While Linux doesn't honor setuid on scripts. However, it mistakenly
behaves differently for file capabilities.
This patch fixes that behavior by making sure that get_file_caps()
begins with empty bprm->caps_*. That way when a script is loaded,
its bprm->caps_* may be filled when binfmt_misc calls prepare_binprm(),
but they will be cleared again when binfmt_elf calls prepare_binprm()
next to read the interpreter's file capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
SELinux has wrongly (since 2004) had an incorrect test for an empty
tty->tty_files list. With an empty list selinux would be pointing to part
of the tty struct itself and would then proceed to dereference that value
and again dereference that result. An F10 change to plymouth on a ppc64
system is actually currently triggering this bug. This patch uses
list_empty() to handle empty lists rather than looking at a meaningless
location.
[note, this fixes the oops reported in
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=469079]
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Using NIPQUAD() with NIPQUAD_FMT, %d.%d.%d.%d or %u.%u.%u.%u
can be replaced with %pI4
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Junjiro R. Okajima reported a problem where knfsd crashes if you are
using it to export shmemfs objects and run strict overcommit. In this
situation the current->mm based modifier to the overcommit goes through a
NULL pointer.
We could simply check for NULL and skip the modifier but we've caught
other real bugs in the past from mm being NULL here - cases where we did
need a valid mm set up (eg the exec bug about a year ago).
To preserve the checks and get the logic we want shuffle the checking
around and add a new helper to the vm_ security wrappers
Also fix a current->mm reference in nommu that should use the passed mm
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix build]
Reported-by: Junjiro R. Okajima <hooanon05@yahoo.co.jp>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Some operations, like searching a directory path or connecting a unix domain
socket, make explicit calls into inode_permission. Our choices are to
either try to come up with a signature for all of the explicit calls to
inode_permission and do not check open on those, or to move the open checks to
dentry_open where we know this is always an open operation. This patch moves
the checks to dentry_open.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The iscsi_ibft.c changes are almost certainly a bugfix as the
pointer 'ip' is a u8 *, so they never print the last 8 bytes
of the IPv6 address, and the eight bytes they do print have
a zero byte with them in each 16-bit word.
Other than that, this should cause no difference in functionality.
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
* 'v28-timers-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/linux-2.6-tip: (36 commits)
fix documentation of sysrq-q really
Fix documentation of sysrq-q
timer_list: add base address to clock base
timer_list: print cpu number of clockevents device
timer_list: print real timer address
NOHZ: restart tick device from irq_enter()
NOHZ: split tick_nohz_restart_sched_tick()
NOHZ: unify the nohz function calls in irq_enter()
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang, fix
timers: fix itimer/many thread hang, v3
ntp: improve adjtimex frequency rounding
timekeeping: fix rounding problem during clock update
ntp: let update_persistent_clock() sleep
hrtimer: reorder struct hrtimer to save 8 bytes on 64bit builds
posix-timers: lock_timer: make it readable
posix-timers: lock_timer: kill the bogus ->it_id check
posix-timers: kill ->it_sigev_signo and ->it_sigev_value
posix-timers: sys_timer_create: cleanup the error handling
posix-timers: move the initialization of timer->sigq from send to create path
posix-timers: sys_timer_create: simplify and s/tasklist/rcu/
...
Fix trivial conflicts due to sysrq-q description clahes in
Documentation/sysrq.txt and drivers/char/sysrq.c
Since we introduced rcu for read side, spin_lock is used only for update.
But we always hold cgroup_lock() when update, so spin_lock() is not need.
Additional cleanup:
1) include linux/rcupdate.h explicitly
2) remove unused variable cur_devcgroup in devcgroup_update_access()
Signed-off-by: Lai Jiangshan <laijs@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This saves 40 bytes on my x86_32 box.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is a much better version of a previous patch to make the parser
tables constant. Rather than changing the typedef, we put the "const" in
all the various places where its required, allowing the __initconst
exception for nfsroot which was the cause of the previous trouble.
This was posted for review some time ago and I believe its been in -mm
since then.
Signed-off-by: Steven Whitehouse <swhiteho@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexander Viro <aviro@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (24 commits)
integrity: special fs magic
As pointed out by Jonathan Corbet, the timer must be deleted before
ERROR: code indent should use tabs where possible
The tpm_dev_release function is only called for platform devices, not pnp
Protect tpm_chip_list when transversing it.
Renames num_open to is_open, as only one process can open the file at a time.
Remove the BKL calls from the TPM driver, which were added in the overall
netlabel: Add configuration support for local labeling
cipso: Add support for native local labeling and fixup mapping names
netlabel: Changes to the NetLabel security attributes to allow LSMs to pass full contexts
selinux: Cache NetLabel secattrs in the socket's security struct
selinux: Set socket NetLabel based on connection endpoint
netlabel: Add functionality to set the security attributes of a packet
netlabel: Add network address selectors to the NetLabel/LSM domain mapping
netlabel: Add a generic way to create ordered linked lists of network addrs
netlabel: Replace protocol/NetLabel linking with refrerence counts
smack: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()
selinux: Fix missing calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()
selinux: Fix a problem in security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr()
selinux: Better local/forward check in selinux_ip_postroute()
...
Currently it is sometimes locked by the tty mutex and sometimes by the
sighand lock. The latter is in fact correct and now we can hand back referenced
objects we can fix this up without problems around sleeping functions.
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
We now return a kref covered tty reference. That ensures the tty structure
doesn't go away when you have a return from get_current_tty. This is not
enough to protect you from most of the resources being freed behind your
back - yet.
[Updated to include fixes for SELinux problems found by Andrew Morton and
an s390 leak found while debugging the former]
Signed-off-by: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Discussion on the mailing list questioned the use of these
magic values in userspace, concluding these values are already
exported to userspace via statfs and their correct/incorrect
usage is left up to the userspace application.
- Move special fs magic number definitions to magic.h
- Add magic.h include
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch provides support for including the LSM's secid in addition to
the LSM's MLS information in the NetLabel security attributes structure.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Previous work enabled the use of address based NetLabel selectors, which
while highly useful, brought the potential for additional per-packet overhead
when used. This patch attempts to mitigate some of that overhead by caching
the NetLabel security attribute struct within the SELinux socket security
structure. This should help eliminate the need to recreate the NetLabel
secattr structure for each packet resulting in less overhead.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Previous work enabled the use of address based NetLabel selectors, which while
highly useful, brought the potential for additional per-packet overhead when
used. This patch attempts to solve that by applying NetLabel socket labels
when sockets are connect()'d. This should alleviate the per-packet NetLabel
labeling for all connected sockets (yes, it even works for connected DGRAM
sockets).
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch builds upon the new NetLabel address selector functionality by
providing the NetLabel KAPI and CIPSO engine support needed to enable the
new packet-based labeling. The only new addition to the NetLabel KAPI at
this point is shown below:
* int netlbl_skbuff_setattr(skb, family, secattr)
... and is designed to be called from a Netfilter hook after the packet's
IP header has been populated such as in the FORWARD or LOCAL_OUT hooks.
This patch also provides the necessary SELinux hooks to support this new
functionality. Smack support is not currently included due to uncertainty
regarding the permissions needed to expand the Smack network access controls.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
NetLabel has always had a list of backpointers in the CIPSO DOI definition
structure which pointed to the NetLabel LSM domain mapping structures which
referenced the CIPSO DOI struct. The rationale for this was that when an
administrator removed a CIPSO DOI from the system all of the associated
NetLabel LSM domain mappings should be removed as well; a list of
backpointers made this a simple operation.
Unfortunately, while the backpointers did make the removal easier they were
a bit of a mess from an implementation point of view which was making
further development difficult. Since the removal of a CIPSO DOI is a
realtively rare event it seems to make sense to remove this backpointer
list as the optimization was hurting us more then it was helping. However,
we still need to be able to track when a CIPSO DOI definition is being used
so replace the backpointer list with a reference count. In order to
preserve the current functionality of removing the associated LSM domain
mappings when a CIPSO DOI is removed we walk the LSM domain mapping table,
removing the relevant entries.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Smack needs to call netlbl_skbuff_err() to let NetLabel do the necessary
protocol specific error handling.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
At some point I think I messed up and dropped the calls to netlbl_skbuff_err()
which are necessary for CIPSO to send error notifications to remote systems.
