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linux/crypto/jitterentropy.c

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/*
* Non-physical true random number generator based on timing jitter.
*
* Copyright Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>, 2014
*
* Design
* ======
*
* See http://www.chronox.de/jent.html
*
* License
* =======
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
* including the disclaimer of warranties.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
* products derived from this software without specific prior
* written permission.
*
* ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2 are
* required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
* necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
* the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
* WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
* OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
* BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
* LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
* USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
* DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* This Jitterentropy RNG is based on the jitterentropy library
* version 1.1.0 provided at http://www.chronox.de/jent.html
*/
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/fips.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <crypto/internal/rng.h>
/* The entropy pool */
struct rand_data {
/* all data values that are vital to maintain the security
* of the RNG are marked as SENSITIVE. A user must not
* access that information while the RNG executes its loops to
* calculate the next random value. */
__u64 data; /* SENSITIVE Actual random number */
__u64 old_data; /* SENSITIVE Previous random number */
__u64 prev_time; /* SENSITIVE Previous time stamp */
#define DATA_SIZE_BITS ((sizeof(__u64)) * 8)
__u64 last_delta; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
__s64 last_delta2; /* SENSITIVE stuck test */
unsigned int stuck:1; /* Time measurement stuck */
unsigned int osr; /* Oversample rate */
unsigned int stir:1; /* Post-processing stirring */
unsigned int disable_unbias:1; /* Deactivate Von-Neuman unbias */
#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS 64
#define JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE 32
#define JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS 128
#define JENT_MEMORY_SIZE (JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS*JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE)
unsigned char *mem; /* Memory access location with size of
* memblocks * memblocksize */
unsigned int memlocation; /* Pointer to byte in *mem */
unsigned int memblocks; /* Number of memory blocks in *mem */
unsigned int memblocksize; /* Size of one memory block in bytes */
unsigned int memaccessloops; /* Number of memory accesses per random
* bit generation */
};
/* Flags that can be used to initialize the RNG */
#define JENT_DISABLE_STIR (1<<0) /* Disable stirring the entropy pool */
#define JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS (1<<1) /* Disable the Von-Neuman Unbiaser */
#define JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS (1<<2) /* Disable memory access for more
* entropy, saves MEMORY_SIZE RAM for
* entropy collector */
#define DRIVER_NAME "jitterentropy"
/* -- error codes for init function -- */
#define JENT_ENOTIME 1 /* Timer service not available */
#define JENT_ECOARSETIME 2 /* Timer too coarse for RNG */
#define JENT_ENOMONOTONIC 3 /* Timer is not monotonic increasing */
#define JENT_EMINVARIATION 4 /* Timer variations too small for RNG */
#define JENT_EVARVAR 5 /* Timer does not produce variations of
* variations (2nd derivation of time is
* zero). */
#define JENT_EMINVARVAR 6 /* Timer variations of variations is tooi
* small. */
/***************************************************************************
* Helper functions
***************************************************************************/
static inline void jent_get_nstime(__u64 *out)
{
struct timespec ts;
__u64 tmp = 0;
tmp = random_get_entropy();
/*
* If random_get_entropy does not return a value (which is possible on,
* for example, MIPS), invoke __getnstimeofday
* hoping that there are timers we can work with.
*
* The list of available timers can be obtained from
* /sys/devices/system/clocksource/clocksource0/available_clocksource
* and are registered with clocksource_register()
*/
if ((0 == tmp) &&
(0 == __getnstimeofday(&ts))) {
tmp = ts.tv_sec;
tmp = tmp << 32;
tmp = tmp | ts.tv_nsec;
}
*out = tmp;
}
/**
* Update of the loop count used for the next round of
* an entropy collection.
*
* Input:
* @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
* @bits is the number of low bits of the timer to consider
* @min is the number of bits we shift the timer value to the right at
* the end to make sure we have a guaranteed minimum value
*
* @return Newly calculated loop counter
*/
static __u64 jent_loop_shuffle(struct rand_data *ec,
unsigned int bits, unsigned int min)
{
__u64 time = 0;
__u64 shuffle = 0;
unsigned int i = 0;
unsigned int mask = (1<<bits) - 1;
jent_get_nstime(&time);
/*
* mix the current state of the random number into the shuffle
* calculation to balance that shuffle a bit more
*/
if (ec)
time ^= ec->data;
/*
* we fold the time value as much as possible to ensure that as many
* bits of the time stamp are included as possible
*/
for (i = 0; (DATA_SIZE_BITS / bits) > i; i++) {
shuffle ^= time & mask;
time = time >> bits;
}
/*
* We add a lower boundary value to ensure we have a minimum
* RNG loop count.
