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Changelog
=========
3.1.0 (TBD)
------------------
OAuth2.0 Provider - Features
* #660: OIDC add support of nonce, c_hash, at_hash fields
- New RequestValidator.fill_id_token method
- Deprecated RequestValidator.get_id_token method
* #677: OIDC add UserInfo endpoint
- New RequestValidator.get_userinfo_claims method
OAuth2.0 Provider - Security
* #665: Enhance data leak to logs
- New default to not expose request content in logs
- New function `oauthlib.set_debug(True)`
* #666: Disabling query parameters for POST requests
OAuth2.0 Provider - Bugfixes
* #670: Fix validate_authorization_request to return the new PKCE fields
* #674: Fix token_type to be case-insensitive (bearer and Bearer)
OAuth2.0 Client - Bugfixes
* #290: Fix Authorization Code's errors processing
* #603: BackendApplication.Client.prepare_request_body use the "scope" argument as intended.
* #672: Fix edge case when expires_in=Null
OAuth1.0 Client
* #669: Add case-insensitive headers to oauth1 BaseEndpoint
3.0.2 (2019-07-04)
------------------
* #650: Fixed space encoding in base string URI used in the signature base string.
* #652: Fixed OIDC /token response which wrongly returned "&state=None"
* #654: Doc: The value `state` must not be stored by the AS, only returned in /authorize response.
* #656: Fixed OIDC "nonce" checks: raise errors when it's mandatory
3.0.1 (2019-01-24)
------------------
* Fixed OAuth2.0 regression introduced in 3.0.0: Revocation with Basic auth no longer possible #644
3.0.0 (2019-01-01)
------------------
OAuth2.0 Provider - outstanding Features
* OpenID Connect Core support
* RFC7662 Introspect support
* RFC8414 OAuth2.0 Authorization Server Metadata support (#605)
* RFC7636 PKCE support (#617 #624)
OAuth2.0 Provider - API/Breaking Changes
* Add "request" to confirm_redirect_uri #504
* confirm_redirect_uri/get_default_redirect_uri has a bit changed #445
* invalid_client is now a FatalError #606
* Changed errors status code from 401 to 400:
- invalid_grant: #264
- invalid_scope: #620
- access_denied/unauthorized_client/consent_required/login_required #623
- 401 must have WWW-Authenticate HTTP Header set. #623
OAuth2.0 Provider - Bugfixes
* empty scopes no longer raise exceptions for implicit and authorization_code #475 / #406
OAuth2.0 Client - Bugfixes / Changes:
* expires_in in Implicit flow is now an integer #569
* expires is no longer overriding expires_in #506
* parse_request_uri_response is now required #499
* Unknown error=xxx raised by OAuth2 providers was not understood #431
* OAuth2's `prepare_token_request` supports sending an empty string for `client_id` (#585)
* OAuth2's `WebApplicationClient.prepare_request_body` was refactored to better
support sending or omitting the `client_id` via a new `include_client_id` kwarg.
By default this is included. The method will also emit a DeprecationWarning if
a `client_id` parameter is submitted; the already configured `self.client_id`
is the preferred option. (#585)
OAuth1.0 Client:
* Support for HMAC-SHA256 #498
General fixes:
* $ and ' are allowed to be unencoded in query strings #564
* Request attributes are no longer overriden by HTTP Headers #409
* Removed unnecessary code for handling python2.6
* Add support of python3.7 #621
* Several minors updates to setup.py and tox
* Set pytest as the default unittest framework
2.1.0 (2018-05-21)
------------------
* Fixed some copy and paste typos (#535)
* Use secrets module in Python 3.6 and later (#533)
* Add request argument to confirm_redirect_uri (#504)
* Avoid populating spurious token credentials (#542)
* Make populate attributes API public (#546)
2.0.7 (2018-03-19)
------------------
* Moved oauthlib into new organization on GitHub.
* Include license file in the generated wheel package. (#494)
* When deploying a release to PyPI, include the wheel distribution. (#496)
* Check access token in self.token dict. (#500)
* Added bottle-oauthlib to docs. (#509)
* Update repository location in Travis. (#514)
* Updated docs for organization change. (#515)
* Replace G+ with Gitter. (#517)
* Update requirements. (#518)
* Add shields for Python versions, license and RTD. (#520)
* Fix ReadTheDocs build (#521).
* Fixed "make" command to test upstream with local oauthlib. (#522)
* Replace IRC notification with Gitter Hook. (#523)
* Added Github Releases deploy provider. (#523)
2.0.6 (2017-10-20)
------------------
* 2.0.5 contains breaking changes.
2.0.5 (2017-10-19)
------------------
* Fix OAuth2Error.response_mode for #463.
* Documentation improvement.
2.0.4 (2017-09-17)
------------------
* Fixed typo that caused OAuthlib to crash because of the fix in "Address missing OIDC errors and fix a typo in the AccountSelectionRequired exception".
2.0.3 (2017-09-07)
------------------
* Address missing OIDC errors and fix a typo in the AccountSelectionRequired exception.
* Update proxy keys on CaseInsensitiveDict.update().
* Redirect errors according to OIDC's response_mode.
* Added universal wheel support.
* Added log statements to except clauses.
* According to RC7009 Section 2.1, a client should include authentication credentials when revoking its tokens.
As discussed in #339, this is not make sense for public clients.
However, in that case, the public client should still be checked that is infact a public client (authenticate_client_id).
* Improved prompt parameter validation.
* Added two error codes from RFC 6750.
* Hybrid response types are now be fragment-encoded.
* Added Python 3.6 to Travis CI testing and trove classifiers.
* Fixed BytesWarning issued when using a string placeholder for bytes object.
* Documented PyJWT dependency and improved logging and exception messages.
* Documentation improvements and fixes.
2.0.2 (2017-03-19)
------------------
* Dropped support for Python 2.6, 3.2 & 3.3.
* (FIX) `OpenIDConnector` will no longer raise an AttributeError when calling `openid_authorization_validator()` twice.
2.0.1 (2016-11-23)
------------------
* (FIX) Normalize handling of request.scopes list
2.0.0 (2016-09-03)
------------------
* (New Feature) **OpenID** support.
* Documentation improvements and fixes.
1.1.2 (2016-06-01)
------------------
* (Fix) Query strings should be able to include colons.
* (Fix) Cast body to a string to ensure that we can perform a regex substitution on it.
1.1.1 (2016-05-01)
------------------
* (Enhancement) Better sanitisation of Request objects __repr__.
1.1.0 (2016-04-11)
------------------
* (Fix) '(', ')', '/' and '?' are now safe characters in url encoded strings.
* (Enhancement) Added support for specifying if refresh tokens should be created on authorization code grants.
* (Fix) OAuth2Token now handles None scopes correctly.
* (Fix) Request token is now available for OAuth 1.
* (Enhancement) OAuth2Token is declared with __slots__ for smaller memory footprint.
* (Enhancement) RefreshTokenGrant now allows to set issue_new_refresh_tokens.
* Documentation improvements and fixes.
1.0.3 (2015-08-16)
------------------
* (Fix) Changed the documented return type of the ```invalidate_request_token()``` method from the RSA key to None since nobody is using the return type.
* (Enhancement) Added a validator log that will store what the endpoint has computed for debugging and logging purposes (OAuth 1 only for now).
1.0.2 (2015-08-10)
------------------
* (Fix) Allow client secret to be null for public applications that do not mandate it's specification in the query parameters.
* (Fix) Encode request body before hashing in order to prevent encoding errors in Python 3.
1.0.1 (2015-07-27)
------------------
* (Fix) Added token_type_hint to the list of default Request parameters.
1.0.0 (2015-07-19)
------------------
* (Breaking Change) Replace pycrypto with cryptography from https://cryptography.io
* (Breaking Change) Update jwt to 1.0.0 (which is backwards incompatible) no oauthlib api changes
were made.
* (Breaking Change) Raise attribute error for non-existing attributes in the Request object.
* (Fix) Strip whitespace off of scope string.
* (Change) Don't require to return the state in the access token response.
* (Change) Hide password in logs.
* (Fix) Fix incorrect invocation of prepare_refresh_body in the OAuth2 client.
* (Fix) Handle empty/non-parsable query strings.
* (Fix) Check if an RSA key is actually needed before requiring it.
* (Change) Allow tuples for list_to_scope as well as sets and lists.
* (Change) Add code to determine if client authentication is required for OAuth2.
* (Fix) Fix error message on invalid Content-Type header for OAtuh1 signing.
* (Fix) Allow ! character in query strings.
* (Fix) OAuth1 now includes the body hash for requests that specify any content-type that isn't x-www-form-urlencoded.
* (Fix) Fixed error description in oauth1 endpoint.
* (Fix) Revocation endpoint for oauth2 will now return an empty string in the response body instead of 'None'.
* Increased test coverage.
* Performance improvements.
* Documentation improvements and fixes.
0.7.2 (2014-11-13)
------------------
* (Quick fix) Unpushed locally modified files got included in the PyPI 0.7.1
release. Doing a new clean release to address this. Please upgrade quickly
and report any issues you are running into.
0.7.1 (2014-10-27)
------------------
* (Quick fix) Add oauthlib.common.log object back in for libraries using it.
0.7.0 (2014-10-27)
------------------
* (Change) OAuth2 clients will not raise a Warning on scope change if
the environment variable ``OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE`` is set. The token
will now be available as an attribute on the error, ``error.token``.
Token changes will now also be announced using blinker.
* (Fix/Feature) Automatic fixes of non-compliant OAuth2 provider responses (e.g. Facebook).
* (Fix) Logging is now tiered (per file) as opposed to logging all under ``oauthlib``.
* (Fix) Error messages should now include a description in their message.
* (Fix/Feature) Optional support for jsonp callbacks after token revocation.
* (Feature) Client side preparation of OAuth 2 token revocation requests.
* (Feature) New OAuth2 client API methods for preparing full requests.
* (Feature) OAuth1 SignatureOnlyEndpoint that only verifies signatures and client IDs.
* (Fix/Feature) Refresh token grant now allow optional refresh tokens.
* (Fix) add missing state param to OAuth2 errors.
* (Fix) add_params_to_uri now properly parse fragment.
* (Fix/Feature) All OAuth1 errors can now be imported from oauthlib.oauth1.
* (Fix/Security) OAuth2 logs will now strip client provided password, if present.
* Allow unescaped @ in urlencoded parameters.
0.6.3 (2014-06-10)
------------------
Quick fix. OAuth 1 client repr in 0.6.2 overwrote secrets when scrubbing for print.
0.6.2 (2014-06-06)
------------------
* Numerous OAuth2 provider errors now suggest a status code of 401 instead
of 400 (#247.
* Added support for JSON web tokens with oauthlib.common.generate_signed_token.
Install extra dependency with oauthlib[signedtoken] (#237).
* OAuth2 scopes can be arbitrary objects with __str__ defined (#240).
* OAuth 1 Clients can now register custom signature methods (#239).
* Exposed new method oauthlib.oauth2.is_secure_transport that checks whether
the given URL is HTTPS. Checks using this method can be disabled by setting
the environment variable OAUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT (#249).
* OAuth1 clients now has __repr__ and will be printed with secrets scrubbed.
* OAuth1 Client.get_oauth_params now takes an oauthlib.Request as an argument.
* urldecode will now raise a much more informative error message on
incorrectly encoded strings.
* Plenty of typo and other doc fixes.
0.6.1 (2014-01-20)
------------------
Draft revocation endpoint features and numerous fixes including:
* (OAuth 2 Provider) is_within_original_scope to check whether a refresh token
is trying to aquire a new set of scopes that are a subset of the original scope.
* (OAuth 2 Provider) expires_in token lifetime can be set per request.
* (OAuth 2 Provider) client_authentication_required method added to differentiate
between public and confidential clients.
* (OAuth 2 Provider) rotate_refresh_token now indicates whether a new refresh
token should be generated during token refresh or if old should be kept.
* (OAuth 2 Provider) returned JSON headers no longer include charset.
* (OAuth 2 Provider) validate_authorizatoin_request now also includes the
internal request object in the returned dictionary. Note that this is
not meant to be relied upon heavily and its interface might change.
* and many style and typo fixes.
0.6.0
-----
OAuth 1 & 2 provider API refactor with breaking changes:
* All endpoint methods change contract to return 3 values instead of 4. The new
signature is `headers`, `body`, `status code` where the initial `redirect_uri`
has been relocated to its rightful place inside headers as `Location`.
* OAuth 1 Access Token Endpoint has a new required validator method
`invalidate_request_token`.
* OAuth 1 Authorization Endpoint now returns a 200 response instead of 302 on
`oob` callbacks.
0.5.1
-----
OAuth 1 provider fix for incorrect token param in nonce validation.
0.5.0
-----
OAuth 1 provider refactor. OAuth 2 refresh token validation fix.
0.4.2
-----
OAuth 2 draft to RFC. Removed OAuth 2 framework decorators.
0.4.1
-----
Documentation corrections and various small code fixes.
0.4.0
-----
OAuth 2 Provider support (experimental).
0.3.8
-----
OAuth 2 Client now uses custom errors and raise on expire.
0.3.7
-----
OAuth 1 optional encoding of Client.sign return values.
0.3.6
-----
Revert default urlencoding.
0.3.5
-----
Default unicode conversion (utf-8) and urlencoding of input.
0.3.4
-----
A number of small features and bug fixes.
0.3.3
-----
OAuth 1 Provider verify now return useful params.
0.3.2
-----
Fixed #62, all Python 3 tests pass.
0.3.1
-----
Python 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 support (experimental).
0.3.0
-----
Initial OAuth 2 client support.
0.2.1
-----
Exclude non urlencoded bodies during request verification.
0.2.0
-----
OAuth provider support.
0.1.4
-----
Soft dependency on PyCrypto.
0.1.3
-----
Use python-rsa instead of pycrypto.
0.1.1 / 0.1.2
-------------
Fix installation of pycrypto dependency.
0.1.0
-----
OAuth 1 client functionality seems to be working. Hooray!
0.0.x
-----
In the beginning, there was the word.

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Copyright (c) 2019 The OAuthlib Community
All rights reserved.
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
3. Neither the name of this project nor the names of its contributors may
be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without
specific prior written permission.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY,
OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

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include README.rst LICENSE CHANGELOG.rst
recursive-include tests *.py

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Metadata-Version: 2.1
Name: oauthlib
Version: 3.1.0
Summary: A generic, spec-compliant, thorough implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic
Home-page: https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib
Author: The OAuthlib Community
Author-email: idan@gazit.me
Maintainer: Ib Lundgren
Maintainer-email: ib.lundgren@gmail.com
License: BSD
Description: OAuthLib - Python Framework for OAuth1 & OAuth2
===============================================
*A generic, spec-compliant, thorough implementation of the OAuth request-signing
logic for Python 2.7 and 3.4+.*
.. image:: https://travis-ci.org/oauthlib/oauthlib.svg?branch=master
:target: https://travis-ci.org/oauthlib/oauthlib
:alt: Travis
.. image:: https://coveralls.io/repos/oauthlib/oauthlib/badge.svg?branch=master
:target: https://coveralls.io/r/oauthlib/oauthlib
:alt: Coveralls
.. image:: https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://pypi.org/project/oauthlib/
:alt: Download from PyPI
.. image:: https://img.shields.io/pypi/l/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://pypi.org/project/oauthlib/
:alt: License
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:target: https://app.fossa.io/projects/git%2Bgithub.com%2Foauthlib%2Foauthlib?ref=badge_shield
:alt: FOSSA Status
.. image:: https://img.shields.io/readthedocs/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://oauthlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html
:alt: Read the Docs
.. image:: https://badges.gitter.im/oauthlib/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://gitter.im/oauthlib/Lobby
:alt: Chat on Gitter
OAuth often seems complicated and difficult-to-implement. There are several
prominent libraries for handling OAuth requests, but they all suffer from one or
both of the following:
1. They predate the `OAuth 1.0 spec`_, AKA RFC 5849.
2. They predate the `OAuth 2.0 spec`_, AKA RFC 6749.
3. They assume the usage of a specific HTTP request library.
.. _`OAuth 1.0 spec`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849
.. _`OAuth 2.0 spec`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
OAuthLib is a framework which implements the logic of OAuth1 or OAuth2 without
assuming a specific HTTP request object or web framework. Use it to graft OAuth
client support onto your favorite HTTP library, or provide support onto your
favourite web framework. If you're a maintainer of such a library, write a thin
veneer on top of OAuthLib and get OAuth support for very little effort.
Documentation
--------------
Full documentation is available on `Read the Docs`_. All contributions are very
welcome! The documentation is still quite sparse, please open an issue for what
you'd like to know, or discuss it in our `Gitter community`_, or even better, send a
pull request!
.. _`Gitter community`: https://gitter.im/oauthlib/Lobby
.. _`Read the Docs`: https://oauthlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html
Interested in making OAuth requests?
------------------------------------
Then you might be more interested in using `requests`_ which has OAuthLib
powered OAuth support provided by the `requests-oauthlib`_ library.
.. _`requests`: https://github.com/requests/requests
.. _`requests-oauthlib`: https://github.com/requests/requests-oauthlib
Which web frameworks are supported?
-----------------------------------
The following packages provide OAuth support using OAuthLib.
- For Django there is `django-oauth-toolkit`_, which includes `Django REST framework`_ support.
- For Flask there is `flask-oauthlib`_ and `Flask-Dance`_.
- For Pyramid there is `pyramid-oauthlib`_.
- For Bottle there is `bottle-oauthlib`_.
If you have written an OAuthLib package that supports your favorite framework,
please open a Pull Request, updating the documentation.
.. _`django-oauth-toolkit`: https://github.com/evonove/django-oauth-toolkit
.. _`flask-oauthlib`: https://github.com/lepture/flask-oauthlib
.. _`Django REST framework`: http://django-rest-framework.org
.. _`Flask-Dance`: https://github.com/singingwolfboy/flask-dance
.. _`pyramid-oauthlib`: https://github.com/tilgovi/pyramid-oauthlib
.. _`bottle-oauthlib`: https://github.com/thomsonreuters/bottle-oauthlib
Using OAuthLib? Please get in touch!
------------------------------------
Patching OAuth support onto an http request framework? Creating an OAuth
provider extension for a web framework? Simply using OAuthLib to Get Things Done
or to learn?
No matter which we'd love to hear from you in our `Gitter community`_ or if you have
anything in particular you would like to have, change or comment on don't
hesitate for a second to send a pull request or open an issue. We might be quite
busy and therefore slow to reply but we love feedback!
Chances are you have run into something annoying that you wish there was
documentation for, if you wish to gain eternal fame and glory, and a drink if we
have the pleasure to run into eachother, please send a docs pull request =)
.. _`Gitter community`: https://gitter.im/oauthlib/Lobby
License
-------
OAuthLib is yours to use and abuse according to the terms of the BSD license.
Check the LICENSE file for full details.
Credits
-------
OAuthLib has been started and maintained several years by Idan Gazit and other
amazing `AUTHORS`_. Thanks to their wonderful work, the open-source `community`_
creation has been possible and the project can stay active and reactive to users
requests.
.. _`AUTHORS`: https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/master/AUTHORS
.. _`community`: https://github.com/oauthlib/
Changelog
---------
*OAuthLib is in active development, with the core of both OAuth1 and OAuth2
completed, for providers as well as clients.* See `supported features`_ for
details.
.. _`supported features`: https://oauthlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/feature_matrix.html
For a full changelog see ``CHANGELOG.rst``.
Platform: any
Classifier: Development Status :: 5 - Production/Stable
Classifier: Environment :: Web Environment
Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
Classifier: License :: OSI Approved
Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: BSD License
Classifier: Operating System :: MacOS
Classifier: Operating System :: POSIX
Classifier: Operating System :: POSIX :: Linux
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 2
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 2.7
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.4
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.5
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.6
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.7
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation :: CPython
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation :: PyPy
Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries :: Python Modules
Requires-Python: >=2.7, !=3.0.*, !=3.1.*, !=3.2.*, !=3.3.*
Provides-Extra: signedtoken
Provides-Extra: signals
Provides-Extra: rsa

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OAuthLib - Python Framework for OAuth1 & OAuth2
===============================================
*A generic, spec-compliant, thorough implementation of the OAuth request-signing
logic for Python 2.7 and 3.4+.*
.. image:: https://travis-ci.org/oauthlib/oauthlib.svg?branch=master
:target: https://travis-ci.org/oauthlib/oauthlib
:alt: Travis
.. image:: https://coveralls.io/repos/oauthlib/oauthlib/badge.svg?branch=master
:target: https://coveralls.io/r/oauthlib/oauthlib
:alt: Coveralls
.. image:: https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://pypi.org/project/oauthlib/
:alt: Download from PyPI
.. image:: https://img.shields.io/pypi/l/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://pypi.org/project/oauthlib/
:alt: License
.. image:: https://app.fossa.io/api/projects/git%2Bgithub.com%2Foauthlib%2Foauthlib.svg?type=shield
:target: https://app.fossa.io/projects/git%2Bgithub.com%2Foauthlib%2Foauthlib?ref=badge_shield
:alt: FOSSA Status
.. image:: https://img.shields.io/readthedocs/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://oauthlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html
:alt: Read the Docs
.. image:: https://badges.gitter.im/oauthlib/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://gitter.im/oauthlib/Lobby
:alt: Chat on Gitter
OAuth often seems complicated and difficult-to-implement. There are several
prominent libraries for handling OAuth requests, but they all suffer from one or
both of the following:
1. They predate the `OAuth 1.0 spec`_, AKA RFC 5849.
2. They predate the `OAuth 2.0 spec`_, AKA RFC 6749.
3. They assume the usage of a specific HTTP request library.
.. _`OAuth 1.0 spec`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849
.. _`OAuth 2.0 spec`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
OAuthLib is a framework which implements the logic of OAuth1 or OAuth2 without
assuming a specific HTTP request object or web framework. Use it to graft OAuth
client support onto your favorite HTTP library, or provide support onto your
favourite web framework. If you're a maintainer of such a library, write a thin
veneer on top of OAuthLib and get OAuth support for very little effort.
Documentation
--------------
Full documentation is available on `Read the Docs`_. All contributions are very
welcome! The documentation is still quite sparse, please open an issue for what
you'd like to know, or discuss it in our `Gitter community`_, or even better, send a
pull request!
.. _`Gitter community`: https://gitter.im/oauthlib/Lobby
.. _`Read the Docs`: https://oauthlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html
Interested in making OAuth requests?
------------------------------------
Then you might be more interested in using `requests`_ which has OAuthLib
powered OAuth support provided by the `requests-oauthlib`_ library.
.. _`requests`: https://github.com/requests/requests
.. _`requests-oauthlib`: https://github.com/requests/requests-oauthlib
Which web frameworks are supported?
-----------------------------------
The following packages provide OAuth support using OAuthLib.
- For Django there is `django-oauth-toolkit`_, which includes `Django REST framework`_ support.
- For Flask there is `flask-oauthlib`_ and `Flask-Dance`_.
- For Pyramid there is `pyramid-oauthlib`_.
- For Bottle there is `bottle-oauthlib`_.
If you have written an OAuthLib package that supports your favorite framework,
please open a Pull Request, updating the documentation.
.. _`django-oauth-toolkit`: https://github.com/evonove/django-oauth-toolkit
.. _`flask-oauthlib`: https://github.com/lepture/flask-oauthlib
.. _`Django REST framework`: http://django-rest-framework.org
.. _`Flask-Dance`: https://github.com/singingwolfboy/flask-dance
.. _`pyramid-oauthlib`: https://github.com/tilgovi/pyramid-oauthlib
.. _`bottle-oauthlib`: https://github.com/thomsonreuters/bottle-oauthlib
Using OAuthLib? Please get in touch!
------------------------------------
Patching OAuth support onto an http request framework? Creating an OAuth
provider extension for a web framework? Simply using OAuthLib to Get Things Done
or to learn?
No matter which we'd love to hear from you in our `Gitter community`_ or if you have
anything in particular you would like to have, change or comment on don't
hesitate for a second to send a pull request or open an issue. We might be quite
busy and therefore slow to reply but we love feedback!
Chances are you have run into something annoying that you wish there was
documentation for, if you wish to gain eternal fame and glory, and a drink if we
have the pleasure to run into eachother, please send a docs pull request =)
.. _`Gitter community`: https://gitter.im/oauthlib/Lobby
License
-------
OAuthLib is yours to use and abuse according to the terms of the BSD license.
Check the LICENSE file for full details.
Credits
-------
OAuthLib has been started and maintained several years by Idan Gazit and other
amazing `AUTHORS`_. Thanks to their wonderful work, the open-source `community`_
creation has been possible and the project can stay active and reactive to users
requests.
.. _`AUTHORS`: https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/master/AUTHORS
.. _`community`: https://github.com/oauthlib/
Changelog
---------
*OAuthLib is in active development, with the core of both OAuth1 and OAuth2
completed, for providers as well as clients.* See `supported features`_ for
details.
.. _`supported features`: https://oauthlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/feature_matrix.html
For a full changelog see ``CHANGELOG.rst``.

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Metadata-Version: 2.1
Name: oauthlib
Version: 3.1.0
Summary: A generic, spec-compliant, thorough implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic
Home-page: https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib
Author: The OAuthlib Community
Author-email: idan@gazit.me
Maintainer: Ib Lundgren
Maintainer-email: ib.lundgren@gmail.com
License: BSD
Description: OAuthLib - Python Framework for OAuth1 & OAuth2
===============================================
*A generic, spec-compliant, thorough implementation of the OAuth request-signing
logic for Python 2.7 and 3.4+.*
.. image:: https://travis-ci.org/oauthlib/oauthlib.svg?branch=master
:target: https://travis-ci.org/oauthlib/oauthlib
:alt: Travis
.. image:: https://coveralls.io/repos/oauthlib/oauthlib/badge.svg?branch=master
:target: https://coveralls.io/r/oauthlib/oauthlib
:alt: Coveralls
.. image:: https://img.shields.io/pypi/pyversions/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://pypi.org/project/oauthlib/
:alt: Download from PyPI
.. image:: https://img.shields.io/pypi/l/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://pypi.org/project/oauthlib/
:alt: License
.. image:: https://app.fossa.io/api/projects/git%2Bgithub.com%2Foauthlib%2Foauthlib.svg?type=shield
:target: https://app.fossa.io/projects/git%2Bgithub.com%2Foauthlib%2Foauthlib?ref=badge_shield
:alt: FOSSA Status
.. image:: https://img.shields.io/readthedocs/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://oauthlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html
:alt: Read the Docs
.. image:: https://badges.gitter.im/oauthlib/oauthlib.svg
:target: https://gitter.im/oauthlib/Lobby
:alt: Chat on Gitter
OAuth often seems complicated and difficult-to-implement. There are several
prominent libraries for handling OAuth requests, but they all suffer from one or
both of the following:
1. They predate the `OAuth 1.0 spec`_, AKA RFC 5849.
2. They predate the `OAuth 2.0 spec`_, AKA RFC 6749.
3. They assume the usage of a specific HTTP request library.
.. _`OAuth 1.0 spec`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849
.. _`OAuth 2.0 spec`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
OAuthLib is a framework which implements the logic of OAuth1 or OAuth2 without
assuming a specific HTTP request object or web framework. Use it to graft OAuth
client support onto your favorite HTTP library, or provide support onto your
favourite web framework. If you're a maintainer of such a library, write a thin
veneer on top of OAuthLib and get OAuth support for very little effort.
Documentation
--------------
Full documentation is available on `Read the Docs`_. All contributions are very
welcome! The documentation is still quite sparse, please open an issue for what
you'd like to know, or discuss it in our `Gitter community`_, or even better, send a
pull request!
.. _`Gitter community`: https://gitter.im/oauthlib/Lobby
.. _`Read the Docs`: https://oauthlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html
Interested in making OAuth requests?
------------------------------------
Then you might be more interested in using `requests`_ which has OAuthLib
powered OAuth support provided by the `requests-oauthlib`_ library.
.. _`requests`: https://github.com/requests/requests
.. _`requests-oauthlib`: https://github.com/requests/requests-oauthlib
Which web frameworks are supported?
-----------------------------------
The following packages provide OAuth support using OAuthLib.
- For Django there is `django-oauth-toolkit`_, which includes `Django REST framework`_ support.
- For Flask there is `flask-oauthlib`_ and `Flask-Dance`_.
- For Pyramid there is `pyramid-oauthlib`_.
- For Bottle there is `bottle-oauthlib`_.
If you have written an OAuthLib package that supports your favorite framework,
please open a Pull Request, updating the documentation.
.. _`django-oauth-toolkit`: https://github.com/evonove/django-oauth-toolkit
.. _`flask-oauthlib`: https://github.com/lepture/flask-oauthlib
.. _`Django REST framework`: http://django-rest-framework.org
.. _`Flask-Dance`: https://github.com/singingwolfboy/flask-dance
.. _`pyramid-oauthlib`: https://github.com/tilgovi/pyramid-oauthlib
.. _`bottle-oauthlib`: https://github.com/thomsonreuters/bottle-oauthlib
Using OAuthLib? Please get in touch!
------------------------------------
Patching OAuth support onto an http request framework? Creating an OAuth
provider extension for a web framework? Simply using OAuthLib to Get Things Done
or to learn?
No matter which we'd love to hear from you in our `Gitter community`_ or if you have
anything in particular you would like to have, change or comment on don't
hesitate for a second to send a pull request or open an issue. We might be quite
busy and therefore slow to reply but we love feedback!
Chances are you have run into something annoying that you wish there was
documentation for, if you wish to gain eternal fame and glory, and a drink if we
have the pleasure to run into eachother, please send a docs pull request =)
.. _`Gitter community`: https://gitter.im/oauthlib/Lobby
License
-------
OAuthLib is yours to use and abuse according to the terms of the BSD license.
Check the LICENSE file for full details.
Credits
-------
OAuthLib has been started and maintained several years by Idan Gazit and other
amazing `AUTHORS`_. Thanks to their wonderful work, the open-source `community`_
creation has been possible and the project can stay active and reactive to users
requests.
.. _`AUTHORS`: https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/blob/master/AUTHORS
.. _`community`: https://github.com/oauthlib/
Changelog
---------
*OAuthLib is in active development, with the core of both OAuth1 and OAuth2
completed, for providers as well as clients.* See `supported features`_ for
details.
.. _`supported features`: https://oauthlib.readthedocs.io/en/latest/feature_matrix.html
For a full changelog see ``CHANGELOG.rst``.
Platform: any
Classifier: Development Status :: 5 - Production/Stable
Classifier: Environment :: Web Environment
Classifier: Intended Audience :: Developers
Classifier: License :: OSI Approved
Classifier: License :: OSI Approved :: BSD License
Classifier: Operating System :: MacOS
Classifier: Operating System :: POSIX
Classifier: Operating System :: POSIX :: Linux
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 2
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 2.7
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.4
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.5
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.6
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: 3.7
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation :: CPython
Classifier: Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation :: PyPy
Classifier: Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries :: Python Modules
Requires-Python: >=2.7, !=3.0.*, !=3.1.*, !=3.2.*, !=3.3.*
Provides-Extra: signedtoken
Provides-Extra: signals
Provides-Extra: rsa

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CHANGELOG.rst
LICENSE
MANIFEST.in
README.rst
setup.cfg
setup.py
oauthlib/__init__.py
oauthlib/common.py
oauthlib/signals.py
oauthlib/uri_validate.py
oauthlib.egg-info/PKG-INFO
oauthlib.egg-info/SOURCES.txt
oauthlib.egg-info/dependency_links.txt
oauthlib.egg-info/requires.txt
oauthlib.egg-info/top_level.txt
oauthlib/oauth1/__init__.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/__init__.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/errors.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/parameters.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/request_validator.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/signature.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/utils.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/__init__.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/access_token.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/authorization.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/base.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/pre_configured.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/request_token.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/resource.py
oauthlib/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/signature_only.py
oauthlib/oauth2/__init__.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/__init__.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/errors.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/parameters.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/request_validator.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/tokens.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/utils.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/__init__.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/backend_application.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/base.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/legacy_application.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/mobile_application.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/service_application.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/web_application.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/__init__.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/authorization.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/base.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/introspect.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/metadata.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/pre_configured.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/resource.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/revocation.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/token.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/__init__.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/base.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/client_credentials.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/implicit.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/refresh_token.py
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/resource_owner_password_credentials.py
oauthlib/openid/__init__.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/__init__.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/__init__.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/exceptions.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/request_validator.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/tokens.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/endpoints/__init__.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/endpoints/pre_configured.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/endpoints/userinfo.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/grant_types/__init__.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/grant_types/authorization_code.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/grant_types/base.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/grant_types/dispatchers.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/grant_types/exceptions.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/grant_types/hybrid.py
oauthlib/openid/connect/core/grant_types/implicit.py
tests/__init__.py
tests/test_common.py
tests/oauth1/__init__.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/__init__.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/test_client.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/test_parameters.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/test_request_validator.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/test_signatures.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/test_utils.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/__init__.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/test_access_token.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/test_authorization.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/test_base.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/test_request_token.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/test_resource.py
tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/test_signature_only.py
tests/oauth2/__init__.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/__init__.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/test_parameters.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/test_request_validator.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/test_server.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/test_tokens.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/test_utils.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/__init__.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/test_backend_application.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/test_base.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/test_legacy_application.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/test_mobile_application.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/test_service_application.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/test_web_application.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/__init__.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_base_endpoint.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_client_authentication.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_credentials_preservation.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_error_responses.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_extra_credentials.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_introspect_endpoint.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_metadata.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_resource_owner_association.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_revocation_endpoint.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_scope_handling.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/endpoints/test_utils.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/__init__.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/test_authorization_code.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/test_client_credentials.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/test_implicit.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/test_refresh_token.py
tests/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/test_resource_owner_password.py
tests/openid/__init__.py
tests/openid/connect/__init__.py
tests/openid/connect/core/__init__.py
tests/openid/connect/core/test_request_validator.py
tests/openid/connect/core/test_server.py
tests/openid/connect/core/test_tokens.py
tests/openid/connect/core/endpoints/__init__.py
tests/openid/connect/core/endpoints/test_claims_handling.py
tests/openid/connect/core/endpoints/test_openid_connect_params_handling.py
tests/openid/connect/core/endpoints/test_userinfo_endpoint.py
tests/openid/connect/core/grant_types/__init__.py
tests/openid/connect/core/grant_types/test_authorization_code.py
tests/openid/connect/core/grant_types/test_base.py
tests/openid/connect/core/grant_types/test_dispatchers.py
tests/openid/connect/core/grant_types/test_hybrid.py
tests/openid/connect/core/grant_types/test_implicit.py
tests/unittest/__init__.py

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[rsa]
cryptography
[signals]
blinker
[signedtoken]
cryptography
pyjwt>=1.0.0

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oauthlib

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"""
oauthlib
~~~~~~~~
A generic, spec-compliant, thorough implementation of the OAuth
request-signing logic.
:copyright: (c) 2019 by The OAuthlib Community
:license: BSD, see LICENSE for details.
"""
import logging
from logging import NullHandler
__author__ = 'The OAuthlib Community'
__version__ = '3.1.0'
logging.getLogger('oauthlib').addHandler(NullHandler())
_DEBUG = False
def set_debug(debug_val):
"""Set value of debug flag
:param debug_val: Value to set. Must be a bool value.
"""
global _DEBUG
_DEBUG = debug_val
def get_debug():
"""Get debug mode value.
:return: `True` if debug mode is on, `False` otherwise
"""
return _DEBUG

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.common
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module provides data structures and utilities common
to all implementations of OAuth.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import collections
import datetime
import logging
import re
import sys
import time
from . import get_debug
try:
from secrets import randbits
from secrets import SystemRandom
except ImportError:
from random import getrandbits as randbits
from random import SystemRandom
try:
from urllib import quote as _quote
from urllib import unquote as _unquote
from urllib import urlencode as _urlencode
except ImportError:
from urllib.parse import quote as _quote
from urllib.parse import unquote as _unquote
from urllib.parse import urlencode as _urlencode
try:
import urlparse
except ImportError:
import urllib.parse as urlparse
UNICODE_ASCII_CHARACTER_SET = ('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
'0123456789')
CLIENT_ID_CHARACTER_SET = (r' !"#$%&\'()*+,-./0123456789:;<=>?@ABCDEFGHIJKLMN'
'OPQRSTUVWXYZ[\\]^_`abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz{|}')
SANITIZE_PATTERN = re.compile(r'([^&;]*(?:password|token)[^=]*=)[^&;]+', re.IGNORECASE)
INVALID_HEX_PATTERN = re.compile(r'%[^0-9A-Fa-f]|%[0-9A-Fa-f][^0-9A-Fa-f]')
always_safe = ('ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
'0123456789' '_.-')
log = logging.getLogger('oauthlib')
PY3 = sys.version_info[0] == 3
if PY3:
unicode_type = str
else:
unicode_type = unicode
# 'safe' must be bytes (Python 2.6 requires bytes, other versions allow either)
def quote(s, safe=b'/'):
s = s.encode('utf-8') if isinstance(s, unicode_type) else s
s = _quote(s, safe)
# PY3 always returns unicode. PY2 may return either, depending on whether
# it had to modify the string.
if isinstance(s, bytes):
s = s.decode('utf-8')
return s
def unquote(s):
s = _unquote(s)
# PY3 always returns unicode. PY2 seems to always return what you give it,
# which differs from quote's behavior. Just to be safe, make sure it is
# unicode before we return.
if isinstance(s, bytes):
s = s.decode('utf-8')
return s
def urlencode(params):
utf8_params = encode_params_utf8(params)
urlencoded = _urlencode(utf8_params)
if isinstance(urlencoded, unicode_type): # PY3 returns unicode
return urlencoded
else:
return urlencoded.decode("utf-8")
def encode_params_utf8(params):
"""Ensures that all parameters in a list of 2-element tuples are encoded to
bytestrings using UTF-8
"""
encoded = []
for k, v in params:
encoded.append((
k.encode('utf-8') if isinstance(k, unicode_type) else k,
v.encode('utf-8') if isinstance(v, unicode_type) else v))
return encoded
def decode_params_utf8(params):
"""Ensures that all parameters in a list of 2-element tuples are decoded to
unicode using UTF-8.
"""
decoded = []
for k, v in params:
decoded.append((
k.decode('utf-8') if isinstance(k, bytes) else k,
v.decode('utf-8') if isinstance(v, bytes) else v))
return decoded
urlencoded = set(always_safe) | set('=&;:%+~,*@!()/?\'$')
def urldecode(query):
"""Decode a query string in x-www-form-urlencoded format into a sequence
of two-element tuples.
Unlike urlparse.parse_qsl(..., strict_parsing=True) urldecode will enforce
correct formatting of the query string by validation. If validation fails
a ValueError will be raised. urllib.parse_qsl will only raise errors if
any of name-value pairs omits the equals sign.
"""
# Check if query contains invalid characters
if query and not set(query) <= urlencoded:
error = ("Error trying to decode a non urlencoded string. "
"Found invalid characters: %s "
"in the string: '%s'. "
"Please ensure the request/response body is "
"x-www-form-urlencoded.")
raise ValueError(error % (set(query) - urlencoded, query))
# Check for correctly hex encoded values using a regular expression
# All encoded values begin with % followed by two hex characters
# correct = %00, %A0, %0A, %FF
# invalid = %G0, %5H, %PO
if INVALID_HEX_PATTERN.search(query):
raise ValueError('Invalid hex encoding in query string.')
# We encode to utf-8 prior to parsing because parse_qsl behaves
# differently on unicode input in python 2 and 3.
# Python 2.7
# >>> urlparse.parse_qsl(u'%E5%95%A6%E5%95%A6')
# u'\xe5\x95\xa6\xe5\x95\xa6'
# Python 2.7, non unicode input gives the same
# >>> urlparse.parse_qsl('%E5%95%A6%E5%95%A6')
# '\xe5\x95\xa6\xe5\x95\xa6'
# but now we can decode it to unicode
# >>> urlparse.parse_qsl('%E5%95%A6%E5%95%A6').decode('utf-8')
# u'\u5566\u5566'
# Python 3.3 however
# >>> urllib.parse.parse_qsl(u'%E5%95%A6%E5%95%A6')
# u'\u5566\u5566'
query = query.encode(
'utf-8') if not PY3 and isinstance(query, unicode_type) else query
# We want to allow queries such as "c2" whereas urlparse.parse_qsl
# with the strict_parsing flag will not.
params = urlparse.parse_qsl(query, keep_blank_values=True)
# unicode all the things
return decode_params_utf8(params)
def extract_params(raw):
"""Extract parameters and return them as a list of 2-tuples.
Will successfully extract parameters from urlencoded query strings,
dicts, or lists of 2-tuples. Empty strings/dicts/lists will return an
empty list of parameters. Any other input will result in a return
value of None.
"""
if isinstance(raw, (bytes, unicode_type)):
try:
params = urldecode(raw)
except ValueError:
params = None
elif hasattr(raw, '__iter__'):
try:
dict(raw)
except ValueError:
params = None
except TypeError:
params = None
else:
params = list(raw.items() if isinstance(raw, dict) else raw)
params = decode_params_utf8(params)
else:
params = None
return params
def generate_nonce():
"""Generate pseudorandom nonce that is unlikely to repeat.
Per `section 3.3`_ of the OAuth 1 RFC 5849 spec.
Per `section 3.2.1`_ of the MAC Access Authentication spec.
A random 64-bit number is appended to the epoch timestamp for both
randomness and to decrease the likelihood of collisions.
.. _`section 3.2.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01#section-3.2.1
.. _`section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.3
"""
return unicode_type(unicode_type(randbits(64)) + generate_timestamp())
def generate_timestamp():
"""Get seconds since epoch (UTC).
Per `section 3.3`_ of the OAuth 1 RFC 5849 spec.
Per `section 3.2.1`_ of the MAC Access Authentication spec.
.. _`section 3.2.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01#section-3.2.1
.. _`section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.3
"""
return unicode_type(int(time.time()))
def generate_token(length=30, chars=UNICODE_ASCII_CHARACTER_SET):
"""Generates a non-guessable OAuth token
OAuth (1 and 2) does not specify the format of tokens except that they
should be strings of random characters. Tokens should not be guessable
and entropy when generating the random characters is important. Which is
why SystemRandom is used instead of the default random.choice method.
"""
rand = SystemRandom()
return ''.join(rand.choice(chars) for x in range(length))
def generate_signed_token(private_pem, request):
import jwt
now = datetime.datetime.utcnow()
claims = {
'scope': request.scope,
'exp': now + datetime.timedelta(seconds=request.expires_in)
}
claims.update(request.claims)
token = jwt.encode(claims, private_pem, 'RS256')
token = to_unicode(token, "UTF-8")
return token
def verify_signed_token(public_pem, token):
import jwt
return jwt.decode(token, public_pem, algorithms=['RS256'])
def generate_client_id(length=30, chars=CLIENT_ID_CHARACTER_SET):
"""Generates an OAuth client_id
OAuth 2 specify the format of client_id in
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-A.
"""
return generate_token(length, chars)
def add_params_to_qs(query, params):
"""Extend a query with a list of two-tuples."""
if isinstance(params, dict):
params = params.items()
queryparams = urlparse.parse_qsl(query, keep_blank_values=True)
queryparams.extend(params)
return urlencode(queryparams)
def add_params_to_uri(uri, params, fragment=False):
"""Add a list of two-tuples to the uri query components."""
sch, net, path, par, query, fra = urlparse.urlparse(uri)
if fragment:
fra = add_params_to_qs(fra, params)
else:
query = add_params_to_qs(query, params)
return urlparse.urlunparse((sch, net, path, par, query, fra))
def safe_string_equals(a, b):
""" Near-constant time string comparison.
Used in order to avoid timing attacks on sensitive information such
as secret keys during request verification (`rootLabs`_).
.. _`rootLabs`: http://rdist.root.org/2010/01/07/timing-independent-array-comparison/
"""
if len(a) != len(b):
return False
result = 0
for x, y in zip(a, b):
result |= ord(x) ^ ord(y)
return result == 0
def to_unicode(data, encoding='UTF-8'):
"""Convert a number of different types of objects to unicode."""
if isinstance(data, unicode_type):
return data
if isinstance(data, bytes):
return unicode_type(data, encoding=encoding)
if hasattr(data, '__iter__'):
try:
dict(data)
except TypeError:
pass
except ValueError:
# Assume it's a one dimensional data structure
return (to_unicode(i, encoding) for i in data)
else:
# We support 2.6 which lacks dict comprehensions
if hasattr(data, 'items'):
data = data.items()
return dict(((to_unicode(k, encoding), to_unicode(v, encoding)) for k, v in data))
return data
class CaseInsensitiveDict(dict):
"""Basic case insensitive dict with strings only keys."""
proxy = {}
def __init__(self, data):
self.proxy = dict((k.lower(), k) for k in data)
for k in data:
self[k] = data[k]
def __contains__(self, k):
return k.lower() in self.proxy
def __delitem__(self, k):
key = self.proxy[k.lower()]
super(CaseInsensitiveDict, self).__delitem__(key)
del self.proxy[k.lower()]
def __getitem__(self, k):
key = self.proxy[k.lower()]
return super(CaseInsensitiveDict, self).__getitem__(key)
def get(self, k, default=None):
return self[k] if k in self else default
def __setitem__(self, k, v):
super(CaseInsensitiveDict, self).__setitem__(k, v)
self.proxy[k.lower()] = k
def update(self, *args, **kwargs):
super(CaseInsensitiveDict, self).update(*args, **kwargs)
for k in dict(*args, **kwargs):
self.proxy[k.lower()] = k
class Request(object):
"""A malleable representation of a signable HTTP request.
Body argument may contain any data, but parameters will only be decoded if
they are one of:
* urlencoded query string
* dict
* list of 2-tuples
Anything else will be treated as raw body data to be passed through
unmolested.
"""
def __init__(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None, headers=None,
encoding='utf-8'):
# Convert to unicode using encoding if given, else assume unicode
encode = lambda x: to_unicode(x, encoding) if encoding else x
self.uri = encode(uri)
self.http_method = encode(http_method)
self.headers = CaseInsensitiveDict(encode(headers or {}))
self.body = encode(body)
self.decoded_body = extract_params(self.body)
self.oauth_params = []
self.validator_log = {}
self._params = {
"access_token": None,
"client": None,
"client_id": None,
"client_secret": None,
"code": None,
"code_challenge": None,
"code_challenge_method": None,
"code_verifier": None,
"extra_credentials": None,
"grant_type": None,
"redirect_uri": None,
"refresh_token": None,
"request_token": None,
"response_type": None,
"scope": None,
"scopes": None,
"state": None,
"token": None,
"user": None,
"token_type_hint": None,
# OpenID Connect
"response_mode": None,
"nonce": None,
"display": None,
"prompt": None,
"claims": None,
"max_age": None,
"ui_locales": None,
"id_token_hint": None,
"login_hint": None,
"acr_values": None
}
self._params.update(dict(urldecode(self.uri_query)))
self._params.update(dict(self.decoded_body or []))
def __getattr__(self, name):
if name in self._params:
return self._params[name]
else:
raise AttributeError(name)
def __repr__(self):
if not get_debug():
return "<oauthlib.Request SANITIZED>"
body = self.body
headers = self.headers.copy()
if body:
body = SANITIZE_PATTERN.sub('\1<SANITIZED>', str(body))
if 'Authorization' in headers:
headers['Authorization'] = '<SANITIZED>'
return '<oauthlib.Request url="%s", http_method="%s", headers="%s", body="%s">' % (
self.uri, self.http_method, headers, body)
@property
def uri_query(self):
return urlparse.urlparse(self.uri).query
@property
def uri_query_params(self):
if not self.uri_query:
return []
return urlparse.parse_qsl(self.uri_query, keep_blank_values=True,
strict_parsing=True)
@property
def duplicate_params(self):
seen_keys = collections.defaultdict(int)
all_keys = (p[0]
for p in (self.decoded_body or []) + self.uri_query_params)
for k in all_keys:
seen_keys[k] += 1
return [k for k, c in seen_keys.items() if c > 1]

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is a wrapper for the most recent implementation of OAuth 1.0 Client
and Server classes.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from .rfc5849 import Client
from .rfc5849 import SIGNATURE_HMAC, SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1, SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256, SIGNATURE_RSA, SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT
from .rfc5849 import SIGNATURE_TYPE_AUTH_HEADER, SIGNATURE_TYPE_QUERY
from .rfc5849 import SIGNATURE_TYPE_BODY
from .rfc5849.request_validator import RequestValidator
from .rfc5849.endpoints import RequestTokenEndpoint, AuthorizationEndpoint
from .rfc5849.endpoints import AccessTokenEndpoint, ResourceEndpoint
from .rfc5849.endpoints import SignatureOnlyEndpoint, WebApplicationServer
from .rfc5849.errors import InsecureTransportError, InvalidClientError, InvalidRequestError, InvalidSignatureMethodError, OAuth1Error

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for signing and checking OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849 requests.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import base64
import hashlib
import logging
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
import sys
try:
import urlparse
except ImportError:
import urllib.parse as urlparse
from oauthlib.common import Request, urlencode, generate_nonce
from oauthlib.common import generate_timestamp, to_unicode
from . import parameters, signature
SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1 = "HMAC-SHA1"
SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256 = "HMAC-SHA256"
SIGNATURE_HMAC = SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1
SIGNATURE_RSA = "RSA-SHA1"
SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT = "PLAINTEXT"
SIGNATURE_METHODS = (SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1, SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256, SIGNATURE_RSA, SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT)
SIGNATURE_TYPE_AUTH_HEADER = 'AUTH_HEADER'
SIGNATURE_TYPE_QUERY = 'QUERY'
SIGNATURE_TYPE_BODY = 'BODY'
CONTENT_TYPE_FORM_URLENCODED = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
class Client(object):
"""A client used to sign OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849 requests."""
SIGNATURE_METHODS = {
SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1: signature.sign_hmac_sha1_with_client,
SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256: signature.sign_hmac_sha256_with_client,
SIGNATURE_RSA: signature.sign_rsa_sha1_with_client,
SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT: signature.sign_plaintext_with_client
}
@classmethod
def register_signature_method(cls, method_name, method_callback):
cls.SIGNATURE_METHODS[method_name] = method_callback
def __init__(self, client_key,
client_secret=None,
resource_owner_key=None,
resource_owner_secret=None,
callback_uri=None,
signature_method=SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1,
signature_type=SIGNATURE_TYPE_AUTH_HEADER,
rsa_key=None, verifier=None, realm=None,
encoding='utf-8', decoding=None,
nonce=None, timestamp=None):
"""Create an OAuth 1 client.
:param client_key: Client key (consumer key), mandatory.
:param resource_owner_key: Resource owner key (oauth token).
:param resource_owner_secret: Resource owner secret (oauth token secret).
:param callback_uri: Callback used when obtaining request token.
:param signature_method: SIGNATURE_HMAC, SIGNATURE_RSA or SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT.
:param signature_type: SIGNATURE_TYPE_AUTH_HEADER (default),
SIGNATURE_TYPE_QUERY or SIGNATURE_TYPE_BODY
depending on where you want to embed the oauth
credentials.
:param rsa_key: RSA key used with SIGNATURE_RSA.
:param verifier: Verifier used when obtaining an access token.
:param realm: Realm (scope) to which access is being requested.
:param encoding: If you provide non-unicode input you may use this
to have oauthlib automatically convert.
:param decoding: If you wish that the returned uri, headers and body
from sign be encoded back from unicode, then set
decoding to your preferred encoding, i.e. utf-8.
:param nonce: Use this nonce instead of generating one. (Mainly for testing)
:param timestamp: Use this timestamp instead of using current. (Mainly for testing)
"""
# Convert to unicode using encoding if given, else assume unicode
encode = lambda x: to_unicode(x, encoding) if encoding else x
self.client_key = encode(client_key)
self.client_secret = encode(client_secret)
self.resource_owner_key = encode(resource_owner_key)
self.resource_owner_secret = encode(resource_owner_secret)
self.signature_method = encode(signature_method)
self.signature_type = encode(signature_type)
self.callback_uri = encode(callback_uri)
self.rsa_key = encode(rsa_key)
self.verifier = encode(verifier)
self.realm = encode(realm)
self.encoding = encode(encoding)
self.decoding = encode(decoding)
self.nonce = encode(nonce)
self.timestamp = encode(timestamp)
def __repr__(self):
attrs = vars(self).copy()
attrs['client_secret'] = '****' if attrs['client_secret'] else None
attrs['rsa_key'] = '****' if attrs['rsa_key'] else None
attrs[
'resource_owner_secret'] = '****' if attrs['resource_owner_secret'] else None
attribute_str = ', '.join('%s=%s' % (k, v) for k, v in attrs.items())
return '<%s %s>' % (self.__class__.__name__, attribute_str)
def get_oauth_signature(self, request):
"""Get an OAuth signature to be used in signing a request
To satisfy `section 3.4.1.2`_ item 2, if the request argument's
headers dict attribute contains a Host item, its value will
replace any netloc part of the request argument's uri attribute
value.
.. _`section 3.4.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.2
"""
if self.signature_method == SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT:
# fast-path
return signature.sign_plaintext(self.client_secret,
self.resource_owner_secret)
uri, headers, body = self._render(request)
collected_params = signature.collect_parameters(
uri_query=urlparse.urlparse(uri).query,
body=body,
headers=headers)
log.debug("Collected params: {0}".format(collected_params))
normalized_params = signature.normalize_parameters(collected_params)
normalized_uri = signature.base_string_uri(uri, headers.get('Host', None))
log.debug("Normalized params: {0}".format(normalized_params))
log.debug("Normalized URI: {0}".format(normalized_uri))
base_string = signature.signature_base_string(request.http_method,
normalized_uri, normalized_params)
log.debug("Signing: signature base string: {0}".format(base_string))
if self.signature_method not in self.SIGNATURE_METHODS:
raise ValueError('Invalid signature method.')
sig = self.SIGNATURE_METHODS[self.signature_method](base_string, self)
log.debug("Signature: {0}".format(sig))
return sig
def get_oauth_params(self, request):
"""Get the basic OAuth parameters to be used in generating a signature.
"""
nonce = (generate_nonce()
if self.nonce is None else self.nonce)
timestamp = (generate_timestamp()
if self.timestamp is None else self.timestamp)
params = [
('oauth_nonce', nonce),
('oauth_timestamp', timestamp),
('oauth_version', '1.0'),
('oauth_signature_method', self.signature_method),
('oauth_consumer_key', self.client_key),
]
if self.resource_owner_key:
params.append(('oauth_token', self.resource_owner_key))
if self.callback_uri:
params.append(('oauth_callback', self.callback_uri))
if self.verifier:
params.append(('oauth_verifier', self.verifier))
# providing body hash for requests other than x-www-form-urlencoded
# as described in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-eaton-oauth-bodyhash-00#section-4.1.1
# 4.1.1. When to include the body hash
# * [...] MUST NOT include an oauth_body_hash parameter on requests with form-encoded request bodies
# * [...] SHOULD include the oauth_body_hash parameter on all other requests.
# Note that SHA-1 is vulnerable. The spec acknowledges that in https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-eaton-oauth-bodyhash-00#section-6.2
# At this time, no further effort has been made to replace SHA-1 for the OAuth Request Body Hash extension.
content_type = request.headers.get('Content-Type', None)
content_type_eligible = content_type and content_type.find('application/x-www-form-urlencoded') < 0
if request.body is not None and content_type_eligible:
params.append(('oauth_body_hash', base64.b64encode(hashlib.sha1(request.body.encode('utf-8')).digest()).decode('utf-8')))
return params
def _render(self, request, formencode=False, realm=None):
"""Render a signed request according to signature type
Returns a 3-tuple containing the request URI, headers, and body.
If the formencode argument is True and the body contains parameters, it
is escaped and returned as a valid formencoded string.
"""
# TODO what if there are body params on a header-type auth?
# TODO what if there are query params on a body-type auth?
uri, headers, body = request.uri, request.headers, request.body
# TODO: right now these prepare_* methods are very narrow in scope--they
# only affect their little thing. In some cases (for example, with
# header auth) it might be advantageous to allow these methods to touch
# other parts of the request, like the headers—so the prepare_headers
# method could also set the Content-Type header to x-www-form-urlencoded
# like the spec requires. This would be a fundamental change though, and
# I'm not sure how I feel about it.
if self.signature_type == SIGNATURE_TYPE_AUTH_HEADER:
headers = parameters.prepare_headers(
request.oauth_params, request.headers, realm=realm)
elif self.signature_type == SIGNATURE_TYPE_BODY and request.decoded_body is not None:
body = parameters.prepare_form_encoded_body(
request.oauth_params, request.decoded_body)
if formencode:
body = urlencode(body)
headers['Content-Type'] = 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
elif self.signature_type == SIGNATURE_TYPE_QUERY:
uri = parameters.prepare_request_uri_query(
request.oauth_params, request.uri)
else:
raise ValueError('Unknown signature type specified.')
return uri, headers, body
def sign(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None, headers=None, realm=None):
"""Sign a request
Signs an HTTP request with the specified parts.
Returns a 3-tuple of the signed request's URI, headers, and body.
Note that http_method is not returned as it is unaffected by the OAuth
signing process. Also worth noting is that duplicate parameters
will be included in the signature, regardless of where they are
specified (query, body).
The body argument may be a dict, a list of 2-tuples, or a formencoded
string. The Content-Type header must be 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
if it is present.
If the body argument is not one of the above, it will be returned
verbatim as it is unaffected by the OAuth signing process. Attempting to
sign a request with non-formencoded data using the OAuth body signature
type is invalid and will raise an exception.
If the body does contain parameters, it will be returned as a properly-
formatted formencoded string.
Body may not be included if the http_method is either GET or HEAD as
this changes the semantic meaning of the request.
All string data MUST be unicode or be encoded with the same encoding
scheme supplied to the Client constructor, default utf-8. This includes
strings inside body dicts, for example.
"""
# normalize request data
request = Request(uri, http_method, body, headers,
encoding=self.encoding)
# sanity check
content_type = request.headers.get('Content-Type', None)
multipart = content_type and content_type.startswith('multipart/')
should_have_params = content_type == CONTENT_TYPE_FORM_URLENCODED
has_params = request.decoded_body is not None
# 3.4.1.3.1. Parameter Sources
# [Parameters are collected from the HTTP request entity-body, but only
# if [...]:
# * The entity-body is single-part.
if multipart and has_params:
raise ValueError(
"Headers indicate a multipart body but body contains parameters.")
# * The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
# "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
# [W3C.REC-html40-19980424].
elif should_have_params and not has_params:
raise ValueError(
"Headers indicate a formencoded body but body was not decodable.")
# * The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type"
# header field set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".
elif not should_have_params and has_params:
raise ValueError(
"Body contains parameters but Content-Type header was {0} "
"instead of {1}".format(content_type or "not set",
CONTENT_TYPE_FORM_URLENCODED))
# 3.5.2. Form-Encoded Body
# Protocol parameters can be transmitted in the HTTP request entity-
# body, but only if the following REQUIRED conditions are met:
# o The entity-body is single-part.
# o The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
# "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
# [W3C.REC-html40-19980424].
# o The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type" header
# field set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".
elif self.signature_type == SIGNATURE_TYPE_BODY and not (
should_have_params and has_params and not multipart):
raise ValueError(
'Body signatures may only be used with form-urlencoded content')
# We amend https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.3.1
# with the clause that parameters from body should only be included
# in non GET or HEAD requests. Extracting the request body parameters
# and including them in the signature base string would give semantic
# meaning to the body, which it should not have according to the
# HTTP 1.1 spec.
elif http_method.upper() in ('GET', 'HEAD') and has_params:
raise ValueError('GET/HEAD requests should not include body.')
# generate the basic OAuth parameters
request.oauth_params = self.get_oauth_params(request)
# generate the signature
request.oauth_params.append(
('oauth_signature', self.get_oauth_signature(request)))
# render the signed request and return it
uri, headers, body = self._render(request, formencode=True,
realm=(realm or self.realm))
if self.decoding:
log.debug('Encoding URI, headers and body to %s.', self.decoding)
uri = uri.encode(self.decoding)
body = body.encode(self.decoding) if body else body
new_headers = {}
for k, v in headers.items():
new_headers[k.encode(self.decoding)] = v.encode(self.decoding)
headers = new_headers
return uri, headers, body

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from __future__ import absolute_import
from .base import BaseEndpoint
from .request_token import RequestTokenEndpoint
from .authorization import AuthorizationEndpoint
from .access_token import AccessTokenEndpoint
from .resource import ResourceEndpoint
from .signature_only import SignatureOnlyEndpoint
from .pre_configured import WebApplicationServer

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints.access_token
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of the access token provider logic of
OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849. It validates the correctness of access token requests,
creates and persists tokens as well as create the proper response to be
returned to the client.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib.common import urlencode
from .. import errors
from .base import BaseEndpoint
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class AccessTokenEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""An endpoint responsible for providing OAuth 1 access tokens.
Typical use is to instantiate with a request validator and invoke the
``create_access_token_response`` from a view function. The tuple returned
has all information necessary (body, status, headers) to quickly form
and return a proper response. See :doc:`/oauth1/validator` for details on which
validator methods to implement for this endpoint.
"""
def create_access_token(self, request, credentials):
"""Create and save a new access token.
Similar to OAuth 2, indication of granted scopes will be included as a
space separated list in ``oauth_authorized_realms``.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: The token as an urlencoded string.
"""
request.realms = self.request_validator.get_realms(
request.resource_owner_key, request)
token = {
'oauth_token': self.token_generator(),
'oauth_token_secret': self.token_generator(),
# Backport the authorized scopes indication used in OAuth2
'oauth_authorized_realms': ' '.join(request.realms)
}
token.update(credentials)
self.request_validator.save_access_token(token, request)
return urlencode(token.items())
def create_access_token_response(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None,
headers=None, credentials=None):
"""Create an access token response, with a new request token if valid.
:param uri: The full URI of the token request.
:param http_method: A valid HTTP verb, i.e. GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, etc.
:param body: The request body as a string.
:param headers: The request headers as a dict.
:param credentials: A list of extra credentials to include in the token.
:returns: A tuple of 3 elements.
1. A dict of headers to set on the response.
2. The response body as a string.
3. The response status code as an integer.
An example of a valid request::
>>> from your_validator import your_validator
>>> from oauthlib.oauth1 import AccessTokenEndpoint
>>> endpoint = AccessTokenEndpoint(your_validator)
>>> h, b, s = endpoint.create_access_token_response(
... 'https://your.provider/access_token?foo=bar',
... headers={
... 'Authorization': 'OAuth oauth_token=234lsdkf....'
... },
... credentials={
... 'my_specific': 'argument',
... })
>>> h
{'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}
>>> b
'oauth_token=lsdkfol23w54jlksdef&oauth_token_secret=qwe089234lkjsdf&oauth_authorized_realms=movies+pics&my_specific=argument'
>>> s
200
An response to invalid request would have a different body and status::
>>> b
'error=invalid_request&description=missing+resource+owner+key'
>>> s
400
The same goes for an an unauthorized request:
>>> b
''
>>> s
401
"""
resp_headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}
try:
request = self._create_request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
valid, processed_request = self.validate_access_token_request(
request)
if valid:
token = self.create_access_token(request, credentials or {})
self.request_validator.invalidate_request_token(
request.client_key,
request.resource_owner_key,
request)
return resp_headers, token, 200
else:
return {}, None, 401
except errors.OAuth1Error as e:
return resp_headers, e.urlencoded, e.status_code
def validate_access_token_request(self, request):
"""Validate an access token request.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:raises: OAuth1Error if the request is invalid.
:returns: A tuple of 2 elements.
1. The validation result (True or False).
2. The request object.
"""
self._check_transport_security(request)
self._check_mandatory_parameters(request)
if not request.resource_owner_key:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Missing resource owner.')
if not self.request_validator.check_request_token(
request.resource_owner_key):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Invalid resource owner key format.')
if not request.verifier:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Missing verifier.')
if not self.request_validator.check_verifier(request.verifier):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Invalid verifier format.')
if not self.request_validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce(
request.client_key, request.timestamp, request.nonce, request,
request_token=request.resource_owner_key):
return False, request
# The server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) status code when
# receiving a request with invalid client credentials.
# Note: This is postponed in order to avoid timing attacks, instead
# a dummy client is assigned and used to maintain near constant
# time request verification.
#
# Note that early exit would enable client enumeration
valid_client = self.request_validator.validate_client_key(
request.client_key, request)
if not valid_client:
request.client_key = self.request_validator.dummy_client
# The server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) status code when
# receiving a request with invalid or expired token.
# Note: This is postponed in order to avoid timing attacks, instead
# a dummy token is assigned and used to maintain near constant
# time request verification.
#
# Note that early exit would enable resource owner enumeration
valid_resource_owner = self.request_validator.validate_request_token(
request.client_key, request.resource_owner_key, request)
if not valid_resource_owner:
request.resource_owner_key = self.request_validator.dummy_request_token
# The server MUST verify (Section 3.2) the validity of the request,
# ensure that the resource owner has authorized the provisioning of
# token credentials to the client, and ensure that the temporary
# credentials have not expired or been used before. The server MUST
# also verify the verification code received from the client.
# .. _`Section 3.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.2
#
# Note that early exit would enable resource owner authorization
# verifier enumertion.
valid_verifier = self.request_validator.validate_verifier(
request.client_key,
request.resource_owner_key,
request.verifier,
request)
valid_signature = self._check_signature(request, is_token_request=True)
# log the results to the validator_log
# this lets us handle internal reporting and analysis
request.validator_log['client'] = valid_client
request.validator_log['resource_owner'] = valid_resource_owner
request.validator_log['verifier'] = valid_verifier
request.validator_log['signature'] = valid_signature
# We delay checking validity until the very end, using dummy values for
# calculations and fetching secrets/keys to ensure the flow of every
# request remains almost identical regardless of whether valid values
# have been supplied. This ensures near constant time execution and
# prevents malicious users from guessing sensitive information
v = all((valid_client, valid_resource_owner, valid_verifier,
valid_signature))
if not v:
log.info("[Failure] request verification failed.")
log.info("Valid client:, %s", valid_client)
log.info("Valid token:, %s", valid_resource_owner)
log.info("Valid verifier:, %s", valid_verifier)
log.info("Valid signature:, %s", valid_signature)
return v, request

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints.authorization
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for signing and checking OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849 requests.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.common import Request, add_params_to_uri
from .. import errors
from .base import BaseEndpoint
try:
from urllib import urlencode
except ImportError:
from urllib.parse import urlencode
class AuthorizationEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""An endpoint responsible for letting authenticated users authorize access
to their protected resources to a client.
Typical use would be to have two views, one for displaying the authorization
form and one to process said form on submission.
The first view will want to utilize ``get_realms_and_credentials`` to fetch
requested realms and useful client credentials, such as name and
description, to be used when creating the authorization form.
During form processing you can use ``create_authorization_response`` to
validate the request, create a verifier as well as prepare the final
redirection URI used to send the user back to the client.
See :doc:`/oauth1/validator` for details on which validator methods to implement
for this endpoint.
"""
def create_verifier(self, request, credentials):
"""Create and save a new request token.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param credentials: A dict of extra token credentials.
:returns: The verifier as a dict.
"""
verifier = {
'oauth_token': request.resource_owner_key,
'oauth_verifier': self.token_generator(),
}
verifier.update(credentials)
self.request_validator.save_verifier(
request.resource_owner_key, verifier, request)
return verifier
def create_authorization_response(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None,
headers=None, realms=None, credentials=None):
"""Create an authorization response, with a new request token if valid.
:param uri: The full URI of the token request.
:param http_method: A valid HTTP verb, i.e. GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, etc.
:param body: The request body as a string.
:param headers: The request headers as a dict.
:param credentials: A list of credentials to include in the verifier.
:returns: A tuple of 3 elements.
1. A dict of headers to set on the response.
2. The response body as a string.
3. The response status code as an integer.
If the callback URI tied to the current token is "oob", a response with
a 200 status code will be returned. In this case, it may be desirable to
modify the response to better display the verifier to the client.
An example of an authorization request::
>>> from your_validator import your_validator
>>> from oauthlib.oauth1 import AuthorizationEndpoint
>>> endpoint = AuthorizationEndpoint(your_validator)
>>> h, b, s = endpoint.create_authorization_response(
... 'https://your.provider/authorize?oauth_token=...',
... credentials={
... 'extra': 'argument',
... })
>>> h
{'Location': 'https://the.client/callback?oauth_verifier=...&extra=argument'}
>>> b
None
>>> s
302
An example of a request with an "oob" callback::
>>> from your_validator import your_validator
>>> from oauthlib.oauth1 import AuthorizationEndpoint
>>> endpoint = AuthorizationEndpoint(your_validator)
>>> h, b, s = endpoint.create_authorization_response(
... 'https://your.provider/authorize?foo=bar',
... credentials={
... 'extra': 'argument',
... })
>>> h
{'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}
>>> b
'oauth_verifier=...&extra=argument'
>>> s
200
"""
request = self._create_request(uri, http_method=http_method, body=body,
headers=headers)
if not request.resource_owner_key:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
'Missing mandatory parameter oauth_token.')
if not self.request_validator.verify_request_token(
request.resource_owner_key, request):
raise errors.InvalidClientError()
request.realms = realms
if (request.realms and not self.request_validator.verify_realms(
request.resource_owner_key, request.realms, request)):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description=('User granted access to realms outside of '
'what the client may request.'))
verifier = self.create_verifier(request, credentials or {})
redirect_uri = self.request_validator.get_redirect_uri(
request.resource_owner_key, request)
if redirect_uri == 'oob':
response_headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}
response_body = urlencode(verifier)
return response_headers, response_body, 200
else:
populated_redirect = add_params_to_uri(
redirect_uri, verifier.items())
return {'Location': populated_redirect}, None, 302
def get_realms_and_credentials(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None,
headers=None):
"""Fetch realms and credentials for the presented request token.
:param uri: The full URI of the token request.
:param http_method: A valid HTTP verb, i.e. GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, etc.
:param body: The request body as a string.
:param headers: The request headers as a dict.
:returns: A tuple of 2 elements.
1. A list of request realms.
2. A dict of credentials which may be useful in creating the
authorization form.
"""
request = self._create_request(uri, http_method=http_method, body=body,
headers=headers)
if not self.request_validator.verify_request_token(
request.resource_owner_key, request):
raise errors.InvalidClientError()
realms = self.request_validator.get_realms(
request.resource_owner_key, request)
return realms, {'resource_owner_key': request.resource_owner_key}

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints.base
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for signing and checking OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849 requests.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import time
from oauthlib.common import CaseInsensitiveDict, Request, generate_token
from .. import (CONTENT_TYPE_FORM_URLENCODED, SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1, SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256, SIGNATURE_RSA,
SIGNATURE_TYPE_AUTH_HEADER, SIGNATURE_TYPE_BODY,
SIGNATURE_TYPE_QUERY, errors, signature, utils)
class BaseEndpoint(object):
def __init__(self, request_validator, token_generator=None):
self.request_validator = request_validator
self.token_generator = token_generator or generate_token
def _get_signature_type_and_params(self, request):
"""Extracts parameters from query, headers and body. Signature type
is set to the source in which parameters were found.
"""
# Per RFC5849, only the Authorization header may contain the 'realm'
# optional parameter.
header_params = signature.collect_parameters(headers=request.headers,
exclude_oauth_signature=False, with_realm=True)
body_params = signature.collect_parameters(body=request.body,
exclude_oauth_signature=False)
query_params = signature.collect_parameters(uri_query=request.uri_query,
exclude_oauth_signature=False)
params = []
params.extend(header_params)
params.extend(body_params)
params.extend(query_params)
signature_types_with_oauth_params = list(filter(lambda s: s[2], (
(SIGNATURE_TYPE_AUTH_HEADER, params,
utils.filter_oauth_params(header_params)),
(SIGNATURE_TYPE_BODY, params,
utils.filter_oauth_params(body_params)),
(SIGNATURE_TYPE_QUERY, params,
utils.filter_oauth_params(query_params))
)))
if len(signature_types_with_oauth_params) > 1:
found_types = [s[0] for s in signature_types_with_oauth_params]
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description=('oauth_ params must come from only 1 signature'
'type but were found in %s',
', '.join(found_types)))
try:
signature_type, params, oauth_params = signature_types_with_oauth_params[
0]
except IndexError:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Missing mandatory OAuth parameters.')
return signature_type, params, oauth_params
def _create_request(self, uri, http_method, body, headers):
# Only include body data from x-www-form-urlencoded requests
headers = CaseInsensitiveDict(headers or {})
if ("Content-Type" in headers and
CONTENT_TYPE_FORM_URLENCODED in headers["Content-Type"]):
request = Request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
else:
request = Request(uri, http_method, '', headers)
signature_type, params, oauth_params = (
self._get_signature_type_and_params(request))
# The server SHOULD return a 400 (Bad Request) status code when
# receiving a request with duplicated protocol parameters.
if len(dict(oauth_params)) != len(oauth_params):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Duplicate OAuth1 entries.')
oauth_params = dict(oauth_params)
request.signature = oauth_params.get('oauth_signature')
request.client_key = oauth_params.get('oauth_consumer_key')
request.resource_owner_key = oauth_params.get('oauth_token')
request.nonce = oauth_params.get('oauth_nonce')
request.timestamp = oauth_params.get('oauth_timestamp')
request.redirect_uri = oauth_params.get('oauth_callback')
request.verifier = oauth_params.get('oauth_verifier')
request.signature_method = oauth_params.get('oauth_signature_method')
request.realm = dict(params).get('realm')
request.oauth_params = oauth_params
# Parameters to Client depend on signature method which may vary
# for each request. Note that HMAC-SHA1 and PLAINTEXT share parameters
request.params = [(k, v) for k, v in params if k != "oauth_signature"]
if 'realm' in request.headers.get('Authorization', ''):
request.params = [(k, v)
for k, v in request.params if k != "realm"]
return request
def _check_transport_security(self, request):
# TODO: move into oauthlib.common from oauth2.utils
if (self.request_validator.enforce_ssl and
not request.uri.lower().startswith("https://")):
raise errors.InsecureTransportError()
def _check_mandatory_parameters(self, request):
# The server SHOULD return a 400 (Bad Request) status code when
# receiving a request with missing parameters.
if not all((request.signature, request.client_key,
request.nonce, request.timestamp,
request.signature_method)):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Missing mandatory OAuth parameters.')
# OAuth does not mandate a particular signature method, as each
# implementation can have its own unique requirements. Servers are
# free to implement and document their own custom methods.
# Recommending any particular method is beyond the scope of this
# specification. Implementers should review the Security
# Considerations section (`Section 4`_) before deciding on which
# method to support.
# .. _`Section 4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-4
if (not request.signature_method in
self.request_validator.allowed_signature_methods):
raise errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError(
description="Invalid signature, %s not in %r." % (
request.signature_method,
self.request_validator.allowed_signature_methods))
# Servers receiving an authenticated request MUST validate it by:
# If the "oauth_version" parameter is present, ensuring its value is
# "1.0".
if ('oauth_version' in request.oauth_params and
request.oauth_params['oauth_version'] != '1.0'):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Invalid OAuth version.')
# The timestamp value MUST be a positive integer. Unless otherwise
# specified by the server's documentation, the timestamp is expressed
# in the number of seconds since January 1, 1970 00:00:00 GMT.
if len(request.timestamp) != 10:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Invalid timestamp size')
try:
ts = int(request.timestamp)
except ValueError:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Timestamp must be an integer.')
else:
# To avoid the need to retain an infinite number of nonce values for
# future checks, servers MAY choose to restrict the time period after
# which a request with an old timestamp is rejected.
if abs(time.time() - ts) > self.request_validator.timestamp_lifetime:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description=('Timestamp given is invalid, differ from '
'allowed by over %s seconds.' % (
self.request_validator.timestamp_lifetime)))
# Provider specific validation of parameters, used to enforce
# restrictions such as character set and length.
if not self.request_validator.check_client_key(request.client_key):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Invalid client key format.')
if not self.request_validator.check_nonce(request.nonce):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Invalid nonce format.')
def _check_signature(self, request, is_token_request=False):
# ---- RSA Signature verification ----
if request.signature_method == SIGNATURE_RSA:
# The server verifies the signature per `[RFC3447] section 8.2.2`_
# .. _`[RFC3447] section 8.2.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#section-8.2.1
rsa_key = self.request_validator.get_rsa_key(
request.client_key, request)
valid_signature = signature.verify_rsa_sha1(request, rsa_key)
# ---- HMAC or Plaintext Signature verification ----
else:
# Servers receiving an authenticated request MUST validate it by:
# Recalculating the request signature independently as described in
# `Section 3.4`_ and comparing it to the value received from the
# client via the "oauth_signature" parameter.
# .. _`Section 3.4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4
client_secret = self.request_validator.get_client_secret(
request.client_key, request)
resource_owner_secret = None
if request.resource_owner_key:
if is_token_request:
resource_owner_secret = self.request_validator.get_request_token_secret(
request.client_key, request.resource_owner_key, request)
else:
resource_owner_secret = self.request_validator.get_access_token_secret(
request.client_key, request.resource_owner_key, request)
if request.signature_method == SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1:
valid_signature = signature.verify_hmac_sha1(request,
client_secret, resource_owner_secret)
elif request.signature_method == SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256:
valid_signature = signature.verify_hmac_sha256(request,
client_secret, resource_owner_secret)
else:
valid_signature = signature.verify_plaintext(request,
client_secret, resource_owner_secret)
return valid_signature

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from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from . import (AccessTokenEndpoint, AuthorizationEndpoint,
RequestTokenEndpoint, ResourceEndpoint)
class WebApplicationServer(RequestTokenEndpoint, AuthorizationEndpoint,
AccessTokenEndpoint, ResourceEndpoint):
def __init__(self, request_validator):
RequestTokenEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
AuthorizationEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
AccessTokenEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
ResourceEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints.request_token
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of the request token provider logic of
OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849. It validates the correctness of request token requests,
creates and persists tokens as well as create the proper response to be
returned to the client.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib.common import urlencode
from .. import errors
from .base import BaseEndpoint
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class RequestTokenEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""An endpoint responsible for providing OAuth 1 request tokens.
Typical use is to instantiate with a request validator and invoke the
``create_request_token_response`` from a view function. The tuple returned
has all information necessary (body, status, headers) to quickly form
and return a proper response. See :doc:`/oauth1/validator` for details on which
validator methods to implement for this endpoint.
"""
def create_request_token(self, request, credentials):
"""Create and save a new request token.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param credentials: A dict of extra token credentials.
:returns: The token as an urlencoded string.
"""
token = {
'oauth_token': self.token_generator(),
'oauth_token_secret': self.token_generator(),
'oauth_callback_confirmed': 'true'
}
token.update(credentials)
self.request_validator.save_request_token(token, request)
return urlencode(token.items())
def create_request_token_response(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None,
headers=None, credentials=None):
"""Create a request token response, with a new request token if valid.
:param uri: The full URI of the token request.
:param http_method: A valid HTTP verb, i.e. GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, etc.
:param body: The request body as a string.
:param headers: The request headers as a dict.
:param credentials: A list of extra credentials to include in the token.
:returns: A tuple of 3 elements.
1. A dict of headers to set on the response.
2. The response body as a string.
3. The response status code as an integer.
An example of a valid request::
>>> from your_validator import your_validator
>>> from oauthlib.oauth1 import RequestTokenEndpoint
>>> endpoint = RequestTokenEndpoint(your_validator)
>>> h, b, s = endpoint.create_request_token_response(
... 'https://your.provider/request_token?foo=bar',
... headers={
... 'Authorization': 'OAuth realm=movies user, oauth_....'
... },
... credentials={
... 'my_specific': 'argument',
... })
>>> h
{'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}
>>> b
'oauth_token=lsdkfol23w54jlksdef&oauth_token_secret=qwe089234lkjsdf&oauth_callback_confirmed=true&my_specific=argument'
>>> s
200
An response to invalid request would have a different body and status::
>>> b
'error=invalid_request&description=missing+callback+uri'
>>> s
400
The same goes for an an unauthorized request:
>>> b
''
>>> s
401
"""
resp_headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}
try:
request = self._create_request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
valid, processed_request = self.validate_request_token_request(
request)
if valid:
token = self.create_request_token(request, credentials or {})
return resp_headers, token, 200
else:
return {}, None, 401
except errors.OAuth1Error as e:
return resp_headers, e.urlencoded, e.status_code
def validate_request_token_request(self, request):
"""Validate a request token request.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:raises: OAuth1Error if the request is invalid.
:returns: A tuple of 2 elements.
1. The validation result (True or False).
2. The request object.
"""
self._check_transport_security(request)
self._check_mandatory_parameters(request)
if request.realm:
request.realms = request.realm.split(' ')
else:
request.realms = self.request_validator.get_default_realms(
request.client_key, request)
if not self.request_validator.check_realms(request.realms):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Invalid realm %s. Allowed are %r.' % (
request.realms, self.request_validator.realms))
if not request.redirect_uri:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Missing callback URI.')
if not self.request_validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce(
request.client_key, request.timestamp, request.nonce, request,
request_token=request.resource_owner_key):
return False, request
# The server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) status code when
# receiving a request with invalid client credentials.
# Note: This is postponed in order to avoid timing attacks, instead
# a dummy client is assigned and used to maintain near constant
# time request verification.
#
# Note that early exit would enable client enumeration
valid_client = self.request_validator.validate_client_key(
request.client_key, request)
if not valid_client:
request.client_key = self.request_validator.dummy_client
# Note that `realm`_ is only used in authorization headers and how
# it should be interepreted is not included in the OAuth spec.
# However they could be seen as a scope or realm to which the
# client has access and as such every client should be checked
# to ensure it is authorized access to that scope or realm.
# .. _`realm`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617#section-1.2
#
# Note that early exit would enable client realm access enumeration.
#
# The require_realm indicates this is the first step in the OAuth
# workflow where a client requests access to a specific realm.
# This first step (obtaining request token) need not require a realm
# and can then be identified by checking the require_resource_owner
# flag and abscence of realm.
#
# Clients obtaining an access token will not supply a realm and it will
# not be checked. Instead the previously requested realm should be
# transferred from the request token to the access token.
#
# Access to protected resources will always validate the realm but note
# that the realm is now tied to the access token and not provided by
# the client.
valid_realm = self.request_validator.validate_requested_realms(
request.client_key, request.realms, request)
# Callback is normally never required, except for requests for
# a Temporary Credential as described in `Section 2.1`_
# .._`Section 2.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-2.1
valid_redirect = self.request_validator.validate_redirect_uri(
request.client_key, request.redirect_uri, request)
if not request.redirect_uri:
raise NotImplementedError('Redirect URI must either be provided '
'or set to a default during validation.')
valid_signature = self._check_signature(request)
# log the results to the validator_log
# this lets us handle internal reporting and analysis
request.validator_log['client'] = valid_client
request.validator_log['realm'] = valid_realm
request.validator_log['callback'] = valid_redirect
request.validator_log['signature'] = valid_signature
# We delay checking validity until the very end, using dummy values for
# calculations and fetching secrets/keys to ensure the flow of every
# request remains almost identical regardless of whether valid values
# have been supplied. This ensures near constant time execution and
# prevents malicious users from guessing sensitive information
v = all((valid_client, valid_realm, valid_redirect, valid_signature))
if not v:
log.info("[Failure] request verification failed.")
log.info("Valid client: %s.", valid_client)
log.info("Valid realm: %s.", valid_realm)
log.info("Valid callback: %s.", valid_redirect)
log.info("Valid signature: %s.", valid_signature)
return v, request

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints.resource
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of the resource protection provider logic of
OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from .. import errors
from .base import BaseEndpoint
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class ResourceEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""An endpoint responsible for protecting resources.
Typical use is to instantiate with a request validator and invoke the
``validate_protected_resource_request`` in a decorator around a view
function. If the request is valid, invoke and return the response of the
view. If invalid create and return an error response directly from the
decorator.
See :doc:`/oauth1/validator` for details on which validator methods to implement
for this endpoint.
An example decorator::
from functools import wraps
from your_validator import your_validator
from oauthlib.oauth1 import ResourceEndpoint
endpoint = ResourceEndpoint(your_validator)
def require_oauth(realms=None):
def decorator(f):
@wraps(f)
def wrapper(request, *args, **kwargs):
v, r = provider.validate_protected_resource_request(
request.url,
http_method=request.method,
body=request.data,
headers=request.headers,
realms=realms or [])
if v:
return f(*args, **kwargs)
else:
return abort(403)
"""
def validate_protected_resource_request(self, uri, http_method='GET',
body=None, headers=None, realms=None):
"""Create a request token response, with a new request token if valid.
:param uri: The full URI of the token request.
:param http_method: A valid HTTP verb, i.e. GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, etc.
:param body: The request body as a string.
:param headers: The request headers as a dict.
:param realms: A list of realms the resource is protected under.
This will be supplied to the ``validate_realms``
method of the request validator.
:returns: A tuple of 2 elements.
1. True if valid, False otherwise.
2. An oauthlib.common.Request object.
"""
try:
request = self._create_request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
except errors.OAuth1Error:
return False, None
try:
self._check_transport_security(request)
self._check_mandatory_parameters(request)
except errors.OAuth1Error:
return False, request
if not request.resource_owner_key:
return False, request
if not self.request_validator.check_access_token(
request.resource_owner_key):
return False, request
if not self.request_validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce(
request.client_key, request.timestamp, request.nonce, request,
access_token=request.resource_owner_key):
return False, request
# The server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) status code when
# receiving a request with invalid client credentials.
# Note: This is postponed in order to avoid timing attacks, instead
# a dummy client is assigned and used to maintain near constant
# time request verification.
#
# Note that early exit would enable client enumeration
valid_client = self.request_validator.validate_client_key(
request.client_key, request)
if not valid_client:
request.client_key = self.request_validator.dummy_client
# The server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) status code when
# receiving a request with invalid or expired token.
# Note: This is postponed in order to avoid timing attacks, instead
# a dummy token is assigned and used to maintain near constant
# time request verification.
#
# Note that early exit would enable resource owner enumeration
valid_resource_owner = self.request_validator.validate_access_token(
request.client_key, request.resource_owner_key, request)
if not valid_resource_owner:
request.resource_owner_key = self.request_validator.dummy_access_token
# Note that `realm`_ is only used in authorization headers and how
# it should be interepreted is not included in the OAuth spec.
# However they could be seen as a scope or realm to which the
# client has access and as such every client should be checked
# to ensure it is authorized access to that scope or realm.
# .. _`realm`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617#section-1.2
#
# Note that early exit would enable client realm access enumeration.
#
# The require_realm indicates this is the first step in the OAuth
# workflow where a client requests access to a specific realm.
# This first step (obtaining request token) need not require a realm
# and can then be identified by checking the require_resource_owner
# flag and abscence of realm.
#
# Clients obtaining an access token will not supply a realm and it will
# not be checked. Instead the previously requested realm should be
# transferred from the request token to the access token.
#
# Access to protected resources will always validate the realm but note
# that the realm is now tied to the access token and not provided by
# the client.
valid_realm = self.request_validator.validate_realms(request.client_key,
request.resource_owner_key, request, uri=request.uri,
realms=realms)
valid_signature = self._check_signature(request)
# log the results to the validator_log
# this lets us handle internal reporting and analysis
request.validator_log['client'] = valid_client
request.validator_log['resource_owner'] = valid_resource_owner
request.validator_log['realm'] = valid_realm
request.validator_log['signature'] = valid_signature
# We delay checking validity until the very end, using dummy values for
# calculations and fetching secrets/keys to ensure the flow of every
# request remains almost identical regardless of whether valid values
# have been supplied. This ensures near constant time execution and
# prevents malicious users from guessing sensitive information
v = all((valid_client, valid_resource_owner, valid_realm,
valid_signature))
if not v:
log.info("[Failure] request verification failed.")
log.info("Valid client: %s", valid_client)
log.info("Valid token: %s", valid_resource_owner)
log.info("Valid realm: %s", valid_realm)
log.info("Valid signature: %s", valid_signature)
return v, request

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints.signature_only
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of the signing logic of OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from .. import errors
from .base import BaseEndpoint
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class SignatureOnlyEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""An endpoint only responsible for verifying an oauth signature."""
def validate_request(self, uri, http_method='GET',
body=None, headers=None):
"""Validate a signed OAuth request.
:param uri: The full URI of the token request.
:param http_method: A valid HTTP verb, i.e. GET, POST, PUT, HEAD, etc.
:param body: The request body as a string.
:param headers: The request headers as a dict.
:returns: A tuple of 2 elements.
1. True if valid, False otherwise.
2. An oauthlib.common.Request object.
"""
try:
request = self._create_request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
except errors.OAuth1Error as err:
log.info(
'Exception caught while validating request, %s.' % err)
return False, None
try:
self._check_transport_security(request)
self._check_mandatory_parameters(request)
except errors.OAuth1Error as err:
log.info(
'Exception caught while validating request, %s.' % err)
return False, request
if not self.request_validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce(
request.client_key, request.timestamp, request.nonce, request):
log.debug('[Failure] verification failed: timestamp/nonce')
return False, request
# The server SHOULD return a 401 (Unauthorized) status code when
# receiving a request with invalid client credentials.
# Note: This is postponed in order to avoid timing attacks, instead
# a dummy client is assigned and used to maintain near constant
# time request verification.
#
# Note that early exit would enable client enumeration
valid_client = self.request_validator.validate_client_key(
request.client_key, request)
if not valid_client:
request.client_key = self.request_validator.dummy_client
valid_signature = self._check_signature(request)
# log the results to the validator_log
# this lets us handle internal reporting and analysis
request.validator_log['client'] = valid_client
request.validator_log['signature'] = valid_signature
# We delay checking validity until the very end, using dummy values for
# calculations and fetching secrets/keys to ensure the flow of every
# request remains almost identical regardless of whether valid values
# have been supplied. This ensures near constant time execution and
# prevents malicious users from guessing sensitive information
v = all((valid_client, valid_signature))
if not v:
log.info("[Failure] request verification failed.")
log.info("Valid client: %s", valid_client)
log.info("Valid signature: %s", valid_signature)
return v, request

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# coding=utf-8
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.errors
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Error used both by OAuth 1 clients and provicers to represent the spec
defined error responses for all four core grant types.
"""
from __future__ import unicode_literals
from oauthlib.common import add_params_to_uri, urlencode
class OAuth1Error(Exception):
error = None
description = ''
def __init__(self, description=None, uri=None, status_code=400,
request=None):
"""
description: A human-readable ASCII [USASCII] text providing
additional information, used to assist the client
developer in understanding the error that occurred.
Values for the "error_description" parameter MUST NOT
include characters outside the set
x20-21 / x23-5B / x5D-7E.
uri: A URI identifying a human-readable web page with information
about the error, used to provide the client developer with
additional information about the error. Values for the
"error_uri" parameter MUST conform to the URI- Reference
syntax, and thus MUST NOT include characters outside the set
x21 / x23-5B / x5D-7E.
state: A CSRF protection value received from the client.
request: Oauthlib Request object
"""
self.description = description or self.description
message = '(%s) %s' % (self.error, self.description)
if request:
message += ' ' + repr(request)
super(OAuth1Error, self).__init__(message)
self.uri = uri
self.status_code = status_code
def in_uri(self, uri):
return add_params_to_uri(uri, self.twotuples)
@property
def twotuples(self):
error = [('error', self.error)]
if self.description:
error.append(('error_description', self.description))
if self.uri:
error.append(('error_uri', self.uri))
return error
@property
def urlencoded(self):
return urlencode(self.twotuples)
class InsecureTransportError(OAuth1Error):
error = 'insecure_transport_protocol'
description = 'Only HTTPS connections are permitted.'
class InvalidSignatureMethodError(OAuth1Error):
error = 'invalid_signature_method'
class InvalidRequestError(OAuth1Error):
error = 'invalid_request'
class InvalidClientError(OAuth1Error):
error = 'invalid_client'

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.parameters
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module contains methods related to `section 3.5`_ of the OAuth 1.0a spec.
.. _`section 3.5`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.5
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.common import extract_params, urlencode
from . import utils
try:
from urlparse import urlparse, urlunparse
except ImportError: # noqa
from urllib.parse import urlparse, urlunparse
# TODO: do we need filter_params now that oauth_params are handled by Request?
# We can easily pass in just oauth protocol params.
@utils.filter_params
def prepare_headers(oauth_params, headers=None, realm=None):
"""**Prepare the Authorization header.**
Per `section 3.5.1`_ of the spec.
Protocol parameters can be transmitted using the HTTP "Authorization"
header field as defined by `RFC2617`_ with the auth-scheme name set to
"OAuth" (case insensitive).
For example::
Authorization: OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="0685bd9184jfhq22",
oauth_token="ad180jjd733klru7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_signature="wOJIO9A2W5mFwDgiDvZbTSMK%2FPY%3D",
oauth_timestamp="137131200",
oauth_nonce="4572616e48616d6d65724c61686176",
oauth_version="1.0"
.. _`section 3.5.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.5.1
.. _`RFC2617`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617
"""
headers = headers or {}
# Protocol parameters SHALL be included in the "Authorization" header
# field as follows:
authorization_header_parameters_parts = []
for oauth_parameter_name, value in oauth_params:
# 1. Parameter names and values are encoded per Parameter Encoding
# (`Section 3.6`_)
#
# .. _`Section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
escaped_name = utils.escape(oauth_parameter_name)
escaped_value = utils.escape(value)
# 2. Each parameter's name is immediately followed by an "=" character
# (ASCII code 61), a """ character (ASCII code 34), the parameter
# value (MAY be empty), and another """ character (ASCII code 34).
part = '{0}="{1}"'.format(escaped_name, escaped_value)
authorization_header_parameters_parts.append(part)
# 3. Parameters are separated by a "," character (ASCII code 44) and
# OPTIONAL linear whitespace per `RFC2617`_.
#
# .. _`RFC2617`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617
authorization_header_parameters = ', '.join(
authorization_header_parameters_parts)
# 4. The OPTIONAL "realm" parameter MAY be added and interpreted per
# `RFC2617 section 1.2`_.
#
# .. _`RFC2617 section 1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2617#section-1.2
if realm:
# NOTE: realm should *not* be escaped
authorization_header_parameters = ('realm="%s", ' % realm +
authorization_header_parameters)
# the auth-scheme name set to "OAuth" (case insensitive).
authorization_header = 'OAuth %s' % authorization_header_parameters
# contribute the Authorization header to the given headers
full_headers = {}
full_headers.update(headers)
full_headers['Authorization'] = authorization_header
return full_headers
def _append_params(oauth_params, params):
"""Append OAuth params to an existing set of parameters.
Both params and oauth_params is must be lists of 2-tuples.
Per `section 3.5.2`_ and `3.5.3`_ of the spec.
.. _`section 3.5.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.5.2
.. _`3.5.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.5.3
"""
merged = list(params)
merged.extend(oauth_params)
# The request URI / entity-body MAY include other request-specific
# parameters, in which case, the protocol parameters SHOULD be appended
# following the request-specific parameters, properly separated by an "&"
# character (ASCII code 38)
merged.sort(key=lambda i: i[0].startswith('oauth_'))
return merged
def prepare_form_encoded_body(oauth_params, body):
"""Prepare the Form-Encoded Body.
Per `section 3.5.2`_ of the spec.
.. _`section 3.5.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.5.2
"""
# append OAuth params to the existing body
return _append_params(oauth_params, body)
def prepare_request_uri_query(oauth_params, uri):
"""Prepare the Request URI Query.
Per `section 3.5.3`_ of the spec.
.. _`section 3.5.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.5.3
"""
# append OAuth params to the existing set of query components
sch, net, path, par, query, fra = urlparse(uri)
query = urlencode(
_append_params(oauth_params, extract_params(query) or []))
return urlunparse((sch, net, path, par, query, fra))

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for signing and checking OAuth 1.0 RFC 5849 requests.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import sys
from . import SIGNATURE_METHODS, utils
class RequestValidator(object):
"""A validator/datastore interaction base class for OAuth 1 providers.
OAuth providers should inherit from RequestValidator and implement the
methods and properties outlined below. Further details are provided in the
documentation for each method and property.
Methods used to check the format of input parameters. Common tests include
length, character set, membership, range or pattern. These tests are
referred to as `whitelisting or blacklisting`_. Whitelisting is better
but blacklisting can be usefull to spot malicious activity.
The following have methods a default implementation:
- check_client_key
- check_request_token
- check_access_token
- check_nonce
- check_verifier
- check_realms
The methods above default to whitelist input parameters, checking that they
are alphanumerical and between a minimum and maximum length. Rather than
overloading the methods a few properties can be used to configure these
methods.
* @safe_characters -> (character set)
* @client_key_length -> (min, max)
* @request_token_length -> (min, max)
* @access_token_length -> (min, max)
* @nonce_length -> (min, max)
* @verifier_length -> (min, max)
* @realms -> [list, of, realms]
Methods used to validate/invalidate input parameters. These checks usually
hit either persistent or temporary storage such as databases or the
filesystem. See each methods documentation for detailed usage.
The following methods must be implemented:
- validate_client_key
- validate_request_token
- validate_access_token
- validate_timestamp_and_nonce
- validate_redirect_uri
- validate_requested_realms
- validate_realms
- validate_verifier
- invalidate_request_token
Methods used to retrieve sensitive information from storage.
The following methods must be implemented:
- get_client_secret
- get_request_token_secret
- get_access_token_secret
- get_rsa_key
- get_realms
- get_default_realms
- get_redirect_uri
Methods used to save credentials.
The following methods must be implemented:
- save_request_token
- save_verifier
- save_access_token
Methods used to verify input parameters. This methods are used during
authorizing request token by user (AuthorizationEndpoint), to check if
parameters are valid. During token authorization request is not signed,
thus 'validation' methods can not be used. The following methods must be
implemented:
- verify_realms
- verify_request_token
To prevent timing attacks it is necessary to not exit early even if the
client key or resource owner key is invalid. Instead dummy values should
be used during the remaining verification process. It is very important
that the dummy client and token are valid input parameters to the methods
get_client_secret, get_rsa_key and get_(access/request)_token_secret and
that the running time of those methods when given a dummy value remain
equivalent to the running time when given a valid client/resource owner.
The following properties must be implemented:
* @dummy_client
* @dummy_request_token
* @dummy_access_token
Example implementations have been provided, note that the database used is
a simple dictionary and serves only an illustrative purpose. Use whichever
database suits your project and how to access it is entirely up to you.
The methods are introduced in an order which should make understanding
their use more straightforward and as such it could be worth reading what
follows in chronological order.
.. _`whitelisting or blacklisting`: https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2011/01/whitelisting_vs.html
"""
def __init__(self):
pass
@property
def allowed_signature_methods(self):
return SIGNATURE_METHODS
@property
def safe_characters(self):
return set(utils.UNICODE_ASCII_CHARACTER_SET)
@property
def client_key_length(self):
return 20, 30
@property
def request_token_length(self):
return 20, 30
@property
def access_token_length(self):
return 20, 30
@property
def timestamp_lifetime(self):
return 600
@property
def nonce_length(self):
return 20, 30
@property
def verifier_length(self):
return 20, 30
@property
def realms(self):
return []
@property
def enforce_ssl(self):
return True
def check_client_key(self, client_key):
"""Check that the client key only contains safe characters
and is no shorter than lower and no longer than upper.
"""
lower, upper = self.client_key_length
return (set(client_key) <= self.safe_characters and
lower <= len(client_key) <= upper)
def check_request_token(self, request_token):
"""Checks that the request token contains only safe characters
and is no shorter than lower and no longer than upper.
"""
lower, upper = self.request_token_length
return (set(request_token) <= self.safe_characters and
lower <= len(request_token) <= upper)
def check_access_token(self, request_token):
"""Checks that the token contains only safe characters
and is no shorter than lower and no longer than upper.
"""
lower, upper = self.access_token_length
return (set(request_token) <= self.safe_characters and
lower <= len(request_token) <= upper)
def check_nonce(self, nonce):
"""Checks that the nonce only contains only safe characters
and is no shorter than lower and no longer than upper.
"""
lower, upper = self.nonce_length
return (set(nonce) <= self.safe_characters and
lower <= len(nonce) <= upper)
def check_verifier(self, verifier):
"""Checks that the verifier contains only safe characters
and is no shorter than lower and no longer than upper.
"""
lower, upper = self.verifier_length
return (set(verifier) <= self.safe_characters and
lower <= len(verifier) <= upper)
def check_realms(self, realms):
"""Check that the realm is one of a set allowed realms."""
return all((r in self.realms for r in realms))
def _subclass_must_implement(self, fn):
"""
Returns a NotImplementedError for a function that should be implemented.
:param fn: name of the function
"""
m = "Missing function implementation in {}: {}".format(type(self), fn)
return NotImplementedError(m)
@property
def dummy_client(self):
"""Dummy client used when an invalid client key is supplied.
:returns: The dummy client key string.
The dummy client should be associated with either a client secret,
a rsa key or both depending on which signature methods are supported.
Providers should make sure that
get_client_secret(dummy_client)
get_rsa_key(dummy_client)
return a valid secret or key for the dummy client.
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
* RequestTokenEndpoint
* ResourceEndpoint
* SignatureOnlyEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("dummy_client")
@property
def dummy_request_token(self):
"""Dummy request token used when an invalid token was supplied.
:returns: The dummy request token string.
The dummy request token should be associated with a request token
secret such that get_request_token_secret(.., dummy_request_token)
returns a valid secret.
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("dummy_request_token")
@property
def dummy_access_token(self):
"""Dummy access token used when an invalid token was supplied.
:returns: The dummy access token string.
The dummy access token should be associated with an access token
secret such that get_access_token_secret(.., dummy_access_token)
returns a valid secret.
This method is used by
* ResourceEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("dummy_access_token")
def get_client_secret(self, client_key, request):
"""Retrieves the client secret associated with the client key.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: The client secret as a string.
This method must allow the use of a dummy client_key value.
Fetching the secret using the dummy key must take the same amount of
time as fetching a secret for a valid client::
# Unlikely to be near constant time as it uses two database
# lookups for a valid client, and only one for an invalid.
from your_datastore import ClientSecret
if ClientSecret.has(client_key):
return ClientSecret.get(client_key)
else:
return 'dummy'
# Aim to mimic number of latency inducing operations no matter
# whether the client is valid or not.
from your_datastore import ClientSecret
return ClientSecret.get(client_key, 'dummy')
Note that the returned key must be in plaintext.
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
* RequestTokenEndpoint
* ResourceEndpoint
* SignatureOnlyEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement('get_client_secret')
def get_request_token_secret(self, client_key, token, request):
"""Retrieves the shared secret associated with the request token.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param token: The request token string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: The token secret as a string.
This method must allow the use of a dummy values and the running time
must be roughly equivalent to that of the running time of valid values::
# Unlikely to be near constant time as it uses two database
# lookups for a valid client, and only one for an invalid.
from your_datastore import RequestTokenSecret
if RequestTokenSecret.has(client_key):
return RequestTokenSecret.get((client_key, request_token))
else:
return 'dummy'
# Aim to mimic number of latency inducing operations no matter
# whether the client is valid or not.
from your_datastore import RequestTokenSecret
return ClientSecret.get((client_key, request_token), 'dummy')
Note that the returned key must be in plaintext.
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement('get_request_token_secret')
def get_access_token_secret(self, client_key, token, request):
"""Retrieves the shared secret associated with the access token.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param token: The access token string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: The token secret as a string.
This method must allow the use of a dummy values and the running time
must be roughly equivalent to that of the running time of valid values::
# Unlikely to be near constant time as it uses two database
# lookups for a valid client, and only one for an invalid.
from your_datastore import AccessTokenSecret
if AccessTokenSecret.has(client_key):
return AccessTokenSecret.get((client_key, request_token))
else:
return 'dummy'
# Aim to mimic number of latency inducing operations no matter
# whether the client is valid or not.
from your_datastore import AccessTokenSecret
return ClientSecret.get((client_key, request_token), 'dummy')
Note that the returned key must be in plaintext.
This method is used by
* ResourceEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("get_access_token_secret")
def get_default_realms(self, client_key, request):
"""Get the default realms for a client.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: The list of default realms associated with the client.
The list of default realms will be set during client registration and
is outside the scope of OAuthLib.
This method is used by
* RequestTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("get_default_realms")
def get_realms(self, token, request):
"""Get realms associated with a request token.
:param token: The request token string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: The list of realms associated with the request token.
This method is used by
* AuthorizationEndpoint
* AccessTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("get_realms")
def get_redirect_uri(self, token, request):
"""Get the redirect URI associated with a request token.
:param token: The request token string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: The redirect URI associated with the request token.
It may be desirable to return a custom URI if the redirect is set to "oob".
In this case, the user will be redirected to the returned URI and at that
endpoint the verifier can be displayed.
This method is used by
* AuthorizationEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("get_redirect_uri")
def get_rsa_key(self, client_key, request):
"""Retrieves a previously stored client provided RSA key.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: The rsa public key as a string.
This method must allow the use of a dummy client_key value. Fetching
the rsa key using the dummy key must take the same amount of time
as fetching a key for a valid client. The dummy key must also be of
the same bit length as client keys.
Note that the key must be returned in plaintext.
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
* RequestTokenEndpoint
* ResourceEndpoint
* SignatureOnlyEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("get_rsa_key")
def invalidate_request_token(self, client_key, request_token, request):
"""Invalidates a used request token.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param request_token: The request token string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: None
Per `Section 2.3`__ of the spec:
"The server MUST (...) ensure that the temporary
credentials have not expired or been used before."
.. _`Section 2.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-2.3
This method should ensure that provided token won't validate anymore.
It can be simply removing RequestToken from storage or setting
specific flag that makes it invalid (note that such flag should be
also validated during request token validation).
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("invalidate_request_token")
def validate_client_key(self, client_key, request):
"""Validates that supplied client key is a registered and valid client.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: True or False
Note that if the dummy client is supplied it should validate in same
or nearly the same amount of time as a valid one.
Ensure latency inducing tasks are mimiced even for dummy clients.
For example, use::
from your_datastore import Client
try:
return Client.exists(client_key, access_token)
except DoesNotExist:
return False
Rather than::
from your_datastore import Client
if access_token == self.dummy_access_token:
return False
else:
return Client.exists(client_key, access_token)
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
* RequestTokenEndpoint
* ResourceEndpoint
* SignatureOnlyEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("validate_client_key")
def validate_request_token(self, client_key, token, request):
"""Validates that supplied request token is registered and valid.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param token: The request token string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: True or False
Note that if the dummy request_token is supplied it should validate in
the same nearly the same amount of time as a valid one.
Ensure latency inducing tasks are mimiced even for dummy clients.
For example, use::
from your_datastore import RequestToken
try:
return RequestToken.exists(client_key, access_token)
except DoesNotExist:
return False
Rather than::
from your_datastore import RequestToken
if access_token == self.dummy_access_token:
return False
else:
return RequestToken.exists(client_key, access_token)
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("validate_request_token")
def validate_access_token(self, client_key, token, request):
"""Validates that supplied access token is registered and valid.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param token: The access token string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: True or False
Note that if the dummy access token is supplied it should validate in
the same or nearly the same amount of time as a valid one.
Ensure latency inducing tasks are mimiced even for dummy clients.
