Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions
provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the
generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for
per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl
permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example:
allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds
auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds
Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros
representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands.
When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked.
This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl
permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver
may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as
driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such
as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or
access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism
to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications
to the subset of commands required.
The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl
commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to
POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format
change.
The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow
components to be reused e.g. netlink filters
Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"The main change in this kernel is Casey's generalized LSM stacking
work, which removes the hard-coding of Capabilities and Yama stacking,
allowing multiple arbitrary "small" LSMs to be stacked with a default
monolithic module (e.g. SELinux, Smack, AppArmor).
See
https://lwn.net/Articles/636056/
This will allow smaller, simpler LSMs to be incorporated into the
mainline kernel and arbitrarily stacked by users. Also, this is a
useful cleanup of the LSM code in its own right"
* 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (38 commits)
tpm, tpm_crb: fix le64_to_cpu conversions in crb_acpi_add()
vTPM: set virtual device before passing to ibmvtpm_reset_crq
tpm_ibmvtpm: remove unneccessary message level.
ima: update builtin policies
ima: extend "mask" policy matching support
ima: add support for new "euid" policy condition
ima: fix ima_show_template_data_ascii()
Smack: freeing an error pointer in smk_write_revoke_subj()
selinux: fix setting of security labels on NFS
selinux: Remove unused permission definitions
selinux: enable genfscon labeling for sysfs and pstore files
selinux: enable per-file labeling for debugfs files.
selinux: update netlink socket classes
signals: don't abuse __flush_signals() in selinux_bprm_committed_creds()
selinux: Print 'sclass' as string when unrecognized netlink message occurs
Smack: allow multiple labels in onlycap
Smack: fix seq operations in smackfs
ima: pass iint to ima_add_violation()
ima: wrap event related data to the new ima_event_data structure
integrity: add validity checks for 'path' parameter
...
Remove unused permission definitions from SELinux.
Many of these were only ever used in pre-mainline
versions of SELinux, prior to Linux 2.6.0. Some of them
were used in the legacy network or compat_net=1 checks
that were disabled by default in Linux 2.6.18 and
fully removed in Linux 2.6.30.
Permissions never used in mainline Linux:
file swapon
filesystem transition
tcp_socket { connectto newconn acceptfrom }
node enforce_dest
unix_stream_socket { newconn acceptfrom }
Legacy network checks, removed in 2.6.30:
socket { recv_msg send_msg }
node { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
netif { tcp_recv tcp_send udp_recv udp_send rawip_recv rawip_send dccp_recv dccp_send }
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Add support for per-file labeling of debugfs files so that
we can distinguish them in policy. This is particularly
important in Android where certain debugfs files have to be writable
by apps and therefore the debugfs directory tree can be read and
searched by all.
Since debugfs is entirely kernel-generated, the directory tree is
immutable by userspace, and the inodes are pinned in memory, we can
simply use the same approach as with proc and label the inodes from
policy based on pathname from the root of the debugfs filesystem.
Generalize the existing labeling support used for proc and reuse it
for debugfs too.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Update the set of SELinux netlink socket class definitions to match
the set of netlink protocols implemented by the kernel. The
ip_queue implementation for the NETLINK_FIREWALL and NETLINK_IP6_FW protocols
was removed in d16cf20e2f, so we can remove
the corresponding class definitions as this is dead code. Add new
classes for NETLINK_ISCSI, NETLINK_FIB_LOOKUP, NETLINK_CONNECTOR,
NETLINK_NETFILTER, NETLINK_GENERIC, NETLINK_SCSITRANSPORT, NETLINK_RDMA,
and NETLINK_CRYPTO so that we can distinguish among sockets created
for each of these protocols. This change does not define the finer-grained
nlsmsg_read/write permissions or map specific nlmsg_type values to those
permissions in the SELinux nlmsgtab; if finer-grained control of these
sockets is desired/required, that can be added as a follow-on change.
We do not define a SELinux class for NETLINK_ECRYPTFS as the implementation
was removed in 624ae52845.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
This allows MAY_NOT_BLOCK to be passed, in RCU-walk mode, through
the new avc_has_perm_flags() to avc_audit() and thence the slow_avc_audit.
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Add security hooks to the binder and implement the hooks for SELinux.
The security hooks enable security modules such as SELinux to implement
controls over binder IPC. The security hooks include support for
controlling what process can become the binder context manager
(binder_set_context_mgr), controlling the ability of a process
to invoke a binder transaction/IPC to another process (binder_transaction),
controlling the ability of a process to transfer a binder reference to
another process (binder_transfer_binder), and controlling the ability
of a process to transfer an open file to another process (binder_transfer_file).
These hooks have been included in the Android kernel trees since Android 4.3.
(Updated to reflect upstream relocation and changes to the binder driver,
changes to the LSM audit data structures, coding style cleanups, and
to add inline documentation for the hooks).
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com>
Acked-by: Jeffrey Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
While SELinux largely ignores namespaces, for good reason, there are
some places where it needs to at least be aware of namespaces in order
to function correctly. Network namespaces are one example. Basic
awareness of network namespaces are necessary in order to match a
network interface's index number to an actual network device.
This patch corrects a problem with network interfaces added to a
non-init namespace, and can be reproduced with the following commands:
[NOTE: the NetLabel configuration is here only to active the dynamic
networking controls ]
# netlabelctl unlbl add default address:0.0.0.0/0 \
label:system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0
# netlabelctl unlbl add default address:::/0 \
label:system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t:s0
# netlabelctl cipsov4 add pass doi:100 tags:1
# netlabelctl map add domain:lspp_test_netlabel_t \
protocol:cipsov4,100
# ip link add type veth
# ip netns add myns
# ip link set veth1 netns myns
# ip a add dev veth0 10.250.13.100/24
# ip netns exec myns ip a add dev veth1 10.250.13.101/24
# ip l set veth0 up
# ip netns exec myns ip l set veth1 up
# ping -c 1 10.250.13.101
# ip netns exec myns ping -c 1 10.250.13.100
Reported-by: Jiri Jaburek <jjaburek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
When flushing the AVC, such as during a policy load, the various
network caches are also flushed, with each making a call to
synchronize_net() which has shown to be expensive in some cases.
This patch consolidates the network cache flushes into a single AVC
callback which only calls synchronize_net() once for each AVC cache
flush.
Reported-by: Jaejyn Shin <flagon22bass@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
To increase compiler portability there is <linux/compiler.h> which
provides convenience macros for various gcc constructs. Eg: __packed
for __attribute__((packed)).
This patch is part of a large task I've taken to clean the gcc
specific attributes and use the the macros instead.
Signed-off-by: Gideon Israel Dsouza <gidisrael@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Pull networking updates from David Miller:
1) Seccomp BPF filters can now be JIT'd, from Alexei Starovoitov.
2) Multiqueue support in xen-netback and xen-netfront, from Andrew J
Benniston.
3) Allow tweaking of aggregation settings in cdc_ncm driver, from Bjørn
Mork.
4) BPF now has a "random" opcode, from Chema Gonzalez.
5) Add more BPF documentation and improve test framework, from Daniel
Borkmann.
6) Support TCP fastopen over ipv6, from Daniel Lee.
7) Add software TSO helper functions and use them to support software
TSO in mvneta and mv643xx_eth drivers. From Ezequiel Garcia.
8) Support software TSO in fec driver too, from Nimrod Andy.
9) Add Broadcom SYSTEMPORT driver, from Florian Fainelli.
10) Handle broadcasts more gracefully over macvlan when there are large
numbers of interfaces configured, from Herbert Xu.
11) Allow more control over fwmark used for non-socket based responses,
from Lorenzo Colitti.
12) Do TCP congestion window limiting based upon measurements, from Neal
Cardwell.
13) Support busy polling in SCTP, from Neal Horman.
14) Allow RSS key to be configured via ethtool, from Venkata Duvvuru.
15) Bridge promisc mode handling improvements from Vlad Yasevich.
16) Don't use inetpeer entries to implement ID generation any more, it
performs poorly, from Eric Dumazet.
* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1522 commits)
rtnetlink: fix userspace API breakage for iproute2 < v3.9.0
tcp: fixing TLP's FIN recovery
net: fec: Add software TSO support
net: fec: Add Scatter/gather support
net: fec: Increase buffer descriptor entry number
net: fec: Factorize feature setting
net: fec: Enable IP header hardware checksum
net: fec: Factorize the .xmit transmit function
bridge: fix compile error when compiling without IPv6 support
bridge: fix smatch warning / potential null pointer dereference
via-rhine: fix full-duplex with autoneg disable
bnx2x: Enlarge the dorq threshold for VFs
bnx2x: Check for UNDI in uncommon branch
bnx2x: Fix 1G-baseT link
bnx2x: Fix link for KR with swapped polarity lane
sctp: Fix sk_ack_backlog wrap-around problem
net/core: Add VF link state control policy
net/fsl: xgmac_mdio is dependent on OF_MDIO
net/fsl: Make xgmac_mdio read error message useful
net_sched: drr: warn when qdisc is not work conserving
...
