linux_old1/Documentation/sysctl/fs.txt

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Documentation for /proc/sys/fs/* kernel version 2.2.10
(c) 1998, 1999, Rik van Riel <riel@nl.linux.org>
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:20 +08:00
(c) 2009, Shen Feng<shen@cn.fujitsu.com>
For general info and legal blurb, please look in README.
==============================================================
This file contains documentation for the sysctl files in
/proc/sys/fs/ and is valid for Linux kernel version 2.2.
The files in this directory can be used to tune and monitor
miscellaneous and general things in the operation of the Linux
kernel. Since some of the files _can_ be used to screw up your
system, it is advisable to read both documentation and source
before actually making adjustments.
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:20 +08:00
1. /proc/sys/fs
----------------------------------------------------------
Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:20 +08:00
- aio-max-nr
- aio-nr
- dentry-state
- dquot-max
- dquot-nr
- file-max
- file-nr
- inode-max
- inode-nr
- inode-state
- nr_open
- overflowuid
- overflowgid
fs: add link restrictions This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS. Symlinks: A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp The solution is to permit symlinks to only be followed when outside a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. Some pointers to the history of earlier discussion that I could find: 1996 Aug, Zygo Blaxell http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=87602167419830&w=2 1996 Oct, Andrew Tridgell http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9610.2/0086.html 1997 Dec, Albert D Cahalan http://lkml.org/lkml/1997/12/16/4 2005 Feb, Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0502.0/1896.html 2010 May, Kees Cook https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/30/144 Past objections and rebuttals could be summarized as: - Violates POSIX. - POSIX didn't consider this situation and it's not useful to follow a broken specification at the cost of security. - Might break unknown applications that use this feature. - Applications that break because of the change are easy to spot and fix. Applications that are vulnerable to symlink ToCToU by not having the change aren't. Additionally, no applications have yet been found that rely on this behavior. - Applications should just use mkstemp() or O_CREATE|O_EXCL. - True, but applications are not perfect, and new software is written all the time that makes these mistakes; blocking this flaw at the kernel is a single solution to the entire class of vulnerability. - This should live in the core VFS. - This should live in an LSM. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/31/135) - This should live in an LSM. - This should live in the core VFS. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/2/188) Hardlinks: On systems that have user-writable directories on the same partition as system files, a long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally, an issue exists where users can "pin" a potentially vulnerable setuid/setgid file so that an administrator will not actually upgrade a system fully. The solution is to permit hardlinks to only be created when the user is already the existing file's owner, or if they already have read/write access to the existing file. Many Linux users are surprised when they learn they can link to files they have no access to, so this change appears to follow the doctrine of "least surprise". Additionally, this change does not violate POSIX, which states "the implementation may require that the calling process has permission to access the existing file"[1]. This change is known to break some implementations of the "at" daemon, though the version used by Fedora and Ubuntu has been fixed[2] for a while. Otherwise, the change has been undisruptive while in use in Ubuntu for the last 1.5 years. [1] http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/linkat.html [2] http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=collab-maint/at.git;a=commitdiff;h=f4114656c3a6c6f6070e315ffdf940a49eda3279 This patch is based on the patches in Openwall and grsecurity, along with suggestions from Al Viro. I have added a sysctl to enable the protected behavior, and documentation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-26 08:29:07 +08:00
- protected_hardlinks
- protected_symlinks
- suid_dumpable
- super-max
- super-nr
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:20 +08:00
==============================================================
aio-nr & aio-max-nr:
aio-nr is the running total of the number of events specified on the
io_setup system call for all currently active aio contexts. If aio-nr
reaches aio-max-nr then io_setup will fail with EAGAIN. Note that
raising aio-max-nr does not result in the pre-allocation or re-sizing
of any kernel data structures.