*/
return (shuffle + (1<<min));
}
/***************************************************************************
* Noise sources
***************************************************************************/
/*
* The disabling of the optimizations is performed as documented and assessed
* thoroughly in http://www.chronox.de/jent.html. However, instead of disabling
* the optimization of the entire C file, only the main functions the jitter is
* measured for are not optimized. These functions include the noise sources as
* well as the main functions triggering the noise sources. As the time
* measurement is done from one invocation of the jitter noise source to the
* next, even the execution jitter of the code invoking the noise sources
* contribute to the overall randomness as well. The behavior of the RNG and the
* statistical characteristics when only the mentioned functions are not
* optimized is almost equal to the a completely non-optimized RNG compilation
* as tested with the test tools provided at the initially mentioned web site.
*/
/**
* CPU Jitter noise source -- this is the noise source based on the CPU
* execution time jitter
*
* This function folds the time into one bit units by iterating
* through the DATA_SIZE_BITS bit time value as follows: assume our time value
* is 0xabcd
* 1st loop, 1st shift generates 0xd000
* 1st loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000d
* 2nd loop, 1st shift generates 0xcd00
* 2nd loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000c
* 3rd loop, 1st shift generates 0xbcd0
* 3rd loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000b
* 4th loop, 1st shift generates 0xabcd
* 4th loop, 2nd shift generates 0x000a
* Now, the values at the end of the 2nd shifts are XORed together.
*
* The code is deliberately inefficient and shall stay that way. This function
* is the root cause why the code shall be compiled without optimization. This
* function not only acts as folding operation, but this function's execution
* is used to measure the CPU execution time jitter. Any change to the loop in
* this function implies that careful retesting must be done.
*
* Input:
* @ec entropy collector struct -- may be NULL
* @time time stamp to be folded
* @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of
* loops to perform the folding
*
* Output:
* @folded result of folding operation
*
* @return Number of loops the folding operation is performed
*/
#pragma GCC push_options
#pragma GCC optimize ("-O0")
static __u64 jent_fold_time(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 time,
__u64 *folded, __u64 loop_cnt)
{
unsigned int i;
__u64 j = 0;
__u64 new = 0;
#define MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 4
#define MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT 0
__u64 fold_loop_cnt =
jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_FOLD_LOOP_BIT, MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT);
/*
* testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
* needed during runtime
*/
if (loop_cnt)
fold_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;
for (j = 0; j < fold_loop_cnt; j++) {
new = 0;
for (i = 1; (DATA_SIZE_BITS) >= i; i++) {
__u64 tmp = time << (DATA_SIZE_BITS - i);
tmp = tmp >> (DATA_SIZE_BITS - 1);
new ^= tmp;
}
}
*folded = new;
return fold_loop_cnt;
}
#pragma GCC pop_options
/**
* Memory Access noise source -- this is a noise source based on variations in
* memory access times
*
* This function performs memory accesses which will add to the timing
* variations due to an unknown amount of CPU wait states that need to be
* added when accessing memory. The memory size should be larger than the L1
* caches as outlined in the documentation and the associated testing.
*
* The L1 cache has a very high bandwidth, albeit its access rate is usually
* slower than accessing CPU registers. Therefore, L1 accesses only add minimal
* variations as the CPU has hardly to wait. Starting with L2, significant
* variations are added because L2 typically does not belong to the CPU any more
* and therefore a wider range of CPU wait states is necessary for accesses.
* L3 and real memory accesses have even a wider range of wait states. However,
* to reliably access either L3 or memory, the ec->mem memory must be quite
* large which is usually not desirable.