For example, use::
from your_datastore import AccessToken
try:
return AccessToken.exists(client_key, access_token)
except DoesNotExist:
return False
Rather than::
from your_datastore import AccessToken
if access_token == self.dummy_access_token:
return False
else:
return AccessToken.exists(client_key, access_token)
This method is used by
* ResourceEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("validate_access_token")
def validate_timestamp_and_nonce(self, client_key, timestamp, nonce,
request, request_token=None, access_token=None):
"""Validates that the nonce has not been used before.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param timestamp: The ``oauth_timestamp`` parameter.
:param nonce: The ``oauth_nonce`` parameter.
:param request_token: Request token string, if any.
:param access_token: Access token string, if any.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: True or False
Per `Section 3.3`_ of the spec.
"A nonce is a random string, uniquely generated by the client to allow
the server to verify that a request has never been made before and
helps prevent replay attacks when requests are made over a non-secure
channel. The nonce value MUST be unique across all requests with the
same timestamp, client credentials, and token combinations."
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.3
One of the first validation checks that will be made is for the validity
of the nonce and timestamp, which are associated with a client key and
possibly a token. If invalid then immediately fail the request
by returning False. If the nonce/timestamp pair has been used before and
you may just have detected a replay attack. Therefore it is an essential
part of OAuth security that you not allow nonce/timestamp reuse.
Note that this validation check is done before checking the validity of
the client and token.::
nonces_and_timestamps_database = [
(u'foo', 1234567890, u'rannoMstrInghere', u'bar')
]
def validate_timestamp_and_nonce(self, client_key, timestamp, nonce,
request_token=None, access_token=None):
return ((client_key, timestamp, nonce, request_token or access_token)
not in self.nonces_and_timestamps_database)
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
* RequestTokenEndpoint
* ResourceEndpoint
* SignatureOnlyEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("validate_timestamp_and_nonce")
def validate_redirect_uri(self, client_key, redirect_uri, request):
"""Validates the client supplied redirection URI.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param redirect_uri: The URI the client which to redirect back to after
authorization is successful.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: True or False
It is highly recommended that OAuth providers require their clients
to register all redirection URIs prior to using them in requests and
register them as absolute URIs. See `CWE-601`_ for more information
about open redirection attacks.
By requiring registration of all redirection URIs it should be
straightforward for the provider to verify whether the supplied
redirect_uri is valid or not.
Alternatively per `Section 2.1`_ of the spec:
"If the client is unable to receive callbacks or a callback URI has
been established via other means, the parameter value MUST be set to
"oob" (case sensitive), to indicate an out-of-band configuration."
.. _`CWE-601`: http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html#CWE-601
.. _`Section 2.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-2.1
This method is used by
* RequestTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("validate_redirect_uri")
def validate_requested_realms(self, client_key, realms, request):
"""Validates that the client may request access to the realm.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param realms: The list of realms that client is requesting access to.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: True or False
This method is invoked when obtaining a request token and should
tie a realm to the request token and after user authorization
this realm restriction should transfer to the access token.
This method is used by
* RequestTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("validate_requested_realms")
def validate_realms(self, client_key, token, request, uri=None,
realms=None):
"""Validates access to the request realm.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param token: A request token string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param uri: The URI the realms is protecting.
:param realms: A list of realms that must have been granted to
the access token.
:returns: True or False
How providers choose to use the realm parameter is outside the OAuth
specification but it is commonly used to restrict access to a subset
of protected resources such as "photos".
realms is a convenience parameter which can be used to provide
a per view method pre-defined list of allowed realms.
Can be as simple as::
from your_datastore import RequestToken
request_token = RequestToken.get(token, None)
if not request_token:
return False
return set(request_token.realms).issuperset(set(realms))
This method is used by
* ResourceEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("validate_realms")
def validate_verifier(self, client_key, token, verifier, request):
"""Validates a verification code.
:param client_key: The client/consumer key.
:param token: A request token string.
:param verifier: The authorization verifier string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: True or False
OAuth providers issue a verification code to clients after the
resource owner authorizes access. This code is used by the client to
obtain token credentials and the provider must verify that the
verifier is valid and associated with the client as well as the
resource owner.
Verifier validation should be done in near constant time
(to avoid verifier enumeration). To achieve this we need a
constant time string comparison which is provided by OAuthLib
in ``oauthlib.common.safe_string_equals``::
from your_datastore import Verifier
correct_verifier = Verifier.get(client_key, request_token)
from oauthlib.common import safe_string_equals
return safe_string_equals(verifier, correct_verifier)
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("validate_verifier")
def verify_request_token(self, token, request):
"""Verify that the given OAuth1 request token is valid.
:param token: A request token string.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: True or False
This method is used only in AuthorizationEndpoint to check whether the
oauth_token given in the authorization URL is valid or not.
This request is not signed and thus similar ``validate_request_token``
method can not be used.
This method is used by
* AuthorizationEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("verify_request_token")
def verify_realms(self, token, realms, request):
"""Verify authorized realms to see if they match those given to token.
:param token: An access token string.
:param realms: A list of realms the client attempts to access.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:returns: True or False
This prevents the list of authorized realms sent by the client during
the authorization step to be altered to include realms outside what
was bound with the request token.
Can be as simple as::
valid_realms = self.get_realms(token)
return all((r in valid_realms for r in realms))
This method is used by
* AuthorizationEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("verify_realms")
def save_access_token(self, token, request):
"""Save an OAuth1 access token.
:param token: A dict with token credentials.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
The token dictionary will at minimum include
* ``oauth_token`` the access token string.
* ``oauth_token_secret`` the token specific secret used in signing.
* ``oauth_authorized_realms`` a space separated list of realms.
Client key can be obtained from ``request.client_key``.
The list of realms (not joined string) can be obtained from
``request.realm``.
This method is used by
* AccessTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("save_access_token")
def save_request_token(self, token, request):
"""Save an OAuth1 request token.
:param token: A dict with token credentials.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
The token dictionary will at minimum include
* ``oauth_token`` the request token string.
* ``oauth_token_secret`` the token specific secret used in signing.
* ``oauth_callback_confirmed`` the string ``true``.
Client key can be obtained from ``request.client_key``.
This method is used by
* RequestTokenEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("save_request_token")
def save_verifier(self, token, verifier, request):
"""Associate an authorization verifier with a request token.
:param token: A request token string.
:param verifier A dictionary containing the oauth_verifier and
oauth_token
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
We need to associate verifiers with tokens for validation during the
access token request.
Note that unlike save_x_token token here is the ``oauth_token`` token
string from the request token saved previously.
This method is used by
* AuthorizationEndpoint
"""
raise self._subclass_must_implement("save_verifier")

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@ -0,0 +1,743 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.signature
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module represents a direct implementation of `section 3.4`_ of the spec.
Terminology:
* Client: software interfacing with an OAuth API
* Server: the API provider
* Resource Owner: the user who is granting authorization to the client
Steps for signing a request:
1. Collect parameters from the uri query, auth header, & body
2. Normalize those parameters
3. Normalize the uri
4. Pass the normalized uri, normalized parameters, and http method to
construct the base string
5. Pass the base string and any keys needed to a signing function
.. _`section 3.4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import binascii
import hashlib
import hmac
import logging
from oauthlib.common import (extract_params, safe_string_equals,
unicode_type, urldecode)
from . import utils
try:
import urlparse
except ImportError:
import urllib.parse as urlparse
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def signature_base_string(http_method, base_str_uri,
normalized_encoded_request_parameters):
"""**Construct the signature base string.**
Per `section 3.4.1.1`_ of the spec.
For example, the HTTP request::
POST /request?b5=%3D%253D&a3=a&c%40=&a2=r%20b HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%3D"
c2&a3=2+q
is represented by the following signature base string (line breaks
are for display purposes only)::
POST&http%3A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Frequest&a2%3Dr%2520b%26a3%3D2%2520q
%26a3%3Da%26b5%3D%253D%25253D%26c%2540%3D%26c2%3D%26oauth_consumer_
key%3D9djdj82h48djs9d2%26oauth_nonce%3D7d8f3e4a%26oauth_signature_m
ethod%3DHMAC-SHA1%26oauth_timestamp%3D137131201%26oauth_token%3Dkkk
9d7dh3k39sjv7
.. _`section 3.4.1.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.1
"""
# The signature base string is constructed by concatenating together,
# in order, the following HTTP request elements:
# 1. The HTTP request method in uppercase. For example: "HEAD",
# "GET", "POST", etc. If the request uses a custom HTTP method, it
# MUST be encoded (`Section 3.6`_).
#
# .. _`Section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
base_string = utils.escape(http_method.upper())
# 2. An "&" character (ASCII code 38).
base_string += '&'
# 3. The base string URI from `Section 3.4.1.2`_, after being encoded
# (`Section 3.6`_).
#
# .. _`Section 3.4.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.2
# .. _`Section 3.4.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.6
base_string += utils.escape(base_str_uri)
# 4. An "&" character (ASCII code 38).
base_string += '&'
# 5. The request parameters as normalized in `Section 3.4.1.3.2`_, after
# being encoded (`Section 3.6`).
#
# .. _`Section 3.4.1.3.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.3.2
# .. _`Section 3.4.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.6
base_string += utils.escape(normalized_encoded_request_parameters)
return base_string
def base_string_uri(uri, host=None):
"""**Base String URI**
Per `section 3.4.1.2`_ of RFC 5849.
For example, the HTTP request::
GET /r%20v/X?id=123 HTTP/1.1
Host: EXAMPLE.COM:80
is represented by the base string URI: "http://example.com/r%20v/X".
In another example, the HTTPS request::
GET /?q=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.net:8080
is represented by the base string URI: "https://www.example.net:8080/".
.. _`section 3.4.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.2
The host argument overrides the netloc part of the uri argument.
"""
if not isinstance(uri, unicode_type):
raise ValueError('uri must be a unicode object.')
# FIXME: urlparse does not support unicode
scheme, netloc, path, params, query, fragment = urlparse.urlparse(uri)
# The scheme, authority, and path of the request resource URI `RFC3986`
# are included by constructing an "http" or "https" URI representing
# the request resource (without the query or fragment) as follows:
#
# .. _`RFC3986`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986
if not scheme or not netloc:
raise ValueError('uri must include a scheme and netloc')
# Per `RFC 2616 section 5.1.2`_:
#
# Note that the absolute path cannot be empty; if none is present in
# the original URI, it MUST be given as "/" (the server root).
#
# .. _`RFC 2616 section 5.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616#section-5.1.2
if not path:
path = '/'
# 1. The scheme and host MUST be in lowercase.
scheme = scheme.lower()
netloc = netloc.lower()
# 2. The host and port values MUST match the content of the HTTP
# request "Host" header field.
if host is not None:
netloc = host.lower()
# 3. The port MUST be included if it is not the default port for the
# scheme, and MUST be excluded if it is the default. Specifically,
# the port MUST be excluded when making an HTTP request `RFC2616`_
# to port 80 or when making an HTTPS request `RFC2818`_ to port 443.
# All other non-default port numbers MUST be included.
#
# .. _`RFC2616`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616
# .. _`RFC2818`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818
default_ports = (
('http', '80'),
('https', '443'),
)
if ':' in netloc:
host, port = netloc.split(':', 1)
if (scheme, port) in default_ports:
netloc = host
v = urlparse.urlunparse((scheme, netloc, path, params, '', ''))
# RFC 5849 does not specify which characters are encoded in the
# "base string URI", nor how they are encoded - which is very bad, since
# the signatures won't match if there are any differences. Fortunately,
# most URIs only use characters that are clearly not encoded (e.g. digits
# and A-Z, a-z), so have avoided any differences between implementations.
#
# The example from its section 3.4.1.2 illustrates that spaces in
# the path are percent encoded. But it provides no guidance as to what other
# characters (if any) must be encoded (nor how); nor if characters in the
# other components are to be encoded or not.
#
# This implementation **assumes** that **only** the space is percent-encoded
# and it is done to the entire value (not just to spaces in the path).
#
# This code may need to be changed if it is discovered that other characters
# are expected to be encoded.
#
# Note: the "base string URI" returned by this function will be encoded
# again before being concatenated into the "signature base string". So any
# spaces in the URI will actually appear in the "signature base string"
# as "%2520" (the "%20" further encoded according to section 3.6).
return v.replace(' ', '%20')
# ** Request Parameters **
#
# Per `section 3.4.1.3`_ of the spec.
#
# In order to guarantee a consistent and reproducible representation of
# the request parameters, the parameters are collected and decoded to
# their original decoded form. They are then sorted and encoded in a
# particular manner that is often different from their original
# encoding scheme, and concatenated into a single string.
#
# .. _`section 3.4.1.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.3
def collect_parameters(uri_query='', body=[], headers=None,
exclude_oauth_signature=True, with_realm=False):
"""**Parameter Sources**
Parameters starting with `oauth_` will be unescaped.
Body parameters must be supplied as a dict, a list of 2-tuples, or a
formencoded query string.
Headers must be supplied as a dict.
Per `section 3.4.1.3.1`_ of the spec.
For example, the HTTP request::
POST /request?b5=%3D%253D&a3=a&c%40=&a2=r%20b HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="djosJKDKJSD8743243%2Fjdk33klY%3D"
c2&a3=2+q
contains the following (fully decoded) parameters used in the
signature base sting::
+------------------------+------------------+
| Name | Value |
+------------------------+------------------+
| b5 | =%3D |
| a3 | a |
| c@ | |
| a2 | r b |
| oauth_consumer_key | 9djdj82h48djs9d2 |
| oauth_token | kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7 |
| oauth_signature_method | HMAC-SHA1 |
| oauth_timestamp | 137131201 |
| oauth_nonce | 7d8f3e4a |
| c2 | |
| a3 | 2 q |
+------------------------+------------------+
Note that the value of "b5" is "=%3D" and not "==". Both "c@" and
"c2" have empty values. While the encoding rules specified in this
specification for the purpose of constructing the signature base
string exclude the use of a "+" character (ASCII code 43) to
represent an encoded space character (ASCII code 32), this practice
is widely used in "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" encoded values,
and MUST be properly decoded, as demonstrated by one of the "a3"
parameter instances (the "a3" parameter is used twice in this
request).
.. _`section 3.4.1.3.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.3.1
"""
headers = headers or {}
params = []
# The parameters from the following sources are collected into a single
# list of name/value pairs:
# * The query component of the HTTP request URI as defined by
# `RFC3986, Section 3.4`_. The query component is parsed into a list
# of name/value pairs by treating it as an
# "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" string, separating the names
# and values and decoding them as defined by
# `W3C.REC-html40-19980424`_, Section 17.13.4.
#
# .. _`RFC3986, Section 3.4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.4
# .. _`W3C.REC-html40-19980424`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#ref-W3C.REC-html40-19980424
if uri_query:
params.extend(urldecode(uri_query))
# * The OAuth HTTP "Authorization" header field (`Section 3.5.1`_) if
# present. The header's content is parsed into a list of name/value
# pairs excluding the "realm" parameter if present. The parameter
# values are decoded as defined by `Section 3.5.1`_.
#
# .. _`Section 3.5.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.5.1
if headers:
headers_lower = dict((k.lower(), v) for k, v in headers.items())
authorization_header = headers_lower.get('authorization')
if authorization_header is not None:
params.extend([i for i in utils.parse_authorization_header(
authorization_header) if with_realm or i[0] != 'realm'])
# * The HTTP request entity-body, but only if all of the following
# conditions are met:
# * The entity-body is single-part.
#
# * The entity-body follows the encoding requirements of the
# "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" content-type as defined by
# `W3C.REC-html40-19980424`_.
# * The HTTP request entity-header includes the "Content-Type"
# header field set to "application/x-www-form-urlencoded".
#
# .._`W3C.REC-html40-19980424`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#ref-W3C.REC-html40-19980424
# TODO: enforce header param inclusion conditions
bodyparams = extract_params(body) or []
params.extend(bodyparams)
# ensure all oauth params are unescaped
unescaped_params = []
for k, v in params:
if k.startswith('oauth_'):
v = utils.unescape(v)
unescaped_params.append((k, v))
# The "oauth_signature" parameter MUST be excluded from the signature
# base string if present.
if exclude_oauth_signature:
unescaped_params = list(filter(lambda i: i[0] != 'oauth_signature',
unescaped_params))
return unescaped_params
def normalize_parameters(params):
"""**Parameters Normalization**
Per `section 3.4.1.3.2`_ of the spec.
For example, the list of parameters from the previous section would
be normalized as follows:
Encoded::
+------------------------+------------------+
| Name | Value |
+------------------------+------------------+
| b5 | %3D%253D |
| a3 | a |
| c%40 | |
| a2 | r%20b |
| oauth_consumer_key | 9djdj82h48djs9d2 |
| oauth_token | kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7 |
| oauth_signature_method | HMAC-SHA1 |
| oauth_timestamp | 137131201 |
| oauth_nonce | 7d8f3e4a |
| c2 | |
| a3 | 2%20q |
+------------------------+------------------+
Sorted::
+------------------------+------------------+
| Name | Value |
+------------------------+------------------+
| a2 | r%20b |
| a3 | 2%20q |
| a3 | a |
| b5 | %3D%253D |
| c%40 | |
| c2 | |
| oauth_consumer_key | 9djdj82h48djs9d2 |
| oauth_nonce | 7d8f3e4a |
| oauth_signature_method | HMAC-SHA1 |
| oauth_timestamp | 137131201 |
| oauth_token | kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7 |
+------------------------+------------------+
Concatenated Pairs::
+-------------------------------------+
| Name=Value |
+-------------------------------------+
| a2=r%20b |
| a3=2%20q |
| a3=a |
| b5=%3D%253D |
| c%40= |
| c2= |
| oauth_consumer_key=9djdj82h48djs9d2 |
| oauth_nonce=7d8f3e4a |
| oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1 |
| oauth_timestamp=137131201 |
| oauth_token=kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7 |
+-------------------------------------+
and concatenated together into a single string (line breaks are for
display purposes only)::
a2=r%20b&a3=2%20q&a3=a&b5=%3D%253D&c%40=&c2=&oauth_consumer_key=9dj
dj82h48djs9d2&oauth_nonce=7d8f3e4a&oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1
&oauth_timestamp=137131201&oauth_token=kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7
.. _`section 3.4.1.3.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.3.2
"""
# The parameters collected in `Section 3.4.1.3`_ are normalized into a
# single string as follows:
#
# .. _`Section 3.4.1.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.3
# 1. First, the name and value of each parameter are encoded
# (`Section 3.6`_).
#
# .. _`Section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
key_values = [(utils.escape(k), utils.escape(v)) for k, v in params]
# 2. The parameters are sorted by name, using ascending byte value
# ordering. If two or more parameters share the same name, they
# are sorted by their value.
key_values.sort()
# 3. The name of each parameter is concatenated to its corresponding
# value using an "=" character (ASCII code 61) as a separator, even
# if the value is empty.
parameter_parts = ['{0}={1}'.format(k, v) for k, v in key_values]
# 4. The sorted name/value pairs are concatenated together into a
# single string by using an "&" character (ASCII code 38) as
# separator.
return '&'.join(parameter_parts)
def sign_hmac_sha1_with_client(base_string, client):
return sign_hmac_sha1(base_string,
client.client_secret,
client.resource_owner_secret
)
def sign_hmac_sha1(base_string, client_secret, resource_owner_secret):
"""**HMAC-SHA1**
The "HMAC-SHA1" signature method uses the HMAC-SHA1 signature
algorithm as defined in `RFC2104`_::
digest = HMAC-SHA1 (key, text)
Per `section 3.4.2`_ of the spec.
.. _`RFC2104`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2104
.. _`section 3.4.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2
"""
# The HMAC-SHA1 function variables are used in following way:
# text is set to the value of the signature base string from
# `Section 3.4.1.1`_.
#
# .. _`Section 3.4.1.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.1
text = base_string
# key is set to the concatenated values of:
# 1. The client shared-secret, after being encoded (`Section 3.6`_).
#
# .. _`Section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
key = utils.escape(client_secret or '')
# 2. An "&" character (ASCII code 38), which MUST be included
# even when either secret is empty.
key += '&'
# 3. The token shared-secret, after being encoded (`Section 3.6`_).
#
# .. _`Section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
key += utils.escape(resource_owner_secret or '')
# FIXME: HMAC does not support unicode!
key_utf8 = key.encode('utf-8')
text_utf8 = text.encode('utf-8')
signature = hmac.new(key_utf8, text_utf8, hashlib.sha1)
# digest is used to set the value of the "oauth_signature" protocol
# parameter, after the result octet string is base64-encoded
# per `RFC2045, Section 6.8`.
#
# .. _`RFC2045, Section 6.8`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2045#section-6.8
return binascii.b2a_base64(signature.digest())[:-1].decode('utf-8')
def sign_hmac_sha256_with_client(base_string, client):
return sign_hmac_sha256(base_string,
client.client_secret,
client.resource_owner_secret
)
def sign_hmac_sha256(base_string, client_secret, resource_owner_secret):
"""**HMAC-SHA256**
The "HMAC-SHA256" signature method uses the HMAC-SHA256 signature
algorithm as defined in `RFC4634`_::
digest = HMAC-SHA256 (key, text)
Per `section 3.4.2`_ of the spec.
.. _`RFC4634`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4634
.. _`section 3.4.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.2
"""
# The HMAC-SHA256 function variables are used in following way:
# text is set to the value of the signature base string from
# `Section 3.4.1.1`_.
#
# .. _`Section 3.4.1.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.1.1
text = base_string
# key is set to the concatenated values of:
# 1. The client shared-secret, after being encoded (`Section 3.6`_).
#
# .. _`Section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
key = utils.escape(client_secret or '')
# 2. An "&" character (ASCII code 38), which MUST be included
# even when either secret is empty.
key += '&'
# 3. The token shared-secret, after being encoded (`Section 3.6`_).
#
# .. _`Section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
key += utils.escape(resource_owner_secret or '')
# FIXME: HMAC does not support unicode!
key_utf8 = key.encode('utf-8')
text_utf8 = text.encode('utf-8')
signature = hmac.new(key_utf8, text_utf8, hashlib.sha256)
# digest is used to set the value of the "oauth_signature" protocol
# parameter, after the result octet string is base64-encoded
# per `RFC2045, Section 6.8`.
#
# .. _`RFC2045, Section 6.8`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2045#section-6.8
return binascii.b2a_base64(signature.digest())[:-1].decode('utf-8')
_jwtrs1 = None
#jwt has some nice pycrypto/cryptography abstractions
def _jwt_rs1_signing_algorithm():
global _jwtrs1
if _jwtrs1 is None:
import jwt.algorithms as jwtalgo
_jwtrs1 = jwtalgo.RSAAlgorithm(jwtalgo.hashes.SHA1)
return _jwtrs1
def sign_rsa_sha1(base_string, rsa_private_key):
"""**RSA-SHA1**
Per `section 3.4.3`_ of the spec.
The "RSA-SHA1" signature method uses the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature
algorithm as defined in `RFC3447, Section 8.2`_ (also known as
PKCS#1), using SHA-1 as the hash function for EMSA-PKCS1-v1_5. To
use this method, the client MUST have established client credentials
with the server that included its RSA public key (in a manner that is
beyond the scope of this specification).
.. _`section 3.4.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3
.. _`RFC3447, Section 8.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3447#section-8.2
"""
if isinstance(base_string, unicode_type):
base_string = base_string.encode('utf-8')
# TODO: finish RSA documentation
alg = _jwt_rs1_signing_algorithm()
key = _prepare_key_plus(alg, rsa_private_key)
s=alg.sign(base_string, key)
return binascii.b2a_base64(s)[:-1].decode('utf-8')
def sign_rsa_sha1_with_client(base_string, client):
if not client.rsa_key:
raise ValueError('rsa_key is required when using RSA signature method.')
return sign_rsa_sha1(base_string, client.rsa_key)
def sign_plaintext(client_secret, resource_owner_secret):
"""Sign a request using plaintext.
Per `section 3.4.4`_ of the spec.
The "PLAINTEXT" method does not employ a signature algorithm. It
MUST be used with a transport-layer mechanism such as TLS or SSL (or
sent over a secure channel with equivalent protections). It does not
utilize the signature base string or the "oauth_timestamp" and
"oauth_nonce" parameters.
.. _`section 3.4.4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.4
"""
# The "oauth_signature" protocol parameter is set to the concatenated
# value of:
# 1. The client shared-secret, after being encoded (`Section 3.6`_).
#
# .. _`Section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
signature = utils.escape(client_secret or '')
# 2. An "&" character (ASCII code 38), which MUST be included even
# when either secret is empty.
signature += '&'
# 3. The token shared-secret, after being encoded (`Section 3.6`_).
#
# .. _`Section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
signature += utils.escape(resource_owner_secret or '')
return signature
def sign_plaintext_with_client(base_string, client):
return sign_plaintext(client.client_secret, client.resource_owner_secret)
def verify_hmac_sha1(request, client_secret=None,
resource_owner_secret=None):
"""Verify a HMAC-SHA1 signature.
Per `section 3.4`_ of the spec.
.. _`section 3.4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4
To satisfy `RFC2616 section 5.2`_ item 1, the request argument's uri
attribute MUST be an absolute URI whose netloc part identifies the
origin server or gateway on which the resource resides. Any Host
item of the request argument's headers dict attribute will be
ignored.
.. _`RFC2616 section 5.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616#section-5.2
"""
norm_params = normalize_parameters(request.params)
bs_uri = base_string_uri(request.uri)
sig_base_str = signature_base_string(request.http_method, bs_uri,
norm_params)
signature = sign_hmac_sha1(sig_base_str, client_secret,
resource_owner_secret)
match = safe_string_equals(signature, request.signature)
if not match:
log.debug('Verify HMAC-SHA1 failed: signature base string: %s',
sig_base_str)
return match
def verify_hmac_sha256(request, client_secret=None,
resource_owner_secret=None):
"""Verify a HMAC-SHA256 signature.
Per `section 3.4`_ of the spec.
.. _`section 3.4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4
To satisfy `RFC2616 section 5.2`_ item 1, the request argument's uri
attribute MUST be an absolute URI whose netloc part identifies the
origin server or gateway on which the resource resides. Any Host
item of the request argument's headers dict attribute will be
ignored.
.. _`RFC2616 section 5.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616#section-5.2
"""
norm_params = normalize_parameters(request.params)
bs_uri = base_string_uri(request.uri)
sig_base_str = signature_base_string(request.http_method, bs_uri,
norm_params)
signature = sign_hmac_sha256(sig_base_str, client_secret,
resource_owner_secret)
match = safe_string_equals(signature, request.signature)
if not match:
log.debug('Verify HMAC-SHA256 failed: signature base string: %s',
sig_base_str)
return match
def _prepare_key_plus(alg, keystr):
if isinstance(keystr, bytes):
keystr = keystr.decode('utf-8')
return alg.prepare_key(keystr)
def verify_rsa_sha1(request, rsa_public_key):
"""Verify a RSASSA-PKCS #1 v1.5 base64 encoded signature.
Per `section 3.4.3`_ of the spec.
Note this method requires the jwt and cryptography libraries.
.. _`section 3.4.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4.3
To satisfy `RFC2616 section 5.2`_ item 1, the request argument's uri
attribute MUST be an absolute URI whose netloc part identifies the
origin server or gateway on which the resource resides. Any Host
item of the request argument's headers dict attribute will be
ignored.
.. _`RFC2616 section 5.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2616#section-5.2
"""
norm_params = normalize_parameters(request.params)
bs_uri = base_string_uri(request.uri)
sig_base_str = signature_base_string(request.http_method, bs_uri,
norm_params).encode('utf-8')
sig = binascii.a2b_base64(request.signature.encode('utf-8'))
alg = _jwt_rs1_signing_algorithm()
key = _prepare_key_plus(alg, rsa_public_key)
verify_ok = alg.verify(sig_base_str, key, sig)
if not verify_ok:
log.debug('Verify RSA-SHA1 failed: signature base string: %s',
sig_base_str)
return verify_ok
def verify_plaintext(request, client_secret=None, resource_owner_secret=None):
"""Verify a PLAINTEXT signature.
Per `section 3.4`_ of the spec.
.. _`section 3.4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.4
"""
signature = sign_plaintext(client_secret, resource_owner_secret)
match = safe_string_equals(signature, request.signature)
if not match:
log.debug('Verify PLAINTEXT failed')
return match

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.utils
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module contains utility methods used by various parts of the OAuth
spec.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.common import quote, unicode_type, unquote
try:
import urllib2
except ImportError:
import urllib.request as urllib2
UNICODE_ASCII_CHARACTER_SET = ('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
'0123456789')
def filter_params(target):
"""Decorator which filters params to remove non-oauth_* parameters
Assumes the decorated method takes a params dict or list of tuples as its
first argument.
"""
def wrapper(params, *args, **kwargs):
params = filter_oauth_params(params)
return target(params, *args, **kwargs)
wrapper.__doc__ = target.__doc__
return wrapper
def filter_oauth_params(params):
"""Removes all non oauth parameters from a dict or a list of params."""
is_oauth = lambda kv: kv[0].startswith("oauth_")
if isinstance(params, dict):
return list(filter(is_oauth, list(params.items())))
else:
return list(filter(is_oauth, params))
def escape(u):
"""Escape a unicode string in an OAuth-compatible fashion.
Per `section 3.6`_ of the spec.
.. _`section 3.6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5849#section-3.6
"""
if not isinstance(u, unicode_type):
raise ValueError('Only unicode objects are escapable. ' +
'Got %r of type %s.' % (u, type(u)))
# Letters, digits, and the characters '_.-' are already treated as safe
# by urllib.quote(). We need to add '~' to fully support rfc5849.
return quote(u, safe=b'~')
def unescape(u):
if not isinstance(u, unicode_type):
raise ValueError('Only unicode objects are unescapable.')
return unquote(u)
def parse_keqv_list(l):
"""A unicode-safe version of urllib2.parse_keqv_list"""
# With Python 2.6, parse_http_list handles unicode fine
return urllib2.parse_keqv_list(l)
def parse_http_list(u):
"""A unicode-safe version of urllib2.parse_http_list"""
# With Python 2.6, parse_http_list handles unicode fine
return urllib2.parse_http_list(u)
def parse_authorization_header(authorization_header):
"""Parse an OAuth authorization header into a list of 2-tuples"""
auth_scheme = 'OAuth '.lower()
if authorization_header[:len(auth_scheme)].lower().startswith(auth_scheme):
items = parse_http_list(authorization_header[len(auth_scheme):])
try:
return list(parse_keqv_list(items).items())
except (IndexError, ValueError):
pass
raise ValueError('Malformed authorization header')

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is a wrapper for the most recent implementation of OAuth 2.0 Client
and Server classes.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from .rfc6749.clients import Client
from .rfc6749.clients import WebApplicationClient
from .rfc6749.clients import MobileApplicationClient
from .rfc6749.clients import LegacyApplicationClient
from .rfc6749.clients import BackendApplicationClient
from .rfc6749.clients import ServiceApplicationClient
from .rfc6749.endpoints import AuthorizationEndpoint
from .rfc6749.endpoints import IntrospectEndpoint
from .rfc6749.endpoints import MetadataEndpoint
from .rfc6749.endpoints import TokenEndpoint
from .rfc6749.endpoints import ResourceEndpoint
from .rfc6749.endpoints import RevocationEndpoint
from .rfc6749.endpoints import Server
from .rfc6749.endpoints import WebApplicationServer
from .rfc6749.endpoints import MobileApplicationServer
from .rfc6749.endpoints import LegacyApplicationServer
from .rfc6749.endpoints import BackendApplicationServer
from .rfc6749.errors import AccessDeniedError, OAuth2Error, FatalClientError, InsecureTransportError, InvalidClientError, InvalidClientIdError, InvalidGrantError, InvalidRedirectURIError, InvalidRequestError, InvalidRequestFatalError, InvalidScopeError, MismatchingRedirectURIError, MismatchingStateError, MissingClientIdError, MissingCodeError, MissingRedirectURIError, MissingResponseTypeError, MissingTokenError, MissingTokenTypeError, ServerError, TemporarilyUnavailableError, TokenExpiredError, UnauthorizedClientError, UnsupportedGrantTypeError, UnsupportedResponseTypeError, UnsupportedTokenTypeError
from .rfc6749.grant_types import AuthorizationCodeGrant
from .rfc6749.grant_types import ImplicitGrant
from .rfc6749.grant_types import ResourceOwnerPasswordCredentialsGrant
from .rfc6749.grant_types import ClientCredentialsGrant
from .rfc6749.grant_types import RefreshTokenGrant
from .rfc6749.request_validator import RequestValidator
from .rfc6749.tokens import BearerToken, OAuth2Token
from .rfc6749.utils import is_secure_transport

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import functools
import logging
from .endpoints.base import BaseEndpoint
from .endpoints.base import catch_errors_and_unavailability
from .errors import TemporarilyUnavailableError, ServerError
from .errors import FatalClientError, OAuth2Error
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from .base import Client, AUTH_HEADER, URI_QUERY, BODY
from .web_application import WebApplicationClient
from .mobile_application import MobileApplicationClient
from .legacy_application import LegacyApplicationClient
from .backend_application import BackendApplicationClient
from .service_application import ServiceApplicationClient

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from ..parameters import parse_token_response, prepare_token_request
from .base import Client
class BackendApplicationClient(Client):
"""A public client utilizing the client credentials grant workflow.
The client can request an access token using only its client
credentials (or other supported means of authentication) when the
client is requesting access to the protected resources under its
control, or those of another resource owner which has been previously
arranged with the authorization server (the method of which is beyond
the scope of this specification).
The client credentials grant type MUST only be used by confidential
clients.
Since the client authentication is used as the authorization grant,
no additional authorization request is needed.
"""
grant_type = 'client_credentials'
def prepare_request_body(self, body='', scope=None,
include_client_id=False, **kwargs):
"""Add the client credentials to the request body.
The client makes a request to the token endpoint by adding the
following parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
format per `Appendix B`_ in the HTTP request entity-body:
:param body: Existing request body (URL encoded string) to embed parameters
into. This may contain extra paramters. Default ''.
:param scope: The scope of the access request as described by
`Section 3.3`_.
:param include_client_id: `True` to send the `client_id` in the
body of the upstream request. This is required
if the client is not authenticating with the
authorization server as described in
`Section 3.2.1`_. False otherwise (default).
:type include_client_id: Boolean
:param kwargs: Extra credentials to include in the token request.
The client MUST authenticate with the authorization server as
described in `Section 3.2.1`_.
The prepared body will include all provided credentials as well as
the ``grant_type`` parameter set to ``client_credentials``::
>>> from oauthlib.oauth2 import BackendApplicationClient
>>> client = BackendApplicationClient('your_id')
>>> client.prepare_request_body(scope=['hello', 'world'])
'grant_type=client_credentials&scope=hello+world'
.. _`Appendix B`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`Section 3.2.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
"""
kwargs['client_id'] = self.client_id
kwargs['include_client_id'] = include_client_id
scope = self.scope if scope is None else scope
return prepare_token_request(self.grant_type, body=body,
scope=scope, **kwargs)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import time
import warnings
from oauthlib.common import generate_token
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749 import tokens
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.errors import (InsecureTransportError,
TokenExpiredError)
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.parameters import (parse_token_response,
prepare_token_request,
prepare_token_revocation_request)
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.utils import is_secure_transport
AUTH_HEADER = 'auth_header'
URI_QUERY = 'query'
BODY = 'body'
FORM_ENC_HEADERS = {
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
}
class Client(object):
"""Base OAuth2 client responsible for access token management.
This class also acts as a generic interface providing methods common to all
client types such as ``prepare_authorization_request`` and
``prepare_token_revocation_request``. The ``prepare_x_request`` methods are
the recommended way of interacting with clients (as opposed to the abstract
prepare uri/body/etc methods). They are recommended over the older set
because they are easier to use (more consistent) and add a few additional
security checks, such as HTTPS and state checking.
Some of these methods require further implementation only provided by the
specific purpose clients such as
:py:class:`oauthlib.oauth2.MobileApplicationClient` and thus you should always
seek to use the client class matching the OAuth workflow you need. For
Python, this is usually :py:class:`oauthlib.oauth2.WebApplicationClient`.
"""
refresh_token_key = 'refresh_token'
def __init__(self, client_id,
default_token_placement=AUTH_HEADER,
token_type='Bearer',
access_token=None,
refresh_token=None,
mac_key=None,
mac_algorithm=None,
token=None,
scope=None,
state=None,
redirect_url=None,
state_generator=generate_token,
**kwargs):
"""Initialize a client with commonly used attributes.
:param client_id: Client identifier given by the OAuth provider upon
registration.
:param default_token_placement: Tokens can be supplied in the Authorization
header (default), the URL query component (``query``) or the request
body (``body``).
:param token_type: OAuth 2 token type. Defaults to Bearer. Change this
if you specify the ``access_token`` parameter and know it is of a
different token type, such as a MAC, JWT or SAML token. Can
also be supplied as ``token_type`` inside the ``token`` dict parameter.
:param access_token: An access token (string) used to authenticate
requests to protected resources. Can also be supplied inside the
``token`` dict parameter.
:param refresh_token: A refresh token (string) used to refresh expired
tokens. Can also be supplied inside the ``token`` dict parameter.
:param mac_key: Encryption key used with MAC tokens.
:param mac_algorithm: Hashing algorithm for MAC tokens.
:param token: A dict of token attributes such as ``access_token``,
``token_type`` and ``expires_at``.
:param scope: A list of default scopes to request authorization for.
:param state: A CSRF protection string used during authorization.
:param redirect_url: The redirection endpoint on the client side to which
the user returns after authorization.
:param state_generator: A no argument state generation callable. Defaults
to :py:meth:`oauthlib.common.generate_token`.
"""
self.client_id = client_id
self.default_token_placement = default_token_placement
self.token_type = token_type
self.access_token = access_token
self.refresh_token = refresh_token
self.mac_key = mac_key
self.mac_algorithm = mac_algorithm
self.token = token or {}
self.scope = scope
self.state_generator = state_generator
self.state = state
self.redirect_url = redirect_url
self.code = None
self.expires_in = None
self._expires_at = None
self.populate_token_attributes(self.token)
@property
def token_types(self):
"""Supported token types and their respective methods
Additional tokens can be supported by extending this dictionary.
The Bearer token spec is stable and safe to use.
The MAC token spec is not yet stable and support for MAC tokens
is experimental and currently matching version 00 of the spec.
"""
return {
'Bearer': self._add_bearer_token,
'MAC': self._add_mac_token
}
def prepare_request_uri(self, *args, **kwargs):
"""Abstract method used to create request URIs."""
raise NotImplementedError("Must be implemented by inheriting classes.")
def prepare_request_body(self, *args, **kwargs):
"""Abstract method used to create request bodies."""
raise NotImplementedError("Must be implemented by inheriting classes.")
def parse_request_uri_response(self, *args, **kwargs):
"""Abstract method used to parse redirection responses."""
raise NotImplementedError("Must be implemented by inheriting classes.")
def add_token(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None, headers=None,
token_placement=None, **kwargs):
"""Add token to the request uri, body or authorization header.
The access token type provides the client with the information
required to successfully utilize the access token to make a protected
resource request (along with type-specific attributes). The client
MUST NOT use an access token if it does not understand the token
type.
For example, the "bearer" token type defined in
[`I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer`_] is utilized by simply including the access
token string in the request:
.. code-block:: http
GET /resource/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Authorization: Bearer mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM
while the "mac" token type defined in [`I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac`_] is
utilized by issuing a MAC key together with the access token which is
used to sign certain components of the HTTP requests:
.. code-block:: http
GET /resource/1 HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Authorization: MAC id="h480djs93hd8",
nonce="274312:dj83hs9s",
mac="kDZvddkndxvhGRXZhvuDjEWhGeE="
.. _`I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-bearer`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-12.2
.. _`I-D.ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-12.2
"""
if not is_secure_transport(uri):
raise InsecureTransportError()
token_placement = token_placement or self.default_token_placement
case_insensitive_token_types = dict(
(k.lower(), v) for k, v in self.token_types.items())
if not self.token_type.lower() in case_insensitive_token_types:
raise ValueError("Unsupported token type: %s" % self.token_type)
if not (self.access_token or self.token.get('access_token')):
raise ValueError("Missing access token.")
if self._expires_at and self._expires_at < time.time():
raise TokenExpiredError()
return case_insensitive_token_types[self.token_type.lower()](uri, http_method, body,
headers, token_placement, **kwargs)
def prepare_authorization_request(self, authorization_url, state=None,
redirect_url=None, scope=None, **kwargs):
"""Prepare the authorization request.
This is the first step in many OAuth flows in which the user is
redirected to a certain authorization URL. This method adds
required parameters to the authorization URL.
:param authorization_url: Provider authorization endpoint URL.
:param state: CSRF protection string. Will be automatically created if
not provided. The generated state is available via the ``state``
attribute. Clients should verify that the state is unchanged and
present in the authorization response. This verification is done
automatically if using the ``authorization_response`` parameter
with ``prepare_token_request``.
:param redirect_url: Redirect URL to which the user will be returned
after authorization. Must be provided unless previously setup with
the provider. If provided then it must also be provided in the
token request.
:param scope:
:param kwargs: Additional parameters to included in the request.
:returns: The prepared request tuple with (url, headers, body).
"""
if not is_secure_transport(authorization_url):
raise InsecureTransportError()
self.state = state or self.state_generator()
self.redirect_url = redirect_url or self.redirect_url
self.scope = scope or self.scope
auth_url = self.prepare_request_uri(
authorization_url, redirect_uri=self.redirect_url,
scope=self.scope, state=self.state, **kwargs)
return auth_url, FORM_ENC_HEADERS, ''
def prepare_token_request(self, token_url, authorization_response=None,
redirect_url=None, state=None, body='', **kwargs):
"""Prepare a token creation request.
Note that these requests usually require client authentication, either
by including client_id or a set of provider specific authentication
credentials.
:param token_url: Provider token creation endpoint URL.
:param authorization_response: The full redirection URL string, i.e.
the location to which the user was redirected after successfull
authorization. Used to mine credentials needed to obtain a token
in this step, such as authorization code.
:param redirect_url: The redirect_url supplied with the authorization
request (if there was one).
:param state:
:param body: Existing request body (URL encoded string) to embed parameters
into. This may contain extra paramters. Default ''.
:param kwargs: Additional parameters to included in the request.
:returns: The prepared request tuple with (url, headers, body).
"""
if not is_secure_transport(token_url):
raise InsecureTransportError()
state = state or self.state
if authorization_response:
self.parse_request_uri_response(
authorization_response, state=state)
self.redirect_url = redirect_url or self.redirect_url
body = self.prepare_request_body(body=body,
redirect_uri=self.redirect_url, **kwargs)
return token_url, FORM_ENC_HEADERS, body
def prepare_refresh_token_request(self, token_url, refresh_token=None,
body='', scope=None, **kwargs):
"""Prepare an access token refresh request.
Expired access tokens can be replaced by new access tokens without
going through the OAuth dance if the client obtained a refresh token.
This refresh token and authentication credentials can be used to
obtain a new access token, and possibly a new refresh token.
:param token_url: Provider token refresh endpoint URL.
:param refresh_token: Refresh token string.
:param body: Existing request body (URL encoded string) to embed parameters
into. This may contain extra paramters. Default ''.
:param scope: List of scopes to request. Must be equal to
or a subset of the scopes granted when obtaining the refresh
token.
:param kwargs: Additional parameters to included in the request.
:returns: The prepared request tuple with (url, headers, body).
"""
if not is_secure_transport(token_url):
raise InsecureTransportError()
self.scope = scope or self.scope
body = self.prepare_refresh_body(body=body,
refresh_token=refresh_token, scope=self.scope, **kwargs)
return token_url, FORM_ENC_HEADERS, body
def prepare_token_revocation_request(self, revocation_url, token,
token_type_hint="access_token", body='', callback=None, **kwargs):
"""Prepare a token revocation request.
:param revocation_url: Provider token revocation endpoint URL.
:param token: The access or refresh token to be revoked (string).
:param token_type_hint: ``"access_token"`` (default) or
``"refresh_token"``. This is optional and if you wish to not pass it you
must provide ``token_type_hint=None``.
:param body:
:param callback: A jsonp callback such as ``package.callback`` to be invoked
upon receiving the response. Not that it should not include a () suffix.
:param kwargs: Additional parameters to included in the request.
:returns: The prepared request tuple with (url, headers, body).
Note that JSONP request may use GET requests as the parameters will
be added to the request URL query as opposed to the request body.
An example of a revocation request
.. code-block: http
POST /revoke HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
token=45ghiukldjahdnhzdauz&token_type_hint=refresh_token
An example of a jsonp revocation request
.. code-block: http
GET /revoke?token=agabcdefddddafdd&callback=package.myCallback HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: Basic czZCaGRSa3F0MzpnWDFmQmF0M2JW
and an error response
.. code-block: http
package.myCallback({"error":"unsupported_token_type"});
Note that these requests usually require client credentials, client_id in
the case for public clients and provider specific authentication
credentials for confidential clients.
"""
if not is_secure_transport(revocation_url):
raise InsecureTransportError()
return prepare_token_revocation_request(revocation_url, token,
token_type_hint=token_type_hint, body=body, callback=callback,
**kwargs)
def parse_request_body_response(self, body, scope=None, **kwargs):
"""Parse the JSON response body.
If the access token request is valid and authorized, the
authorization server issues an access token as described in
`Section 5.1`_. A refresh token SHOULD NOT be included. If the request
failed client authentication or is invalid, the authorization server
returns an error response as described in `Section 5.2`_.
:param body: The response body from the token request.
:param scope: Scopes originally requested.
:return: Dictionary of token parameters.
:raises: Warning if scope has changed. OAuth2Error if response is invalid.
These response are json encoded and could easily be parsed without
the assistance of OAuthLib. However, there are a few subtle issues
to be aware of regarding the response which are helpfully addressed
through the raising of various errors.
A successful response should always contain
**access_token**
The access token issued by the authorization server. Often
a random string.
**token_type**
The type of the token issued as described in `Section 7.1`_.
Commonly ``Bearer``.
While it is not mandated it is recommended that the provider include
**expires_in**
The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For
example, the value "3600" denotes that the access token will
expire in one hour from the time the response was generated.
If omitted, the authorization server SHOULD provide the
expiration time via other means or document the default value.
**scope**
Providers may supply this in all responses but are required to only
if it has changed since the authorization request.
.. _`Section 5.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.1
.. _`Section 5.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
.. _`Section 7.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-7.1
"""
self.token = parse_token_response(body, scope=scope)
self.populate_token_attributes(self.token)
return self.token
def prepare_refresh_body(self, body='', refresh_token=None, scope=None, **kwargs):
"""Prepare an access token request, using a refresh token.
If the authorization server issued a refresh token to the client, the
client makes a refresh request to the token endpoint by adding the
following parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
format in the HTTP request entity-body:
grant_type
REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "refresh_token".
refresh_token
REQUIRED. The refresh token issued to the client.
scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
Section 3.3. The requested scope MUST NOT include any scope
not originally granted by the resource owner, and if omitted is
treated as equal to the scope originally granted by the
resource owner.
"""
refresh_token = refresh_token or self.refresh_token
return prepare_token_request(self.refresh_token_key, body=body, scope=scope,
refresh_token=refresh_token, **kwargs)
def _add_bearer_token(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None,
headers=None, token_placement=None):
"""Add a bearer token to the request uri, body or authorization header."""
if token_placement == AUTH_HEADER:
headers = tokens.prepare_bearer_headers(self.access_token, headers)
elif token_placement == URI_QUERY:
uri = tokens.prepare_bearer_uri(self.access_token, uri)
elif token_placement == BODY:
body = tokens.prepare_bearer_body(self.access_token, body)
else:
raise ValueError("Invalid token placement.")
return uri, headers, body
def _add_mac_token(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None,
headers=None, token_placement=AUTH_HEADER, ext=None, **kwargs):
"""Add a MAC token to the request authorization header.
Warning: MAC token support is experimental as the spec is not yet stable.
"""
if token_placement != AUTH_HEADER:
raise ValueError("Invalid token placement.")
headers = tokens.prepare_mac_header(self.access_token, uri,
self.mac_key, http_method, headers=headers, body=body, ext=ext,
hash_algorithm=self.mac_algorithm, **kwargs)
return uri, headers, body
def _populate_attributes(self, response):
warnings.warn("Please switch to the public method "
"populate_token_attributes.", DeprecationWarning)
return self.populate_token_attributes(response)
def populate_code_attributes(self, response):
"""Add attributes from an auth code response to self."""
if 'code' in response:
self.code = response.get('code')
def populate_token_attributes(self, response):
"""Add attributes from a token exchange response to self."""
if 'access_token' in response:
self.access_token = response.get('access_token')
if 'refresh_token' in response:
self.refresh_token = response.get('refresh_token')
if 'token_type' in response:
self.token_type = response.get('token_type')
if 'expires_in' in response:
self.expires_in = response.get('expires_in')
self._expires_at = time.time() + int(self.expires_in)
if 'expires_at' in response:
self._expires_at = int(response.get('expires_at'))
if 'mac_key' in response:
self.mac_key = response.get('mac_key')
if 'mac_algorithm' in response:
self.mac_algorithm = response.get('mac_algorithm')

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from ..parameters import parse_token_response, prepare_token_request
from .base import Client
class LegacyApplicationClient(Client):
"""A public client using the resource owner password and username directly.
The resource owner password credentials grant type is suitable in
cases where the resource owner has a trust relationship with the
client, such as the device operating system or a highly privileged
application. The authorization server should take special care when
enabling this grant type, and only allow it when other flows are not
viable.
The grant type is suitable for clients capable of obtaining the
resource owner's credentials (username and password, typically using
an interactive form). It is also used to migrate existing clients
using direct authentication schemes such as HTTP Basic or Digest
authentication to OAuth by converting the stored credentials to an
access token.
The method through which the client obtains the resource owner
credentials is beyond the scope of this specification. The client
MUST discard the credentials once an access token has been obtained.
"""
grant_type = 'password'
def __init__(self, client_id, **kwargs):
super(LegacyApplicationClient, self).__init__(client_id, **kwargs)
def prepare_request_body(self, username, password, body='', scope=None,
include_client_id=False, **kwargs):
"""Add the resource owner password and username to the request body.
The client makes a request to the token endpoint by adding the
following parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
format per `Appendix B`_ in the HTTP request entity-body:
:param username: The resource owner username.
:param password: The resource owner password.
:param body: Existing request body (URL encoded string) to embed parameters
into. This may contain extra paramters. Default ''.
:param scope: The scope of the access request as described by
`Section 3.3`_.
:param include_client_id: `True` to send the `client_id` in the
body of the upstream request. This is required
if the client is not authenticating with the
authorization server as described in
`Section 3.2.1`_. False otherwise (default).
:type include_client_id: Boolean
:param kwargs: Extra credentials to include in the token request.
If the client type is confidential or the client was issued client
credentials (or assigned other authentication requirements), the
client MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described
in `Section 3.2.1`_.
The prepared body will include all provided credentials as well as
the ``grant_type`` parameter set to ``password``::
>>> from oauthlib.oauth2 import LegacyApplicationClient
>>> client = LegacyApplicationClient('your_id')
>>> client.prepare_request_body(username='foo', password='bar', scope=['hello', 'world'])
'grant_type=password&username=foo&scope=hello+world&password=bar'
.. _`Appendix B`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`Section 3.2.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
"""
kwargs['client_id'] = self.client_id
kwargs['include_client_id'] = include_client_id
return prepare_token_request(self.grant_type, body=body, username=username,
password=password, scope=scope, **kwargs)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from ..parameters import parse_implicit_response, prepare_grant_uri
from .base import Client
class MobileApplicationClient(Client):
"""A public client utilizing the implicit code grant workflow.
A user-agent-based application is a public client in which the
client code is downloaded from a web server and executes within a
user-agent (e.g. web browser) on the device used by the resource
owner. Protocol data and credentials are easily accessible (and
often visible) to the resource owner. Since such applications
reside within the user-agent, they can make seamless use of the
user-agent capabilities when requesting authorization.
The implicit grant type is used to obtain access tokens (it does not
support the issuance of refresh tokens) and is optimized for public
clients known to operate a particular redirection URI. These clients
are typically implemented in a browser using a scripting language
such as JavaScript.
As a redirection-based flow, the client must be capable of
interacting with the resource owner's user-agent (typically a web
browser) and capable of receiving incoming requests (via redirection)
from the authorization server.
Unlike the authorization code grant type in which the client makes
separate requests for authorization and access token, the client
receives the access token as the result of the authorization request.
The implicit grant type does not include client authentication, and
relies on the presence of the resource owner and the registration of
the redirection URI. Because the access token is encoded into the
redirection URI, it may be exposed to the resource owner and other
applications residing on the same device.
"""
response_type = 'token'
def prepare_request_uri(self, uri, redirect_uri=None, scope=None,
state=None, **kwargs):
"""Prepare the implicit grant request URI.
The client constructs the request URI by adding the following
parameters to the query component of the authorization endpoint URI
using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per `Appendix B`_:
:param redirect_uri: OPTIONAL. The redirect URI must be an absolute URI
and it should have been registerd with the OAuth
provider prior to use. As described in `Section 3.1.2`_.
:param scope: OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
Section 3.3`_. These may be any string but are commonly
URIs or various categories such as ``videos`` or ``documents``.
:param state: RECOMMENDED. An opaque value used by the client to maintain
state between the request and callback. The authorization
server includes this value when redirecting the user-agent back
to the client. The parameter SHOULD be used for preventing
cross-site request forgery as described in `Section 10.12`_.
:param kwargs: Extra arguments to include in the request URI.
