fsprogs currently does).
Note that we do not expose the other FS_*_KEY_SIZE constants as they are
not necessary. Only XTS is supported for contents_encryption_mode, so
currently FS_MAX_KEY_SIZE bytes of key material must always be passed to
the kernel.
This commit also removes __packed from fscrypt_key as it does not
contain any implicit padding and does not refer to an on-disk structure.
Signed-off-by: Joe Richey <joerichey@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Filesystem encryption ostensibly supported revoking a keyring key that
had been used to "unlock" encrypted files, causing those files to become
"locked" again. This was, however, buggy for several reasons, the most
severe of which was that when key revocation happened to be detected for
an inode, its fscrypt_info was immediately freed, even while other
threads could be using it for encryption or decryption concurrently.
This could be exploited to crash the kernel or worse.
This patch fixes the use-after-free by removing the code which detects
the keyring key having been revoked, invalidated, or expired. Instead,
an encrypted inode that is "unlocked" now simply remains unlocked until
it is evicted from memory. Note that this is no worse than the case for
block device-level encryption, e.g. dm-crypt, and it still remains
possible for a privileged user to evict unused pages, inodes, and
dentries by running 'sync; echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches', or by
simply unmounting the filesystem. In fact, one of those actions was
already needed anyway for key revocation to work even somewhat sanely.
This change is not expected to break any applications.
In the future I'd like to implement a real API for fscrypt key
revocation that interacts sanely with ongoing filesystem operations ---
waiting for existing operations to complete and blocking new operations,
and invalidating and sanitizing key material and plaintext from the VFS
caches. But this is a hard problem, and for now this bug must be fixed.
This bug affected almost all versions of ext4, f2fs, and ubifs
encryption, and it was potentially reachable in any kernel configured
with encryption support (CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION=y,
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y, or
CONFIG_UBIFS_FS_ENCRYPTION=y). Note that older kernels did not use the
shared fs/crypto/ code, but due to the potential security implications
of this bug, it may still be worthwhile to backport this fix to them.
Fixes: b7236e21d5 ("ext4 crypto: reorganize how we store keys in the inode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.2+
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Acked-by: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com>
When a completion is declared on-stack we have to use
COMPLETION_INITIALIZER_ONSTACK().
Fixes: 0b81d07790 ("fs crypto: move per-file encryption from f2fs
tree to fs/crypto")
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Previously, each filesystem configured without encryption support would
define all the public fscrypt functions to their notsupp_* stubs. This
list of #defines had to be updated in every filesystem whenever a change
was made to the public fscrypt functions. To make things more
maintainable now that we have three filesystems using fscrypt, split the
old header fscrypto.h into several new headers. fscrypt_supp.h contains
the real declarations and is included by filesystems when configured
with encryption support, whereas fscrypt_notsupp.h contains the inline
stubs and is included by filesystems when configured without encryption
support. fscrypt_common.h contains common declarations needed by both.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
That way we can get rid of the direct dependency on CONFIG_BLOCK.
Fixes: d475a50745 ("ubifs: Add skeleton for fscrypto")
Reported-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
... to better explain its purpose after introducing in-place encryption
without bounce buffer.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Since fscrypt users can now indicated if fscrypt_encrypt_page() should
use a bounce page, we can delay the bounce page pool initialization util
it is really needed. That is until fscrypt_operations has no
FS_CFLG_OWN_PAGES flag set.
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
The fscrypt_initalize() function isn't used outside fs/crypto, so
there's no point making it be an exported symbol.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
To avoid namespace collisions, rename get_crypt_info() to
fscrypt_get_crypt_info(). The function is only used inside the
fs/crypto directory, so declare it in the new header file,
fscrypt_private.h.
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Eric Biggers