7be3fd486c | ||
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corpus | ||
Android.bp | ||
README.md | ||
example_fuzzer.cpp | ||
example_fuzzer.dict |
README.md
example_fuzzer
This is just a simple fuzzer that will run for a few iterations and then crash. It can be used as a smoke test to confirm that ASAN+coverage builds and libFuzzer are working correctly.
Fuzz targets (like this one) generally live adjacent to the code that they
exercise. If you wish to write a new target that exercises the library
/external/example
, the fuzz target should generally be in
/external/example/test/fuzzers/
.
To build the fuzzer, run:
$ SANITIZE_TARGET=address SANITIZE_HOST=address mmma -j$(nproc) \
tools/security/example_fuzzer
To run on device:
$ adb sync data
$ adb shell /data/fuzz/example_fuzzer
To run on host:
$ $ANDROID_HOST_OUT/fuzz/example_fuzzer
For more information, see the libFuzzer documentation at https://llvm.org/docs/LibFuzzer.html.
The output should look like the output below. You should notice that:
- cov: values are increasing
- NEW units are discovered
- a stack-buffer-overflow is caught by AddressSanitizer
- the overflow is a WRITE
- the artifact generated starts with 'Hi!'
INFO: Seed: 1154663995
INFO: Loaded 1 modules (10 inline 8-bit counters): 10 [0x5bde606000, 0x5bde60600a),
INFO: Loaded 1 PC tables (10 PCs): 10 [0x5bde606010,0x5bde6060b0),
INFO: -max_len is not provided; libFuzzer will not generate inputs larger than 4096 bytes
INFO: A corpus is not provided, starting from an empty corpus
#2 INITED cov: 5 ft: 5 corp: 1/1b lim: 4 exec/s: 0 rss: 23Mb
#2133 NEW cov: 8 ft: 8 corp: 2/26b lim: 25 exec/s: 0 rss: 23Mb L: 25/25 MS: 1 CrossOver-
#2162 REDUCE cov: 8 ft: 8 corp: 2/24b lim: 25 exec/s: 0 rss: 23Mb L: 23/23 MS: 4 CMP-EraseBytes-InsertRepeatedBytes-InsertByte- DE: "\x18\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"-
=================================================================
==32069==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow on address 0x007fe3caf8c3 at pc 0x0078919740f4 bp 0x007fe3caf890 sp 0x007fe3caf020
WRITE of size 4 at 0x007fe3caf8c3 thread T0
#0 0x78919740f0 (/system/lib64/libclang_rt.asan-aarch64-android.so+0xb30f0)
#1 0x5bde5e0354 (/data/fuzz/example_fuzzer+0xf354)
#2 0x5bde5f1574 (/data/fuzz/example_fuzzer+0x20574)
#3 0x5bde5f1118 (/data/fuzz/example_fuzzer+0x20118)
#4 0x5bde5f2314 (/data/fuzz/example_fuzzer+0x21314)
#5 0x5bde5f2fc0 (/data/fuzz/example_fuzzer+0x21fc0)
#6 0x5bde5e4c10 (/data/fuzz/example_fuzzer+0x13c10)
#7 0x5bde5e0568 (/data/fuzz/example_fuzzer+0xf568)
#8 0x7891304254 (/apex/com.android.runtime/lib64/bionic/libc.so+0x7c254)
Address 0x007fe3caf8c3 is located in stack of thread T0 at offset 35 in frame
#0 0x5bde5e008c (/data/fuzz/example_fuzzer+0xf08c)
This frame has 2 object(s):
[32, 35) 'buffer.i' (line 23) <== Memory access at offset 35 overflows this variable
[48, 72) 'null_terminated_string' (line 31)
HINT: this may be a false positive if your program uses some custom stack unwind mechanism, swapcontext or vfork
(longjmp and C++ exceptions *are* supported)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-buffer-overflow (/system/lib64/libclang_rt.asan-aarch64-android.so+0xb30f0)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x001ffc795ec0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x001ffc795ed0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x001ffc795ee0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x001ffc795ef0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x001ffc795f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x001ffc795f10: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1[03]f2 00 00 00 f3 f3 f3
0x001ffc795f20: f3 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x001ffc795f30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x001ffc795f40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x001ffc795f50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x001ffc795f60: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap: cc
==32069==ABORTING
MS: 4 CopyPart-InsertByte-PersAutoDict-CMP- DE: "\x18\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00"-"Hi!"-; base unit: adc83b19e793491b1c6ea0fd8b46cd9f32e592fc
0x48,0x69,0x21,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0x0,0xa,
Hi!\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x0a
artifact_prefix='./'; Test unit written to ./crash-8a4daff3931e139b7dfff19e7e47dc75c29c3a5e
Base64: SGkhAAAAAAAAAAo=