*
* Input:
* @ec Reference to the entropy collector with the memory access data -- if
* the reference to the memory block to be accessed is NULL, this noise
* source is disabled
* @loop_cnt if a value not equal to 0 is set, use the given value as number of
* loops to perform the folding
*
* @return Number of memory access operations
*/
#pragma GCC push_options
#pragma GCC optimize ("-O0")
static unsigned int jent_memaccess(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 loop_cnt)
{
unsigned char *tmpval = NULL;
unsigned int wrap = 0;
__u64 i = 0;
#define MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT 7
#define MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT 0
__u64 acc_loop_cnt =
jent_loop_shuffle(ec, MAX_ACC_LOOP_BIT, MIN_ACC_LOOP_BIT);
if (NULL == ec || NULL == ec->mem)
return 0;
wrap = ec->memblocksize * ec->memblocks;
/*
* testing purposes -- allow test app to set the counter, not
* needed during runtime
*/
if (loop_cnt)
acc_loop_cnt = loop_cnt;
for (i = 0; i < (ec->memaccessloops + acc_loop_cnt); i++) {
tmpval = ec->mem + ec->memlocation;
/*
* memory access: just add 1 to one byte,
* wrap at 255 -- memory access implies read
* from and write to memory location
*/
*tmpval = (*tmpval + 1) & 0xff;
/*
* Addition of memblocksize - 1 to pointer
* with wrap around logic to ensure that every
* memory location is hit evenly
*/
ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation + ec->memblocksize - 1;
ec->memlocation = ec->memlocation % wrap;
}
return i;
}
#pragma GCC pop_options
/***************************************************************************
* Start of entropy processing logic
***************************************************************************/
/**
* Stuck test by checking the:
* 1st derivation of the jitter measurement (time delta)
* 2nd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of time deltas)
* 3rd derivation of the jitter measurement (delta of delta of time deltas)
*
* All values must always be non-zero.
*
* Input:
* @ec Reference to entropy collector
* @current_delta Jitter time delta
*
* @return
* 0 jitter measurement not stuck (good bit)
* 1 jitter measurement stuck (reject bit)
*/
static void jent_stuck(struct rand_data *ec, __u64 current_delta)
{
__s64 delta2 = ec->last_delta - current_delta;
__s64 delta3 = delta2 - ec->last_delta2;
ec->last_delta = current_delta;
ec->last_delta2 = delta2;
if (!current_delta || !delta2 || !delta3)
ec->stuck = 1;
}
/**
* This is the heart of the entropy generation: calculate time deltas and
* use the CPU jitter in the time deltas. The jitter is folded into one
* bit. You can call this function the "random bit generator" as it
* produces one random bit per invocation.
*
* WARNING: ensure that ->prev_time is primed before using the output
* of this function! This can be done by calling this function
* and not using its result.
*
* Input:
* @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
*
* @return One random bit
*/
#pragma GCC push_options
#pragma GCC optimize ("-O0")
static __u64 jent_measure_jitter(struct rand_data *ec)
{
__u64 time = 0;
__u64 data = 0;
__u64 current_delta = 0;
/* Invoke one noise source before time measurement to add variations */
jent_memaccess(ec, 0);
/*
* Get time stamp and calculate time delta to previous
* invocation to measure the timing variations
*/
jent_get_nstime(&time);
current_delta = time - ec->prev_time;
ec->prev_time = time;
/* Now call the next noise sources which also folds the data */
jent_fold_time(ec, current_delta, &data, 0);
/*
* Check whether we have a stuck measurement. The enforcement
* is performed after the stuck value has been mixed into the
* entropy pool.
*/
jent_stuck(ec, current_delta);
return data;
}
#pragma GCC pop_options
/**
* Von Neuman unbias as explained in RFC 4086 section 4.2. As shown in the
* documentation of that RNG, the bits from jent_measure_jitter are considered
* independent which implies that the Von Neuman unbias operation is applicable.
* A proof of the Von-Neumann unbias operation to remove skews is given in the
* document "A proposal for: Functionality classes for random number
* generators", version 2.0 by Werner Schindler, section 5.4.1.
*
* Input:
* @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
*
* @return One random bit
*/
static __u64 jent_unbiased_bit(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
{
do {
__u64 a = jent_measure_jitter(entropy_collector);
__u64 b = jent_measure_jitter(entropy_collector);
if (a == b)
continue;
if (1 == a)
return 1;
else
return 0;
} while (1);
}
/**
* Shuffle the pool a bit by mixing some value with a bijective function (XOR)
* into the pool.
