linux_old1/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S

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/*
* Copyright (C) 1991,1992 Linus Torvalds
*
* entry_32.S contains the system-call and low-level fault and trap handling routines.
*
* Stack layout in 'syscall_exit':
* ptrace needs to have all registers on the stack.
* If the order here is changed, it needs to be
* updated in fork.c:copy_process(), signal.c:do_signal(),
* ptrace.c and ptrace.h
*
* 0(%esp) - %ebx
* 4(%esp) - %ecx
* 8(%esp) - %edx
* C(%esp) - %esi
* 10(%esp) - %edi
* 14(%esp) - %ebp
* 18(%esp) - %eax
* 1C(%esp) - %ds
* 20(%esp) - %es
* 24(%esp) - %fs
* 28(%esp) - %gs saved iff !CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
* 2C(%esp) - orig_eax
* 30(%esp) - %eip
* 34(%esp) - %cs
* 38(%esp) - %eflags
* 3C(%esp) - %oldesp
* 40(%esp) - %oldss
*/
#include <linux/linkage.h>
Audit: push audit success and retcode into arch ptrace.h The audit system previously expected arches calling to audit_syscall_exit to supply as arguments if the syscall was a success and what the return code was. Audit also provides a helper AUDITSC_RESULT which was supposed to simplify things by converting from negative retcodes to an audit internal magic value stating success or failure. This helper was wrong and could indicate that a valid pointer returned to userspace was a failed syscall. The fix is to fix the layering foolishness. We now pass audit_syscall_exit a struct pt_reg and it in turns calls back into arch code to collect the return value and to determine if the syscall was a success or failure. We also define a generic is_syscall_success() macro which determines success/failure based on if the value is < -MAX_ERRNO. This works for arches like x86 which do not use a separate mechanism to indicate syscall failure. We make both the is_syscall_success() and regs_return_value() static inlines instead of macros. The reason is because the audit function must take a void* for the regs. (uml calls theirs struct uml_pt_regs instead of just struct pt_regs so audit_syscall_exit can't take a struct pt_regs). Since the audit function takes a void* we need to use static inlines to cast it back to the arch correct structure to dereference it. The other major change is that on some arches, like ia64, MIPS and ppc, we change regs_return_value() to give us the negative value on syscall failure. THE only other user of this macro, kretprobe_example.c, won't notice and it makes the value signed consistently for the audit functions across all archs. In arch/sh/kernel/ptrace_64.c I see that we were using regs[9] in the old audit code as the return value. But the ptrace_64.h code defined the macro regs_return_value() as regs[3]. I have no idea which one is correct, but this patch now uses the regs_return_value() function, so it now uses regs[3]. For powerpc we previously used regs->result but now use the regs_return_value() function which uses regs->gprs[3]. regs->gprs[3] is always positive so the regs_return_value(), much like ia64 makes it negative before calling the audit code when appropriate. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Acked-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> [for x86 portion] Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> [for ia64] Acked-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> [for uml] Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> [for sparc] Acked-by: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org> [for mips] Acked-by: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> [for ppc]
2012-01-04 03:23:06 +08:00
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <asm/thread_info.h>
#include <asm/irqflags.h>
#include <asm/errno.h>
#include <asm/segment.h>
#include <asm/smp.h>
#include <asm/page_types.h>
#include <asm/percpu.h>
#include <asm/processor-flags.h>
#include <asm/ftrace.h>
#include <asm/irq_vectors.h>
#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
#include <asm/alternative-asm.h>
#include <asm/asm.h>
#include <asm/smap.h>
x86: Separate out entry text section Put x86 entry code into a separate link section: .entry.text. Separating the entry text section seems to have performance benefits - caused by more efficient instruction cache usage. Running hackbench with perf stat --repeat showed that the change compresses the icache footprint. The icache load miss rate went down by about 15%: before patch: 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) after patch: 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) The motivation of the patch was to fix a particular kprobes bug that relates to the entry text section, the performance advantage was discovered accidentally. Whole perf output follows: - results for current tip tree: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 19417627 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.147% ) 2676914223 instructions # 0.497 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5389516026 cycles ( +- 0.144% ) 0.206267711 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.138% ) - results for current tip tree with the patch applied: Performance counter stats for './hackbench/hackbench 10' (500 runs): 16490788 L1-icache-load-misses ( +- 0.180% ) 2717734941 instructions # 0.502 IPC ( +- 0.079% ) 5414756975 cycles ( +- 0.148% ) 0.206747566 seconds time elapsed ( +- 0.137% ) Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@kernel.dk> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: masami.hiramatsu.pt@hitachi.com Cc: ananth@in.ibm.com Cc: davem@davemloft.net Cc: 2nddept-manager@sdl.hitachi.co.jp LKML-Reference: <20110307181039.GB15197@jolsa.redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2011-03-08 02:10:39 +08:00
.section .entry.text, "ax"
/*
* We use macros for low-level operations which need to be overridden
* for paravirtualization. The following will never clobber any registers:
* INTERRUPT_RETURN (aka. "iret")
* GET_CR0_INTO_EAX (aka. "movl %cr0, %eax")
* ENABLE_INTERRUPTS_SYSEXIT (aka "sti; sysexit").
