linux_old1/security/tomoyo/realpath.c

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Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
/*
* security/tomoyo/realpath.c
*
* Copyright (C) 2005-2011 NTT DATA CORPORATION
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*/
#include "common.h"
#include <linux/magic.h>
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
/**
* tomoyo_encode2 - Encode binary string to ascii string.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* @str: String in binary format.
* @str_len: Size of @str in byte.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* Returns pointer to @str in ascii format on success, NULL otherwise.
*
* This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
* didn't return NULL.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*/
char *tomoyo_encode2(const char *str, int str_len)
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
{
int i;
int len = 0;
const char *p = str;
char *cp;
char *cp0;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
if (!p)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < str_len; i++) {
const unsigned char c = p[i];
if (c == '\\')
len += 2;
else if (c > ' ' && c < 127)
len++;
else
len += 4;
}
len++;
/* Reserve space for appending "/". */
cp = kzalloc(len + 10, GFP_NOFS);
if (!cp)
return NULL;
cp0 = cp;
p = str;
for (i = 0; i < str_len; i++) {
const unsigned char c = p[i];
if (c == '\\') {
*cp++ = '\\';
*cp++ = '\\';
} else if (c > ' ' && c < 127) {
*cp++ = c;
} else {
*cp++ = '\\';
*cp++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
*cp++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
*cp++ = (c & 7) + '0';
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
}
return cp0;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_encode - Encode binary string to ascii string.
*
* @str: String in binary format.
*
* Returns pointer to @str in ascii format on success, NULL otherwise.
*
* This function uses kzalloc(), so caller must kfree() if this function
* didn't return NULL.
*/
char *tomoyo_encode(const char *str)
{
return str ? tomoyo_encode2(str, strlen(str)) : NULL;
}
/**
* tomoyo_get_absolute_path - Get the path of a dentry but ignores chroot'ed root.
*
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
* @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
* @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
*
* Returns the buffer on success, an error code otherwise.
*
* If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
*/
static char *tomoyo_get_absolute_path(struct path *path, char * const buffer,
const int buflen)
{
char *pos = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (buflen >= 256) {
/* go to whatever namespace root we are under */
fix apparmor dereferencing potentially freed dentry, sanitize __d_path() API __d_path() API is asking for trouble and in case of apparmor d_namespace_path() getting just that. The root cause is that when __d_path() misses the root it had been told to look for, it stores the location of the most remote ancestor in *root. Without grabbing references. Sure, at the moment of call it had been pinned down by what we have in *path. And if we raced with umount -l, we could have very well stopped at vfsmount/dentry that got freed as soon as prepend_path() dropped vfsmount_lock. It is safe to compare these pointers with pre-existing (and known to be still alive) vfsmount and dentry, as long as all we are asking is "is it the same address?". Dereferencing is not safe and apparmor ended up stepping into that. d_namespace_path() really wants to examine the place where we stopped, even if it's not connected to our namespace. As the result, it looked at ->d_sb->s_magic of a dentry that might've been already freed by that point. All other callers had been careful enough to avoid that, but it's really a bad interface - it invites that kind of trouble. The fix is fairly straightforward, even though it's bigger than I'd like: * prepend_path() root argument becomes const. * __d_path() is never called with NULL/NULL root. It was a kludge to start with. Instead, we have an explicit function - d_absolute_root(). Same as __d_path(), except that it doesn't get root passed and stops where it stops. apparmor and tomoyo are using it. * __d_path() returns NULL on path outside of root. The main caller is show_mountinfo() and that's precisely what we pass root for - to skip those outside chroot jail. Those who don't want that can (and do) use d_path(). * __d_path() root argument becomes const. Everyone agrees, I hope. * apparmor does *NOT* try to use __d_path() or any of its variants when it sees that path->mnt is an internal vfsmount. In that case it's definitely not mounted anywhere and dentry_path() is exactly what we want there. Handling of sysctl()-triggered weirdness is moved to that place. * if apparmor is asked to do pathname relative to chroot jail and __d_path() tells it we it's not in that jail, the sucker just calls d_absolute_path() instead. That's the other remaining caller of __d_path(), BTW. * seq_path_root() does _NOT_ return -ENAMETOOLONG (it's stupid anyway - the normal seq_file logics will take care of growing the buffer and redoing the call of ->show() just fine). However, if it gets path not reachable from root, it returns SEQ_SKIP. The only caller adjusted (i.e. stopped ignoring the return value as it used to do). Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> ACKed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
2011-12-05 21:43:34 +08:00
pos = d_absolute_path(path, buffer, buflen - 1);
if (!IS_ERR(pos) && *pos == '/' && pos[1]) {
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
buffer[buflen - 2] = '/';
buffer[buflen - 1] = '\0';
}
}
}
return pos;
}
/**
* tomoyo_get_dentry_path - Get the path of a dentry.