*
* The function generates a mixer value that depends on the bits set and the
* location of the set bits in the random number generated by the entropy
* source. Therefore, based on the generated random number, this mixer value
* can have 2**64 different values. That mixer value is initialized with the
* first two SHA-1 constants. After obtaining the mixer value, it is XORed into
* the random number.
*
* The mixer value is not assumed to contain any entropy. But due to the XOR
* operation, it can also not destroy any entropy present in the entropy pool.
*
* Input:
* @entropy_collector Reference to entropy collector
*/
static void jent_stir_pool(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
{
/*
* to shut up GCC on 32 bit, we have to initialize the 64 variable
* with two 32 bit variables
*/
union c {
__u64 u64;
__u32 u32[2];
};
/*
* This constant is derived from the first two 32 bit initialization
* vectors of SHA-1 as defined in FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1
*/
union c constant;
/*
* The start value of the mixer variable is derived from the third
* and fourth 32 bit initialization vector of SHA-1 as defined in
* FIPS 180-4 section 5.3.1
*/
union c mixer;
unsigned int i = 0;
/*
* Store the SHA-1 constants in reverse order to make up the 64 bit
* value -- this applies to a little endian system, on a big endian
* system, it reverses as expected. But this really does not matter
* as we do not rely on the specific numbers. We just pick the SHA-1
* constants as they have a good mix of bit set and unset.
*/
constant.u32[1] = 0x67452301;
constant.u32[0] = 0xefcdab89;
mixer.u32[1] = 0x98badcfe;
mixer.u32[0] = 0x10325476;
for (i = 0; i < DATA_SIZE_BITS; i++) {
/*
* get the i-th bit of the input random number and only XOR
* the constant into the mixer value when that bit is set
*/
if ((entropy_collector->data >> i) & 1)
mixer.u64 ^= constant.u64;
mixer.u64 = rol64(mixer.u64, 1);
}
entropy_collector->data ^= mixer.u64;
}
/**
* Generator of one 64 bit random number
* Function fills rand_data->data
*
* Input:
* @ec Reference to entropy collector
*/
#pragma GCC push_options
#pragma GCC optimize ("-O0")
static void jent_gen_entropy(struct rand_data *ec)
{
unsigned int k = 0;
/* priming of the ->prev_time value */
jent_measure_jitter(ec);
while (1) {
__u64 data = 0;
if (ec->disable_unbias == 1)
data = jent_measure_jitter(ec);
else
data = jent_unbiased_bit(ec);
/* enforcement of the jent_stuck test */
if (ec->stuck) {
/*
* We only mix in the bit considered not appropriate
* without the LSFR. The reason is that if we apply
* the LSFR and we do not rotate, the 2nd bit with LSFR
* will cancel out the first LSFR application on the
* bad bit.
*
* And we do not rotate as we apply the next bit to the
* current bit location again.
*/
ec->data ^= data;
ec->stuck = 0;
continue;
}
/*
* Fibonacci LSFR with polynom of
* x^64 + x^61 + x^56 + x^31 + x^28 + x^23 + 1 which is
* primitive according to
* http://poincare.matf.bg.ac.rs/~ezivkovm/publications/primpol1.pdf
* (the shift values are the polynom values minus one
* due to counting bits from 0 to 63). As the current
* position is always the LSB, the polynom only needs
* to shift data in from the left without wrap.
*/
ec->data ^= data;
ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 63) & 1);
ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 60) & 1);
ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 55) & 1);
ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 30) & 1);
ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 27) & 1);
ec->data ^= ((ec->data >> 22) & 1);
ec->data = rol64(ec->data, 1);
/*
* We multiply the loop value with ->osr to obtain the
* oversampling rate requested by the caller
*/
if (++k >= (DATA_SIZE_BITS * ec->osr))
break;
}
if (ec->stir)
jent_stir_pool(ec);
}
#pragma GCC pop_options
/**
* The continuous test required by FIPS 140-2 -- the function automatically
* primes the test if needed.
