Commit Graph

4239 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Paolo Bonzini 04a7ea04d5 KVM/ARM updates for 4.13
- vcpu request overhaul
 - allow timer and PMU to have their interrupt number
   selected from userspace
 - workaround for Cavium erratum 30115
 - handling of memory poisonning
 - the usual crop of fixes and cleanups
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Merge tag 'kvmarm-for-4.13' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/ARM updates for 4.13

- vcpu request overhaul
- allow timer and PMU to have their interrupt number
  selected from userspace
- workaround for Cavium erratum 30115
- handling of memory poisonning
- the usual crop of fixes and cleanups

Conflicts:
	arch/s390/include/asm/kvm_host.h
2017-06-30 12:38:26 +02:00
Josh Poimboeuf c207aee480 objtool, x86: Add several functions and files to the objtool whitelist
In preparation for an objtool rewrite which will have broader checks,
whitelist functions and files which cause problems because they do
unusual things with the stack.

These whitelists serve as a TODO list for which functions and files
don't yet have undwarf unwinder coverage.  Eventually most of the
whitelists can be removed in favor of manual CFI hint annotations or
objtool improvements.

Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: live-patching@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/7f934a5d707a574bda33ea282e9478e627fb1829.1498659915.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-06-30 10:19:19 +02:00
Wanpeng Li c853354429 KVM: LAPIC: Fix lapic timer injection delay
If the TSC deadline timer is programmed really close to the deadline or
even in the past, the computation in vmx_set_hv_timer will program the
absolute target tsc value to vmcs preemption timer field w/ delta == 0,
then plays a vmentry and an upcoming vmx preemption timer fire vmexit
dance, the lapic timer injection is delayed due to this duration. Actually
the lapic timer which is emulated by hrtimer can handle this correctly.

This patch fixes it by firing the lapic timer and injecting a timer interrupt
immediately during the next vmentry if the TSC deadline timer is programmed
really close to the deadline or even in the past. This saves ~300 cycles on
the tsc_deadline_timer test of apic.flat.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-29 18:21:13 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini a749e247f7 KVM: lapic: reorganize restart_apic_timer
Move the code to cancel the hv timer into the caller, just before
it starts the hrtimer.  Check availability of the hv timer in
start_hv_timer.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-29 18:18:52 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini 35ee9e48b9 KVM: lapic: reorganize start_hv_timer
There are many cases in which the hv timer must be canceled.  Split out
a new function to avoid duplication.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-29 18:10:35 +02:00
Jim Mattson 403526054a kvm: nVMX: Check memory operand to INVVPID
The memory operand fetched for INVVPID is 128 bits. Bits 63:16 are
reserved and must be zero.  Otherwise, the instruction fails with
VMfail(Invalid operand to INVEPT/INVVPID).  If the INVVPID_TYPE is 0
(individual address invalidation), then bits 127:64 must be in
canonical form, or the instruction fails with VMfail(Invalid operand
to INVEPT/INVVPID).

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-28 22:38:37 +02:00
Ladi Prosek 1a5e185294 KVM: SVM: suppress unnecessary NMI singlestep on GIF=0 and nested exit
enable_nmi_window is supposed to be a no-op if we know that we'll see
a VM exit by the time the NMI window opens. This commit adds two more
cases:

* We intercept stgi so we don't need to singlestep on GIF=0.

* We emulate nested vmexit so we don't need to singlestep when nested
  VM exit is required.

Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-27 16:35:43 +02:00
Ladi Prosek a12713c25b KVM: SVM: don't NMI singlestep over event injection
Singlestepping is enabled by setting the TF flag and care must be
taken to not let the guest see (and reuse at an inconvenient time)
the modified rflag value. One such case is event injection, as part
of which flags are pushed on the stack and restored later on iret.

This commit disables singlestepping when we're about to inject an
event and forces an immediate exit for us to re-evaluate the NMI
related state.

Suggested-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-27 16:35:25 +02:00
Ladi Prosek 9b61174793 KVM: SVM: hide TF/RF flags used by NMI singlestep
These flags are used internally by SVM so it's cleaner to not leak
them to callers of svm_get_rflags. This is similar to how the TF
flag is handled on KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP by kvm_get_rflags and
kvm_set_rflags.

Without this change, the flags may propagate from host VMCB to nested
VMCB or vice versa while singlestepping over a nested VM enter/exit,
and then get stuck in inappropriate places.

Example: NMI singlestepping is enabled while running L1 guest. The
instruction to step over is VMRUN and nested vmrun emulation stashes
rflags to hsave->save.rflags. Then if singlestepping is disabled
while still in L2, TF/RF will be cleared from the nested VMCB but the
next nested VM exit will restore them from hsave->save.rflags and
cause an unexpected DB exception.

Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-27 16:34:58 +02:00
Ladi Prosek ab2f4d73eb KVM: nSVM: do not forward NMI window singlestep VM exits to L1
Nested hypervisor should not see singlestep VM exits if singlestepping
was enabled internally by KVM. Windows is particularly sensitive to this
and known to bluescreen on unexpected VM exits.

Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-27 16:34:47 +02:00
Ladi Prosek 4aebd0e9ca KVM: SVM: introduce disable_nmi_singlestep helper
Just moving the code to a new helper in preparation for following
commits.

Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-27 16:34:32 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini c8401dda2f KVM: x86: fix singlestepping over syscall
TF is handled a bit differently for syscall and sysret, compared
to the other instructions: TF is checked after the instruction completes,
so that the OS can disable #DB at a syscall by adding TF to FMASK.
When the sysret is executed the #DB is taken "as if" the syscall insn
just completed.

KVM emulates syscall so that it can trap 32-bit syscall on Intel processors.
Fix the behavior, otherwise you could get #DB on a user stack which is not
nice.  This does not affect Linux guests, as they use an IST or task gate
for #DB.

This fixes CVE-2017-7518.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-22 16:13:29 +02:00
Ingo Molnar a4eb8b9935 Merge branch 'linus' into x86/mm, to pick up fixes
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-06-22 10:57:28 +02:00
Andy Lutomirski 6c690ee103 x86/mm: Split read_cr3() into read_cr3_pa() and __read_cr3()
The kernel has several code paths that read CR3.  Most of them assume that
CR3 contains the PGD's physical address, whereas some of them awkwardly
use PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK to mask off low bits.

Add explicit mask macros for CR3 and convert all of the CR3 readers.
This will keep them from breaking when PCID is enabled.

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/883f8fb121f4616c1c1427ad87350bb2f5ffeca1.1497288170.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-06-13 08:48:09 +02:00
Wanpeng Li 9bc1f09f6f KVM: async_pf: avoid async pf injection when in guest mode
INFO: task gnome-terminal-:1734 blocked for more than 120 seconds.
       Not tainted 4.12.0-rc4+ #8
 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
 gnome-terminal- D    0  1734   1015 0x00000000
 Call Trace:
  __schedule+0x3cd/0xb30
  schedule+0x40/0x90
  kvm_async_pf_task_wait+0x1cc/0x270
  ? __vfs_read+0x37/0x150
  ? prepare_to_swait+0x22/0x70
  do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  ? do_async_page_fault+0x77/0xb0
  async_page_fault+0x28/0x30

This is triggered by running both win7 and win2016 on L1 KVM simultaneously,
and then gives stress to memory on L1, I can observed this hang on L1 when
at least ~70% swap area is occupied on L0.

This is due to async pf was injected to L2 which should be injected to L1,
L2 guest starts receiving pagefault w/ bogus %cr2(apf token from the host
actually), and L1 guest starts accumulating tasks stuck in D state in
kvm_async_pf_task_wait() since missing PAGE_READY async_pfs.

This patch fixes the hang by doing async pf when executing L1 guest.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-11 08:39:24 +02:00
Wanpeng Li a3641631d1 KVM: cpuid: Fix read/write out-of-bounds vulnerability in cpuid emulation
If "i" is the last element in the vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[] array, it
potentially can be exploited the vulnerability. this will out-of-bounds
read and write.  Luckily, the effect is small:

	/* when no next entry is found, the current entry[i] is reselected */
	for (j = i + 1; ; j = (j + 1) % nent) {
		struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *ej = &vcpu->arch.cpuid_entries[j];
		if (ej->function == e->function) {

It reads ej->maxphyaddr, which is user controlled.  However...

			ej->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_STATE_READ_NEXT;

After cpuid_entries there is

	int maxphyaddr;
	struct x86_emulate_ctxt emulate_ctxt;  /* 16-byte aligned */

So we have:

- cpuid_entries at offset 1B50 (6992)
- maxphyaddr at offset 27D0 (6992 + 3200 = 10192)
- padding at 27D4...27DF
- emulate_ctxt at 27E0

And it writes in the padding.  Pfew, writing the ops field of emulate_ctxt
would have been much worse.