In addition to supplied parameters, OAuthLib will append the ``client_id``
that was provided in the constructor as well as the mandatory ``response_type``
argument, set to ``token``::
>>> from oauthlib.oauth2 import MobileApplicationClient
>>> client = MobileApplicationClient('your_id')
>>> client.prepare_request_uri('https://example.com')
'https://example.com?client_id=your_id&response_type=token'
>>> client.prepare_request_uri('https://example.com', redirect_uri='https://a.b/callback')
'https://example.com?client_id=your_id&response_type=token&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fa.b%2Fcallback'
>>> client.prepare_request_uri('https://example.com', scope=['profile', 'pictures'])
'https://example.com?client_id=your_id&response_type=token&scope=profile+pictures'
>>> client.prepare_request_uri('https://example.com', foo='bar')
'https://example.com?client_id=your_id&response_type=token&foo=bar'
.. _`Appendix B`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
.. _`Section 2.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.2
.. _`Section 3.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`Section 10.12`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.12
"""
return prepare_grant_uri(uri, self.client_id, self.response_type,
redirect_uri=redirect_uri, state=state, scope=scope, **kwargs)
def parse_request_uri_response(self, uri, state=None, scope=None):
"""Parse the response URI fragment.
If the resource owner grants the access request, the authorization
server issues an access token and delivers it to the client by adding
the following parameters to the fragment component of the redirection
URI using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format:
:param uri: The callback URI that resulted from the user being redirected
back from the provider to you, the client.
:param state: The state provided in the authorization request.
:param scope: The scopes provided in the authorization request.
:return: Dictionary of token parameters.
:raises: OAuth2Error if response is invalid.
A successful response should always contain
**access_token**
The access token issued by the authorization server. Often
a random string.
**token_type**
The type of the token issued as described in `Section 7.1`_.
Commonly ``Bearer``.
**state**
If you provided the state parameter in the authorization phase, then
the provider is required to include that exact state value in the
response.
While it is not mandated it is recommended that the provider include
**expires_in**
The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For
example, the value "3600" denotes that the access token will
expire in one hour from the time the response was generated.
If omitted, the authorization server SHOULD provide the
expiration time via other means or document the default value.
**scope**
Providers may supply this in all responses but are required to only
if it has changed since the authorization request.
A few example responses can be seen below::
>>> response_uri = 'https://example.com/callback#access_token=sdlfkj452&state=ss345asyht&token_type=Bearer&scope=hello+world'
>>> from oauthlib.oauth2 import MobileApplicationClient
>>> client = MobileApplicationClient('your_id')
>>> client.parse_request_uri_response(response_uri)
{
'access_token': 'sdlfkj452',
'token_type': 'Bearer',
'state': 'ss345asyht',
'scope': [u'hello', u'world']
}
>>> client.parse_request_uri_response(response_uri, state='other')
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
File "oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/__init__.py", line 598, in parse_request_uri_response
**scope**
File "oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/parameters.py", line 197, in parse_implicit_response
raise ValueError("Mismatching or missing state in params.")
ValueError: Mismatching or missing state in params.
>>> def alert_scope_changed(message, old, new):
... print(message, old, new)
...
>>> oauthlib.signals.scope_changed.connect(alert_scope_changed)
>>> client.parse_request_body_response(response_body, scope=['other'])
('Scope has changed from "other" to "hello world".', ['other'], ['hello', 'world'])
.. _`Section 7.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-7.1
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
"""
self.token = parse_implicit_response(uri, state=state, scope=scope)
self.populate_token_attributes(self.token)
return self.token

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import time
from oauthlib.common import to_unicode
from ..parameters import parse_token_response, prepare_token_request
from .base import Client
class ServiceApplicationClient(Client):
"""A public client utilizing the JWT bearer grant.
JWT bearer tokes can be used to request an access token when a client
wishes to utilize an existing trust relationship, expressed through the
semantics of (and digital signature or keyed message digest calculated
over) the JWT, without a direct user approval step at the authorization
server.
This grant type does not involve an authorization step. It may be
used by both public and confidential clients.
"""
grant_type = 'urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:jwt-bearer'
def __init__(self, client_id, private_key=None, subject=None, issuer=None,
audience=None, **kwargs):
"""Initalize a JWT client with defaults for implicit use later.
:param client_id: Client identifier given by the OAuth provider upon
registration.
:param private_key: Private key used for signing and encrypting.
Must be given as a string.
:param subject: The principal that is the subject of the JWT, i.e.
which user is the token requested on behalf of.
For example, ``foo@example.com.
:param issuer: The JWT MUST contain an "iss" (issuer) claim that
contains a unique identifier for the entity that issued
the JWT. For example, ``your-client@provider.com``.
:param audience: A value identifying the authorization server as an
intended audience, e.g.
``https://provider.com/oauth2/token``.
:param kwargs: Additional arguments to pass to base client, such as
state and token. See ``Client.__init__.__doc__`` for
details.
"""
super(ServiceApplicationClient, self).__init__(client_id, **kwargs)
self.private_key = private_key
self.subject = subject
self.issuer = issuer
self.audience = audience
def prepare_request_body(self,
private_key=None,
subject=None,
issuer=None,
audience=None,
expires_at=None,
issued_at=None,
extra_claims=None,
body='',
scope=None,
include_client_id=False,
**kwargs):
"""Create and add a JWT assertion to the request body.
:param private_key: Private key used for signing and encrypting.
Must be given as a string.
:param subject: (sub) The principal that is the subject of the JWT,
i.e. which user is the token requested on behalf of.
For example, ``foo@example.com.
:param issuer: (iss) The JWT MUST contain an "iss" (issuer) claim that
contains a unique identifier for the entity that issued
the JWT. For example, ``your-client@provider.com``.
:param audience: (aud) A value identifying the authorization server as an
intended audience, e.g.
``https://provider.com/oauth2/token``.
:param expires_at: A unix expiration timestamp for the JWT. Defaults
to an hour from now, i.e. ``time.time() + 3600``.
:param issued_at: A unix timestamp of when the JWT was created.
Defaults to now, i.e. ``time.time()``.
:param extra_claims: A dict of additional claims to include in the JWT.
:param body: Existing request body (URL encoded string) to embed parameters
into. This may contain extra paramters. Default ''.
:param scope: The scope of the access request.
:param include_client_id: `True` to send the `client_id` in the
body of the upstream request. This is required
if the client is not authenticating with the
authorization server as described in
`Section 3.2.1`_. False otherwise (default).
:type include_client_id: Boolean
:param not_before: A unix timestamp after which the JWT may be used.
Not included unless provided. *
:param jwt_id: A unique JWT token identifier. Not included unless
provided. *
:param kwargs: Extra credentials to include in the token request.
Parameters marked with a `*` above are not explicit arguments in the
function signature, but are specially documented arguments for items
appearing in the generic `**kwargs` keyworded input.
The "scope" parameter may be used, as defined in the Assertion
Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants
[I-D.ietf-oauth-assertions] specification, to indicate the requested
scope.
Authentication of the client is optional, as described in
`Section 3.2.1`_ of OAuth 2.0 [RFC6749] and consequently, the
"client_id" is only needed when a form of client authentication that
relies on the parameter is used.
The following non-normative example demonstrates an Access Token
Request with a JWT as an authorization grant (with extra line breaks
for display purposes only):
.. code-block: http
POST /token.oauth2 HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
grant_type=urn%3Aietf%3Aparams%3Aoauth%3Agrant-type%3Ajwt-bearer
&assertion=eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiJ9.
eyJpc3Mi[...omitted for brevity...].
J9l-ZhwP[...omitted for brevity...]
.. _`Section 3.2.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
"""
import jwt
key = private_key or self.private_key
if not key:
raise ValueError('An encryption key must be supplied to make JWT'
' token requests.')
claim = {
'iss': issuer or self.issuer,
'aud': audience or self.audience,
'sub': subject or self.subject,
'exp': int(expires_at or time.time() + 3600),
'iat': int(issued_at or time.time()),
}
for attr in ('iss', 'aud', 'sub'):
if claim[attr] is None:
raise ValueError(
'Claim must include %s but none was given.' % attr)
if 'not_before' in kwargs:
claim['nbf'] = kwargs.pop('not_before')
if 'jwt_id' in kwargs:
claim['jti'] = kwargs.pop('jwt_id')
claim.update(extra_claims or {})
assertion = jwt.encode(claim, key, 'RS256')
assertion = to_unicode(assertion)
kwargs['client_id'] = self.client_id
kwargs['include_client_id'] = include_client_id
return prepare_token_request(self.grant_type,
body=body,
assertion=assertion,
scope=scope,
**kwargs)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import warnings
from ..parameters import (parse_authorization_code_response,
parse_token_response, prepare_grant_uri,
prepare_token_request)
from .base import Client
class WebApplicationClient(Client):
"""A client utilizing the authorization code grant workflow.
A web application is a confidential client running on a web
server. Resource owners access the client via an HTML user
interface rendered in a user-agent on the device used by the
resource owner. The client credentials as well as any access
token issued to the client are stored on the web server and are
not exposed to or accessible by the resource owner.
The authorization code grant type is used to obtain both access
tokens and refresh tokens and is optimized for confidential clients.
As a redirection-based flow, the client must be capable of
interacting with the resource owner's user-agent (typically a web
browser) and capable of receiving incoming requests (via redirection)
from the authorization server.
"""
grant_type = 'authorization_code'
def __init__(self, client_id, code=None, **kwargs):
super(WebApplicationClient, self).__init__(client_id, **kwargs)
self.code = code
def prepare_request_uri(self, uri, redirect_uri=None, scope=None,
state=None, **kwargs):
"""Prepare the authorization code request URI
The client constructs the request URI by adding the following
parameters to the query component of the authorization endpoint URI
using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per `Appendix B`_:
:param redirect_uri: OPTIONAL. The redirect URI must be an absolute URI
and it should have been registerd with the OAuth
provider prior to use. As described in `Section 3.1.2`_.
:param scope: OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
Section 3.3`_. These may be any string but are commonly
URIs or various categories such as ``videos`` or ``documents``.
:param state: RECOMMENDED. An opaque value used by the client to maintain
state between the request and callback. The authorization
server includes this value when redirecting the user-agent back
to the client. The parameter SHOULD be used for preventing
cross-site request forgery as described in `Section 10.12`_.
:param kwargs: Extra arguments to include in the request URI.
In addition to supplied parameters, OAuthLib will append the ``client_id``
that was provided in the constructor as well as the mandatory ``response_type``
argument, set to ``code``::
>>> from oauthlib.oauth2 import WebApplicationClient
>>> client = WebApplicationClient('your_id')
>>> client.prepare_request_uri('https://example.com')
'https://example.com?client_id=your_id&response_type=code'
>>> client.prepare_request_uri('https://example.com', redirect_uri='https://a.b/callback')
'https://example.com?client_id=your_id&response_type=code&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fa.b%2Fcallback'
>>> client.prepare_request_uri('https://example.com', scope=['profile', 'pictures'])
'https://example.com?client_id=your_id&response_type=code&scope=profile+pictures'
>>> client.prepare_request_uri('https://example.com', foo='bar')
'https://example.com?client_id=your_id&response_type=code&foo=bar'
.. _`Appendix B`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
.. _`Section 2.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.2
.. _`Section 3.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`Section 10.12`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.12
"""
return prepare_grant_uri(uri, self.client_id, 'code',
redirect_uri=redirect_uri, scope=scope, state=state, **kwargs)
def prepare_request_body(self, code=None, redirect_uri=None, body='',
include_client_id=True, **kwargs):
"""Prepare the access token request body.
The client makes a request to the token endpoint by adding the
following parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
format in the HTTP request entity-body:
:param code: REQUIRED. The authorization code received from the
authorization server.
:param redirect_uri: REQUIRED, if the "redirect_uri" parameter was included in the
authorization request as described in `Section 4.1.1`_, and their
values MUST be identical.
:param body: Existing request body (URL encoded string) to embed parameters
into. This may contain extra paramters. Default ''.
:param include_client_id: `True` (default) to send the `client_id` in the
body of the upstream request. This is required
if the client is not authenticating with the
authorization server as described in `Section 3.2.1`_.
:type include_client_id: Boolean
:param kwargs: Extra parameters to include in the token request.
In addition OAuthLib will add the ``grant_type`` parameter set to
``authorization_code``.
If the client type is confidential or the client was issued client
credentials (or assigned other authentication requirements), the
client MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described
in `Section 3.2.1`_::
>>> from oauthlib.oauth2 import WebApplicationClient
>>> client = WebApplicationClient('your_id')
>>> client.prepare_request_body(code='sh35ksdf09sf')
'grant_type=authorization_code&code=sh35ksdf09sf'
>>> client.prepare_request_body(code='sh35ksdf09sf', foo='bar')
'grant_type=authorization_code&code=sh35ksdf09sf&foo=bar'
`Section 3.2.1` also states:
In the "authorization_code" "grant_type" request to the token
endpoint, an unauthenticated client MUST send its "client_id" to
prevent itself from inadvertently accepting a code intended for a
client with a different "client_id". This protects the client from
substitution of the authentication code. (It provides no additional
security for the protected resource.)
.. _`Section 4.1.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.1
.. _`Section 3.2.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
"""
code = code or self.code
if 'client_id' in kwargs:
warnings.warn("`client_id` has been deprecated in favor of "
"`include_client_id`, a boolean value which will "
"include the already configured `self.client_id`.",
DeprecationWarning)
if kwargs['client_id'] != self.client_id:
raise ValueError("`client_id` was supplied as an argument, but "
"it does not match `self.client_id`")
kwargs['client_id'] = self.client_id
kwargs['include_client_id'] = include_client_id
return prepare_token_request(self.grant_type, code=code, body=body,
redirect_uri=redirect_uri, **kwargs)
def parse_request_uri_response(self, uri, state=None):
"""Parse the URI query for code and state.
If the resource owner grants the access request, the authorization
server issues an authorization code and delivers it to the client by
adding the following parameters to the query component of the
redirection URI using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format:
:param uri: The callback URI that resulted from the user being redirected
back from the provider to you, the client.
:param state: The state provided in the authorization request.
**code**
The authorization code generated by the authorization server.
The authorization code MUST expire shortly after it is issued
to mitigate the risk of leaks. A maximum authorization code
lifetime of 10 minutes is RECOMMENDED. The client MUST NOT
use the authorization code more than once. If an authorization
code is used more than once, the authorization server MUST deny
the request and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all tokens
previously issued based on that authorization code.
The authorization code is bound to the client identifier and
redirection URI.
**state**
If the "state" parameter was present in the authorization request.
This method is mainly intended to enforce strict state checking with
the added benefit of easily extracting parameters from the URI::
>>> from oauthlib.oauth2 import WebApplicationClient
>>> client = WebApplicationClient('your_id')
>>> uri = 'https://example.com/callback?code=sdfkjh345&state=sfetw45'
>>> client.parse_request_uri_response(uri, state='sfetw45')
{'state': 'sfetw45', 'code': 'sdfkjh345'}
>>> client.parse_request_uri_response(uri, state='other')
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
File "oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/__init__.py", line 357, in parse_request_uri_response
back from the provider to you, the client.
File "oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/parameters.py", line 153, in parse_authorization_code_response
raise MismatchingStateError()
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.errors.MismatchingStateError
"""
response = parse_authorization_code_response(uri, state=state)
self.populate_code_attributes(response)
return response

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from .authorization import AuthorizationEndpoint
from .introspect import IntrospectEndpoint
from .metadata import MetadataEndpoint
from .token import TokenEndpoint
from .resource import ResourceEndpoint
from .revocation import RevocationEndpoint
from .pre_configured import Server
from .pre_configured import WebApplicationServer
from .pre_configured import MobileApplicationServer
from .pre_configured import LegacyApplicationServer
from .pre_configured import BackendApplicationServer

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib.common import Request
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749 import utils
from .base import BaseEndpoint, catch_errors_and_unavailability
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class AuthorizationEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""Authorization endpoint - used by the client to obtain authorization
from the resource owner via user-agent redirection.
The authorization endpoint is used to interact with the resource
owner and obtain an authorization grant. The authorization server
MUST first verify the identity of the resource owner. The way in
which the authorization server authenticates the resource owner (e.g.
username and password login, session cookies) is beyond the scope of
this specification.
The endpoint URI MAY include an "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
formatted (per `Appendix B`_) query component,
which MUST be retained when adding additional query parameters. The
endpoint URI MUST NOT include a fragment component::
https://example.com/path?query=component # OK
https://example.com/path?query=component#fragment # Not OK
Since requests to the authorization endpoint result in user
authentication and the transmission of clear-text credentials (in the
HTTP response), the authorization server MUST require the use of TLS
as described in Section 1.6 when sending requests to the
authorization endpoint::
# We will deny any request which URI schema is not with https
The authorization server MUST support the use of the HTTP "GET"
method [RFC2616] for the authorization endpoint, and MAY support the
use of the "POST" method as well::
# HTTP method is currently not enforced
Parameters sent without a value MUST be treated as if they were
omitted from the request. The authorization server MUST ignore
unrecognized request parameters. Request and response parameters
MUST NOT be included more than once::
# Enforced through the design of oauthlib.common.Request
.. _`Appendix B`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
"""
def __init__(self, default_response_type, default_token_type,
response_types):
BaseEndpoint.__init__(self)
self._response_types = response_types
self._default_response_type = default_response_type
self._default_token_type = default_token_type
@property
def response_types(self):
return self._response_types
@property
def default_response_type(self):
return self._default_response_type
@property
def default_response_type_handler(self):
return self.response_types.get(self.default_response_type)
@property
def default_token_type(self):
return self._default_token_type
@catch_errors_and_unavailability
def create_authorization_response(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None,
headers=None, scopes=None, credentials=None):
"""Extract response_type and route to the designated handler."""
request = Request(
uri, http_method=http_method, body=body, headers=headers)
request.scopes = scopes
# TODO: decide whether this should be a required argument
request.user = None # TODO: explain this in docs
for k, v in (credentials or {}).items():
setattr(request, k, v)
response_type_handler = self.response_types.get(
request.response_type, self.default_response_type_handler)
log.debug('Dispatching response_type %s request to %r.',
request.response_type, response_type_handler)
return response_type_handler.create_authorization_response(
request, self.default_token_type)
@catch_errors_and_unavailability
def validate_authorization_request(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None,
headers=None):
"""Extract response_type and route to the designated handler."""
request = Request(
uri, http_method=http_method, body=body, headers=headers)
request.scopes = utils.scope_to_list(request.scope)
response_type_handler = self.response_types.get(
request.response_type, self.default_response_type_handler)
return response_type_handler.validate_authorization_request(request)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import functools
import logging
from ..errors import (FatalClientError, OAuth2Error, ServerError,
TemporarilyUnavailableError, InvalidRequestError,
InvalidClientError, UnsupportedTokenTypeError)
from oauthlib.common import CaseInsensitiveDict, urldecode
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class BaseEndpoint(object):
def __init__(self):
self._available = True
self._catch_errors = False
self._valid_request_methods = None
@property
def valid_request_methods(self):
return self._valid_request_methods
@valid_request_methods.setter
def valid_request_methods(self, valid_request_methods):
if valid_request_methods is not None:
valid_request_methods = [x.upper() for x in valid_request_methods]
self._valid_request_methods = valid_request_methods
@property
def available(self):
return self._available
@available.setter
def available(self, available):
self._available = available
@property
def catch_errors(self):
return self._catch_errors
@catch_errors.setter
def catch_errors(self, catch_errors):
self._catch_errors = catch_errors
def _raise_on_missing_token(self, request):
"""Raise error on missing token."""
if not request.token:
raise InvalidRequestError(request=request,
description='Missing token parameter.')
def _raise_on_invalid_client(self, request):
"""Raise on failed client authentication."""
if self.request_validator.client_authentication_required(request):
if not self.request_validator.authenticate_client(request):
log.debug('Client authentication failed, %r.', request)
raise InvalidClientError(request=request)
elif not self.request_validator.authenticate_client_id(request.client_id, request):
log.debug('Client authentication failed, %r.', request)
raise InvalidClientError(request=request)
def _raise_on_unsupported_token(self, request):
"""Raise on unsupported tokens."""
if (request.token_type_hint and
request.token_type_hint in self.valid_token_types and
request.token_type_hint not in self.supported_token_types):
raise UnsupportedTokenTypeError(request=request)
def _raise_on_bad_method(self, request):
if self.valid_request_methods is None:
raise ValueError('Configure "valid_request_methods" property first')
if request.http_method.upper() not in self.valid_request_methods:
raise InvalidRequestError(request=request,
description=('Unsupported request method %s' % request.http_method.upper()))
def _raise_on_bad_post_request(self, request):
"""Raise if invalid POST request received
"""
if request.http_method.upper() == 'POST':
query_params = request.uri_query or ""
if query_params:
raise InvalidRequestError(request=request,
description=('URL query parameters are not allowed'))
def catch_errors_and_unavailability(f):
@functools.wraps(f)
def wrapper(endpoint, uri, *args, **kwargs):
if not endpoint.available:
e = TemporarilyUnavailableError()
log.info('Endpoint unavailable, ignoring request %s.' % uri)
return {}, e.json, 503
if endpoint.catch_errors:
try:
return f(endpoint, uri, *args, **kwargs)
except OAuth2Error:
raise
except FatalClientError:
raise
except Exception as e:
error = ServerError()
log.warning(
'Exception caught while processing request, %s.' % e)
return {}, error.json, 500
else:
return f(endpoint, uri, *args, **kwargs)
return wrapper

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.endpoint.introspect
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
An implementation of the OAuth 2.0 `Token Introspection`.
.. _`Token Introspection`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7662
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import json
import logging
from oauthlib.common import Request
from ..errors import OAuth2Error, UnsupportedTokenTypeError
from .base import BaseEndpoint, catch_errors_and_unavailability
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class IntrospectEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""Introspect token endpoint.
This endpoint defines a method to query an OAuth 2.0 authorization
server to determine the active state of an OAuth 2.0 token and to
determine meta-information about this token. OAuth 2.0 deployments
can use this method to convey information about the authorization
context of the token from the authorization server to the protected
resource.
To prevent the values of access tokens from leaking into
server-side logs via query parameters, an authorization server
offering token introspection MAY disallow the use of HTTP GET on
the introspection endpoint and instead require the HTTP POST method
to be used at the introspection endpoint.
"""
valid_token_types = ('access_token', 'refresh_token')
valid_request_methods = ('POST',)
def __init__(self, request_validator, supported_token_types=None):
BaseEndpoint.__init__(self)
self.request_validator = request_validator
self.supported_token_types = (
supported_token_types or self.valid_token_types)
@catch_errors_and_unavailability
def create_introspect_response(self, uri, http_method='POST', body=None,
headers=None):
"""Create introspect valid or invalid response
If the authorization server is unable to determine the state
of the token without additional information, it SHOULD return
an introspection response indicating the token is not active
as described in Section 2.2.
"""
resp_headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
'Pragma': 'no-cache',
}
request = Request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
try:
self.validate_introspect_request(request)
log.debug('Token introspect valid for %r.', request)
except OAuth2Error as e:
log.debug('Client error during validation of %r. %r.', request, e)
resp_headers.update(e.headers)
return resp_headers, e.json, e.status_code
claims = self.request_validator.introspect_token(
request.token,
request.token_type_hint,
request
)
if claims is None:
return resp_headers, json.dumps(dict(active=False)), 200
if "active" in claims:
claims.pop("active")
return resp_headers, json.dumps(dict(active=True, **claims)), 200
def validate_introspect_request(self, request):
"""Ensure the request is valid.
The protected resource calls the introspection endpoint using
an HTTP POST request with parameters sent as
"application/x-www-form-urlencoded".
token REQUIRED. The string value of the token.
token_type_hint OPTIONAL.
A hint about the type of the token submitted for
introspection. The protected resource MAY pass this parameter to
help the authorization server optimize the token lookup. If the
server is unable to locate the token using the given hint, it MUST
extend its search across all of its supported token types. An
authorization server MAY ignore this parameter, particularly if it
is able to detect the token type automatically.
* access_token: An Access Token as defined in [`RFC6749`],
`section 1.4`_
* refresh_token: A Refresh Token as defined in [`RFC6749`],
`section 1.5`_
The introspection endpoint MAY accept other OPTIONAL
parameters to provide further context to the query. For
instance, an authorization server may desire to know the IP
address of the client accessing the protected resource to
determine if the correct client is likely to be presenting the
token. The definition of this or any other parameters are
outside the scope of this specification, to be defined by
service documentation or extensions to this specification.
.. _`section 1.4`: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.4
.. _`section 1.5`: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.5
.. _`RFC6749`: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
"""
self._raise_on_bad_method(request)
self._raise_on_bad_post_request(request)
self._raise_on_missing_token(request)
self._raise_on_invalid_client(request)
self._raise_on_unsupported_token(request)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.endpoint.metadata
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
An implementation of the `OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata`.
.. _`OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8414
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import copy
import json
import logging
from ....common import unicode_type
from .base import BaseEndpoint, catch_errors_and_unavailability
from .authorization import AuthorizationEndpoint
from .introspect import IntrospectEndpoint
from .token import TokenEndpoint
from .revocation import RevocationEndpoint
from .. import grant_types
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class MetadataEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""OAuth2.0 Authorization Server Metadata endpoint.
This specification generalizes the metadata format defined by
`OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0` in a way that is compatible
with OpenID Connect Discovery while being applicable to a wider set
of OAuth 2.0 use cases. This is intentionally parallel to the way
that OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol [`RFC7591`_]
generalized the dynamic client registration mechanisms defined by
OpenID Connect Dynamic Client Registration 1.0
in a way that is compatible with it.
.. _`OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0`: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html
.. _`RFC7591`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7591
"""
def __init__(self, endpoints, claims={}, raise_errors=True):
assert isinstance(claims, dict)
for endpoint in endpoints:
assert isinstance(endpoint, BaseEndpoint)
BaseEndpoint.__init__(self)
self.raise_errors = raise_errors
self.endpoints = endpoints
self.initial_claims = claims
self.claims = self.validate_metadata_server()
@catch_errors_and_unavailability
def create_metadata_response(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None,
headers=None):
"""Create metadata response
"""
headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json'
}
return headers, json.dumps(self.claims), 200
def validate_metadata(self, array, key, is_required=False, is_list=False, is_url=False, is_issuer=False):
if not self.raise_errors:
return
if key not in array:
if is_required:
raise ValueError("key {} is a mandatory metadata.".format(key))
elif is_issuer:
if not array[key].startswith("https"):
raise ValueError("key {}: {} must be an HTTPS URL".format(key, array[key]))
if "?" in array[key] or "&" in array[key] or "#" in array[key]:
raise ValueError("key {}: {} must not contain query or fragment components".format(key, array[key]))
elif is_url:
if not array[key].startswith("http"):
raise ValueError("key {}: {} must be an URL".format(key, array[key]))
elif is_list:
if not isinstance(array[key], list):
raise ValueError("key {}: {} must be an Array".format(key, array[key]))
for elem in array[key]:
if not isinstance(elem, unicode_type):
raise ValueError("array {}: {} must contains only string (not {})".format(key, array[key], elem))
def validate_metadata_token(self, claims, endpoint):
"""
If the token endpoint is used in the grant type, the value of this
parameter MUST be the same as the value of the "grant_type"
parameter passed to the token endpoint defined in the grant type
definition.
"""
self._grant_types.extend(endpoint._grant_types.keys())
claims.setdefault("token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported", ["client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic"])
self.validate_metadata(claims, "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported", is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported", is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "token_endpoint", is_required=True, is_url=True)
def validate_metadata_authorization(self, claims, endpoint):
claims.setdefault("response_types_supported",
list(filter(lambda x: x != "none", endpoint._response_types.keys())))
claims.setdefault("response_modes_supported", ["query", "fragment"])
# The OAuth2.0 Implicit flow is defined as a "grant type" but it is not
# using the "token" endpoint, as such, we have to add it explicitly to
# the list of "grant_types_supported" when enabled.
if "token" in claims["response_types_supported"]:
self._grant_types.append("implicit")
self.validate_metadata(claims, "response_types_supported", is_required=True, is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "response_modes_supported", is_list=True)
if "code" in claims["response_types_supported"]:
code_grant = endpoint._response_types["code"]
if not isinstance(code_grant, grant_types.AuthorizationCodeGrant) and hasattr(code_grant, "default_grant"):
code_grant = code_grant.default_grant
claims.setdefault("code_challenge_methods_supported",
list(code_grant._code_challenge_methods.keys()))
self.validate_metadata(claims, "code_challenge_methods_supported", is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "authorization_endpoint", is_required=True, is_url=True)
def validate_metadata_revocation(self, claims, endpoint):
claims.setdefault("revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported",
["client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic"])
self.validate_metadata(claims, "revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported", is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "revocation_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported", is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "revocation_endpoint", is_required=True, is_url=True)
def validate_metadata_introspection(self, claims, endpoint):
claims.setdefault("introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported",
["client_secret_post", "client_secret_basic"])
self.validate_metadata(claims, "introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported", is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "introspection_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported", is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "introspection_endpoint", is_required=True, is_url=True)
def validate_metadata_server(self):
"""
Authorization servers can have metadata describing their
configuration. The following authorization server metadata values
are used by this specification. More details can be found in
`RFC8414 section 2`_ :
issuer
REQUIRED
authorization_endpoint
URL of the authorization server's authorization endpoint
[`RFC6749#Authorization`_]. This is REQUIRED unless no grant types are supported
that use the authorization endpoint.
token_endpoint
URL of the authorization server's token endpoint [`RFC6749#Token`_]. This
is REQUIRED unless only the implicit grant type is supported.
scopes_supported
RECOMMENDED.
response_types_supported
REQUIRED.
* Other OPTIONAL fields:
jwks_uri
registration_endpoint
response_modes_supported
grant_types_supported
OPTIONAL. JSON array containing a list of the OAuth 2.0 grant
type values that this authorization server supports. The array
values used are the same as those used with the "grant_types"
parameter defined by "OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration
Protocol" [`RFC7591`_]. If omitted, the default value is
"["authorization_code", "implicit"]".
token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
token_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
service_documentation
ui_locales_supported
op_policy_uri
op_tos_uri
revocation_endpoint
revocation_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
revocation_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
introspection_endpoint
introspection_endpoint_auth_methods_supported
introspection_endpoint_auth_signing_alg_values_supported
code_challenge_methods_supported
Additional authorization server metadata parameters MAY also be used.
Some are defined by other specifications, such as OpenID Connect
Discovery 1.0 [`OpenID.Discovery`_].
.. _`RFC8414 section 2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc8414#section-2
.. _`RFC6749#Authorization`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1
.. _`RFC6749#Token`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2
.. _`RFC7591`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7591
.. _`OpenID.Discovery`: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-discovery-1_0.html
"""
claims = copy.deepcopy(self.initial_claims)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "issuer", is_required=True, is_issuer=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "jwks_uri", is_url=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "scopes_supported", is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "service_documentation", is_url=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "ui_locales_supported", is_list=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "op_policy_uri", is_url=True)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "op_tos_uri", is_url=True)
self._grant_types = []
for endpoint in self.endpoints:
if isinstance(endpoint, TokenEndpoint):
self.validate_metadata_token(claims, endpoint)
if isinstance(endpoint, AuthorizationEndpoint):
self.validate_metadata_authorization(claims, endpoint)
if isinstance(endpoint, RevocationEndpoint):
self.validate_metadata_revocation(claims, endpoint)
if isinstance(endpoint, IntrospectEndpoint):
self.validate_metadata_introspection(claims, endpoint)
# "grant_types_supported" is a combination of all OAuth2 grant types
# allowed in the current provider implementation.
claims.setdefault("grant_types_supported", self._grant_types)
self.validate_metadata(claims, "grant_types_supported", is_list=True)
return claims

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.endpoints.pre_configured
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various endpoints needed
for providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749 servers.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from ..grant_types import (AuthorizationCodeGrant,
ClientCredentialsGrant,
ImplicitGrant,
RefreshTokenGrant,
ResourceOwnerPasswordCredentialsGrant)
from ..tokens import BearerToken
from .authorization import AuthorizationEndpoint
from .introspect import IntrospectEndpoint
from .resource import ResourceEndpoint
from .revocation import RevocationEndpoint
from .token import TokenEndpoint
class Server(AuthorizationEndpoint, IntrospectEndpoint, TokenEndpoint,
ResourceEndpoint, RevocationEndpoint):
"""An all-in-one endpoint featuring all four major grant types."""
def __init__(self, request_validator, token_expires_in=None,
token_generator=None, refresh_token_generator=None,
*args, **kwargs):
"""Construct a new all-grants-in-one server.
:param request_validator: An implementation of
oauthlib.oauth2.RequestValidator.
:param token_expires_in: An int or a function to generate a token
expiration offset (in seconds) given a
oauthlib.common.Request object.
:param token_generator: A function to generate a token from a request.
:param refresh_token_generator: A function to generate a token from a
request for the refresh token.
:param kwargs: Extra parameters to pass to authorization-,
token-, resource-, and revocation-endpoint constructors.
"""
auth_grant = AuthorizationCodeGrant(request_validator)
implicit_grant = ImplicitGrant(request_validator)
password_grant = ResourceOwnerPasswordCredentialsGrant(
request_validator)
credentials_grant = ClientCredentialsGrant(request_validator)
refresh_grant = RefreshTokenGrant(request_validator)
bearer = BearerToken(request_validator, token_generator,
token_expires_in, refresh_token_generator)
AuthorizationEndpoint.__init__(self, default_response_type='code',
response_types={
'code': auth_grant,
'token': implicit_grant,
'none': auth_grant
},
default_token_type=bearer)
TokenEndpoint.__init__(self, default_grant_type='authorization_code',
grant_types={
'authorization_code': auth_grant,
'password': password_grant,
'client_credentials': credentials_grant,
'refresh_token': refresh_grant,
},
default_token_type=bearer)
ResourceEndpoint.__init__(self, default_token='Bearer',
token_types={'Bearer': bearer})
RevocationEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
IntrospectEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
class WebApplicationServer(AuthorizationEndpoint, IntrospectEndpoint, TokenEndpoint,
ResourceEndpoint, RevocationEndpoint):
"""An all-in-one endpoint featuring Authorization code grant and Bearer tokens."""
def __init__(self, request_validator, token_generator=None,
token_expires_in=None, refresh_token_generator=None, **kwargs):
"""Construct a new web application server.
:param request_validator: An implementation of
oauthlib.oauth2.RequestValidator.
:param token_expires_in: An int or a function to generate a token
expiration offset (in seconds) given a
oauthlib.common.Request object.
:param token_generator: A function to generate a token from a request.
:param refresh_token_generator: A function to generate a token from a
request for the refresh token.
:param kwargs: Extra parameters to pass to authorization-,
token-, resource-, and revocation-endpoint constructors.
"""
auth_grant = AuthorizationCodeGrant(request_validator)
refresh_grant = RefreshTokenGrant(request_validator)
bearer = BearerToken(request_validator, token_generator,
token_expires_in, refresh_token_generator)
AuthorizationEndpoint.__init__(self, default_response_type='code',
response_types={'code': auth_grant},
default_token_type=bearer)
TokenEndpoint.__init__(self, default_grant_type='authorization_code',
grant_types={
'authorization_code': auth_grant,
'refresh_token': refresh_grant,
},
default_token_type=bearer)
ResourceEndpoint.__init__(self, default_token='Bearer',
token_types={'Bearer': bearer})
RevocationEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
IntrospectEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
class MobileApplicationServer(AuthorizationEndpoint, IntrospectEndpoint,
ResourceEndpoint, RevocationEndpoint):
"""An all-in-one endpoint featuring Implicit code grant and Bearer tokens."""
def __init__(self, request_validator, token_generator=None,
token_expires_in=None, refresh_token_generator=None, **kwargs):
"""Construct a new implicit grant server.
:param request_validator: An implementation of
oauthlib.oauth2.RequestValidator.
:param token_expires_in: An int or a function to generate a token
expiration offset (in seconds) given a
oauthlib.common.Request object.
:param token_generator: A function to generate a token from a request.
:param refresh_token_generator: A function to generate a token from a
request for the refresh token.
:param kwargs: Extra parameters to pass to authorization-,
token-, resource-, and revocation-endpoint constructors.
"""
implicit_grant = ImplicitGrant(request_validator)
bearer = BearerToken(request_validator, token_generator,
token_expires_in, refresh_token_generator)
AuthorizationEndpoint.__init__(self, default_response_type='token',
response_types={
'token': implicit_grant},
default_token_type=bearer)
ResourceEndpoint.__init__(self, default_token='Bearer',
token_types={'Bearer': bearer})
RevocationEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator,
supported_token_types=['access_token'])
IntrospectEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator,
supported_token_types=['access_token'])
class LegacyApplicationServer(TokenEndpoint, IntrospectEndpoint,
ResourceEndpoint, RevocationEndpoint):
"""An all-in-one endpoint featuring Resource Owner Password Credentials grant and Bearer tokens."""
def __init__(self, request_validator, token_generator=None,
token_expires_in=None, refresh_token_generator=None, **kwargs):
"""Construct a resource owner password credentials grant server.
:param request_validator: An implementation of
oauthlib.oauth2.RequestValidator.
:param token_expires_in: An int or a function to generate a token
expiration offset (in seconds) given a
oauthlib.common.Request object.
:param token_generator: A function to generate a token from a request.
:param refresh_token_generator: A function to generate a token from a
request for the refresh token.
:param kwargs: Extra parameters to pass to authorization-,
token-, resource-, and revocation-endpoint constructors.
"""
password_grant = ResourceOwnerPasswordCredentialsGrant(
request_validator)
refresh_grant = RefreshTokenGrant(request_validator)
bearer = BearerToken(request_validator, token_generator,
token_expires_in, refresh_token_generator)
TokenEndpoint.__init__(self, default_grant_type='password',
grant_types={
'password': password_grant,
'refresh_token': refresh_grant,
},
default_token_type=bearer)
ResourceEndpoint.__init__(self, default_token='Bearer',
token_types={'Bearer': bearer})
RevocationEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
IntrospectEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
class BackendApplicationServer(TokenEndpoint, IntrospectEndpoint,
ResourceEndpoint, RevocationEndpoint):
"""An all-in-one endpoint featuring Client Credentials grant and Bearer tokens."""
def __init__(self, request_validator, token_generator=None,
token_expires_in=None, refresh_token_generator=None, **kwargs):
"""Construct a client credentials grant server.
:param request_validator: An implementation of
oauthlib.oauth2.RequestValidator.
:param token_expires_in: An int or a function to generate a token
expiration offset (in seconds) given a
oauthlib.common.Request object.
:param token_generator: A function to generate a token from a request.
:param refresh_token_generator: A function to generate a token from a
request for the refresh token.
:param kwargs: Extra parameters to pass to authorization-,
token-, resource-, and revocation-endpoint constructors.
"""
credentials_grant = ClientCredentialsGrant(request_validator)
bearer = BearerToken(request_validator, token_generator,
token_expires_in, refresh_token_generator)
TokenEndpoint.__init__(self, default_grant_type='client_credentials',
grant_types={
'client_credentials': credentials_grant},
default_token_type=bearer)
ResourceEndpoint.__init__(self, default_token='Bearer',
token_types={'Bearer': bearer})
RevocationEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator,
supported_token_types=['access_token'])
IntrospectEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator,
supported_token_types=['access_token'])

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib.common import Request
from .base import BaseEndpoint, catch_errors_and_unavailability
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class ResourceEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""Authorizes access to protected resources.
The client accesses protected resources by presenting the access
token to the resource server. The resource server MUST validate the
access token and ensure that it has not expired and that its scope
covers the requested resource. The methods used by the resource
server to validate the access token (as well as any error responses)
are beyond the scope of this specification but generally involve an
interaction or coordination between the resource server and the
authorization server::
# For most cases, returning a 403 should suffice.
The method in which the client utilizes the access token to
authenticate with the resource server depends on the type of access
token issued by the authorization server. Typically, it involves
using the HTTP "Authorization" request header field [RFC2617] with an
authentication scheme defined by the specification of the access
token type used, such as [RFC6750]::
# Access tokens may also be provided in query and body
https://example.com/protected?access_token=kjfch2345sdf # Query
access_token=sdf23409df # Body
"""
def __init__(self, default_token, token_types):
BaseEndpoint.__init__(self)
self._tokens = token_types
self._default_token = default_token
@property
def default_token(self):
return self._default_token
@property
def default_token_type_handler(self):
return self.tokens.get(self.default_token)
@property
def tokens(self):
return self._tokens
@catch_errors_and_unavailability
def verify_request(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None, headers=None,
scopes=None):
"""Validate client, code etc, return body + headers"""
request = Request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
request.token_type = self.find_token_type(request)
request.scopes = scopes
token_type_handler = self.tokens.get(request.token_type,
self.default_token_type_handler)
log.debug('Dispatching token_type %s request to %r.',
request.token_type, token_type_handler)
return token_type_handler.validate_request(request), request
def find_token_type(self, request):
"""Token type identification.
RFC 6749 does not provide a method for easily differentiating between
different token types during protected resource access. We estimate
the most likely token type (if any) by asking each known token type
to give an estimation based on the request.
"""
estimates = sorted(((t.estimate_type(request), n)
for n, t in self.tokens.items()), reverse=True)
return estimates[0][1] if len(estimates) else None

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.endpoint.revocation
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
An implementation of the OAuth 2 `Token Revocation`_ spec (draft 11).
.. _`Token Revocation`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib.common import Request
from ..errors import OAuth2Error, UnsupportedTokenTypeError
from .base import BaseEndpoint, catch_errors_and_unavailability
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class RevocationEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""Token revocation endpoint.
Endpoint used by authenticated clients to revoke access and refresh tokens.
Commonly this will be part of the Authorization Endpoint.
"""
valid_token_types = ('access_token', 'refresh_token')
valid_request_methods = ('POST',)
def __init__(self, request_validator, supported_token_types=None,
enable_jsonp=False):
BaseEndpoint.__init__(self)
self.request_validator = request_validator
self.supported_token_types = (
supported_token_types or self.valid_token_types)
self.enable_jsonp = enable_jsonp
@catch_errors_and_unavailability
def create_revocation_response(self, uri, http_method='POST', body=None,
headers=None):
"""Revoke supplied access or refresh token.
The authorization server responds with HTTP status code 200 if the
token has been revoked sucessfully or if the client submitted an
invalid token.
Note: invalid tokens do not cause an error response since the client
cannot handle such an error in a reasonable way. Moreover, the purpose
of the revocation request, invalidating the particular token, is
already achieved.
The content of the response body is ignored by the client as all
necessary information is conveyed in the response code.
An invalid token type hint value is ignored by the authorization server
and does not influence the revocation response.
"""
resp_headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
'Pragma': 'no-cache',
}
request = Request(
uri, http_method=http_method, body=body, headers=headers)
try:
self.validate_revocation_request(request)
log.debug('Token revocation valid for %r.', request)
except OAuth2Error as e:
log.debug('Client error during validation of %r. %r.', request, e)
response_body = e.json
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
response_body = '%s(%s);' % (request.callback, response_body)
resp_headers.update(e.headers)
return resp_headers, response_body, e.status_code
self.request_validator.revoke_token(request.token,
request.token_type_hint, request)
response_body = ''
if self.enable_jsonp and request.callback:
response_body = request.callback + '();'
return {}, response_body, 200
def validate_revocation_request(self, request):
"""Ensure the request is valid.
The client constructs the request by including the following parameters
using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format in the HTTP
request entity-body:
token (REQUIRED). The token that the client wants to get revoked.
token_type_hint (OPTIONAL). A hint about the type of the token
submitted for revocation. Clients MAY pass this parameter in order to
help the authorization server to optimize the token lookup. If the
server is unable to locate the token using the given hint, it MUST
extend its search accross all of its supported token types. An
authorization server MAY ignore this parameter, particularly if it is
able to detect the token type automatically. This specification
defines two such values:
* access_token: An Access Token as defined in [RFC6749],
`section 1.4`_
* refresh_token: A Refresh Token as defined in [RFC6749],
`section 1.5`_
Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
specification MAY define other values for this parameter using
the registry defined in `Section 4.1.2`_.
The client also includes its authentication credentials as described in
`Section 2.3`_. of [`RFC6749`_].
.. _`section 1.4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.4
.. _`section 1.5`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.5
.. _`section 2.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.3
.. _`Section 4.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-revocation-11#section-4.1.2
.. _`RFC6749`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749
"""
self._raise_on_bad_method(request)
self._raise_on_bad_post_request(request)
self._raise_on_missing_token(request)
self._raise_on_invalid_client(request)
self._raise_on_unsupported_token(request)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OAuth 2.0 RFC6749.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib.common import Request
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749 import utils
from .base import BaseEndpoint, catch_errors_and_unavailability
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class TokenEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""Token issuing endpoint.
The token endpoint is used by the client to obtain an access token by
presenting its authorization grant or refresh token. The token
endpoint is used with every authorization grant except for the
implicit grant type (since an access token is issued directly).
The means through which the client obtains the location of the token
endpoint are beyond the scope of this specification, but the location
is typically provided in the service documentation.
The endpoint URI MAY include an "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
formatted (per `Appendix B`_) query component,
which MUST be retained when adding additional query parameters. The
endpoint URI MUST NOT include a fragment component::
https://example.com/path?query=component # OK
https://example.com/path?query=component#fragment # Not OK
Since requests to the authorization endpoint result in user
Since requests to the token endpoint result in the transmission of
clear-text credentials (in the HTTP request and response), the
authorization server MUST require the use of TLS as described in
Section 1.6 when sending requests to the token endpoint::
# We will deny any request which URI schema is not with https
The client MUST use the HTTP "POST" method when making access token
requests::
# HTTP method is currently not enforced
Parameters sent without a value MUST be treated as if they were
omitted from the request. The authorization server MUST ignore
unrecognized request parameters. Request and response parameters
MUST NOT be included more than once::
# Delegated to each grant type.
.. _`Appendix B`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
"""
valid_request_methods = ('POST',)
def __init__(self, default_grant_type, default_token_type, grant_types):
BaseEndpoint.__init__(self)
self._grant_types = grant_types
self._default_token_type = default_token_type
self._default_grant_type = default_grant_type
@property
def grant_types(self):
return self._grant_types
@property
def default_grant_type(self):
return self._default_grant_type
@property
def default_grant_type_handler(self):
return self.grant_types.get(self.default_grant_type)
@property
def default_token_type(self):
return self._default_token_type
@catch_errors_and_unavailability
def create_token_response(self, uri, http_method='POST', body=None,
headers=None, credentials=None, grant_type_for_scope=None,
claims=None):
"""Extract grant_type and route to the designated handler."""
request = Request(
uri, http_method=http_method, body=body, headers=headers)
self.validate_token_request(request)
# 'scope' is an allowed Token Request param in both the "Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant"
# and "Client Credentials Grant" flows
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.3.2
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.4.2
request.scopes = utils.scope_to_list(request.scope)
request.extra_credentials = credentials
if grant_type_for_scope:
request.grant_type = grant_type_for_scope
# OpenID Connect claims, if provided. The server using oauthlib might choose
# to implement the claims parameter of the Authorization Request. In this case
# it should retrieve those claims and pass them via the claims argument here,
# as a dict.
if claims:
request.claims = claims
grant_type_handler = self.grant_types.get(request.grant_type,
self.default_grant_type_handler)
log.debug('Dispatching grant_type %s request to %r.',
request.grant_type, grant_type_handler)
return grant_type_handler.create_token_response(
request, self.default_token_type)
def validate_token_request(self, request):
self._raise_on_bad_method(request)
self._raise_on_bad_post_request(request)

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# coding=utf-8
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.errors
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Error used both by OAuth 2 clients and providers to represent the spec
defined error responses for all four core grant types.
"""
from __future__ import unicode_literals
import json
from oauthlib.common import add_params_to_uri, urlencode
class OAuth2Error(Exception):
error = None
status_code = 400
description = ''
def __init__(self, description=None, uri=None, state=None,
status_code=None, request=None):
"""
:param description: A human-readable ASCII [USASCII] text providing
additional information, used to assist the client
developer in understanding the error that occurred.
Values for the "error_description" parameter
MUST NOT include characters outside the set
x20-21 / x23-5B / x5D-7E.
:param uri: A URI identifying a human-readable web page with information
about the error, used to provide the client developer with
additional information about the error. Values for the
"error_uri" parameter MUST conform to the URI- Reference
syntax, and thus MUST NOT include characters outside the set
x21 / x23-5B / x5D-7E.
:param state: A CSRF protection value received from the client.
:param status_code:
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
if description is not None:
self.description = description
message = '(%s) %s' % (self.error, self.description)
if request:
message += ' ' + repr(request)
super(OAuth2Error, self).__init__(message)
self.uri = uri
self.state = state
if status_code:
self.status_code = status_code
if request:
self.redirect_uri = request.redirect_uri
self.client_id = request.client_id
self.scopes = request.scopes
self.response_type = request.response_type
self.response_mode = request.response_mode
self.grant_type = request.grant_type
if not state:
self.state = request.state
else:
self.redirect_uri = None
self.client_id = None
self.scopes = None
self.response_type = None
self.response_mode = None
self.grant_type = None
def in_uri(self, uri):
fragment = self.response_mode == "fragment"
return add_params_to_uri(uri, self.twotuples, fragment)
@property
def twotuples(self):
error = [('error', self.error)]
if self.description:
error.append(('error_description', self.description))
if self.uri:
error.append(('error_uri', self.uri))
if self.state:
error.append(('state', self.state))
return error
@property
def urlencoded(self):
return urlencode(self.twotuples)
@property
def json(self):
return json.dumps(dict(self.twotuples))
@property
def headers(self):
if self.status_code == 401:
"""
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750#section-3
All challenges defined by this specification MUST use the auth-scheme
value "Bearer". This scheme MUST be followed by one or more
auth-param values.
"""
authvalues = [
"Bearer",
'error="{}"'.format(self.error)
]
if self.description:
authvalues.append('error_description="{}"'.format(self.description))
if self.uri:
authvalues.append('error_uri="{}"'.format(self.uri))
return {"WWW-Authenticate": ", ".join(authvalues)}
return {}
class TokenExpiredError(OAuth2Error):
error = 'token_expired'
class InsecureTransportError(OAuth2Error):
error = 'insecure_transport'
description = 'OAuth 2 MUST utilize https.'
class MismatchingStateError(OAuth2Error):
error = 'mismatching_state'
description = 'CSRF Warning! State not equal in request and response.'
class MissingCodeError(OAuth2Error):
error = 'missing_code'
class MissingTokenError(OAuth2Error):
error = 'missing_token'
class MissingTokenTypeError(OAuth2Error):
error = 'missing_token_type'
class FatalClientError(OAuth2Error):
"""
Errors during authorization where user should not be redirected back.
If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching
redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid,
the authorization server SHOULD inform the resource owner of the
error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user-agent to the
invalid redirection URI.
Instead the user should be informed of the error by the provider itself.
"""
pass
class InvalidRequestFatalError(FatalClientError):
"""
For fatal errors, the request is missing a required parameter, includes
an invalid parameter value, includes a parameter more than once, or is
otherwise malformed.
"""
error = 'invalid_request'
class InvalidRedirectURIError(InvalidRequestFatalError):
description = 'Invalid redirect URI.'
class MissingRedirectURIError(InvalidRequestFatalError):
description = 'Missing redirect URI.'
class MismatchingRedirectURIError(InvalidRequestFatalError):
description = 'Mismatching redirect URI.'
class InvalidClientIdError(InvalidRequestFatalError):
description = 'Invalid client_id parameter value.'
class MissingClientIdError(InvalidRequestFatalError):
description = 'Missing client_id parameter.'
class InvalidRequestError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The request is missing a required parameter, includes an invalid
parameter value, includes a parameter more than once, or is
otherwise malformed.
"""
error = 'invalid_request'
class MissingResponseTypeError(InvalidRequestError):
description = 'Missing response_type parameter.'
class MissingCodeChallengeError(InvalidRequestError):
"""
If the server requires Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) by OAuth
public clients and the client does not send the "code_challenge" in
the request, the authorization endpoint MUST return the authorization
error response with the "error" value set to "invalid_request". The
"error_description" or the response of "error_uri" SHOULD explain the
nature of error, e.g., code challenge required.
"""
description = 'Code challenge required.'
class MissingCodeVerifierError(InvalidRequestError):
"""
The request to the token endpoint, when PKCE is enabled, has
the parameter `code_verifier` REQUIRED.
"""
description = 'Code verifier required.'
class AccessDeniedError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The resource owner or authorization server denied the request.
"""
error = 'access_denied'
class UnsupportedResponseTypeError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The authorization server does not support obtaining an authorization
code using this method.
"""
error = 'unsupported_response_type'
class UnsupportedCodeChallengeMethodError(InvalidRequestError):
"""
If the server supporting PKCE does not support the requested
transformation, the authorization endpoint MUST return the
authorization error response with "error" value set to
"invalid_request". The "error_description" or the response of
"error_uri" SHOULD explain the nature of error, e.g., transform
algorithm not supported.
"""
description = 'Transform algorithm not supported.'
class InvalidScopeError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The requested scope is invalid, unknown, or malformed, or
exceeds the scope granted by the resource owner.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
"""
error = 'invalid_scope'
class ServerError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The authorization server encountered an unexpected condition that
prevented it from fulfilling the request. (This error code is needed
because a 500 Internal Server Error HTTP status code cannot be returned
to the client via a HTTP redirect.)
"""
error = 'server_error'
class TemporarilyUnavailableError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The authorization server is currently unable to handle the request
due to a temporary overloading or maintenance of the server.
(This error code is needed because a 503 Service Unavailable HTTP
status code cannot be returned to the client via a HTTP redirect.)
"""
error = 'temporarily_unavailable'
class InvalidClientError(FatalClientError):
"""
Client authentication failed (e.g. unknown client, no client
authentication included, or unsupported authentication method).