*
* For DISABLE_INTERRUPTS/ENABLE_INTERRUPTS (aka "cli"/"sti"), you must
* specify what registers can be overwritten (CLBR_NONE, CLBR_EAX/EDX/ECX/ANY).
* Allowing a register to be clobbered can shrink the paravirt replacement
* enough to patch inline, increasing performance.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT
# define preempt_stop(clobbers) DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(clobbers); TRACE_IRQS_OFF
#else
# define preempt_stop(clobbers)
# define resume_kernel restore_all
#endif
.macro TRACE_IRQS_IRET
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS
testl $X86_EFLAGS_IF, PT_EFLAGS(%esp) # interrupts off?
jz 1f
TRACE_IRQS_ON
1:
#endif
.endm
/*
* User gs save/restore
*
* %gs is used for userland TLS and kernel only uses it for stack
* canary which is required to be at %gs:20 by gcc. Read the comment
* at the top of stackprotector.h for more info.
*
* Local labels 98 and 99 are used.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS
/* unfortunately push/pop can't be no-op */
.macro PUSH_GS
pushl $0
.endm
.macro POP_GS pop=0
addl $(4 + \pop), %esp
.endm
.macro POP_GS_EX
.endm
/* all the rest are no-op */
.macro PTGS_TO_GS
.endm
.macro PTGS_TO_GS_EX
.endm
.macro GS_TO_REG reg
.endm
.macro REG_TO_PTGS reg
.endm
.macro SET_KERNEL_GS reg
.endm
#else /* CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS */
.macro PUSH_GS
pushl %gs
.endm
.macro POP_GS pop=0
98: popl %gs
.if \pop <> 0
add $\pop, %esp
.endif
.endm
.macro POP_GS_EX
.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
99: movl $0, (%esp)
jmp 98b
.popsection
_ASM_EXTABLE(98b, 99b)
.endm
.macro PTGS_TO_GS
98: mov PT_GS(%esp), %gs
.endm
.macro PTGS_TO_GS_EX
.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
99: movl $0, PT_GS(%esp)
jmp 98b
.popsection
_ASM_EXTABLE(98b, 99b)
.endm
.macro GS_TO_REG reg
movl %gs, \reg
.endm
.macro REG_TO_PTGS reg
movl \reg, PT_GS(%esp)
.endm
.macro SET_KERNEL_GS reg
movl $(__KERNEL_STACK_CANARY), \reg
movl \reg, %gs
.endm
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32_LAZY_GS */
.macro SAVE_ALL
cld
PUSH_GS
pushl %fs
pushl %es
pushl %ds
pushl %eax
pushl %ebp
pushl %edi
pushl %esi
pushl %edx
pushl %ecx
pushl %ebx
movl $(__USER_DS), %edx
movl %edx, %ds
movl %edx, %es
movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %edx
movl %edx, %fs
SET_KERNEL_GS %edx
.endm
.macro RESTORE_INT_REGS
popl %ebx
popl %ecx
popl %edx
popl %esi
popl %edi
popl %ebp
popl %eax
.endm
.macro RESTORE_REGS pop=0
RESTORE_INT_REGS
1: popl %ds
2: popl %es
3: popl %fs
POP_GS \pop
.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
4: movl $0, (%esp)
jmp 1b
5: movl $0, (%esp)
jmp 2b
6: movl $0, (%esp)
jmp 3b
.popsection
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 5b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(3b, 6b)
POP_GS_EX
.endm
ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
pushl %eax
call schedule_tail
GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
popl %eax
pushl $0x0202 # Reset kernel eflags
x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotations So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros mixed into some of the most security sensitive code paths of the Linux kernel. These debug info annotations don't even buy the upstream kernel anything: dwarf driven stack unwinding has caused problems in the past so it's out of tree, and the upstream kernel only uses the much more robust framepointers based stack unwinding method. In addition to that there's a steady, slow bitrot going on with these annotations, requiring frequent fixups. There's no tooling and no functionality upstream that keeps it correct. So burn down the sick forest, allowing new, healthier growth: 27 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-) Someone who has the willingness and time to do this properly can attempt to reintroduce dwarf debuginfo in x86 assembly code plus dwarf unwinding from first principles, with the following conditions: - it