This patch fixes it by modding the index to avoid the out-of-bounds
access. Worst case, i == j and ej->function == e->function,
the loop can bail out.

Reported-by: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Guofang Mo <moguofang@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-08 15:38:21 +02:00
Jim Mattson d281e13b0b KVM: nVMX: Update vmcs12->guest_linear_address on nested VM-exit
The guest-linear address field is set for VM exits due to attempts to
execute LMSW with a memory operand and VM exits due to attempts to
execute INS or OUTS for which the relevant segment is usable,
regardless of whether or not EPT is in use.

Fixes: 119a9c01a5 ("KVM: nVMX: pass valid guest linear-address to the L1")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-07 16:36:41 +02:00
Jim Mattson d923fcf636 KVM: nVMX: Don't update vmcs12->xss_exit_bitmap on nested VM-exit
The XSS-exiting bitmap is a VMCS control field that does not change
while the CPU is in non-root mode. Transferring the unchanged value
from vmcs02 to vmcs12 is unnecessary.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-07 16:34:08 +02:00
Jim Mattson 4531662d1a kvm: vmx: Check value written to IA32_BNDCFGS
Bits 11:2 must be zero and the linear addess in bits 63:12 must be
canonical. Otherwise, WRMSR(BNDCFGS) should raise #GP.

Fixes: 0dd376e709 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-07 16:28:55 +02:00
Jim Mattson 4439af9f91 kvm: x86: Guest BNDCFGS requires guest MPX support
The BNDCFGS MSR should only be exposed to the guest if the guest
supports MPX. (cf. the TSC_AUX MSR and RDTSCP.)

Fixes: 0dd376e709 ("KVM: x86: add MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS to msrs_to_save")
Change-Id: I3ad7c01bda616715137ceac878f3fa7e66b6b387
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-07 16:28:15 +02:00
Jim Mattson a8b6fda38f kvm: vmx: Do not disable intercepts for BNDCFGS
The MSR permission bitmaps are shared by all VMs. However, some VMs
may not be configured to support MPX, even when the host does. If the
host supports VMX and the guest does not, we should intercept accesses
to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can synthesize a #GP
fault. Furthermore, if the host does not support MPX and the
"ignore_msrs" kvm kernel parameter is set, then we should intercept
accesses to the BNDCFGS MSR, so that we can skip over the rdmsr/wrmsr
without raising a #GP fault.

Fixes: da8999d318 ("KVM: x86: Intel MPX vmx and msr handle")
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-07 16:28:15 +02:00
Wanpeng Li d4912215d1 KVM: nVMX: Fix exception injection
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 2840 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c:10966 nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
 CPU: 3 PID: 2840 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Tainted: G           OE   4.12.0-rc3+ #23
 RIP: 0010:nested_vmx_vmexit+0xdcd/0xde0 [kvm_intel]
 Call Trace:
  ? kvm_check_async_pf_completion+0xef/0x120 [kvm]
  ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x79/0x80
  vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel]
  ? vmx_queue_exception+0x104/0x160 [kvm_intel]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1171/0x1ce0 [kvm]
  ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x47/0x240 [kvm]
  ? kvm_arch_vcpu_load+0x62/0x240 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
  ? __fget+0xf3/0x210
  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
  ? __fget+0x114/0x210
  SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
  do_syscall_64+0x81/0x220
  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25

This is triggered occasionally by running both win7 and win2016 in L2, in
addition, EPT is disabled on both L1 and L2. It can't be reproduced easily.

Commit 0b6ac343fc (KVM: nVMX: Correct handling of exception injection) mentioned
that "KVM wants to inject page-faults which it got to the guest. This function
assumes it is called with the exit reason in vmcs02 being a #PF exception".
Commit e011c663 (KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to
L2) allows to check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2. However,
there is no guarantee the exit reason is exception currently, when there is an
external interrupt occurred on host, maybe a time interrupt for host which should
not be injected to guest, and somewhere queues an exception, then the function
nested_vmx_check_exception() will be called and the vmexit emulation codes will
try to emulate the "Acknowledge interrupt on exit" behavior, the warning is
triggered.

Reusing the exit reason from the L2->L0 vmexit is wrong in this case,
the reason must always be EXCEPTION_NMI when injecting an exception into
L1 as a nested vmexit.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Fixes: e011c663b9 ("KVM: nVMX: Check all exceptions for intercept during delivery to L2")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-06 15:21:50 +02:00
Andy Lutomirski d6e41f1151 x86/mm, KVM: Teach KVM's VMX code that CR3 isn't a constant
When PCID is enabled, CR3's PCID bits can change during context
switches, so KVM won't be able to treat CR3 as a per-mm constant any
more.

I structured this like the existing CR4 handling.  Under ordinary
circumstances (PCID disabled or if the current PCID and the value
that's already in the VMCS match), then we won't do an extra VMCS
write, and we'll never do an extra direct CR3 read.  The overhead
should be minimal.

I disallowed using the new helper in non-atomic context because
PCID support will cause CR3 to stop being constant in non-atomic
process context.

(Frankly, it also scares me a bit that KVM ever treated CR3 as
constant, but it looks like it was okay before.)

Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bpetkov@suse.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>
Cc: Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2017-06-05 09:59:45 +02:00
Radim Krčmář 2fa6e1e12a KVM: add kvm_request_pending
A first step in vcpu->requests encapsulation.  Additionally, we now
use READ_ONCE() when accessing vcpu->requests, which ensures we
always load vcpu->requests when it's accessed.  This is important as
other threads can change it any time.  Also, READ_ONCE() documents
that vcpu->requests is used with other threads, likely requiring
memory barriers, which it does.

Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
[ Documented the new use of READ_ONCE() and converted another check
  in arch/mips/kvm/vz.c ]
Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoffer Dall <cdall@linaro.org>
2017-06-04 16:53:00 +02:00
Nick Desaulniers 9d643f6312 KVM: x86: avoid large stack allocations in em_fxrstor
em_fxstor previously called fxstor_fixup.  Both created instances of
struct fxregs_state on the stack, which triggered the warning:

arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c:4018:12: warning: stack frame size of 1080 bytes
in function
      'em_fxrstor' [-Wframe-larger-than=]
static int em_fxrstor(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
           ^
with CONFIG_FRAME_WARN set to 1024.

This patch does the fixup in em_fxstor now, avoiding one additional
struct fxregs_state, and now fxstor_fixup can be removed as it has no
other call sites.

Further, the calculation for offsets into xmm_space can be shared
between em_fxstor and em_fxsave.

Signed-off-by: Nick Desaulniers <nick.desaulniers@gmail.com>
[Clean up calculation of offsets and fix it for 64-bit mode. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-01 11:23:12 +02:00
Dan Carpenter 7461fbc46e KVM: white space cleanup in nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs()
This should have been indented one more character over and it should use
tabs.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-01 11:23:11 +02:00
Dan Carpenter e9196cebbe KVM: Tidy the whitespace in nested_svm_check_permissions()
I moved the || to the line before.  Also I replaced some spaces with a
tab on the "return 0;" line.  It looks OK in the diff but originally
that line was only indented 7 spaces.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-06-01 11:23:11 +02:00
ZhuangYanying 47a66eed99 KVM: x86: Fix nmi injection failure when vcpu got blocked
When spin_lock_irqsave() deadlock occurs inside the guest, vcpu threads,
other than the lock-holding one, would enter into S state because of
pvspinlock. Then inject NMI via libvirt API "inject-nmi", the NMI could
not be injected into vm.

The reason is:
1 It sets nmi_queued to 1 when calling ioctl KVM_NMI in qemu, and sets
cpu->kvm_vcpu_dirty to true in do_inject_external_nmi() meanwhile.
2 It sets nmi_queued to 0 in process_nmi(), before entering guest, because
cpu->kvm_vcpu_dirty is true.

It's not enough just to check nmi_queued to decide whether to stay in
vcpu_block() or not. NMI should be injected immediately at any situation.
Add checking nmi_pending, and testing KVM_REQ_NMI replaces nmi_queued
in vm_vcpu_has_events().

Do the same change for SMIs.

Signed-off-by: Zhuang Yanying <ann.zhuangyanying@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-01 11:23:10 +02:00
Roman Pen d9c1b5431d KVM: SVM: do not zero out segment attributes if segment is unusable or not present
This is a fix for the problem [1], where VMCB.CPL was set to 0 and interrupt
was taken on userspace stack.  The root cause lies in the specific AMD CPU
behaviour which manifests itself as unusable segment attributes on SYSRET.
The corresponding work around for the kernel is the following:

61f01dd941 ("x86_64, asm: Work around AMD SYSRET SS descriptor attribute issue")

In other turn virtualization side treated unusable segment incorrectly and
restored CPL from SS attributes, which were zeroed out few lines above.