The authorization server MAY return an HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status
code to indicate which HTTP authentication schemes are supported.
If the client attempted to authenticate via the "Authorization" request
header field, the authorization server MUST respond with an
HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code, and include the "WWW-Authenticate"
response header field matching the authentication scheme used by the
client.
"""
error = 'invalid_client'
status_code = 401
class InvalidGrantError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The provided authorization grant (e.g. authorization code, resource
owner credentials) or refresh token is invalid, expired, revoked, does
not match the redirection URI used in the authorization request, or was
issued to another client.
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
"""
error = 'invalid_grant'
status_code = 400
class UnauthorizedClientError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The authenticated client is not authorized to use this authorization
grant type.
"""
error = 'unauthorized_client'
class UnsupportedGrantTypeError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The authorization grant type is not supported by the authorization
server.
"""
error = 'unsupported_grant_type'
class UnsupportedTokenTypeError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The authorization server does not support the hint of the
presented token type. I.e. the client tried to revoke an access token
on a server not supporting this feature.
"""
error = 'unsupported_token_type'
class InvalidTokenError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, or
invalid for other reasons. The resource SHOULD respond with
the HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code. The client MAY
request a new access token and retry the protected resource
request.
"""
error = 'invalid_token'
status_code = 401
description = ("The access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, "
"or invalid for other reasons.")
class InsufficientScopeError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The request requires higher privileges than provided by the
access token. The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP
403 (Forbidden) status code and MAY include the "scope"
attribute with the scope necessary to access the protected
resource.
"""
error = 'insufficient_scope'
status_code = 403
description = ("The request requires higher privileges than provided by "
"the access token.")
class ConsentRequired(OAuth2Error):
"""
The Authorization Server requires End-User consent.
This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter value in the
Authentication Request is none, but the Authentication Request cannot be
completed without displaying a user interface for End-User consent.
"""
error = 'consent_required'
class LoginRequired(OAuth2Error):
"""
The Authorization Server requires End-User authentication.
This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter value in the
Authentication Request is none, but the Authentication Request cannot be
completed without displaying a user interface for End-User authentication.
"""
error = 'login_required'
class CustomOAuth2Error(OAuth2Error):
"""
This error is a placeholder for all custom errors not described by the RFC.
Some of the popular OAuth2 providers are using custom errors.
"""
def __init__(self, error, *args, **kwargs):
self.error = error
super(CustomOAuth2Error, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs)
def raise_from_error(error, params=None):
import inspect
import sys
kwargs = {
'description': params.get('error_description'),
'uri': params.get('error_uri'),
'state': params.get('state')
}
for _, cls in inspect.getmembers(sys.modules[__name__], inspect.isclass):
if cls.error == error:
raise cls(**kwargs)
raise CustomOAuth2Error(error=error, **kwargs)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import unicode_literals, absolute_import
from .authorization_code import AuthorizationCodeGrant
from .implicit import ImplicitGrant
from .resource_owner_password_credentials import ResourceOwnerPasswordCredentialsGrant
from .client_credentials import ClientCredentialsGrant
from .refresh_token import RefreshTokenGrant

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oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/authorization_code.py Normal file
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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import base64
import hashlib
import json
import logging
from oauthlib import common
from .. import errors
from .base import GrantTypeBase
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
def code_challenge_method_s256(verifier, challenge):
"""
If the "code_challenge_method" from `Section 4.3`_ was "S256", the
received "code_verifier" is hashed by SHA-256, base64url-encoded, and
then compared to the "code_challenge", i.e.:
BASE64URL-ENCODE(SHA256(ASCII(code_verifier))) == code_challenge
How to implement a base64url-encoding
function without padding, based upon the standard base64-encoding
function that uses padding.
To be concrete, example C# code implementing these functions is shown
below. Similar code could be used in other languages.
static string base64urlencode(byte [] arg)
{
string s = Convert.ToBase64String(arg); // Regular base64 encoder
s = s.Split('=')[0]; // Remove any trailing '='s
s = s.Replace('+', '-'); // 62nd char of encoding
s = s.Replace('/', '_'); // 63rd char of encoding
return s;
}
In python urlsafe_b64encode is already replacing '+' and '/', but preserve
the trailing '='. So we have to remove it.
.. _`Section 4.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636#section-4.3
"""
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(
hashlib.sha256(verifier.encode()).digest()
).decode().rstrip('=') == challenge
def code_challenge_method_plain(verifier, challenge):
"""
If the "code_challenge_method" from `Section 4.3`_ was "plain", they are
compared directly, i.e.:
code_verifier == code_challenge.
.. _`Section 4.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636#section-4.3
"""
return verifier == challenge
class AuthorizationCodeGrant(GrantTypeBase):
"""`Authorization Code Grant`_
The authorization code grant type is used to obtain both access
tokens and refresh tokens and is optimized for confidential clients.
Since this is a redirection-based flow, the client must be capable of
interacting with the resource owner's user-agent (typically a web
browser) and capable of receiving incoming requests (via redirection)
from the authorization server::
+----------+
| Resource |
| Owner |
| |
+----------+
^
|
(B)
+----|-----+ Client Identifier +---------------+
| -+----(A)-- & Redirection URI ---->| |
| User- | | Authorization |
| Agent -+----(B)-- User authenticates --->| Server |
| | | |
| -+----(C)-- Authorization Code ---<| |
+-|----|---+ +---------------+
| | ^ v
(A) (C) | |
| | | |
^ v | |
+---------+ | |
| |>---(D)-- Authorization Code ---------' |
| Client | & Redirection URI |
| | |
| |<---(E)----- Access Token -------------------'
+---------+ (w/ Optional Refresh Token)
Note: The lines illustrating steps (A), (B), and (C) are broken into
two parts as they pass through the user-agent.
Figure 3: Authorization Code Flow
The flow illustrated in Figure 3 includes the following steps:
(A) The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
user-agent to the authorization endpoint. The client includes
its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
redirection URI to which the authorization server will send the
user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
(B) The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
grants or denies the client's access request.
(C) Assuming the resource owner grants access, the authorization
server redirects the user-agent back to the client using the
redirection URI provided earlier (in the request or during
client registration). The redirection URI includes an
authorization code and any local state provided by the client
earlier.
(D) The client requests an access token from the authorization
server's token endpoint by including the authorization code
received in the previous step. When making the request, the
client authenticates with the authorization server. The client
includes the redirection URI used to obtain the authorization
code for verification.
(E) The authorization server authenticates the client, validates the
authorization code, and ensures that the redirection URI
received matches the URI used to redirect the client in
step (C). If valid, the authorization server responds back with
an access token and, optionally, a refresh token.
OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing the Authorization Code Grant are
susceptible to the authorization code interception attack.
A technique to mitigate against the threat through the use of Proof Key for Code
Exchange (PKCE, pronounced "pixy") is implemented in the current oauthlib
implementation.
.. _`Authorization Code Grant`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1
.. _`PKCE`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636
"""
default_response_mode = 'query'
response_types = ['code']
# This dict below is private because as RFC mention it:
# "S256" is Mandatory To Implement (MTI) on the server.
#
_code_challenge_methods = {
'plain': code_challenge_method_plain,
'S256': code_challenge_method_s256
}
def create_authorization_code(self, request):
"""
Generates an authorization grant represented as a dictionary.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
grant = {'code': common.generate_token()}
if hasattr(request, 'state') and request.state:
grant['state'] = request.state
log.debug('Created authorization code grant %r for request %r.',
grant, request)
return grant
def create_authorization_response(self, request, token_handler):
"""
The client constructs the request URI by adding the following
parameters to the query component of the authorization endpoint URI
using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per `Appendix B`_:
response_type
REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "code" for standard OAuth2
authorization flow. For OpenID Connect it must be one of
"code token", "code id_token", or "code token id_token" - we
essentially test that "code" appears in the response_type.
client_id
REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in `Section 2.2`_.
redirect_uri
OPTIONAL. As described in `Section 3.1.2`_.
scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
`Section 3.3`_.
state
RECOMMENDED. An opaque value used by the client to maintain
state between the request and callback. The authorization
server includes this value when redirecting the user-agent back
to the client. The parameter SHOULD be used for preventing
cross-site request forgery as described in `Section 10.12`_.
The client directs the resource owner to the constructed URI using an
HTTP redirection response, or by other means available to it via the
user-agent.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
:returns: headers, body, status
:raises: FatalClientError on invalid redirect URI or client id.
A few examples::
>>> from your_validator import your_validator
>>> request = Request('https://example.com/authorize?client_id=valid'
... '&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fclient.com%2F')
>>> from oauthlib.common import Request
>>> from oauthlib.oauth2 import AuthorizationCodeGrant, BearerToken
>>> token = BearerToken(your_validator)
>>> grant = AuthorizationCodeGrant(your_validator)
>>> request.scopes = ['authorized', 'in', 'some', 'form']
>>> grant.create_authorization_response(request, token)
(u'http://client.com/?error=invalid_request&error_description=Missing+response_type+parameter.', None, None, 400)
>>> request = Request('https://example.com/authorize?client_id=valid'
... '&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fclient.com%2F'
... '&response_type=code')
>>> request.scopes = ['authorized', 'in', 'some', 'form']
>>> grant.create_authorization_response(request, token)
(u'http://client.com/?code=u3F05aEObJuP2k7DordviIgW5wl52N', None, None, 200)
>>> # If the client id or redirect uri fails validation
>>> grant.create_authorization_response(request, token)
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module>
File "oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types.py", line 515, in create_authorization_response
>>> grant.create_authorization_response(request, token)
File "oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types.py", line 591, in validate_authorization_request
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.errors.InvalidClientIdError
.. _`Appendix B`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
.. _`Section 2.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.2
.. _`Section 3.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`Section 10.12`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.12
"""
try:
self.validate_authorization_request(request)
log.debug('Pre resource owner authorization validation ok for %r.',
request)
# If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching
# redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid,
# the authorization server SHOULD inform the resource owner of the
# error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user-agent to the
# invalid redirection URI.
except errors.FatalClientError as e:
log.debug('Fatal client error during validation of %r. %r.',
request, e)
raise
# If the resource owner denies the access request or if the request
# fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid redirection URI,
# the authorization server informs the client by adding the following
# parameters to the query component of the redirection URI using the
# "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per Appendix B:
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
except errors.OAuth2Error as e:
log.debug('Client error during validation of %r. %r.', request, e)
request.redirect_uri = request.redirect_uri or self.error_uri
redirect_uri = common.add_params_to_uri(
request.redirect_uri, e.twotuples,
fragment=request.response_mode == "fragment")
return {'Location': redirect_uri}, None, 302
grant = self.create_authorization_code(request)
for modifier in self._code_modifiers:
grant = modifier(grant, token_handler, request)
log.debug('Saving grant %r for %r.', grant, request)
self.request_validator.save_authorization_code(
request.client_id, grant, request)
return self.prepare_authorization_response(
request, grant, {}, None, 302)
def create_token_response(self, request, token_handler):
"""Validate the authorization code.
The client MUST NOT use the authorization code more than once. If an
authorization code is used more than once, the authorization server
MUST deny the request and SHOULD revoke (when possible) all tokens
previously issued based on that authorization code. The authorization
code is bound to the client identifier and redirection URI.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
"""
headers = self._get_default_headers()
try:
self.validate_token_request(request)
log.debug('Token request validation ok for %r.', request)
except errors.OAuth2Error as e:
log.debug('Client error during validation of %r. %r.', request, e)
headers.update(e.headers)
return headers, e.json, e.status_code
token = token_handler.create_token(request, refresh_token=self.refresh_token)
for modifier in self._token_modifiers:
token = modifier(token, token_handler, request)
self.request_validator.save_token(token, request)
self.request_validator.invalidate_authorization_code(
request.client_id, request.code, request)
return headers, json.dumps(token), 200
def validate_authorization_request(self, request):
"""Check the authorization request for normal and fatal errors.
A normal error could be a missing response_type parameter or the client
attempting to access scope it is not allowed to ask authorization for.
Normal errors can safely be included in the redirection URI and
sent back to the client.
Fatal errors occur when the client_id or redirect_uri is invalid or
missing. These must be caught by the provider and handled, how this
is done is outside of the scope of OAuthLib but showing an error
page describing the issue is a good idea.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
# First check for fatal errors
# If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching
# redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid,
# the authorization server SHOULD inform the resource owner of the
# error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user-agent to the
# invalid redirection URI.
# First check duplicate parameters
for param in ('client_id', 'response_type', 'redirect_uri', 'scope', 'state'):
try:
duplicate_params = request.duplicate_params
except ValueError:
raise errors.InvalidRequestFatalError(description='Unable to parse query string', request=request)
if param in duplicate_params:
raise errors.InvalidRequestFatalError(description='Duplicate %s parameter.' % param, request=request)
# REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in Section 2.2.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.2
if not request.client_id:
raise errors.MissingClientIdError(request=request)
if not self.request_validator.validate_client_id(request.client_id, request):
raise errors.InvalidClientIdError(request=request)
# OPTIONAL. As described in Section 3.1.2.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
log.debug('Validating redirection uri %s for client %s.',
request.redirect_uri, request.client_id)
# OPTIONAL. As described in Section 3.1.2.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
self._handle_redirects(request)
# Then check for normal errors.
# If the resource owner denies the access request or if the request
# fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid redirection URI,
# the authorization server informs the client by adding the following
# parameters to the query component of the redirection URI using the
# "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per Appendix B.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
# Note that the correct parameters to be added are automatically
# populated through the use of specific exceptions.
request_info = {}
for validator in self.custom_validators.pre_auth:
request_info.update(validator(request))
# REQUIRED.
if request.response_type is None:
raise errors.MissingResponseTypeError(request=request)
# Value MUST be set to "code" or one of the OpenID authorization code including
# response_types "code token", "code id_token", "code token id_token"
elif not 'code' in request.response_type and request.response_type != 'none':
raise errors.UnsupportedResponseTypeError(request=request)
if not self.request_validator.validate_response_type(request.client_id,
request.response_type,
request.client, request):
log.debug('Client %s is not authorized to use response_type %s.',
request.client_id, request.response_type)
raise errors.UnauthorizedClientError(request=request)
# OPTIONAL. Validate PKCE request or reply with "error"/"invalid_request"
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.4.1
if self.request_validator.is_pkce_required(request.client_id, request) is True:
if request.code_challenge is None:
raise errors.MissingCodeChallengeError(request=request)
if request.code_challenge is not None:
request_info["code_challenge"] = request.code_challenge
# OPTIONAL, defaults to "plain" if not present in the request.
if request.code_challenge_method is None:
request.code_challenge_method = "plain"
if request.code_challenge_method not in self._code_challenge_methods:
raise errors.UnsupportedCodeChallengeMethodError(request=request)
request_info["code_challenge_method"] = request.code_challenge_method
# OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by Section 3.3
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
self.validate_scopes(request)
request_info.update({
'client_id': request.client_id,
'redirect_uri': request.redirect_uri,
'response_type': request.response_type,
'state': request.state,
'request': request
})
for validator in self.custom_validators.post_auth:
request_info.update(validator(request))
return request.scopes, request_info
def validate_token_request(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
# REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "authorization_code".
if request.grant_type not in ('authorization_code', 'openid'):
raise errors.UnsupportedGrantTypeError(request=request)
for validator in self.custom_validators.pre_token:
validator(request)
if request.code is None:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Missing code parameter.', request=request)
for param in ('client_id', 'grant_type', 'redirect_uri'):
if param in request.duplicate_params:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(description='Duplicate %s parameter.' % param,
request=request)
if self.request_validator.client_authentication_required(request):
# If the client type is confidential or the client was issued client
# credentials (or assigned other authentication requirements), the
# client MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described
# in Section 3.2.1.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
if not self.request_validator.authenticate_client(request):
log.debug('Client authentication failed, %r.', request)
raise errors.InvalidClientError(request=request)
elif not self.request_validator.authenticate_client_id(request.client_id, request):
# REQUIRED, if the client is not authenticating with the
# authorization server as described in Section 3.2.1.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
log.debug('Client authentication failed, %r.', request)
raise errors.InvalidClientError(request=request)
if not hasattr(request.client, 'client_id'):
raise NotImplementedError('Authenticate client must set the '
'request.client.client_id attribute '
'in authenticate_client.')
request.client_id = request.client_id or request.client.client_id
# Ensure client is authorized use of this grant type
self.validate_grant_type(request)
# REQUIRED. The authorization code received from the
# authorization server.
if not self.request_validator.validate_code(request.client_id,
request.code, request.client, request):
log.debug('Client, %r (%r), is not allowed access to scopes %r.',
request.client_id, request.client, request.scopes)
raise errors.InvalidGrantError(request=request)
# OPTIONAL. Validate PKCE code_verifier
challenge = self.request_validator.get_code_challenge(request.code, request)
if challenge is not None:
if request.code_verifier is None:
raise errors.MissingCodeVerifierError(request=request)
challenge_method = self.request_validator.get_code_challenge_method(request.code, request)
if challenge_method is None:
raise errors.InvalidGrantError(request=request, description="Challenge method not found")
if challenge_method not in self._code_challenge_methods:
raise errors.ServerError(
description="code_challenge_method {} is not supported.".format(challenge_method),
request=request
)
if not self.validate_code_challenge(challenge,
challenge_method,
request.code_verifier):
log.debug('request provided a invalid code_verifier.')
raise errors.InvalidGrantError(request=request)
elif self.request_validator.is_pkce_required(request.client_id, request) is True:
if request.code_verifier is None:
raise errors.MissingCodeVerifierError(request=request)
raise errors.InvalidGrantError(request=request, description="Challenge not found")
for attr in ('user', 'scopes'):
if getattr(request, attr, None) is None:
log.debug('request.%s was not set on code validation.', attr)
# REQUIRED, if the "redirect_uri" parameter was included in the
# authorization request as described in Section 4.1.1, and their
# values MUST be identical.
if request.redirect_uri is None:
request.using_default_redirect_uri = True
request.redirect_uri = self.request_validator.get_default_redirect_uri(
request.client_id, request)
log.debug('Using default redirect_uri %s.', request.redirect_uri)
if not request.redirect_uri:
raise errors.MissingRedirectURIError(request=request)
else:
request.using_default_redirect_uri = False
log.debug('Using provided redirect_uri %s', request.redirect_uri)
if not self.request_validator.confirm_redirect_uri(request.client_id, request.code,
request.redirect_uri, request.client,
request):
log.debug('Redirect_uri (%r) invalid for client %r (%r).',
request.redirect_uri, request.client_id, request.client)
raise errors.MismatchingRedirectURIError(request=request)
for validator in self.custom_validators.post_token:
validator(request)
def validate_code_challenge(self, challenge, challenge_method, verifier):
if challenge_method in self._code_challenge_methods:
return self._code_challenge_methods[challenge_method](verifier, challenge)
raise NotImplementedError('Unknown challenge_method %s' % challenge_method)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from itertools import chain
from oauthlib.common import add_params_to_uri
from oauthlib.uri_validate import is_absolute_uri
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749 import errors, utils
from ..request_validator import RequestValidator
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class ValidatorsContainer(object):
"""
Container object for holding custom validator callables to be invoked
as part of the grant type `validate_authorization_request()` or
`validate_authorization_request()` methods on the various grant types.
Authorization validators must be callables that take a request object and
return a dict, which may contain items to be added to the `request_info`
returned from the grant_type after validation.
Token validators must be callables that take a request object and
return None.
Both authorization validators and token validators may raise OAuth2
exceptions if validation conditions fail.
Authorization validators added to `pre_auth` will be run BEFORE
the standard validations (but after the critical ones that raise
fatal errors) as part of `validate_authorization_request()`
Authorization validators added to `post_auth` will be run AFTER
the standard validations as part of `validate_authorization_request()`
Token validators added to `pre_token` will be run BEFORE
the standard validations as part of `validate_token_request()`
Token validators added to `post_token` will be run AFTER
the standard validations as part of `validate_token_request()`
For example:
>>> def my_auth_validator(request):
... return {'myval': True}
>>> auth_code_grant = AuthorizationCodeGrant(request_validator)
>>> auth_code_grant.custom_validators.pre_auth.append(my_auth_validator)
>>> def my_token_validator(request):
... if not request.everything_okay:
... raise errors.OAuth2Error("uh-oh")
>>> auth_code_grant.custom_validators.post_token.append(my_token_validator)
"""
def __init__(self, post_auth, post_token,
pre_auth, pre_token):
self.pre_auth = pre_auth
self.post_auth = post_auth
self.pre_token = pre_token
self.post_token = post_token
@property
def all_pre(self):
return chain(self.pre_auth, self.pre_token)
@property
def all_post(self):
return chain(self.post_auth, self.post_token)
class GrantTypeBase(object):
error_uri = None
request_validator = None
default_response_mode = 'fragment'
refresh_token = True
response_types = ['code']
def __init__(self, request_validator=None, **kwargs):
self.request_validator = request_validator or RequestValidator()
# Transforms class variables into instance variables:
self.response_types = self.response_types
self.refresh_token = self.refresh_token
self._setup_custom_validators(kwargs)
self._code_modifiers = []
self._token_modifiers = []
for kw, val in kwargs.items():
setattr(self, kw, val)
def _setup_custom_validators(self, kwargs):
post_auth = kwargs.get('post_auth', [])
post_token = kwargs.get('post_token', [])
pre_auth = kwargs.get('pre_auth', [])
pre_token = kwargs.get('pre_token', [])
if not hasattr(self, 'validate_authorization_request'):
if post_auth or pre_auth:
msg = ("{} does not support authorization validators. Use "
"token validators instead.").format(self.__class__.__name__)
raise ValueError(msg)
# Using tuples here because they can't be appended to:
post_auth, pre_auth = (), ()
self.custom_validators = ValidatorsContainer(post_auth, post_token,
pre_auth, pre_token)
def register_response_type(self, response_type):
self.response_types.append(response_type)
def register_code_modifier(self, modifier):
self._code_modifiers.append(modifier)
def register_token_modifier(self, modifier):
self._token_modifiers.append(modifier)
def create_authorization_response(self, request, token_handler):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def create_token_response(self, request, token_handler):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def add_token(self, token, token_handler, request):
"""
:param token:
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
# Only add a hybrid access token on auth step if asked for
if not request.response_type in ["token", "code token", "id_token token", "code id_token token"]:
return token
token.update(token_handler.create_token(request, refresh_token=False))
return token
def validate_grant_type(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
client_id = getattr(request, 'client_id', None)
if not self.request_validator.validate_grant_type(client_id,
request.grant_type, request.client, request):
log.debug('Unauthorized from %r (%r) access to grant type %s.',
request.client_id, request.client, request.grant_type)
raise errors.UnauthorizedClientError(request=request)
def validate_scopes(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
if not request.scopes:
request.scopes = utils.scope_to_list(request.scope) or utils.scope_to_list(
self.request_validator.get_default_scopes(request.client_id, request))
log.debug('Validating access to scopes %r for client %r (%r).',
request.scopes, request.client_id, request.client)
if not self.request_validator.validate_scopes(request.client_id,
request.scopes, request.client, request):
raise errors.InvalidScopeError(request=request)
def prepare_authorization_response(self, request, token, headers, body, status):
"""Place token according to response mode.
Base classes can define a default response mode for their authorization
response by overriding the static `default_response_mode` member.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token:
:param headers:
:param body:
:param status:
"""
request.response_mode = request.response_mode or self.default_response_mode
if request.response_mode not in ('query', 'fragment'):
log.debug('Overriding invalid response mode %s with %s',
request.response_mode, self.default_response_mode)
request.response_mode = self.default_response_mode
token_items = token.items()
if request.response_type == 'none':
state = token.get('state', None)
if state:
token_items = [('state', state)]
else:
token_items = []
if request.response_mode == 'query':
headers['Location'] = add_params_to_uri(
request.redirect_uri, token_items, fragment=False)
return headers, body, status
if request.response_mode == 'fragment':
headers['Location'] = add_params_to_uri(
request.redirect_uri, token_items, fragment=True)
return headers, body, status
raise NotImplementedError(
'Subclasses must set a valid default_response_mode')
def _get_default_headers(self):
"""Create default headers for grant responses."""
return {
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'Cache-Control': 'no-store',
'Pragma': 'no-cache',
}
def _handle_redirects(self, request):
if request.redirect_uri is not None:
request.using_default_redirect_uri = False
log.debug('Using provided redirect_uri %s', request.redirect_uri)
if not is_absolute_uri(request.redirect_uri):
raise errors.InvalidRedirectURIError(request=request)
# The authorization server MUST verify that the redirection URI
# to which it will redirect the access token matches a
# redirection URI registered by the client as described in
# Section 3.1.2.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
if not self.request_validator.validate_redirect_uri(
request.client_id, request.redirect_uri, request):
raise errors.MismatchingRedirectURIError(request=request)
else:
request.redirect_uri = self.request_validator.get_default_redirect_uri(
request.client_id, request)
request.using_default_redirect_uri = True
log.debug('Using default redirect_uri %s.', request.redirect_uri)
if not request.redirect_uri:
raise errors.MissingRedirectURIError(request=request)
if not is_absolute_uri(request.redirect_uri):
raise errors.InvalidRedirectURIError(request=request)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import json
import logging
from .. import errors
from ..request_validator import RequestValidator
from .base import GrantTypeBase
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class ClientCredentialsGrant(GrantTypeBase):
"""`Client Credentials Grant`_
The client can request an access token using only its client
credentials (or other supported means of authentication) when the
client is requesting access to the protected resources under its
control, or those of another resource owner that have been previously
arranged with the authorization server (the method of which is beyond
the scope of this specification).
The client credentials grant type MUST only be used by confidential
clients::
+---------+ +---------------+
: : : :
: :>-- A - Client Authentication --->: Authorization :
: Client : : Server :
: :<-- B ---- Access Token ---------<: :
: : : :
+---------+ +---------------+
Figure 6: Client Credentials Flow
The flow illustrated in Figure 6 includes the following steps:
(A) The client authenticates with the authorization server and
requests an access token from the token endpoint.
(B) The authorization server authenticates the client, and if valid,
issues an access token.
.. _`Client Credentials Grant`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.4
"""
def create_token_response(self, request, token_handler):
"""Return token or error in JSON format.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
If the access token request is valid and authorized, the
authorization server issues an access token as described in
`Section 5.1`_. A refresh token SHOULD NOT be included. If the request
failed client authentication or is invalid, the authorization server
returns an error response as described in `Section 5.2`_.
.. _`Section 5.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.1
.. _`Section 5.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
"""
headers = self._get_default_headers()
try:
log.debug('Validating access token request, %r.', request)
self.validate_token_request(request)
except errors.OAuth2Error as e:
log.debug('Client error in token request. %s.', e)
headers.update(e.headers)
return headers, e.json, e.status_code
token = token_handler.create_token(request, refresh_token=False)
for modifier in self._token_modifiers:
token = modifier(token)
self.request_validator.save_token(token, request)
log.debug('Issuing token to client id %r (%r), %r.',
request.client_id, request.client, token)
return headers, json.dumps(token), 200
def validate_token_request(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
for validator in self.custom_validators.pre_token:
validator(request)
if not getattr(request, 'grant_type', None):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError('Request is missing grant type.',
request=request)
if not request.grant_type == 'client_credentials':
raise errors.UnsupportedGrantTypeError(request=request)
for param in ('grant_type', 'scope'):
if param in request.duplicate_params:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(description='Duplicate %s parameter.' % param,
request=request)
log.debug('Authenticating client, %r.', request)
if not self.request_validator.authenticate_client(request):
log.debug('Client authentication failed, %r.', request)
raise errors.InvalidClientError(request=request)
else:
if not hasattr(request.client, 'client_id'):
raise NotImplementedError('Authenticate client must set the '
'request.client.client_id attribute '
'in authenticate_client.')
# Ensure client is authorized use of this grant type
self.validate_grant_type(request)
log.debug('Authorizing access to user %r.', request.user)
request.client_id = request.client_id or request.client.client_id
self.validate_scopes(request)
for validator in self.custom_validators.post_token:
validator(request)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib import common
from .. import errors
from .base import GrantTypeBase
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class ImplicitGrant(GrantTypeBase):
"""`Implicit Grant`_
The implicit grant type is used to obtain access tokens (it does not
support the issuance of refresh tokens) and is optimized for public
clients known to operate a particular redirection URI. These clients
are typically implemented in a browser using a scripting language
such as JavaScript.
Unlike the authorization code grant type, in which the client makes
separate requests for authorization and for an access token, the
client receives the access token as the result of the authorization
request.
The implicit grant type does not include client authentication, and
relies on the presence of the resource owner and the registration of
the redirection URI. Because the access token is encoded into the
redirection URI, it may be exposed to the resource owner and other
applications residing on the same device::
+----------+
| Resource |
| Owner |
| |
+----------+
^
|
(B)
+----|-----+ Client Identifier +---------------+
| -+----(A)-- & Redirection URI --->| |
| User- | | Authorization |
| Agent -|----(B)-- User authenticates -->| Server |
| | | |
| |<---(C)--- Redirection URI ----<| |
| | with Access Token +---------------+
| | in Fragment
| | +---------------+
| |----(D)--- Redirection URI ---->| Web-Hosted |
| | without Fragment | Client |
| | | Resource |
| (F) |<---(E)------- Script ---------<| |
| | +---------------+
+-|--------+
| |
(A) (G) Access Token
| |
^ v
+---------+
| |
| Client |
| |
+---------+
Note: The lines illustrating steps (A) and (B) are broken into two
parts as they pass through the user-agent.
Figure 4: Implicit Grant Flow
The flow illustrated in Figure 4 includes the following steps:
(A) The client initiates the flow by directing the resource owner's
user-agent to the authorization endpoint. The client includes
its client identifier, requested scope, local state, and a
redirection URI to which the authorization server will send the
user-agent back once access is granted (or denied).
(B) The authorization server authenticates the resource owner (via
the user-agent) and establishes whether the resource owner
grants or denies the client's access request.
(C) Assuming the resource owner grants access, the authorization
server redirects the user-agent back to the client using the
redirection URI provided earlier. The redirection URI includes
the access token in the URI fragment.
(D) The user-agent follows the redirection instructions by making a
request to the web-hosted client resource (which does not
include the fragment per [RFC2616]). The user-agent retains the
fragment information locally.
(E) The web-hosted client resource returns a web page (typically an
HTML document with an embedded script) capable of accessing the
full redirection URI including the fragment retained by the
user-agent, and extracting the access token (and other
parameters) contained in the fragment.
(F) The user-agent executes the script provided by the web-hosted
client resource locally, which extracts the access token.
(G) The user-agent passes the access token to the client.
See `Section 10.3`_ and `Section 10.16`_ for important security considerations
when using the implicit grant.
.. _`Implicit Grant`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.2
.. _`Section 10.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.3
.. _`Section 10.16`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.16
"""
response_types = ['token']
grant_allows_refresh_token = False
def create_authorization_response(self, request, token_handler):
"""Create an authorization response.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
The client constructs the request URI by adding the following
parameters to the query component of the authorization endpoint URI
using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per `Appendix B`_:
response_type
REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "token" for standard OAuth2 implicit flow
or "id_token token" or just "id_token" for OIDC implicit flow
client_id
REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in `Section 2.2`_.
redirect_uri
OPTIONAL. As described in `Section 3.1.2`_.
scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
`Section 3.3`_.
state
RECOMMENDED. An opaque value used by the client to maintain
state between the request and callback. The authorization
server includes this value when redirecting the user-agent back
to the client. The parameter SHOULD be used for preventing
cross-site request forgery as described in `Section 10.12`_.
The authorization server validates the request to ensure that all
required parameters are present and valid. The authorization server
MUST verify that the redirection URI to which it will redirect the
access token matches a redirection URI registered by the client as
described in `Section 3.1.2`_.
.. _`Section 2.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.2
.. _`Section 3.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`Section 10.12`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.12
.. _`Appendix B`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
"""
return self.create_token_response(request, token_handler)
def create_token_response(self, request, token_handler):
"""Return token or error embedded in the URI fragment.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
If the resource owner grants the access request, the authorization
server issues an access token and delivers it to the client by adding
the following parameters to the fragment component of the redirection
URI using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per
`Appendix B`_:
access_token
REQUIRED. The access token issued by the authorization server.
token_type
REQUIRED. The type of the token issued as described in
`Section 7.1`_. Value is case insensitive.
expires_in
RECOMMENDED. The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For
example, the value "3600" denotes that the access token will
expire in one hour from the time the response was generated.
If omitted, the authorization server SHOULD provide the
expiration time via other means or document the default value.
scope
OPTIONAL, if identical to the scope requested by the client;
otherwise, REQUIRED. The scope of the access token as
described by `Section 3.3`_.
state
REQUIRED if the "state" parameter was present in the client
authorization request. The exact value received from the
client.
The authorization server MUST NOT issue a refresh token.
.. _`Appendix B`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`Section 7.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-7.1
"""
try:
self.validate_token_request(request)
# If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching
# redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid,
# the authorization server SHOULD inform the resource owner of the
# error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user-agent to the
# invalid redirection URI.
except errors.FatalClientError as e:
log.debug('Fatal client error during validation of %r. %r.',
request, e)
raise
# If the resource owner denies the access request or if the request
# fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid redirection URI,
# the authorization server informs the client by adding the following
# parameters to the fragment component of the redirection URI using the
# "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per Appendix B:
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
except errors.OAuth2Error as e:
log.debug('Client error during validation of %r. %r.', request, e)
return {'Location': common.add_params_to_uri(request.redirect_uri, e.twotuples,
fragment=True)}, None, 302
# In OIDC implicit flow it is possible to have a request_type that does not include the access_token!
# "id_token token" - return the access token and the id token
# "id_token" - don't return the access token
if "token" in request.response_type.split():
token = token_handler.create_token(request, refresh_token=False)
else:
token = {}
if request.state is not None:
token['state'] = request.state
for modifier in self._token_modifiers:
token = modifier(token, token_handler, request)
# In OIDC implicit flow it is possible to have a request_type that does
# not include the access_token! In this case there is no need to save a token.
if "token" in request.response_type.split():
self.request_validator.save_token(token, request)
return self.prepare_authorization_response(
request, token, {}, None, 302)
def validate_authorization_request(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
return self.validate_token_request(request)
def validate_token_request(self, request):
"""Check the token request for normal and fatal errors.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
This method is very similar to validate_authorization_request in
the AuthorizationCodeGrant but differ in a few subtle areas.
A normal error could be a missing response_type parameter or the client
attempting to access scope it is not allowed to ask authorization for.
Normal errors can safely be included in the redirection URI and
sent back to the client.
Fatal errors occur when the client_id or redirect_uri is invalid or
missing. These must be caught by the provider and handled, how this
is done is outside of the scope of OAuthLib but showing an error
page describing the issue is a good idea.
"""
# First check for fatal errors
# If the request fails due to a missing, invalid, or mismatching
# redirection URI, or if the client identifier is missing or invalid,
# the authorization server SHOULD inform the resource owner of the
# error and MUST NOT automatically redirect the user-agent to the
# invalid redirection URI.
# First check duplicate parameters
for param in ('client_id', 'response_type', 'redirect_uri', 'scope', 'state'):
try:
duplicate_params = request.duplicate_params
except ValueError:
raise errors.InvalidRequestFatalError(description='Unable to parse query string', request=request)
if param in duplicate_params:
raise errors.InvalidRequestFatalError(description='Duplicate %s parameter.' % param, request=request)
# REQUIRED. The client identifier as described in Section 2.2.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.2
if not request.client_id:
raise errors.MissingClientIdError(request=request)
if not self.request_validator.validate_client_id(request.client_id, request):
raise errors.InvalidClientIdError(request=request)
# OPTIONAL. As described in Section 3.1.2.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
self._handle_redirects(request)
# Then check for normal errors.
request_info = self._run_custom_validators(request,
self.custom_validators.all_pre)
# If the resource owner denies the access request or if the request
# fails for reasons other than a missing or invalid redirection URI,
# the authorization server informs the client by adding the following
# parameters to the fragment component of the redirection URI using the
# "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format, per Appendix B.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#appendix-B
# Note that the correct parameters to be added are automatically
# populated through the use of specific exceptions
# REQUIRED.
if request.response_type is None:
raise errors.MissingResponseTypeError(request=request)
# Value MUST be one of our registered types: "token" by default or if using OIDC "id_token" or "id_token token"
elif not set(request.response_type.split()).issubset(self.response_types):
raise errors.UnsupportedResponseTypeError(request=request)
log.debug('Validating use of response_type token for client %r (%r).',
request.client_id, request.client)
if not self.request_validator.validate_response_type(request.client_id,
request.response_type,
request.client, request):
log.debug('Client %s is not authorized to use response_type %s.',
request.client_id, request.response_type)
raise errors.UnauthorizedClientError(request=request)
# OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by Section 3.3
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
self.validate_scopes(request)
request_info.update({
'client_id': request.client_id,
'redirect_uri': request.redirect_uri,
'response_type': request.response_type,
'state': request.state,
'request': request,
})
request_info = self._run_custom_validators(
request,
self.custom_validators.all_post,
request_info
)
return request.scopes, request_info
def _run_custom_validators(self,
request,
validations,
request_info=None):
# Make a copy so we don't modify the existing request_info dict
request_info = {} if request_info is None else request_info.copy()
# For implicit grant, auth_validators and token_validators are
# basically equivalent since the token is returned from the
# authorization endpoint.
for validator in validations:
result = validator(request)
if result is not None:
request_info.update(result)
return request_info

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import json
import logging
from .. import errors, utils
from ..request_validator import RequestValidator
from .base import GrantTypeBase
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class RefreshTokenGrant(GrantTypeBase):
"""`Refresh token grant`_
.. _`Refresh token grant`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-6
"""
def __init__(self, request_validator=None,
issue_new_refresh_tokens=True,
**kwargs):
super(RefreshTokenGrant, self).__init__(
request_validator,
issue_new_refresh_tokens=issue_new_refresh_tokens,
**kwargs)
def create_token_response(self, request, token_handler):
"""Create a new access token from a refresh_token.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
If valid and authorized, the authorization server issues an access
token as described in `Section 5.1`_. If the request failed
verification or is invalid, the authorization server returns an error
response as described in `Section 5.2`_.
The authorization server MAY issue a new refresh token, in which case
the client MUST discard the old refresh token and replace it with the
new refresh token. The authorization server MAY revoke the old
refresh token after issuing a new refresh token to the client. If a
new refresh token is issued, the refresh token scope MUST be
identical to that of the refresh token included by the client in the
request.
.. _`Section 5.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.1
.. _`Section 5.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
"""
headers = self._get_default_headers()
try:
log.debug('Validating refresh token request, %r.', request)
self.validate_token_request(request)
except errors.OAuth2Error as e:
log.debug('Client error in token request, %s.', e)
headers.update(e.headers)
return headers, e.json, e.status_code
token = token_handler.create_token(request,
refresh_token=self.issue_new_refresh_tokens)
for modifier in self._token_modifiers:
token = modifier(token)
self.request_validator.save_token(token, request)
log.debug('Issuing new token to client id %r (%r), %r.',
request.client_id, request.client, token)
return headers, json.dumps(token), 200
def validate_token_request(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
# REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "refresh_token".
if request.grant_type != 'refresh_token':
raise errors.UnsupportedGrantTypeError(request=request)
for validator in self.custom_validators.pre_token:
validator(request)
if request.refresh_token is None:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
description='Missing refresh token parameter.',
request=request)
# Because refresh tokens are typically long-lasting credentials used to
# request additional access tokens, the refresh token is bound to the
# client to which it was issued. If the client type is confidential or
# the client was issued client credentials (or assigned other
# authentication requirements), the client MUST authenticate with the
# authorization server as described in Section 3.2.1.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
if self.request_validator.client_authentication_required(request):
log.debug('Authenticating client, %r.', request)
if not self.request_validator.authenticate_client(request):
log.debug('Invalid client (%r), denying access.', request)
raise errors.InvalidClientError(request=request)
elif not self.request_validator.authenticate_client_id(request.client_id, request):
log.debug('Client authentication failed, %r.', request)
raise errors.InvalidClientError(request=request)
# Ensure client is authorized use of this grant type
self.validate_grant_type(request)
# REQUIRED. The refresh token issued to the client.
log.debug('Validating refresh token %s for client %r.',
request.refresh_token, request.client)
if not self.request_validator.validate_refresh_token(
request.refresh_token, request.client, request):
log.debug('Invalid refresh token, %s, for client %r.',
request.refresh_token, request.client)
raise errors.InvalidGrantError(request=request)
original_scopes = utils.scope_to_list(
self.request_validator.get_original_scopes(
request.refresh_token, request))
if request.scope:
request.scopes = utils.scope_to_list(request.scope)
if (not all((s in original_scopes for s in request.scopes))
and not self.request_validator.is_within_original_scope(
request.scopes, request.refresh_token, request)):
log.debug('Refresh token %s lack requested scopes, %r.',
request.refresh_token, request.scopes)
raise errors.InvalidScopeError(request=request)
else:
request.scopes = original_scopes
for validator in self.custom_validators.post_token:
validator(request)

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oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/grant_types/resource_owner_password_credentials.py Normal file
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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import json
import logging
from .. import errors
from ..request_validator import RequestValidator
from .base import GrantTypeBase
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class ResourceOwnerPasswordCredentialsGrant(GrantTypeBase):
"""`Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant`_
The resource owner password credentials grant type is suitable in
cases where the resource owner has a trust relationship with the
client, such as the device operating system or a highly privileged
application. The authorization server should take special care when
enabling this grant type and only allow it when other flows are not
viable.
This grant type is suitable for clients capable of obtaining the
resource owner's credentials (username and password, typically using
an interactive form). It is also used to migrate existing clients
using direct authentication schemes such as HTTP Basic or Digest
authentication to OAuth by converting the stored credentials to an
access token::
+----------+
| Resource |
| Owner |
| |
+----------+
v
| Resource Owner
(A) Password Credentials
|
v
+---------+ +---------------+
| |>--(B)---- Resource Owner ------->| |
| | Password Credentials | Authorization |
| Client | | Server |
| |<--(C)---- Access Token ---------<| |
| | (w/ Optional Refresh Token) | |
+---------+ +---------------+
Figure 5: Resource Owner Password Credentials Flow
The flow illustrated in Figure 5 includes the following steps:
(A) The resource owner provides the client with its username and
password.
(B) The client requests an access token from the authorization
server's token endpoint by including the credentials received
from the resource owner. When making the request, the client
authenticates with the authorization server.
(C) The authorization server authenticates the client and validates
the resource owner credentials, and if valid, issues an access
token.
.. _`Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.3
"""
def create_token_response(self, request, token_handler):
"""Return token or error in json format.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param token_handler: A token handler instance, for example of type
oauthlib.oauth2.BearerToken.
If the access token request is valid and authorized, the
authorization server issues an access token and optional refresh
token as described in `Section 5.1`_. If the request failed client
authentication or is invalid, the authorization server returns an
error response as described in `Section 5.2`_.
.. _`Section 5.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.1
.. _`Section 5.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-5.2
"""
headers = self._get_default_headers()
try:
if self.request_validator.client_authentication_required(request):
log.debug('Authenticating client, %r.', request)
if not self.request_validator.authenticate_client(request):
log.debug('Client authentication failed, %r.', request)
raise errors.InvalidClientError(request=request)
elif not self.request_validator.authenticate_client_id(request.client_id, request):
log.debug('Client authentication failed, %r.', request)
raise errors.InvalidClientError(request=request)
log.debug('Validating access token request, %r.', request)
self.validate_token_request(request)
except errors.OAuth2Error as e:
log.debug('Client error in token request, %s.', e)
headers.update(e.headers)
return headers, e.json, e.status_code
token = token_handler.create_token(request, self.refresh_token)
for modifier in self._token_modifiers:
token = modifier(token)
self.request_validator.save_token(token, request)
log.debug('Issuing token %r to client id %r (%r) and username %s.',
token, request.client_id, request.client, request.username)
return headers, json.dumps(token), 200
def validate_token_request(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
The client makes a request to the token endpoint by adding the
following parameters using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
format per Appendix B with a character encoding of UTF-8 in the HTTP
request entity-body:
grant_type
REQUIRED. Value MUST be set to "password".
username
REQUIRED. The resource owner username.
password
REQUIRED. The resource owner password.
scope
OPTIONAL. The scope of the access request as described by
`Section 3.3`_.
If the client type is confidential or the client was issued client
credentials (or assigned other authentication requirements), the
client MUST authenticate with the authorization server as described
in `Section 3.2.1`_.
The authorization server MUST:
o require client authentication for confidential clients or for any
client that was issued client credentials (or with other
authentication requirements),
o authenticate the client if client authentication is included, and
o validate the resource owner password credentials using its
existing password validation algorithm.
Since this access token request utilizes the resource owner's
password, the authorization server MUST protect the endpoint against
brute force attacks (e.g., using rate-limitation or generating
alerts).
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`Section 3.2.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.2.1
"""
for validator in self.custom_validators.pre_token:
validator(request)
for param in ('grant_type', 'username', 'password'):
if not getattr(request, param, None):
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(
'Request is missing %s parameter.' % param, request=request)
for param in ('grant_type', 'username', 'password', 'scope'):
if param in request.duplicate_params:
raise errors.InvalidRequestError(description='Duplicate %s parameter.' % param, request=request)
# This error should rarely (if ever) occur if requests are routed to
# grant type handlers based on the grant_type parameter.
if not request.grant_type == 'password':
raise errors.UnsupportedGrantTypeError(request=request)
log.debug('Validating username %s.', request.username)
if not self.request_validator.validate_user(request.username,
request.password, request.client, request):
raise errors.InvalidGrantError(
'Invalid credentials given.', request=request)
else:
if not hasattr(request.client, 'client_id'):
raise NotImplementedError(
'Validate user must set the '
'request.client.client_id attribute '
'in authenticate_client.')
log.debug('Authorizing access to user %r.', request.user)
# Ensure client is authorized use of this grant type
self.validate_grant_type(request)
if request.client:
request.client_id = request.client_id or request.client.client_id
self.validate_scopes(request)
for validator in self.custom_validators.post_token:
validator(request)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.parameters
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module contains methods related to `Section 4`_ of the OAuth 2 RFC.
.. _`Section 4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import json
import os
import time
from oauthlib.common import add_params_to_qs, add_params_to_uri, unicode_type
from oauthlib.signals import scope_changed
from .errors import (InsecureTransportError, MismatchingStateError,
MissingCodeError, MissingTokenError,
MissingTokenTypeError, raise_from_error)
from .tokens import OAuth2Token
from .utils import is_secure_transport, list_to_scope, scope_to_list
try:
import urlparse
except ImportError:
import urllib.parse as urlparse
def prepare_grant_uri(uri, client_id, response_type, redirect_uri=None,
scope=None, state=None, **kwargs):
"""Prepare the authorization grant request URI.
The client constructs the request URI by adding the following
parameters to the query component of the authorization endpoint URI
using the ``application/x-www-form-urlencoded`` format as defined by
[`W3C.REC-html401-19991224`_]:
:param uri:
:param client_id: The client identifier as described in `Section 2.2`_.
:param response_type: To indicate which OAuth 2 grant/flow is required,
"code" and "token".
:param redirect_uri: The client provided URI to redirect back to after
authorization as described in `Section 3.1.2`_.
:param scope: The scope of the access request as described by
`Section 3.3`_.
:param state: An opaque value used by the client to maintain
state between the request and callback. The authorization
server includes this value when redirecting the user-agent
back to the client. The parameter SHOULD be used for
preventing cross-site request forgery as described in
`Section 10.12`_.
:param kwargs: Extra arguments to embed in the grant/authorization URL.
An example of an authorization code grant authorization URL:
.. code-block:: http
GET /authorize?response_type=code&client_id=s6BhdRkqt3&state=xyz
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
.. _`W3C.REC-html401-19991224`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#ref-W3C.REC-html401-19991224
.. _`Section 2.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-2.2
.. _`Section 3.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.1.2
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`section 10.12`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-10.12
"""
if not is_secure_transport(uri):
raise InsecureTransportError()
params = [(('response_type', response_type)),
(('client_id', client_id))]
if redirect_uri:
params.append(('redirect_uri', redirect_uri))
if scope:
params.append(('scope', list_to_scope(scope)))
if state:
params.append(('state', state))
for k in kwargs:
if kwargs[k]:
params.append((unicode_type(k), kwargs[k]))
return add_params_to_uri(uri, params)
def prepare_token_request(grant_type, body='', include_client_id=True, **kwargs):
"""Prepare the access token request.
The client makes a request to the token endpoint by adding the
following parameters using the ``application/x-www-form-urlencoded``
format in the HTTP request entity-body:
:param grant_type: To indicate grant type being used, i.e. "password",
"authorization_code" or "client_credentials".
:param body: Existing request body (URL encoded string) to embed parameters
into. This may contain extra parameters. Default ''.
:param include_client_id: `True` (default) to send the `client_id` in the
body of the upstream request. This is required
if the client is not authenticating with the
authorization server as described in
`Section 3.2.1`_.
:type include_client_id: Boolean
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier. Will only appear if
`include_client_id` is True. *
:param client_secret: Unicode client secret. Will only appear if set to a
value that is not `None`. Invoking this function with
an empty string will send an empty `client_secret`
value to the server. *
:param code: If using authorization_code grant, pass the previously
obtained authorization code as the ``code`` argument. *
:param redirect_uri: If the "redirect_uri" parameter was included in the
authorization request as described in
`Section 4.1.1`_, and their values MUST be identical. *
:param kwargs: Extra arguments to embed in the request body.
Parameters marked with a `*` above are not explicit arguments in the
function signature, but are specially documented arguments for items
appearing in the generic `**kwargs` keyworded input.
An example of an authorization code token request body:
.. code-block:: http
grant_type=authorization_code&code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fclient%2Eexample%2Ecom%2Fcb
.. _`Section 4.1.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.1
"""
params = [('grant_type', grant_type)]
if 'scope' in kwargs:
kwargs['scope'] = list_to_scope(kwargs['scope'])
# pull the `client_id` out of the kwargs.
client_id = kwargs.pop('client_id', None)
if include_client_id:
if client_id is not None:
params.append((unicode_type('client_id'), client_id))
# the kwargs iteration below only supports including boolean truth (truthy)
# values, but some servers may require an empty string for `client_secret`
client_secret = kwargs.pop('client_secret', None)
if client_secret is not None:
params.append((unicode_type('client_secret'), client_secret))
# this handles: `code`, `redirect_uri`, and other undocumented params
for k in kwargs:
if kwargs[k]:
params.append((unicode_type(k), kwargs[k]))
return add_params_to_qs(body, params)
def prepare_token_revocation_request(url, token, token_type_hint="access_token",
callback=None, body='', **kwargs):
"""Prepare a token revocation request.
The client constructs the request by including the following parameters
using the "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" format in the HTTP request
entity-body:
:param token: REQUIRED. The token that the client wants to get revoked.
:param token_type_hint: OPTIONAL. A hint about the type of the token
submitted for revocation. Clients MAY pass this
parameter in order to help the authorization server
to optimize the token lookup. If the server is
unable to locate the token using the given hint, it
MUST extend its search across all of its supported
token types. An authorization server MAY ignore
this parameter, particularly if it is able to detect
the token type automatically.
This specification defines two values for `token_type_hint`:
* access_token: An access token as defined in [RFC6749],
`Section 1.4`_
* refresh_token: A refresh token as defined in [RFC6749],
`Section 1.5`_
Specific implementations, profiles, and extensions of this
specification MAY define other values for this parameter using the
registry defined in `Section 4.1.2`_.
.. _`Section 1.4`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.4
.. _`Section 1.5`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-1.5
.. _`Section 4.1.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7009#section-4.1.2
"""
if not is_secure_transport(url):
raise InsecureTransportError()
params = [('token', token)]
if token_type_hint:
params.append(('token_type_hint', token_type_hint))
for k in kwargs:
if kwargs[k]:
params.append((unicode_type(k), kwargs[k]))
headers = {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'}
if callback:
params.append(('callback', callback))
return add_params_to_uri(url, params), headers, body
else:
return url, headers, add_params_to_qs(body, params)
def parse_authorization_code_response(uri, state=None):
"""Parse authorization grant response URI into a dict.
If the resource owner grants the access request, the authorization
server issues an authorization code and delivers it to the client by
adding the following parameters to the query component of the
redirection URI using the ``application/x-www-form-urlencoded`` format:
**code**
REQUIRED. The authorization code generated by the
authorization server. The authorization code MUST expire
shortly after it is issued to mitigate the risk of leaks. A
maximum authorization code lifetime of 10 minutes is
RECOMMENDED. The client MUST NOT use the authorization code
more than once. If an authorization code is used more than
once, the authorization server MUST deny the request and SHOULD
revoke (when possible) all tokens previously issued based on
that authorization code. The authorization code is bound to
the client identifier and redirection URI.
**state**
REQUIRED if the "state" parameter was present in the client
authorization request. The exact value received from the
client.
:param uri: The full redirect URL back to the client.
:param state: The state parameter from the authorization request.
For example, the authorization server redirects the user-agent by
sending the following HTTP response:
.. code-block:: http
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: https://client.example.com/cb?code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA
&state=xyz
"""
if not is_secure_transport(uri):
raise InsecureTransportError()
query = urlparse.urlparse(uri).query
params = dict(urlparse.parse_qsl(query))
if state and params.get('state', None) != state:
raise MismatchingStateError()
if 'error' in params:
raise_from_error(params.get('error'), params)
if not 'code' in params:
raise MissingCodeError("Missing code parameter in response.")
return params
def parse_implicit_response(uri, state=None, scope=None):
"""Parse the implicit token response URI into a dict.
If the resource owner grants the access request, the authorization
server issues an access token and delivers it to the client by adding
the following parameters to the fragment component of the redirection
URI using the ``application/x-www-form-urlencoded`` format:
**access_token**
REQUIRED. The access token issued by the authorization server.
**token_type**
REQUIRED. The type of the token issued as described in
Section 7.1. Value is case insensitive.
**expires_in**
RECOMMENDED. The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For
example, the value "3600" denotes that the access token will
expire in one hour from the time the response was generated.
If omitted, the authorization server SHOULD provide the
expiration time via other means or document the default value.
**scope**
OPTIONAL, if identical to the scope requested by the client,
otherwise REQUIRED. The scope of the access token as described
by Section 3.3.
**state**
REQUIRED if the "state" parameter was present in the client
authorization request. The exact value received from the
client.
:param uri:
:param state:
:param scope:
Similar to the authorization code response, but with a full token provided
in the URL fragment:
.. code-block:: http
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://example.com/cb#access_token=2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA
&state=xyz&token_type=example&expires_in=3600
"""
if not is_secure_transport(uri):
raise InsecureTransportError()
fragment = urlparse.urlparse(uri).fragment
params = dict(urlparse.parse_qsl(fragment, keep_blank_values=True))
for key in ('expires_in',):
if key in params: # cast things to int
params[key] = int(params[key])
if 'scope' in params:
params['scope'] = scope_to_list(params['scope'])
if 'expires_in' in params:
params['expires_at'] = time.time() + int(params['expires_in'])
if state and params.get('state', None) != state:
raise ValueError("Mismatching or missing state in params.")
params = OAuth2Token(params, old_scope=scope)
validate_token_parameters(params)
return params
def parse_token_response(body, scope=None):
"""Parse the JSON token response body into a dict.
The authorization server issues an access token and optional refresh
token, and constructs the response by adding the following parameters
to the entity body of the HTTP response with a 200 (OK) status code:
access_token
REQUIRED. The access token issued by the authorization server.
token_type
REQUIRED. The type of the token issued as described in
`Section 7.1`_. Value is case insensitive.
expires_in
RECOMMENDED. The lifetime in seconds of the access token. For
example, the value "3600" denotes that the access token will
expire in one hour from the time the response was generated.
If omitted, the authorization server SHOULD provide the
expiration time via other means or document the default value.
refresh_token
OPTIONAL. The refresh token which can be used to obtain new
access tokens using the same authorization grant as described
in `Section 6`_.
scope
OPTIONAL, if identical to the scope requested by the client,
otherwise REQUIRED. The scope of the access token as described
by `Section 3.3`_.
The parameters are included in the entity body of the HTTP response
using the "application/json" media type as defined by [`RFC4627`_]. The
parameters are serialized into a JSON structure by adding each
parameter at the highest structure level. Parameter names and string
values are included as JSON strings. Numerical values are included
as JSON numbers. The order of parameters does not matter and can
vary.
:param body: The full json encoded response body.
:param scope: The scope requested during authorization.
For example:
.. code-block:: http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
Pragma: no-cache
{
"access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type":"example",
"expires_in":3600,
"refresh_token":"tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
"example_parameter":"example_value"
}
.. _`Section 7.1`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-7.1
.. _`Section 6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-6
.. _`Section 3.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
.. _`RFC4627`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4627
"""
try:
params = json.loads(body)
except ValueError:
# Fall back to URL-encoded string, to support old implementations,
# including (at time of writing) Facebook. See:
# https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/issues/267
params = dict(urlparse.parse_qsl(body))
for key in ('expires_in',):
if key in params: # cast things to int
params[key] = int(params[key])
if 'scope' in params:
params['scope'] = scope_to_list(params['scope'])
if 'expires_in' in params:
if params['expires_in'] is None:
params.pop('expires_in')
else:
params['expires_at'] = time.time() + int(params['expires_in'])
params = OAuth2Token(params, old_scope=scope)
validate_token_parameters(params)
return params
def validate_token_parameters(params):
"""Ensures token precence, token type, expiration and scope in params."""
if 'error' in params:
raise_from_error(params.get('error'), params)
if not 'access_token' in params:
raise MissingTokenError(description="Missing access token parameter.")
if not 'token_type' in params:
if os.environ.get('OAUTHLIB_STRICT_TOKEN_TYPE'):
raise MissingTokenTypeError()
# If the issued access token scope is different from the one requested by
# the client, the authorization server MUST include the "scope" response
# parameter to inform the client of the actual scope granted.
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3
if params.scope_changed:
message = 'Scope has changed from "{old}" to "{new}".'.format(
old=params.old_scope, new=params.scope,
)
scope_changed.send(message=message, old=params.old_scopes, new=params.scopes)
if not os.environ.get('OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE', None):
w = Warning(message)
w.token = params
w.old_scope = params.old_scopes
w.new_scope = params.scopes
raise w

643
oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/request_validator.py Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,643 @@
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.request_validator
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class RequestValidator(object):
def client_authentication_required(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Determine if client authentication is required for current request.
According to the rfc6749, client authentication is required in the following cases:
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant, when Client type is Confidential or when
Client was issued client credentials or whenever Client provided client
authentication, see `Section 4.3.2`_.
- Authorization Code Grant, when Client type is Confidential or when Client was issued
client credentials or whenever Client provided client authentication,
see `Section 4.1.3`_.
- Refresh Token Grant, when Client type is Confidential or when Client was issued
client credentials or whenever Client provided client authentication, see
`Section 6`_
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
- Refresh Token Grant
.. _`Section 4.3.2`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.3.2
.. _`Section 4.1.3`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-4.1.3
.. _`Section 6`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-6
"""
return True
def authenticate_client(self, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Authenticate client through means outside the OAuth 2 spec.
Means of authentication is negotiated beforehand and may for example
be `HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme`_ which utilizes the Authorization
header.
Headers may be accesses through request.headers and parameters found in
both body and query can be obtained by direct attribute access, i.e.
request.client_id for client_id in the URL query.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant (may be disabled)
- Client Credentials Grant
- Refresh Token Grant
.. _`HTTP Basic Authentication Scheme`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1945#section-11.1
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def authenticate_client_id(self, client_id, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Ensure client_id belong to a non-confidential client.
A non-confidential client is one that is not required to authenticate
through other means, such as using HTTP Basic.
Note, while not strictly necessary it can often be very convenient
to set request.client to the client object associated with the
given client_id.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def confirm_redirect_uri(self, client_id, code, redirect_uri, client, request,
*args, **kwargs):
"""Ensure that the authorization process represented by this authorization
code began with this 'redirect_uri'.
If the client specifies a redirect_uri when obtaining code then that
redirect URI must be bound to the code and verified equal in this
method, according to RFC 6749 section 4.1.3. Do not compare against
the client's allowed redirect URIs, but against the URI used when the
code was saved.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param code: Unicode authorization_code.
:param redirect_uri: Unicode absolute URI.
:param client: Client object set by you, see ``.authenticate_client``.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant (during token request)
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def get_default_redirect_uri(self, client_id, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Get the default redirect URI for the client.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: The default redirect URI for the client
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def get_default_scopes(self, client_id, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Get the default scopes for the client.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: List of default scopes
Method is used by all core grant types:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
- Client Credentials grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def get_original_scopes(self, refresh_token, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Get the list of scopes associated with the refresh token.
:param refresh_token: Unicode refresh token.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: List of scopes.
Method is used by:
- Refresh token grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def is_within_original_scope(self, request_scopes, refresh_token, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Check if requested scopes are within a scope of the refresh token.
When access tokens are refreshed the scope of the new token
needs to be within the scope of the original token. This is
ensured by checking that all requested scopes strings are on
the list returned by the get_original_scopes. If this check
fails, is_within_original_scope is called. The method can be
used in situations where returning all valid scopes from the
get_original_scopes is not practical.
:param request_scopes: A list of scopes that were requested by client.
:param refresh_token: Unicode refresh_token.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Refresh token grant
"""
return False
def introspect_token(self, token, token_type_hint, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Introspect an access or refresh token.
Called once the introspect request is validated. This method should
verify the *token* and either return a dictionary with the list of
claims associated, or `None` in case the token is unknown.
Below the list of registered claims you should be interested in:
- scope : space-separated list of scopes
- client_id : client identifier
- username : human-readable identifier for the resource owner
- token_type : type of the token
- exp : integer timestamp indicating when this token will expire
- iat : integer timestamp indicating when this token was issued
- nbf : integer timestamp indicating when it can be "not-before" used
- sub : subject of the token - identifier of the resource owner
- aud : list of string identifiers representing the intended audience
- iss : string representing issuer of this token
- jti : string identifier for the token
Note that most of them are coming directly from JWT RFC. More details
can be found in `Introspect Claims`_ or `_JWT Claims`_.
The implementation can use *token_type_hint* to improve lookup
efficency, but must fallback to other types to be compliant with RFC.
The dict of claims is added to request.token after this method.
:param token: The token string.
:param token_type_hint: access_token or refresh_token.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
Method is used by:
- Introspect Endpoint (all grants are compatible)
.. _`Introspect Claims`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7662#section-2.2
.. _`JWT Claims`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7519#section-4
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def invalidate_authorization_code(self, client_id, code, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Invalidate an authorization code after use.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param code: The authorization code grant (request.code).
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def revoke_token(self, token, token_type_hint, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Revoke an access or refresh token.
:param token: The token string.
:param token_type_hint: access_token or refresh_token.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
Method is used by:
- Revocation Endpoint
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def rotate_refresh_token(self, request):
"""Determine whether to rotate the refresh token. Default, yes.
When access tokens are refreshed the old refresh token can be kept
or replaced with a new one (rotated). Return True to rotate and
and False for keeping original.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Refresh Token Grant
"""
return True
def save_authorization_code(self, client_id, code, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Persist the authorization_code.
The code should at minimum be stored with:
- the client_id (``client_id``)
- the redirect URI used (``request.redirect_uri``)
- a resource owner / user (``request.user``)
- the authorized scopes (``request.scopes``)
To support PKCE, you MUST associate the code with:
- Code Challenge (``request.code_challenge``) and
- Code Challenge Method (``request.code_challenge_method``)
To support OIDC, you MUST associate the code with:
- nonce, if present (``code["nonce"]``)
The ``code`` argument is actually a dictionary, containing at least a
``code`` key with the actual authorization code:
``{'code': 'sdf345jsdf0934f'}``
It may also have a ``claims`` parameter which, when present, will be a dict
deserialized from JSON as described at
http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ClaimsParameter
This value should be saved in this method and used again in ``.validate_code``.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param code: A dict of the authorization code grant and, optionally, state.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def save_token(self, token, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Persist the token with a token type specific method.
Currently, only save_bearer_token is supported.
:param token: A (Bearer) token dict.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
return self.save_bearer_token(token, request, *args, **kwargs)
def save_bearer_token(self, token, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Persist the Bearer token.
The Bearer token should at minimum be associated with:
- a client and it's client_id, if available
- a resource owner / user (request.user)
- authorized scopes (request.scopes)
- an expiration time
- a refresh token, if issued
- a claims document, if present in request.claims
The Bearer token dict may hold a number of items::
{
'token_type': 'Bearer',
'access_token': 'askfjh234as9sd8',
'expires_in': 3600,
'scope': 'string of space separated authorized scopes',
'refresh_token': '23sdf876234', # if issued
'state': 'given_by_client', # if supplied by client (implicit ONLY)
}
Note that while "scope" is a string-separated list of authorized scopes,
the original list is still available in request.scopes.
The token dict is passed as a reference so any changes made to the dictionary
will go back to the user. If additional information must return to the client
user, and it is only possible to get this information after writing the token
to storage, it should be added to the token dictionary. If the token
dictionary must be modified but the changes should not go back to the user,
a copy of the dictionary must be made before making the changes.
Also note that if an Authorization Code grant request included a valid claims
parameter (for OpenID Connect) then the request.claims property will contain
the claims dict, which should be saved for later use when generating the
id_token and/or UserInfo response content.
:param token: A Bearer token dict.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: The default redirect URI for the client
Method is used by all core grant types issuing Bearer tokens:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant (might not associate a client)
- Client Credentials grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_bearer_token(self, token, scopes, request):
"""Ensure the Bearer token is valid and authorized access to scopes.
:param token: A string of random characters.
:param scopes: A list of scopes associated with the protected resource.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
A key to OAuth 2 security and restricting impact of leaked tokens is
the short expiration time of tokens, *always ensure the token has not
expired!*.
Two different approaches to scope validation:
1) all(scopes). The token must be authorized access to all scopes
associated with the resource. For example, the
token has access to ``read-only`` and ``images``,
thus the client can view images but not upload new.
Allows for fine grained access control through
combining various scopes.
2) any(scopes). The token must be authorized access to one of the
scopes associated with the resource. For example,
token has access to ``read-only-images``.
Allows for fine grained, although arguably less
convenient, access control.
A powerful way to use scopes would mimic UNIX ACLs and see a scope
as a group with certain privileges. For a restful API these might
map to HTTP verbs instead of read, write and execute.
Note, the request.user attribute can be set to the resource owner
associated with this token. Similarly the request.client and
request.scopes attribute can be set to associated client object
and authorized scopes. If you then use a decorator such as the
one provided for django these attributes will be made available
in all protected views as keyword arguments.
:param token: Unicode Bearer token
:param scopes: List of scopes (defined by you)
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is indirectly used by all core Bearer token issuing grant types:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
- Client Credentials Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_client_id(self, client_id, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Ensure client_id belong to a valid and active client.
Note, while not strictly necessary it can often be very convenient
to set request.client to the client object associated with the
given client_id.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_code(self, client_id, code, client, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Verify that the authorization_code is valid and assigned to the given
client.
Before returning true, set the following based on the information stored
with the code in 'save_authorization_code':
- request.user
- request.scopes
- request.claims (if given)
OBS! The request.user attribute should be set to the resource owner
associated with this authorization code. Similarly request.scopes
must also be set.
The request.claims property, if it was given, should assigned a dict.
If PKCE is enabled (see 'is_pkce_required' and 'save_authorization_code')
you MUST set the following based on the information stored:
- request.code_challenge
- request.code_challenge_method
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param code: Unicode authorization code.
:param client: Client object set by you, see ``.authenticate_client``.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_grant_type(self, client_id, grant_type, client, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Ensure client is authorized to use the grant_type requested.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param grant_type: Unicode grant type, i.e. authorization_code, password.
:param client: Client object set by you, see ``.authenticate_client``.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
- Client Credentials Grant
- Refresh Token Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_redirect_uri(self, client_id, redirect_uri, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Ensure client is authorized to redirect to the redirect_uri requested.
All clients should register the absolute URIs of all URIs they intend
to redirect to. The registration is outside of the scope of oauthlib.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param redirect_uri: Unicode absolute URI.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_refresh_token(self, refresh_token, client, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Ensure the Bearer token is valid and authorized access to scopes.
OBS! The request.user attribute should be set to the resource owner
associated with this refresh token.
:param refresh_token: Unicode refresh token.
:param client: Client object set by you, see ``.authenticate_client``.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant (indirectly by issuing refresh tokens)
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant (also indirectly)
- Refresh Token Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_response_type(self, client_id, response_type, client, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Ensure client is authorized to use the response_type requested.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param response_type: Unicode response type, i.e. code, token.
:param client: Client object set by you, see ``.authenticate_client``.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_scopes(self, client_id, scopes, client, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Ensure the client is authorized access to requested scopes.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier.
:param scopes: List of scopes (defined by you).
:param client: Client object set by you, see ``.authenticate_client``.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by all core grant types:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
- Client Credentials Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_user(self, username, password, client, request, *args, **kwargs):
"""Ensure the username and password is valid.
OBS! The validation should also set the user attribute of the request
to a valid resource owner, i.e. request.user = username or similar. If
not set you will be unable to associate a token with a user in the
persistance method used (commonly, save_bearer_token).
:param username: Unicode username.
:param password: Unicode password.
:param client: Client object set by you, see ``.authenticate_client``.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def is_pkce_required(self, client_id, request):
"""Determine if current request requires PKCE. Default, False.
This is called for both "authorization" and "token" requests.
Override this method by ``return True`` to enable PKCE for everyone.
You might want to enable it only for public clients.
Note that PKCE can also be used in addition of a client authentication.
OAuth 2.0 public clients utilizing the Authorization Code Grant are
susceptible to the authorization code interception attack. This
specification describes the attack as well as a technique to mitigate
against the threat through the use of Proof Key for Code Exchange
(PKCE, pronounced "pixy"). See `RFC7636`_.
:param client_id: Client identifier.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant
.. _`RFC7636`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7636
"""
return False
def get_code_challenge(self, code, request):
"""Is called for every "token" requests.
When the server issues the authorization code in the authorization
response, it MUST associate the ``code_challenge`` and
``code_challenge_method`` values with the authorization code so it can
be verified later.
Typically, the ``code_challenge`` and ``code_challenge_method`` values
are stored in encrypted form in the ``code`` itself but could
alternatively be stored on the server associated with the code. The
server MUST NOT include the ``code_challenge`` value in client requests
in a form that other entities can extract.
Return the ``code_challenge`` associated to the code.
If ``None`` is returned, code is considered to not be associated to any
challenges.
:param code: Authorization code.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: code_challenge string
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant - when PKCE is active
"""
return None
def get_code_challenge_method(self, code, request):
"""Is called during the "token" request processing, when a
``code_verifier`` and a ``code_challenge`` has been provided.
See ``.get_code_challenge``.
Must return ``plain`` or ``S256``. You can return a custom value if you have
implemented your own ``AuthorizationCodeGrant`` class.
:param code: Authorization code.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: code_challenge_method string
Method is used by:
- Authorization Code Grant - when PKCE is active
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')

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"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.tokens
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module contains methods for adding two types of access tokens to requests.
- Bearer https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750
- MAC https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import hashlib
import hmac
from binascii import b2a_base64
import warnings
from oauthlib import common
from oauthlib.common import add_params_to_qs, add_params_to_uri, unicode_type
from . import utils
try:
from urlparse import urlparse
except ImportError:
from urllib.parse import urlparse
class OAuth2Token(dict):
def __init__(self, params, old_scope=None):
super(OAuth2Token, self).__init__(params)
self._new_scope = None
if 'scope' in params and params['scope']:
self._new_scope = set(utils.scope_to_list(params['scope']))
if old_scope is not None:
self._old_scope = set(utils.scope_to_list(old_scope))
if self._new_scope is None:
# the rfc says that if the scope hasn't changed, it's optional
# in params so set the new scope to the old scope
self._new_scope = self._old_scope
else:
self._old_scope = self._new_scope
@property
def scope_changed(self):
return self._new_scope != self._old_scope
@property
def old_scope(self):
return utils.list_to_scope(self._old_scope)
@property
def old_scopes(self):
return list(self._old_scope)
@property
def scope(self):
return utils.list_to_scope(self._new_scope)
@property
def scopes(self):
return list(self._new_scope)
@property
def missing_scopes(self):
return list(self._old_scope - self._new_scope)
@property
def additional_scopes(self):
return list(self._new_scope - self._old_scope)
def prepare_mac_header(token, uri, key, http_method,
nonce=None,
headers=None,
body=None,
ext='',
hash_algorithm='hmac-sha-1',
issue_time=None,
draft=0):
"""Add an `MAC Access Authentication`_ signature to headers.
Unlike OAuth 1, this HMAC signature does not require inclusion of the
request payload/body, neither does it use a combination of client_secret
and token_secret but rather a mac_key provided together with the access
token.
Currently two algorithms are supported, "hmac-sha-1" and "hmac-sha-256",
`extension algorithms`_ are not supported.
Example MAC Authorization header, linebreaks added for clarity
Authorization: MAC id="h480djs93hd8",
nonce="1336363200:dj83hs9s",
mac="bhCQXTVyfj5cmA9uKkPFx1zeOXM="
.. _`MAC Access Authentication`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01
.. _`extension algorithms`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-oauth-v2-http-mac-01#section-7.1
:param token:
:param uri: Request URI.
:param key: MAC given provided by token endpoint.
:param http_method: HTTP Request method.
:param nonce:
:param headers: Request headers as a dictionary.
:param body:
:param ext:
:param hash_algorithm: HMAC algorithm provided by token endpoint.
:param issue_time: Time when the MAC credentials were issued (datetime).
:param draft: MAC authentication specification version.
:return: headers dictionary with the authorization field added.
"""
http_method = http_method.upper()
host, port = utils.host_from_uri(uri)
if hash_algorithm.lower() == 'hmac-sha-1':
h = hashlib.sha1
elif hash_algorithm.lower() == 'hmac-sha-256':
h = hashlib.sha256
else:
raise ValueError('unknown hash algorithm')
if draft == 0:
nonce = nonce or '{0}:{1}'.format(utils.generate_age(issue_time),
common.generate_nonce())
else:
ts = common.generate_timestamp()
nonce = common.generate_nonce()
sch, net, path, par, query, fra = urlparse(uri)
if query:
request_uri = path + '?' + query
else:
request_uri = path
# Hash the body/payload
if body is not None and draft == 0:
body = body.encode('utf-8')
bodyhash = b2a_base64(h(body).digest())[:-1].decode('utf-8')
else:
bodyhash = ''
# Create the normalized base string
base = []
if draft == 0:
base.append(nonce)
else:
base.append(ts)
base.append(nonce)
base.append(http_method.upper())
base.append(request_uri)
base.append(host)
base.append(port)
if draft == 0:
base.append(bodyhash)
base.append(ext or '')
base_string = '\n'.join(base) + '\n'
# hmac struggles with unicode strings - http://bugs.python.org/issue5285
if isinstance(key, unicode_type):
key = key.encode('utf-8')
sign = hmac.new(key, base_string.encode('utf-8'), h)
sign = b2a_base64(sign.digest())[:-1].decode('utf-8')
header = []
header.append('MAC id="%s"' % token)
if draft != 0:
header.append('ts="%s"' % ts)
header.append('nonce="%s"' % nonce)
if bodyhash:
header.append('bodyhash="%s"' % bodyhash)
if ext:
header.append('ext="%s"' % ext)
header.append('mac="%s"' % sign)
headers = headers or {}
headers['Authorization'] = ', '.join(header)
return headers
def prepare_bearer_uri(token, uri):
"""Add a `Bearer Token`_ to the request URI.
Not recommended, use only if client can't use authorization header or body.
http://www.example.com/path?access_token=h480djs93hd8
.. _`Bearer Token`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750
:param token:
:param uri:
"""
return add_params_to_uri(uri, [(('access_token', token))])
def prepare_bearer_headers(token, headers=None):
"""Add a `Bearer Token`_ to the request URI.
Recommended method of passing bearer tokens.
Authorization: Bearer h480djs93hd8
.. _`Bearer Token`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750
:param token:
:param headers:
"""
headers = headers or {}
headers['Authorization'] = 'Bearer %s' % token
return headers
def prepare_bearer_body(token, body=''):
"""Add a `Bearer Token`_ to the request body.
access_token=h480djs93hd8
.. _`Bearer Token`: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6750
:param token:
:param body:
"""
return add_params_to_qs(body, [(('access_token', token))])
def random_token_generator(request, refresh_token=False):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param refresh_token:
"""
return common.generate_token()
def signed_token_generator(private_pem, **kwargs):
"""
:param private_pem:
"""
def signed_token_generator(request):
request.claims = kwargs
return common.generate_signed_token(private_pem, request)
return signed_token_generator
def get_token_from_header(request):
"""
Helper function to extract a token from the request header.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:return: Return the token or None if the Authorization header is malformed.
"""
token = None
if 'Authorization' in request.headers:
split_header = request.headers.get('Authorization').split()
if len(split_header) == 2 and split_header[0].lower() == 'bearer':
token = split_header[1]
else:
token = request.access_token
return token
class TokenBase(object):
def __call__(self, request, refresh_token=False):
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_request(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def estimate_type(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
class BearerToken(TokenBase):
__slots__ = (
'request_validator', 'token_generator',
'refresh_token_generator', 'expires_in'
)
def __init__(self, request_validator=None, token_generator=None,
expires_in=None, refresh_token_generator=None):
self.request_validator = request_validator
self.token_generator = token_generator or random_token_generator
self.refresh_token_generator = (
refresh_token_generator or self.token_generator
)
self.expires_in = expires_in or 3600
def create_token(self, request, refresh_token=False, **kwargs):
"""
Create a BearerToken, by default without refresh token.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:param refresh_token:
"""
if "save_token" in kwargs:
warnings.warn("`save_token` has been deprecated, it was not called internally."
"If you do, call `request_validator.save_token()` instead.",
DeprecationWarning)
if callable(self.expires_in):
expires_in = self.expires_in(request)
else:
expires_in = self.expires_in
request.expires_in = expires_in
token = {
'access_token': self.token_generator(request),
'expires_in': expires_in,
'token_type': 'Bearer',
}
# If provided, include - this is optional in some cases https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749#section-3.3 but
# there is currently no mechanism to coordinate issuing a token for only a subset of the requested scopes so
# all tokens issued are for the entire set of requested scopes.
if request.scopes is not None:
token['scope'] = ' '.join(request.scopes)
if refresh_token:
if (request.refresh_token and
not self.request_validator.rotate_refresh_token(request)):
token['refresh_token'] = request.refresh_token
else:
token['refresh_token'] = self.refresh_token_generator(request)
token.update(request.extra_credentials or {})
return OAuth2Token(token)
def validate_request(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
token = get_token_from_header(request)
return self.request_validator.validate_bearer_token(
token, request.scopes, request)
def estimate_type(self, request):
"""
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
"""
if request.headers.get('Authorization', '').split(' ')[0].lower() == 'bearer':
return 9
elif request.access_token is not None:
return 5
else:
return 0

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.utils
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module contains utility methods used by various parts of the OAuth 2 spec.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import datetime
import os
from oauthlib.common import unicode_type, urldecode
try:
from urllib import quote
except ImportError:
from urllib.parse import quote
try:
from urlparse import urlparse
except ImportError:
from urllib.parse import urlparse
def list_to_scope(scope):
"""Convert a list of scopes to a space separated string."""
if isinstance(scope, unicode_type) or scope is None:
return scope
elif isinstance(scope, (set, tuple, list)):
return " ".join([unicode_type(s) for s in scope])
else:
raise ValueError("Invalid scope (%s), must be string, tuple, set, or list." % scope)
def scope_to_list(scope):
"""Convert a space separated string to a list of scopes."""
if isinstance(scope, (tuple, list, set)):
return [unicode_type(s) for s in scope]
elif scope is None:
return None
else:
return scope.strip().split(" ")
def params_from_uri(uri):
params = dict(urldecode(urlparse(uri).query))
if 'scope' in params:
params['scope'] = scope_to_list(params['scope'])
return params
def host_from_uri(uri):
"""Extract hostname and port from URI.
Will use default port for HTTP and HTTPS if none is present in the URI.
"""
default_ports = {
'HTTP': '80',
'HTTPS': '443',
}
sch, netloc, path, par, query, fra = urlparse(uri)
if ':' in netloc:
netloc, port = netloc.split(':', 1)
else:
port = default_ports.get(sch.upper())
return netloc, port
def escape(u):
"""Escape a string in an OAuth-compatible fashion.
TODO: verify whether this can in fact be used for OAuth 2
"""
if not isinstance(u, unicode_type):
raise ValueError('Only unicode objects are escapable.')
return quote(u.encode('utf-8'), safe=b'~')
def generate_age(issue_time):
"""Generate a age parameter for MAC authentication draft 00."""
td = datetime.datetime.now() - issue_time
age = (td.microseconds + (td.seconds + td.days * 24 * 3600)
* 10 ** 6) / 10 ** 6
return unicode_type(age)
def is_secure_transport(uri):
"""Check if the uri is over ssl."""
if os.environ.get('OAUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT'):
return True
return uri.lower().startswith('https://')

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.openid
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from .connect.core.endpoints import Server
from .connect.core.endpoints import UserInfoEndpoint
from .connect.core.request_validator import RequestValidator

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.oopenid.core
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various logic needed
for consuming and providing OpenID Connect
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from .pre_configured import Server
from .userinfo import UserInfoEndpoint

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.openid.connect.core.endpoints.pre_configured
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of various endpoints needed
for providing OpenID Connect servers.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.endpoints import (
AuthorizationEndpoint,
IntrospectEndpoint,
ResourceEndpoint,
RevocationEndpoint,
TokenEndpoint
)
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types import (
AuthorizationCodeGrant as OAuth2AuthorizationCodeGrant,
ImplicitGrant as OAuth2ImplicitGrant,
ClientCredentialsGrant,
RefreshTokenGrant,
ResourceOwnerPasswordCredentialsGrant
)
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.tokens import BearerToken
from ..grant_types import (
AuthorizationCodeGrant,
ImplicitGrant,
HybridGrant,
)
from ..grant_types.dispatchers import (
AuthorizationCodeGrantDispatcher,
ImplicitTokenGrantDispatcher,
AuthorizationTokenGrantDispatcher
)
from ..tokens import JWTToken
from .userinfo import UserInfoEndpoint
class Server(AuthorizationEndpoint, IntrospectEndpoint, TokenEndpoint,
ResourceEndpoint, RevocationEndpoint, UserInfoEndpoint):
"""An all-in-one endpoint featuring all four major grant types."""
def __init__(self, request_validator, token_expires_in=None,
token_generator=None, refresh_token_generator=None,
*args, **kwargs):
"""Construct a new all-grants-in-one server.
:param request_validator: An implementation of
oauthlib.oauth2.RequestValidator.
:param token_expires_in: An int or a function to generate a token
expiration offset (in seconds) given a
oauthlib.common.Request object.
:param token_generator: A function to generate a token from a request.
:param refresh_token_generator: A function to generate a token from a
request for the refresh token.
:param kwargs: Extra parameters to pass to authorization-,
token-, resource-, and revocation-endpoint constructors.
"""
auth_grant = OAuth2AuthorizationCodeGrant(request_validator)
implicit_grant = OAuth2ImplicitGrant(request_validator)
password_grant = ResourceOwnerPasswordCredentialsGrant(
request_validator)
credentials_grant = ClientCredentialsGrant(request_validator)
refresh_grant = RefreshTokenGrant(request_validator)
openid_connect_auth = AuthorizationCodeGrant(request_validator)
openid_connect_implicit = ImplicitGrant(request_validator)
openid_connect_hybrid = HybridGrant(request_validator)
bearer = BearerToken(request_validator, token_generator,
token_expires_in, refresh_token_generator)
jwt = JWTToken(request_validator, token_generator,
token_expires_in, refresh_token_generator)
auth_grant_choice = AuthorizationCodeGrantDispatcher(default_grant=auth_grant, oidc_grant=openid_connect_auth)
implicit_grant_choice = ImplicitTokenGrantDispatcher(default_grant=implicit_grant, oidc_grant=openid_connect_implicit)
# See http://openid.net/specs/oauth-v2-multiple-response-types-1_0.html#Combinations for valid combinations
# internally our AuthorizationEndpoint will ensure they can appear in any order for any valid combination
AuthorizationEndpoint.__init__(self, default_response_type='code',
response_types={
'code': auth_grant_choice,
'token': implicit_grant_choice,
'id_token': openid_connect_implicit,
'id_token token': openid_connect_implicit,
'code token': openid_connect_hybrid,
'code id_token': openid_connect_hybrid,
'code id_token token': openid_connect_hybrid,
'none': auth_grant
},
default_token_type=bearer)
token_grant_choice = AuthorizationTokenGrantDispatcher(request_validator, default_grant=auth_grant, oidc_grant=openid_connect_auth)
TokenEndpoint.__init__(self, default_grant_type='authorization_code',
grant_types={
'authorization_code': token_grant_choice,
'password': password_grant,
'client_credentials': credentials_grant,
'refresh_token': refresh_grant,
},
default_token_type=bearer)
ResourceEndpoint.__init__(self, default_token='Bearer',
token_types={'Bearer': bearer, 'JWT': jwt})
RevocationEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
IntrospectEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)
UserInfoEndpoint.__init__(self, request_validator)

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"""
oauthlib.openid.connect.core.endpoints.userinfo
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module is an implementation of userinfo endpoint.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import json
import logging
from oauthlib.common import Request
from oauthlib.common import unicode_type
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.endpoints.base import BaseEndpoint
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.endpoints.base import catch_errors_and_unavailability
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.tokens import BearerToken
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749 import errors
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class UserInfoEndpoint(BaseEndpoint):
"""Authorizes access to userinfo resource.
"""
def __init__(self, request_validator):
self.bearer = BearerToken(request_validator, None, None, None)
self.request_validator = request_validator
BaseEndpoint.__init__(self)
@catch_errors_and_unavailability
def create_userinfo_response(self, uri, http_method='GET', body=None, headers=None):
"""Validate BearerToken and return userinfo from RequestValidator
The UserInfo Endpoint MUST return a
content-type header to indicate which format is being returned. The
content-type of the HTTP response MUST be application/json if the
response body is a text JSON object; the response body SHOULD be encoded
using UTF-8.
"""
request = Request(uri, http_method, body, headers)
request.scopes = ["openid"]
self.validate_userinfo_request(request)
claims = self.request_validator.get_userinfo_claims(request)
if claims is None:
log.error('Userinfo MUST have claims for %r.', request)
raise errors.ServerError(status_code=500)
if isinstance(claims, dict):
resp_headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/json'
}
if "sub" not in claims:
log.error('Userinfo MUST have "sub" for %r.', request)
raise errors.ServerError(status_code=500)
body = json.dumps(claims)
elif isinstance(claims, unicode_type):
resp_headers = {
'Content-Type': 'application/jwt'
}
body = claims
else:
log.error('Userinfo return unknown response for %r.', request)
raise errors.ServerError(status_code=500)
log.debug('Userinfo access valid for %r.', request)
return resp_headers, body, 200
def validate_userinfo_request(self, request):
"""Ensure the request is valid.
5.3.1. UserInfo Request
The Client sends the UserInfo Request using either HTTP GET or HTTP
POST. The Access Token obtained from an OpenID Connect Authentication
Request MUST be sent as a Bearer Token, per Section 2 of OAuth 2.0
Bearer Token Usage [RFC6750].
It is RECOMMENDED that the request use the HTTP GET method and the
Access Token be sent using the Authorization header field.
The following is a non-normative example of a UserInfo Request:
GET /userinfo HTTP/1.1
Host: server.example.com
Authorization: Bearer SlAV32hkKG
5.3.3. UserInfo Error Response
When an error condition occurs, the UserInfo Endpoint returns an Error
Response as defined in Section 3 of OAuth 2.0 Bearer Token Usage
[RFC6750]. (HTTP errors unrelated to RFC 6750 are returned to the User
Agent using the appropriate HTTP status code.)
The following is a non-normative example of a UserInfo Error Response:
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer error="invalid_token",
error_description="The Access Token expired"
"""
if not self.bearer.validate_request(request):
raise errors.InvalidTokenError()
if "openid" not in request.scopes:
raise errors.InsufficientScopeError()

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# coding=utf-8
"""
oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.errors
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Error used both by OAuth 2 clients and providers to represent the spec
defined error responses for all four core grant types.
"""
from __future__ import unicode_literals
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.errors import FatalClientError, OAuth2Error
class FatalOpenIDClientError(FatalClientError):
pass
class OpenIDClientError(OAuth2Error):
pass
class InteractionRequired(OpenIDClientError):
"""
The Authorization Server requires End-User interaction to proceed.
This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter value in the
Authentication Request is none, but the Authentication Request cannot be
completed without displaying a user interface for End-User interaction.
"""
error = 'interaction_required'
status_code = 401
class LoginRequired(OpenIDClientError):
"""
The Authorization Server requires End-User authentication.
This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter value in the
Authentication Request is none, but the Authentication Request cannot be
completed without displaying a user interface for End-User authentication.
"""
error = 'login_required'
status_code = 401
class AccountSelectionRequired(OpenIDClientError):
"""
The End-User is REQUIRED to select a session at the Authorization Server.
The End-User MAY be authenticated at the Authorization Server with
different associated accounts, but the End-User did not select a session.
This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter value in the
Authentication Request is none, but the Authentication Request cannot be
completed without displaying a user interface to prompt for a session to
use.
"""
error = 'account_selection_required'
class ConsentRequired(OpenIDClientError):
"""
The Authorization Server requires End-User consent.
This error MAY be returned when the prompt parameter value in the
Authentication Request is none, but the Authentication Request cannot be
completed without displaying a user interface for End-User consent.
"""
error = 'consent_required'
status_code = 401
class InvalidRequestURI(OpenIDClientError):
"""
The request_uri in the Authorization Request returns an error or
contains invalid data.
"""
error = 'invalid_request_uri'
description = 'The request_uri in the Authorization Request returns an ' \
'error or contains invalid data.'
class InvalidRequestObject(OpenIDClientError):
"""
The request parameter contains an invalid Request Object.
"""
error = 'invalid_request_object'
description = 'The request parameter contains an invalid Request Object.'
class RequestNotSupported(OpenIDClientError):
"""
The OP does not support use of the request parameter.
"""
error = 'request_not_supported'
description = 'The request parameter is not supported.'
class RequestURINotSupported(OpenIDClientError):
"""
The OP does not support use of the request_uri parameter.
"""
error = 'request_uri_not_supported'
description = 'The request_uri parameter is not supported.'
class RegistrationNotSupported(OpenIDClientError):
"""
The OP does not support use of the registration parameter.
"""
error = 'registration_not_supported'
description = 'The registration parameter is not supported.'
class InvalidTokenError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, or
invalid for other reasons. The resource SHOULD respond with
the HTTP 401 (Unauthorized) status code. The client MAY
request a new access token and retry the protected resource
request.
"""
error = 'invalid_token'
status_code = 401
description = ("The access token provided is expired, revoked, malformed, "
"or invalid for other reasons.")
class InsufficientScopeError(OAuth2Error):
"""
The request requires higher privileges than provided by the
access token. The resource server SHOULD respond with the HTTP
403 (Forbidden) status code and MAY include the "scope"
attribute with the scope necessary to access the protected
resource.
"""
error = 'insufficient_scope'
status_code = 403
description = ("The request requires higher privileges than provided by "
"the access token.")
def raise_from_error(error, params=None):
import inspect
import sys
kwargs = {
'description': params.get('error_description'),
'uri': params.get('error_uri'),
'state': params.get('state')
}
for _, cls in inspect.getmembers(sys.modules[__name__], inspect.isclass):
if cls.error == error:
raise cls(**kwargs)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.openid.connect.core.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import unicode_literals, absolute_import
from .authorization_code import AuthorizationCodeGrant
from .implicit import ImplicitGrant
from .base import GrantTypeBase
from .hybrid import HybridGrant
from .exceptions import OIDCNoPrompt
from .dispatchers import (
AuthorizationCodeGrantDispatcher,
ImplicitTokenGrantDispatcher,
AuthorizationTokenGrantDispatcher
)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.openid.connect.core.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types.authorization_code import AuthorizationCodeGrant as OAuth2AuthorizationCodeGrant
from .base import GrantTypeBase
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class AuthorizationCodeGrant(GrantTypeBase):
def __init__(self, request_validator=None, **kwargs):
self.proxy_target = OAuth2AuthorizationCodeGrant(
request_validator=request_validator, **kwargs)
self.custom_validators.post_auth.append(
self.openid_authorization_validator)
self.register_token_modifier(self.add_id_token)
def add_id_token(self, token, token_handler, request):
"""
Construct an initial version of id_token, and let the
request_validator sign or encrypt it.
The authorization_code version of this method is used to
retrieve the nonce accordingly to the code storage.
"""
# Treat it as normal OAuth 2 auth code request if openid is not present
if not request.scopes or 'openid' not in request.scopes:
return token
nonce = self.request_validator.get_authorization_code_nonce(
request.client_id,
request.code,
request.redirect_uri,
request
)
return super(AuthorizationCodeGrant, self).add_id_token(token, token_handler, request, nonce=nonce)

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from .exceptions import OIDCNoPrompt
import base64
import hashlib
import logging
import time
from json import loads
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.errors import ConsentRequired, InvalidRequestError, LoginRequired
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class GrantTypeBase(object):
# Just proxy the majority of method calls through to the
# proxy_target grant type handler, which will usually be either
# the standard OAuth2 AuthCode or Implicit grant types.
def __getattr__(self, attr):
return getattr(self.proxy_target, attr)
def __setattr__(self, attr, value):
proxied_attrs = set(('refresh_token', 'response_types'))
if attr in proxied_attrs:
setattr(self.proxy_target, attr, value)
else:
super(OpenIDConnectBase, self).__setattr__(attr, value)
def validate_authorization_request(self, request):
"""Validates the OpenID Connect authorization request parameters.
:returns: (list of scopes, dict of request info)
"""
# If request.prompt is 'none' then no login/authorization form should
# be presented to the user. Instead, a silent login/authorization
# should be performed.
if request.prompt == 'none':
raise OIDCNoPrompt()
else:
return self.proxy_target.validate_authorization_request(request)
def _inflate_claims(self, request):
# this may be called multiple times in a single request so make sure we only de-serialize the claims once
if request.claims and not isinstance(request.claims, dict):
# specific claims are requested during the Authorization Request and may be requested for inclusion
# in either the id_token or the UserInfo endpoint response
# see http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ClaimsParameter
try:
request.claims = loads(request.claims)
except Exception as ex:
raise InvalidRequestError(description="Malformed claims parameter",
uri="http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ClaimsParameter")
def id_token_hash(self, value, hashfunc=hashlib.sha256):
"""
Its value is the base64url encoding of the left-most half of the
hash of the octets of the ASCII representation of the access_token
value, where the hash algorithm used is the hash algorithm used in
the alg Header Parameter of the ID Token's JOSE Header.
For instance, if the alg is RS256, hash the access_token value
with SHA-256, then take the left-most 128 bits and
base64url-encode them.
For instance, if the alg is HS512, hash the code value with
SHA-512, then take the left-most 256 bits and base64url-encode
them. The c_hash value is a case-sensitive string.
Example of hash from OIDC specification (bound to a JWS using RS256):
code:
Qcb0Orv1zh30vL1MPRsbm-diHiMwcLyZvn1arpZv-Jxf_11jnpEX3Tgfvk
c_hash:
LDktKdoQak3Pk0cnXxCltA
"""
digest = hashfunc(value.encode()).digest()
left_most = len(digest) // 2
return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(digest[:left_most]).decode().rstrip("=")
def add_id_token(self, token, token_handler, request, nonce=None):
"""
Construct an initial version of id_token, and let the
request_validator sign or encrypt it.
The initial version can contain the fields below, accordingly
to the spec:
- aud
- iat
- nonce
- at_hash
- c_hash
"""
# Treat it as normal OAuth 2 auth code request if openid is not present
if not request.scopes or 'openid' not in request.scopes:
return token
# Only add an id token on auth/token step if asked for.
if request.response_type and 'id_token' not in request.response_type:
return token
# Implementation mint its own id_token without help.
id_token = self.request_validator.get_id_token(token, token_handler, request)
if id_token:
token['id_token'] = id_token
return token
# Fallback for asking some help from oauthlib framework.
# Start with technicals fields bound to the specification.
id_token = {}
id_token['aud'] = request.client_id
id_token['iat'] = int(time.time())
# nonce is REQUIRED when response_type value is:
# - id_token token (Implicit)
# - id_token (Implicit)
# - code id_token (Hybrid)
# - code id_token token (Hybrid)
#
# nonce is OPTIONAL when response_type value is:
# - code (Authorization Code)
# - code token (Hybrid)
if nonce is not None:
id_token["nonce"] = nonce
# at_hash is REQUIRED when response_type value is:
# - id_token token (Implicit)
# - code id_token token (Hybrid)
#
# at_hash is OPTIONAL when:
# - code (Authorization code)
# - code id_token (Hybrid)
# - code token (Hybrid)
#
# at_hash MAY NOT be used when:
# - id_token (Implicit)
if "access_token" in token:
id_token["at_hash"] = self.id_token_hash(token["access_token"])
# c_hash is REQUIRED when response_type value is:
# - code id_token (Hybrid)
# - code id_token token (Hybrid)
#
# c_hash is OPTIONAL for others.
if "code" in token:
id_token["c_hash"] = self.id_token_hash(token["code"])
# Call request_validator to complete/sign/encrypt id_token
token['id_token'] = self.request_validator.finalize_id_token(id_token, token, token_handler, request)
return token
def openid_authorization_validator(self, request):
"""Perform OpenID Connect specific authorization request validation.
nonce
OPTIONAL. String value used to associate a Client session with
an ID Token, and to mitigate replay attacks. The value is
passed through unmodified from the Authentication Request to
the ID Token. Sufficient entropy MUST be present in the nonce
values used to prevent attackers from guessing values
display
OPTIONAL. ASCII string value that specifies how the
Authorization Server displays the authentication and consent
user interface pages to the End-User. The defined values are:
page - The Authorization Server SHOULD display the
authentication and consent UI consistent with a full User
Agent page view. If the display parameter is not specified,
this is the default display mode.
popup - The Authorization Server SHOULD display the
authentication and consent UI consistent with a popup User
Agent window. The popup User Agent window should be of an
appropriate size for a login-focused dialog and should not
obscure the entire window that it is popping up over.
touch - The Authorization Server SHOULD display the
authentication and consent UI consistent with a device that
leverages a touch interface.
wap - The Authorization Server SHOULD display the
authentication and consent UI consistent with a "feature
phone" type display.
The Authorization Server MAY also attempt to detect the
capabilities of the User Agent and present an appropriate
display.
prompt
OPTIONAL. Space delimited, case sensitive list of ASCII string
values that specifies whether the Authorization Server prompts
the End-User for reauthentication and consent. The defined
values are:
none - The Authorization Server MUST NOT display any
authentication or consent user interface pages. An error is
returned if an End-User is not already authenticated or the
Client does not have pre-configured consent for the
requested Claims or does not fulfill other conditions for
processing the request. The error code will typically be
login_required, interaction_required, or another code
defined in Section 3.1.2.6. This can be used as a method to
check for existing authentication and/or consent.
login - The Authorization Server SHOULD prompt the End-User
for reauthentication. If it cannot reauthenticate the
End-User, it MUST return an error, typically
login_required.
consent - The Authorization Server SHOULD prompt the
End-User for consent before returning information to the
Client. If it cannot obtain consent, it MUST return an
error, typically consent_required.
select_account - The Authorization Server SHOULD prompt the
End-User to select a user account. This enables an End-User
who has multiple accounts at the Authorization Server to
select amongst the multiple accounts that they might have
current sessions for. If it cannot obtain an account
selection choice made by the End-User, it MUST return an
error, typically account_selection_required.
The prompt parameter can be used by the Client to make sure
that the End-User is still present for the current session or
to bring attention to the request. If this parameter contains
none with any other value, an error is returned.
max_age
OPTIONAL. Maximum Authentication Age. Specifies the allowable
elapsed time in seconds since the last time the End-User was
actively authenticated by the OP. If the elapsed time is
greater than this value, the OP MUST attempt to actively
re-authenticate the End-User. (The max_age request parameter
corresponds to the OpenID 2.0 PAPE [OpenID.PAPE] max_auth_age
request parameter.) When max_age is used, the ID Token returned
MUST include an auth_time Claim Value.
ui_locales
OPTIONAL. End-User's preferred languages and scripts for the
user interface, represented as a space-separated list of BCP47
[RFC5646] language tag values, ordered by preference. For
instance, the value "fr-CA fr en" represents a preference for
French as spoken in Canada, then French (without a region
designation), followed by English (without a region
designation). An error SHOULD NOT result if some or all of the
requested locales are not supported by the OpenID Provider.
id_token_hint
OPTIONAL. ID Token previously issued by the Authorization
Server being passed as a hint about the End-User's current or
past authenticated session with the Client. If the End-User
identified by the ID Token is logged in or is logged in by the
request, then the Authorization Server returns a positive
response; otherwise, it SHOULD return an error, such as
login_required. When possible, an id_token_hint SHOULD be
present when prompt=none is used and an invalid_request error
MAY be returned if it is not; however, the server SHOULD
respond successfully when possible, even if it is not present.
The Authorization Server need not be listed as an audience of
the ID Token when it is used as an id_token_hint value. If the
ID Token received by the RP from the OP is encrypted, to use it
as an id_token_hint, the Client MUST decrypt the signed ID
Token contained within the encrypted ID Token. The Client MAY
re-encrypt the signed ID token to the Authentication Server
using a key that enables the server to decrypt the ID Token,
and use the re-encrypted ID token as the id_token_hint value.
login_hint
OPTIONAL. Hint to the Authorization Server about the login
identifier the End-User might use to log in (if necessary).
This hint can be used by an RP if it first asks the End-User
for their e-mail address (or other identifier) and then wants
to pass that value as a hint to the discovered authorization
service. It is RECOMMENDED that the hint value match the value
used for discovery. This value MAY also be a phone number in
the format specified for the phone_number Claim. The use of
this parameter is left to the OP's discretion.
acr_values
OPTIONAL. Requested Authentication Context Class Reference
values. Space-separated string that specifies the acr values
that the Authorization Server is being requested to use for
processing this Authentication Request, with the values
appearing in order of preference. The Authentication Context
Class satisfied by the authentication performed is returned as
the acr Claim Value, as specified in Section 2. The acr Claim
is requested as a Voluntary Claim by this parameter.
"""
# Treat it as normal OAuth 2 auth code request if openid is not present
if not request.scopes or 'openid' not in request.scopes:
return {}
prompt = request.prompt if request.prompt else []
if hasattr(prompt, 'split'):
prompt = prompt.strip().split()
prompt = set(prompt)
if 'none' in prompt:
if len(prompt) > 1:
msg = "Prompt none is mutually exclusive with other values."
raise InvalidRequestError(request=request, description=msg)
if not self.request_validator.validate_silent_login(request):
raise LoginRequired(request=request)
if not self.request_validator.validate_silent_authorization(request):
raise ConsentRequired(request=request)
self._inflate_claims(request)
if not self.request_validator.validate_user_match(
request.id_token_hint, request.scopes, request.claims, request):
msg = "Session user does not match client supplied user."
raise LoginRequired(request=request, description=msg)
request_info = {
'display': request.display,
'nonce': request.nonce,
'prompt': prompt,
'ui_locales': request.ui_locales.split() if request.ui_locales else [],
'id_token_hint': request.id_token_hint,
'login_hint': request.login_hint,
'claims': request.claims
}
return request_info
OpenIDConnectBase = GrantTypeBase

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import logging
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class Dispatcher(object):
default_grant = None
oidc_grant = None
class AuthorizationCodeGrantDispatcher(Dispatcher):
"""
This is an adapter class that will route simple Authorization Code requests, those that have response_type=code and a scope
including 'openid' to either the default_grant or the oidc_grant based on the scopes requested.
"""
def __init__(self, default_grant=None, oidc_grant=None):
self.default_grant = default_grant
self.oidc_grant = oidc_grant
def _handler_for_request(self, request):
handler = self.default_grant
if request.scopes and "openid" in request.scopes:
handler = self.oidc_grant
log.debug('Selecting handler for request %r.', handler)
return handler
def create_authorization_response(self, request, token_handler):
return self._handler_for_request(request).create_authorization_response(request, token_handler)
def validate_authorization_request(self, request):
return self._handler_for_request(request).validate_authorization_request(request)
class ImplicitTokenGrantDispatcher(Dispatcher):
"""
This is an adapter class that will route simple Authorization Code requests, those that have response_type=code and a scope
including 'openid' to either the default_grant or the oidc_grant based on the scopes requested.
"""
def __init__(self, default_grant=None, oidc_grant=None):
self.default_grant = default_grant
self.oidc_grant = oidc_grant
def _handler_for_request(self, request):
handler = self.default_grant
if request.scopes and "openid" in request.scopes and 'id_token' in request.response_type:
handler = self.oidc_grant
log.debug('Selecting handler for request %r.', handler)
return handler
def create_authorization_response(self, request, token_handler):
return self._handler_for_request(request).create_authorization_response(request, token_handler)
def validate_authorization_request(self, request):
return self._handler_for_request(request).validate_authorization_request(request)
class AuthorizationTokenGrantDispatcher(Dispatcher):
"""
This is an adapter class that will route simple Token requests, those that authorization_code have a scope
including 'openid' to either the default_grant or the oidc_grant based on the scopes requested.
"""
def __init__(self, request_validator, default_grant=None, oidc_grant=None):
self.default_grant = default_grant
self.oidc_grant = oidc_grant
self.request_validator = request_validator
def _handler_for_request(self, request):
handler = self.default_grant
scopes = ()
parameters = dict(request.decoded_body)
client_id = parameters.get('client_id', None)
code = parameters.get('code', None)
redirect_uri = parameters.get('redirect_uri', None)
# If code is not pressent fallback to `default_grant` wich will
# raise an error for the missing `code` in `create_token_response` step.
if code:
scopes = self.request_validator.get_authorization_code_scopes(client_id, code, redirect_uri, request)
if 'openid' in scopes:
handler = self.oidc_grant
log.debug('Selecting handler for request %r.', handler)
return handler
def create_token_response(self, request, token_handler):
handler = self._handler_for_request(request)
return handler.create_token_response(request, token_handler)

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class OIDCNoPrompt(Exception):
"""Exception used to inform users that no explicit authorization is needed.
Normally users authorize requests after validation of the request is done.
Then post-authorization validation is again made and a response containing
an auth code or token is created. However, when OIDC clients request
no prompting of user authorization the final response is created directly.
Example (without the shortcut for no prompt)
scopes, req_info = endpoint.validate_authorization_request(url, ...)
authorization_view = create_fancy_auth_form(scopes, req_info)
return authorization_view
Example (with the no prompt shortcut)
try:
scopes, req_info = endpoint.validate_authorization_request(url, ...)
authorization_view = create_fancy_auth_form(scopes, req_info)
return authorization_view
except OIDCNoPrompt:
# Note: Location will be set for you
headers, body, status = endpoint.create_authorization_response(url, ...)
redirect_view = create_redirect(headers, body, status)
return redirect_view
"""
def __init__(self):
msg = ("OIDC request for no user interaction received. Do not ask user "
"for authorization, it should been done using silent "
"authentication through create_authorization_response. "
"See OIDCNoPrompt.__doc__ for more details.")
super(OIDCNoPrompt, self).__init__(msg)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.openid.connect.core.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types.authorization_code import AuthorizationCodeGrant as OAuth2AuthorizationCodeGrant
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.errors import InvalidRequestError
from .base import GrantTypeBase
from ..request_validator import RequestValidator
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class HybridGrant(GrantTypeBase):
def __init__(self, request_validator=None, **kwargs):
self.request_validator = request_validator or RequestValidator()
self.proxy_target = OAuth2AuthorizationCodeGrant(
request_validator=request_validator, **kwargs)
# All hybrid response types should be fragment-encoded.
self.proxy_target.default_response_mode = "fragment"
self.register_response_type('code id_token')
self.register_response_type('code token')
self.register_response_type('code id_token token')
self.custom_validators.post_auth.append(
self.openid_authorization_validator)
# Hybrid flows can return the id_token from the authorization
# endpoint as part of the 'code' response
self.register_code_modifier(self.add_token)
self.register_code_modifier(self.add_id_token)
self.register_token_modifier(self.add_id_token)
def openid_authorization_validator(self, request):
"""Additional validation when following the Authorization Code flow.
"""
request_info = super(HybridGrant, self).openid_authorization_validator(request)
if not request_info: # returns immediately if OAuth2.0
return request_info
# REQUIRED if the Response Type of the request is `code
# id_token` or `code id_token token` and OPTIONAL when the
# Response Type of the request is `code token`. It is a string
# value used to associate a Client session with an ID Token,
# and to mitigate replay attacks. The value is passed through
# unmodified from the Authentication Request to the ID
# Token. Sufficient entropy MUST be present in the `nonce`
# values used to prevent attackers from guessing values. For
# implementation notes, see Section 15.5.2.
if request.response_type in ["code id_token", "code id_token token"]:
if not request.nonce:
raise InvalidRequestError(
request=request,
description='Request is missing mandatory nonce parameter.'
)
return request_info

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.openid.connect.core.grant_types
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from .base import GrantTypeBase
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grant_types.implicit import ImplicitGrant as OAuth2ImplicitGrant
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.errors import InvalidRequestError
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class ImplicitGrant(GrantTypeBase):
def __init__(self, request_validator=None, **kwargs):
self.proxy_target = OAuth2ImplicitGrant(
request_validator=request_validator, **kwargs)
self.register_response_type('id_token')
self.register_response_type('id_token token')
self.custom_validators.post_auth.append(
self.openid_authorization_validator)
self.register_token_modifier(self.add_id_token)
def add_id_token(self, token, token_handler, request):
if 'state' not in token and request.state:
token['state'] = request.state
return super(ImplicitGrant, self).add_id_token(token, token_handler, request, nonce=request.nonce)
def openid_authorization_validator(self, request):
"""Additional validation when following the implicit flow.
"""
request_info = super(ImplicitGrant, self).openid_authorization_validator(request)
if not request_info: # returns immediately if OAuth2.0
return request_info
# REQUIRED. String value used to associate a Client session with an ID
# Token, and to mitigate replay attacks. The value is passed through
# unmodified from the Authentication Request to the ID Token.
# Sufficient entropy MUST be present in the nonce values used to
# prevent attackers from guessing values. For implementation notes, see
# Section 15.5.2.
if not request.nonce:
raise InvalidRequestError(
request=request,
description='Request is missing mandatory nonce parameter.'
)
return request_info

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
oauthlib.openid.connect.core.request_validator
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import logging
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.request_validator import RequestValidator as OAuth2RequestValidator
log = logging.getLogger(__name__)
class RequestValidator(OAuth2RequestValidator):
def get_authorization_code_scopes(self, client_id, code, redirect_uri, request):
""" Extracts scopes from saved authorization code.
The scopes returned by this method is used to route token requests
based on scopes passed to Authorization Code requests.
With that the token endpoint knows when to include OpenIDConnect
id_token in token response only based on authorization code scopes.
Only code param should be sufficient to retrieve grant code from
any storage you are using, `client_id` and `redirect_uri` can have a
blank value `""` don't forget to check it before using those values
in a select query if a database is used.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier
:param code: Unicode authorization code grant
:param redirect_uri: Unicode absolute URI
:return: A list of scope
Method is used by:
- Authorization Token Grant Dispatcher
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def get_authorization_code_nonce(self, client_id, code, redirect_uri, request):
""" Extracts nonce from saved authorization code.
If present in the Authentication Request, Authorization
Servers MUST include a nonce Claim in the ID Token with the
Claim Value being the nonce value sent in the Authentication
Request. Authorization Servers SHOULD perform no other
processing on nonce values used. The nonce value is a
case-sensitive string.
Only code param should be sufficient to retrieve grant code from
any storage you are using. However, `client_id` and `redirect_uri`
have been validated and can be used also.
:param client_id: Unicode client identifier
:param code: Unicode authorization code grant
:param redirect_uri: Unicode absolute URI
:return: Unicode nonce
Method is used by:
- Authorization Token Grant Dispatcher
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def get_jwt_bearer_token(self, token, token_handler, request):
"""Get JWT Bearer token or OpenID Connect ID token
If using OpenID Connect this SHOULD call `oauthlib.oauth2.RequestValidator.get_id_token`
:param token: A Bearer token dict
:param token_handler: the token handler (BearerToken class)
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:return: The JWT Bearer token or OpenID Connect ID token (a JWS signed JWT)
Method is used by JWT Bearer and OpenID Connect tokens:
- JWTToken.create_token
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def get_id_token(self, token, token_handler, request):
"""Get OpenID Connect ID token
This method is OPTIONAL and is NOT RECOMMENDED.
`finalize_id_token` SHOULD be implemented instead. However, if you
want a full control over the minting of the `id_token`, you
MAY want to override `get_id_token` instead of using
`finalize_id_token`.
In the OpenID Connect workflows when an ID Token is requested this method is called.
Subclasses should implement the construction, signing and optional encryption of the
ID Token as described in the OpenID Connect spec.
In addition to the standard OAuth2 request properties, the request may also contain
these OIDC specific properties which are useful to this method:
- nonce, if workflow is implicit or hybrid and it was provided
- claims, if provided to the original Authorization Code request
The token parameter is a dict which may contain an ``access_token`` entry, in which
case the resulting ID Token *should* include a calculated ``at_hash`` claim.
Similarly, when the request parameter has a ``code`` property defined, the ID Token
*should* include a calculated ``c_hash`` claim.
http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html (sections `3.1.3.6`_, `3.2.2.10`_, `3.3.2.11`_)
.. _`3.1.3.6`: http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#CodeIDToken
.. _`3.2.2.10`: http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ImplicitIDToken
.. _`3.3.2.11`: http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#HybridIDToken
:param token: A Bearer token dict
:param token_handler: the token handler (BearerToken class)
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:return: The ID Token (a JWS signed JWT)
"""
return None
def finalize_id_token(self, id_token, token, token_handler, request):
"""Finalize OpenID Connect ID token & Sign or Encrypt.
In the OpenID Connect workflows when an ID Token is requested
this method is called. Subclasses should implement the
construction, signing and optional encryption of the ID Token
as described in the OpenID Connect spec.
The `id_token` parameter is a dict containing a couple of OIDC
technical fields related to the specification. Prepopulated
attributes are:
- `aud`, equals to `request.client_id`.
- `iat`, equals to current time.
- `nonce`, if present, is equals to the `nonce` from the
authorization request.
- `at_hash`, hash of `access_token`, if relevant.
- `c_hash`, hash of `code`, if relevant.
This method MUST provide required fields as below:
- `iss`, REQUIRED. Issuer Identifier for the Issuer of the response.
- `sub`, REQUIRED. Subject Identifier
- `exp`, REQUIRED. Expiration time on or after which the ID
Token MUST NOT be accepted by the RP when performing
authentication with the OP.
Additionals claims must be added, note that `request.scope`
should be used to determine the list of claims.
More information can be found at `OpenID Connect Core#Claims`_
.. _`OpenID Connect Core#Claims`: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#Claims
:param id_token: A dict containing technical fields of id_token
:param token: A Bearer token dict
:param token_handler: the token handler (BearerToken class)
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:return: The ID Token (a JWS signed JWT or JWE encrypted JWT)
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_jwt_bearer_token(self, token, scopes, request):
"""Ensure the JWT Bearer token or OpenID Connect ID token are valids and authorized access to scopes.
If using OpenID Connect this SHOULD call `oauthlib.oauth2.RequestValidator.get_id_token`
If not using OpenID Connect this can `return None` to avoid 5xx rather 401/3 response.
OpenID connect core 1.0 describe how to validate an id_token:
- http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDTokenValidation
- http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ImplicitIDTValidation
- http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#HybridIDTValidation
- http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#HybridIDTValidation2
:param token: Unicode Bearer token
:param scopes: List of scopes (defined by you)
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is indirectly used by all core OpenID connect JWT token issuing grant types:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
- Hybrid Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_id_token(self, token, scopes, request):
"""Ensure the id token is valid and authorized access to scopes.
OpenID connect core 1.0 describe how to validate an id_token:
- http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDTokenValidation
- http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#ImplicitIDTValidation
- http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#HybridIDTValidation
- http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#HybridIDTValidation2
:param token: Unicode Bearer token
:param scopes: List of scopes (defined by you)
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is indirectly used by all core OpenID connect JWT token issuing grant types:
- Authorization Code Grant
- Implicit Grant
- Hybrid Grant
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_silent_authorization(self, request):
"""Ensure the logged in user has authorized silent OpenID authorization.
Silent OpenID authorization allows access tokens and id tokens to be
granted to clients without any user prompt or interaction.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- OpenIDConnectAuthCode
- OpenIDConnectImplicit
- OpenIDConnectHybrid
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_silent_login(self, request):
"""Ensure session user has authorized silent OpenID login.
If no user is logged in or has not authorized silent login, this
method should return False.
If the user is logged in but associated with multiple accounts and
not selected which one to link to the token then this method should
raise an oauthlib.oauth2.AccountSelectionRequired error.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- OpenIDConnectAuthCode
- OpenIDConnectImplicit
- OpenIDConnectHybrid
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def validate_user_match(self, id_token_hint, scopes, claims, request):
"""Ensure client supplied user id hint matches session user.
If the sub claim or id_token_hint is supplied then the session
user must match the given ID.
:param id_token_hint: User identifier string.
:param scopes: List of OAuth 2 scopes and OpenID claims (strings).
:param claims: OpenID Connect claims dict.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: True or False
Method is used by:
- OpenIDConnectAuthCode
- OpenIDConnectImplicit
- OpenIDConnectHybrid
"""
raise NotImplementedError('Subclasses must implement this method.')
def get_userinfo_claims(self, request):
"""Return the UserInfo claims in JSON or Signed or Encrypted.
The UserInfo Claims MUST be returned as the members of a JSON object
unless a signed or encrypted response was requested during Client
Registration. The Claims defined in Section 5.1 can be returned, as can
additional Claims not specified there.
For privacy reasons, OpenID Providers MAY elect to not return values for
some requested Claims.
If a Claim is not returned, that Claim Name SHOULD be omitted from the
JSON object representing the Claims; it SHOULD NOT be present with a
null or empty string value.
The sub (subject) Claim MUST always be returned in the UserInfo
Response.
Upon receipt of the UserInfo Request, the UserInfo Endpoint MUST return
the JSON Serialization of the UserInfo Response as in Section 13.3 in
the HTTP response body unless a different format was specified during
Registration [OpenID.Registration].
If the UserInfo Response is signed and/or encrypted, then the Claims are
returned in a JWT and the content-type MUST be application/jwt. The
response MAY be encrypted without also being signed. If both signing and
encryption are requested, the response MUST be signed then encrypted,
with the result being a Nested JWT, as defined in [JWT].
If signed, the UserInfo Response SHOULD contain the Claims iss (issuer)
and aud (audience) as members. The iss value SHOULD be the OP's Issuer
Identifier URL. The aud value SHOULD be or include the RP's Client ID
value.
:param request: OAuthlib request.
:type request: oauthlib.common.Request
:rtype: Claims as a dict OR JWT/JWS/JWE as a string
Method is used by:
UserInfoEndpoint
"""

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"""
authlib.openid.connect.core.tokens
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
This module contains methods for adding JWT tokens to requests.
"""
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.tokens import TokenBase, random_token_generator
class JWTToken(TokenBase):
__slots__ = (
'request_validator', 'token_generator',
'refresh_token_generator', 'expires_in'
)
def __init__(self, request_validator=None, token_generator=None,
expires_in=None, refresh_token_generator=None):
self.request_validator = request_validator
self.token_generator = token_generator or random_token_generator
self.refresh_token_generator = (
refresh_token_generator or self.token_generator
)
self.expires_in = expires_in or 3600
def create_token(self, request, refresh_token=False):
"""Create a JWT Token, using requestvalidator method."""
if callable(self.expires_in):
expires_in = self.expires_in(request)
else:
expires_in = self.expires_in
request.expires_in = expires_in
return self.request_validator.get_jwt_bearer_token(None, None, request)
def validate_request(self, request):
token = None
if 'Authorization' in request.headers:
token = request.headers.get('Authorization')[7:]
else:
token = request.access_token
return self.request_validator.validate_jwt_bearer_token(
token, request.scopes, request)
def estimate_type(self, request):
token = request.headers.get('Authorization', '')[7:]
if token.startswith('ey') and token.count('.') in (2, 4):
return 10
else:
return 0

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
"""
Implements signals based on blinker if available, otherwise
falls silently back to a noop. Shamelessly stolen from flask.signals:
https://github.com/mitsuhiko/flask/blob/master/flask/signals.py
"""
signals_available = False
try:
from blinker import Namespace
signals_available = True
except ImportError: # noqa
class Namespace(object):
def signal(self, name, doc=None):
return _FakeSignal(name, doc)
class _FakeSignal(object):
"""If blinker is unavailable, create a fake class with the same
interface that allows sending of signals but will fail with an
error on anything else. Instead of doing anything on send, it
will just ignore the arguments and do nothing instead.
"""
def __init__(self, name, doc=None):
self.name = name
self.__doc__ = doc
def _fail(self, *args, **kwargs):
raise RuntimeError('signalling support is unavailable '
'because the blinker library is '
'not installed.')
send = lambda *a, **kw: None
connect = disconnect = has_receivers_for = receivers_for = \
temporarily_connected_to = connected_to = _fail
del _fail
# The namespace for code signals. If you are not oauthlib code, do
# not put signals in here. Create your own namespace instead.
_signals = Namespace()
# Core signals.
scope_changed = _signals.signal('scope-changed')

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"""
Regex for URIs
These regex are directly derived from the collected ABNF in RFC3986
(except for DIGIT, ALPHA and HEXDIG, defined by RFC2234).
They should be processed with re.VERBOSE.
Thanks Mark Nottingham for this code - https://gist.github.com/138549
"""
from __future__ import unicode_literals
import re
# basics
DIGIT = r"[\x30-\x39]"
ALPHA = r"[\x41-\x5A\x61-\x7A]"
HEXDIG = r"[\x30-\x39A-Fa-f]"
# pct-encoded = "%" HEXDIG HEXDIG
pct_encoded = r" %% %(HEXDIG)s %(HEXDIG)s" % locals()
# unreserved = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
unreserved = r"(?: %(ALPHA)s | %(DIGIT)s | \- | \. | _ | ~ )" % locals()
# gen-delims = ":" / "/" / "?" / "#" / "[" / "]" / "@"
gen_delims = r"(?: : | / | \? | \# | \[ | \] | @ )"
# sub-delims = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")"
# / "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="
sub_delims = r"""(?: ! | \$ | & | ' | \( | \) |
\* | \+ | , | ; | = )"""
# pchar = unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" / "@"
pchar = r"(?: %(unreserved)s | %(pct_encoded)s | %(sub_delims)s | : | @ )" % locals(
)
# reserved = gen-delims / sub-delims
reserved = r"(?: %(gen_delims)s | %(sub_delims)s )" % locals()
# scheme
# scheme = ALPHA *( ALPHA / DIGIT / "+" / "-" / "." )
scheme = r"%(ALPHA)s (?: %(ALPHA)s | %(DIGIT)s | \+ | \- | \. )*" % locals()
# authority
# dec-octet = DIGIT ; 0-9
# / %x31-39 DIGIT ; 10-99
# / "1" 2DIGIT ; 100-199
# / "2" %x30-34 DIGIT ; 200-249
# / "25" %x30-35 ; 250-255
dec_octet = r"""(?: %(DIGIT)s |
[\x31-\x39] %(DIGIT)s |
1 %(DIGIT)s{2} |
2 [\x30-\x34] %(DIGIT)s |
25 [\x30-\x35]
)
""" % locals()
# IPv4address = dec-octet "." dec-octet "." dec-octet "." dec-octet
IPv4address = r"%(dec_octet)s \. %(dec_octet)s \. %(dec_octet)s \. %(dec_octet)s" % locals(
)
# h16 = 1*4HEXDIG
h16 = r"(?: %(HEXDIG)s ){1,4}" % locals()
# ls32 = ( h16 ":" h16 ) / IPv4address
ls32 = r"(?: (?: %(h16)s : %(h16)s ) | %(IPv4address)s )" % locals()
# IPv6address = 6( h16 ":" ) ls32
# / "::" 5( h16 ":" ) ls32
# / [ h16 ] "::" 4( h16 ":" ) ls32
# / [ *1( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::" 3( h16 ":" ) ls32
# / [ *2( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::" 2( h16 ":" ) ls32
# / [ *3( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::" h16 ":" ls32
# / [ *4( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::" ls32
# / [ *5( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::" h16
# / [ *6( h16 ":" ) h16 ] "::"
IPv6address = r"""(?: (?: %(h16)s : ){6} %(ls32)s |
:: (?: %(h16)s : ){5} %(ls32)s |
%(h16)s :: (?: %(h16)s : ){4} %(ls32)s |
(?: %(h16)s : ) %(h16)s :: (?: %(h16)s : ){3} %(ls32)s |
(?: %(h16)s : ){2} %(h16)s :: (?: %(h16)s : ){2} %(ls32)s |
(?: %(h16)s : ){3} %(h16)s :: %(h16)s : %(ls32)s |
(?: %(h16)s : ){4} %(h16)s :: %(ls32)s |
(?: %(h16)s : ){5} %(h16)s :: %(h16)s |
(?: %(h16)s : ){6} %(h16)s ::
)
""" % locals()
# IPvFuture = "v" 1*HEXDIG "." 1*( unreserved / sub-delims / ":" )
IPvFuture = r"v %(HEXDIG)s+ \. (?: %(unreserved)s | %(sub_delims)s | : )+" % locals()
# IP-literal = "[" ( IPv6address / IPvFuture ) "]"
IP_literal = r"\[ (?: %(IPv6address)s | %(IPvFuture)s ) \]" % locals()
# reg-name = *( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims )
reg_name = r"(?: %(unreserved)s | %(pct_encoded)s | %(sub_delims)s )*" % locals()
# userinfo = *( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / ":" )
userinfo = r"(?: %(unreserved)s | %(pct_encoded)s | %(sub_delims)s | : )" % locals(
)
# host = IP-literal / IPv4address / reg-name
host = r"(?: %(IP_literal)s | %(IPv4address)s | %(reg_name)s )" % locals()
# port = *DIGIT
port = r"(?: %(DIGIT)s )*" % locals()
# authority = [ userinfo "@" ] host [ ":" port ]
authority = r"(?: %(userinfo)s @)? %(host)s (?: : %(port)s)?" % locals()
# Path
# segment = *pchar
segment = r"%(pchar)s*" % locals()
# segment-nz = 1*pchar
segment_nz = r"%(pchar)s+" % locals()
# segment-nz-nc = 1*( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims / "@" )
# ; non-zero-length segment without any colon ":"
segment_nz_nc = r"(?: %(unreserved)s | %(pct_encoded)s | %(sub_delims)s | @ )+" % locals()
# path-abempty = *( "/" segment )
path_abempty = r"(?: / %(segment)s )*" % locals()
# path-absolute = "/" [ segment-nz *( "/" segment ) ]
path_absolute = r"/ (?: %(segment_nz)s (?: / %(segment)s )* )?" % locals()
# path-noscheme = segment-nz-nc *( "/" segment )
path_noscheme = r"%(segment_nz_nc)s (?: / %(segment)s )*" % locals()
# path-rootless = segment-nz *( "/" segment )
path_rootless = r"%(segment_nz)s (?: / %(segment)s )*" % locals()
# path-empty = 0<pchar>
path_empty = r"" # FIXME
# path = path-abempty ; begins with "/" or is empty
# / path-absolute ; begins with "/" but not "//"
# / path-noscheme ; begins with a non-colon segment
# / path-rootless ; begins with a segment
# / path-empty ; zero characters
path = r"""(?: %(path_abempty)s |
%(path_absolute)s |
%(path_noscheme)s |
%(path_rootless)s |
%(path_empty)s
)
""" % locals()
### Query and Fragment
# query = *( pchar / "/" / "?" )
query = r"(?: %(pchar)s | / | \? )*" % locals()
# fragment = *( pchar / "/" / "?" )
fragment = r"(?: %(pchar)s | / | \? )*" % locals()
# URIs
# hier-part = "//" authority path-abempty
# / path-absolute
# / path-rootless
# / path-empty
hier_part = r"""(?: (?: // %(authority)s %(path_abempty)s ) |
%(path_absolute)s |
%(path_rootless)s |
%(path_empty)s
)
""" % locals()
# relative-part = "//" authority path-abempty
# / path-absolute
# / path-noscheme
# / path-empty
relative_part = r"""(?: (?: // %(authority)s %(path_abempty)s ) |
%(path_absolute)s |
%(path_noscheme)s |
%(path_empty)s
)
""" % locals()
# relative-ref = relative-part [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ]
relative_ref = r"%(relative_part)s (?: \? %(query)s)? (?: \# %(fragment)s)?" % locals(
)
# URI = scheme ":" hier-part [ "?" query ] [ "#" fragment ]
URI = r"^(?: %(scheme)s : %(hier_part)s (?: \? %(query)s )? (?: \# %(fragment)s )? )$" % locals(
)
# URI-reference = URI / relative-ref
URI_reference = r"^(?: %(URI)s | %(relative_ref)s )$" % locals()
# absolute-URI = scheme ":" hier-part [ "?" query ]
absolute_URI = r"^(?: %(scheme)s : %(hier_part)s (?: \? %(query)s )? )$" % locals(
)
def is_uri(uri):
return re.match(URI, uri, re.VERBOSE)
def is_uri_reference(uri):
return re.match(URI_reference, uri, re.VERBOSE)
def is_absolute_uri(uri):
return re.match(absolute_URI, uri, re.VERBOSE)

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[bdist_wheel]
universal = 1
[metadata]
license_file = LICENSE
[egg_info]
tag_build =
tag_date = 0

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# Hack because logging + setuptools sucks.
try:
import multiprocessing
except ImportError:
pass
import sys
from os.path import dirname, join
from setuptools import find_packages, setup
import oauthlib
def fread(fn):
with open(join(dirname(__file__), fn), 'r') as f:
return f.read()
rsa_require = ['cryptography']
signedtoken_require = ['cryptography', 'pyjwt>=1.0.0']
signals_require = ['blinker']
setup(
name='oauthlib',
version=oauthlib.__version__,
description='A generic, spec-compliant, thorough implementation of the OAuth request-signing logic',
long_description=fread('README.rst'),
author='The OAuthlib Community',
author_email='idan@gazit.me',
maintainer='Ib Lundgren',
maintainer_email='ib.lundgren@gmail.com',
url='https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib',
platforms='any',
license='BSD',
packages=find_packages(exclude=('docs', 'tests', 'tests.*')),
python_requires='>=2.7, !=3.0.*, !=3.1.*, !=3.2.*, !=3.3.*',
extras_require={
'rsa': rsa_require,
'signedtoken': signedtoken_require,
'signals': signals_require,
},
classifiers=[
'Development Status :: 5 - Production/Stable',
'Environment :: Web Environment',
'Intended Audience :: Developers',
'License :: OSI Approved',
'License :: OSI Approved :: BSD License',
'Operating System :: MacOS',
'Operating System :: POSIX',
'Operating System :: POSIX :: Linux',
'Programming Language :: Python',
'Programming Language :: Python :: 2',
'Programming Language :: Python :: 2.7',
'Programming Language :: Python :: 3',
'Programming Language :: Python :: 3.4',
'Programming Language :: Python :: 3.5',
'Programming Language :: Python :: 3.6',
'Programming Language :: Python :: 3.7',
'Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation',
'Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation :: CPython',
'Programming Language :: Python :: Implementation :: PyPy',
'Topic :: Software Development :: Libraries :: Python Modules',
]
)

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import oauthlib
oauthlib.set_debug(True)

0
tests/oauth1/__init__.py Normal file
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tests/oauth1/rfc5849/__init__.py Normal file
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tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/__init__.py Normal file
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tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/test_access_token.py Normal file
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from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from mock import ANY, MagicMock
from oauthlib.oauth1 import RequestValidator
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849 import Client
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints import AccessTokenEndpoint
from ....unittest import TestCase
class AccessTokenEndpointTest(TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.validator = MagicMock(wraps=RequestValidator())
self.validator.check_client_key.return_value = True
self.validator.check_request_token.return_value = True
self.validator.check_verifier.return_value = True
self.validator.allowed_signature_methods = ['HMAC-SHA1']
self.validator.get_client_secret.return_value = 'bar'
self.validator.get_request_token_secret.return_value = 'secret'
self.validator.get_realms.return_value = ['foo']
self.validator.timestamp_lifetime = 600
self.validator.validate_client_key.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_request_token.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_verifier.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce.return_value = True
self.validator.invalidate_request_token.return_value = True
self.validator.dummy_client = 'dummy'
self.validator.dummy_secret = 'dummy'
self.validator.dummy_request_token = 'dummy'
self.validator.save_access_token = MagicMock()
self.endpoint = AccessTokenEndpoint(self.validator)
self.client = Client('foo',
client_secret='bar',
resource_owner_key='token',
resource_owner_secret='secret',
verifier='verfier')
self.uri, self.headers, self.body = self.client.sign(
'https://i.b/access_token')
def test_check_request_token(self):
self.validator.check_request_token.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_access_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_request', b)
def test_check_verifier(self):
self.validator.check_verifier.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_access_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_request', b)
def test_validate_client_key(self):
self.validator.validate_client_key.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_access_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 401)
def test_validate_request_token(self):
self.validator.validate_request_token.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_access_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 401)
def test_validate_verifier(self):
self.validator.validate_verifier.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_access_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 401)
def test_validate_signature(self):
client = Client('foo',
resource_owner_key='token',
resource_owner_secret='secret',
verifier='verfier')
_, headers, _ = client.sign(self.uri + '/extra')
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_access_token_response(
self.uri, headers=headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 401)
def test_valid_request(self):
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_access_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 200)
self.assertIn('oauth_token', b)
self.validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce.assert_called_once_with(
self.client.client_key, ANY, ANY, ANY,
request_token=self.client.resource_owner_key)
self.validator.invalidate_request_token.assert_called_once_with(
self.client.client_key, self.client.resource_owner_key, ANY)

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tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/test_authorization.py Normal file
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from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from mock import MagicMock
from oauthlib.oauth1 import RequestValidator
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849 import errors
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints import AuthorizationEndpoint
from tests.unittest import TestCase
class AuthorizationEndpointTest(TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.validator = MagicMock(wraps=RequestValidator())
self.validator.verify_request_token.return_value = True
self.validator.verify_realms.return_value = True
self.validator.get_realms.return_value = ['test']
self.validator.save_verifier = MagicMock()
self.endpoint = AuthorizationEndpoint(self.validator)
self.uri = 'https://i.b/authorize?oauth_token=foo'
def test_get_realms_and_credentials(self):
realms, credentials = self.endpoint.get_realms_and_credentials(self.uri)
self.assertEqual(realms, ['test'])
def test_verify_token(self):
self.validator.verify_request_token.return_value = False
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidClientError,
self.endpoint.get_realms_and_credentials, self.uri)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidClientError,
self.endpoint.create_authorization_response, self.uri)
def test_verify_realms(self):
self.validator.verify_realms.return_value = False
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError,
self.endpoint.create_authorization_response,
self.uri,
realms=['bar'])
def test_create_authorization_response(self):
self.validator.get_redirect_uri.return_value = 'https://c.b/cb'
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_authorization_response(self.uri)
self.assertEqual(s, 302)
self.assertIn('Location', h)
location = h['Location']
self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://c.b/cb'))
self.assertIn('oauth_verifier', location)
def test_create_authorization_response_oob(self):
self.validator.get_redirect_uri.return_value = 'oob'
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_authorization_response(self.uri)
self.assertEqual(s, 200)
self.assertNotIn('Location', h)
self.assertIn('oauth_verifier', b)
self.assertIn('oauth_token', b)

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from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from re import sub
from mock import MagicMock
from oauthlib.common import CaseInsensitiveDict, safe_string_equals
from oauthlib.oauth1 import Client, RequestValidator
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849 import (SIGNATURE_HMAC, SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT,
SIGNATURE_RSA, errors)
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints import (BaseEndpoint,
RequestTokenEndpoint)
from ....unittest import TestCase
URLENCODED = {"Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"}
class BaseEndpointTest(TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.validator = MagicMock(spec=RequestValidator)
self.validator.allowed_signature_methods = ['HMAC-SHA1']
self.validator.timestamp_lifetime = 600
self.endpoint = RequestTokenEndpoint(self.validator)
self.client = Client('foo', callback_uri='https://c.b/cb')
self.uri, self.headers, self.body = self.client.sign(
'https://i.b/request_token')
def test_ssl_enforcement(self):
uri, headers, _ = self.client.sign('http://i.b/request_token')
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
uri, headers=headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('insecure_transport_protocol', b)
def test_missing_parameters(self):
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(self.uri)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_request', b)
def test_signature_methods(self):
headers = {}
headers['Authorization'] = self.headers['Authorization'].replace(
'HMAC', 'RSA')
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_signature_method', b)
def test_invalid_version(self):
headers = {}
headers['Authorization'] = self.headers['Authorization'].replace(
'1.0', '2.0')
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_request', b)
def test_expired_timestamp(self):
headers = {}
for pattern in ('12345678901', '4567890123', '123456789K'):
headers['Authorization'] = sub(r'timestamp="\d*k?"',
'timestamp="%s"' % pattern,
self.headers['Authorization'])
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_request', b)
def test_client_key_check(self):
self.validator.check_client_key.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_request', b)
def test_noncecheck(self):
self.validator.check_nonce.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_request', b)
def test_enforce_ssl(self):
"""Ensure SSL is enforced by default."""
v = RequestValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
c = Client('foo')
u, h, b = c.sign('http://example.com')
r = e._create_request(u, 'GET', b, h)
self.assertRaises(errors.InsecureTransportError,
e._check_transport_security, r)
def test_multiple_source_params(self):
"""Check for duplicate params"""
v = RequestValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError, e._create_request,
'https://a.b/?oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1',
'GET', 'oauth_version=foo', URLENCODED)
headers = {'Authorization': 'OAuth oauth_signature="foo"'}
headers.update(URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError, e._create_request,
'https://a.b/?oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1',
'GET',
'oauth_version=foo',
headers)
headers = {'Authorization': 'OAuth oauth_signature_method="foo"'}
headers.update(URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError, e._create_request,
'https://a.b/',
'GET',
'oauth_signature=foo',
headers)
def test_duplicate_params(self):
"""Ensure params are only supplied once"""
v = RequestValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError, e._create_request,
'https://a.b/?oauth_version=a&oauth_version=b',
'GET', None, URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError, e._create_request,
'https://a.b/', 'GET', 'oauth_version=a&oauth_version=b',
URLENCODED)
def test_mandated_params(self):
"""Ensure all mandatory params are present."""
v = RequestValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
r = e._create_request('https://a.b/', 'GET',
'oauth_signature=a&oauth_consumer_key=b&oauth_nonce',
URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
def test_oauth_version(self):
"""OAuth version must be 1.0 if present."""
v = RequestValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
r = e._create_request('https://a.b/', 'GET',
('oauth_signature=a&oauth_consumer_key=b&oauth_nonce=c&'
'oauth_timestamp=a&oauth_signature_method=RSA-SHA1&'
'oauth_version=2.0'),
URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
def test_oauth_timestamp(self):
"""Check for a valid UNIX timestamp."""
v = RequestValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
# Invalid timestamp length, must be 10
r = e._create_request('https://a.b/', 'GET',
('oauth_signature=a&oauth_consumer_key=b&oauth_nonce=c&'
'oauth_version=1.0&oauth_signature_method=RSA-SHA1&'
'oauth_timestamp=123456789'),
URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
# Invalid timestamp age, must be younger than 10 minutes
r = e._create_request('https://a.b/', 'GET',
('oauth_signature=a&oauth_consumer_key=b&oauth_nonce=c&'
'oauth_version=1.0&oauth_signature_method=RSA-SHA1&'
'oauth_timestamp=1234567890'),
URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
# Timestamp must be an integer
r = e._create_request('https://a.b/', 'GET',
('oauth_signature=a&oauth_consumer_key=b&oauth_nonce=c&'
'oauth_version=1.0&oauth_signature_method=RSA-SHA1&'
'oauth_timestamp=123456789a'),
URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidRequestError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
def test_case_insensitive_headers(self):
"""Ensure headers are case-insensitive"""
v = RequestValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
r = e._create_request('https://a.b', 'POST',
('oauth_signature=a&oauth_consumer_key=b&oauth_nonce=c&'
'oauth_version=1.0&oauth_signature_method=RSA-SHA1&'
'oauth_timestamp=123456789a'),
URLENCODED)
self.assertIsInstance(r.headers, CaseInsensitiveDict)
def test_signature_method_validation(self):
"""Ensure valid signature method is used."""
body = ('oauth_signature=a&oauth_consumer_key=b&oauth_nonce=c&'
'oauth_version=1.0&oauth_signature_method=%s&'
'oauth_timestamp=1234567890')
uri = 'https://example.com/'
class HMACValidator(RequestValidator):
@property
def allowed_signature_methods(self):
return (SIGNATURE_HMAC,)
v = HMACValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
r = e._create_request(uri, 'GET', body % 'RSA-SHA1', URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
r = e._create_request(uri, 'GET', body % 'PLAINTEXT', URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
r = e._create_request(uri, 'GET', body % 'shibboleth', URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
class RSAValidator(RequestValidator):
@property
def allowed_signature_methods(self):
return (SIGNATURE_RSA,)
v = RSAValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
r = e._create_request(uri, 'GET', body % 'HMAC-SHA1', URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
r = e._create_request(uri, 'GET', body % 'PLAINTEXT', URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
r = e._create_request(uri, 'GET', body % 'shibboleth', URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
class PlainValidator(RequestValidator):
@property
def allowed_signature_methods(self):
return (SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT,)
v = PlainValidator()
e = BaseEndpoint(v)
r = e._create_request(uri, 'GET', body % 'HMAC-SHA1', URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
r = e._create_request(uri, 'GET', body % 'RSA-SHA1', URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
r = e._create_request(uri, 'GET', body % 'shibboleth', URLENCODED)
self.assertRaises(errors.InvalidSignatureMethodError,
e._check_mandatory_parameters, r)
class ClientValidator(RequestValidator):
clients = ['foo']
nonces = [('foo', 'once', '1234567891', 'fez')]
owners = {'foo': ['abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvxyz', 'fez']}
assigned_realms = {('foo', 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvxyz'): 'photos'}
verifiers = {('foo', 'fez'): 'shibboleth'}
@property
def client_key_length(self):
return 1, 30
@property
def request_token_length(self):
return 1, 30
@property
def access_token_length(self):
return 1, 30
@property
def nonce_length(self):
return 2, 30
@property
def verifier_length(self):
return 2, 30
@property
def realms(self):
return ['photos']
@property
def timestamp_lifetime(self):
# Disabled check to allow hardcoded verification signatures
return 1000000000
@property
def dummy_client(self):
return 'dummy'
@property
def dummy_request_token(self):
return 'dumbo'
@property
def dummy_access_token(self):
return 'dumbo'
def validate_timestamp_and_nonce(self, client_key, timestamp, nonce,
request, request_token=None, access_token=None):
resource_owner_key = request_token if request_token else access_token
return not (client_key, nonce, timestamp, resource_owner_key) in self.nonces
def validate_client_key(self, client_key):
return client_key in self.clients
def validate_access_token(self, client_key, access_token, request):
return (self.owners.get(client_key) and
access_token in self.owners.get(client_key))
def validate_request_token(self, client_key, request_token, request):
return (self.owners.get(client_key) and
request_token in self.owners.get(client_key))
def validate_requested_realm(self, client_key, realm, request):
return True
def validate_realm(self, client_key, access_token, request, uri=None,
required_realm=None):
return (client_key, access_token) in self.assigned_realms
def validate_verifier(self, client_key, request_token, verifier,
request):
return ((client_key, request_token) in self.verifiers and
safe_string_equals(verifier, self.verifiers.get(
(client_key, request_token))))
def validate_redirect_uri(self, client_key, redirect_uri, request):
return redirect_uri.startswith('http://client.example.com/')
def get_client_secret(self, client_key, request):
return 'super secret'
def get_access_token_secret(self, client_key, access_token, request):
return 'even more secret'
def get_request_token_secret(self, client_key, request_token, request):
return 'even more secret'
def get_rsa_key(self, client_key, request):
return ("-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\nMIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNA"
"DCBiQKBgQDVLQCATX8iK+aZuGVdkGb6uiar\nLi/jqFwL1dYj0JLIsdQc"
"KaMWtPC06K0+vI+RRZcjKc6sNB9/7kJcKN9Ekc9BUxyT\n/D09Cz47cmC"
"YsUoiW7G8NSqbE4wPiVpGkJRzFAxaCWwOSSQ+lpC9vwxnvVQfOoZ1\nnp"
"mWbCdA0iTxsMahwQIDAQAB\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----")
class SignatureVerificationTest(TestCase):
def setUp(self):
v = ClientValidator()
self.e = BaseEndpoint(v)
self.uri = 'https://example.com/'
self.sig = ('oauth_signature=%s&'
'oauth_timestamp=1234567890&'
'oauth_nonce=abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz&'
'oauth_version=1.0&'
'oauth_signature_method=%s&'
'oauth_token=abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvxyz&'
'oauth_consumer_key=foo')
def test_signature_too_short(self):
short_sig = ('oauth_signature=fmrXnTF4lO4o%2BD0%2FlZaJHP%2FXqEY&'
'oauth_timestamp=1234567890&'
'oauth_nonce=abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz&'
'oauth_version=1.0&oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1&'
'oauth_token=abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvxyz&'
'oauth_consumer_key=foo')
r = self.e._create_request(self.uri, 'GET', short_sig, URLENCODED)
self.assertFalse(self.e._check_signature(r))
plain = ('oauth_signature=correctlengthbutthewrongcontent1111&'
'oauth_timestamp=1234567890&'
'oauth_nonce=abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz&'
'oauth_version=1.0&oauth_signature_method=PLAINTEXT&'
'oauth_token=abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvxyz&'
'oauth_consumer_key=foo')
r = self.e._create_request(self.uri, 'GET', plain, URLENCODED)
self.assertFalse(self.e._check_signature(r))
def test_hmac_signature(self):
hmac_sig = "fmrXnTF4lO4o%2BD0%2FlZaJHP%2FXqEY%3D"
sig = self.sig % (hmac_sig, "HMAC-SHA1")
r = self.e._create_request(self.uri, 'GET', sig, URLENCODED)
self.assertTrue(self.e._check_signature(r))
def test_rsa_signature(self):
rsa_sig = ("fxFvCx33oKlR9wDquJ%2FPsndFzJphyBa3RFPPIKi3flqK%2BJ7yIrMVbH"
"YTM%2FLHPc7NChWz4F4%2FzRA%2BDN1k08xgYGSBoWJUOW6VvOQ6fbYhMA"
"FkOGYbuGDbje487XMzsAcv6ZjqZHCROSCk5vofgLk2SN7RZ3OrgrFzf4in"
"xetClqA%3D")
sig = self.sig % (rsa_sig, "RSA-SHA1")
r = self.e._create_request(self.uri, 'GET', sig, URLENCODED)
self.assertTrue(self.e._check_signature(r))
def test_plaintext_signature(self):
plain_sig = "super%252520secret%26even%252520more%252520secret"
sig = self.sig % (plain_sig, "PLAINTEXT")
r = self.e._create_request(self.uri, 'GET', sig, URLENCODED)
self.assertTrue(self.e._check_signature(r))

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from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from mock import ANY, MagicMock
from oauthlib.oauth1 import RequestValidator
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849 import Client
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints import RequestTokenEndpoint
from ....unittest import TestCase
class RequestTokenEndpointTest(TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.validator = MagicMock(wraps=RequestValidator())
self.validator.check_client_key.return_value = True
self.validator.allowed_signature_methods = ['HMAC-SHA1']
self.validator.get_client_secret.return_value = 'bar'
self.validator.get_default_realms.return_value = ['foo']
self.validator.timestamp_lifetime = 600
self.validator.check_realms.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_client_key.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_requested_realms.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_redirect_uri.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce.return_value = True
self.validator.dummy_client = 'dummy'
self.validator.dummy_secret = 'dummy'
self.validator.save_request_token = MagicMock()
self.endpoint = RequestTokenEndpoint(self.validator)
self.client = Client('foo', client_secret='bar', realm='foo',
callback_uri='https://c.b/cb')
self.uri, self.headers, self.body = self.client.sign(
'https://i.b/request_token')
def test_check_redirect_uri(self):
client = Client('foo')
uri, headers, _ = client.sign(self.uri)
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
uri, headers=headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_request', b)
def test_check_realms(self):
self.validator.check_realms.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 400)
self.assertIn('invalid_request', b)
def test_validate_client_key(self):
self.validator.validate_client_key.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 401)
def test_validate_realms(self):
self.validator.validate_requested_realms.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 401)
def test_validate_redirect_uri(self):
self.validator.validate_redirect_uri.return_value = False
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 401)
def test_validate_signature(self):
client = Client('foo', callback_uri='https://c.b/cb')
_, headers, _ = client.sign(self.uri + '/extra')
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 401)
def test_valid_request(self):
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 200)
self.assertIn('oauth_token', b)
self.validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce.assert_called_once_with(
self.client.client_key, ANY, ANY, ANY,
request_token=self.client.resource_owner_key)
def test_uri_provided_realm(self):
client = Client('foo', callback_uri='https://c.b/cb',
client_secret='bar')
uri = self.uri + '?realm=foo'
_, headers, _ = client.sign(uri)
h, b, s = self.endpoint.create_request_token_response(
uri, headers=headers)
self.assertEqual(s, 200)
self.assertIn('oauth_token', b)

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tests/oauth1/rfc5849/endpoints/test_resource.py Normal file
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from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from mock import ANY, MagicMock
from oauthlib.oauth1 import RequestValidator
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849 import Client
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints import ResourceEndpoint
from ....unittest import TestCase
class ResourceEndpointTest(TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.validator = MagicMock(wraps=RequestValidator())
self.validator.check_client_key.return_value = True
self.validator.check_access_token.return_value = True
self.validator.allowed_signature_methods = ['HMAC-SHA1']
self.validator.get_client_secret.return_value = 'bar'
self.validator.get_access_token_secret.return_value = 'secret'
self.validator.timestamp_lifetime = 600
self.validator.validate_client_key.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_access_token.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_realms.return_value = True
self.validator.dummy_client = 'dummy'
self.validator.dummy_secret = 'dummy'
self.validator.dummy_access_token = 'dummy'
self.endpoint = ResourceEndpoint(self.validator)
self.client = Client('foo',
client_secret='bar',
resource_owner_key='token',
resource_owner_secret='secret')
self.uri, self.headers, self.body = self.client.sign(
'https://i.b/protected_resource')
def test_missing_parameters(self):
self.validator.check_access_token.return_value = False
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_protected_resource_request(
self.uri)
self.assertFalse(v)
def test_check_access_token(self):
self.validator.check_access_token.return_value = False
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_protected_resource_request(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertFalse(v)
def test_validate_client_key(self):
self.validator.validate_client_key.return_value = False
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_protected_resource_request(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertFalse(v)
# the validator log should have `False` values
self.assertFalse(r.validator_log['client'])
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['realm'])
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['resource_owner'])
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['signature'])
def test_validate_access_token(self):
self.validator.validate_access_token.return_value = False
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_protected_resource_request(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertFalse(v)
# the validator log should have `False` values
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['client'])
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['realm'])
self.assertFalse(r.validator_log['resource_owner'])
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['signature'])
def test_validate_realms(self):
self.validator.validate_realms.return_value = False
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_protected_resource_request(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertFalse(v)
# the validator log should have `False` values
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['client'])
self.assertFalse(r.validator_log['realm'])
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['resource_owner'])
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['signature'])
def test_validate_signature(self):
client = Client('foo',
resource_owner_key='token',
resource_owner_secret='secret')
_, headers, _ = client.sign(self.uri + '/extra')
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_protected_resource_request(
self.uri, headers=headers)
self.assertFalse(v)
# the validator log should have `False` values
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['client'])
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['realm'])
self.assertTrue(r.validator_log['resource_owner'])
self.assertFalse(r.validator_log['signature'])
def test_valid_request(self):
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_protected_resource_request(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertTrue(v)
self.validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce.assert_called_once_with(
self.client.client_key, ANY, ANY, ANY,
access_token=self.client.resource_owner_key)
# everything in the validator_log should be `True`
self.assertTrue(all(r.validator_log.items()))

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from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from mock import ANY, MagicMock
from oauthlib.oauth1 import RequestValidator
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849 import Client
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.endpoints import SignatureOnlyEndpoint
from ....unittest import TestCase
class SignatureOnlyEndpointTest(TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.validator = MagicMock(wraps=RequestValidator())
self.validator.check_client_key.return_value = True
self.validator.allowed_signature_methods = ['HMAC-SHA1']
self.validator.get_client_secret.return_value = 'bar'
self.validator.timestamp_lifetime = 600
self.validator.validate_client_key.return_value = True
self.validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce.return_value = True
self.validator.dummy_client = 'dummy'
self.validator.dummy_secret = 'dummy'
self.endpoint = SignatureOnlyEndpoint(self.validator)
self.client = Client('foo', client_secret='bar')
self.uri, self.headers, self.body = self.client.sign(
'https://i.b/protected_resource')
def test_missing_parameters(self):
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_request(
self.uri)
self.assertFalse(v)
def test_validate_client_key(self):
self.validator.validate_client_key.return_value = False
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_request(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertFalse(v)
def test_validate_signature(self):
client = Client('foo')
_, headers, _ = client.sign(self.uri + '/extra')
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_request(
self.uri, headers=headers)
self.assertFalse(v)
def test_valid_request(self):
v, r = self.endpoint.validate_request(
self.uri, headers=self.headers)
self.assertTrue(v)
self.validator.validate_timestamp_and_nonce.assert_called_once_with(
self.client.client_key, ANY, ANY, ANY)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.common import Request
from oauthlib.oauth1 import (SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT, SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1,
SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256, SIGNATURE_RSA,
SIGNATURE_TYPE_BODY, SIGNATURE_TYPE_QUERY)
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849 import Client
from ...unittest import TestCase
class ClientRealmTests(TestCase):
def test_client_no_realm(self):
client = Client("client-key")
uri, header, body = client.sign("http://example-uri")
self.assertTrue(
header["Authorization"].startswith('OAuth oauth_nonce='))
def test_client_realm_sign_with_default_realm(self):
client = Client("client-key", realm="moo-realm")
self.assertEqual(client.realm, "moo-realm")
uri, header, body = client.sign("http://example-uri")
self.assertTrue(
header["Authorization"].startswith('OAuth realm="moo-realm",'))
def test_client_realm_sign_with_additional_realm(self):
client = Client("client-key", realm="moo-realm")
uri, header, body = client.sign("http://example-uri", realm="baa-realm")
self.assertTrue(
header["Authorization"].startswith('OAuth realm="baa-realm",'))
# make sure sign() does not override the default realm
self.assertEqual(client.realm, "moo-realm")
class ClientConstructorTests(TestCase):
def test_convert_to_unicode_resource_owner(self):
client = Client('client-key',
resource_owner_key=b'owner key')
self.assertNotIsInstance(client.resource_owner_key, bytes)
self.assertEqual(client.resource_owner_key, 'owner key')
def test_give_explicit_timestamp(self):
client = Client('client-key', timestamp='1')
params = dict(client.get_oauth_params(Request('http://example.com')))
self.assertEqual(params['oauth_timestamp'], '1')
def test_give_explicit_nonce(self):
client = Client('client-key', nonce='1')
params = dict(client.get_oauth_params(Request('http://example.com')))
self.assertEqual(params['oauth_nonce'], '1')
def test_decoding(self):
client = Client('client_key', decoding='utf-8')
uri, headers, body = client.sign('http://a.b/path?query',
http_method='POST', body='a=b',
headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertIsInstance(uri, bytes)
self.assertIsInstance(body, bytes)
for k, v in headers.items():
self.assertIsInstance(k, bytes)
self.assertIsInstance(v, bytes)
def test_hmac_sha1(self):
client = Client('client_key')
# instance is using the correct signer method
self.assertEqual(Client.SIGNATURE_METHODS[SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA1],
client.SIGNATURE_METHODS[client.signature_method])
def test_hmac_sha256(self):
client = Client('client_key', signature_method=SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256)
# instance is using the correct signer method
self.assertEqual(Client.SIGNATURE_METHODS[SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256],
client.SIGNATURE_METHODS[client.signature_method])
def test_rsa(self):
client = Client('client_key', signature_method=SIGNATURE_RSA)
# instance is using the correct signer method
self.assertEqual(Client.SIGNATURE_METHODS[SIGNATURE_RSA],
client.SIGNATURE_METHODS[client.signature_method])
# don't need an RSA key to instantiate
self.assertIsNone(client.rsa_key)
class SignatureMethodTest(TestCase):
def test_hmac_sha1_method(self):
client = Client('client_key', timestamp='1234567890', nonce='abc')
u, h, b = client.sign('http://example.com')
correct = ('OAuth oauth_nonce="abc", oauth_timestamp="1234567890", '
'oauth_version="1.0", oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1", '
'oauth_consumer_key="client_key", '
'oauth_signature="hH5BWYVqo7QI4EmPBUUe9owRUUQ%3D"')
self.assertEqual(h['Authorization'], correct)
def test_hmac_sha256_method(self):
client = Client('client_key', signature_method=SIGNATURE_HMAC_SHA256,
timestamp='1234567890', nonce='abc')
u, h, b = client.sign('http://example.com')
correct = ('OAuth oauth_nonce="abc", oauth_timestamp="1234567890", '
'oauth_version="1.0", oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA256", '
'oauth_consumer_key="client_key", '
'oauth_signature="JzgJWBxX664OiMW3WE4MEjtYwOjI%2FpaUWHqtdHe68Es%3D"')
self.assertEqual(h['Authorization'], correct)
def test_rsa_method(self):
private_key = (
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIICXgIBAAKBgQDk1/bxy"
"S8Q8jiheHeYYp/4rEKJopeQRRKKpZI4s5i+UPwVpupG\nAlwXWfzXw"
"SMaKPAoKJNdu7tqKRniqst5uoHXw98gj0x7zamu0Ck1LtQ4c7pFMVa"
"h\n5IYGhBi2E9ycNS329W27nJPWNCbESTu7snVlG8V8mfvGGg3xNjT"
"MO7IdrwIDAQAB\nAoGBAOQ2KuH8S5+OrsL4K+wfjoCi6MfxCUyqVU9"
"GxocdM1m30WyWRFMEz2nKJ8fR\np3vTD4w8yplTOhcoXdQZl0kRoaD"
"zrcYkm2VvJtQRrX7dKFT8dR8D/Tr7dNQLOXfC\nDY6xveQczE7qt7V"
"k7lp4FqmxBsaaEuokt78pOOjywZoInjZhAkEA9wz3zoZNT0/i\nrf6"
"qv2qTIeieUB035N3dyw6f1BGSWYaXSuerDCD/J1qZbAPKKhyHZbVaw"
"Ft3UMhe\n542UftBaxQJBAO0iJy1I8GQjGnS7B3yvyH3CcLYGy296+"
"XO/2xKp/d/ty1OIeovx\nC60pLNwuFNF3z9d2GVQAdoQ89hUkOtjZL"
"eMCQQD0JO6oPHUeUjYT+T7ImAv7UKVT\nSuy30sKjLzqoGw1kR+wv7"
"C5PeDRvscs4wa4CW9s6mjSrMDkDrmCLuJDtmf55AkEA\nkmaMg2PNr"
"jUR51F0zOEFycaaqXbGcFwe1/xx9zLmHzMDXd4bsnwt9kk+fe0hQzV"
"S\nJzatanQit3+feev1PN3QewJAWv4RZeavEUhKv+kLe95Yd0su7lT"
"LVduVgh4v5yLT\nGa6FHdjGPcfajt+nrpB1n8UQBEH9ZxniokR/IPv"
"dMlxqXA==\n-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
)
client = Client('client_key', signature_method=SIGNATURE_RSA,
rsa_key=private_key, timestamp='1234567890', nonce='abc')
u, h, b = client.sign('http://example.com')
correct = ('OAuth oauth_nonce="abc", oauth_timestamp="1234567890", '
'oauth_version="1.0", oauth_signature_method="RSA-SHA1", '
'oauth_consumer_key="client_key", '
'oauth_signature="ktvzkUhtrIawBcq21DRJrAyysTc3E1Zq5GdGu8EzH'
'OtbeaCmOBDLGHAcqlm92mj7xp5E1Z6i2vbExPimYAJL7FzkLnkRE5YEJR4'
'rNtIgAf1OZbYsIUmmBO%2BCLuStuu5Lg3tAluwC7XkkgoXCBaRKT1mUXzP'
'HJILzZ8iFOvS6w5E%3D"')
self.assertEqual(h['Authorization'], correct)
def test_plaintext_method(self):
client = Client('client_key',
signature_method=SIGNATURE_PLAINTEXT,
timestamp='1234567890',
nonce='abc',
client_secret='foo',
resource_owner_secret='bar')
u, h, b = client.sign('http://example.com')
correct = ('OAuth oauth_nonce="abc", oauth_timestamp="1234567890", '
'oauth_version="1.0", oauth_signature_method="PLAINTEXT", '
'oauth_consumer_key="client_key", '
'oauth_signature="foo%26bar"')
self.assertEqual(h['Authorization'], correct)
def test_invalid_method(self):
client = Client('client_key', signature_method='invalid')
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.sign, 'http://example.com')
def test_rsa_no_key(self):
client = Client('client_key', signature_method=SIGNATURE_RSA)
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.sign, 'http://example.com')
def test_register_method(self):
Client.register_signature_method('PIZZA',
lambda base_string, client: 'PIZZA')
self.assertTrue('PIZZA' in Client.SIGNATURE_METHODS)
client = Client('client_key', signature_method='PIZZA',
timestamp='1234567890', nonce='abc')
u, h, b = client.sign('http://example.com')
self.assertEqual(h['Authorization'], (
'OAuth oauth_nonce="abc", oauth_timestamp="1234567890", '
'oauth_version="1.0", oauth_signature_method="PIZZA", '
'oauth_consumer_key="client_key", '
'oauth_signature="PIZZA"'
))
class SignatureTypeTest(TestCase):
def test_params_in_body(self):
client = Client('client_key', signature_type=SIGNATURE_TYPE_BODY,
timestamp='1378988215', nonce='14205877133089081931378988215')
_, h, b = client.sign('http://i.b/path', http_method='POST', body='a=b',
headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(h['Content-Type'], 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
correct = ('a=b&oauth_nonce=14205877133089081931378988215&'
'oauth_timestamp=1378988215&'
'oauth_version=1.0&'
'oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1&'
'oauth_consumer_key=client_key&'
'oauth_signature=2JAQomgbShqoscqKWBiYQZwWq94%3D')
self.assertEqual(b, correct)
def test_params_in_query(self):
client = Client('client_key', signature_type=SIGNATURE_TYPE_QUERY,
timestamp='1378988215', nonce='14205877133089081931378988215')
u, _, _ = client.sign('http://i.b/path', http_method='POST')
correct = ('http://i.b/path?oauth_nonce=14205877133089081931378988215&'
'oauth_timestamp=1378988215&'
'oauth_version=1.0&'
'oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1&'
'oauth_consumer_key=client_key&'
'oauth_signature=08G5Snvw%2BgDAzBF%2BCmT5KqlrPKo%3D')
self.assertEqual(u, correct)
def test_invalid_signature_type(self):
client = Client('client_key', signature_type='invalid')
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.sign, 'http://i.b/path')
class SigningTest(TestCase):
def test_case_insensitive_headers(self):
client = Client('client_key')
# Uppercase
_, h, _ = client.sign('http://i.b/path', http_method='POST', body='',
headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(h['Content-Type'], 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
# Lowercase
_, h, _ = client.sign('http://i.b/path', http_method='POST', body='',
headers={'content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(h['content-type'], 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
# Capitalized
_, h, _ = client.sign('http://i.b/path', http_method='POST', body='',
headers={'Content-type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(h['Content-type'], 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
# Random
_, h, _ = client.sign('http://i.b/path', http_method='POST', body='',
headers={'conTent-tYpe': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(h['conTent-tYpe'], 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
def test_sign_no_body(self):
client = Client('client_key', decoding='utf-8')
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.sign, 'http://i.b/path',
http_method='POST', body=None,
headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
def test_sign_body(self):
client = Client('client_key')
_, h, b = client.sign('http://i.b/path', http_method='POST', body='',
headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(h['Content-Type'], 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded')
def test_sign_get_with_body(self):
client = Client('client_key')
for method in ('GET', 'HEAD'):
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.sign, 'http://a.b/path?query',
http_method=method, body='a=b',
headers={
'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'
})
def test_sign_unicode(self):
client = Client('client_key', nonce='abc', timestamp='abc')
_, h, b = client.sign('http://i.b/path', http_method='POST',
body='status=%E5%95%A6%E5%95%A6',
headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(b, 'status=%E5%95%A6%E5%95%A6')
self.assertIn('oauth_signature="yrtSqp88m%2Fc5UDaucI8BXK4oEtk%3D"', h['Authorization'])
_, h, b = client.sign('http://i.b/path', http_method='POST',
body='status=%C3%A6%C3%A5%C3%B8',
headers={'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(b, 'status=%C3%A6%C3%A5%C3%B8')
self.assertIn('oauth_signature="oG5t3Eg%2FXO5FfQgUUlTtUeeZzvk%3D"', h['Authorization'])

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.common import urlencode
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.parameters import (_append_params,
prepare_form_encoded_body,
prepare_headers,
prepare_request_uri_query)
from ...unittest import TestCase
class ParameterTests(TestCase):
auth_only_params = [
('oauth_consumer_key', "9djdj82h48djs9d2"),
('oauth_token', "kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7"),
('oauth_signature_method', "HMAC-SHA1"),
('oauth_timestamp', "137131201"),
('oauth_nonce', "7d8f3e4a"),
('oauth_signature', "bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw=")
]
auth_and_data = list(auth_only_params)
auth_and_data.append(('data_param_foo', 'foo'))
auth_and_data.append(('data_param_1', '1'))
realm = 'testrealm'
norealm_authorization_header = ' '.join((
'OAuth',
'oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",',
'oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",',
'oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",',
'oauth_timestamp="137131201",',
'oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",',
'oauth_signature="bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%3D"',
))
withrealm_authorization_header = ' '.join((
'OAuth',
'realm="testrealm",',
'oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",',
'oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",',
'oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",',
'oauth_timestamp="137131201",',
'oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",',
'oauth_signature="bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%3D"',
))
def test_append_params(self):
unordered_1 = [
('oauth_foo', 'foo'),
('lala', 123),
('oauth_baz', 'baz'),
('oauth_bar', 'bar'), ]
unordered_2 = [
('teehee', 456),
('oauth_quux', 'quux'), ]
expected = [
('teehee', 456),
('lala', 123),
('oauth_quux', 'quux'),
('oauth_foo', 'foo'),
('oauth_baz', 'baz'),
('oauth_bar', 'bar'), ]
self.assertEqual(_append_params(unordered_1, unordered_2), expected)
def test_prepare_headers(self):
self.assertEqual(
prepare_headers(self.auth_only_params, {}),
{'Authorization': self.norealm_authorization_header})
self.assertEqual(
prepare_headers(self.auth_only_params, {}, realm=self.realm),
{'Authorization': self.withrealm_authorization_header})
def test_prepare_headers_ignore_data(self):
self.assertEqual(
prepare_headers(self.auth_and_data, {}),
{'Authorization': self.norealm_authorization_header})
self.assertEqual(
prepare_headers(self.auth_and_data, {}, realm=self.realm),
{'Authorization': self.withrealm_authorization_header})
def test_prepare_form_encoded_body(self):
existing_body = ''
form_encoded_body = 'data_param_foo=foo&data_param_1=1&oauth_consumer_key=9djdj82h48djs9d2&oauth_token=kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7&oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1&oauth_timestamp=137131201&oauth_nonce=7d8f3e4a&oauth_signature=bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%3D'
self.assertEqual(
urlencode(prepare_form_encoded_body(self.auth_and_data, existing_body)),
form_encoded_body)
def test_prepare_request_uri_query(self):
url = 'http://notarealdomain.com/foo/bar/baz?some=args&go=here'
request_uri_query = 'http://notarealdomain.com/foo/bar/baz?some=args&go=here&data_param_foo=foo&data_param_1=1&oauth_consumer_key=9djdj82h48djs9d2&oauth_token=kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7&oauth_signature_method=HMAC-SHA1&oauth_timestamp=137131201&oauth_nonce=7d8f3e4a&oauth_signature=bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%3D'
self.assertEqual(
prepare_request_uri_query(self.auth_and_data, url),
request_uri_query)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.oauth1 import RequestValidator
from ...unittest import TestCase
class RequestValidatorTests(TestCase):
def test_not_implemented(self):
v = RequestValidator()
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.get_client_secret, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.get_request_token_secret,
None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.get_access_token_secret,
None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, lambda: v.dummy_client)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, lambda: v.dummy_request_token)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, lambda: v.dummy_access_token)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.get_rsa_key, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.get_default_realms, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.get_realms, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.get_redirect_uri, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.validate_client_key, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.validate_access_token,
None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.validate_request_token,
None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.verify_request_token,
None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.verify_realms,
None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.validate_timestamp_and_nonce,
None, None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.validate_redirect_uri,
None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.validate_realms,
None, None, None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.validate_requested_realms,
None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.validate_verifier,
None, None, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.save_access_token, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.save_request_token, None, None)
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, v.save_verifier,
None, None, None)
def test_check_length(self):
v = RequestValidator()
for method in (v.check_client_key, v.check_request_token,
v.check_access_token, v.check_nonce, v.check_verifier):
for not_valid in ('tooshort', 'invalid?characters!',
'thisclientkeyisalittlebittoolong'):
self.assertFalse(method(not_valid))
for valid in ('itsjustaboutlongenough',):
self.assertTrue(method(valid))
def test_check_realms(self):
v = RequestValidator()
self.assertFalse(v.check_realms(['foo']))
class FooRealmValidator(RequestValidator):
@property
def realms(self):
return ['foo']
v = FooRealmValidator()
self.assertTrue(v.check_realms(['foo']))

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.common import unicode_type
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.signature import (collect_parameters,
signature_base_string,
base_string_uri,
normalize_parameters,
sign_hmac_sha1,
sign_hmac_sha1_with_client,
sign_plaintext,
sign_plaintext_with_client,
sign_rsa_sha1,
sign_rsa_sha1_with_client)
from ...unittest import TestCase
try:
from urllib import quote
except ImportError:
from urllib.parse import quote
class SignatureTests(TestCase):
class MockClient(dict):
def __getattr__(self, name):
return self[name]
def __setattr__(self, name, value):
self[name] = value
def decode(self):
for k, v in self.items():
self[k] = v.decode('utf-8')
uri_query = "b5=%3D%253D&a3=a&c%40=&a2=r%20b&c2=&a3=2+q"
authorization_header = """OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="djosJKDKJSD8743243%2Fjdk33klY%3D" """.strip()
body = "content=This+is+being+the+body+of+things"
http_method = b"post"
base_string_url = quote("http://example.com/request?b5=%3D%253D"
"&a3=a&c%40=&a2=r%20b").encode('utf-8')
normalized_encoded_request_parameters = quote(
'OAuth realm="Example",'
'oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",'
'oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",'
'oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",'
'oauth_timestamp="137131201",'
'oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",'
'oauth_signature="bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%3D"'
).encode('utf-8')
client_secret = b"ECrDNoq1VYzzzzzzzzzyAK7TwZNtPnkqatqZZZZ"
resource_owner_secret = b"just-a-string asdasd"
control_base_string = (
"POST&http%253A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Frequest%253F"
"b5%253D%25253D%2525253D%2526"
"a3%253D"
"a%2526"
"c%252540%253D%2526"
"a2%253D"
"r%252520b&"
"OAuth%2520realm%253D%2522Example%2522%252C"
"oauth_consumer_key%253D%25229djdj82h48djs9d2%2522%252C"
"oauth_token%253D%2522kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7%2522%252C"
"oauth_signature_method%253D%2522HMAC-SHA1%2522%252C"
"oauth_timestamp%253D%2522137131201%2522%252C"
"oauth_nonce%253D%25227d8f3e4a%2522%252C"
"oauth_signature%253D%2522bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%25253D%2522")
def setUp(self):
self.client = self.MockClient(
client_secret = self.client_secret,
resource_owner_secret = self.resource_owner_secret
)
def test_signature_base_string(self):
"""
Example text to be turned into a base string::
POST /request?b5=%3D%253D&a3=a&c%40=&a2=r%20b HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Authorization: OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%3D"
Sample Base string generated and tested against::
POST&http%253A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Frequest%253Fb5%253D%25253D%252525
3D%2526a3%253Da%2526c%252540%253D%2526a2%253Dr%252520b&OAuth%2520re
alm%253D%2522Example%2522%252Coauth_consumer_key%253D%25229djdj82h4
8djs9d2%2522%252Coauth_token%253D%2522kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7%2522%252Coau
th_signature_method%253D%2522HMAC-SHA1%2522%252Coauth_timestamp%253
D%2522137131201%2522%252Coauth_nonce%253D%25227d8f3e4a%2522%252Coau
th_signature%253D%2522bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%25253D%2522
"""
self.assertRaises(ValueError, signature_base_string,
self.http_method,
self.base_string_url,
self.normalized_encoded_request_parameters)
self.assertRaises(ValueError, signature_base_string,
self.http_method.decode('utf-8'),
self.base_string_url,
self.normalized_encoded_request_parameters)
self.assertRaises(ValueError, signature_base_string,
self.http_method.decode('utf-8'),
self.base_string_url.decode('utf-8'),
self.normalized_encoded_request_parameters)
base_string = signature_base_string(
self.http_method.decode('utf-8'),
self.base_string_url.decode('utf-8'),
self.normalized_encoded_request_parameters.decode('utf-8')
)
self.assertEqual(self.control_base_string, base_string)
def test_base_string_uri(self):
"""
Example text to be turned into a normalized base string uri::
GET /?q=1 HTTP/1.1
Host: www.example.net:8080
Sample string generated::
https://www.example.net:8080/
"""
