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144 lines
5.5 KiB
ReStructuredText
144 lines
5.5 KiB
ReStructuredText
===============
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NVDIMM Security
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===============
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1. Introduction
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---------------
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With the introduction of Intel Device Specific Methods (DSM) v1.8
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specification [1], security DSMs are introduced. The spec added the following
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security DSMs: "get security state", "set passphrase", "disable passphrase",
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"unlock unit", "freeze lock", "secure erase", and "overwrite". A security_ops
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data structure has been added to struct dimm in order to support the security
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operations and generic APIs are exposed to allow vendor neutral operations.
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2. Sysfs Interface
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------------------
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The "security" sysfs attribute is provided in the nvdimm sysfs directory. For
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example:
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/sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/security
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The "show" attribute of that attribute will display the security state for
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that DIMM. The following states are available: disabled, unlocked, locked,
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frozen, and overwrite. If security is not supported, the sysfs attribute
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will not be visible.
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The "store" attribute takes several commands when it is being written to
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in order to support some of the security functionalities:
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update <old_keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update passphrase.
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disable <keyid> - disable enabled security and remove key.
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freeze - freeze changing of security states.
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erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.
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overwrite <keyid> - wipe the entire nvdimm.
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master_update <keyid> <new_keyid> - enable or update master passphrase.
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master_erase <keyid> - delete existing user encryption key.
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3. Key Management
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-----------------
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The key is associated to the payload by the DIMM id. For example:
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# cat /sys/devices/LNXSYSTM:00/LNXSYBUS:00/ACPI0012:00/ndbus0/nmem0/nfit/id
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8089-a2-1740-00000133
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The DIMM id would be provided along with the key payload (passphrase) to
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the kernel.
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The security keys are managed on the basis of a single key per DIMM. The
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key "passphrase" is expected to be 32bytes long. This is similar to the ATA
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security specification [2]. A key is initially acquired via the request_key()
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kernel API call during nvdimm unlock. It is up to the user to make sure that
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all the keys are in the kernel user keyring for unlock.
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A nvdimm encrypted-key of format enc32 has the description format of:
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nvdimm:<bus-provider-specific-unique-id>
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See file ``Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst`` for creating
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encrypted-keys of enc32 format. TPM usage with a master trusted key is
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preferred for sealing the encrypted-keys.
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4. Unlocking
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------------
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When the DIMMs are being enumerated by the kernel, the kernel will attempt to
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retrieve the key from the kernel user keyring. This is the only time
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a locked DIMM can be unlocked. Once unlocked, the DIMM will remain unlocked
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until reboot. Typically an entity (i.e. shell script) will inject all the
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relevant encrypted-keys into the kernel user keyring during the initramfs phase.
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This provides the unlock function access to all the related keys that contain
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the passphrase for the respective nvdimms. It is also recommended that the
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keys are injected before libnvdimm is loaded by modprobe.
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5. Update
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---------
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When doing an update, it is expected that the existing key is removed from
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the kernel user keyring and reinjected as different (old) key. It's irrelevant
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what the key description is for the old key since we are only interested in the
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keyid when doing the update operation. It is also expected that the new key
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is injected with the description format described from earlier in this
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document. The update command written to the sysfs attribute will be with
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the format:
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update <old keyid> <new keyid>
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If there is no old keyid due to a security enabling, then a 0 should be
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passed in.
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6. Freeze
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---------
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The freeze operation does not require any keys. The security config can be
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frozen by a user with root privelege.
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7. Disable
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----------
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The security disable command format is:
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disable <keyid>
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An key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
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in the kernel user keyring.
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8. Secure Erase
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---------------
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The command format for doing a secure erase is:
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erase <keyid>
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An key with the current passphrase payload that is tied to the nvdimm should be
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in the kernel user keyring.
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9. Overwrite
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------------
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The command format for doing an overwrite is:
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overwrite <keyid>
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Overwrite can be done without a key if security is not enabled. A key serial
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of 0 can be passed in to indicate no key.
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The sysfs attribute "security" can be polled to wait on overwrite completion.
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Overwrite can last tens of minutes or more depending on nvdimm size.
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An encrypted-key with the current user passphrase that is tied to the nvdimm
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should be injected and its keyid should be passed in via sysfs.
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10. Master Update
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-----------------
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The command format for doing a master update is:
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update <old keyid> <new keyid>
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The operating mechanism for master update is identical to update except the
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master passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key
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is just another encrypted-key.
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This command is only available when security is disabled.
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11. Master Erase
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----------------
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The command format for doing a master erase is:
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master_erase <current keyid>
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This command has the same operating mechanism as erase except the master
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passphrase key is passed to the kernel. The master passphrase key is just
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another encrypted-key.
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This command is only available when the master security is enabled, indicated
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by the extended security status.
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[1]: http://pmem.io/documents/NVDIMM_DSM_Interface-V1.8.pdf
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[2]: http://www.t13.org/documents/UploadedDocuments/docs2006/e05179r4-ACS-SecurityClarifications.pdf
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