This patch re-introduces the error handling calls into the SELinux code.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently when SELinux fails to allocate memory in
security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr() the NetLabel LSM domain field is set to
NULL which triggers the default NetLabel LSM domain mapping which may not
always be the desired mapping. This patch fixes this by returning an error
when the kernel is unable to allocate memory. This could result in more
failures on a system with heavy memory pressure but it is the "correct"
thing to do.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
It turns out that checking to see if skb->sk is NULL is not a very good
indicator of a forwarded packet as some locally generated packets also have
skb->sk set to NULL. Fix this by not only checking the skb->sk field but also
the IP[6]CB(skb)->flags field for the IP[6]SKB_FORWARDED flag. While we are
at it, we are calling selinux_parse_skb() much earlier than we really should
resulting in potentially wasted cycles parsing packets for information we
might no use; so shuffle the code around a bit to fix this.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We did the right thing in a few cases but there were several areas where we
determined a packet's address family based on the socket's address family which
is not the right thing to do since we can get IPv4 packets on IPv6 sockets.
This patch fixes these problems by either taking the address family directly
from the packet.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We were doing a lot of extra work in selinux_netlbl_sock_graft() what wasn't
necessary so this patch removes that code. It also removes the redundant
second argument to selinux_netlbl_sock_setsid() which allows us to simplify a
few other functions.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.
Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
At some point during the 2.6.27 development cycle two new fields were added
to the SELinux context structure, a string pointer and a length field. The
code in selinux_secattr_to_sid() was not modified and as a result these two
fields were left uninitialized which could result in erratic behavior,
including kernel panics, when NetLabel is used. This patch fixes the
problem by fully initializing the context in selinux_secattr_to_sid() before
use and reducing the level of direct context manipulation done to help
prevent future problems.
Please apply this to the 2.6.27-rcX release stream.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
As we are not concerned with fine-grained control over reading of
symlinks in proc, always use the default proc SID for all proc symlinks.
This should help avoid permission issues upon changes to the proc tree
as in the /proc/net -> /proc/self/net example.
This does not alter labeling of symlinks within /proc/pid directories.
ls -Zd /proc/net output before and after the patch should show the difference.
Signed-off-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This reduces the kernel size by 289 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Overview
This patch reworks the handling of POSIX CPU timers, including the
ITIMER_PROF, ITIMER_VIRT timers and rlimit handling. It was put together
with the help of Roland McGrath, the owner and original writer of this code.
The problem we ran into, and the reason for this rework, has to do with using
a profiling timer in a process with a large number of threads. It appears
that the performance of the old implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() was
at least O(n*3) (where "n" is the number of threads in a process) or worse.
Everything is fine with an increasing number of threads until the time taken
for that routine to run becomes the same as or greater than the tick time, at
which point things degrade rather quickly.
This patch fixes bug 9906, "Weird hang with NPTL and SIGPROF."
Code Changes
This rework corrects the implementation of run_posix_cpu_timers() to make it
run in constant time for a particular machine. (Performance may vary between
one machine and another depending upon whether the kernel is built as single-
or multiprocessor and, in the latter case, depending upon the number of
running processors.) To do this, at each tick we now update fields in
signal_struct as well as task_struct. The run_posix_cpu_timers() function
uses those fields to make its decisions.
We define a new structure, "task_cputime," to contain user, system and
scheduler times and use these in appropriate places:
struct task_cputime {
cputime_t utime;
cputime_t stime;
unsigned long long sum_exec_runtime;
};
This is included in the structure "thread_group_cputime," which is a new
substructure of signal_struct and which varies for uniprocessor versus
multiprocessor kernels. For uniprocessor kernels, it uses "task_cputime" as
a simple substructure, while for multiprocessor kernels it is a pointer:
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime totals;
};
struct thread_group_cputime {
struct task_cputime *totals;
};
We also add a new task_cputime substructure directly to signal_struct, to
cache the earliest expiration of process-wide timers, and task_cputime also
replaces the it_*_expires fields of task_struct (used for earliest expiration
of thread timers). The "thread_group_cputime" structure contains process-wide
timers that are updated via account_user_time() and friends. In the non-SMP
case the structure is a simple aggregator; unfortunately in the SMP case that
simplicity was not achievable due to cache-line contention between CPUs (in
one measured case performance was actually _worse_ on a 16-cpu system than
the same test on a 4-cpu system, due to this contention). For SMP, the
thread_group_cputime counters are maintained as a per-cpu structure allocated
using alloc_percpu(). The timer functions update only the timer field in
the structure corresponding to the running CPU, obtained using per_cpu_ptr().
We define a set of inline functions in sched.h that we use to maintain the
thread_group_cputime structure and hide the differences between UP and SMP
implementations from the rest of the kernel. The thread_group_cputime_init()
function initializes the thread_group_cputime structure for the given task.
The thread_group_cputime_alloc() is a no-op for UP; for SMP it calls the
out-of-line function thread_group_cputime_alloc_smp() to allocate and fill
in the per-cpu structures and fields. The thread_group_cputime_free()
function, also a no-op for UP, in SMP frees the per-cpu structures. The
thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() function (also a UP no-op) for SMP calls
thread_group_cputime_alloc() if the per-cpu structures haven't yet been
allocated. The thread_group_cputime() function fills the task_cputime
structure it is passed with the contents of the thread_group_cputime fields;
in UP it's that simple but in SMP it must also safely check that tsk->signal
is non-NULL (if it is it just uses the appropriate fields of task_struct) and,
if so, sums the per-cpu values for each online CPU. Finally, the three
functions account_group_user_time(), account_group_system_time() and
account_group_exec_runtime() are used by timer functions to update the
respective fields of the thread_group_cputime structure.
Non-SMP operation is trivial and will not be mentioned further.
The per-cpu structure is always allocated when a task creates its first new
thread, via a call to thread_group_cputime_clone_thread() from copy_signal().
It is freed at process exit via a call to thread_group_cputime_free() from
cleanup_signal().
All functions that formerly summed utime/stime/sum_sched_runtime values from
from all threads in the thread group now use thread_group_cputime() to
snapshot the values in the thread_group_cputime structure or the values in
the task structure itself if the per-cpu structure hasn't been allocated.
Finally, the code in kernel/posix-cpu-timers.c has changed quite a bit.
The run_posix_cpu_timers() function has been split into a fast path and a
slow path; the former safely checks whether there are any expired thread
timers and, if not, just returns, while the slow path does the heavy lifting.
With the dedicated thread group fields, timers are no longer "rebalanced" and
the process_timer_rebalance() function and related code has gone away. All
summing loops are gone and all code that used them now uses the
thread_group_cputime() inline. When process-wide timers are set, the new
task_cputime structure in signal_struct is used to cache the earliest
expiration; this is checked in the fast path.
Performance
The fix appears not to add significant overhead to existing operations. It
generally performs the same as the current code except in two cases, one in
which it performs slightly worse (Case 5 below) and one in which it performs
very significantly better (Case 2 below). Overall it's a wash except in those
two cases.
I've since done somewhat more involved testing on a dual-core Opteron system.
Case 1: With no itimer running, for a test with 100,000 threads, the fixed
kernel took 1428.5 seconds, 513 seconds more than the unfixed system,
all of which was spent in the system. There were twice as many
voluntary context switches with the fix as without it.
Case 2: With an itimer running at .01 second ticks and 4000 threads (the most
an unmodified kernel can handle), the fixed kernel ran the test in
eight percent of the time (5.8 seconds as opposed to 70 seconds) and
had better tick accuracy (.012 seconds per tick as opposed to .023
seconds per tick).
