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linux_old1/include/net/scm.h

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Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
#ifndef __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
#define __LINUX_NET_SCM_H
#include <linux/limits.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
[AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the security context when the receiver requests it. This new design requires modification of the current unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely, secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing the security context because it is up to the security module to decide how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree operation. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-08-03 05:12:06 +08:00
#include <linux/security.h>
pid namespaces: changes to show virtual ids to user This is the largest patch in the set. Make all (I hope) the places where the pid is shown to or get from user operate on the virtual pids. The idea is: - all in-kernel data structures must store either struct pid itself or the pid's global nr, obtained with pid_nr() call; - when seeking the task from kernel code with the stored id one should use find_task_by_pid() call that works with global pids; - when showing pid's numerical value to the user the virtual one should be used, but however when one shows task's pid outside this task's namespace the global one is to be used; - when getting the pid from userspace one need to consider this as the virtual one and use appropriate task/pid-searching functions. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: nuther build fix] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: yet nuther build fix] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded casts] Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 14:40:14 +08:00
#include <linux/pid.h>
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
/* Well, we should have at least one descriptor open
* to accept passed FDs 8)
*/
avoid OPEN_MAX in SCM_MAX_FD The OPEN_MAX constant is an arbitrary number with no useful relation to anything. Nothing should be using it. SCM_MAX_FD is just an arbitrary constant and it should be clear that its value is chosen in net/scm.h and not actually derived from anything else meaningful in the system. Signed-off-by: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-07-17 19:03:48 +08:00
#define SCM_MAX_FD 255
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
struct scm_fp_list
{
int count;
struct file *fp[SCM_MAX_FD];
};
struct scm_cookie
{
struct ucred creds; /* Skb credentials */
struct scm_fp_list *fp; /* Passed files */
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
[AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the security context when the receiver requests it. This new design requires modification of the current unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely, secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing the security context because it is up to the security module to decide how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree operation. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-08-03 05:12:06 +08:00
u32 secid; /* Passed security ID */
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
#endif
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
unsigned long seq; /* Connection seqno */
};
extern void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
extern struct scm_fp_list * scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
[AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the security context when the receiver requests it. This new design requires modification of the current unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely, secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing the security context because it is up to the security module to decide how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree operation. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-08-03 05:12:06 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
security_socket_getpeersec_dgram(sock, NULL, &scm->secid);
}
#else
static __inline__ void unix_get_peersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
static __inline__ void scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
if (scm && scm->fp)
__scm_destroy(scm);
}
static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
[AF_UNIX]: scm: better initialization Instead of doing a memset then initialization of the fields of the scm structure, just initialize all the members explicitly. Prevent reloading of current on x86 and x86-64 by storing the value in a local variable for subsequent dereferences. This is worth a ~7KB/s increase in af_unix bandwidth. Note that we avoid the issues surrounding potentially uninitialized members of the ucred structure by constructing a struct ucred instead of assigning the members individually, which forces the compiler to zero any padding. [ I modified the patch not to use the aggregate assignment since gcc-3.4.x and earlier cannot optimize that properly at all even though gcc-4.0.x and later can -DaveM ] Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <benjamin.c.lahaise@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 13:31:51 +08:00
struct task_struct *p = current;
scm->creds.uid = p->uid;
scm->creds.gid = p->gid;
pid namespaces: changes to show virtual ids to user This is the largest patch in the set. Make all (I hope) the places where the pid is shown to or get from user operate on the virtual pids. The idea is: - all in-kernel data structures must store either struct pid itself or the pid's global nr, obtained with pid_nr() call; - when seeking the task from kernel code with the stored id one should use find_task_by_pid() call that works with global pids; - when showing pid's numerical value to the user the virtual one should be used, but however when one shows task's pid outside this task's namespace the global one is to be used; - when getting the pid from userspace one need to consider this as the virtual one and use appropriate task/pid-searching functions. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fix] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: nuther build fix] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: yet nuther build fix] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: remove unneeded casts] Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org> Cc: Sukadev Bhattiprolu <sukadev@us.ibm.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Cc: Paul Menage <menage@google.com> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2007-10-19 14:40:14 +08:00
scm->creds.pid = task_tgid_vnr(p);
[AF_UNIX]: scm: better initialization Instead of doing a memset then initialization of the fields of the scm structure, just initialize all the members explicitly. Prevent reloading of current on x86 and x86-64 by storing the value in a local variable for subsequent dereferences. This is worth a ~7KB/s increase in af_unix bandwidth. Note that we avoid the issues surrounding potentially uninitialized members of the ucred structure by constructing a struct ucred instead of assigning the members individually, which forces the compiler to zero any padding. [ I modified the patch not to use the aggregate assignment since gcc-3.4.x and earlier cannot optimize that properly at all even though gcc-4.0.x and later can -DaveM ] Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <benjamin.c.lahaise@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-03-21 13:31:51 +08:00
scm->fp = NULL;
scm->seq = 0;
[AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the security context when the receiver requests it. This new design requires modification of the current unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely, secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing the security context because it is up to the security module to decide how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree operation. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-08-03 05:12:06 +08:00
unix_get_peersec_dgram(sock, scm);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
if (msg->msg_controllen <= 0)
return 0;
return __scm_send(sock, msg, scm);
}
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{
[AF_UNIX]: Kernel memory leak fix for af_unix datagram getpeersec patch From: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> This patch implements a cleaner fix for the memory leak problem of the original unix datagram getpeersec patch. Instead of creating a security context each time a unix datagram is sent, we only create the security context when the receiver requests it. This new design requires modification of the current unix_getsecpeer_dgram LSM hook and addition of two new hooks, namely, secid_to_secctx and release_secctx. The former retrieves the security context and the latter releases it. A hook is required for releasing the security context because it is up to the security module to decide how that's done. In the case of Selinux, it's a simple kfree operation. Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-08-03 05:12:06 +08:00
char *secdata;
u32 seclen;
int err;
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSSEC, &sock->flags)) {
err = security_secid_to_secctx(scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen);
if (!err) {
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY, seclen, secdata);
security_release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
}
}
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
}
#else
static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
static __inline__ void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags)
{
if (!msg->msg_control)
{
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags) || scm->fp)
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
scm_destroy(scm);
return;
}
if (test_bit(SOCK_PASSCRED, &sock->flags))
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_CREDENTIALS, sizeof(scm->creds), &scm->creds);
[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet. Patch design and implementation: The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
scm_passec(sock, msg, scm);
Linux-2.6.12-rc2 Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
if (!scm->fp)
return;
scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
}
#endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */