Commit Graph

7 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Thomas Huth 664785acff qemu-doc: Do not hard-code the name of the QEMU binary
In our documentation, we use a mix of "$QEMU", "qemu-system-i386" and
"qemu-system-x86_64" when we give examples to the users how to run
QEMU. Some more consistency would be good here. Also some distributions
use different names for the QEMU binary (e.g. "qemu-kvm" in RHEL), so
providing more flexibility here would also be good. Thus let's define
some variables for the names of the QEMU command and use those in the
documentation instead: @value{qemu_system} for generic examples, and
@value{qemu_system_x86} for examples that only work with the x86
binaries.

Message-Id: <20190828093447.12441-1-thuth@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Miroslav Rezanina <mrezanin@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
2019-09-05 13:18:52 +02:00
Daniel P. Berrangé 2c7e82a307 docs: recommend use of md-clear feature on all Intel CPUs
Update x86 CPU model guidance to recommend that the md-clear feature is
manually enabled with all Intel CPU models, when supported by the host
microcode.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190515141011.5315-3-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
2019-05-21 15:39:05 -03:00
Daniel P. Berrangé 21ee4787e5 docs: add note about stibp CPU feature for spectre v2
While the stibp CPU feature is not commonly used by guest OS for spectre
mitigation due to its performance impact, it is none the less best
practice to expose it to all guest OS. This allows the guest OS to
decide whether to make use or it.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190307121838.6345-3-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
2019-03-20 12:18:15 -03:00
Daniel P. Berrangé 174a78a8a5 docs: clarify that spec-ctrl is only needed for Spectre v2
The docs currently say that the spec-ctrl feature is needed for both
Spectre variants, but it is only used to address Spectre v2. Also
remove the note about retpolines. The guest OS is usually treated
as a blackbox from host mgmt pov, so it won't have knowledge about
use of retpolines and thus should unconditionally expose spec-ctrl,
allowing the guest to decide whether to use it or not.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20190307121838.6345-2-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
2019-03-20 12:18:15 -03:00
Like Xu 806be3734c doc: fix typos for documents in tree
Signed-off-by: Like Xu <like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <1550640446-18788-1-git-send-email-like.xu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>
2019-03-06 10:40:21 +01:00
Stefan Markovic e5a5b1bb7c docs/qemu-cpu-models: Add MIPS/nanoMIPS QEMU supported CPU models
Add list of supported and preferred CPU models for MIPS32, MIPS64
and nanoMIPS hosts.

Signed-off-by: Aleksandar Markovic <amarkovic@wavecomp.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Markovic <smarkovic@wavecomp.com>
Signed-off-by: Aleksandar Markovic <amarkovic@wavecomp.com>
2019-01-24 17:48:33 +01:00
Daniel P. Berrangé 2544e9e4aa docs: add guidance on configuring CPU models for x86
With the recent set of CPU hardware vulnerabilities on x86, it is
increasingly difficult to understand which CPU configurations are
good to use and what flaws they might be vulnerable to.

This doc attempts to help management applications and administrators in
picking sensible CPU configuration on x86 hosts. It outlines which of
the named CPU models are good choices, and describes which extra CPU
flags should be enabled to allow the guest to mitigate hardware flaws.

Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20180627160103.13634-1-berrange@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eduardo Habkost <ehabkost@redhat.com>
2018-08-16 13:43:01 -03:00