Case 3: A 4000-thread test with an initial timer tick of .01 second and an
interval of 10,000 seconds (i.e. a timer that ticks only once) had
very nearly the same performance in both cases: 6.3 seconds elapsed
for the fixed kernel versus 5.5 seconds for the unfixed kernel.
With fewer threads (eight in these tests), the Case 1 test ran in essentially
the same time on both the modified and unmodified kernels (5.2 seconds versus
5.8 seconds). The Case 2 test ran in about the same time as well, 5.9 seconds
versus 5.4 seconds but again with much better tick accuracy, .013 seconds per
tick versus .025 seconds per tick for the unmodified kernel.
Since the fix affected the rlimit code, I also tested soft and hard CPU limits.
Case 4: With a hard CPU limit of 20 seconds and eight threads (and an itimer
running), the modified kernel was very slightly favored in that while
it killed the process in 19.997 seconds of CPU time (5.002 seconds of
wall time), only .003 seconds of that was system time, the rest was
user time. The unmodified kernel killed the process in 20.001 seconds
of CPU (5.014 seconds of wall time) of which .016 seconds was system
time. Really, though, the results were too close to call. The results
were essentially the same with no itimer running.
Case 5: With a soft limit of 20 seconds and a hard limit of 2000 seconds
(where the hard limit would never be reached) and an itimer running,
the modified kernel exhibited worse tick accuracy than the unmodified
kernel: .050 seconds/tick versus .028 seconds/tick. Otherwise,
performance was almost indistinguishable. With no itimer running this
test exhibited virtually identical behavior and times in both cases.
In times past I did some limited performance testing. those results are below.
On a four-cpu Opteron system without this fix, a sixteen-thread test executed
in 3569.991 seconds, of which user was 3568.435s and system was 1.556s. On
the same system with the fix, user and elapsed time were about the same, but
system time dropped to 0.007 seconds. Performance with eight, four and one
thread were comparable. Interestingly, the timer ticks with the fix seemed
more accurate: The sixteen-thread test with the fix received 149543 ticks
for 0.024 seconds per tick, while the same test without the fix received 58720
for 0.061 seconds per tick. Both cases were configured for an interval of
0.01 seconds. Again, the other tests were comparable. Each thread in this
test computed the primes up to 25,000,000.
I also did a test with a large number of threads, 100,000 threads, which is
impossible without the fix. In this case each thread computed the primes only
up to 10,000 (to make the runtime manageable). System time dominated, at
1546.968 seconds out of a total 2176.906 seconds (giving a user time of
629.938s). It received 147651 ticks for 0.015 seconds per tick, still quite
accurate. There is obviously no comparable test without the fix.
Signed-off-by: Frank Mayhar <fmayhar@google.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Update the SELinux entry in MAINTAINERS and drop the obsolete information
from the selinux Kconfig help text.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a bug and a philosophical decision about who handles errors.
security_context_to_sid_core() was leaking a context in the common case.
This was causing problems on fedora systems which recently have started
making extensive use of this function.
In discussion it was decided that if string_to_context_struct() had an
error it was its own responsibility to clean up any mess it created
along the way.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
During the use of a dev_cgroup, we should guarantee the corresponding
cgroup won't be deleted (i.e. via rmdir). This can be done through
css_get(&dev_cgroup->css), but here we can just get and use the dev_cgroup
under rcu_read_lock.
And also remove checking NULL dev_cgroup, it won't be NULL since a task
always belongs to a cgroup.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The purpose of this patch is to assign per-thread security context
under a constraint. It enables multi-threaded server application
to kick a request handler with its fair security context, and
helps some of userspace object managers to handle user's request.
When we assign a per-thread security context, it must not have wider
permissions than the original one. Because a multi-threaded process
shares a single local memory, an arbitary per-thread security context
also means another thread can easily refer violated information.
The constraint on a per-thread security context requires a new domain
has to be equal or weaker than its original one, when it tries to assign
a per-thread security context.
Bounds relationship between two types is a way to ensure a domain can
never have wider permission than its bounds. We can define it in two
explicit or implicit ways.
The first way is using new TYPEBOUNDS statement. It enables to define
a boundary of types explicitly. The other one expand the concept of
existing named based hierarchy. If we defines a type with "." separated
name like "httpd_t.php", toolchain implicitly set its bounds on "httpd_t".
This feature requires a new policy version.
The 24th version (POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY) enables to ship them into
kernel space, and the following patch enables to handle it.
Signed-off-by: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@ak.jp.nec.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add a new Kconfig option SECURITYFS which will build securityfs support
but does not require CONFIG_SECURITY. The only current user of
securityfs does not depend on CONFIG_SECURITY and there is no reason the
full LSM needs to be built to build this fs.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Add security/inode.c functions to the kernel-api docbook.
Use '%' on constants in kernel-doc notation.
Fix several typos/spellos in security function descriptions.
Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Replace "thing != NULL" comparisons with just "thing" to make
the code look more uniform (mixed styles were used even in the
same source file).
Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix the setting of PF_SUPERPRIV by __capable() as it could corrupt the flags
the target process if that is not the current process and it is trying to
change its own flags in a different way at the same time.
__capable() is using neither atomic ops nor locking to protect t->flags. This
patch removes __capable() and introduces has_capability() that doesn't set
PF_SUPERPRIV on the process being queried.
This patch further splits security_ptrace() in two:
(1) security_ptrace_may_access(). This passes judgement on whether one
process may access another only (PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH for ptrace() and
PTRACE_MODE_READ for /proc), and takes a pointer to the child process.
current is the parent.
(2) security_ptrace_traceme(). This passes judgement on PTRACE_TRACEME only,
and takes only a pointer to the parent process. current is the child.
In Smack and commoncap, this uses has_capability() to determine whether
the parent will be permitted to use PTRACE_ATTACH if normal checks fail.
This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV.
Two of the instances of __capable() actually only act on current, and so have
been changed to calls to capable().
Of the places that were using __capable():
(1) The OOM killer calls __capable() thrice when weighing the killability of a
process. All of these now use has_capability().
(2) cap_ptrace() and smack_ptrace() were using __capable() to check to see
whether the parent was allowed to trace any process. As mentioned above,
these have been split. For PTRACE_ATTACH and /proc, capable() is now
used, and for PTRACE_TRACEME, has_capability() is used.
(3) cap_safe_nice() only ever saw current, so now uses capable().
(4) smack_setprocattr() rejected accesses to tasks other than current just
after calling __capable(), so the order of these two tests have been
switched and capable() is used instead.
(5) In smack_file_send_sigiotask(), we need to allow privileged processes to
receive SIGIO on files they're manipulating.
(6) In smack_task_wait(), we let a process wait for a privileged process,
whether or not the process doing the waiting is privileged.
I've tested this with the LTP SELinux and syscalls testscripts.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
expr_isvalid() in conditional.c was off-by-one and allowed
invalid expression type COND_LAST. However, it is this header file
that needs to be fixed. That way the if-statement's disjunction's
second component reads more naturally, "if expr type is greater than
the last allowed value" ( rather than using ">=" in conditional.c):
if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST)
Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
There have been a number of requests to make the Smack LSM
enforce MAC even in the face of privilege, either capability
based or superuser based. This is not universally desired,
however, so it seems desirable to make it optional. Further,
at least one legacy OS implemented a scheme whereby only
processes running with one particular label could be exempt
from MAC. This patch supports these three cases.
If /smack/onlycap is empty (unset or null-string) privilege
is enforced in the normal way.
If /smack/onlycap contains a label only processes running with
that label may be MAC exempt.
If the label in /smack/onlycap is the star label ("*") the
semantics of the star label combine with the privilege
restrictions to prevent any violations of MAC, even in the
presence of privilege.
Again, this will be independent of the privilege scheme.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a potentially uninitialised variable in SELinux hooks that's given a
pointer to the network address by selinux_parse_skb() passing a pointer back
through its argument list. By restructuring selinux_parse_skb(), the compiler
can see that the error case need not set it as the caller will return
immediately.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Trivial minor fixes that change C null character style.