Pull security layer updates from Serge Hallyn:
"This is a merge of James Morris' security-next tree from 3.14 to
yesterday's master, plus four patches from Paul Moore which are in
linux-next, plus one patch from Mimi"
* 'serge-next-1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/sergeh/linux-security:
ima: audit log files opened with O_DIRECT flag
selinux: conditionally reschedule in hashtab_insert while loading selinux policy
selinux: conditionally reschedule in mls_convert_context while loading selinux policy
selinux: reject setexeccon() on MNT_NOSUID applications with -EACCES
selinux: Report permissive mode in avc: denied messages.
Warning in scanf string typing
Smack: Label cgroup files for systemd
Smack: Verify read access on file open - v3
security: Convert use of typedef ctl_table to struct ctl_table
Smack: bidirectional UDS connect check
Smack: Correctly remove SMACK64TRANSMUTE attribute
SMACK: Fix handling value==NULL in post setxattr
bugfix patch for SMACK
Smack: adds smackfs/ptrace interface
Smack: unify all ptrace accesses in the smack
Smack: fix the subject/object order in smack_ptrace_traceme()
Minor improvement of 'smack_sb_kern_mount'
smack: fix key permission verification
KEYS: Move the flags representing required permission to linux/key.h
We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
We cannot presently tell from an avc: denied message whether access was in
fact denied or was allowed due to global or per-domain permissive mode.
Add a permissive= field to the avc message to reflect this information.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Register a netlink per-protocol bind fuction for audit to check userspace
process capabilities before allowing a multicast group connection.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Conflicts:
Documentation/devicetree/bindings/net/micrel-ks8851.txt
net/core/netpoll.c
The net/core/netpoll.c conflict is a bug fix in 'net' happening
to code which is completely removed in 'net-next'.
In micrel-ks8851.txt we simply have overlapping changes.
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
security_xfrm_policy_alloc can be called in atomic context so the
allocation should be done with GFP_ATOMIC. Add an argument to let the
callers choose the appropriate way. In order to do so a gfp argument
needs to be added to the method xfrm_policy_alloc_security in struct
security_operations and to the internal function
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user. After that switch to GFP_ATOMIC in the atomic
callers and leave GFP_KERNEL as before for the rest.
The path that needed the gfp argument addition is:
security_xfrm_policy_alloc -> security_ops.xfrm_policy_alloc_security ->
all users of xfrm_policy_alloc_security (e.g. selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc) ->
selinux_xfrm_alloc_user (here the allocation used to be GFP_KERNEL only)
Now adding a gfp argument to selinux_xfrm_alloc_user requires us to also
add it to security_context_to_sid which is used inside and prior to this
patch did only GFP_KERNEL allocation. So add gfp argument to
security_context_to_sid and adjust all of its callers as well.
CC: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
CC: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
CC: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CC: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
CC: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: LSM list <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
CC: SELinux list <selinux@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Inserting a entry into flowcache, or flushing flowcache should be based
on per net scope. The reason to do so is flushing operation from fat
netns crammed with flow entries will also making the slim netns with only
a few flow cache entries go away in original implementation.
Since flowcache is tightly coupled with IPsec, so it would be easier to
put flow cache global parameters into xfrm namespace part. And one last
thing needs to do is bumping flow cache genid, and flush flow cache should
also be made in per net style.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Pull security layer updates from James Morris:
"Changes for this kernel include maintenance updates for Smack, SELinux
(and several networking fixes), IMA and TPM"
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: (39 commits)
SELinux: Fix memory leak upon loading policy
tpm/tpm-sysfs: active_show() can be static
tpm: tpm_tis: Fix compile problems with CONFIG_PM_SLEEP/CONFIG_PNP
tpm: Make tpm-dev allocate a per-file structure
tpm: Use the ops structure instead of a copy in tpm_vendor_specific
tpm: Create a tpm_class_ops structure and use it in the drivers
tpm: Pull all driver sysfs code into tpm-sysfs.c
tpm: Move sysfs functions from tpm-interface to tpm-sysfs
tpm: Pull everything related to /dev/tpmX into tpm-dev.c
char: tpm: nuvoton: remove unused variable
tpm: MAINTAINERS: Cleanup TPM Maintainers file
tpm/tpm_i2c_atmel: fix coccinelle warnings
tpm/tpm_ibmvtpm: fix unreachable code warning (smatch warning)
tpm/tpm_i2c_stm_st33: Check return code of get_burstcount
tpm/tpm_ppi: Check return value of acpi_get_name
tpm/tpm_ppi: Do not compare strcmp(a,b) == -1
ima: remove unneeded size_limit argument from ima_eventdigest_init_common()
ima: update IMA-templates.txt documentation
ima: pass HASH_ALGO__LAST as hash algo in ima_eventdigest_init()
ima: change the default hash algorithm to SHA1 in ima_eventdigest_ng_init()
...