*
* Return:
* 0 if FIPS test passed
* < 0 if FIPS test failed
*/
static void jent_fips_test(struct rand_data *ec)
{
if (!fips_enabled)
return;
/* prime the FIPS test */
if (!ec->old_data) {
ec->old_data = ec->data;
jent_gen_entropy(ec);
}
if (ec->data == ec->old_data)
panic(DRIVER_NAME ": Duplicate output detected\n");
ec->old_data = ec->data;
}
/**
* Entry function: Obtain entropy for the caller.
*
* This function invokes the entropy gathering logic as often to generate
* as many bytes as requested by the caller. The entropy gathering logic
* creates 64 bit per invocation.
*
* This function truncates the last 64 bit entropy value output to the exact
* size specified by the caller.
*
* Input:
* @ec Reference to entropy collector
* @data pointer to buffer for storing random data -- buffer must already
* exist
* @len size of the buffer, specifying also the requested number of random
* in bytes
*
* @return 0 when request is fulfilled or an error
*
* The following error codes can occur:
* -1 entropy_collector is NULL
*/
static ssize_t jent_read_entropy(struct rand_data *ec, u8 *data, size_t len)
{
u8 *p = data;
if (!ec)
return -EINVAL;
while (0 < len) {
size_t tocopy;
jent_gen_entropy(ec);
jent_fips_test(ec);
if ((DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8) < len)
tocopy = (DATA_SIZE_BITS / 8);
else
tocopy = len;
memcpy(p, &ec->data, tocopy);
len -= tocopy;
p += tocopy;
}
return 0;
}
/***************************************************************************
* Initialization logic
***************************************************************************/
static struct rand_data *jent_entropy_collector_alloc(unsigned int osr,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
entropy_collector = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rand_data), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entropy_collector)
return NULL;
if (!(flags & JENT_DISABLE_MEMORY_ACCESS)) {
/* Allocate memory for adding variations based on memory
* access
*/
entropy_collector->mem = kzalloc(JENT_MEMORY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!entropy_collector->mem) {
kfree(entropy_collector);
return NULL;
}
entropy_collector->memblocksize = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKSIZE;
entropy_collector->memblocks = JENT_MEMORY_BLOCKS;
entropy_collector->memaccessloops = JENT_MEMORY_ACCESSLOOPS;
}
/* verify and set the oversampling rate */
if (0 == osr)
osr = 1; /* minimum sampling rate is 1 */
entropy_collector->osr = osr;
entropy_collector->stir = 1;
if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_STIR)
entropy_collector->stir = 0;
if (flags & JENT_DISABLE_UNBIAS)
entropy_collector->disable_unbias = 1;
/* fill the data pad with non-zero values */
jent_gen_entropy(entropy_collector);
return entropy_collector;
}
static void jent_entropy_collector_free(struct rand_data *entropy_collector)
{
if (entropy_collector->mem)
kzfree(entropy_collector->mem);
entropy_collector->mem = NULL;
if (entropy_collector)
kzfree(entropy_collector);
entropy_collector = NULL;
}
static int jent_entropy_init(void)
{
int i;
__u64 delta_sum = 0;
__u64 old_delta = 0;
int time_backwards = 0;
int count_var = 0;
int count_mod = 0;
/* We could perform statistical tests here, but the problem is
* that we only have a few loop counts to do testing. These
* loop counts may show some slight skew and we produce
* false positives.
*
* Moreover, only old systems show potentially problematic
* jitter entropy that could potentially be caught here. But
* the RNG is intended for hardware that is available or widely
* used, but not old systems that are long out of favor. Thus,
* no statistical tests.
*/
/*
* We could add a check for system capabilities such as clock_getres or
* check for CONFIG_X86_TSC, but it does not make much sense as the
* following sanity checks verify that we have a high-resolution
* timer.
*/
/*
* TESTLOOPCOUNT needs some loops to identify edge systems. 100 is
* definitely too little.
*/
#define TESTLOOPCOUNT 300
#define CLEARCACHE 100
for (i = 0; (TESTLOOPCOUNT + CLEARCACHE) > i; i++) {
__u64 time = 0;
__u64 time2 = 0;
__u64 folded = 0;
__u64 delta = 0;
unsigned int lowdelta = 0;
jent_get_nstime(&time);
jent_fold_time(NULL, time, &folded, 1<<MIN_FOLD_LOOP_BIT);
jent_get_nstime(&time2);
/* test whether timer works */
if (!time || !time2)
return JENT_ENOTIME;
delta = time2 - time;
/*
* test whether timer is fine grained enough to provide
* delta even when called shortly after each other -- this
* implies that we also have a high resolution timer
*/
if (!delta)
return JENT_ECOARSETIME;
/*
* up to here we did not modify any variable that will be
* evaluated later, but we already performed some work. Thus we
* already have had an impact on the caches, branch prediction,
* etc. with the goal to clear it to get the worst case
* measurements.