Signed-off-by: Vesa-Matti Kari <vmkari@cc.helsinki.fi>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch makes the needlessly global selinux_write_opts() static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Given a hosed SELinux config in which a system never loads policy or
disables SELinux we currently just return -EINVAL for anyone trying to
read /proc/mounts. This is a configuration problem but we can certainly
be more graceful. This patch just ignores -EINVAL when displaying LSM
options and causes /proc/mounts display everything else it can. If
policy isn't loaded the obviously there are no options, so we aren't
really loosing any information here.
This is safe as the only other return of EINVAL comes from
security_sid_to_context_core() in the case of an invalid sid. Even if a
FS was mounted with a now invalidated context that sid should have been
remapped to unlabeled and so we won't hit the EINVAL and will work like
we should. (yes, I tested to make sure it worked like I thought)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6: (39 commits)
[PATCH] fix RLIM_NOFILE handling
[PATCH] get rid of corner case in dup3() entirely
[PATCH] remove remaining namei_{32,64}.h crap
[PATCH] get rid of indirect users of namei.h
[PATCH] get rid of __user_path_lookup_open
[PATCH] f_count may wrap around
[PATCH] dup3 fix
[PATCH] don't pass nameidata to __ncp_lookup_validate()
[PATCH] don't pass nameidata to gfs2_lookupi()
[PATCH] new (local) helper: user_path_parent()
[PATCH] sanitize __user_walk_fd() et.al.
[PATCH] preparation to __user_walk_fd cleanup
[PATCH] kill nameidata passing to permission(), rename to inode_permission()
[PATCH] take noexec checks to very few callers that care
Re: [PATCH 3/6] vfs: open_exec cleanup
[patch 4/4] vfs: immutable inode checking cleanup
[patch 3/4] fat: dont call notify_change
[patch 2/4] vfs: utimes cleanup
[patch 1/4] vfs: utimes: move owner check into inode_change_ok()
[PATCH] vfs: use kstrdup() and check failing allocation
...
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6:
netns: fix ip_rt_frag_needed rt_is_expired
netfilter: nf_conntrack_extend: avoid unnecessary "ct->ext" dereferences
netfilter: fix double-free and use-after free
netfilter: arptables in netns for real
netfilter: ip{,6}tables_security: fix future section mismatch
selinux: use nf_register_hooks()
netfilter: ebtables: use nf_register_hooks()
Revert "pkt_sched: sch_sfq: dump a real number of flows"
qeth: use dev->ml_priv instead of dev->priv
syncookies: Make sure ECN is disabled
net: drop unused BUG_TRAP()
net: convert BUG_TRAP to generic WARN_ON
drivers/net: convert BUG_TRAP to generic WARN_ON
The FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl() calls notify_change() to change
the file mode before changing the inode attributes. Replace with
explicit calls to security_inode_setattr(), fat_setattr() and
fsnotify_change().
This is equivalent to the original. The reason it is needed, is that
later in the series we move the immutable check into notify_change().
That would break the FAT_IOCTL_SET_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, as it needs to
perform the mode change regardless of the immutability of the file.
[Fix error if fat is built as a module. Thanks to OGAWA Hirofumi for
noticing.]
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: OGAWA Hirofumi <hirofumi@mail.parknet.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
This adds the tracehook_tracer_task() hook to consolidate all forms of
"Who is using ptrace on me?" logic. This is used for "TracerPid:" in
/proc and for permission checks. We also clean up the selinux code the
called an identical accessor.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Currently this list is protected with a simple spinlock, even for reading
from one. This is OK, but can be better.
Actually I want it to be better very much, since after replacing the
OpenVZ device permissions engine with the cgroup-based one I noticed, that
we set 12 default device permissions for each newly created container (for
/dev/null, full, terminals, ect devices), and people sometimes have up to
20 perms more, so traversing the ~30-40 elements list under a spinlock
doesn't seem very good.
Here's the RCU protection for white-list - dev_whitelist_item-s are added
and removed under the devcg->lock, but are looked up in permissions
checking under the rcu_read_lock.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch converts devcgroup_access_write() from a raw file handler
into a handler for the cgroup write_string() method. This allows some
boilerplate copying/locking/checking to be removed and simplifies the
cleanup path, since these functions are performed by the cgroups
framework before calling the handler.
Signed-off-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Paul Jackson <pj@sgi.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Filesystem capabilities have come of age. Remove the experimental tag for
configuring filesystem capabilities.
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
When cap_bset suppresses some of the forced (fP) capabilities of a file,
it is generally only safe to execute the program if it understands how to
recognize it doesn't have enough privilege to work correctly. For legacy
applications (fE!=0), which have no non-destructive way to determine that
they are missing privilege, we fail to execute (EPERM) any executable that
requires fP capabilities, but would otherwise get pP' < fP. This is a
fail-safe permission check.
For some discussion of why it is problematic for (legacy) privileged
applications to run with less than the set of capabilities requested for
them, see:
http://userweb.kernel.org/~morgan/sendmail-capabilities-war-story.html
With this iteration of this support, we do not include setuid-0 based
privilege protection from the bounding set. That is, the admin can still
(ab)use the bounding set to suppress the privileges of a setuid-0 program.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This reverts commit 811f379927.
From Eric Paris:
"Please drop this patch for now. It deadlocks on ntfs-3g. I need to
rework it to handle fuse filesystems better. (casey was right)"
The register security hook is no longer required, as the capability
module is always registered. LSMs wishing to stack capability as
a secondary module should do so explicitly.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Remove the dummy module and make the "capability" module the default.
Compile and boot tested.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The sb_get_mnt_opts() hook is unused, and is superseded by the
sb_show_options() hook.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch causes SELinux mount options to show up in /proc/mounts. As
with other code in the area seq_put errors are ignored. Other LSM's
will not have their mount options displayed until they fill in their own
security_sb_show_options() function.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Currently if a FS is mounted for which SELinux policy does not define an
fs_use_* that FS will either be genfs labeled or not labeled at all.
This decision is based on the existence of a genfscon rule in policy and
is irrespective of the capabilities of the filesystem itself. This
patch allows the kernel to check if the filesystem supports security
xattrs and if so will use those if there is no fs_use_* rule in policy.
An fstype with a no fs_use_* rule but with a genfs rule will use xattrs
if available and will follow the genfs rule.
This can be particularly interesting for things like ecryptfs which
actually overlays a real underlying FS. If we define excryptfs in
policy to use xattrs we will likely get this wrong at times, so with
this path we just don't need to define it!
Overlay ecryptfs on top of NFS with no xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses genfs_contexts
Overlay ecryptfs on top of ext4 with xattr support:
SELinux: initialized (dev ecryptfs, type ecryptfs), uses xattr
It is also useful as the kernel adds new FS we don't need to add them in
policy if they support xattrs and that is how we want to handle them.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix several warnings generated by sparse of the form
"returning void-valued expression".
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Use do_each_thread as a proper do/while block. Sparse complained.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Remove unused and shadowed addrlen variable. Picked up by sparse.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
I've gotten complaints and reports about people not understanding the
meaning of the current unknown class/perm handling the kernel emits on
every policy load. Hopefully this will make make it clear to everyone
the meaning of the message and won't waste a printk the user won't care
about anyway on systems where the kernel and the policy agree on
everything.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
On Mon, 2008-06-09 at 01:24 -0700, Andrew Morton wrote:
> Getting a few of these with FC5:
>
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
> SELinux: context_struct_compute_av: unrecognized class 69
>
> one came out when I logged in.
>
> No other symptoms, yet.
Change handling of invalid classes by SELinux, reporting class values
unknown to the kernel as errors (w/ ratelimit applied) and handling
class values unknown to policy as normal denials.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
We used to protect against races of policy load in security_load_policy
by using the load_mutex. Since then we have added a new mutex,
sel_mutex, in sel_write_load() which is always held across all calls to
security_load_policy we are covered and can safely just drop this one.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The class_to_string array is referenced by tclass. My code mistakenly
was using tclass - 1. If the proceeding class is a userspace class
rather than kernel class this may cause a denial/EINVAL even if unknown
handling is set to allow. The bug shouldn't be allowing excess
privileges since those are given based on the contents of another array
which should be correctly referenced.