# test first example from RFC 5849 section 3.4.1.2.
# Note: there is a space between "r" and "v"
uri = 'http://EXAMPLE.COM:80/r v/X?id=123'
self.assertEqual(base_string_uri(uri),
'http://example.com/r%20v/X')
# test second example from RFC 5849 section 3.4.1.2.
uri = 'https://www.example.net:8080/?q=1'
self.assertEqual(base_string_uri(uri),
'https://www.example.net:8080/')
# test for unicode failure
uri = b"www.example.com:8080"
self.assertRaises(ValueError, base_string_uri, uri)
# test for missing scheme
uri = "www.example.com:8080"
self.assertRaises(ValueError, base_string_uri, uri)
# test a URI with the default port
uri = "http://www.example.com:80/"
self.assertEqual(base_string_uri(uri),
"http://www.example.com/")
# test a URI missing a path
uri = "http://www.example.com"
self.assertEqual(base_string_uri(uri),
"http://www.example.com/")
# test a relative URI
uri = "/a-host-relative-uri"
host = "www.example.com"
self.assertRaises(ValueError, base_string_uri, (uri, host))
# test overriding the URI's netloc with a host argument
uri = "http://www.example.com/a-path"
host = "alternatehost.example.com"
self.assertEqual(base_string_uri(uri, host),
"http://alternatehost.example.com/a-path")
def test_collect_parameters(self):
"""We check against parameters multiple times in case things change
after more parameters are added.
"""
self.assertEqual(collect_parameters(), [])
# Check against uri_query
parameters = collect_parameters(uri_query=self.uri_query)
correct_parameters = [('b5', '=%3D'),
('a3', 'a'),
('c@', ''),
('a2', 'r b'),
('c2', ''),
('a3', '2 q')]
self.assertEqual(sorted(parameters), sorted(correct_parameters))
headers = {'Authorization': self.authorization_header}
# check against authorization header as well
parameters = collect_parameters(
uri_query=self.uri_query, headers=headers)
parameters_with_realm = collect_parameters(
uri_query=self.uri_query, headers=headers, with_realm=True)
# Redo the checks against all the parameters. Duplicated code but
# better safety
correct_parameters += [
('oauth_nonce', '7d8f3e4a'),
('oauth_timestamp', '137131201'),
('oauth_consumer_key', '9djdj82h48djs9d2'),
('oauth_signature_method', 'HMAC-SHA1'),
('oauth_token', 'kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7')]
correct_parameters_with_realm = (
correct_parameters + [('realm', 'Example')])
self.assertEqual(sorted(parameters), sorted(correct_parameters))
self.assertEqual(sorted(parameters_with_realm),
sorted(correct_parameters_with_realm))
# Add in the body.
# TODO: Add more content for the body. Daniel Greenfeld 2012/03/12
# Redo again the checks against all the parameters. Duplicated code
# but better safety
parameters = collect_parameters(
uri_query=self.uri_query, body=self.body, headers=headers)
correct_parameters += [
('content', 'This is being the body of things')]
self.assertEqual(sorted(parameters), sorted(correct_parameters))
def test_normalize_parameters(self):
""" We copy some of the variables from the test method above."""
headers = {'Authorization': self.authorization_header}
parameters = collect_parameters(
uri_query=self.uri_query, body=self.body, headers=headers)
normalized = normalize_parameters(parameters)
# Unicode everywhere and always
self.assertIsInstance(normalized, unicode_type)
# Lets see if things are in order
# check to see that querystring keys come in alphanumeric order:
querystring_keys = ['a2', 'a3', 'b5', 'content', 'oauth_consumer_key',
'oauth_nonce', 'oauth_signature_method',
'oauth_timestamp', 'oauth_token']
index = -1 # start at -1 because the 'a2' key starts at index 0
for key in querystring_keys:
self.assertGreater(normalized.index(key), index)
index = normalized.index(key)
# Control signature created using openssl:
# echo -n $(cat <message>) | openssl dgst -binary -hmac <key> | base64
control_signature = "Uau4O9Kpd2k6rvh7UZN/RN+RG7Y="
def test_sign_hmac_sha1(self):
"""Verifying HMAC-SHA1 signature against one created by OpenSSL."""
self.assertRaises(ValueError, sign_hmac_sha1, self.control_base_string,
self.client_secret, self.resource_owner_secret)
sign = sign_hmac_sha1(self.control_base_string,
self.client_secret.decode('utf-8'),
self.resource_owner_secret.decode('utf-8'))
self.assertEqual(len(sign), 28)
self.assertEqual(sign, self.control_signature)
def test_sign_hmac_sha1_with_client(self):
self.assertRaises(ValueError,
sign_hmac_sha1_with_client,
self.control_base_string,
self.client)
self.client.decode()
sign = sign_hmac_sha1_with_client(
self.control_base_string, self.client)
self.assertEqual(len(sign), 28)
self.assertEqual(sign, self.control_signature)
control_base_string_rsa_sha1 = (
b"POST&http%253A%2F%2Fexample.com%2Frequest%253Fb5%253D"
b"%25253D%2525253D%2526a3%253Da%2526c%252540%253D%2526"
b"a2%253Dr%252520b&OAuth%2520realm%253D%2522Example%25"
b"22%252Coauth_consumer_key%253D%25229djdj82h48djs9d2"
b"%2522%252Coauth_token%253D%2522kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7%2522"
b"%252Coauth_signature_method%253D%2522HMAC-SHA1%2522"
b"%252Coauth_timestamp%253D%2522137131201%2522%252Coau"
b"th_nonce%253D%25227d8f3e4a%2522%252Coauth_signature"
b"%253D%2522bYT5CMsGcbgUdFHObYMEfcx6bsw%25253D%2522")
# Generated using: $ openssl genrsa -out <key>.pem 1024
# PEM encoding requires the key to be concatenated with
# linebreaks.
rsa_private_key = b"""-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIICXgIBAAKBgQDk1/bxyS8Q8jiheHeYYp/4rEKJopeQRRKKpZI4s5i+UPwVpupG
AlwXWfzXwSMaKPAoKJNdu7tqKRniqst5uoHXw98gj0x7zamu0Ck1LtQ4c7pFMVah
5IYGhBi2E9ycNS329W27nJPWNCbESTu7snVlG8V8mfvGGg3xNjTMO7IdrwIDAQAB
AoGBAOQ2KuH8S5+OrsL4K+wfjoCi6MfxCUyqVU9GxocdM1m30WyWRFMEz2nKJ8fR
p3vTD4w8yplTOhcoXdQZl0kRoaDzrcYkm2VvJtQRrX7dKFT8dR8D/Tr7dNQLOXfC
DY6xveQczE7qt7Vk7lp4FqmxBsaaEuokt78pOOjywZoInjZhAkEA9wz3zoZNT0/i
rf6qv2qTIeieUB035N3dyw6f1BGSWYaXSuerDCD/J1qZbAPKKhyHZbVawFt3UMhe
542UftBaxQJBAO0iJy1I8GQjGnS7B3yvyH3CcLYGy296+XO/2xKp/d/ty1OIeovx
C60pLNwuFNF3z9d2GVQAdoQ89hUkOtjZLeMCQQD0JO6oPHUeUjYT+T7ImAv7UKVT
Suy30sKjLzqoGw1kR+wv7C5PeDRvscs4wa4CW9s6mjSrMDkDrmCLuJDtmf55AkEA
kmaMg2PNrjUR51F0zOEFycaaqXbGcFwe1/xx9zLmHzMDXd4bsnwt9kk+fe0hQzVS
JzatanQit3+feev1PN3QewJAWv4RZeavEUhKv+kLe95Yd0su7lTLVduVgh4v5yLT
Ga6FHdjGPcfajt+nrpB1n8UQBEH9ZxniokR/IPvdMlxqXA==
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
"""
@property
def control_signature_rsa_sha1(self):
# Base string saved in "<message>". Signature obtained using:
# $ echo -n $(cat <message>) | openssl dgst -sign <key>.pem | base64
# where echo -n suppresses the last linebreak.
return (
"zV5g8ArdMuJuOXlH8XOqfLHS11XdthfIn4HReDm7jz8JmgLabHGmVBqCkCfZoFJPH"
"dka7tLvCplK/jsV4FUOnftrJOQhbXguuBdi87/hmxOFKLmQYqqlEW7BdXmwKLZcki"
"qq3qE5XziBgKSAFRkxJ4gmJAymvJBtrJYN9728rK8="
)
def test_sign_rsa_sha1(self):
"""Verify RSA-SHA1 signature against one created by OpenSSL."""
base_string = self.control_base_string_rsa_sha1
private_key = self.rsa_private_key
control_signature = self.control_signature_rsa_sha1
sign = sign_rsa_sha1(base_string, private_key)
self.assertEqual(sign, control_signature)
sign = sign_rsa_sha1(base_string.decode('utf-8'), private_key)
self.assertEqual(sign, control_signature)
def test_sign_rsa_sha1_with_client(self):
base_string = self.control_base_string_rsa_sha1
self.client.rsa_key = self.rsa_private_key
control_signature = self.control_signature_rsa_sha1
sign = sign_rsa_sha1_with_client(base_string, self.client)
self.assertEqual(sign, control_signature)
self.client.decode() ## Decode `rsa_private_key` from UTF-8
sign = sign_rsa_sha1_with_client(base_string, self.client)
self.assertEqual(sign, control_signature)
control_signature_plaintext = (
"ECrDNoq1VYzzzzzzzzzyAK7TwZNtPnkqatqZZZZ&"
"just-a-string%20%20%20%20asdasd")
def test_sign_plaintext(self):
""" """
self.assertRaises(ValueError, sign_plaintext, self.client_secret,
self.resource_owner_secret)
sign = sign_plaintext(self.client_secret.decode('utf-8'),
self.resource_owner_secret.decode('utf-8'))
self.assertEqual(sign, self.control_signature_plaintext)
def test_sign_plaintext_with_client(self):
self.assertRaises(ValueError, sign_plaintext_with_client,
None, self.client)
self.client.decode()
sign = sign_plaintext_with_client(None, self.client)
self.assertEqual(sign, self.control_signature_plaintext)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
from oauthlib.common import unicode_type
from oauthlib.oauth1.rfc5849.utils import *
from ...unittest import TestCase
class UtilsTests(TestCase):
sample_params_list = [
("notoauth", "shouldnotbehere"),
("oauth_consumer_key", "9djdj82h48djs9d2"),
("oauth_token", "kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7"),
("notoautheither", "shouldnotbehere")
]
sample_params_dict = {
"notoauth": "shouldnotbehere",
"oauth_consumer_key": "9djdj82h48djs9d2",
"oauth_token": "kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
"notoautheither": "shouldnotbehere"
}
sample_params_unicode_list = [
("notoauth", "shouldnotbehere"),
("oauth_consumer_key", "9djdj82h48djs9d2"),
("oauth_token", "kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7"),
("notoautheither", "shouldnotbehere")
]
sample_params_unicode_dict = {
"notoauth": "shouldnotbehere",
"oauth_consumer_key": "9djdj82h48djs9d2",
"oauth_token": "kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
"notoautheither": "shouldnotbehere"
}
authorization_header = """OAuth realm="Example",
oauth_consumer_key="9djdj82h48djs9d2",
oauth_token="kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7",
oauth_signature_method="HMAC-SHA1",
oauth_timestamp="137131201",
oauth_nonce="7d8f3e4a",
oauth_signature="djosJKDKJSD8743243%2Fjdk33klY%3D" """.strip()
bad_authorization_headers = (
"OAuth",
"OAuth oauth_nonce=",
"Negotiate b2F1dGhsaWI=",
"OA",
)
def test_filter_params(self):
# The following is an isolated test function used to test the filter_params decorator.
@filter_params
def special_test_function(params, realm=None):
""" I am a special test function """
return 'OAuth ' + ','.join(['='.join([k, v]) for k, v in params])
# check that the docstring got through
self.assertEqual(special_test_function.__doc__, " I am a special test function ")
# Check that the decorator filtering works as per design.
# Any param that does not start with 'oauth'
# should not be present in the filtered params
filtered_params = special_test_function(self.sample_params_list)
self.assertNotIn("notoauth", filtered_params)
self.assertIn("oauth_consumer_key", filtered_params)
self.assertIn("oauth_token", filtered_params)
self.assertNotIn("notoautheither", filtered_params)
def test_filter_oauth_params(self):
# try with list
# try with list
# try with list
self.assertEqual(len(self.sample_params_list), 4)
# Any param that does not start with 'oauth'
# should not be present in the filtered params
filtered_params = filter_oauth_params(self.sample_params_list)
self.assertEqual(len(filtered_params), 2)
self.assertTrue(filtered_params[0][0].startswith('oauth'))
self.assertTrue(filtered_params[1][0].startswith('oauth'))
# try with dict
# try with dict
# try with dict
self.assertEqual(len(self.sample_params_dict), 4)
# Any param that does not start with 'oauth'
# should not be present in the filtered params
filtered_params = filter_oauth_params(self.sample_params_dict)
self.assertEqual(len(filtered_params), 2)
self.assertTrue(filtered_params[0][0].startswith('oauth'))
self.assertTrue(filtered_params[1][0].startswith('oauth'))
def test_escape(self):
self.assertRaises(ValueError, escape, b"I am a string type. Not a unicode type.")
self.assertEqual(escape("I am a unicode type."), "I%20am%20a%20unicode%20type.")
self.assertIsInstance(escape("I am a unicode type."), unicode_type)
def test_unescape(self):
self.assertRaises(ValueError, unescape, b"I am a string type. Not a unicode type.")
self.assertEqual(unescape("I%20am%20a%20unicode%20type."), 'I am a unicode type.')
self.assertIsInstance(unescape("I%20am%20a%20unicode%20type."), unicode_type)
def test_parse_authorization_header(self):
# make us some headers
authorization_headers = parse_authorization_header(self.authorization_header)
# is it a list?
self.assertIsInstance(authorization_headers, list)
# are the internal items tuples?
for header in authorization_headers:
self.assertIsInstance(header, tuple)
# are the internal components of each tuple unicode?
for k, v in authorization_headers:
self.assertIsInstance(k, unicode_type)
self.assertIsInstance(v, unicode_type)
# let's check the parsed headers created
correct_headers = [
("oauth_nonce", "7d8f3e4a"),
("oauth_timestamp", "137131201"),
("oauth_consumer_key", "9djdj82h48djs9d2"),
('oauth_signature', 'djosJKDKJSD8743243%2Fjdk33klY%3D'),
('oauth_signature_method', 'HMAC-SHA1'),
('oauth_token', 'kkk9d7dh3k39sjv7'),
('realm', 'Example')]
self.assertEqual(sorted(authorization_headers), sorted(correct_headers))
# Check against malformed headers.
for header in self.bad_authorization_headers:
self.assertRaises(ValueError, parse_authorization_header, header)

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tests/oauth2/rfc6749/clients/__init__.py Normal file
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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import os
from mock import patch
from oauthlib import signals
from oauthlib.oauth2 import BackendApplicationClient
from ....unittest import TestCase
@patch('time.time', new=lambda: 1000)
class BackendApplicationClientTest(TestCase):
client_id = "someclientid"
client_secret = 'someclientsecret'
scope = ["/profile"]
kwargs = {
"some": "providers",
"require": "extra arguments"
}
body = "not=empty"
body_up = "not=empty&grant_type=client_credentials"
body_kwargs = body_up + "&some=providers&require=extra+arguments"
token_json = ('{ "access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",'
' "token_type":"example",'
' "expires_in":3600,'
' "scope":"/profile",'
' "example_parameter":"example_value"}')
token = {
"access_token": "2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type": "example",
"expires_in": 3600,
"expires_at": 4600,
"scope": ["/profile"],
"example_parameter": "example_value"
}
def test_request_body(self):
client = BackendApplicationClient(self.client_id)
# Basic, no extra arguments
body = client.prepare_request_body(body=self.body)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body_up)
rclient = BackendApplicationClient(self.client_id)
body = rclient.prepare_request_body(body=self.body)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body_up)
# With extra parameters
body = client.prepare_request_body(body=self.body, **self.kwargs)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body_kwargs)
def test_parse_token_response(self):
client = BackendApplicationClient(self.client_id)
# Parse code and state
response = client.parse_request_body_response(self.token_json, scope=self.scope)
self.assertEqual(response, self.token)
self.assertEqual(client.access_token, response.get("access_token"))
self.assertEqual(client.refresh_token, response.get("refresh_token"))
self.assertEqual(client.token_type, response.get("token_type"))
# Mismatching state
self.assertRaises(Warning, client.parse_request_body_response, self.token_json, scope="invalid")
os.environ['OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE'] = '3'
token = client.parse_request_body_response(self.token_json, scope="invalid")
self.assertTrue(token.scope_changed)
scope_changes_recorded = []
def record_scope_change(sender, message, old, new):
scope_changes_recorded.append((message, old, new))
signals.scope_changed.connect(record_scope_change)
try:
client.parse_request_body_response(self.token_json, scope="invalid")
self.assertEqual(len(scope_changes_recorded), 1)
message, old, new = scope_changes_recorded[0]
self.assertEqual(message, 'Scope has changed from "invalid" to "/profile".')
self.assertEqual(old, ['invalid'])
self.assertEqual(new, ['/profile'])
finally:
signals.scope_changed.disconnect(record_scope_change)
del os.environ['OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE']

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import datetime
from oauthlib import common
from oauthlib.oauth2 import Client, InsecureTransportError, TokenExpiredError
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749 import utils
from oauthlib.oauth2.rfc6749.clients import AUTH_HEADER, BODY, URI_QUERY
from ....unittest import TestCase
class ClientTest(TestCase):
client_id = "someclientid"
uri = "https://example.com/path?query=world"
body = "not=empty"
headers = {}
access_token = "token"
mac_key = "secret"
bearer_query = uri + "&access_token=" + access_token
bearer_header = {
"Authorization": "Bearer " + access_token
}
bearer_body = body + "&access_token=" + access_token
mac_00_header = {
"Authorization": 'MAC id="' + access_token + '", nonce="0:abc123",' +
' bodyhash="Yqyso8r3hR5Nm1ZFv+6AvNHrxjE=",' +
' mac="0X6aACoBY0G6xgGZVJ1IeE8dF9k="'
}
mac_01_header = {
"Authorization": 'MAC id="' + access_token + '", ts="123456789",' +
' nonce="abc123", mac="Xuk+9oqaaKyhitkgh1CD0xrI6+s="'
}
def test_add_bearer_token(self):
"""Test a number of bearer token placements"""
# Invalid token type
client = Client(self.client_id, token_type="invalid")
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.add_token, self.uri)
# Case-insensitive token type
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token, token_type="bEAreR")
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.bearer_header)
# Non-HTTPS
insecure_uri = 'http://example.com/path?query=world'
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token, token_type="Bearer")
self.assertRaises(InsecureTransportError, client.add_token, insecure_uri,
body=self.body,
headers=self.headers)
# Missing access token
client = Client(self.client_id)
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.add_token, self.uri)
# Expired token
expired = 523549800
expired_token = {
'expires_at': expired,
}
client = Client(self.client_id, token=expired_token, access_token=self.access_token, token_type="Bearer")
self.assertRaises(TokenExpiredError, client.add_token, self.uri,
body=self.body, headers=self.headers)
# The default token placement, bearer in auth header
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token)
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.bearer_header)
# Setting default placements of tokens
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token,
default_token_placement=AUTH_HEADER)
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.bearer_header)
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token,
default_token_placement=URI_QUERY)
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.bearer_query)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.headers)
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token,
default_token_placement=BODY)
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.bearer_body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.headers)
# Asking for specific placement in the add_token method
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token)
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers, token_placement=AUTH_HEADER)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.bearer_header)
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token)
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers, token_placement=URI_QUERY)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.bearer_query)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.headers)
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token)
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers, token_placement=BODY)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.bearer_body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.headers)
# Invalid token placement
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token)
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.add_token, self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers, token_placement="invalid")
client = Client(self.client_id, access_token=self.access_token,
default_token_placement="invalid")
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.add_token, self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers)
def test_add_mac_token(self):
# Missing access token
client = Client(self.client_id, token_type="MAC")
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.add_token, self.uri)
# Invalid hash algorithm
client = Client(self.client_id, token_type="MAC",
access_token=self.access_token, mac_key=self.mac_key,
mac_algorithm="hmac-sha-2")
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.add_token, self.uri)
orig_generate_timestamp = common.generate_timestamp
orig_generate_nonce = common.generate_nonce
orig_generate_age = utils.generate_age
self.addCleanup(setattr, common, 'generage_timestamp', orig_generate_timestamp)
self.addCleanup(setattr, common, 'generage_nonce', orig_generate_nonce)
self.addCleanup(setattr, utils, 'generate_age', orig_generate_age)
common.generate_timestamp = lambda: '123456789'
common.generate_nonce = lambda: 'abc123'
utils.generate_age = lambda *args: 0
# Add the Authorization header (draft 00)
client = Client(self.client_id, token_type="MAC",
access_token=self.access_token, mac_key=self.mac_key,
mac_algorithm="hmac-sha-1")
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers, issue_time=datetime.datetime.now())
self.assertEqual(uri, self.uri)
self.assertEqual(body, self.body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.mac_00_header)
# Non-HTTPS
insecure_uri = 'http://example.com/path?query=world'
self.assertRaises(InsecureTransportError, client.add_token, insecure_uri,
body=self.body,
headers=self.headers,
issue_time=datetime.datetime.now())
# Expired Token
expired = 523549800
expired_token = {
'expires_at': expired,
}
client = Client(self.client_id, token=expired_token, token_type="MAC",
access_token=self.access_token, mac_key=self.mac_key,
mac_algorithm="hmac-sha-1")
self.assertRaises(TokenExpiredError, client.add_token, self.uri,
body=self.body,
headers=self.headers,
issue_time=datetime.datetime.now())
# Add the Authorization header (draft 01)
client = Client(self.client_id, token_type="MAC",
access_token=self.access_token, mac_key=self.mac_key,
mac_algorithm="hmac-sha-1")
uri, headers, body = client.add_token(self.uri, body=self.body,
headers=self.headers, draft=1)
self.assertEqual(uri, self.uri)
self.assertEqual(body, self.body)
self.assertEqual(headers, self.mac_01_header)
# Non-HTTPS
insecure_uri = 'http://example.com/path?query=world'
self.assertRaises(InsecureTransportError, client.add_token, insecure_uri,
body=self.body,
headers=self.headers,
draft=1)
# Expired Token
expired = 523549800
expired_token = {
'expires_at': expired,
}
client = Client(self.client_id, token=expired_token, token_type="MAC",
access_token=self.access_token, mac_key=self.mac_key,
mac_algorithm="hmac-sha-1")
self.assertRaises(TokenExpiredError, client.add_token, self.uri,
body=self.body,
headers=self.headers,
draft=1)
def test_revocation_request(self):
client = Client(self.client_id)
url = 'https://example.com/revoke'
token = 'foobar'
# Valid request
u, h, b = client.prepare_token_revocation_request(url, token)
self.assertEqual(u, url)
self.assertEqual(h, {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(b, 'token=%s&token_type_hint=access_token' % token)
# Non-HTTPS revocation endpoint
self.assertRaises(InsecureTransportError,
client.prepare_token_revocation_request,
'http://example.com/revoke', token)
u, h, b = client.prepare_token_revocation_request(
url, token, token_type_hint='refresh_token')
self.assertEqual(u, url)
self.assertEqual(h, {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(b, 'token=%s&token_type_hint=refresh_token' % token)
# JSONP
u, h, b = client.prepare_token_revocation_request(
url, token, callback='hello.world')
self.assertURLEqual(u, url + '?callback=hello.world&token=%s&token_type_hint=access_token' % token)
self.assertEqual(h, {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertEqual(b, '')
def test_prepare_authorization_request(self):
redirect_url = 'https://example.com/callback/'
scopes = 'read'
auth_url = 'https://example.com/authorize/'
state = 'fake_state'
client = Client(self.client_id, redirect_url=redirect_url, scope=scopes, state=state)
# Non-HTTPS
self.assertRaises(InsecureTransportError,
client.prepare_authorization_request, 'http://example.com/authorize/')
# NotImplementedError
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, client.prepare_authorization_request, auth_url)
def test_prepare_token_request(self):
redirect_url = 'https://example.com/callback/'
scopes = 'read'
token_url = 'https://example.com/token/'
state = 'fake_state'
client = Client(self.client_id, scope=scopes, state=state)
# Non-HTTPS
self.assertRaises(InsecureTransportError,
client.prepare_token_request, 'http://example.com/token/')
# NotImplementedError
self.assertRaises(NotImplementedError, client.prepare_token_request, token_url)
def test_prepare_refresh_token_request(self):
client = Client(self.client_id)
url = 'https://example.com/revoke'
token = 'foobar'
scope = 'extra_scope'
u, h, b = client.prepare_refresh_token_request(url, token)
self.assertEqual(u, url)
self.assertEqual(h, {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertFormBodyEqual(b, 'grant_type=refresh_token&refresh_token=%s' % token)
# Non-HTTPS revocation endpoint
self.assertRaises(InsecureTransportError,
client.prepare_refresh_token_request,
'http://example.com/revoke', token)
# provide extra scope
u, h, b = client.prepare_refresh_token_request(url, token, scope=scope)
self.assertEqual(u, url)
self.assertEqual(h, {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertFormBodyEqual(b, 'grant_type=refresh_token&scope=%s&refresh_token=%s' % (scope, token))
# provide scope while init
client = Client(self.client_id, scope=scope)
u, h, b = client.prepare_refresh_token_request(url, token, scope=scope)
self.assertEqual(u, url)
self.assertEqual(h, {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'})
self.assertFormBodyEqual(b, 'grant_type=refresh_token&scope=%s&refresh_token=%s' % (scope, token))

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import os
from mock import patch
from oauthlib import signals
from oauthlib.oauth2 import LegacyApplicationClient
from ....unittest import TestCase
# this is the same import method used in oauthlib/oauth2/rfc6749/parameters.py
try:
import urlparse
except ImportError:
import urllib.parse as urlparse
@patch('time.time', new=lambda: 1000)
class LegacyApplicationClientTest(TestCase):
client_id = "someclientid"
client_secret = 'someclientsecret'
scope = ["/profile"]
kwargs = {
"some": "providers",
"require": "extra arguments"
}
username = "user_username"
password = "user_password"
body = "not=empty"
body_up = "not=empty&grant_type=password&username=%s&password=%s" % (username, password)
body_kwargs = body_up + "&some=providers&require=extra+arguments"
token_json = ('{ "access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",'
' "token_type":"example",'
' "expires_in":3600,'
' "scope":"/profile",'
' "refresh_token":"tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",'
' "example_parameter":"example_value"}')
token = {
"access_token": "2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type": "example",
"expires_in": 3600,
"expires_at": 4600,
"scope": scope,
"refresh_token": "tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
"example_parameter": "example_value"
}
def test_request_body(self):
client = LegacyApplicationClient(self.client_id)
# Basic, no extra arguments
body = client.prepare_request_body(self.username, self.password,
body=self.body)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body_up)
# With extra parameters
body = client.prepare_request_body(self.username, self.password,
body=self.body, **self.kwargs)
self.assertFormBodyEqual(body, self.body_kwargs)
def test_parse_token_response(self):
client = LegacyApplicationClient(self.client_id)
# Parse code and state
response = client.parse_request_body_response(self.token_json, scope=self.scope)
self.assertEqual(response, self.token)
self.assertEqual(client.access_token, response.get("access_token"))
self.assertEqual(client.refresh_token, response.get("refresh_token"))
self.assertEqual(client.token_type, response.get("token_type"))
# Mismatching state
self.assertRaises(Warning, client.parse_request_body_response, self.token_json, scope="invalid")
os.environ['OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE'] = '5'
token = client.parse_request_body_response(self.token_json, scope="invalid")
self.assertTrue(token.scope_changed)
scope_changes_recorded = []
def record_scope_change(sender, message, old, new):
scope_changes_recorded.append((message, old, new))
signals.scope_changed.connect(record_scope_change)
try:
client.parse_request_body_response(self.token_json, scope="invalid")
self.assertEqual(len(scope_changes_recorded), 1)
message, old, new = scope_changes_recorded[0]
self.assertEqual(message, 'Scope has changed from "invalid" to "/profile".')
self.assertEqual(old, ['invalid'])
self.assertEqual(new, ['/profile'])
finally:
signals.scope_changed.disconnect(record_scope_change)
del os.environ['OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE']
def test_prepare_request_body(self):
"""
see issue #585
https://github.com/oauthlib/oauthlib/issues/585
"""
client = LegacyApplicationClient(self.client_id)
# scenario 1, default behavior to not include `client_id`
r1 = client.prepare_request_body(username=self.username, password=self.password)
self.assertIn(r1, ('grant_type=password&username=%s&password=%s' % (self.username, self.password, ),
'grant_type=password&password=%s&username=%s' % (self.password, self.username, ),
))
# scenario 2, include `client_id` in the body
r2 = client.prepare_request_body(username=self.username, password=self.password, include_client_id=True)
r2_params = dict(urlparse.parse_qsl(r2, keep_blank_values=True))
self.assertEqual(len(r2_params.keys()), 4)
self.assertEqual(r2_params['grant_type'], 'password')
self.assertEqual(r2_params['username'], self.username)
self.assertEqual(r2_params['password'], self.password)
self.assertEqual(r2_params['client_id'], self.client_id)
# scenario 3, include `client_id` + `client_secret` in the body
r3 = client.prepare_request_body(username=self.username, password=self.password, include_client_id=True, client_secret=self.client_secret)
r3_params = dict(urlparse.parse_qsl(r3, keep_blank_values=True))
self.assertEqual(len(r3_params.keys()), 5)
self.assertEqual(r3_params['grant_type'], 'password')
self.assertEqual(r3_params['username'], self.username)
self.assertEqual(r3_params['password'], self.password)
self.assertEqual(r3_params['client_id'], self.client_id)
self.assertEqual(r3_params['client_secret'], self.client_secret)
# scenario 4, `client_secret` is an empty string
r4 = client.prepare_request_body(username=self.username, password=self.password, include_client_id=True, client_secret='')
r4_params = dict(urlparse.parse_qsl(r4, keep_blank_values=True))
self.assertEqual(len(r4_params.keys()), 5)
self.assertEqual(r4_params['grant_type'], 'password')
self.assertEqual(r4_params['username'], self.username)
self.assertEqual(r4_params['password'], self.password)
self.assertEqual(r4_params['client_id'], self.client_id)
self.assertEqual(r4_params['client_secret'], '')
# scenario 4b`,` client_secret is `None`
r4b = client.prepare_request_body(username=self.username, password=self.password, include_client_id=True, client_secret=None)
r4b_params = dict(urlparse.parse_qsl(r4b, keep_blank_values=True))
self.assertEqual(len(r4b_params.keys()), 4)
self.assertEqual(r4b_params['grant_type'], 'password')
self.assertEqual(r4b_params['username'], self.username)
self.assertEqual(r4b_params['password'], self.password)
self.assertEqual(r4b_params['client_id'], self.client_id)

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import os
from mock import patch
from oauthlib import signals
from oauthlib.oauth2 import MobileApplicationClient
from ....unittest import TestCase
@patch('time.time', new=lambda: 1000)
class MobileApplicationClientTest(TestCase):
client_id = "someclientid"
uri = "https://example.com/path?query=world"
uri_id = uri + "&response_type=token&client_id=" + client_id
uri_redirect = uri_id + "&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fmy.page.com%2Fcallback"
redirect_uri = "http://my.page.com/callback"
scope = ["/profile"]
state = "xyz"
uri_scope = uri_id + "&scope=%2Fprofile"
uri_state = uri_id + "&state=" + state
kwargs = {
"some": "providers",
"require": "extra arguments"
}
uri_kwargs = uri_id + "&some=providers&require=extra+arguments"
code = "zzzzaaaa"
response_uri = ('https://client.example.com/cb?#'
'access_token=2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA&'
'token_type=example&'
'expires_in=3600&'
'scope=%2Fprofile&'
'example_parameter=example_value')
token = {
"access_token": "2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type": "example",
"expires_in": 3600,
"expires_at": 4600,
"scope": scope,
"example_parameter": "example_value"
}
def test_implicit_token_uri(self):
client = MobileApplicationClient(self.client_id)
# Basic, no extra arguments
uri = client.prepare_request_uri(self.uri)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri_id)
# With redirection uri
uri = client.prepare_request_uri(self.uri, redirect_uri=self.redirect_uri)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri_redirect)
# With scope
uri = client.prepare_request_uri(self.uri, scope=self.scope)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri_scope)
# With state
uri = client.prepare_request_uri(self.uri, state=self.state)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri_state)
# With extra parameters through kwargs
uri = client.prepare_request_uri(self.uri, **self.kwargs)
self.assertURLEqual(uri, self.uri_kwargs)
def test_populate_attributes(self):
client = MobileApplicationClient(self.client_id)
response_uri = (self.response_uri + "&code=EVIL-CODE")
client.parse_request_uri_response(response_uri, scope=self.scope)
# We must not accidentally pick up any further security
# credentials at this point.
self.assertIsNone(client.code)
def test_parse_token_response(self):
client = MobileApplicationClient(self.client_id)
# Parse code and state
response = client.parse_request_uri_response(self.response_uri, scope=self.scope)
self.assertEqual(response, self.token)
self.assertEqual(client.access_token, response.get("access_token"))
self.assertEqual(client.refresh_token, response.get("refresh_token"))
self.assertEqual(client.token_type, response.get("token_type"))
# Mismatching scope
self.assertRaises(Warning, client.parse_request_uri_response, self.response_uri, scope="invalid")
os.environ['OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE'] = '4'
token = client.parse_request_uri_response(self.response_uri, scope='invalid')
self.assertTrue(token.scope_changed)
scope_changes_recorded = []
def record_scope_change(sender, message, old, new):
scope_changes_recorded.append((message, old, new))
signals.scope_changed.connect(record_scope_change)
try:
client.parse_request_uri_response(self.response_uri, scope="invalid")
self.assertEqual(len(scope_changes_recorded), 1)
message, old, new = scope_changes_recorded[0]
self.assertEqual(message, 'Scope has changed from "invalid" to "/profile".')
self.assertEqual(old, ['invalid'])
self.assertEqual(new, ['/profile'])
finally:
signals.scope_changed.disconnect(record_scope_change)
del os.environ['OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE']

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# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from __future__ import absolute_import, unicode_literals
import os
from time import time
import jwt
from mock import patch
from oauthlib.common import Request
from oauthlib.oauth2 import ServiceApplicationClient
from ....unittest import TestCase
class ServiceApplicationClientTest(TestCase):
gt = ServiceApplicationClient.grant_type
private_key = """
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
"""
public_key = """
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGfMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4GNADCBiQKBgQDk1/bxyS8Q8jiheHeYYp/4rEKJ
opeQRRKKpZI4s5i+UPwVpupGAlwXWfzXwSMaKPAoKJNdu7tqKRniqst5uoHXw98g
j0x7zamu0Ck1LtQ4c7pFMVah5IYGhBi2E9ycNS329W27nJPWNCbESTu7snVlG8V8
mfvGGg3xNjTMO7IdrwIDAQAB
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
"""
subject = 'resource-owner@provider.com'
issuer = 'the-client@provider.com'
audience = 'https://provider.com/token'
client_id = "someclientid"
scope = ["/profile"]
kwargs = {
"some": "providers",
"require": "extra arguments"
}
body = "isnot=empty"
body_up = "not=empty&grant_type=%s" % gt
body_kwargs = body_up + "&some=providers&require=extra+arguments"
token_json = ('{ "access_token":"2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",'
' "token_type":"example",'
' "expires_in":3600,'
' "scope":"/profile",'
' "example_parameter":"example_value"}')
token = {
"access_token": "2YotnFZFEjr1zCsicMWpAA",
"token_type": "example",
"expires_in": 3600,
"scope": ["/profile"],
"example_parameter": "example_value"
}
@patch('time.time')
def test_request_body(self, t):
t.return_value = time()
self.token['expires_at'] = self.token['expires_in'] + t.return_value
client = ServiceApplicationClient(
self.client_id, private_key=self.private_key)
# Basic with min required params
body = client.prepare_request_body(issuer=self.issuer,
subject=self.subject,
audience=self.audience,
body=self.body)
r = Request('https://a.b', body=body)
self.assertEqual(r.isnot, 'empty')
self.assertEqual(r.grant_type, ServiceApplicationClient.grant_type)
claim = jwt.decode(r.assertion, self.public_key, audience=self.audience, algorithms=['RS256'])
self.assertEqual(claim['iss'], self.issuer)
# audience verification is handled during decode now
self.assertEqual(claim['sub'], self.subject)
self.assertEqual(claim['iat'], int(t.return_value))
self.assertNotIn('nbf', claim)
self.assertNotIn('jti', claim)
# Missing issuer parameter
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.prepare_request_body,
issuer=None, subject=self.subject, audience=self.audience, body=self.body)
# Missing subject parameter
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.prepare_request_body,
issuer=self.issuer, subject=None, audience=self.audience, body=self.body)
# Missing audience parameter
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.prepare_request_body,
issuer=self.issuer, subject=self.subject, audience=None, body=self.body)
# Optional kwargs
not_before = time() - 3600
jwt_id = '8zd15df4s35f43sd'
body = client.prepare_request_body(issuer=self.issuer,
subject=self.subject,
audience=self.audience,
body=self.body,
not_before=not_before,
jwt_id=jwt_id)
r = Request('https://a.b', body=body)
self.assertEqual(r.isnot, 'empty')
self.assertEqual(r.grant_type, ServiceApplicationClient.grant_type)
claim = jwt.decode(r.assertion, self.public_key, audience=self.audience, algorithms=['RS256'])
self.assertEqual(claim['iss'], self.issuer)
# audience verification is handled during decode now
self.assertEqual(claim['sub'], self.subject)
self.assertEqual(claim['iat'], int(t.return_value))
self.assertEqual(claim['nbf'], not_before)
self.assertEqual(claim['jti'], jwt_id)
@patch('time.time')
def test_request_body_no_initial_private_key(self, t):
t.return_value = time()
self.token['expires_at'] = self.token['expires_in'] + t.return_value
client = ServiceApplicationClient(
self.client_id, private_key=None)
# Basic with private key provided
body = client.prepare_request_body(issuer=self.issuer,
subject=self.subject,
audience=self.audience,
body=self.body,
private_key=self.private_key)
r = Request('https://a.b', body=body)
self.assertEqual(r.isnot, 'empty')
self.assertEqual(r.grant_type, ServiceApplicationClient.grant_type)
claim = jwt.decode(r.assertion, self.public_key, audience=self.audience, algorithms=['RS256'])
self.assertEqual(claim['iss'], self.issuer)
# audience verification is handled during decode now
self.assertEqual(claim['sub'], self.subject)
self.assertEqual(claim['iat'], int(t.return_value))
# No private key provided
self.assertRaises(ValueError, client.prepare_request_body,
issuer=self.issuer, subject=self.subject, audience=self.audience, body=self.body)
@patch('time.time')
def test_parse_token_response(self, t):
t.return_value = time()
self.token['expires_at'] = self.token['expires_in'] + t.return_value
client = ServiceApplicationClient(self.client_id)
# Parse code and state
response = client.parse_request_body_response(self.token_json, scope=self.scope)
self.assertEqual(response, self.token)
self.assertEqual(client.access_token, response.get("access_token"))
self.assertEqual(client.refresh_token, response.get("refresh_token"))
self.assertEqual(client.token_type, response.get("token_type"))
# Mismatching state
self.assertRaises(Warning, client.parse_request_body_response, self.token_json, scope="invalid")
os.environ['OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE'] = '2'
token = client.parse_request_body_response(self.token_json, scope="invalid")
self.assertTrue(token.scope_changed)
del os.environ['OAUTHLIB_RELAX_TOKEN_SCOPE']

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