These were leftovers from the SELinux boolean support that
was originally merged. Since Android prohibits SELinux policy
booleans, we can just drop it.
Change-Id: I02f646a7d8db65e153702205b082b87a73f60d73
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Adding "setenforce 0" to init.rc isn't a supported way to turn off
SELinux, and doesn't work with AOSP SELinux policy. Remove the code
from init.
Change-Id: If8c8149560789c9a7ba518a0a100e6033bb68898
- Make sure compatible DT node is "android,firmware"
- Set ro.boot.* properties from firmware/android/ DT node
Change-Id: If3d0716831516cb3d3fde1f75d57e2691d42d054
I've been deliberately vague about the name of the readme because I want to
come back and switch to markdown, but that probably won't happen today.
Change-Id: I60651703709bbfd499227f882eb949396e8f4f6c
Add a built-in command for loading verity state. If dm-verity
will be started in logging mode, trigger verity-logging.
Needs changes from
Ibb82953594d234f81ad21c40f524190b88e4ac8f
Change-Id: I5af4918f2f14fdd4d07f51c55837e08111fd3748
- Clean up the paths for ro.revision and ro.hardware parsing
- Use ro.hardwre in ueventd instead of parsing the kernel command line
Bug: 19366018
Change-Id: I018a293f3d46e736a8b65132b5b00b0f7c20edae
- KISS as all options are now passed to adb for better or worse
- runs bootchart and immediately displays the results
Bug: 19485335
Bug: 18390773
Change-Id: Id32930031371d0368e605810f0c998232a1d4f16
bootchart uses a file on the data partition to decide if it should collect
data for bootchart, but the data partition will be mounted by the mount_all
command in the "on fs" section, and it will be only added into the action
queue when command "trigger fs" is executed, but that's after the
bootchart_init action (late_init).
This change makes bootchart_init a builtin command of init,
and make it executed as the first command of "on post-fs" section
which will be triggered after the "on fs" section.
This change also refactors the bootchart code to all be in bootchart.cpp.
Change-Id: Ia74aa34ca5b785f51fcffdd383075a549b2a99d9
Signed-off-by: Yongqin Liu <yongqin.liu@linaro.org>
In the case of do_write (write to generic file) there
is really no relation to the PROP_VALUE_MAX limitation
of system properties. The current value, 92, is not so
much for writing to files so bump it a bit.
Ideally there should not be any low hard limit in this
case. Either expand_props should allocate the output
buffer or take the output fd and to streaming write.
Such a change is rather invasive though and at this
point in time it seems reasonable that one dont want
more than 256 character strings in the init files.
Change-Id: I846a282ae4e747e6171eef38b302b46287951451
This isn't particularly useful in and of itself, but it does introduce the
first (trivial) unit test, improves the documentation (including details
about how to debug init crashes), and made me aware of how unpleasant the
existing parser is.
I also fixed a bug in passing --- unless you thought the "peboot" and "pm"
commands were features...
Bug: 19217569
Change-Id: I6ab76129a543ce3ed3dab52ef2c638009874c3de
Also switch the revision parsing over to sscanf as promised. I haven't
done the hardware parsing because I don't yet know whether we actually need
to keep the space-stripping code.
Change-Id: Ic33378345cd515cb08d00c543acf44eb72673396
A typo in the documentation for one, and a couple of signed/unsigned warnings
in the implementation of the other.
Change-Id: I8fb4b7448ac901c543dea7420aabcedf13ec1bd8
"&&" operator can now be used to test the validity
of two of more properties.
For example:
on property:test.a=1 && property:test.b=1
setprop test.c 1
The above stub sets the test.c to 1 only when
both test.a=1 and test.b=1
(cherry-pick of 162f7d797c67019a7a3f08c3b0f0ffc91d548ddc.)
Change-Id: I72c19f7aa92231372a416193618ee6c7fd368141
Signed-off-by: Badhri Jagan Sridharan <badhri@google.com>
42a9349dc4 modified init's
builtin chmod, chown, and mkdir calls to avoid following
symlinks. This addressed a number of attacks we were seeing
at the time where poorly written init scripts were following
attacker supplied symlinks resulting in rooting vulnerabilities.
To avoid race conditions, the previous implementation only ran
fchown / fchmod on file descriptors opened with open(O_NOFOLLOW).
Unfortunately, unlike the normal "chown" or "chmod" calls, this
requires read or write access to the underlying file. This
isn't ideal, as opening some files may have side effects, or
init may not have permission to open certain files (such as when
SELinux is enabled).
Instead of using open(O_NOFOLLOW) + fchown(), use lchown() instead.
As before, the target of the symlink won't be modified by chown.
This also supports setting the ownership of symlinks.
Instead of using open(O_NOFOLLOW) + fchmod(), use
fchmodat(AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) instead. As before, the target of the
symlink won't be modified by chmod.
This change will continue to ensure that chown/chmod/mkdir doesn't
follow symlinks, without requiring init to open every file in
read-only or read-write mode.
This change depends on bionic commit I1eba0cdb2c509d9193ceecf28f13118188a3cfa7
Addresses the following mako/occam SELinux denial:
audit(1422770408.951:6): avc: denied { write } for pid=1 comm="init" name="smd7" dev="tmpfs" ino=7207 scontext=u:r:init:s0 tcontext=u:object_r:radio_device:s0 tclass=chr_file
Change-Id: I14fde956784d65c44e7aa91dd7eea9a004df3081
Nicolas Geoffray