At this point in time its pretty unlikely this is going to cause
problems. The most recently added kernel classes which could be
affected are association, dccp_socket, and peer. Its pretty unlikely
any policy with handle_unknown=allow doesn't have association and
dccp_socket undefined (they've been around longer than unknown handling)
and peer is conditionalized on a policy cap which should only be defined
if that class exists in policy.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix an endianness bug in the handling of network node addresses by
SELinux. This yields no change on little endian hardware but fixes
the incorrect handling on big endian hardware. The network node
addresses are stored in network order in memory by checkpolicy, not in
cpu/host order, and thus should not have cpu_to_le32/le32_to_cpu
conversions applied upon policy write/read unlike other data in the
policy.
Bug reported by John Weeks of Sun, who noticed that binary policy
files built from the same policy source on x86 and sparc differed and
tracked it down to the ipv4 address handling in checkpolicy.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Simplify and improve the robustness of the SELinux ioctl checking by
using the "access mode" bits of the ioctl command to determine the
permission check rather than dealing with individual command values.
This removes any knowledge of specific ioctl commands from SELinux
and follows the same guidance we gave to Smack earlier.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Enable processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in policy
to get undefined contexts on inodes. This extends the support for
deferred mapping of security contexts in order to permit restorecon
and similar programs to see the raw file contexts unknown to the
system policy in order to check them.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
read access or full attach access is requested. This allows security
modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
full ptrace access. The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.
Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
to already be ptracing the target. The other ptrace checks within
proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
read mode instead of attach.
In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label. This
enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
permitting control or manipulation of the target process, as there are
a number of cases where programs probe for such information via proc
but do not need to be able to control the target (e.g. procps,
lsof, PolicyKit, ConsoleKit). At present we have to choose between
allowing full ptrace in policy (more permissive than required/desired)
or breaking functionality (or in some cases just silencing the denials
via dontaudit rules but this can hide genuine attacks).
This version of the patch incorporates comments from Casey Schaufler
(change/replace existing ptrace_may_attach interface, pass access
mode), and Chris Wright (provide greater consistency in the checking).
Note that like their predecessors __ptrace_may_attach and
ptrace_may_attach, the __ptrace_may_access and ptrace_may_access
interfaces use different return value conventions from each other (0
or -errno vs. 1 or 0). I retained this difference to avoid any
changes to the caller logic but made the difference clearer by
changing the latter interface to return a bool rather than an int and
by adding a comment about it to ptrace.h for any future callers.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Remove inherit field from inode_security_struct, per Stephen Smalley:
"Let's just drop inherit altogether - dead field."
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
reorder inode_security_struct to remove padding on 64 bit builds
size reduced from 72 to 64 bytes increasing objects per slab to 64.
Signed-off-by: Richard Kennedy <richard@rsk.demon.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Formatting and syntax changes
whitespace, tabs to spaces, trailing space
put open { on same line as struct def
remove unneeded {} after if statements
change printk("Lu") to printk("llu")
convert asm/uaccess.h to linux/uaacess.h includes
remove unnecessary asm/bug.h includes
convert all users of simple_strtol to strict_strtol
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Fix a sleeping function called from invalid context bug by moving allocation
to the callers prior to taking the policy rdlock.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Introduce SELinux support for deferred mapping of security contexts in
the SID table upon policy reload, and use this support for inode
security contexts when the context is not yet valid under the current
policy. Only processes with CAP_MAC_ADMIN + mac_admin permission in
policy can set undefined security contexts on inodes. Inodes with
such undefined contexts are treated as having the unlabeled context
until the context becomes valid upon a policy reload that defines the
context. Context invalidation upon policy reload also uses this
support to save the context information in the SID table and later
recover it upon a subsequent policy reload that defines the context
again.
This support is to enable package managers and similar programs to set
down file contexts unknown to the system policy at the time the file
is created in order to better support placing loadable policy modules
in packages and to support build systems that need to create images of
different distro releases with different policies w/o requiring all of
the contexts to be defined or legal in the build host policy.
With this patch applied, the following sequence is possible, although
in practice it is recommended that this permission only be allowed to
specific program domains such as the package manager.
# rmdir baz
# rm bar
# touch bar
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# cat setundefined.te
policy_module(setundefined, 1.0)
require {
type unconfined_t;
type unlabeled_t;
}
files_type(unlabeled_t)
allow unconfined_t self:capability2 mac_admin;
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile setundefined.pp
# semodule -i setundefined.pp
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # foo_exec_t is not yet defined
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz
# cat foo.te
policy_module(foo, 1.0)
type foo_exec_t;
files_type(foo_exec_t)
# make -f /usr/share/selinux/devel/Makefile foo.pp
# semodule -i foo.pp # defines foo_exec_t
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# semodule -r foo
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t baz
# semodule -i foo.pp
# ls -Zd bar baz
-rw-r--r-- root root user_u:object_r:foo_exec_t bar
drwxr-xr-x root root system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
# semodule -r setundefined foo
# chcon -t foo_exec_t bar # no longer defined and not allowed
chcon: failed to change context of `bar' to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
# rmdir baz
# mkdir -Z system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t baz
mkdir: failed to set default file creation context to `system_u:object_r:foo_exec_t': Invalid argument
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
# cat devices.list
c 1:3 r
# echo 'c 1:3 w' > sub/devices.allow
# cat sub/devices.list
c 1:3 w
As illustrated, the parent group has no write permission to /dev/null, so
it's child should not be allowed to add this write permission.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
# echo "b $((0x7fffffff)):$((0x80000000)) rwm" > devices.allow
# cat devices.list
b 214748364:-21474836 rwm
though a major/minor number of 0x800000000 is meaningless, we
should not cast it to a negative value.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
# cat /devcg/devices.list
a *:* rwm
# echo a > devices.allow
# cat /devcg/devices.list
a *:* rwm
a 0:0 rwm
This is odd and maybe confusing. With this patch, writing 'a' to
devices.allow will add 'a *:* rwm' to the whitelist.
Also a few fixes and updates to the document.
Signed-off-by: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The filesystem capability support meaning for CAP_SETPCAP is less powerful
than the non-filesystem capability support. As such, when filesystem
capabilities are configured, we should not permit CAP_SETPCAP to 'enhance'
the current process through strace manipulation of a child process.
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The dummy module is used by folk that run security conscious code(!?). A
feature of such code (for example, dhclient) is that it tries to operate
with minimum privilege (dropping unneeded capabilities). While the dummy
module doesn't restrict code execution based on capability state, the user
code expects the kernel to appear to support it. This patch adds back
faked support for the PR_SET_KEEPCAPS etc., calls - making the kernel
behave as before 2.6.26.
For details see: http://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=10748
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This semaphore doesn't appear to be used, so remove it.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Walker <dwalker@mvista.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Consider you added a 'c foo:bar r' permission to some cgroup and then (a
bit later) 'c'foo:bar w' for it. After this you'll see the
c foo:bar r
c foo:bar w
lines in a devices.list file.
Another example - consider you added 10 'c foo:bar r' permissions to some
cgroup (e.g. by mistake). After this you'll see 10 c foo:bar r lines in
a list file.
This is weird. This situation also has one more annoying consequence.
Having many items in a white list makes permissions checking slower, sine
it has to walk a longer list.
The proposal is to merge permissions for items, that correspond to the
same device.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Two functions, that need to get a device_cgroup from a task (they are
devcgroup_inode_permission and devcgroup_inode_mknod) make it in a strange
way:
They get a css_set from task, then a subsys_state from css_set, then a
cgroup from the state and then a subsys_state again from the cgroup.
Besides, the devices_subsys_id is read from memory, whilst there's a
enum-ed constant for it.
Optimize this part a bit:
1. Get the subsys_stats form the task and be done - no 2 extra
dereferences,
2. Use the device_subsys_id constant, not the value from memory
(i.e. one less dereference).
