Remove the global seccomp option.

Added in af1a9bfb8f, but it's never been
used in practice because of the performance impact, and it's incompatible
with our ability to add new system calls via a bionic module update
because it defaults to disabling all unknown syscalls, and init will
still be using the non-updated bootstrap libc from when it first shipped.

Test: treehugger
Change-Id: I8e396675fcfaf0218a92f464d15e613f43319305
This commit is contained in:
Elliott Hughes 2019-09-04 20:53:01 -07:00
parent 34f2537393
commit 4e6bf2510f
3 changed files with 0 additions and 15 deletions

View File

@ -62,7 +62,6 @@ cc_defaults {
},
},
static_libs: [
"libseccomp_policy",
"libavb",
"libc++fs",
"libcgrouprc_format",

View File

@ -92,7 +92,6 @@ LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := \
liblogwrap \
libext4_utils \
libfscrypt \
libseccomp_policy \
libcrypto_utils \
libsparse \
libavb \

View File

@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
#include <dirent.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <seccomp_policy.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -579,15 +578,6 @@ void HandleKeychord(const std::vector<int>& keycodes) {
}
}
static void GlobalSeccomp() {
import_kernel_cmdline(false, [](const std::string& key, const std::string& value,
bool in_qemu) {
if (key == "androidboot.seccomp" && value == "global" && !set_global_seccomp_filter()) {
LOG(FATAL) << "Failed to globally enable seccomp!";
}
});
}
static void UmountDebugRamdisk() {
if (umount("/debug_ramdisk") != 0) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to umount /debug_ramdisk";
@ -673,9 +663,6 @@ int SecondStageMain(int argc, char** argv) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unable to write -1000 to /proc/1/oom_score_adj: " << result.error();
}
// Enable seccomp if global boot option was passed (otherwise it is enabled in zygote).
GlobalSeccomp();
// Set up a session keyring that all processes will have access to. It
// will hold things like FBE encryption keys. No process should override
// its session keyring.