linux_old1/include/linux/init_task.h

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#ifndef _LINUX__INIT_TASK_H
#define _LINUX__INIT_TASK_H
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/irqflags.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
[PATCH] lockdep: core Do 'make oldconfig' and accept all the defaults for new config options - reboot into the kernel and if everything goes well it should boot up fine and you should have /proc/lockdep and /proc/lockdep_stats files. Typically if the lock validator finds some problem it will print out voluminous debug output that begins with "BUG: ..." and which syslog output can be used by kernel developers to figure out the precise locking scenario. What does the lock validator do? It "observes" and maps all locking rules as they occur dynamically (as triggered by the kernel's natural use of spinlocks, rwlocks, mutexes and rwsems). Whenever the lock validator subsystem detects a new locking scenario, it validates this new rule against the existing set of rules. If this new rule is consistent with the existing set of rules then the new rule is added transparently and the kernel continues as normal. If the new rule could create a deadlock scenario then this condition is printed out. When determining validity of locking, all possible "deadlock scenarios" are considered: assuming arbitrary number of CPUs, arbitrary irq context and task context constellations, running arbitrary combinations of all the existing locking scenarios. In a typical system this means millions of separate scenarios. This is why we call it a "locking correctness" validator - for all rules that are observed the lock validator proves it with mathematical certainty that a deadlock could not occur (assuming that the lock validator implementation itself is correct and its internal data structures are not corrupted by some other kernel subsystem). [see more details and conditionals of this statement in include/linux/lockdep.h and Documentation/lockdep-design.txt] Furthermore, this "all possible scenarios" property of the validator also enables the finding of complex, highly unlikely multi-CPU multi-context races via single single-context rules, increasing the likelyhood of finding bugs drastically. In practical terms: the lock validator already found a bug in the upstream kernel that could only occur on systems with 3 or more CPUs, and which needed 3 very unlikely code sequences to occur at once on the 3 CPUs. That bug was found and reported on a single-CPU system (!). So in essence a race will be found "piecemail-wise", triggering all the necessary components for the race, without having to reproduce the race scenario itself! In its short existence the lock validator found and reported many bugs before they actually caused a real deadlock. To further increase the efficiency of the validator, the mapping is not per "lock instance", but per "lock-class". For example, all struct inode objects in the kernel have inode->inotify_mutex. If there are 10,000 inodes cached, then there are 10,000 lock objects. But ->inotify_mutex is a single "lock type", and all locking activities that occur against ->inotify_mutex are "unified" into this single lock-class. The advantage of the lock-class approach is that all historical ->inotify_mutex uses are mapped into a single (and as narrow as possible) set of locking rules - regardless of how many different tasks or inode structures it took to build this set of rules. The set of rules persist during the lifetime of the kernel. To see the rough magnitude of checking that the lock validator does, here's a portion of /proc/lockdep_stats, fresh after bootup: lock-classes: 694 [max: 2048] direct dependencies: 1598 [max: 8192] indirect dependencies: 17896 all direct dependencies: 16206 dependency chains: 1910 [max: 8192] in-hardirq chains: 17 in-softirq chains: 105 in-process chains: 1065 stack-trace entries: 38761 [max: 131072] combined max dependencies: 2033928 hardirq-safe locks: 24 hardirq-unsafe locks: 176 softirq-safe locks: 53 softirq-unsafe locks: 137 irq-safe locks: 59 irq-unsafe locks: 176 The lock validator has observed 1598 actual single-thread locking patterns, and has validated all possible 2033928 distinct locking scenarios. More details about the design of the lock validator can be found in Documentation/lockdep-design.txt, which can also found at: http://redhat.com/~mingo/lockdep-patches/lockdep-design.txt [bunk@stusta.de: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 15:24:50 +08:00
#include <linux/lockdep.h>
#include <linux/ftrace.h>
#include <linux/ipc.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
capabilities: implement per-process securebits Filesystem capability support makes it possible to do away with (set)uid-0 based privilege and use capabilities instead. That is, with filesystem support for capabilities but without this present patch, it is (conceptually) possible to manage a system with capabilities alone and never need to obtain privilege via (set)uid-0. Of course, conceptually isn't quite the same as currently possible since few user applications, certainly not enough to run a viable system, are currently prepared to leverage capabilities to exercise privilege. Further, many applications exist that may never get upgraded in this way, and the kernel will continue to want to support their setuid-0 base privilege needs. Where pure-capability applications evolve and replace setuid-0 binaries, it is desirable that there be a mechanisms by which they can contain their privilege. In addition to leveraging the per-process bounding and inheritable sets, this should include suppressing the privilege of the uid-0 superuser from the process' tree of children. The feature added by this patch can be leveraged to suppress the privilege associated with (set)uid-0. This suppression requires CAP_SETPCAP to initiate, and only immediately affects the 'current' process (it is inherited through fork()/exec()). This reimplementation differs significantly from the historical support for securebits which was system-wide, unwieldy and which has ultimately withered to a dead relic in the source of the modern kernel. With this patch applied a process, that is capable(CAP_SETPCAP), can now drop all legacy privilege (through uid=0) for itself and all subsequently fork()'d/exec()'d children with: prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0x2f); This patch represents a no-op unless CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is enabled at configure time. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix uninitialised var warning] [serue@us.ibm.com: capabilities: use cap_task_prctl when !CONFIG_SECURITY] Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-04-28 17:13:40 +08:00
#include <linux/securebits.h>
#include <linux/seqlock.h>
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/sched/autogroup.h>
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <linux/sched/rt.h>
livepatch: change to a per-task consistency model Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the biggest remaining piece needed to make livepatch more generally useful. This code stems from the design proposal made by Vojtech [1] in November 2014. It's a hybrid of kGraft and kpatch: it uses kGraft's per-task consistency and syscall barrier switching combined with kpatch's stack trace switching. There are also a number of fallback options which make it quite flexible. Patches are applied on a per-task basis, when the task is deemed safe to switch over. When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where tasks are converging to the patched state. Usually this transition state can complete in a few seconds. The same sequence occurs when a patch is disabled, except the tasks converge from the patched state to the unpatched state. An interrupt handler inherits the patched state of the task it interrupts. The same is true for forked tasks: the child inherits the patched state of the parent. Livepatch uses several complementary approaches to determine when it's safe to patch tasks: 1. The first and most effective approach is stack checking of sleeping tasks. If no affected functions are on the stack of a given task, the task is patched. In most cases this will patch most or all of the tasks on the first try. Otherwise it'll keep trying periodically. This option is only available if the architecture has reliable stacks (HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE). 2. The second approach, if needed, is kernel exit switching. A task is switched when it returns to user space from a system call, a user space IRQ, or a signal. It's useful in the following cases: a) Patching I/O-bound user tasks which are sleeping on an affected function. In this case you have to send SIGSTOP and SIGCONT to force it to exit the kernel and be patched. b) Patching CPU-bound user tasks. If the task is highly CPU-bound then it will get patched the next time it gets interrupted by an IRQ. c) In the future it could be useful for applying patches for architectures which don't yet have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. In this case you would have to signal most of the tasks on the system. However this isn't supported yet because there's currently no way to patch kthreads without HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. 3. For idle "swapper" tasks, since they don't ever exit the kernel, they instead have a klp_update_patch_state() call in the idle loop which allows them to be patched before the CPU enters the idle state. (Note there's not yet such an approach for kthreads.) All the above approaches may be skipped by setting the 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_patch' struct, which will disable per-task consistency and patch all tasks immediately. This can be useful if the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. Note that, even with this flag set, it's possible that some tasks may still be running with an old version of the function, until that function returns. There's also an 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_func' struct which allows you to specify that certain functions in the patch can be applied without per-task consistency. This might be useful if you want to patch a common function like schedule(), and the function change doesn't need consistency but the rest of the patch does. For architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, the user must set patch->immediate which causes all tasks to be patched immediately. This option should be used with care, only when the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. In the future, architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE may be allowed to use per-task consistency if we can come up with another way to patch kthreads. The /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition file shows whether a patch is in transition. Only a single patch (the topmost patch on the stack) can be in transition at a given time. A patch can remain in transition indefinitely, if any of the tasks are stuck in the initial patch state. A transition can be reversed and effectively canceled by writing the opposite value to the /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/enabled file while the transition is in progress. Then all the tasks will attempt to converge back to the original patch state. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> # for the scheduler changes Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2017-02-14 09:42:40 +08:00
#include <linux/livepatch.h>
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
# define INIT_PUSHABLE_TASKS(tsk) \
.pushable_tasks = PLIST_NODE_INIT(tsk.pushable_tasks, MAX_PRIO),
#else
# define INIT_PUSHABLE_TASKS(tsk)
#endif
extern struct files_struct init_files;
extern struct fs_struct init_fs;
cpuset: mm: reduce large amounts of memory barrier related damage v3 Commit c0ff7453bb5c ("cpuset,mm: fix no node to alloc memory when changing cpuset's mems") wins a super prize for the largest number of memory barriers entered into fast paths for one commit. [get|put]_mems_allowed is incredibly heavy with pairs of full memory barriers inserted into a number of hot paths. This was detected while investigating at large page allocator slowdown introduced some time after 2.6.32. The largest portion of this overhead was shown by oprofile to be at an mfence introduced by this commit into the page allocator hot path. For extra style points, the commit introduced the use of yield() in an implementation of what looks like a spinning mutex. This patch replaces the full memory barriers on both read and write sides with a sequence counter with just read barriers on the fast path side. This is much cheaper on some architectures, including x86. The main bulk of the patch is the retry logic if the nodemask changes in a manner that can cause a false failure. While updating the nodemask, a check is made to see if a false failure is a risk. If it is, the sequence number gets bumped and parallel allocators will briefly stall while the nodemask update takes place. In a page fault test microbenchmark, oprofile samples from __alloc_pages_nodemask went from 4.53% of all samples to 1.15%. The actual results were 3.3.0-rc3 3.3.0-rc3 rc3-vanilla nobarrier-v2r1 Clients 1 UserTime 0.07 ( 0.00%) 0.08 (-14.19%) Clients 2 UserTime 0.07 ( 0.00%) 0.07 ( 2.72%) Clients 4 UserTime 0.08 ( 0.00%) 0.07 ( 3.29%) Clients 1 SysTime 0.70 ( 0.00%) 0.65 ( 6.65%) Clients 2 SysTime 0.85 ( 0.00%) 0.82 ( 3.65%) Clients 4 SysTime 1.41 ( 0.00%) 1.41 ( 0.32%) Clients 1 WallTime 0.77 ( 0.00%) 0.74 ( 4.19%) Clients 2 WallTime 0.47 ( 0.00%) 0.45 ( 3.73%) Clients 4 WallTime 0.38 ( 0.00%) 0.37 ( 1.58%) Clients 1 Flt/sec/cpu 497620.28 ( 0.00%) 520294.53 ( 4.56%) Clients 2 Flt/sec/cpu 414639.05 ( 0.00%) 429882.01 ( 3.68%) Clients 4 Flt/sec/cpu 257959.16 ( 0.00%) 258761.48 ( 0.31%) Clients 1 Flt/sec 495161.39 ( 0.00%) 517292.87 ( 4.47%) Clients 2 Flt/sec 820325.95 ( 0.00%) 850289.77 ( 3.65%) Clients 4 Flt/sec 1020068.93 ( 0.00%) 1022674.06 ( 0.26%) MMTests Statistics: duration Sys Time Running Test (seconds) 135.68 132.17 User+Sys Time Running Test (seconds) 164.2 160.13 Total Elapsed Time (seconds) 123.46 120.87 The overall improvement is small but the System CPU time is much improved and roughly in correlation to what oprofile reported (these performance figures are without profiling so skew is expected). The actual number of page faults is noticeably improved. For benchmarks like kernel builds, the overall benefit is marginal but the system CPU time is slightly reduced. To test the actual bug the commit fixed I opened two terminals. The first ran within a cpuset and continually ran a small program that faulted 100M of anonymous data. In a second window, the nodemask of the cpuset was continually randomised in a loop. Without the commit, the program would fail every so often (usually within 10 seconds) and obviously with the commit everything worked fine. With this patch applied, it also worked fine so the fix should be functionally equivalent. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-22 07:34:11 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_CPUSETS
#define INIT_CPUSET_SEQ(tsk) \
.mems_allowed_seq = SEQCNT_ZERO(tsk.mems_allowed_seq),
cpuset: mm: reduce large amounts of memory barrier related damage v3 Commit c0ff7453bb5c ("cpuset,mm: fix no node to alloc memory when changing cpuset's mems") wins a super prize for the largest number of memory barriers entered into fast paths for one commit. [get|put]_mems_allowed is incredibly heavy with pairs of full memory barriers inserted into a number of hot paths. This was detected while investigating at large page allocator slowdown introduced some time after 2.6.32. The largest portion of this overhead was shown by oprofile to be at an mfence introduced by this commit into the page allocator hot path. For extra style points, the commit introduced the use of yield() in an implementation of what looks like a spinning mutex. This patch replaces the full memory barriers on both read and write sides with a sequence counter with just read barriers on the fast path side. This is much cheaper on some architectures, including x86. The main bulk of the patch is the retry logic if the nodemask changes in a manner that can cause a false failure. While updating the nodemask, a check is made to see if a false failure is a risk. If it is, the sequence number gets bumped and parallel allocators will briefly stall while the nodemask update takes place. In a page fault test microbenchmark, oprofile samples from __alloc_pages_nodemask went from 4.53% of all samples to 1.15%. The actual results were 3.3.0-rc3 3.3.0-rc3 rc3-vanilla nobarrier-v2r1 Clients 1 UserTime 0.07 ( 0.00%) 0.08 (-14.19%) Clients 2 UserTime 0.07 ( 0.00%) 0.07 ( 2.72%) Clients 4 UserTime 0.08 ( 0.00%) 0.07 ( 3.29%) Clients 1 SysTime 0.70 ( 0.00%) 0.65 ( 6.65%) Clients 2 SysTime 0.85 ( 0.00%) 0.82 ( 3.65%) Clients 4 SysTime 1.41 ( 0.00%) 1.41 ( 0.32%) Clients 1 WallTime 0.77 ( 0.00%) 0.74 ( 4.19%) Clients 2 WallTime 0.47 ( 0.00%) 0.45 ( 3.73%) Clients 4 WallTime 0.38 ( 0.00%) 0.37 ( 1.58%) Clients 1 Flt/sec/cpu 497620.28 ( 0.00%) 520294.53 ( 4.56%) Clients 2 Flt/sec/cpu 414639.05 ( 0.00%) 429882.01 ( 3.68%) Clients 4 Flt/sec/cpu 257959.16 ( 0.00%) 258761.48 ( 0.31%) Clients 1 Flt/sec 495161.39 ( 0.00%) 517292.87 ( 4.47%) Clients 2 Flt/sec 820325.95 ( 0.00%) 850289.77 ( 3.65%) Clients 4 Flt/sec 1020068.93 ( 0.00%) 1022674.06 ( 0.26%) MMTests Statistics: duration Sys Time Running Test (seconds) 135.68 132.17 User+Sys Time Running Test (seconds) 164.2 160.13 Total Elapsed Time (seconds) 123.46 120.87 The overall improvement is small but the System CPU time is much improved and roughly in correlation to what oprofile reported (these performance figures are without profiling so skew is expected). The actual number of page faults is noticeably improved. For benchmarks like kernel builds, the overall benefit is marginal but the system CPU time is slightly reduced. To test the actual bug the commit fixed I opened two terminals. The first ran within a cpuset and continually ran a small program that faulted 100M of anonymous data. In a second window, the nodemask of the cpuset was continually randomised in a loop. Without the commit, the program would fail every so often (usually within 10 seconds) and obviously with the commit everything worked fine. With this patch applied, it also worked fine so the fix should be functionally equivalent. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-22 07:34:11 +08:00