In current patch it is assured only that P bit is cleared in VMCB.save state
and segment attributes are not zeroed out if segment is not presented or is
unusable, therefore CPL can be safely restored from DPL field.

This is only one part of the fix, since QEMU side should be fixed accordingly
not to zero out attributes on its side.  Corresponding patch will follow.

[1] Message id: CAJrWOzD6Xq==b-zYCDdFLgSRMPM-NkNuTSDFEtX=7MreT45i7Q@mail.gmail.com

Signed-off-by: Roman Pen <roman.penyaev@profitbricks.com>
Signed-off-by: Mikhail Sennikovskii <mikhail.sennikovskii@profitbricks.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim KrÄmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-06-01 11:21:17 +02:00
Gioh Kim 8eae9570d1 KVM: SVM: ignore type when setting segment registers
Commit 19bca6ab75 ("KVM: SVM: Fix cross vendor migration issue with
unusable bit") added checking type when setting unusable.
So unusable can be set if present is 0 OR type is 0.
According to the AMD processor manual, long mode ignores the type value
in segment descriptor. And type can be 0 if it is read-only data segment.
Therefore type value is not related to unusable flag.

This patch is based on linux-next v4.12.0-rc3.

Signed-off-by: Gioh Kim <gi-oh.kim@profitbricks.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-30 17:17:22 +02:00
Radim Krčmář cbf712792b KVM: nVMX: fix nested_vmx_check_vmptr failure paths under debugging
kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() will return 0 if userspace is
single-stepping the guest.

kvm_skip_emulated_instruction() uses return status convention of exit
handler: 0 means "exit to userspace" and 1 means "continue vm entries".
The problem is that nested_vmx_check_vmptr() return status means
something else: 0 is ok, 1 is error.

This means we would continue executing after a failure.  Static checker
noticed it because vmptr was not initialized.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 6affcbedca ("KVM: x86: Add kvm_skip_emulated_instruction and use it.")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-30 17:17:21 +02:00
Jan H. Schönherr 52b5419016 KVM: x86: Fix virtual wire mode
Intel SDM says, that at most one LAPIC should be configured with ExtINT
delivery. KVM configures all LAPICs this way. This causes pic_unlock()
to kick the first available vCPU from the internal KVM data structures.
If this vCPU is not the BSP, but some not-yet-booted AP, the BSP may
never realize that there is an interrupt.

Fix that by enabling ExtINT delivery only for the BSP.

This allows booting a Linux guest without a TSC in the above situation.
Otherwise the BSP gets stuck in calibrate_delay_converge().

Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-26 18:01:21 +02:00
Jan H. Schönherr e1d39b17e0 KVM: nVMX: Fix handling of lmsw instruction
The decision whether or not to exit from L2 to L1 on an lmsw instruction is
based on bogus values: instead of using the information encoded within the
exit qualification, it uses the data also used for the mov-to-cr
instruction, which boils down to using whatever is in %eax at that point.

Use the correct values instead.

Without this fix, an L1 may not get notified when a 32-bit Linux L2
switches its secondary CPUs to protected mode; the L1 is only notified on
the next modification of CR0. This short time window poses a problem, when
there is some other reason to exit to L1 in between. Then, L2 will be
resumed in real mode and chaos ensues.

Signed-off-by: Jan H. Schönherr <jschoenh@amazon.de>
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-26 17:59:27 +02:00
Wanpeng Li 5acc1ca4fb KVM: X86: Fix preempt the preemption timer cancel
Preemption can occur during cancel preemption timer, and there will be
inconsistent status in lapic, vmx and vmcs field.

          CPU0                    CPU1

  preemption timer vmexit
  handle_preemption_timer(vCPU0)
    kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer
      vmx_cancel_hv_timer
        vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = -1
        vmcs_clear_bits
        /* hv_timer_in_use still true */
  sched_out
                           sched_in
                           kvm_arch_vcpu_load
                             vmx_set_hv_timer
                               write vmx->hv_deadline_tsc
                               vmcs_set_bits
                           /* back in kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer */
                           hv_timer_in_use = false
                           ...
                           vmx_vcpu_run
                             vmx_arm_hv_run
                               write preemption timer deadline
                             spurious preemption timer vmexit
                               handle_preemption_timer(vCPU0)
                                 kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer
                                   WARN_ON(!apic->lapic_timer.hv_timer_in_use);

This can be reproduced sporadically during boot of L2 on a
preemptible L1, causing a splat on L1.

 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1952 at arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c:1529 kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer+0xb5/0xd0 [kvm]
 CPU: 3 PID: 1952 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.12.0-rc1+ #24 RIP: 0010:kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer+0xb5/0xd0 [kvm]
  Call Trace:
  handle_preemption_timer+0xe/0x20 [kvm_intel]
  vmx_handle_exit+0xc9/0x15f0 [kvm_intel]
  ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0x250
  ? lock_acquire+0xdb/0x250
  ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xdf3/0x1ce0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xe55/0x1ce0 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
  ? __fget+0xf3/0x210
  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
  ? __fget+0x114/0x210
  SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
  do_syscall_64+0x8f/0x750
  ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25

This patch fixes it by disabling preemption while cancelling
preemption timer.  This way cancel_hv_timer is atomic with
respect to kvm_arch_vcpu_load.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-26 17:46:20 +02:00
Radim Krčmář 92ceb7679a KVM: x86: prevent uninitialized variable warning in check_svme()
get_msr() of MSR_EFER is currently always going to succeed, but static
checker doesn't see that far.

Don't complicate stuff and just use 0 for the fallback -- it means that
the feature is not present.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-19 19:59:28 +02:00
Radim Krčmář 34b0dadbdf KVM: x86/vPMU: fix undefined shift in intel_pmu_refresh()
Static analysis noticed that pmu->nr_arch_gp_counters can be 32
(INTEL_PMC_MAX_GENERIC) and therefore cannot be used to shift 'int'.

I didn't add BUILD_BUG_ON for it as we have a better checker.

Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 25462f7f52 ("KVM: x86/vPMU: Define kvm_pmu_ops to support vPMU function dispatch")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-19 19:59:27 +02:00
Radim Krčmář f0367ee1d6 KVM: x86: zero base3 of unusable segments
Static checker noticed that base3 could be used uninitialized if the
segment was not present (useable).  Random stack values probably would
not pass VMCS entry checks.

Reported-by:  Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Fixes: 1aa366163b ("KVM: x86 emulator: consolidate segment accessors")
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-19 19:59:27 +02:00
Wanpeng Li cbfc6c9184 KVM: X86: Fix read out-of-bounds vulnerability in kvm pio emulation
Huawei folks reported a read out-of-bounds vulnerability in kvm pio emulation.

- "inb" instruction to access PIT Mod/Command register (ioport 0x43, write only,
  a read should be ignored) in guest can get a random number.
- "rep insb" instruction to access PIT register port 0x43 can control memcpy()
  in emulator_pio_in_emulated() to copy max 0x400 bytes but only read 1 bytes,
  which will disclose the unimportant kernel memory in host but no crash.

The similar test program below can reproduce the read out-of-bounds vulnerability:

void hexdump(void *mem, unsigned int len)
{
        unsigned int i, j;

        for(i = 0; i < len + ((len % HEXDUMP_COLS) ? (HEXDUMP_COLS - len % HEXDUMP_COLS) : 0); i++)
        {
                /* print offset */
                if(i % HEXDUMP_COLS == 0)
                {
                        printf("0x%06x: ", i);
                }

                /* print hex data */
                if(i < len)
                {
                        printf("%02x ", 0xFF & ((char*)mem)[i]);
                }
                else /* end of block, just aligning for ASCII dump */
                {
                        printf("   ");
                }

                /* print ASCII dump */
                if(i % HEXDUMP_COLS == (HEXDUMP_COLS - 1))
                {
                        for(j = i - (HEXDUMP_COLS - 1); j <= i; j++)
                        {
                                if(j >= len) /* end of block, not really printing */
                                {
                                        putchar(' ');
                                }
                                else if(isprint(((char*)mem)[j])) /* printable char */
                                {
                                        putchar(0xFF & ((char*)mem)[j]);
                                }
                                else /* other char */
                                {
                                        putchar('.');
                                }
                        }
                        putchar('\n');
                }
        }
}

int main(void)
{
	int i;
	if (iopl(3))
	{
		err(1, "set iopl unsuccessfully\n");
		return -1;
	}
	static char buf[0x40];

