linux/security
Linus Torvalds 1eccfa090e Implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user/copy_from_user
bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and SLUB.
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Merge tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux

Pull usercopy protection from Kees Cook:
 "Tbhis implements HARDENED_USERCOPY verification of copy_to_user and
  copy_from_user bounds checking for most architectures on SLAB and
  SLUB"

* tag 'usercopy-v4.8' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
  mm: SLUB hardened usercopy support
  mm: SLAB hardened usercopy support
  s390/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
  sparc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
  powerpc/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
  ia64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
  arm64/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
  ARM: uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
  x86/uaccess: Enable hardened usercopy
  mm: Hardened usercopy
  mm: Implement stack frame object validation
  mm: Add is_migrate_cma_page
2016-08-08 14:48:14 -07:00
..
apparmor apparmor: fix SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT parameter handling 2016-07-27 17:39:26 +10:00
integrity Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00
keys Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00
loadpin LSM: LoadPin: provide enablement CONFIG 2016-05-17 20:10:30 +10:00
selinux Merge branch 'work.const-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs 2016-08-06 09:49:02 -04:00
smack Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00
tomoyo Merge branch 'next' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security 2016-07-29 17:38:46 -07:00
yama Yama: fix double-spinlock and user access in atomic context 2016-05-26 09:56:18 +10:00
Kconfig mm: Hardened usercopy 2016-07-26 14:41:47 -07:00
Makefile LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions 2016-04-21 10:47:27 +10:00
commoncap.c fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid 2016-06-24 10:40:41 -05:00
device_cgroup.c security/device_cgroup: Fix RCU_LOCKDEP_WARN() condition 2015-09-03 18:13:10 -07:00
inode.c securityfs: ->d_parent is never NULL or negative 2016-05-29 16:22:06 -04:00
lsm_audit.c Merge branch 'next' of git://git.infradead.org/users/pcmoore/selinux into next 2015-08-15 13:29:57 +10:00
min_addr.c mmap_min_addr check CAP_SYS_RAWIO only for write 2010-04-23 08:56:31 +10:00
security.c Merge branch 'work.const-qstr' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs 2016-08-06 09:49:02 -04:00