#else
#define INIT_CPUSET_SEQ(tsk)
cpuset: mm: reduce large amounts of memory barrier related damage v3 Commit c0ff7453bb5c ("cpuset,mm: fix no node to alloc memory when changing cpuset's mems") wins a super prize for the largest number of memory barriers entered into fast paths for one commit. [get|put]_mems_allowed is incredibly heavy with pairs of full memory barriers inserted into a number of hot paths. This was detected while investigating at large page allocator slowdown introduced some time after 2.6.32. The largest portion of this overhead was shown by oprofile to be at an mfence introduced by this commit into the page allocator hot path. For extra style points, the commit introduced the use of yield() in an implementation of what looks like a spinning mutex. This patch replaces the full memory barriers on both read and write sides with a sequence counter with just read barriers on the fast path side. This is much cheaper on some architectures, including x86. The main bulk of the patch is the retry logic if the nodemask changes in a manner that can cause a false failure. While updating the nodemask, a check is made to see if a false failure is a risk. If it is, the sequence number gets bumped and parallel allocators will briefly stall while the nodemask update takes place. In a page fault test microbenchmark, oprofile samples from __alloc_pages_nodemask went from 4.53% of all samples to 1.15%. The actual results were 3.3.0-rc3 3.3.0-rc3 rc3-vanilla nobarrier-v2r1 Clients 1 UserTime 0.07 ( 0.00%) 0.08 (-14.19%) Clients 2 UserTime 0.07 ( 0.00%) 0.07 ( 2.72%) Clients 4 UserTime 0.08 ( 0.00%) 0.07 ( 3.29%) Clients 1 SysTime 0.70 ( 0.00%) 0.65 ( 6.65%) Clients 2 SysTime 0.85 ( 0.00%) 0.82 ( 3.65%) Clients 4 SysTime 1.41 ( 0.00%) 1.41 ( 0.32%) Clients 1 WallTime 0.77 ( 0.00%) 0.74 ( 4.19%) Clients 2 WallTime 0.47 ( 0.00%) 0.45 ( 3.73%) Clients 4 WallTime 0.38 ( 0.00%) 0.37 ( 1.58%) Clients 1 Flt/sec/cpu 497620.28 ( 0.00%) 520294.53 ( 4.56%) Clients 2 Flt/sec/cpu 414639.05 ( 0.00%) 429882.01 ( 3.68%) Clients 4 Flt/sec/cpu 257959.16 ( 0.00%) 258761.48 ( 0.31%) Clients 1 Flt/sec 495161.39 ( 0.00%) 517292.87 ( 4.47%) Clients 2 Flt/sec 820325.95 ( 0.00%) 850289.77 ( 3.65%) Clients 4 Flt/sec 1020068.93 ( 0.00%) 1022674.06 ( 0.26%) MMTests Statistics: duration Sys Time Running Test (seconds) 135.68 132.17 User+Sys Time Running Test (seconds) 164.2 160.13 Total Elapsed Time (seconds) 123.46 120.87 The overall improvement is small but the System CPU time is much improved and roughly in correlation to what oprofile reported (these performance figures are without profiling so skew is expected). The actual number of page faults is noticeably improved. For benchmarks like kernel builds, the overall benefit is marginal but the system CPU time is slightly reduced. To test the actual bug the commit fixed I opened two terminals. The first ran within a cpuset and continually ran a small program that faulted 100M of anonymous data. In a second window, the nodemask of the cpuset was continually randomised in a loop. Without the commit, the program would fail every so often (usually within 10 seconds) and obviously with the commit everything worked fine. With this patch applied, it also worked fine so the fix should be functionally equivalent. Signed-off-by: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de> Cc: Miao Xie <miaox@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-03-22 07:34:11 +08:00
#endif
#ifndef CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_NATIVE
#define INIT_PREV_CPUTIME(x) .prev_cputime = { \
.lock = __RAW_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(x.prev_cputime.lock), \
},
#else
#define INIT_PREV_CPUTIME(x)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS
#define INIT_POSIX_TIMERS(s) \
.posix_timers = LIST_HEAD_INIT(s.posix_timers),
#define INIT_CPU_TIMERS(s) \
.cpu_timers = { \
LIST_HEAD_INIT(s.cpu_timers[0]), \
LIST_HEAD_INIT(s.cpu_timers[1]), \
LIST_HEAD_INIT(s.cpu_timers[2]), \
},
#define INIT_CPUTIMER(s) \
.cputimer = { \
.cputime_atomic = INIT_CPUTIME_ATOMIC, \
.running = false, \
.checking_timer = false, \
},
#else
#define INIT_POSIX_TIMERS(s)
#define INIT_CPU_TIMERS(s)
#define INIT_CPUTIMER(s)
#endif
#define INIT_SIGNALS(sig) { \
.nr_threads = 1, \
introduce for_each_thread() to replace the buggy while_each_thread() while_each_thread() and next_thread() should die, almost every lockless usage is wrong. 1. Unless g == current, the lockless while_each_thread() is not safe. while_each_thread(g, t) can loop forever if g exits, next_thread() can't reach the unhashed thread in this case. Note that this can happen even if g is the group leader, it can exec. 2. Even if while_each_thread() itself was correct, people often use it wrongly. It was never safe to just take rcu_read_lock() and loop unless you verify that pid_alive(g) == T, even the first next_thread() can point to the already freed/reused memory. This patch adds signal_struct->thread_head and task->thread_node to create the normal rcu-safe list with the stable head. The new for_each_thread(g, t) helper is always safe under rcu_read_lock() as long as this task_struct can't go away. Note: of course it is ugly to have both task_struct->thread_node and the old task_struct->thread_group, we will kill it later, after we change the users of while_each_thread() to use for_each_thread(). Perhaps we can kill it even before we convert all users, we can reimplement next_thread(t) using the new thread_head/thread_node. But we can't do this right now because this will lead to subtle behavioural changes. For example, do/while_each_thread() always sees at least one task, while for_each_thread() can do nothing if the whole thread group has died. Or thread_group_empty(), currently its semantics is not clear unless thread_group_leader(p) and we need to audit the callers before we can change it. So this patch adds the new interface which has to coexist with the old one for some time, hopefully the next changes will be more or less straightforward and the old one will go away soon. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org> Cc: "Ma, Xindong" <xindong.ma@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: "Tu, Xiaobing" <xiaobing.tu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-22 07:49:56 +08:00
.thread_head = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_task.thread_node), \
.wait_chldexit = __WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD_INITIALIZER(sig.wait_chldexit),\
.shared_pending = { \
.list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(sig.shared_pending.list), \
.signal = {{0}}}, \
INIT_POSIX_TIMERS(sig) \
INIT_CPU_TIMERS(sig) \
.rlim = INIT_RLIMITS, \
INIT_CPUTIMER(sig) \
INIT_PREV_CPUTIME(sig) \
.cred_guard_mutex = \
__MUTEX_INITIALIZER(sig.cred_guard_mutex), \
}
extern struct nsproxy init_nsproxy;
#define INIT_SIGHAND(sighand) { \
.count = ATOMIC_INIT(1), \
.action = { { { .sa_handler = SIG_DFL, } }, }, \
.siglock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(sighand.siglock), \
.signalfd_wqh = __WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD_INITIALIZER(sighand.signalfd_wqh), \
}
extern struct group_info init_groups;
#define INIT_STRUCT_PID { \
.count = ATOMIC_INIT(1), \
.tasks = { \
pids: init_struct_pid.tasks should never see the swapper process "statically initialize struct pid for swapper" commit 820e45db says: Statically initialize a struct pid for the swapper process (pid_t == 0) and attach it to init_task. This is needed so task_pid(), task_pgrp() and task_session() interfaces work on the swapper process also. OK, but: - it doesn't make sense to add init_task.pids[].node into init_struct_pid.tasks[], and in fact this just wrong. idle threads are special, they shouldn't be visible on any global list. In particular do_each_pid_task(init_struct_pid) shouldn't see swapper. This is the actual reason why kill(0, SIGKILL) from /sbin/init (which starts with 0,0 special pids) crashes the kernel. The signal sent to pgid/sid == 0 must never see idle threads, even if the previous patch fixed the crash itself. - we have other idle threads running on the non-boot CPUs, see the next patch. Change INIT_STRUCT_PID/INIT_PID_LINK to create the empty/unhashed hlist_head/hlist_node. Like any other idle thread swapper can never exit, so detach_pid()->__hlist_del() is not possible, but we could change INIT_PID_LINK() to set pprev = &next if needed. All we need is the valid swapper->pids[].pid == &init_struct_pid. Reported-by: Mathias Krause <mathias.krause@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at> Cc: Mathias Krause <Mathias.Krause@secunet.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27 05:44:10 +08:00