==============================================================
dentry-state:
From linux/fs/dentry.c:
--------------------------------------------------------------
struct {
int nr_dentry;
int nr_unused;
int age_limit; /* age in seconds */
int want_pages; /* pages requested by system */
int dummy[2];
} dentry_stat = {0, 0, 45, 0,};
--------------------------------------------------------------
Dentries are dynamically allocated and deallocated, and
nr_dentry seems to be 0 all the time. Hence it's safe to
assume that only nr_unused, age_limit and want_pages are
used. Nr_unused seems to be exactly what its name says.
Age_limit is the age in seconds after which dcache entries
can be reclaimed when memory is short and want_pages is
nonzero when shrink_dcache_pages() has been called and the
dcache isn't pruned yet.
==============================================================
dquot-max & dquot-nr:
The file dquot-max shows the maximum number of cached disk
quota entries.
The file dquot-nr shows the number of allocated disk quota
entries and the number of free disk quota entries.
If the number of free cached disk quotas is very low and
you have some awesome number of simultaneous system users,
you might want to raise the limit.
==============================================================
file-max & file-nr:
The value in file-max denotes the maximum number of file-
handles that the Linux kernel will allocate. When you get lots
of error messages about running out of file handles, you might
want to increase this limit.
Historically,the kernel was able to allocate file handles
dynamically, but not to free them again. The three values in
file-nr denote the number of allocated file handles, the number
of allocated but unused file handles, and the maximum number of
file handles. Linux 2.6 always reports 0 as the number of free
file handles -- this is not an error, it just means that the
number of allocated file handles exactly matches the number of
used file handles.
Attempts to allocate more file descriptors than file-max are
reported with printk, look for "VFS: file-max limit <number>
reached".
==============================================================
nr_open:
This denotes the maximum number of file-handles a process can
allocate. Default value is 1024*1024 (1048576) which should be
enough for most machines. Actual limit depends on RLIMIT_NOFILE
resource limit.
==============================================================
inode-max, inode-nr & inode-state:
As with file handles, the kernel allocates the inode structures
dynamically, but can't free them yet.
The value in inode-max denotes the maximum number of inode
handlers. This value should be 3-4 times larger than the value
in file-max, since stdin, stdout and network sockets also
need an inode struct to handle them. When you regularly run
out of inodes, you need to increase this value.
The file inode-nr contains the first two items from
inode-state, so we'll skip to that file...
Inode-state contains three actual numbers and four dummies.
The actual numbers are, in order of appearance, nr_inodes,
nr_free_inodes and preshrink.
Nr_inodes stands for the number of inodes the system has
allocated, this can be slightly more than inode-max because
Linux allocates them one pageful at a time.
Nr_free_inodes represents the number of free inodes (?) and
preshrink is nonzero when the nr_inodes > inode-max and the
system needs to prune the inode list instead of allocating
more.
==============================================================
overflowgid & overflowuid:
Some filesystems only support 16-bit UIDs and GIDs, although in Linux
UIDs and GIDs are 32 bits. When one of these filesystems is mounted
with writes enabled, any UID or GID that would exceed 65535 is translated
to a fixed value before being written to disk.
These sysctls allow you to change the value of the fixed UID and GID.
The default is 65534.