	/* test ioport 0x40,0x41,0x42,0x43,0x44,0x45 */

	memset(buf, 0xab, sizeof(buf));

	asm volatile("push %rdi;");
	asm volatile("mov %0, %%rdi;"::"q"(buf));

	asm volatile ("mov $0x40, %rdx;");
	asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
	asm volatile ("stosb;");

	asm volatile ("mov $0x41, %rdx;");
	asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
	asm volatile ("stosb;");

	asm volatile ("mov $0x42, %rdx;");
	asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
	asm volatile ("stosb;");

	asm volatile ("mov $0x43, %rdx;");
	asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
	asm volatile ("stosb;");

	asm volatile ("mov $0x44, %rdx;");
	asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
	asm volatile ("stosb;");

	asm volatile ("mov $0x45, %rdx;");
	asm volatile ("in %dx,%al;");
	asm volatile ("stosb;");

	asm volatile ("pop %rdi;");
	hexdump(buf, 0x40);

	printf("\n");

	/* ins port 0x40 */

	memset(buf, 0xab, sizeof(buf));

	asm volatile("push %rdi;");
	asm volatile("mov %0, %%rdi;"::"q"(buf));

	asm volatile ("mov $0x20, %rcx;");
	asm volatile ("mov $0x40, %rdx;");
	asm volatile ("rep insb;");

	asm volatile ("pop %rdi;");
	hexdump(buf, 0x40);

	printf("\n");

	/* ins port 0x43 */

	memset(buf, 0xab, sizeof(buf));

	asm volatile("push %rdi;");
	asm volatile("mov %0, %%rdi;"::"q"(buf));

	asm volatile ("mov $0x20, %rcx;");
	asm volatile ("mov $0x43, %rdx;");
	asm volatile ("rep insb;");

	asm volatile ("pop %rdi;");
	hexdump(buf, 0x40);

	printf("\n");
	return 0;
}

The vcpu->arch.pio_data buffer is used by both in/out instrutions emulation
w/o clear after using which results in some random datas are left over in
the buffer. Guest reads port 0x43 will be ignored since it is write only,
however, the function kernel_pio() can't distigush this ignore from successfully
reads data from device's ioport. There is no new data fill the buffer from
port 0x43, however, emulator_pio_in_emulated() will copy the stale data in
the buffer to the guest unconditionally. This patch fixes it by clearing the
buffer before in instruction emulation to avoid to grant guest the stale data
in the buffer.

In addition, string I/O is not supported for in kernel device. So there is no
iteration to read ioport %RCX times for string I/O. The function kernel_pio()
just reads one round, and then copy the io size * %RCX to the guest unconditionally,
actually it copies the one round ioport data w/ other random datas which are left
over in the vcpu->arch.pio_data buffer to the guest. This patch fixes it by
introducing the string I/O support for in kernel device in order to grant the right
ioport datas to the guest.

Before the patch:

0x000000: fe 38 93 93 ff ff ab ab .8......
0x000008: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000010: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000018: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........

0x000000: f6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000008: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000010: 00 00 00 00 4d 51 30 30 ....MQ00
0x000018: 30 30 20 33 20 20 20 20 00 3
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........

0x000000: f6 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000008: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000010: 00 00 00 00 4d 51 30 30 ....MQ00
0x000018: 30 30 20 33 20 20 20 20 00 3
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........

After the patch:

0x000000: 1e 02 f8 00 ff ff ab ab ........
0x000008: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000010: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000018: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........

0x000000: d2 e2 d2 df d2 db d2 d7 ........
0x000008: d2 d3 d2 cf d2 cb d2 c7 ........
0x000010: d2 c4 d2 c0 d2 bc d2 b8 ........
0x000018: d2 b4 d2 b0 d2 ac d2 a8 ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........

0x000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000008: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000018: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........
0x000020: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000028: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000030: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........
0x000038: ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ab ........

Reported-by: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: Moguofang <moguofang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-19 19:59:26 +02:00
Wanpeng Li e2c2206a18 KVM: x86: Fix potential preemption when get the current kvmclock timestamp
BUG: using __this_cpu_read() in preemptible [00000000] code: qemu-system-x86/2809
 caller is __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
 CPU: 2 PID: 2809 Comm: qemu-system-x86 Not tainted 4.11.0+ #13
 Call Trace:
  dump_stack+0x99/0xce
  check_preemption_disabled+0xf5/0x100
  __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
  get_kvmclock_ns+0x6f/0x110 [kvm]
  get_time_ref_counter+0x5d/0x80 [kvm]
  kvm_hv_process_stimers+0x2a1/0x8a0 [kvm]
  ? kvm_hv_process_stimers+0x2a1/0x8a0 [kvm]
  ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xac9/0x1ce0 [kvm]
  kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x5bf/0x1ce0 [kvm]
  kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
  ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x7b0 [kvm]
  ? __fget+0xf3/0x210
  do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
  ? __fget+0x114/0x210
  SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
  entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2
 RIP: 0033:0x7f9d164ed357
  ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20

This can be reproduced by run kvm-unit-tests/hyperv_stimer.flat w/
CONFIG_PREEMPT and CONFIG_DEBUG_PREEMPT enabled.

Safe access to per-CPU data requires a couple of constraints, though: the
thread working with the data cannot be preempted and it cannot be migrated
while it manipulates per-CPU variables. If the thread is preempted, the
thread that replaces it could try to work with the same variables; migration
to another CPU could also cause confusion. However there is no preemption
disable when reads host per-CPU tsc rate to calculate the current kvmclock
timestamp.

This patch fixes it by utilizing get_cpu/put_cpu pair to guarantee both
__this_cpu_read() and rdtsc() are not preempted.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-19 19:59:25 +02:00
Dan Carpenter d3e7dec054 KVM: Silence underflow warning in avic_get_physical_id_entry()
Smatch complains that we check cap the upper bound of "index" but don't
check for negatives.  It's a false positive because "index" is never
negative.  But it's also simple enough to make it unsigned which makes
the code easier to audit.

Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-18 14:53:54 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini 0780516a18 KVM: nVMX: fix EPT permissions as reported in exit qualification
This fixes the new ept_access_test_read_only and ept_access_test_read_write
testcases from vmx.flat.

The problem is that gpte_access moves bits around to switch from EPT
bit order (XWR) to ACC_*_MASK bit order (RWX).  This results in an
incorrect exit qualification.  To fix this, make pt_access and
pte_access operate on raw PTE values (only with NX flipped to mean
"can execute") and call gpte_access at the end of the walk.  This
lets us use pte_access to compute the exit qualification with XWR
bit order.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-15 18:22:40 +02:00
Wanpeng Li fce6ac4c05 KVM: VMX: Don't enable EPT A/D feature if EPT feature is disabled
We can observe eptad kvm_intel module parameter is still Y
even if ept is disabled which is weird. This patch will
not enable EPT A/D feature if EPT feature is disabled.

Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-15 16:08:57 +02:00
Wanpeng Li a575813bfe KVM: x86: Fix load damaged SSEx MXCSR register
Reported by syzkaller:

   BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffc07f6a2e
   IP: report_bug+0x94/0x120
   PGD 348e12067
   P4D 348e12067
   PUD 348e14067
   PMD 3cbd84067
   PTE 80000003f7e87161

   Oops: 0003 [#1] SMP
   CPU: 2 PID: 7091 Comm: kvm_load_guest_ Tainted: G           OE   4.11.0+ #8
   task: ffff92fdfb525400 task.stack: ffffbda6c3d04000
   RIP: 0010:report_bug+0x94/0x120
   RSP: 0018:ffffbda6c3d07b20 EFLAGS: 00010202
    do_trap+0x156/0x170
    do_error_trap+0xa3/0x170
    ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
    ? mark_held_locks+0x79/0xa0
    ? retint_kernel+0x10/0x10
    ? trace_hardirqs_off_thunk+0x1a/0x1c
    do_invalid_op+0x20/0x30
    invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
   RIP: 0010:kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x12a/0x170 [kvm]
    ? kvm_load_guest_fpu.part.175+0x1c/0x170 [kvm]
    kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0xed6/0x1b70 [kvm]
    kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
    ? kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x384/0x780 [kvm]
    ? sched_clock+0x13/0x20
    ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
    do_vfs_ioctl+0xa4/0x700
    ? up_read+0x1f/0x40
    ? __do_page_fault+0x2a0/0x550
    SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
    entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc2

SDM mentioned that "The MXCSR has several reserved bits, and attempting to write
a 1 to any of these bits will cause a general-protection exception(#GP) to be
generated". The syzkaller forks' testcase overrides xsave area w/ random values
and steps on the reserved bits of MXCSR register. The damaged MXCSR register
values of guest will be restored to SSEx MXCSR register before vmentry. This
patch fixes it by catching userspace override MXCSR register reserved bits w/
random values and bails out immediately.

Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-15 16:08:56 +02:00
Dan Carpenter 4769886baf kvm: nVMX: off by one in vmx_write_pml_buffer()
There are PML_ENTITY_NUM elements in the pml_address[] array so the >
should be >= or we write beyond the end of the array when we do:

	pml_address[vmcs12->guest_pml_index--] = gpa;

Fixes: c5f983f6e8 ("nVMX: Implement emulated Page Modification Logging")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-05-15 16:08:56 +02:00
Bandan Das 03efce6f93 nVMX: Advertise PML to L1 hypervisor
Advertise the PML bit in vmcs12 but don't try to enable
it in hardware when running L2 since L0 is emulating it. Also,
preserve L0's settings for PML since it may still
want to log writes.

Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-09 11:54:29 +02:00
Bandan Das c5f983f6e8 nVMX: Implement emulated Page Modification Logging
With EPT A/D enabled, processor access to L2 guest
paging structures will result in a write violation.
When this happens, write the GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS
to the pml buffer provided by L1 if the access is
write and the dirty bit is being set.

This patch also adds necessary checks during VMEntry if L1
has enabled PML. If the PML index overflows, we change the
exit reason and run L1 to simulate a PML full event.

Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-09 11:54:22 +02:00
Bandan Das bab4165e2f kvm: x86: Add a hook for arch specific dirty logging emulation
When KVM updates accessed/dirty bits, this hook can be used
to invoke an arch specific function that implements/emulates
dirty logging such as PML.

Signed-off-by: Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-09 11:54:16 +02:00
Jim Mattson c7c2c709b6 kvm: nVMX: Validate CR3 target count on nested VM-entry
According to the SDM, the CR3-target count must not be greater than
4. Future processors may support a different number of CR3-target
values. Software should read the VMX capability MSR IA32_VMX_MISC to
determine the number of values supported.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-09 11:53:41 +02:00
Linus Torvalds bf5f89463f Merge branch 'akpm' (patches from Andrew)
Merge more updates from Andrew Morton:

 - the rest of MM

 - various misc things

 - procfs updates

 - lib/ updates

 - checkpatch updates

 - kdump/kexec updates

 - add kvmalloc helpers, use them

 - time helper updates for Y2038 issues. We're almost ready to remove
   current_fs_time() but that awaits a btrfs merge.

 - add tracepoints to DAX

* emailed patches from Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>: (114 commits)
  drivers/staging/ccree/ssi_hash.c: fix build with gcc-4.4.4
  selftests/vm: add a test for virtual address range mapping
  dax: add tracepoint to dax_insert_mapping()
  dax: add tracepoint to dax_writeback_one()
  dax: add tracepoints to dax_writeback_mapping_range()
  dax: add tracepoints to dax_load_hole()
  dax: add tracepoints to dax_pfn_mkwrite()
  dax: add tracepoints to dax_iomap_pte_fault()
  mtd: nand: nandsim: convert to memalloc_noreclaim_*()
  treewide: convert PF_MEMALLOC manipulations to new helpers
  mm: introduce memalloc_noreclaim_{save,restore}
  mm: prevent potential recursive reclaim due to clearing PF_MEMALLOC
  mm/huge_memory.c: deposit a pgtable for DAX PMD faults when required
  mm/huge_memory.c: use zap_deposited_table() more
  time: delete CURRENT_TIME_SEC and CURRENT_TIME
  gfs2: replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time
  apparmorfs: replace CURRENT_TIME with current_time()
  lustre: replace CURRENT_TIME macro
  fs: ubifs: replace CURRENT_TIME_SEC with current_time
  fs: ufs: use ktime_get_real_ts64() for birthtime
  ...
2017-05-08 18:17:56 -07:00
Michal Hocko a7c3e901a4 mm: introduce kv[mz]alloc helpers
Patch series "kvmalloc", v5.

There are many open coded kmalloc with vmalloc fallback instances in the
tree.  Most of them are not careful enough or simply do not care about
the underlying semantic of the kmalloc/page allocator which means that
a) some vmalloc fallbacks are basically unreachable because the kmalloc
part will keep retrying until it succeeds b) the page allocator can
invoke a really disruptive steps like the OOM killer to move forward
which doesn't sound appropriate when we consider that the vmalloc
fallback is available.

As it can be seen implementing kvmalloc requires quite an intimate
knowledge if the page allocator and the memory reclaim internals which
strongly suggests that a helper should be implemented in the memory
subsystem proper.

Most callers, I could find, have been converted to use the helper
instead.  This is patch 6.  There are some more relying on __GFP_REPEAT
in the networking stack which I have converted as well and Eric Dumazet
was not opposed [2] to convert them as well.

[1] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170130094940.13546-1-mhocko@kernel.org
[2] http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1485273626.16328.301.camel@edumazet-glaptop3.roam.corp.google.com

This patch (of 9):

Using kmalloc with the vmalloc fallback for larger allocations is a
common pattern in the kernel code.  Yet we do not have any common helper
for that and so users have invented their own helpers.  Some of them are
really creative when doing so.  Let's just add kv[mz]alloc and make sure
it is implemented properly.  This implementation makes sure to not make
a large memory pressure for > PAGE_SZE requests (__GFP_NORETRY) and also
to not warn about allocation failures.  This also rules out the OOM
killer as the vmalloc is a more approapriate fallback than a disruptive
user visible action.

This patch also changes some existing users and removes helpers which
are specific for them.  In some cases this is not possible (e.g.
ext4_kvmalloc, libcfs_kvzalloc) because those seems to be broken and
require GFP_NO{FS,IO} context which is not vmalloc compatible in general
(note that the page table allocation is GFP_KERNEL).  Those need to be
fixed separately.

While we are at it, document that __vmalloc{_node} about unsupported gfp
mask because there seems to be a lot of confusion out there.
kvmalloc_node will warn about GFP_KERNEL incompatible (which are not
superset) flags to catch new abusers.  Existing ones would have to die
slowly.

[sfr@canb.auug.org.au: f2fs fixup]
  Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170320163735.332e64b7@canb.auug.org.au
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170306103032.2540-2-mhocko@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>	[ext4 part]
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: John Hubbard <jhubbard@nvidia.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2017-05-08 17:15:12 -07:00
Linus Torvalds 2d3e4866de * ARM: HYP mode stub supports kexec/kdump on 32-bit; improved PMU
support; virtual interrupt controller performance improvements; support
 for userspace virtual interrupt controller (slower, but necessary for
 KVM on the weird Broadcom SoCs used by the Raspberry Pi 3)
 
 * MIPS: basic support for hardware virtualization (ImgTec
 P5600/P6600/I6400 and Cavium Octeon III)
 
 * PPC: in-kernel acceleration for VFIO
 
 * s390: support for guests without storage keys; adapter interruption
 suppression
 
 * x86: usual range of nVMX improvements, notably nested EPT support for
 accessed and dirty bits; emulation of CPL3 CPUID faulting
 
 * generic: first part of VCPU thread request API; kvm_stat improvements
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Merge tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm

Pull KVM updates from Paolo Bonzini:
 "ARM:
   - HYP mode stub supports kexec/kdump on 32-bit
   - improved PMU support
   - virtual interrupt controller performance improvements
   - support for userspace virtual interrupt controller (slower, but
     necessary for KVM on the weird Broadcom SoCs used by the Raspberry
     Pi 3)

  MIPS:
   - basic support for hardware virtualization (ImgTec P5600/P6600/I6400
     and Cavium Octeon III)

  PPC:
   - in-kernel acceleration for VFIO

  s390:
   - support for guests without storage keys
   - adapter interruption suppression

  x86:
   - usual range of nVMX improvements, notably nested EPT support for
     accessed and dirty bits
   - emulation of CPL3 CPUID faulting

  generic:
   - first part of VCPU thread request API
   - kvm_stat improvements"

* tag 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/virt/kvm/kvm: (227 commits)
  kvm: nVMX: Don't validate disabled secondary controls
  KVM: put back #ifndef CONFIG_S390 around kvm_vcpu_kick
  Revert "KVM: Support vCPU-based gfn->hva cache"
  tools/kvm: fix top level makefile
  KVM: x86: don't hold kvm->lock in KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING
  KVM: Documentation: remove VM mmap documentation
  kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks
  KVM: x86: fix emulation of RSM and IRET instructions
  KVM: mark requests that need synchronization
  KVM: return if kvm_vcpu_wake_up() did wake up the VCPU
  KVM: add explicit barrier to kvm_vcpu_kick
  KVM: perform a wake_up in kvm_make_all_cpus_request
  KVM: mark requests that do not need a wakeup
  KVM: remove #ifndef CONFIG_S390 around kvm_vcpu_wake_up
  KVM: x86: always use kvm_make_request instead of set_bit
  KVM: add kvm_{test,clear}_request to replace {test,clear}_bit
  s390: kvm: Cpu model support for msa6, msa7 and msa8
  KVM: x86: remove irq disablement around KVM_SET_CLOCK/KVM_GET_CLOCK
  kvm: better MWAIT emulation for guests
  KVM: x86: virtualize cpuid faulting
  ...
2017-05-08 12:37:56 -07:00
Jim Mattson 2e5b0bd9cc kvm: nVMX: Don't validate disabled secondary controls
According to the SDM, if the "activate secondary controls" primary
processor-based VM-execution control is 0, no checks are performed on
the secondary processor-based VM-execution controls.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-05 10:08:31 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini 4e335d9e7d Revert "KVM: Support vCPU-based gfn->hva cache"
This reverts commit bbd6411513.

I've been sitting on this revert for too long and it unfortunately
missed 4.11.  It's also the reason why I haven't merged ring-based
dirty tracking for 4.12.

Using kvm_vcpu_memslots in kvm_gfn_to_hva_cache_init and
kvm_vcpu_write_guest_offset_cached means that the MSR value can
now be used to access SMRAM, simply by making it point to an SMRAM
physical address.  This is problematic because it lets the guest
OS overwrite memory that it shouldn't be able to touch.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bbd6411513
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-03 16:30:26 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 5c0aea0e8d KVM: x86: don't hold kvm->lock in KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING
We needed the lock to avoid racing with creation of the irqchip on x86. As
kvm_set_irq_routing() calls srcu_synchronize_expedited(), this lock
might be held for a longer time.

Let's introduce an arch specific callback to check if we can actually
add irq routes. For x86, all we have to do is check if we have an
irqchip in the kernel. We don't need kvm->lock at that point as the
irqchip is marked as inititalized only when actually fully created.

Reported-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Fixes: 1df6ddede1 ("KVM: x86: race between KVM_SET_GSI_ROUTING and KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP")
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-05-02 14:45:45 +02:00
Linus Torvalds d3b5d35290 Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
 "The main x86 MM changes in this cycle were:

   - continued native kernel PCID support preparation patches to the TLB
     flushing code (Andy Lutomirski)

   - various fixes related to 32-bit compat syscall returning address
     over 4Gb in applications, launched from 64-bit binaries - motivated
     by C/R frameworks such as Virtuozzo. (Dmitry Safonov)

   - continued Intel 5-level paging enablement: in particular the
     conversion of x86 GUP to the generic GUP code. (Kirill A. Shutemov)

   - x86/mpx ABI corner case fixes/enhancements (Joerg Roedel)

   - ... plus misc updates, fixes and cleanups"

* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (62 commits)
  mm, zone_device: Replace {get, put}_zone_device_page() with a single reference to fix pmem crash
  x86/mm: Fix flush_tlb_page() on Xen
  x86/mm: Make flush_tlb_mm_range() more predictable
  x86/mm: Remove flush_tlb() and flush_tlb_current_task()
  x86/vm86/32: Switch to flush_tlb_mm_range() in mark_screen_rdonly()
  x86/mm/64: Fix crash in remove_pagetable()
  Revert "x86/mm/gup: Switch GUP to the generic get_user_page_fast() implementation"
  x86/boot/e820: Remove a redundant self assignment
  x86/mm: Fix dump pagetables for 4 levels of page tables
  x86/mpx, selftests: Only check bounds-vs-shadow when we keep shadow
  x86/mpx: Correctly report do_mpx_bt_fault() failures to user-space
  Revert "x86/mm/numa: Remove numa_nodemask_from_meminfo()"
  x86/espfix: Add support for 5-level paging
  x86/kasan: Extend KASAN to support 5-level paging
  x86/mm: Add basic defines/helpers for CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y
  x86/paravirt: Add 5-level support to the paravirt code
  x86/mm: Define virtual memory map for 5-level paging
  x86/asm: Remove __VIRTUAL_MASK_SHIFT==47 assert
  x86/boot: Detect 5-level paging support
  x86/mm/numa: Remove numa_nodemask_from_meminfo()
  ...
2017-05-01 23:54:56 -07:00
Jim Mattson 70f3aac964 kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks
According to the Intel SDM, "Certain exceptions have priority over VM
exits. These include invalid-opcode exceptions, faults based on
privilege level*, and general-protection exceptions that are based on
checking I/O permission bits in the task-state segment (TSS)."

There is no need to check for faulting conditions that the hardware
has already checked.

* These include faults generated by attempts to execute, in
  virtual-8086 mode, privileged instructions that are not recognized
  in that mode.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-27 17:05:43 +02:00
Ladi Prosek 6ed071f051 KVM: x86: fix emulation of RSM and IRET instructions
On AMD, the effect of set_nmi_mask called by emulate_iret_real and em_rsm
on hflags is reverted later on in x86_emulate_instruction where hflags are
overwritten with ctxt->emul_flags (the kvm_set_hflags call). This manifests
as a hang when rebooting Windows VMs with QEMU, OVMF, and >1 vcpu.

Instead of trying to merge ctxt->emul_flags into vcpu->arch.hflags after
an instruction is emulated, this commit deletes emul_flags altogether and
makes the emulator access vcpu->arch.hflags using two new accessors. This
way all changes, on the emulator side as well as in functions called from
the emulator and accessing vcpu state with emul_to_vcpu, are preserved.

More details on the bug and its manifestation with Windows and OVMF:

  It's a KVM bug in the interaction between SMI/SMM and NMI, specific to AMD.
  I believe that the SMM part explains why we started seeing this only with
  OVMF.

  KVM masks and unmasks NMI when entering and leaving SMM. When KVM emulates
  the RSM instruction in em_rsm, the set_nmi_mask call doesn't stick because
  later on in x86_emulate_instruction we overwrite arch.hflags with
  ctxt->emul_flags, effectively reverting the effect of the set_nmi_mask call.
  The AMD-specific hflag of interest here is HF_NMI_MASK.

  When rebooting the system, Windows sends an NMI IPI to all but the current
  cpu to shut them down. Only after all of them are parked in HLT will the
  initiating cpu finish the restart. If NMI is masked, other cpus never get
  the memo and the initiating cpu spins forever, waiting for
  hal!HalpInterruptProcessorsStarted to drop. That's the symptom we observe.

Fixes: a584539b24 ("KVM: x86: pass the whole hflags field to emulator and back")
Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-27 16:54:09 +02:00
Andrew Jones cde9af6e79 KVM: add explicit barrier to kvm_vcpu_kick
kvm_vcpu_kick() must issue a general memory barrier prior to reading
vcpu->mode in order to ensure correctness of the mutual-exclusion
memory barrier pattern used with vcpu->requests.  While the cmpxchg
called from kvm_vcpu_kick():

 kvm_vcpu_kick
   kvm_arch_vcpu_should_kick
     kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode
       cmpxchg

implies general memory barriers before and after the operation, that
implication is only valid when cmpxchg succeeds.  We need an explicit
barrier for when it fails, otherwise a VCPU thread on its entry path
that reads zero for vcpu->requests does not exclude the possibility
the requesting thread sees !IN_GUEST_MODE when it reads vcpu->mode.

kvm_make_all_cpus_request already had a barrier, so we remove it, as
now it would be redundant.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-27 14:16:17 +02:00
Radim Krčmář 1bd2009e73 KVM: x86: always use kvm_make_request instead of set_bit
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-27 14:12:53 +02:00
Radim Krčmář 72875d8a4d KVM: add kvm_{test,clear}_request to replace {test,clear}_bit
Users were expected to use kvm_check_request() for testing and clearing,
but request have expanded their use since then and some users want to
only test or do a faster clear.

Make sure that requests are not directly accessed with bit operations.

Reviewed-by: Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Jones <drjones@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-27 14:12:22 +02:00
Marcelo Tosatti e891a32e7a KVM: x86: remove irq disablement around KVM_SET_CLOCK/KVM_GET_CLOCK
The disablement of interrupts at KVM_SET_CLOCK/KVM_GET_CLOCK
attempts to disable software suspend from causing "non atomic behaviour" of
the operation:

    Add a helper function to compute the kernel time and convert nanoseconds
    back to CPU specific cycles.  Note that these must not be called in preemptible
    context, as that would mean the kernel could enter software suspend state,
    which would cause non-atomic operation.