Found while preparing 2.6.26 OpenVZ port.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This is just picking the container_of out of cgroup_to_devcgroup into a
separate function.
This new css_to_devcgroup will be used in the 2nd patch.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The d_instantiate hook for Smack can hang on the root inode of a
filesystem if the file system code has not really done all the set-up.
Fuse is known to encounter this problem.
This change detects an attempt to instantiate a root inode and addresses
it early in the processing, before any attempt is made to do something
that might hang.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Every implementation of ->task_kill() does nothing when the signal comes from
the kernel. This is correct, but means that check_kill_permission() should
call security_task_kill() only for SI_FROMUSER() case, and we can remove the
same check from ->task_kill() implementations.
(sadly, check_kill_permission() is the last user of signal->session/__session
but we can't s/task_session_nr/task_session/ here).
NOTE: Eric W. Biederman pointed out cap_task_kill() should die, and I think
he is very right.
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: David Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Cc: Harald Welte <laforge@gnumonks.org>
Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Setup the new Audit hooks for Smack. SELinux Audit rule fields are recycled
to avoid `auditd' userspace modifications. Currently only equality testing
is supported on labels acting as a subject (AUDIT_SUBJ_USER) or as an object
(AUDIT_OBJ_USER).
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Make secctx_to_secid() take constant secdata.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'audit.b50' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/audit-current:
[PATCH] new predicate - AUDIT_FILETYPE
[patch 2/2] Use find_task_by_vpid in audit code
[patch 1/2] audit: let userspace fully control TTY input auditing
[PATCH 2/2] audit: fix sparse shadowed variable warnings
[PATCH 1/2] audit: move extern declarations to audit.h
Audit: MAINTAINERS update
Audit: increase the maximum length of the key field
Audit: standardize string audit interfaces
Audit: stop deadlock from signals under load
Audit: save audit_backlog_limit audit messages in case auditd comes back
Audit: collect sessionid in netlink messages
Audit: end printk with newline
Since these two source files invoke kmalloc(), they should explicitly
include <linux/slab.h>.
Signed-off-by: Robert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Make the keyring quotas controllable through /proc/sys files:
(*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxkeys
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/root_maxbytes
Maximum number of keys that root may have and the maximum total number of
bytes of data that root may have stored in those keys.
(*) /proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxkeys
/proc/sys/kernel/keys/maxbytes
Maximum number of keys that each non-root user may have and the maximum
total number of bytes of data that each of those users may have stored in
their keys.
Also increase the quotas as a number of people have been complaining that it's
not big enough. I'm not sure that it's big enough now either, but on the
other hand, it can now be set in /etc/sysctl.conf.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Don't generate the per-UID user and user session keyrings unless they're
explicitly accessed. This solves a problem during a login process whereby
set*uid() is called before the SELinux PAM module, resulting in the per-UID
keyrings having the wrong security labels.
This also cures the problem of multiple per-UID keyrings sometimes appearing
due to PAM modules (including pam_keyinit) setuiding and causing user_structs
to come into and go out of existence whilst the session keyring pins the user
keyring. This is achieved by first searching for extant per-UID keyrings
before inventing new ones.
The serial bound argument is also dropped from find_keyring_by_name() as it's
not currently made use of (setting it to 0 disables the feature).
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Cc: <dwalsh@redhat.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The key_create_or_update() function provided by the keyring code has a default
set of permissions that are always applied to the key when created. This
might not be desirable to all clients.
Here's a patch that adds a "perm" parameter to the function to address this,
which can be set to KEY_PERM_UNDEF to revert to the current behaviour.
Signed-off-by: Arun Raghavan <arunsr@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Satyam Sharma <ssatyam@cse.iitk.ac.in>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add a keyctl() function to get the security label of a key.
The following is added to Documentation/keys.txt:
(*) Get the LSM security context attached to a key.
long keyctl(KEYCTL_GET_SECURITY, key_serial_t key, char *buffer,
size_t buflen)
This function returns a string that represents the LSM security context
attached to a key in the buffer provided.
Unless there's an error, it always returns the amount of data it could
produce, even if that's too big for the buffer, but it won't copy more
than requested to userspace. If the buffer pointer is NULL then no copy
will take place.
A NUL character is included at the end of the string if the buffer is
sufficiently big. This is included in the returned count. If no LSM is
in force then an empty string will be returned.
A process must have view permission on the key for this function to be
successful.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: declare keyctl_get_security()]
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Allow the callout data to be passed as a blob rather than a string for
internal kernel services that call any request_key_*() interface other than
request_key(). request_key() itself still takes a NUL-terminated string.
The functions that change are:
request_key_with_auxdata()
request_key_async()
request_key_async_with_auxdata()
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Check the starting keyring as part of the search to (a) see if that is what
we're searching for, and (b) to check it is still valid for searching.
The scenario: User in process A does things that cause things to be created in
its process session keyring. The user then does an su to another user and
starts a new process, B. The two processes now share the same process session
keyring.
Process B does an NFS access which results in an upcall to gssd. When gssd
attempts to instantiate the context key (to be linked into the process session
keyring), it is denied access even though it has an authorization key.
The order of calls is:
keyctl_instantiate_key()
lookup_user_key() (the default: case)
search_process_keyrings(current)
search_process_keyrings(rka->context) (recursive call)
keyring_search_aux()
keyring_search_aux() verifies the keys and keyrings underneath the top-level
keyring it is given, but that top-level keyring is neither fully validated nor
checked to see if it is the thing being searched for.
This patch changes keyring_search_aux() to:
1) do more validation on the top keyring it is given and
2) check whether that top-level keyring is the thing being searched for
Signed-off-by: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Increase the size of a payload that can be used to instantiate a key in
add_key() and keyctl_instantiate_key(). This permits huge CIFS SPNEGO blobs
to be passed around. The limit is raised to 1MB. If kmalloc() can't allocate
a buffer of sufficient size, vmalloc() will be tried instead.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Introduce a read_seq() helper in cftype, which uses seq_file to print out
lists. Use it in the devices cgroup. Also split devices.allow into two
files, so now devices.deny and devices.allow are the ones to use to manipulate
the whitelist, while devices.list outputs the cgroup's current whitelist.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Implement a cgroup to track and enforce open and mknod restrictions on device
files. A device cgroup associates a device access whitelist with each cgroup.
A whitelist entry has 4 fields. 'type' is a (all), c (char), or b (block).
'all' means it applies to all types and all major and minor numbers. Major
and minor are either an integer or * for all. Access is a composition of r
(read), w (write), and m (mknod).
The root device cgroup starts with rwm to 'all'. A child devcg gets a copy of
the parent. Admins can then remove devices from the whitelist or add new
entries. A child cgroup can never receive a device access which is denied its
parent. However when a device access is removed from a parent it will not
also be removed from the child(ren).
An entry is added using devices.allow, and removed using
devices.deny. For instance
echo 'c 1:3 mr' > /cgroups/1/devices.allow
allows cgroup 1 to read and mknod the device usually known as
/dev/null. Doing
echo a > /cgroups/1/devices.deny
will remove the default 'a *:* mrw' entry.
CAP_SYS_ADMIN is needed to change permissions or move another task to a new
cgroup. A cgroup may not be granted more permissions than the cgroup's parent
has. Any task can move itself between cgroups. This won't be sufficient, but
we can decide the best way to adequately restrict movement later.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix may-be-used-uninitialized warning]
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Looks-good-to: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: Daniel Hokka Zakrisson <daniel@hozac.com>
Cc: Li Zefan <lizf@cn.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com>
Cc: Balbir Singh <balbir@in.ibm.com>
Cc: KAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Add missing consts to xattr function arguments.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/selinux-2.6:
SELinux: Fix a RCU free problem with the netport cache
SELinux: Made netnode cache adds faster
SELinux: include/security.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: policydb.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: mls_types.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: mls.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: hashtab.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: context.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: ss/conditional.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: selinux/include/security.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: objsec.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: netlabel.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
SELinux: avc_ss.h whitespace, syntax, and other cleanups
Fixed up conflict in include/linux/security.h manually
With the introduction of per-process securebits, the capabilities-related
prctl callbacks were moved into cap_task_prctl(). Have smack use
cap_task_prctl() so that PR_SET_KEEPCAPS is defined.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The functions smk_cipso_doi and smk_unlbl_ambient are not used outside
smackfs.c and should hence be static.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
With the introduction of per-process securebits, the capabilities-related
prctl callbacks were moved into cap_task_prctl(). Have root_plug use
cap_task_prctl() so that PR_SET_KEEPCAPS is defined.