==============================================================
fs: add link restrictions This adds symlink and hardlink restrictions to the Linux VFS. Symlinks: A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp The solution is to permit symlinks to only be followed when outside a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner. Some pointers to the history of earlier discussion that I could find: 1996 Aug, Zygo Blaxell http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=87602167419830&w=2 1996 Oct, Andrew Tridgell http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/9610.2/0086.html 1997 Dec, Albert D Cahalan http://lkml.org/lkml/1997/12/16/4 2005 Feb, Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro http://lkml.indiana.edu/hypermail/linux/kernel/0502.0/1896.html 2010 May, Kees Cook https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/30/144 Past objections and rebuttals could be summarized as: - Violates POSIX. - POSIX didn't consider this situation and it's not useful to follow a broken specification at the cost of security. - Might break unknown applications that use this feature. - Applications that break because of the change are easy to spot and fix. Applications that are vulnerable to symlink ToCToU by not having the change aren't. Additionally, no applications have yet been found that rely on this behavior. - Applications should just use mkstemp() or O_CREATE|O_EXCL. - True, but applications are not perfect, and new software is written all the time that makes these mistakes; blocking this flaw at the kernel is a single solution to the entire class of vulnerability. - This should live in the core VFS. - This should live in an LSM. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/5/31/135) - This should live in an LSM. - This should live in the core VFS. (https://lkml.org/lkml/2010/8/2/188) Hardlinks: On systems that have user-writable directories on the same partition as system files, a long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally, an issue exists where users can "pin" a potentially vulnerable setuid/setgid file so that an administrator will not actually upgrade a system fully. The solution is to permit hardlinks to only be created when the user is already the existing file's owner, or if they already have read/write access to the existing file. Many Linux users are surprised when they learn they can link to files they have no access to, so this change appears to follow the doctrine of "least surprise". Additionally, this change does not violate POSIX, which states "the implementation may require that the calling process has permission to access the existing file"[1]. This change is known to break some implementations of the "at" daemon, though the version used by Fedora and Ubuntu has been fixed[2] for a while. Otherwise, the change has been undisruptive while in use in Ubuntu for the last 1.5 years. [1] http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/linkat.html [2] http://anonscm.debian.org/gitweb/?p=collab-maint/at.git;a=commitdiff;h=f4114656c3a6c6f6070e315ffdf940a49eda3279 This patch is based on the patches in Openwall and grsecurity, along with suggestions from Al Viro. I have added a sysctl to enable the protected behavior, and documentation. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2012-07-26 08:29:07 +08:00
protected_hardlinks:
A long-standing class of security issues is the hardlink-based
time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given hardlink (i.e. a
root process follows a hardlink created by another user). Additionally,
on systems without separated partitions, this stops unauthorized users
from "pinning" vulnerable setuid/setgid files against being upgraded by
the administrator, or linking to special files.
When set to "0", hardlink creation behavior is unrestricted.
When set to "1" hardlinks cannot be created by users if they do not
already own the source file, or do not have read/write access to it.
This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity.
==============================================================
protected_symlinks:
A long-standing class of security issues is the symlink-based
time-of-check-time-of-use race, most commonly seen in world-writable
directories like /tmp. The common method of exploitation of this flaw
is to cross privilege boundaries when following a given symlink (i.e. a
root process follows a symlink belonging to another user). For a likely
incomplete list of hundreds of examples across the years, please see:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvekey.cgi?keyword=/tmp
When set to "0", symlink following behavior is unrestricted.
When set to "1" symlinks are permitted to be followed only when outside
a sticky world-writable directory, or when the uid of the symlink and
follower match, or when the directory owner matches the symlink's owner.
This protection is based on the restrictions in Openwall and grsecurity.
==============================================================
suid_dumpable:
This value can be used to query and set the core dump mode for setuid
or otherwise protected/tainted binaries. The modes are
0 - (default) - traditional behaviour. Any process which has changed
fs: make dumpable=2 require fully qualified path When the suid_dumpable sysctl is set to "2", and there is no core dump pipe defined in the core_pattern sysctl, a local user can cause core files to be written to root-writable directories, potentially with user-controlled content. This means an admin can unknowningly reintroduce a variation of CVE-2006-2451, allowing local users to gain root privileges. $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable 2 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern core $ ulimit -c unlimited $ cd / $ ls -l core ls: cannot access core: No such file or directory $ touch core touch: cannot touch `core': Permission denied $ OHAI="evil-string-here" ping localhost >/dev/null 2>&1 & $ pid=$! $ sleep 1 $ kill -SEGV $pid $ ls -l core -rw------- 1 root kees 458752 Jun 21 11:35 core $ sudo strings core | grep evil OHAI=evil-string-here While cron has been fixed to abort reading a file when there is any parse error, there are still other sensitive directories that will read any file present and skip unparsable lines. Instead of introducing a suid_dumpable=3 mode and breaking all users of mode 2, this only disables the unsafe portion of mode 2 (writing to disk via relative path). Most users of mode 2 (e.g. Chrome OS) already use a core dump pipe handler, so this change will not break them. For the situations where a pipe handler is not defined but mode 2 is still active, crash dumps will only be written to fully qualified paths. If a relative path is defined (e.g. the default "core" pattern), dump attempts will trigger a printk yelling about the lack of a fully qualified path. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31 05:39:15 +08:00
privilege levels or is execute only will not be dumped.