However, assume the kernel can enter software suspend at the following 2 points:

        ktime_get_ts(&ts);
1.
						hypothetical_ktime_get_ts(&ts)
        monotonic_to_bootbased(&ts);
2.

monotonic_to_bootbased() should be correct relative to a ktime_get_ts(&ts)
performed after point 1 (that is after resuming from software suspend),
hypothetical_ktime_get_ts()

Therefore it is also correct for the ktime_get_ts(&ts) before point 1,
which is

	ktime_get_ts(&ts) = hypothetical_ktime_get_ts(&ts) + time-to-execute-suspend-code

Note CLOCK_MONOTONIC does not count during suspension.

So remove the irq disablement, which causes the following warning on
-RT kernels:

 With this reasoning, and the -RT bug that the irq disablement causes
 (because spin_lock is now a sleeping lock), remove the IRQ protection as it
 causes:

 [ 1064.668109] in_atomic(): 0, irqs_disabled(): 1, pid: 15296, name:m
 [ 1064.668110] INFO: lockdep is turned off.
 [ 1064.668110] irq event stamp: 0
 [ 1064.668112] hardirqs last  enabled at (0): [<          (null)>]  )
 [ 1064.668116] hardirqs last disabled at (0): [] c0
 [ 1064.668118] softirqs last  enabled at (0): [] c0
 [ 1064.668118] softirqs last disabled at (0): [<          (null)>]  )
 [ 1064.668121] CPU: 13 PID: 15296 Comm: qemu-kvm Not tainted 3.10.0-1
 [ 1064.668121] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/0H21J3, BIOS 5
 [ 1064.668123]  ffff8c1796b88000 00000000afe7344c ffff8c179abf3c68 f3
 [ 1064.668125]  ffff8c179abf3c90 ffffffff930ccb3d ffff8c1b992b3610 f0
 [ 1064.668126]  00007ffc1a26fbc0 ffff8c179abf3cb0 ffffffff9375f694 f0
 [ 1064.668126] Call Trace:
 [ 1064.668132]  [] dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
 [ 1064.668135]  [] __might_sleep+0x12d/0x1f0
 [ 1064.668138]  [] rt_spin_lock+0x24/0x60
 [ 1064.668155]  [] __get_kvmclock_ns+0x36/0x110 [k]
 [ 1064.668159]  [] ? futex_wait_queue_me+0x103/0x10
 [ 1064.668171]  [] kvm_arch_vm_ioctl+0xa2/0xd70 [k]
 [ 1064.668173]  [] ? futex_wait+0x1ac/0x2a0

v2: notice get_kvmclock_ns with the same problem (Pankaj).
v3: remove useless helper function (Pankaj).

Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-21 12:50:28 +02:00
Michael S. Tsirkin 668fffa3f8 kvm: better MWAIT emulation for guests
Guests that are heavy on futexes end up IPI'ing each other a lot. That
can lead to significant slowdowns and latency increase for those guests
when running within KVM.

If only a single guest is needed on a host, we have a lot of spare host
CPU time we can throw at the problem. Modern CPUs implement a feature
called "MWAIT" which allows guests to wake up sleeping remote CPUs without
an IPI - thus without an exit - at the expense of never going out of guest
context.

The decision whether this is something sensible to use should be up to the
VM admin, so to user space. We can however allow MWAIT execution on systems
that support it properly hardware wise.

This patch adds a CAP to user space and a KVM cpuid leaf to indicate
availability of native MWAIT execution. With that enabled, the worst a
guest can do is waste as many cycles as a "jmp ." would do, so it's not
a privilege problem.

We consciously do *not* expose the feature in our CPUID bitmap, as most
people will want to benefit from sleeping vCPUs to allow for over commit.

Reported-by: "Gabriel L. Somlo" <gsomlo@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
[agraf: fix amd, change commit message]
Signed-off-by: Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-21 12:50:28 +02:00
Kyle Huey db2336a804 KVM: x86: virtualize cpuid faulting
Hardware support for faulting on the cpuid instruction is not required to
emulate it, because cpuid triggers a VM exit anyways. KVM handles the relevant
MSRs (MSR_PLATFORM_INFO and MSR_MISC_FEATURES_ENABLE) and upon a
cpuid-induced VM exit checks the cpuid faulting state and the CPL.
kvm_require_cpl is even kind enough to inject the GP fault for us.

Signed-off-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com>
Reviewed-by: David Matlack <dmatlack@google.com>
[Return "1" from kvm_emulate_cpuid, it's not void. - Paolo]
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-21 12:50:06 +02:00
David Hildenbrand fe0e80befd KVM: VMX: drop vmm_exclusive module parameter
vmm_exclusive=0 leads to KVM setting X86_CR4_VMXE always and calling
VMXON only when the vcpu is loaded. X86_CR4_VMXE is used as an
indication in cpu_emergency_vmxoff() (called on kdump) if VMXOFF has to be
called. This is obviously not the case if both are used independtly.
Calling VMXOFF without a previous VMXON will result in an exception.

In addition, X86_CR4_VMXE is used as a mean to test if VMX is already in
use by another VMM in hardware_enable(). So there can't really be
co-existance. If the other VMM is prepared for co-existance and does a
similar check, only one VMM can exist. If the other VMM is not prepared
and blindly sets/clears X86_CR4_VMXE, we will get inconsistencies with
X86_CR4_VMXE.

As we also had bug reports related to clearing of vmcs with vmm_exclusive=0
this seems to be pretty much untested. So let's better drop it.

While at it, directly move setting/clearing X86_CR4_VMXE into
kvm_cpu_vmxon/off.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-21 11:42:49 +02:00
Radim Krčmář 3325187061 KVM: nVMX: fix AD condition when handling EPT violation
I have introduced this bug when applying and simplifying Paolo's patch
as we agreed on the list.  The original was "x &= ~y; if (z) x |= y;".

Here is the story of a bad workflow:

  A maintainer was already testing with the intended change, but it was
  applied only to a testing repo on a different machine.  When the time
  to push tested patches to kvm/next came, he realized that this change
  was missing and quickly added it to the maintenance repo, didn't test
  again (because the change is trivial, right), and pushed the world to
  fire.

Fixes: ae1e2d1082 ("kvm: nVMX: support EPT accessed/dirty bits")
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-13 19:36:55 +02:00
Ladi Prosek 405a353a0e KVM: x86: Add MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG to the list of ignored MSRs
Hyper-V writes 0x800000000000 to MSR_AMD64_DC_CFG when running on AMD CPUs
as recommended in erratum 383, analogous to our svm_init_erratum_383.

By ignoring the MSR, this patch enables running Hyper-V in L1 on AMD.

Signed-off-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 21:09:24 +02:00
Denis Plotnikov bd8fab39cd KVM: x86: fix maintaining of kvm_clock stability on guest CPU hotplug
VCPU TSC synchronization is perfromed in kvm_write_tsc() when the TSC
value being set is within 1 second from the expected, as obtained by
extrapolating of the TSC in already synchronized VCPUs.

This is naturally achieved on all VCPUs at VM start and resume;
however on VCPU hotplug it is not: the newly added VCPU is created
with TSC == 0 while others are well ahead.

To compensate for that, consider host-initiated kvm_write_tsc() with
TSC == 0 a special case requiring synchronization regardless of the
current TSC on other VCPUs.

Signed-off-by: Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:15 +02:00
Denis Plotnikov c5e8ec8e9b KVM: x86: remaster kvm_write_tsc code
Reuse existing code instead of using inline asm.
Make the code more concise and clear in the TSC
synchronization part.

Signed-off-by: Denis Plotnikov <dplotnikov@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Kagan <rkagan@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:15 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 900ab14ca9 KVM: x86: use irqchip_kernel() to check for pic+ioapic
Although the current check is not wrong, this check explicitly includes
the pic.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:15 +02:00
David Hildenbrand b5e7cf52e1 KVM: x86: simplify pic_ioport_read()
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:15 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 84a5c79e70 KVM: x86: set data directly in picdev_read()
Now it looks almost as picdev_write().

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:15 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 9fecaa9e32 KVM: x86: drop picdev_in_range()
We already have the exact same checks a couple of lines below.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand dc24d1d2cb KVM: x86: make kvm_pic_reset() static
Not used outside of i8259.c, so let's make it static.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand e21d1758b0 KVM: x86: simplify pic_unlock()
We can easily compact this code and get rid of one local variable.

Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 43ae312ca1 KVM: x86: drop goto label in kvm_set_routing_entry()
No need for the goto label + local variable "r".

Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 993225adf4 KVM: x86: rename kvm_vcpu_request_scan_ioapic()
Let's rename it into a proper arch specific callback.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand ca8ab3f895 KVM: x86: directly call kvm_make_scan_ioapic_request() in ioapic.c
We know there is an ioapic, so let's call it directly.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand d62f270b2d KVM: x86: remove all-vcpu request from kvm_ioapic_init()
kvm_ioapic_init() is guaranteed to be called without any created VCPUs,
so doing an all-vcpu request results in a NOP.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 445ee82d7a KVM: x86: KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_MASTER only has 8 pins
Currently, one could set pin 8-15, implicitly referring to
KVM_IRQCHIP_PIC_SLAVE.

Get rid of the two local variables max_pin and delta on the way.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 49f520b99a KVM: x86: push usage of slots_lock down
Let's just move it to the place where it is actually needed.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand ba7454e17f KVM: x86: don't take kvm->irq_lock when creating IRQCHIP
I don't see any reason any more for this lock, seemed to be used to protect
removal of kvm->arch.vpic / kvm->arch.vioapic when already partially
inititalized, now access is properly protected using kvm->arch.irqchip_mode
and this shouldn't be necessary anymore.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 33392b4911 KVM: x86: convert kvm_(set|get)_ioapic() into void
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 4c0b06d886 KVM: x86: remove duplicate checks for ioapic
When handling KVM_GET_IRQCHIP, we already check irqchip_kernel(), which
implies a fully inititalized ioapic.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:14 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 0bceb15ad1 KVM: x86: use ioapic_in_kernel() to check for ioapic existence
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:13 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 0191e92d84 KVM: x86: get rid of ioapic_irqchip()
Let's just use kvm->arch.vioapic directly.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:13 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 90bca0529e KVM: x86: get rid of pic_irqchip()
It seemed like a nice idea to encapsulate access to kvm->arch.vpic. But
as the usage is already mixed, internal locks are taken outside of i8259.c
and grepping for "vpic" only is much easier, let's just get rid of
pic_irqchip().

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:13 +02:00
David Hildenbrand f567080bdd KVM: x86: check against irqchip_mode in ioapic_in_kernel()
KVM_IRQCHIP_KERNEL implies a fully inititalized ioapic, while
kvm->arch.vioapic might temporarily be set but invalidated again if e.g.
setting of default routing fails when setting KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:13 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 19d25a0e47 KVM: x86: check against irqchip_mode in pic_in_kernel()
Let's avoid checking against kvm->arch.vpic. We have kvm->arch.irqchip_mode
for that now.

KVM_IRQCHIP_KERNEL implies a fully inititalized pic, while kvm->arch.vpic
might temporarily be set but invalidated again if e.g. kvm_ioapic_init()
fails when setting KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP. Although current users seem to be
fine, this avoids future bugs.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:13 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 8bf463f3ba KVM: x86: check against irqchip_mode in kvm_set_routing_entry()
Let's replace the checks for pic_in_kernel() and ioapic_in_kernel() by
checks against irqchip_mode.

Also make sure that creation of any route is only possible if we have
an lapic in kernel (irqchip_in_kernel()) or if we are currently
inititalizing the irqchip.

This is necessary to switch pic_in_kernel() and ioapic_in_kernel() to
irqchip_mode, too.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:13 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 637e3f86fa KVM: x86: new irqchip mode KVM_IRQCHIP_INIT_IN_PROGRESS
Let's add a new mode and set it while we create the irqchip via
KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP and KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP.

This mode will be used later to test if adding routes
(in kvm_set_routing_entry()) is already allowed.

Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-12 20:17:13 +02:00
Jim Mattson 28d0635388 kvm: nVMX: Disallow userspace-injected exceptions in guest mode
The userspace exception injection API and code path are entirely
unprepared for exceptions that might cause a VM-exit from L2 to L1, so
the best course of action may be to simply disallow this for now.

1. The API provides no mechanism for userspace to specify the new DR6
bits for a #DB exception or the new CR2 value for a #PF
exception. Presumably, userspace is expected to modify these registers
directly with KVM_SET_SREGS before the next KVM_RUN ioctl. However, in
the event that L1 intercepts the exception, these registers should not
be changed. Instead, the new values should be provided in the
exit_qualification field of vmcs12 (Intel SDM vol 3, section 27.1).

2. In the case of a userspace-injected #DB, inject_pending_event()
clears DR7.GD before calling vmx_queue_exception(). However, in the
event that L1 intercepts the exception, this is too early, because
DR7.GD should not be modified by a #DB that causes a VM-exit directly
(Intel SDM vol 3, section 27.1).

3. If the injected exception is a #PF, nested_vmx_check_exception()
doesn't properly check whether or not L1 is interested in the
associated error code (using the #PF error code mask and match fields
from vmcs12). It may either return 0 when it should call
nested_vmx_vmexit() or vice versa.

4. nested_vmx_check_exception() assumes that it is dealing with a
hardware-generated exception intercept from L2, with some of the
relevant details (the VM-exit interruption-information and the exit
qualification) live in vmcs02. For userspace-injected exceptions, this
is not the case.

5. prepare_vmcs12() assumes that when its exit_intr_info argument
specifies valid information with a valid error code that it can VMREAD
the VM-exit interruption error code from vmcs02. For
userspace-injected exceptions, this is not the case.

Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:01 +02:00
David Hildenbrand 28bf288879 KVM: x86: fix user triggerable warning in kvm_apic_accept_events()
If we already entered/are about to enter SMM, don't allow switching to
INIT/SIPI_RECEIVED, otherwise the next call to kvm_apic_accept_events()
will report a warning.

Same applies if we are already in MP state INIT_RECEIVED and SMM is
requested to be turned on. Refuse to set the VCPU events in this case.

Fixes: cd7764fe9f ("KVM: x86: latch INITs while in system management mode")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:01 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini 3042255899 kvm: make KVM_CAP_COALESCED_MMIO architecture agnostic
Remove code from architecture files that can be moved to virt/kvm, since there
is already common code for coalesced MMIO.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
[Removed a pointless 'break' after 'return'.]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:00 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini a5f4645704 KVM: nVMX: support RDRAND and RDSEED exiting
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:00 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini ae1e2d1082 kvm: nVMX: support EPT accessed/dirty bits
Now use bit 6 of EPTP to optionally enable A/D bits for EPTP.  Another
thing to change is that, when EPT accessed and dirty bits are not in use,
VMX treats accesses to guest paging structures as data reads.  When they
are in use (bit 6 of EPTP is set), they are treated as writes and the
corresponding EPT dirty bit is set.  The MMU didn't know this detail,
so this patch adds it.

We also have to fix up the exit qualification.  It may be wrong because
KVM sets bit 6 but the guest might not.

L1 emulates EPT A/D bits using write permissions, so in principle it may
be possible for EPT A/D bits to be used by L1 even though not available
in hardware.  The problem is that guest page-table walks will be treated
as reads rather than writes, so they would not cause an EPT violation.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[Fixed typo in walk_addr_generic() comment and changed bit clear +
 conditional-set pattern in handle_ept_violation() to conditional-clear]
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:00 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini 86407bcb5c kvm: x86: MMU support for EPT accessed/dirty bits
This prepares the MMU paging code for EPT accessed and dirty bits,
which can be enabled optionally at runtime.  Code that updates the
accessed and dirty bits will need a pointer to the struct kvm_mmu.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:00 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini 0047723130 KVM: VMX: remove bogus check for invalid EPT violation
handle_ept_violation is checking for "guest-linear-address invalid" +
"not a paging-structure walk".  However, _all_ EPT violations without
a valid guest linear address are paging structure walks, because those
EPT violations happen when loading the guest PDPTEs.

Therefore, the check can never be true, and even if it were, KVM doesn't
care about the guest linear address; it only uses the guest *physical*
address VMCS field.  So, remove the check altogether.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:00 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini 7db742654d KVM: nVMX: we support 1GB EPT pages
Large pages at the PDPE level can be emulated by the MMU, so the bit
can be set unconditionally in the EPT capabilities MSR.  The same is
true of 2MB EPT pages, though all Intel processors with EPT in practice
support those.

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:00 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini ad6260da1e KVM: x86: drop legacy device assignment
Legacy device assignment has been deprecated since 4.2 (released
1.5 years ago).  VFIO is better and everyone should have switched to it.
If they haven't, this should convince them. :)

Reviewed-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:00 +02:00
Paolo Bonzini 2c82878b0c KVM: VMX: require virtual NMI support
Virtual NMIs are only missing in Prescott and Yonah chips.  Both are obsolete
for virtualization usage---Yonah is 32-bit only even---so drop vNMI emulation.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
2017-04-07 16:49:00 +02:00