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0
based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem
support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually)
possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain
privilege via (set)uid-0.
Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few
user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently
prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many
applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel
will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs.
Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is
desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their
privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable
sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser
from the process' tree of children.
The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege
associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to
initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited
through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the
historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which
has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel.
With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop
all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently
fork()'d/exec()'d children with:
prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f);
This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is
enabled at configure time.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning]
[serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY]
Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch standardized the string auditing interfaces. No userspace
changes will be visible and this is all just cleanup and consistancy
work. We have the following string audit interfaces to use:
void audit_log_n_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
void audit_log_n_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf, size_t n);
void audit_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *buf);
void audit_log_n_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string, size_t n);
void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string);
This may be the first step to possibly fixing some of the issues that
people have with the string output from the kernel audit system. But we
still don't have an agreed upon solution to that problem.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Previously I added sessionid output to all audit messages where it was
available but we still didn't know the sessionid of the sender of
netlink messages. This patch adds that information to netlink messages
so we can audit who sent netlink messages.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
The netport cache doesn't free resources in a manner which is safe or orderly.
This patch fixes this by adding in a missing call to rcu_dereference() in
sel_netport_insert() as well as some general cleanup throughout the file.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
When adding new entries to the network node cache we would walk the entire
hash bucket to make sure we didn't cross a threshold (done to bound the
cache size). This isn't a very quick or elegant solution for something
which is supposed to be quick-ish so add a counter to each hash bucket to
track the size of the bucket and eliminate the need to walk the entire
bucket list on each add.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes policydb.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
location of * in pointer declarations
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes mls_types.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
spaces used instead of tabs
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes mls.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
spaces used instead of tabs
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes hashtab.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
spaces used instead of tabs
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes context.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
include spaces around , in function calls
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes ss/conditional.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
location of * in pointer declarations
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes selinux/include/security.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
no assignments in if statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes objsec.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
no assignments in if statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes netlabel.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
spaces used instead of tabs
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes avc_ss.h to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
no assignments in if statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs-2.6:
[PATCH] get rid of __exit_files(), __exit_fs() and __put_fs_struct()
[PATCH] proc_readfd_common() race fix
[PATCH] double-free of inode on alloc_file() failure exit in create_write_pipe()
[PATCH] teach seq_file to discard entries
[PATCH] umount_tree() will unhash everything itself
[PATCH] get rid of more nameidata passing in namespace.c
[PATCH] switch a bunch of LSM hooks from nameidata to path
[PATCH] lock exclusively in collect_mounts() and drop_collected_mounts()
[PATCH] move a bunch of declarations to fs/internal.h
The attached patch needs to move from -rt to mainline given preemptable RCU.
This patch fixes SELinux code that implicitly assumes that disabling
preemption prevents an RCU grace period from completing, an assumption that
is valid for Classic RCU, but not necessarily for preemptable RCU. Explicit
rcu_read_lock() calls are thus added.
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt <srostedt@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The Fedora installer actually makes multiple NFS mounts before it loads
selinux policy. The code in selinux_clone_mnt_opts() assumed that the
init process would always be loading policy before NFS was up and
running. It might be possible to hit this in a diskless environment as
well, I'm not sure. There is no need to BUG_ON() in this situation
since we can safely continue given the circumstances.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
avc.c was bad. It had whitespace and syntax issues which are against
our coding style. I have had a little chat with it and the result of
that conversation looked like this patch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Why would anyone just clean up white space all day? Because they were
out too late last night and don't want to think for a day. So here is a
nice clean selinuxfs.c patch.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
More formatting changes. Aside from the 80 character line limit even
the checkpatch scripts like this file now. Too bad I don't get paid by
the lines of code I change.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
All whitespace and formatting. Nothing interesting to see here. About
the only thing to remember is that we aren't supposed to initialize
static variables to 0/NULL. It is done for us and doing it ourselves
puts them in a different section.
With this patch running checkpatch.pl against hooks.c only gives us
complaints about busting the 80 character limit and declaring extern's
in .c files. Apparently they don't like it, but I don't feel like going
to the trouble of moving those to .h files...
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Make sure all printk start with KERN_*
Make sure all printk end with \n
Make sure all printk have the word 'selinux' in them
Change "function name" to "%s", __func__ (found 2 wrong)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes sidtab.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes services.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes mls.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes hashtab.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes ebitmap.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes conditional.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes avtab.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes xfrm.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes nlmsgtab.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes netnode.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes netlink.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes netlabel.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
locateion of { around struct and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch changes netif.c to fix whitespace and syntax issues. Things that
are fixed may include (does not not have to include)
whitespace at end of lines
spaces followed by tabs
spaces used instead of tabs
spacing around parenthesis
location of { around structs and else clauses
location of * in pointer declarations
removal of initialization of static data to keep it in the right section
useless {} in if statemetns
useless checking for NULL before kfree
fixing of the indentation depth of switch statements
and any number of other things I forgot to mention
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6:
security: fix up documentation for security_module_enable
Security: Introduce security= boot parameter
Audit: Final renamings and cleanup
SELinux: use new audit hooks, remove redundant exports
Audit: internally use the new LSM audit hooks
LSM/Audit: Introduce generic Audit LSM hooks
SELinux: remove redundant exports
Netlink: Use generic LSM hook
Audit: use new LSM hooks instead of SELinux exports
SELinux: setup new inode/ipc getsecid hooks
LSM: Introduce inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid hooks
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-2.6.26: (1090 commits)
[NET]: Fix and allocate less memory for ->priv'less netdevices
[IPV6]: Fix dangling references on error in fib6_add().
[NETLABEL]: Fix NULL deref in netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen() if ifindex not found
[PKT_SCHED]: Fix datalen check in tcf_simp_init().
[INET]: Uninline the __inet_inherit_port call.
[INET]: Drop the inet_inherit_port() call.
SCTP: Initialize partial_bytes_acked to 0, when all of the data is acked.
[netdrvr] forcedeth: internal simplifications; changelog removal
phylib: factor out get_phy_id from within get_phy_device
PHY: add BCM5464 support to broadcom PHY driver
cxgb3: Fix __must_check warning with dev_dbg.
tc35815: Statistics cleanup
natsemi: fix MMIO for PPC 44x platforms
[TIPC]: Cleanup of TIPC reference table code
[TIPC]: Optimized initialization of TIPC reference table
[TIPC]: Remove inlining of reference table locking routines
e1000: convert uint16_t style integers to u16
ixgb: convert uint16_t style integers to u16
sb1000.c: make const arrays static
sb1000.c: stop inlining largish static functions
...
Add the security= boot parameter. This is done to avoid LSM
registration clashes in case of more than one bult-in module.
User can choose a security module to enable at boot. If no
security= boot parameter is specified, only the first LSM
asking for registration will be loaded. An invalid security
module name will be treated as if no module has been chosen.
LSM modules must check now if they are allowed to register
by calling security_module_enable(ops) first. Modify SELinux
and SMACK to do so.
Do not let SMACK register smackfs if it was not chosen on
boot. Smackfs assumes that smack hooks are registered and
the initial task security setup (swapper->security) is done.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Rename the se_str and se_rule audit fields elements to
lsm_str and lsm_rule to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Setup the new Audit LSM hooks for SELinux.
Remove the now redundant exported SELinux Audit interface.