1 - (debug) - all processes dump core when possible. The core dump is
owned by the current user and no security is applied. This is
intended for system debugging situations only. Ptrace is unchecked.
fs: make dumpable=2 require fully qualified path When the suid_dumpable sysctl is set to "2", and there is no core dump pipe defined in the core_pattern sysctl, a local user can cause core files to be written to root-writable directories, potentially with user-controlled content. This means an admin can unknowningly reintroduce a variation of CVE-2006-2451, allowing local users to gain root privileges. $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable 2 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern core $ ulimit -c unlimited $ cd / $ ls -l core ls: cannot access core: No such file or directory $ touch core touch: cannot touch `core': Permission denied $ OHAI="evil-string-here" ping localhost >/dev/null 2>&1 & $ pid=$! $ sleep 1 $ kill -SEGV $pid $ ls -l core -rw------- 1 root kees 458752 Jun 21 11:35 core $ sudo strings core | grep evil OHAI=evil-string-here While cron has been fixed to abort reading a file when there is any parse error, there are still other sensitive directories that will read any file present and skip unparsable lines. Instead of introducing a suid_dumpable=3 mode and breaking all users of mode 2, this only disables the unsafe portion of mode 2 (writing to disk via relative path). Most users of mode 2 (e.g. Chrome OS) already use a core dump pipe handler, so this change will not break them. For the situations where a pipe handler is not defined but mode 2 is still active, crash dumps will only be written to fully qualified paths. If a relative path is defined (e.g. the default "core" pattern), dump attempts will trigger a printk yelling about the lack of a fully qualified path. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31 05:39:15 +08:00
This is insecure as it allows regular users to examine the memory
contents of privileged processes.
2 - (suidsafe) - any binary which normally would not be dumped is dumped
fs: make dumpable=2 require fully qualified path When the suid_dumpable sysctl is set to "2", and there is no core dump pipe defined in the core_pattern sysctl, a local user can cause core files to be written to root-writable directories, potentially with user-controlled content. This means an admin can unknowningly reintroduce a variation of CVE-2006-2451, allowing local users to gain root privileges. $ cat /proc/sys/fs/suid_dumpable 2 $ cat /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern core $ ulimit -c unlimited $ cd / $ ls -l core ls: cannot access core: No such file or directory $ touch core touch: cannot touch `core': Permission denied $ OHAI="evil-string-here" ping localhost >/dev/null 2>&1 & $ pid=$! $ sleep 1 $ kill -SEGV $pid $ ls -l core -rw------- 1 root kees 458752 Jun 21 11:35 core $ sudo strings core | grep evil OHAI=evil-string-here While cron has been fixed to abort reading a file when there is any parse error, there are still other sensitive directories that will read any file present and skip unparsable lines. Instead of introducing a suid_dumpable=3 mode and breaking all users of mode 2, this only disables the unsafe portion of mode 2 (writing to disk via relative path). Most users of mode 2 (e.g. Chrome OS) already use a core dump pipe handler, so this change will not break them. For the situations where a pipe handler is not defined but mode 2 is still active, crash dumps will only be written to fully qualified paths. If a relative path is defined (e.g. the default "core" pattern), dump attempts will trigger a printk yelling about the lack of a fully qualified path. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Alan Cox <alan@linux.intel.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2012-07-31 05:39:15 +08:00
anyway, but only if the "core_pattern" kernel sysctl is set to
either a pipe handler or a fully qualified path. (For more details
on this limitation, see CVE-2006-2451.) This mode is appropriate
when administrators are attempting to debug problems in a normal
environment, and either have a core dump pipe handler that knows
to treat privileged core dumps with care, or specific directory
defined for catching core dumps. If a core dump happens without
a pipe handler or fully qualifid path, a message will be emitted
to syslog warning about the lack of a correct setting.