{ .first = NULL }, \
{ .first = NULL }, \
{ .first = NULL }, \
}, \
.level = 0, \
.numbers = { { \
.nr = 0, \
.ns = &init_pid_ns, \
.pid_chain = { .next = NULL, .pprev = NULL }, \
}, } \
}
#define INIT_PID_LINK(type) \
{ \
.node = { \
.next = NULL, \
pids: init_struct_pid.tasks should never see the swapper process "statically initialize struct pid for swapper" commit 820e45db says: Statically initialize a struct pid for the swapper process (pid_t == 0) and attach it to init_task. This is needed so task_pid(), task_pgrp() and task_session() interfaces work on the swapper process also. OK, but: - it doesn't make sense to add init_task.pids[].node into init_struct_pid.tasks[], and in fact this just wrong. idle threads are special, they shouldn't be visible on any global list. In particular do_each_pid_task(init_struct_pid) shouldn't see swapper. This is the actual reason why kill(0, SIGKILL) from /sbin/init (which starts with 0,0 special pids) crashes the kernel. The signal sent to pgid/sid == 0 must never see idle threads, even if the previous patch fixed the crash itself. - we have other idle threads running on the non-boot CPUs, see the next patch. Change INIT_STRUCT_PID/INIT_PID_LINK to create the empty/unhashed hlist_head/hlist_node. Like any other idle thread swapper can never exit, so detach_pid()->__hlist_del() is not possible, but we could change INIT_PID_LINK() to set pprev = &next if needed. All we need is the valid swapper->pids[].pid == &init_struct_pid. Reported-by: Mathias Krause <mathias.krause@secunet.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Cedric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com> Cc: Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Eric Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Herbert Poetzl <herbert@13thfloor.at> Cc: Mathias Krause <Mathias.Krause@secunet.com> Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-05-27 05:44:10 +08:00
.pprev = NULL, \
}, \
.pid = &init_struct_pid, \
}
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
#define INIT_IDS \
.loginuid = INVALID_UID, \
.sessionid = (unsigned int)-1,
#else
#define INIT_IDS
#endif
capabilities: introduce per-process capability bounding set The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow. Currently cap_bset is per-system. It can be manipulated through sysctl, but only init can add capabilities. Root can remove capabilities. By default it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP. This patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are enabled. It is inherited at fork from parent. Noone can add elements, CAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them. One example use of this is to start a safer container. For instance, until device namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is best to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container. The bounding set will not affect pP and pE immediately. It will only affect pP' and pE' after subsequent exec()s. It also does not affect pI, and exec() does not constrain pI'. So to really start a shell with no way of regain CAP_MKNOD, you would do prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_MKNOD); cap_t cap = cap_get_proc(); cap_value_t caparray[1]; caparray[0] = CAP_MKNOD; cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_DROP); cap_set_proc(cap); cap_free(cap); The following test program will get and set the bounding set (but not pI). For instance ./bset get (lists capabilities in bset) ./bset drop cap_net_raw (starts shell with new bset) (use capset, setuid binary, or binary with file capabilities to try to increase caps) ************************************************************ cap_bound.c ************************************************************ #include <sys/prctl.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ #define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23 #endif #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24 #endif int usage(char *me) { printf("Usage: %s get\n", me); printf(" %s drop <capability>\n", me); return 1; } #define numcaps 32 char *captable[numcaps] = { "cap_chown", "cap_dac_override", "cap_dac_read_search", "cap_fowner", "cap_fsetid", "cap_kill", "cap_setgid", "cap_setuid", "cap_setpcap", "cap_linux_immutable", "cap_net_bind_service", "cap_net_broadcast", "cap_net_admin", "cap_net_raw", "cap_ipc_lock", "cap_ipc_owner", "cap_sys_module", "cap_sys_rawio", "cap_sys_chroot", "cap_sys_ptrace", "cap_sys_pacct", "cap_sys_admin", "cap_sys_boot", "cap_sys_nice", "cap_sys_resource", "cap_sys_time", "cap_sys_tty_config", "cap_mknod", "cap_lease", "cap_audit_write", "cap_audit_control", "cap_setfcap" }; int getbcap(void) { int comma=0; unsigned long i; int ret; printf("i know of %d capabilities\n", numcaps); printf("capability bounding set:"); for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) { ret = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i); if (ret < 0) perror("prctl"); else if (ret==1) printf("%s%s", (comma++) ? ", " : " ", captable[i]); } printf("\n"); return 0; } int capdrop(char *str) { unsigned long i; int found=0; for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) { if (strcmp(captable[i], str) == 0) { found=1; break; } } if (!found) return 1; if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) { perror("prctl"); return 1; } return 0; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { if (argc<2) return usage(argv[0]); if (strcmp(argv[1], "get")==0) return getbcap(); if (strcmp(argv[1], "drop")!=0 || argc<3) return usage(argv[0]); if (capdrop(argv[2])) { printf("unknown capability\n"); return 1; } return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL); } ************************************************************ [serue@us.ibm.com: fix typo] Signed-off-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>a Signed-off-by: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com> Tested-by: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-05 14:29:45 +08:00
rcu: Add a TINY_PREEMPT_RCU Implement a small-memory-footprint uniprocessor-only implementation of preemptible RCU. This implementation uses but a single blocked-tasks list rather than the combinatorial number used per leaf rcu_node by TREE_PREEMPT_RCU, which reduces memory consumption and greatly simplifies processing. This version also takes advantage of uniprocessor execution to accelerate grace periods in the case where there are no readers. The general design is otherwise broadly similar to that of TREE_PREEMPT_RCU. This implementation is a step towards having RCU implementation driven off of the SMP and PREEMPT kernel configuration variables, which can happen once this implementation has accumulated sufficient experience. Removed ACCESS_ONCE() from __rcu_read_unlock() and added barrier() as suggested by Steve Rostedt in order to avoid the compiler-reordering issue noted by Mathieu Desnoyers (http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/16/183). As can be seen below, CONFIG_TINY_PREEMPT_RCU represents almost 5Kbyte savings compared to CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU. Of course, for non-real-time workloads, CONFIG_TINY_RCU is even better. CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU text data bss dec filename 13 0 0 13 kernel/rcupdate.o 6170 825 28 7023 kernel/rcutree.o ---- 7026 Total CONFIG_TINY_PREEMPT_RCU text data bss dec filename 13 0 0 13 kernel/rcupdate.o 2081 81 8 2170 kernel/rcutiny.o ---- 2183 Total CONFIG_TINY_RCU (non-preemptible) text data bss dec filename 13 0 0 13 kernel/rcupdate.o 719 25 0 744 kernel/rcutiny.o --- 757 Total Requested-by: Loïc Minier <loic.minier@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2010-06-30 07:49:16 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RCU
rcu: Merge preemptable-RCU functionality into hierarchical RCU Create a kernel/rcutree_plugin.h file that contains definitions for preemptable RCU (or, under the #else branch of the #ifdef, empty definitions for the classic non-preemptable semantics). These definitions fit into plugins defined in kernel/rcutree.c for this purpose. This variant of preemptable RCU uses a new algorithm whose read-side expense is roughly that of classic hierarchical RCU under CONFIG_PREEMPT. This new algorithm's update-side expense is similar to that of classic hierarchical RCU, and, in absence of read-side preemption or blocking, is exactly that of classic hierarchical RCU. Perhaps more important, this new algorithm has a much simpler implementation, saving well over 1,000 lines of code compared to mainline's implementation of preemptable RCU, which will hopefully be retired in favor of this new algorithm. The simplifications are obtained by maintaining per-task nesting state for running tasks, and using a simple lock-protected algorithm to handle accounting when tasks block within RCU read-side critical sections, making use of lessons learned while creating numerous user-level RCU implementations over the past 18 months. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: laijs@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca Cc: josht@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: dvhltc@us.ibm.com Cc: niv@us.ibm.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org LKML-Reference: <12509746134003-git-send-email-> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-23 04:56:52 +08:00