*/
if (CLEARCACHE > i)
continue;
/* test whether we have an increasing timer */
if (!(time2 > time))
time_backwards++;
/*
* Avoid modulo of 64 bit integer to allow code to compile
* on 32 bit architectures.
*/
lowdelta = time2 - time;
if (!(lowdelta % 100))
count_mod++;
/*
* ensure that we have a varying delta timer which is necessary
* for the calculation of entropy -- perform this check
* only after the first loop is executed as we need to prime
* the old_data value
*/
if (i) {
if (delta != old_delta)
count_var++;
if (delta > old_delta)
delta_sum += (delta - old_delta);
else
delta_sum += (old_delta - delta);
}
old_delta = delta;
}
/*
* we allow up to three times the time running backwards.
* CLOCK_REALTIME is affected by adjtime and NTP operations. Thus,
* if such an operation just happens to interfere with our test, it
* should not fail. The value of 3 should cover the NTP case being
* performed during our test run.
*/
if (3 < time_backwards)
return JENT_ENOMONOTONIC;
/* Error if the time variances are always identical */
if (!delta_sum)
return JENT_EVARVAR;
/*
* Variations of deltas of time must on average be larger
* than 1 to ensure the entropy estimation
* implied with 1 is preserved
*/
if (delta_sum <= 1)
return JENT_EMINVARVAR;
/*
* Ensure that we have variations in the time stamp below 10 for at
* least 10% of all checks -- on some platforms, the counter
* increments in multiples of 100, but not always
*/
if ((TESTLOOPCOUNT/10 * 9) < count_mod)
return JENT_ECOARSETIME;
return 0;
}
/***************************************************************************
* Kernel crypto API interface
***************************************************************************/
struct jitterentropy {
spinlock_t jent_lock;
struct rand_data *entropy_collector;
};
static int jent_kcapi_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
int ret = 0;
rng->entropy_collector = jent_entropy_collector_alloc(1, 0);
if (!rng->entropy_collector)
ret = -ENOMEM;
spin_lock_init(&rng->jent_lock);
return ret;
}
static void jent_kcapi_cleanup(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);
if (rng->entropy_collector)
jent_entropy_collector_free(rng->entropy_collector);
rng->entropy_collector = NULL;
spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);
}
static int jent_kcapi_random(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
const u8 *src, unsigned int slen,
u8 *rdata, unsigned int dlen)
{
struct jitterentropy *rng = crypto_rng_ctx(tfm);
int ret = 0;
spin_lock(&rng->jent_lock);
ret = jent_read_entropy(rng->entropy_collector, rdata, dlen);
spin_unlock(&rng->jent_lock);
return ret;
}
static int jent_kcapi_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm,
const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
return 0;
}
static struct rng_alg jent_alg = {
.generate = jent_kcapi_random,
.seed = jent_kcapi_reset,
.seedsize = 0,
.base = {
.cra_name = "jitterentropy_rng",
.cra_driver_name = "jitterentropy_rng",
.cra_priority = 100,
.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct jitterentropy),
.cra_module = THIS_MODULE,
.cra_init = jent_kcapi_init,
.cra_exit = jent_kcapi_cleanup,
}
};
static int __init jent_mod_init(void)
{
int ret = 0;
ret = jent_entropy_init();
if (ret) {
pr_info(DRIVER_NAME ": Initialization failed with host not compliant with requirements: %d\n", ret);
return -EFAULT;
}
return crypto_register_rng(&jent_alg);
}
static void __exit jent_mod_exit(void)
{
crypto_unregister_rng(&jent_alg);
}
module_init(jent_mod_init);
module_exit(jent_mod_exit);
MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
MODULE_AUTHOR("Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Non-physical True Random Number Generator based on CPU Jitter");
MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("jitterentropy_rng");
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