While running stress tests on adding and deleting ftrace instances I hit
this bug:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000020
IP: selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
PGD 63681067 PUD 7ddbe067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT
CPU: 0 PID: 5634 Comm: ftrace-test-mki Not tainted 3.13.0-rc4-test-00033-gd2a6dde-dirty #20
Hardware name: /DG965MQ, BIOS MQ96510J.86A.0372.2006.0605.1717 06/05/2006
task: ffff880078375800 ti: ffff88007ddb0000 task.ti: ffff88007ddb0000
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d8bc5>] [<ffffffff812d8bc5>] selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
RSP: 0018:ffff88007ddb1c48 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000800000 RCX: ffff88006dd43840
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000081 RDI: ffff88006ee46000
RBP: ffff88007ddb1c88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff88007ddb1c54
R10: 6e6576652f6f6f66 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000081 R14: ffff88006ee46000 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f217b5b6700(0000) GS:ffffffff81e21000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033^M
CR2: 0000000000000020 CR3: 000000006a0fe000 CR4: 00000000000007f0
Call Trace:
security_inode_permission+0x1c/0x30
__inode_permission+0x41/0xa0
inode_permission+0x18/0x50
link_path_walk+0x66/0x920
path_openat+0xa6/0x6c0
do_filp_open+0x43/0xa0
do_sys_open+0x146/0x240
SyS_open+0x1e/0x20
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Code: 84 a1 00 00 00 81 e3 00 20 00 00 89 d8 83 c8 02 40 f6 c6 04 0f 45 d8 40 f6 c6 08 74 71 80 cf 02 49 8b 46 38 4c 8d 4d cc 45 31 c0 <0f> b7 50 20 8b 70 1c 48 8b 41 70 89 d9 8b 78 04 e8 36 cf ff ff
RIP selinux_inode_permission+0x85/0x160
CR2: 0000000000000020
Investigating, I found that the inode->i_security was NULL, and the
dereference of it caused the oops.
in selinux_inode_permission():
isec = inode->i_security;
rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
Note, the crash came from stressing the deletion and reading of debugfs
files. I was not able to recreate this via normal files. But I'm not
sure they are safe. It may just be that the race window is much harder
to hit.
What seems to have happened (and what I have traced), is the file is
being opened at the same time the file or directory is being deleted.
As the dentry and inode locks are not held during the path walk, nor is
the inodes ref counts being incremented, there is nothing saving these
structures from being discarded except for an rcu_read_lock().
The rcu_read_lock() protects against freeing of the inode, but it does
not protect freeing of the inode_security_struct. Now if the freeing of
the i_security happens with a call_rcu(), and the i_security field of
the inode is not changed (it gets freed as the inode gets freed) then
there will be no issue here. (Linus Torvalds suggested not setting the
field to NULL such that we do not need to check if it is NULL in the
permission check).
Note, this is a hack, but it fixes the problem at hand. A real fix is
to restructure the destroy_inode() to call all the destructor handlers
from the RCU callback. But that is a major job to do, and requires a
lot of work. For now, we just band-aid this bug with this fix (it
works), and work on a more maintainable solution in the future.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109101932.0508dec7@gandalf.local.home
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20140109182756.17abaaa8@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Previously selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid() would only check for labeled
IPsec security labels on inbound packets, this patch enables it to
check both inbound and outbound traffic for labeled IPsec security
labels.
Reported-by: Janak Desai <Janak.Desai@gtri.gatech.edu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Update the policy version (POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) to allow
holding of policy source info for constraints.
Signed-off-by: Richard Haines <richard_c_haines@btinternet.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
.. so get rid of it. The only indirect users were all the
avc_has_perm() callers which just expanded to have a zero flags
argument.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Conflicts:
security/selinux/hooks.c
Pull Eric's existing SELinux tree as there are a number of patches in
there that are not yet upstream. There was some minor fixup needed to
resolve a conflict in security/selinux/hooks.c:selinux_set_mnt_opts()
between the labeled NFS patches and Eric's security_fs_use()
simplification patch.
