Fix integer overflow in utf{16,32}_to_utf8_length

Without an explicit check, the return value can wrap around and return
a value that is far too small to hold the data from the resulting
conversion.

No CTS test is provided because it would need to allocate at least
SSIZE_MAX / 2 bytes of UTF-16 data, which is unreasonable on 64-bit
devices.

Bug: 37723026
Test: run cts -p android.security
Change-Id: I56ba5e31657633b7f33685dd8839d4b3b998e586
This commit is contained in:
Adam Vartanian 2017-08-14 15:51:29 +01:00
parent 3a66fd2174
commit 47efc676c8
1 changed files with 20 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@ -180,7 +180,15 @@ ssize_t utf32_to_utf8_length(const char32_t *src, size_t src_len)
size_t ret = 0;
const char32_t *end = src + src_len;
while (src < end) {
ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(*src++);
size_t char_len = utf32_codepoint_utf8_length(*src++);
if (SSIZE_MAX - char_len < ret) {
// If this happens, we would overflow the ssize_t type when
// returning from this function, so we cannot express how
// long this string is in an ssize_t.
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "37723026");
return -1;
}
ret += char_len;
}
return ret;
}
@ -440,14 +448,23 @@ ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
size_t ret = 0;
const char16_t* const end = src + src_len;
while (src < end) {
size_t char_len;
if ((*src & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (src + 1) < end
&& (*(src + 1) & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) {
// surrogate pairs are always 4 bytes.
ret += 4;
char_len = 4;
src += 2;
} else {
ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t) *src++);
char_len = utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t)*src++);
}
if (SSIZE_MAX - char_len < ret) {
// If this happens, we would overflow the ssize_t type when
// returning from this function, so we cannot express how
// long this string is in an ssize_t.
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "37723026");
return -1;
}
ret += char_len;
}
return ret;
}