#define INIT_TASK_RCU_PREEMPT(tsk) \
.rcu_read_lock_nesting = 0, \
.rcu_read_unlock_special.s = 0, \
rcu: Add a TINY_PREEMPT_RCU Implement a small-memory-footprint uniprocessor-only implementation of preemptible RCU. This implementation uses but a single blocked-tasks list rather than the combinatorial number used per leaf rcu_node by TREE_PREEMPT_RCU, which reduces memory consumption and greatly simplifies processing. This version also takes advantage of uniprocessor execution to accelerate grace periods in the case where there are no readers. The general design is otherwise broadly similar to that of TREE_PREEMPT_RCU. This implementation is a step towards having RCU implementation driven off of the SMP and PREEMPT kernel configuration variables, which can happen once this implementation has accumulated sufficient experience. Removed ACCESS_ONCE() from __rcu_read_unlock() and added barrier() as suggested by Steve Rostedt in order to avoid the compiler-reordering issue noted by Mathieu Desnoyers (http://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/16/183). As can be seen below, CONFIG_TINY_PREEMPT_RCU represents almost 5Kbyte savings compared to CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU. Of course, for non-real-time workloads, CONFIG_TINY_RCU is even better. CONFIG_TREE_PREEMPT_RCU text data bss dec filename 13 0 0 13 kernel/rcupdate.o 6170 825 28 7023 kernel/rcutree.o ---- 7026 Total CONFIG_TINY_PREEMPT_RCU text data bss dec filename 13 0 0 13 kernel/rcupdate.o 2081 81 8 2170 kernel/rcutiny.o ---- 2183 Total CONFIG_TINY_RCU (non-preemptible) text data bss dec filename 13 0 0 13 kernel/rcupdate.o 719 25 0 744 kernel/rcutiny.o --- 757 Total Requested-by: Loïc Minier <loic.minier@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
2010-06-30 07:49:16 +08:00
.rcu_node_entry = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.rcu_node_entry), \
.rcu_blocked_node = NULL,
rcu: Merge preemptable-RCU functionality into hierarchical RCU Create a kernel/rcutree_plugin.h file that contains definitions for preemptable RCU (or, under the #else branch of the #ifdef, empty definitions for the classic non-preemptable semantics). These definitions fit into plugins defined in kernel/rcutree.c for this purpose. This variant of preemptable RCU uses a new algorithm whose read-side expense is roughly that of classic hierarchical RCU under CONFIG_PREEMPT. This new algorithm's update-side expense is similar to that of classic hierarchical RCU, and, in absence of read-side preemption or blocking, is exactly that of classic hierarchical RCU. Perhaps more important, this new algorithm has a much simpler implementation, saving well over 1,000 lines of code compared to mainline's implementation of preemptable RCU, which will hopefully be retired in favor of this new algorithm. The simplifications are obtained by maintaining per-task nesting state for running tasks, and using a simple lock-protected algorithm to handle accounting when tasks block within RCU read-side critical sections, making use of lessons learned while creating numerous user-level RCU implementations over the past 18 months. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: laijs@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca Cc: josht@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: dvhltc@us.ibm.com Cc: niv@us.ibm.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org LKML-Reference: <12509746134003-git-send-email-> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-23 04:56:52 +08:00
#else
#define INIT_TASK_RCU_PREEMPT(tsk)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TASKS_RCU
#define INIT_TASK_RCU_TASKS(tsk) \
.rcu_tasks_holdout = false, \
.rcu_tasks_holdout_list = \
LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.rcu_tasks_holdout_list), \
.rcu_tasks_idle_cpu = -1,
#else
#define INIT_TASK_RCU_TASKS(tsk)
#endif
rcu: Merge preemptable-RCU functionality into hierarchical RCU Create a kernel/rcutree_plugin.h file that contains definitions for preemptable RCU (or, under the #else branch of the #ifdef, empty definitions for the classic non-preemptable semantics). These definitions fit into plugins defined in kernel/rcutree.c for this purpose. This variant of preemptable RCU uses a new algorithm whose read-side expense is roughly that of classic hierarchical RCU under CONFIG_PREEMPT. This new algorithm's update-side expense is similar to that of classic hierarchical RCU, and, in absence of read-side preemption or blocking, is exactly that of classic hierarchical RCU. Perhaps more important, this new algorithm has a much simpler implementation, saving well over 1,000 lines of code compared to mainline's implementation of preemptable RCU, which will hopefully be retired in favor of this new algorithm. The simplifications are obtained by maintaining per-task nesting state for running tasks, and using a simple lock-protected algorithm to handle accounting when tasks block within RCU read-side critical sections, making use of lessons learned while creating numerous user-level RCU implementations over the past 18 months. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: laijs@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca Cc: josht@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: dvhltc@us.ibm.com Cc: niv@us.ibm.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org LKML-Reference: <12509746134003-git-send-email-> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-23 04:56:52 +08:00
extern struct cred init_cred;
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED
# define INIT_CGROUP_SCHED(tsk) \
.sched_task_group = &root_task_group,
#else
# define INIT_CGROUP_SCHED(tsk)
#endif
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS
# define INIT_PERF_EVENTS(tsk) \
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
.perf_event_mutex = \
__MUTEX_INITIALIZER(tsk.perf_event_mutex), \
.perf_event_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.perf_event_list),
#else
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
# define INIT_PERF_EVENTS(tsk)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN
# define INIT_VTIME(tsk) \
.vtime.seqcount = SEQCNT_ZERO(tsk.vtime.seqcount), \
.vtime.starttime = 0, \
.vtime.state = VTIME_SYS,
#else
# define INIT_VTIME(tsk)
#endif
#define INIT_TASK_COMM "swapper"
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES
# define INIT_RT_MUTEXES(tsk) \
.pi_waiters = RB_ROOT_CACHED, \
.pi_top_task = NULL,
#else
# define INIT_RT_MUTEXES(tsk)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING
# define INIT_NUMA_BALANCING(tsk) \
.numa_preferred_nid = -1, \
.numa_group = NULL, \
.numa_faults = NULL,
#else
# define INIT_NUMA_BALANCING(tsk)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_KASAN
# define INIT_KASAN(tsk) \
.kasan_depth = 1,
#else
# define INIT_KASAN(tsk)
#endif