This reverts commit 308ab70c46.
It breaks my FC6 test box. /dev/pts is not mounted. dmesg says
SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different security settings
for (dev devpts, type devpts)
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Current net name space has only one genid for both IPv4 and IPv6, it has below
drawbacks:
- Add/delete an IPv4 address will invalidate all IPv6 routing table entries.
- Insert/remove XFRM policy will also invalidate both IPv4/IPv6 routing table
entries even when the policy is only applied for one address family.
Thus, this patch attempt to split one genid for two to cater for IPv4 and IPv6
separately in a fine granularity.
Signed-off-by: Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Currently the packet class in SELinux is not checked if there are no
SECMARK rules in the security or mangle netfilter tables. Some systems
prefer that packets are always checked, for example, to protect the system
should the netfilter rules fail to load or if the nefilter rules
were maliciously flushed.
Add the always_check_network policy capability which, when enabled, treats
SECMARK as enabled, even if there are no netfilter SECMARK rules and
treats peer labeling as enabled, even if there is no Netlabel or
labeled IPSEC configuration.
Includes definition of "redhat1" SELinux policy capability, which
exists in the SELinux userpace library, to keep ordering correct.
The SELinux userpace portion of this was merged last year, but this kernel
change fell on the floor.
Signed-off-by: Chris PeBenito <cpebenito@tresys.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Rather than passing pointers to memory locations, strings, and other
stuff just give up on the separation and give security_fs_use the
superblock. It just makes the code easier to read (even if not easier to
reuse on some other OS)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Instead of having special code around the 'non-mount' seclabel mount option
just handle it like the mount options.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
We only have 6 options, so char is good enough, but use a short as that
packs nicely. This shrinks the superblock_security_struct just a little
bit.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Just to make it clear that we have mount time options and flags,
separate them. Since I decided to move the non-mount options above
above 0x10, we need a short instead of a char. (x86 padding says
this takes up no additional space as we have a 3byte whole in the
structure)
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Remove the BUG_ON() from selinux_skb_xfrm_sid() and propogate the
error code up to the caller. Also check the return values in the
only caller function, selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid().
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Remove the unused get_sock_isec() function and do some formatting
fixes.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
The xfrm_state_alloc_security() LSM hook implementation is really a
multiplexed hook with two different behaviors depending on the
arguments passed to it by the caller. This patch splits the LSM hook
implementation into two new hook implementations, which match the
LSM hooks in the rest of the kernel:
* xfrm_state_alloc
* xfrm_state_alloc_acquire
Also included in this patch are the necessary changes to the SELinux
code; no other LSMs are affected.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
There currently doesn't exist a labeling type that is adequate for use with
labeled NFS. Since NFS doesn't really support xattrs we can't use the use xattr
labeling behavior. For this we developed a new labeling type. The native
labeling type is used solely by NFS to ensure NFS inodes are labeled at runtime
by the NFS code instead of relying on the SELinux security server on the client
end.
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew N. Dodd <Matthew.Dodd@sparta.com>
Signed-off-by: Miguel Rodel Felipe <Rodel_FM@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Phua Eu Gene <PHUA_Eu_Gene@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Khin Mi Mi Aung <Mi_Mi_AUNG@dsi.a-star.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the
multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent
devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
the tun device to lose its SELinux label.
We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
device. In the process we tweak the LSM hooks to work with this new
approach to TUN device/socket labeling and introduce a new LSM hook,
security_tun_dev_attach_queue(), to approve requests to attach to a
TUN queue via TUNSETQUEUE.
The SELinux code has been adjusted to match the new LSM hooks, the
other LSMs do not make use of the LSM TUN controls. This patch makes
use of the recently added "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission to
restrict access to the TUNSETQUEUE operation. On older SELinux
policies which do not define the "tun_socket:attach_queue" permission
the access control decision for TUNSETQUEUE will be handled according
to the SELinux policy's unknown permission setting.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Add a new permission to align with the new TUN multiqueue support,
"tun_socket:attach_queue".
The corresponding SELinux reference policy patch is show below:
diff --git a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors
index 28802c5..a0664a1 100644
--- a/policy/flask/access_vectors
+++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors
@@ -827,6 +827,9 @@ class kernel_service
class tun_socket
inherits socket
+{
+ attach_queue
+}
class x_pointer
inherits x_device
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
Tested-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
When a policy is inserted or deleted, all dst should be recalculated.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Pull the big VFS changes from Al Viro:
"This one is *big* and changes quite a few things around VFS. What's in there:
- the first of two really major architecture changes - death to open
intents.