Audit: Export 'audit_krule' and 'audit_field' to the public
since their internals are needed by the implementation of the
new LSM hook 'audit_rule_known'.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Introduce a generic Audit interface for security modules
by adding the following new LSM hooks:
audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, lsmrule)
audit_rule_known(krule)
audit_rule_match(secid, field, op, rule, actx)
audit_rule_free(rule)
Those hooks are only available if CONFIG_AUDIT is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Remove the following exported SELinux interfaces:
selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, sid)
selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, sid)
selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, sid)
selinux_sid_to_string(sid, ctx, len)
They can be substitued with the following generic equivalents
respectively:
new LSM hook, inode_getsecid(inode, secid)
new LSM hook, ipc_getsecid*(ipcp, secid)
LSM hook, task_getsecid(tsk, secid)
LSM hook, sid_to_secctx(sid, ctx, len)
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Setup the new inode_getsecid and ipc_getsecid() LSM hooks
for SELinux.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Introduce inode_getsecid(inode, secid) and ipc_getsecid(ipcp, secid)
LSM hooks. These hooks will be used instead of similar exported
SELinux interfaces.
Let {inode,ipc,task}_getsecid hooks set the secid to 0 by default
if CONFIG_SECURITY is not defined or if the hook is set to
NULL (dummy). This is done to notify the caller that no valid
secid exists.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Got burned by setting the proposed default of 65536
across all Debian archs.
Thus proposing to be more specific on which archs you may
set this. Also propose a value for arm and friends that
doesn't break sshd.
Reword to mention working archs ia64 and ppc64 too.
Signed-off-by: maximilian attems <max@stro.at>
Cc: Martin Michlmayr <tbm@cyrius.com>
Cc: Gordon Farquharson <gordonfarquharson@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Much like we added a network node cache, this patch adds a network port
cache. The design is taken almost completely from the network node cache
which in turn was taken from the network interface cache. The basic idea is
to cache entries in a hash table based on protocol/port information. The
hash function only takes the port number into account since the number of
different protocols in use at any one time is expected to be relatively
small.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Convert the strings used for mount options into #defines rather than
retyping the string throughout the SELinux code.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Every file should include the headers containing the externs for its global
code.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Introduce the concept of a permissive type. A new ebitmap is introduced to
the policy database which indicates if a given type has the permissive bit
set or not. This bit is tested for the scontext of any denial. The bit is
meaningless on types which only appear as the target of a decision and never
the source. A domain running with a permissive type will be allowed to
perform any action similarly to when the system is globally set permissive.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This changes checks related to ptrace to get rid of the ptrace_sid tracking.
It's good to disentangle the security model from the ptrace implementation
internals. It's sufficient to check against the SID of the ptracer at the
time a tracee attempts a transition.
Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
This patch turns the case where we have a call into avc_has_perm with no
requested permissions into a BUG_ON. All callers to this should be in
the kernel and thus should be a function we need to fix if we ever hit
this. The /selinux/access permission checking it done directly in the
security server and not through the avc, so those requests which we
cannot control from userspace should not be able to trigger this BUG_ON.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen D. Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
ERROR: "(foo*)" should be "(foo *)"
#168: FILE: security/selinux/hooks.c:2656:
+ "%s, rc=%d\n", __func__, (char*)value, -rc);
total: 1 errors, 0 warnings, 195 lines checked
./patches/security-replace-remaining-__function__-occurences.patch has style problems, please review. If any of these errors
are false positives report them to the maintainer, see
CHECKPATCH in MAINTAINERS.
Please run checkpatch prior to sending patches
Cc: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
__FUNCTION__ is gcc-specific, use __func__
Signed-off-by: Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Adds a new open permission inside SELinux when 'opening' a file. The idea
is that opening a file and reading/writing to that file are not the same
thing. Its different if a program had its stdout redirected to /tmp/output
than if the program tried to directly open /tmp/output. This should allow
policy writers to more liberally give read/write permissions across the
policy while still blocking many design and programing flaws SELinux is so
good at catching today.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Reviewed-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Every file should include the headers containing the externs for its
global code.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Replace "security:" prefixes in printk messages with "SELinux"
to help users identify the source of the messages. Also fix a
couple of minor formatting issues.
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The RCU/spinlock locking approach for the nlbl_state in the sk_security_struct
was almost certainly overkill. This patch removes both the RCU and spinlock
locking, relying on the existing socket locks to handle the case of multiple
writers. This change also makes several code reductions possible.
Less locking, less code - it's a Good Thing.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
The xfrm_get_policy() and xfrm_add_pol_expire() put some rather large structs
on the stack to work around the LSM API. This patch attempts to fix that
problem by changing the LSM API to require only the relevant "security"
pointers instead of the entire SPD entry; we do this for all of the
security_xfrm_policy*() functions to keep things consistent.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Smack doesn't have the need to create a private copy of the LSM "domain" when
setting NetLabel security attributes like SELinux, however, the current
NetLabel code requires a private copy of the LSM "domain". This patches fixes
that by letting the LSM determine how it wants to pass the domain value.
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY
The current behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a copy and
frees it when done
* NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN
New, Smack-friendly behavior, NetLabel assumes that the domain value is a
reference to a string managed by the LSM and does not free it when done
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
I (wrongly) assumed that nfs_xdev_get_sb() would not ever share a superblock
and so cloning mount options would always be correct. Turns out that isn't
the case and we could fall over a BUG_ON() that wasn't a BUG at all. Since
there is little we can do to reconcile different mount options this patch
just leaves the sb alone and the first set of options wins.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
More cases where SELinux must not re-enter the fs code. Called from the
d_instantiate security hook.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
BUG fix. Keep us from re-entering the fs when we aren't supposed to.
See discussion at
http://marc.info/?t=120716967100004&r=1&w=2
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <jbacik@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Handle files opened with flags 3 by checking ioctl permission.
Default to returning FILE__IOCTL from file_to_av() if the f_mode has neither
FMODE_READ nor FMODE_WRITE, and thus check ioctl permission on exec or
transfer, thereby validating such descriptors early as with normal r/w
descriptors and catching leaks of them prior to attempted usage.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Introduce per-net_device inlines: dev_net(), dev_net_set().
Without CONFIG_NET_NS, no namespace other than &init_net exists.
Let's explicitly define them to help compiler optimizations.
Signed-off-by: YOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Older smackfs was parsing MAC rules by characters, thus a need of locking
write sessions on open() was needed. This lock is no longer useful now since
each rule is handled by a single write() call.
This is also a bugfix since seq_open() was not called if an open() O_RDWR flag
was given, leading to a seq_read() without an initialized seq_file, thus an
Oops.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
The original justification for cap_task_kill() was as follows:
check_kill_permission() does appropriate uid equivalence checks.
However with file capabilities it becomes possible for an
unprivileged user to execute a file with file capabilities
resulting in a more privileged task with the same uid.
However now that cap_task_kill() always returns 0 (permission
granted) when p->uid==current->uid, the whole hook is worthless,
and only likely to create more subtle problems in the corner cases
where it might still be called but return -EPERM. Those cases
are basically when uids are different but euid/suid is equivalent
as per the check in check_kill_permission().
One example of a still-broken application is 'at' for non-root users.
This patch removes cap_task_kill().
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Earlier-version-tested-by: Luiz Fernando N. Capitulino <lcapitulino@mandriva.com.br>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
In the SYSV ipc msgctl(),semctl(),shmctl() family, if the user passed *_INFO
as the desired operation, no specific object is meant to be controlled and
only system-wide information is returned. This leads to a NULL IPC object in
the LSM hooks if the _INFO flag is given.
Avoid dereferencing this NULL pointer in Smack ipc *ctl() methods.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
This patch makes the needlessly global selinux_parse_opts_str() static.
Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Smackfs write() implementation does not put a higher bound on the number of
bytes to copy from user-space. This may lead to a DOS attack if a malicious
`count' field is given.
Assure that given `count' is exactly the length needed for a /smack/load rule.
In case of /smack/cipso where the length is relative, assure that `count'
does not exceed the size needed for a buffer representing maximum possible
number of CIPSO 2.2 categories.
Signed-off-by: Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Serge Hallyn