livepatch: change to a per-task consistency model Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the biggest remaining piece needed to make livepatch more generally useful. This code stems from the design proposal made by Vojtech [1] in November 2014. It's a hybrid of kGraft and kpatch: it uses kGraft's per-task consistency and syscall barrier switching combined with kpatch's stack trace switching. There are also a number of fallback options which make it quite flexible. Patches are applied on a per-task basis, when the task is deemed safe to switch over. When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where tasks are converging to the patched state. Usually this transition state can complete in a few seconds. The same sequence occurs when a patch is disabled, except the tasks converge from the patched state to the unpatched state. An interrupt handler inherits the patched state of the task it interrupts. The same is true for forked tasks: the child inherits the patched state of the parent. Livepatch uses several complementary approaches to determine when it's safe to patch tasks: 1. The first and most effective approach is stack checking of sleeping tasks. If no affected functions are on the stack of a given task, the task is patched. In most cases this will patch most or all of the tasks on the first try. Otherwise it'll keep trying periodically. This option is only available if the architecture has reliable stacks (HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE). 2. The second approach, if needed, is kernel exit switching. A task is switched when it returns to user space from a system call, a user space IRQ, or a signal. It's useful in the following cases: a) Patching I/O-bound user tasks which are sleeping on an affected function. In this case you have to send SIGSTOP and SIGCONT to force it to exit the kernel and be patched. b) Patching CPU-bound user tasks. If the task is highly CPU-bound then it will get patched the next time it gets interrupted by an IRQ. c) In the future it could be useful for applying patches for architectures which don't yet have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. In this case you would have to signal most of the tasks on the system. However this isn't supported yet because there's currently no way to patch kthreads without HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. 3. For idle "swapper" tasks, since they don't ever exit the kernel, they instead have a klp_update_patch_state() call in the idle loop which allows them to be patched before the CPU enters the idle state. (Note there's not yet such an approach for kthreads.) All the above approaches may be skipped by setting the 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_patch' struct, which will disable per-task consistency and patch all tasks immediately. This can be useful if the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. Note that, even with this flag set, it's possible that some tasks may still be running with an old version of the function, until that function returns. There's also an 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_func' struct which allows you to specify that certain functions in the patch can be applied without per-task consistency. This might be useful if you want to patch a common function like schedule(), and the function change doesn't need consistency but the rest of the patch does. For architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, the user must set patch->immediate which causes all tasks to be patched immediately. This option should be used with care, only when the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. In the future, architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE may be allowed to use per-task consistency if we can come up with another way to patch kthreads. The /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition file shows whether a patch is in transition. Only a single patch (the topmost patch on the stack) can be in transition at a given time. A patch can remain in transition indefinitely, if any of the tasks are stuck in the initial patch state. A transition can be reversed and effectively canceled by writing the opposite value to the /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/enabled file while the transition is in progress. Then all the tasks will attempt to converge back to the original patch state. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> # for the scheduler changes Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2017-02-14 09:42:40 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH
# define INIT_LIVEPATCH(tsk) \
.patch_state = KLP_UNDEFINED,
#else
# define INIT_LIVEPATCH(tsk)
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK
# define INIT_TASK_TI(tsk) \
.thread_info = INIT_THREAD_INFO(tsk), \
.stack_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
#else
# define INIT_TASK_TI(tsk)
#endif
LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob. We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change. TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob, security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"-> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged this patch. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-24 19:46:33 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
#define INIT_TASK_SECURITY .security = NULL,
#else
#define INIT_TASK_SECURITY
#endif
/*
* INIT_TASK is used to set up the first task table, touch at
* your own risk!. Base=0, limit=0x1fffff (=2MB)
*/
#define INIT_TASK(tsk) \
{ \
INIT_TASK_TI(tsk) \
.state = 0, \
.stack = init_stack, \
.usage = ATOMIC_INIT(2), \
.flags = PF_KTHREAD, \
.prio = MAX_PRIO-20, \
.static_prio = MAX_PRIO-20, \
.normal_prio = MAX_PRIO-20, \
.policy = SCHED_NORMAL, \
.cpus_allowed = CPU_MASK_ALL, \
.nr_cpus_allowed= NR_CPUS, \
.mm = NULL, \
.active_mm = &init_mm, \
all arches, signal: move restart_block to struct task_struct If an attacker can cause a controlled kernel stack overflow, overwriting the restart block is a very juicy exploit target. This is because the restart_block is held in the same memory allocation as the kernel stack. Moving the restart block to struct task_struct prevents this exploit by making the restart_block harder to locate. Note that there are other fields in thread_info that are also easy targets, at least on some architectures. It's also a decent simplification, since the restart code is more or less identical on all architectures. [james.hogan@imgtec.com: metag: align thread_info::supervisor_stack] Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Richard Henderson <rth@twiddle.net> Cc: Ivan Kokshaysky <ink@jurassic.park.msu.ru> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Russell King <rmk@arm.linux.org.uk> Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Cc: Haavard Skinnemoen <hskinnemoen@gmail.com> Cc: Hans-Christian Egtvedt <egtvedt@samfundet.no> Cc: Steven Miao <realmz6@gmail.com> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Aurelien Jacquiot <a-jacquiot@ti.com> Cc: Mikael Starvik <starvik@axis.com> Cc: Jesper Nilsson <jesper.nilsson@axis.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Richard Kuo <rkuo@codeaurora.org> Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <jejb@parisc-linux.org> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Acked-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Tested-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> (powerpc) Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Chen Liqin <liqin.linux@gmail.com> Cc: Lennox Wu <lennox.wu@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Metcalf <cmetcalf@ezchip.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@mprc.pku.edu.cn> Cc: Chris Zankel <chris@zankel.net> Cc: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net> Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@imgtec.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-02-13 07:01:14 +08:00
.restart_block = { \
.fn = do_no_restart_syscall, \
}, \
.se = { \
.group_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.se.group_node), \
}, \
.rt = { \
.run_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.rt.run_list), \
.time_slice = RR_TIMESLICE, \
}, \
.tasks = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.tasks), \
INIT_PUSHABLE_TASKS(tsk) \
INIT_CGROUP_SCHED(tsk) \
.ptraced = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.ptraced), \
.ptrace_entry = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.ptrace_entry), \
.real_parent = &tsk, \
.parent = &tsk, \
.children = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.children), \
.sibling = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.sibling), \
.group_leader = &tsk, \
RCU_POINTER_INITIALIZER(real_cred, &init_cred), \
RCU_POINTER_INITIALIZER(cred, &init_cred), \
.comm = INIT_TASK_COMM, \
.thread = INIT_THREAD, \
.fs = &init_fs, \
.files = &init_files, \
.signal = &init_signals, \
.sighand = &init_sighand, \
.nsproxy = &init_nsproxy, \
.pending = { \
.list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.pending.list), \
.signal = {{0}}}, \
.blocked = {{0}}, \
.alloc_lock = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(tsk.alloc_lock), \
.journal_info = NULL, \
INIT_CPU_TIMERS(tsk) \
.pi_lock = __RAW_SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(tsk.pi_lock), \
.timer_slack_ns = 50000, /* 50 usec default slack */ \
.pids = { \
[PIDTYPE_PID] = INIT_PID_LINK(PIDTYPE_PID), \
[PIDTYPE_PGID] = INIT_PID_LINK(PIDTYPE_PGID), \
[PIDTYPE_SID] = INIT_PID_LINK(PIDTYPE_SID), \
}, \
.thread_group = LIST_HEAD_INIT(tsk.thread_group), \