*
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
* @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
* @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
*
* Returns the buffer on success, an error code otherwise.
*
* If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
*/
static char *tomoyo_get_dentry_path(struct dentry *dentry, char * const buffer,
const int buflen)
{
char *pos = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
if (buflen >= 256) {
pos = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, buflen - 1);
if (!IS_ERR(pos) && *pos == '/' && pos[1]) {
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
if (inode && S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
buffer[buflen - 2] = '/';
buffer[buflen - 1] = '\0';
}
}
}
return pos;
}
/**
* tomoyo_get_local_path - Get the path of a dentry.
*
* @dentry: Pointer to "struct dentry".
* @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
* @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
*
* Returns the buffer on success, an error code otherwise.
*/
static char *tomoyo_get_local_path(struct dentry *dentry, char * const buffer,
const int buflen)
{
struct super_block *sb = dentry->d_sb;
char *pos = tomoyo_get_dentry_path(dentry, buffer, buflen);
if (IS_ERR(pos))
return pos;
/* Convert from $PID to self if $PID is current thread. */
if (sb->s_magic == PROC_SUPER_MAGIC && *pos == '/') {
char *ep;
const pid_t pid = (pid_t) simple_strtoul(pos + 1, &ep, 10);
if (*ep == '/' && pid && pid ==
task_tgid_nr_ns(current, sb->s_fs_info)) {
pos = ep - 5;
if (pos < buffer)
goto out;
memmove(pos, "/self", 5);
}
goto prepend_filesystem_name;
}
/* Use filesystem name for unnamed devices. */
if (!MAJOR(sb->s_dev))
goto prepend_filesystem_name;
{
struct inode *inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
/*
* Use filesystem name if filesystem does not support rename()
* operation.
*/
if (!inode->i_op->rename && !inode->i_op->rename2)
goto prepend_filesystem_name;
}
/* Prepend device name. */
{
char name[64];
int name_len;
const dev_t dev = sb->s_dev;
name[sizeof(name) - 1] = '\0';
snprintf(name, sizeof(name) - 1, "dev(%u,%u):", MAJOR(dev),
MINOR(dev));
name_len = strlen(name);
pos -= name_len;
if (pos < buffer)
goto out;
memmove(pos, name, name_len);
return pos;
}
/* Prepend filesystem name. */
prepend_filesystem_name:
{
const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
const int name_len = strlen(name);
pos -= name_len + 1;
if (pos < buffer)
goto out;
memmove(pos, name, name_len);
pos[name_len] = ':';
}
return pos;
out:
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
/**
* tomoyo_get_socket_name - Get the name of a socket.
*
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
* @buffer: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
* @buflen: Sizeof @buffer.
*
* Returns the buffer.
*/
static char *tomoyo_get_socket_name(struct path *path, char * const buffer,
const int buflen)
{
struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
struct socket *sock = inode ? SOCKET_I(inode) : NULL;
struct sock *sk = sock ? sock->sk : NULL;
if (sk) {
snprintf(buffer, buflen, "socket:[family=%u:type=%u:"
"protocol=%u]", sk->sk_family, sk->sk_type,
sk->sk_protocol);
} else {
snprintf(buffer, buflen, "socket:[unknown]");
}
return buffer;
}
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
/**
* tomoyo_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* @path: Pointer to "struct path".