==============================================================
super-max & super-nr:
These numbers control the maximum number of superblocks, and
thus the maximum number of mounted filesystems the kernel
can have. You only need to increase super-max if you need to
mount more filesystems than the current value in super-max
allows you to.
==============================================================
aio-nr & aio-max-nr:
aio-nr shows the current system-wide number of asynchronous io
requests. aio-max-nr allows you to change the maximum value
aio-nr can grow to.
==============================================================
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:20 +08:00
2. /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc
----------------------------------------------------------
Documentation for the files in /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc is
in Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt.
3. /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem
----------------------------------------------------------
The "mqueue" filesystem provides the necessary kernel features to enable the
creation of a user space library that implements the POSIX message queues
API (as noted by the MSG tag in the POSIX 1003.1-2001 version of the System
Interfaces specification.)
The "mqueue" filesystem contains values for determining/setting the amount of
resources used by the file system.
/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/queues_max is a read/write file for setting/getting the
maximum number of message queues allowed on the system.
/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msg_max is a read/write file for setting/getting the
maximum number of messages in a queue value. In fact it is the limiting value
for another (user) limit which is set in mq_open invocation. This attribute of
a queue must be less or equal then msg_max.
/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msgsize_max is a read/write file for setting/getting the
maximum message size value (it is every message queue's attribute set during
its creation).
/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msg_default is a read/write file for setting/getting the
default number of messages in a queue value if attr parameter of mq_open(2) is
NULL. If it exceed msg_max, the default value is initialized msg_max.
/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msgsize_default is a read/write file for setting/getting
the default message size value if attr parameter of mq_open(2) is NULL. If it
exceed msgsize_max, the default value is initialized msgsize_max.
documentation: update Documentation/filesystem/proc.txt and Documentation/sysctls Now /proc/sys is described in many places and much information is redundant. This patch updates the proc.txt and move the /proc/sys desciption out to the files in Documentation/sysctls. Details are: merge - 2.1 /proc/sys/fs - File system data - 2.11 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue - POSIX message queues filesystem - 2.17 /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface with Documentation/sysctls/fs.txt. remove - 2.2 /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc - Miscellaneous binary formats since it's not better then the Documentation/binfmt_misc.txt. merge - 2.3 /proc/sys/kernel - general kernel parameters with Documentation/sysctls/kernel.txt remove - 2.5 /proc/sys/dev - Device specific parameters since it's obsolete the sysfs is used now. remove - 2.6 /proc/sys/sunrpc - Remote procedure calls since it's not better then the Documentation/sysctls/sunrpc.txt move - 2.7 /proc/sys/net - Networking stuff - 2.9 Appletalk - 2.10 IPX to newly created Documentation/sysctls/net.txt. remove - 2.8 /proc/sys/net/ipv4 - IPV4 settings since it's not better then the Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt. add - Chapter 3 Per-Process Parameters to descibe /proc/<pid>/xxx parameters. Signed-off-by: Shen Feng <shen@cn.fujitsu.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2009-04-03 07:57:20 +08:00
4. /proc/sys/fs/epoll - Configuration options for the epoll interface
--------------------------------------------------------
This directory contains configuration options for the epoll(7) interface.
max_user_watches
----------------
Every epoll file descriptor can store a number of files to be monitored
for event readiness. Each one of these monitored files constitutes a "watch".
This configuration option sets the maximum number of "watches" that are
allowed for each user.
Each "watch" costs roughly 90 bytes on a 32bit kernel, and roughly 160 bytes
on a 64bit one.
The current default value for max_user_watches is the 1/32 of the available
low memory, divided for the "watch" cost in bytes.