introduce for_each_thread() to replace the buggy while_each_thread() while_each_thread() and next_thread() should die, almost every lockless usage is wrong. 1. Unless g == current, the lockless while_each_thread() is not safe. while_each_thread(g, t) can loop forever if g exits, next_thread() can't reach the unhashed thread in this case. Note that this can happen even if g is the group leader, it can exec. 2. Even if while_each_thread() itself was correct, people often use it wrongly. It was never safe to just take rcu_read_lock() and loop unless you verify that pid_alive(g) == T, even the first next_thread() can point to the already freed/reused memory. This patch adds signal_struct->thread_head and task->thread_node to create the normal rcu-safe list with the stable head. The new for_each_thread(g, t) helper is always safe under rcu_read_lock() as long as this task_struct can't go away. Note: of course it is ugly to have both task_struct->thread_node and the old task_struct->thread_group, we will kill it later, after we change the users of while_each_thread() to use for_each_thread(). Perhaps we can kill it even before we convert all users, we can reimplement next_thread(t) using the new thread_head/thread_node. But we can't do this right now because this will lead to subtle behavioural changes. For example, do/while_each_thread() always sees at least one task, while for_each_thread() can do nothing if the whole thread group has died. Or thread_group_empty(), currently its semantics is not clear unless thread_group_leader(p) and we need to audit the callers before we can change it. So this patch adds the new interface which has to coexist with the old one for some time, hopefully the next changes will be more or less straightforward and the old one will go away soon. Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Tested-by: Sergey Dyasly <dserrg@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Sameer Nanda <snanda@chromium.org> Acked-by: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Mandeep Singh Baines <msb@chromium.org> Cc: "Ma, Xindong" <xindong.ma@intel.com> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz> Cc: "Tu, Xiaobing" <xiaobing.tu@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2014-01-22 07:49:56 +08:00
.thread_node = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_signals.thread_head), \
INIT_IDS \
perf: Do the big rename: Performance Counters -> Performance Events Bye-bye Performance Counters, welcome Performance Events! In the past few months the perfcounters subsystem has grown out its initial role of counting hardware events, and has become (and is becoming) a much broader generic event enumeration, reporting, logging, monitoring, analysis facility. Naming its core object 'perf_counter' and naming the subsystem 'perfcounters' has become more and more of a misnomer. With pending code like hw-breakpoints support the 'counter' name is less and less appropriate. All in one, we've decided to rename the subsystem to 'performance events' and to propagate this rename through all fields, variables and API names. (in an ABI compatible fashion) The word 'event' is also a bit shorter than 'counter' - which makes it slightly more convenient to write/handle as well. Thanks goes to Stephane Eranian who first observed this misnomer and suggested a rename. User-space tooling and ABI compatibility is not affected - this patch should be function-invariant. (Also, defconfigs were not touched to keep the size down.) This patch has been generated via the following script: FILES=$(find * -type f | grep -vE 'oprofile|[^K]config') sed -i \ -e 's/PERF_EVENT_/PERF_RECORD_/g' \ -e 's/PERF_COUNTER/PERF_EVENT/g' \ -e 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g' \ -e 's/nb_counters/nb_events/g' \ -e 's/swcounter/swevent/g' \ -e 's/tpcounter_event/tp_event/g' \ $FILES for N in $(find . -name perf_counter.[ch]); do M=$(echo $N | sed 's/perf_counter/perf_event/g') mv $N $M done FILES=$(find . -name perf_event.*) sed -i \ -e 's/COUNTER_MASK/REG_MASK/g' \ -e 's/COUNTER/EVENT/g' \ -e 's/\<event\>/event_id/g' \ -e 's/counter/event/g' \ -e 's/Counter/Event/g' \ $FILES ... to keep it as correct as possible. This script can also be used by anyone who has pending perfcounters patches - it converts a Linux kernel tree over to the new naming. We tried to time this change to the point in time where the amount of pending patches is the smallest: the end of the merge window. Namespace clashes were fixed up in a preparatory patch - and some stylistic fallout will be fixed up in a subsequent patch. ( NOTE: 'counters' are still the proper terminology when we deal with hardware registers - and these sed scripts are a bit over-eager in renaming them. I've undone some of that, but in case there's something left where 'counter' would be better than 'event' we can undo that on an individual basis instead of touching an otherwise nicely automated patch. ) Suggested-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com> Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Acked-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Reviewed-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org> LKML-Reference: <new-submission> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-09-21 18:02:48 +08:00
INIT_PERF_EVENTS(tsk) \
INIT_TRACE_IRQFLAGS \
[PATCH] lockdep: core Do 'make oldconfig' and accept all the defaults for new config options - reboot into the kernel and if everything goes well it should boot up fine and you should have /proc/lockdep and /proc/lockdep_stats files. Typically if the lock validator finds some problem it will print out voluminous debug output that begins with "BUG: ..." and which syslog output can be used by kernel developers to figure out the precise locking scenario. What does the lock validator do? It "observes" and maps all locking rules as they occur dynamically (as triggered by the kernel's natural use of spinlocks, rwlocks, mutexes and rwsems). Whenever the lock validator subsystem detects a new locking scenario, it validates this new rule against the existing set of rules. If this new rule is consistent with the existing set of rules then the new rule is added transparently and the kernel continues as normal. If the new rule could create a deadlock scenario then this condition is printed out. When determining validity of locking, all possible "deadlock scenarios" are considered: assuming arbitrary number of CPUs, arbitrary irq context and task context constellations, running arbitrary combinations of all the existing locking scenarios. In a typical system this means millions of separate scenarios. This is why we call it a "locking correctness" validator - for all rules that are observed the lock validator proves it with mathematical certainty that a deadlock could not occur (assuming that the lock validator implementation itself is correct and its internal data structures are not corrupted by some other kernel subsystem). [see more details and conditionals of this statement in include/linux/lockdep.h and Documentation/lockdep-design.txt] Furthermore, this "all possible scenarios" property of the validator also enables the finding of complex, highly unlikely multi-CPU multi-context races via single single-context rules, increasing the likelyhood of finding bugs drastically. In practical terms: the lock validator already found a bug in the upstream kernel that could only occur on systems with 3 or more CPUs, and which needed 3 very unlikely code sequences to occur at once on the 3 CPUs. That bug was found and reported on a single-CPU system (!). So in essence a race will be found "piecemail-wise", triggering all the necessary components for the race, without having to reproduce the race scenario itself! In its short existence the lock validator found and reported many bugs before they actually caused a real deadlock. To further increase the efficiency of the validator, the mapping is not per "lock instance", but per "lock-class". For example, all struct inode objects in the kernel have inode->inotify_mutex. If there are 10,000 inodes cached, then there are 10,000 lock objects. But ->inotify_mutex is a single "lock type", and all locking activities that occur against ->inotify_mutex are "unified" into this single lock-class. The advantage of the lock-class approach is that all historical ->inotify_mutex uses are mapped into a single (and as narrow as possible) set of locking rules - regardless of how many different tasks or inode structures it took to build this set of rules. The set of rules persist during the lifetime of the kernel. To see the rough magnitude of checking that the lock validator does, here's a portion of /proc/lockdep_stats, fresh after bootup: lock-classes: 694 [max: 2048] direct dependencies: 1598 [max: 8192] indirect dependencies: 17896 all direct dependencies: 16206 dependency chains: 1910 [max: 8192] in-hardirq chains: 17 in-softirq chains: 105 in-process chains: 1065 stack-trace entries: 38761 [max: 131072] combined max dependencies: 2033928 hardirq-safe locks: 24 hardirq-unsafe locks: 176 softirq-safe locks: 53 softirq-unsafe locks: 137 irq-safe locks: 59 irq-unsafe locks: 176 The lock validator has observed 1598 actual single-thread locking patterns, and has validated all possible 2033928 distinct locking scenarios. More details about the design of the lock validator can be found in Documentation/lockdep-design.txt, which can also found at: http://redhat.com/~mingo/lockdep-patches/lockdep-design.txt [bunk@stusta.de: cleanups] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-07-03 15:24:50 +08:00
INIT_LOCKDEP \
