[PATCH] opj_tcd_init_tile(): avoid integer overflow

That could lead to later assertion failures.

Fixes #1231 / CVE-2020-8112

Gbp-Pq: Name CVE-2020-8112.patch
This commit is contained in:
Even Rouault 2020-01-30 00:59:57 +01:00 committed by openKylinBot
parent ff08967f85
commit 2eee49d87c
1 changed files with 18 additions and 2 deletions

View File

@ -905,8 +905,24 @@ static INLINE OPJ_BOOL opj_tcd_init_tile(opj_tcd_t *p_tcd, OPJ_UINT32 p_tile_no,
/* p. 64, B.6, ISO/IEC FDIS15444-1 : 2000 (18 august 2000) */
l_tl_prc_x_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->x0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_tl_prc_y_start = opj_int_floordivpow2(l_res->y0, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
l_br_prc_x_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdx) << l_pdx;
l_br_prc_y_end = opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1, (OPJ_INT32)l_pdy) << l_pdy;
{
OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->x1,
(OPJ_INT32)l_pdx)) << l_pdx;
if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
l_br_prc_x_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
}
{
OPJ_UINT32 tmp = ((OPJ_UINT32)opj_int_ceildivpow2(l_res->y1,
(OPJ_INT32)l_pdy)) << l_pdy;
if (tmp > (OPJ_UINT32)INT_MAX) {
opj_event_msg(manager, EVT_ERROR, "Integer overflow\n");
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
l_br_prc_y_end = (OPJ_INT32)tmp;
}
/*fprintf(stderr, "\t\t\tprc_x_start=%d, prc_y_start=%d, br_prc_x_end=%d, br_prc_y_end=%d \n", l_tl_prc_x_start, l_tl_prc_y_start, l_br_prc_x_end ,l_br_prc_y_end );*/
l_res->pw = (l_res->x0 == l_res->x1) ? 0U : (OPJ_UINT32)((