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*
* If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
* Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to
* \ooo style octal string.
* Character \ is converted to \\ string.
*
* These functions use kzalloc(), so the caller must call kfree()
* if these functions didn't return NULL.
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
*/
char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path)
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
{
char *buf = NULL;
char *name = NULL;
unsigned int buf_len = PAGE_SIZE / 2;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct super_block *sb;
if (!dentry)
return NULL;
sb = dentry->d_sb;
while (1) {
char *pos;
struct inode *inode;
buf_len <<= 1;
kfree(buf);
buf = kmalloc(buf_len, GFP_NOFS);
if (!buf)
break;
/* To make sure that pos is '\0' terminated. */
buf[buf_len - 1] = '\0';
/* Get better name for socket. */
if (sb->s_magic == SOCKFS_MAGIC) {
pos = tomoyo_get_socket_name(path, buf, buf_len - 1);
goto encode;
}
/* For "pipe:[\$]". */
if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) {
pos = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, buf, buf_len - 1);
goto encode;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
inode = sb->s_root->d_inode;
/*
* Get local name for filesystems without rename() operation
* or dentry without vfsmount.
*/
if (!path->mnt ||
(!inode->i_op->rename && !inode->i_op->rename2))
pos = tomoyo_get_local_path(path->dentry, buf,
buf_len - 1);
/* Get absolute name for the rest. */
else {
pos = tomoyo_get_absolute_path(path, buf, buf_len - 1);
/*
* Fall back to local name if absolute name is not
* available.
*/
if (pos == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
pos = tomoyo_get_local_path(path->dentry, buf,
buf_len - 1);
}
encode:
if (IS_ERR(pos))
continue;
name = tomoyo_encode(pos);
break;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
kfree(buf);
if (!name)
tomoyo_warn_oom(__func__);
return name;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
}
/**
* tomoyo_realpath_nofollow - Get realpath of a pathname.
*
* @pathname: The pathname to solve.
*
* Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
*/
char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname)
{
struct path path;
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
if (pathname && kern_path(pathname, 0, &path) == 0) {
char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&path);
path_put(&path);
Memory and pathname management functions. TOMOYO Linux performs pathname based access control. To remove factors that make pathname based access control difficult (e.g. symbolic links, "..", "//" etc.), TOMOYO Linux derives realpath of requested pathname from "struct dentry" and "struct vfsmount". The maximum length of string data is limited to 4000 including trailing '\0'. Since TOMOYO Linux uses '\ooo' style representation for non ASCII printable characters, maybe TOMOYO Linux should be able to support 16336 (which means (NAME_MAX * (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1)) * 4 + (PATH_MAX / (NAME_MAX + 1))) including trailing '\0'), but I think 4000 is enough for practical use. TOMOYO uses only 0x21 - 0x7E (as printable characters) and 0x20 (as word delimiter) and 0x0A (as line delimiter). 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x80 - 0xFF is handled in \ooo style representation. The reason to use \ooo is to guarantee that "%s" won't damage logs. Userland program can request open("/tmp/file granted.\nAccess /tmp/file ", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) and logging such crazy pathname using "Access %s denied.\n" format will cause "fabrication of logs" like Access /tmp/file granted. Access /tmp/file denied. TOMOYO converts such characters to \ooo so that the logs will become Access /tmp/file\040granted.\012Access\040/tmp/file denied. and the administrator can read the logs safely using /bin/cat . Likewise, a crazy request like open("/tmp/\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08\x09", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT, 0600) will be processed safely by converting to Access /tmp/\001\002\003\004\005\006\007\010\011 denied. Signed-off-by: Kentaro Takeda <takedakn@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Signed-off-by: Toshiharu Harada <haradats@nttdata.co.jp> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
2009-02-05 16:18:12 +08:00
return buf;
}
return NULL;
}