The former is finally there; it was very long in making, but with
Miklos getting through really hard and messy final push in
fs/namei.c, we finally have it. Unlike his variant, this one
doesn't introduce struct opendata; what we have instead is
->atomic_open() taking preallocated struct file * and passing
everything via its fields.
Instead of returning struct file *, it returns -E... on error, 0
on success and 1 in "deal with it yourself" case (e.g. symlink
found on server, etc.).
See comments before fs/namei.c:atomic_open(). That made a lot of
goodies finally possible and quite a few are in that pile:
->lookup(), ->d_revalidate() and ->create() do not get struct
nameidata * anymore; ->lookup() and ->d_revalidate() get lookup
flags instead, ->create() gets "do we want it exclusive" flag.
With the introduction of new helper (kern_path_locked()) we are rid
of all struct nameidata instances outside of fs/namei.c; it's still
visible in namei.h, but not for long. Come the next cycle,
declaration will move either to fs/internal.h or to fs/namei.c
itself. [me, miklos, hch]
- The second major change: behaviour of final fput(). Now we have
__fput() done without any locks held by caller *and* not from deep
in call stack.
That obviously lifts a lot of constraints on the locking in there.
Moreover, it's legal now to call fput() from atomic contexts (which
has immediately simplified life for aio.c). We also don't need
anti-recursion logics in __scm_destroy() anymore.
There is a price, though - the damn thing has become partially
asynchronous. For fput() from normal process we are guaranteed
that pending __fput() will be done before the caller returns to
userland, exits or gets stopped for ptrace.
For kernel threads and atomic contexts it's done via
schedule_work(), so theoretically we might need a way to make sure
it's finished; so far only one such place had been found, but there
might be more.
There's flush_delayed_fput() (do all pending __fput()) and there's
__fput_sync() (fput() analog doing __fput() immediately). I hope
we won't need them often; see warnings in fs/file_table.c for
details. [me, based on task_work series from Oleg merged last
cycle]
- sync series from Jan
- large part of "death to sync_supers()" work from Artem; the only
bits missing here are exofs and ext4 ones. As far as I understand,
those are going via the exofs and ext4 trees resp.; once they are
in, we can put ->write_super() to the rest, along with the thread
calling it.
- preparatory bits from unionmount series (from dhowells).
- assorted cleanups and fixes all over the place, as usual.
This is not the last pile for this cycle; there's at least jlayton's
ESTALE work and fsfreeze series (the latter - in dire need of fixes,
so I'm not sure it'll make the cut this cycle). I'll probably throw
symlink/hardlink restrictions stuff from Kees into the next pile, too.
Plus there's a lot of misc patches I hadn't thrown into that one -
it's large enough as it is..."
* 'for-linus-2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (127 commits)
ext4: switch EXT4_IOC_RESIZE_FS to mnt_want_write_file()
btrfs: switch btrfs_ioctl_balance() to mnt_want_write_file()
switch dentry_open() to struct path, make it grab references itself
spufs: shift dget/mntget towards dentry_open()
zoran: don't bother with struct file * in zoran_map
ecryptfs: don't reinvent the wheels, please - use struct completion
don't expose I_NEW inodes via dentry->d_inode
tidy up namei.c a bit
unobfuscate follow_up() a bit
ext3: pass custom EOF to generic_file_llseek_size()
ext4: use core vfs llseek code for dir seeks
vfs: allow custom EOF in generic_file_llseek code
vfs: Avoid unnecessary WB_SYNC_NONE writeback during sys_sync and reorder sync passes
vfs: Remove unnecessary flushing of block devices
vfs: Make sys_sync writeout also block device inodes
vfs: Create function for iterating over block devices
vfs: Reorder operations during sys_sync
quota: Move quota syncing to ->sync_fs method
quota: Split dquot_quota_sync() to writeback and cache flushing part
vfs: Move noop_backing_dev_info check from sync into writeback
...
Pull SELinux regression fixes from James Morris.
Andrew Morton has a box that hit that open perms problem.
I also renamed the "epollwakeup" selinux name for the new capability to
be "block_suspend", to match the rename done by commit d9914cf661
("PM: Rename CAP_EPOLLWAKEUP to CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND").
* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
SELinux: do not check open perms if they are not known to policy
SELinux: include definition of new capabilities
James Morris