Under certain conditions, poll() may raise the POLLERR
flag along with POLLIN, in which case the check for
(ufd.revents == POLLIN) results in an endless busy loop.
The following fix was applied to
hardware/libhardware_legacy/uevent/uevent.c
to fix a similar bug:
commit 3aabb260ceef10377c31c9e45fb239247f5cfeba
Author: Mathias Agopian <mathias@google.com>
Date: Mon Oct 1 14:53:18 2012 -0700
fix a typo in uevent_next_eventi
Bug: 7114973
Change-Id: I15a4c714b59aeb1d02db00517d70b5f0e5ab22c2
Applying the same fix for two more poll loops in init
and ueventd.
Change-Id: I50693f6d3c904992ac4b8a9a14a83c7106e6b9e0
Obsolete RLE 565 logo is used nowhere,
because 565 framebuffer isn't used for years.
It's not necessary to keep this thing alive anymore.
Change-Id: Ie61e168790f791230530cd3eb1c68b1f7344c9a7
Create a new "androidboot.selinux" option, to control how userspace
handles SELinux. This kernel command line can have three options:
* disabled
* permissive
* enforcing
"disabled" completely disables userspace support for SELinux. No
policy is ever loaded, nor is the SELinux filesystem /sys/fs/selinux
ever mounted.
"permissive" loads the SELinux policy, but puts SELinux into
permissive mode. SELinux policy violations are logged, but not rejected.
"enforcing", the default, loads the SELinux policy, and places
SELinux into enforcing mode. Policy violations are rejected.
This change addresses post review comments for change
b710ed21de .
Change-Id: I912583db8e6a0e9c63380de32ad8ffc47a8a440f
When init starts up, immediately put SELinux into enforcing mode.
This is currently a no-op. We currently have everything in the
unconfined domain, so this should not break anything.
(if it does, I'll roll it back immediately)
If the kernel doesn't have SELinux support compiled in, then
don't try loading a policy and continue without SELinux protections.
Change-Id: Id0279cf82c545ea0f7090137b7566a5bc3ddd641
Add an optional argument to the socket option for specifying
a SELinux security context for the socket. Normally the socket
security context is automatically computed from the service security
context or set using the seclabel option, but this facility allows
dealing with two scenarios that cannot be addressed using the existing
mechanisms:
1) Use of logwrapper to wrap a service.
In this case, init cannot determine the service security context
as it does not directly execute it and we do not want logwrapper
to run in the same domain as the service.
2) Situations where a service has multiple sockets and we want to
label them distinctly.
Change-Id: I7ae9088c326a2140e56a8044bfb21a91505aea11
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
The Linux RNG may have little entropy during boot. As more and more
devices have a Hardware RNG, we mix in 512 bytes from Hardware RNG
(if present) into Linux RNG early during boot (after
wait_for_coldboot_done and before property_service_init actions in
init).
To avoid having to trust the output of Hardware RNG, we do not mix it
into the Linux RNG's primary pool or increase the Linux RNG's entropy
estimates.
Bug: 10362513
Change-Id: I80617f21710400747f5e7533e518d90ea74e2f11
Create a new "androidboot.selinux" option, to control how userspace
handles SELinux. This kernel command line can have three options:
* disabled
* permissive
* enforcing
"disabled" completely disables userspace support for SELinux. No
policy is ever loaded, nor is the SELinux filesystem /sys/fs/selinux
ever mounted.
"permissive" loads the SELinux policy, but puts SELinux into
permissive mode. SELinux policy violations are logged, but not rejected.
"enforcing", the default, loads the SELinux policy, and places
SELinux into enforcing mode. Policy violations are rejected.
This change addresses post review comments for change
b710ed21de .
Change-Id: I912583db8e6a0e9c63380de32ad8ffc47a8a440f
When init starts up, immediately put SELinux into enforcing mode.
This is currently a no-op. We currently have everything in the
unconfined domain, so this should not break anything.
(if it does, I'll roll it back immediately)
If the kernel doesn't have SELinux support compiled in, then
don't try loading a policy and continue without SELinux protections.
Change-Id: Id0279cf82c545ea0f7090137b7566a5bc3ddd641
The previous patch "init: verify size of property buffers passed
to property_get" incorrectly modified one of the callers,
resulting in ro.serialno, ro.bootmode, ro.baseband, and
ro.bootloader always being set to their default values.
Bug: 9469860
(cherry picked from commit 67e3663fc9)
Change-Id: Ia7b337e1fab6e334729f47ee1269e6c736615177
The previous patch "init: verify size of property buffers passed
to property_get" incorrectly modified one of the callers,
resulting in ro.serialno, ro.bootmode, ro.baseband, and
ro.bootloader always being set to their default values.
Bug: 9469860
Change-Id: Id45bd8dd657e8d61f4cfaf7e6b2559d2bfd05181
This helps to ensure that when a new system image is installed,
old userdata policy isn't applied over the top of it.
Bug: 8841348
Change-Id: I135af32250aa62979763e775842ce0af3c8b6f9f
With the old strdup() mechanism, it may return NULL if insufficient memory was
available. So we check the return value or do not use strdup to avoid null
pointer issue.
Change-Id: Id684948d6cb6c2f06327f29a2ba692f9542fce80
Signed-off-by: Hong-Mei Li <a21834@motorola.com>
Adding a new location for policy files under
/data, the new location is /data/security. The
new location is used before attempting to use
any other location.
This requires a new directory to be created by
the init script and an update to the location of
the property_contexts file for property service.
Change-Id: I955a722ac3e51fa6c1b97201b8bdef3f601cf09d
This logic has been moved to platform/frameworks/base commit
8a0a929422682ba3eb6a205dc6c0638e68b909de and is no longer needed
here.
This reverts commit 01b1dee0ab.
This is necessary to ensure that the adbd socket is created in the
adbd domain rather than the init domain.
Change-Id: Id4997d7f074aeefea62b41c87b46a6609e03f527
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Some Android programs have problems with memory which grows
from the top down. Temporarily set ADDR_COMPAT_LAYOUT to
avoid breaking those programs.
Bug: 7188322
Change-Id: I61760500e670b4563838c63b82d4a0b6e354a86e
This is a set of changes to the init property service
implementation to apply a SELinux check over who can
change what properties. Also included control hooks
for the 'ctl' keys.
Change-Id: I5a18809bf5536f6459a36b6bf0d622b9f5061aa0
Signed-off-by: rpcraig <rpcraig@tycho.ncsc.mil>
To support runtime policy management, add support for reloading
policy from /data/system. This can be triggered by setting the
selinux.loadpolicy property to 1, whether from init.rc after
mounting /data or from the system_server (e.g. upon invocation of
a new device admin API for provisioning policy). ueventd and
installd are restarted upon policy reloads to pick up the new
policy configurations relevant to their operation.
Change-Id: I97479aecef8cec23b32f60e09cc778cc5520b691
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Colin Cross