INIT_FTRACE_GRAPH \
INIT_TRACE_RECURSION \
rcu: Merge preemptable-RCU functionality into hierarchical RCU Create a kernel/rcutree_plugin.h file that contains definitions for preemptable RCU (or, under the #else branch of the #ifdef, empty definitions for the classic non-preemptable semantics). These definitions fit into plugins defined in kernel/rcutree.c for this purpose. This variant of preemptable RCU uses a new algorithm whose read-side expense is roughly that of classic hierarchical RCU under CONFIG_PREEMPT. This new algorithm's update-side expense is similar to that of classic hierarchical RCU, and, in absence of read-side preemption or blocking, is exactly that of classic hierarchical RCU. Perhaps more important, this new algorithm has a much simpler implementation, saving well over 1,000 lines of code compared to mainline's implementation of preemptable RCU, which will hopefully be retired in favor of this new algorithm. The simplifications are obtained by maintaining per-task nesting state for running tasks, and using a simple lock-protected algorithm to handle accounting when tasks block within RCU read-side critical sections, making use of lessons learned while creating numerous user-level RCU implementations over the past 18 months. Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Cc: laijs@cn.fujitsu.com Cc: dipankar@in.ibm.com Cc: akpm@linux-foundation.org Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@polymtl.ca Cc: josht@linux.vnet.ibm.com Cc: dvhltc@us.ibm.com Cc: niv@us.ibm.com Cc: peterz@infradead.org Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org LKML-Reference: <12509746134003-git-send-email-> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2009-08-23 04:56:52 +08:00
INIT_TASK_RCU_PREEMPT(tsk) \
INIT_TASK_RCU_TASKS(tsk) \
INIT_CPUSET_SEQ(tsk) \
INIT_RT_MUTEXES(tsk) \
INIT_PREV_CPUTIME(tsk) \
INIT_VTIME(tsk) \
INIT_NUMA_BALANCING(tsk) \
INIT_KASAN(tsk) \
livepatch: change to a per-task consistency model Change livepatch to use a basic per-task consistency model. This is the foundation which will eventually enable us to patch those ~10% of security patches which change function or data semantics. This is the biggest remaining piece needed to make livepatch more generally useful. This code stems from the design proposal made by Vojtech [1] in November 2014. It's a hybrid of kGraft and kpatch: it uses kGraft's per-task consistency and syscall barrier switching combined with kpatch's stack trace switching. There are also a number of fallback options which make it quite flexible. Patches are applied on a per-task basis, when the task is deemed safe to switch over. When a patch is enabled, livepatch enters into a transition state where tasks are converging to the patched state. Usually this transition state can complete in a few seconds. The same sequence occurs when a patch is disabled, except the tasks converge from the patched state to the unpatched state. An interrupt handler inherits the patched state of the task it interrupts. The same is true for forked tasks: the child inherits the patched state of the parent. Livepatch uses several complementary approaches to determine when it's safe to patch tasks: 1. The first and most effective approach is stack checking of sleeping tasks. If no affected functions are on the stack of a given task, the task is patched. In most cases this will patch most or all of the tasks on the first try. Otherwise it'll keep trying periodically. This option is only available if the architecture has reliable stacks (HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE). 2. The second approach, if needed, is kernel exit switching. A task is switched when it returns to user space from a system call, a user space IRQ, or a signal. It's useful in the following cases: a) Patching I/O-bound user tasks which are sleeping on an affected function. In this case you have to send SIGSTOP and SIGCONT to force it to exit the kernel and be patched. b) Patching CPU-bound user tasks. If the task is highly CPU-bound then it will get patched the next time it gets interrupted by an IRQ. c) In the future it could be useful for applying patches for architectures which don't yet have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. In this case you would have to signal most of the tasks on the system. However this isn't supported yet because there's currently no way to patch kthreads without HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE. 3. For idle "swapper" tasks, since they don't ever exit the kernel, they instead have a klp_update_patch_state() call in the idle loop which allows them to be patched before the CPU enters the idle state. (Note there's not yet such an approach for kthreads.) All the above approaches may be skipped by setting the 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_patch' struct, which will disable per-task consistency and patch all tasks immediately. This can be useful if the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. Note that, even with this flag set, it's possible that some tasks may still be running with an old version of the function, until that function returns. There's also an 'immediate' flag in the 'klp_func' struct which allows you to specify that certain functions in the patch can be applied without per-task consistency. This might be useful if you want to patch a common function like schedule(), and the function change doesn't need consistency but the rest of the patch does. For architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE, the user must set patch->immediate which causes all tasks to be patched immediately. This option should be used with care, only when the patch doesn't change any function or data semantics. In the future, architectures which don't have HAVE_RELIABLE_STACKTRACE may be allowed to use per-task consistency if we can come up with another way to patch kthreads. The /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/transition file shows whether a patch is in transition. Only a single patch (the topmost patch on the stack) can be in transition at a given time. A patch can remain in transition indefinitely, if any of the tasks are stuck in the initial patch state. A transition can be reversed and effectively canceled by writing the opposite value to the /sys/kernel/livepatch/<patch>/enabled file while the transition is in progress. Then all the tasks will attempt to converge back to the original patch state. [1] https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20141107140458.GA21774@suse.cz Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Miroslav Benes <mbenes@suse.cz> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> # for the scheduler changes Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
2017-02-14 09:42:40 +08:00
INIT_LIVEPATCH(tsk) \
LSM: Revive security_task_alloc() hook and per "struct task_struct" security blob. We switched from "struct task_struct"->security to "struct cred"->security in Linux 2.6.29. But not all LSM modules were happy with that change. TOMOYO LSM module is an example which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob, for TOMOYO's security context is defined based on "struct task_struct" rather than "struct cred". AppArmor LSM module is another example which want to use it, for AppArmor is currently abusing the cred a little bit to store the change_hat and setexeccon info. Although security_task_free() hook was revived in Linux 3.4 because Yama LSM module wanted to release per "struct task_struct" security blob, security_task_alloc() hook and "struct task_struct"->security field were not revived. Nowadays, we are getting proposals of lightweight LSM modules which want to use per "struct task_struct" security blob. We are already allowing multiple concurrent LSM modules (up to one fully armored module which uses "struct cred"->security field or exclusive hooks like security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(), plus unlimited number of lightweight modules which do not use "struct cred"->security nor exclusive hooks) as long as they are built into the kernel. But this patch does not implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field which will become needed when multiple LSM modules want to use "struct task_struct"-> security field. Although it won't be difficult to implement variable length "struct task_struct"->security field, let's think about it after we merged this patch. Signed-off-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Acked-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Tested-by: Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@gmail.com> Acked-by: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Cc: José Bollo <jobol@nonadev.net> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2017-03-24 19:46:33 +08:00
INIT_TASK_SECURITY \
}
/* Attach to the init_task data structure for proper alignment */
#define __init_task_data __attribute__((__section__(".data..init_task")))
#endif