should be maximally readable, and maximally low-key to 'ordinary' code reading and maintenance. - find a build time method to insert dwarf annotations automatically in the most common cases, for pop/push instructions that manipulate the stack pointer. This could be done for example via a preprocessing step that just looks for common patterns - plus special annotations for the few cases where we want to depart from the default. We have hundreds of CFI annotations, so automating most of that makes sense. - it should come with build tooling checks that ensure that CFI annotations are sensible. We've seen such efforts from the framepointer side, and there's no reason it couldn't be done on the dwarf side. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-28 18:21:47 +08:00
popfl
jmp syscall_exit
END(ret_from_fork)
ENTRY(ret_from_kernel_thread)
pushl %eax
call schedule_tail
GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
popl %eax
pushl $0x0202 # Reset kernel eflags
x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotations So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros mixed into some of the most security sensitive code paths of the Linux kernel. These debug info annotations don't even buy the upstream kernel anything: dwarf driven stack unwinding has caused problems in the past so it's out of tree, and the upstream kernel only uses the much more robust framepointers based stack unwinding method. In addition to that there's a steady, slow bitrot going on with these annotations, requiring frequent fixups. There's no tooling and no functionality upstream that keeps it correct. So burn down the sick forest, allowing new, healthier growth: 27 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-) Someone who has the willingness and time to do this properly can attempt to reintroduce dwarf debuginfo in x86 assembly code plus dwarf unwinding from first principles, with the following conditions: - it should be maximally readable, and maximally low-key to 'ordinary' code reading and maintenance. - find a build time method to insert dwarf annotations automatically in the most common cases, for pop/push instructions that manipulate the stack pointer. This could be done for example via a preprocessing step that just looks for common patterns - plus special annotations for the few cases where we want to depart from the default. We have hundreds of CFI annotations, so automating most of that makes sense. - it should come with build tooling checks that ensure that CFI annotations are sensible. We've seen such efforts from the framepointer side, and there's no reason it couldn't be done on the dwarf side. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-28 18:21:47 +08:00
popfl
movl PT_EBP(%esp), %eax
call *PT_EBX(%esp)
movl $0, PT_EAX(%esp)
jmp syscall_exit
ENDPROC(ret_from_kernel_thread)
/*
* Return to user mode is not as complex as all this looks,
* but we want the default path for a system call return to
* go as quickly as possible which is why some of this is
* less clear than it otherwise should be.
*/
# userspace resumption stub bypassing syscall exit tracing
ALIGN
ret_from_exception:
preempt_stop(CLBR_ANY)
ret_from_intr:
GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
#ifdef CONFIG_VM86
movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %eax # mix EFLAGS and CS
movb PT_CS(%esp), %al
andl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM | SEGMENT_RPL_MASK), %eax
#else
/*
* We can be coming here from child spawned by kernel_thread().
*/
movl PT_CS(%esp), %eax
andl $SEGMENT_RPL_MASK, %eax
#endif
cmpl $USER_RPL, %eax
jb resume_kernel # not returning to v8086 or userspace
ENTRY(resume_userspace)
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
x86: fix lockdep warning during suspend-to-ram Andrew Morton wrote: > I've been seeing the below for a long time during suspend-to-ram on the Vaio. > > > PM: Syncing filesystems ... done. > PM: Preparing system for mem sleep > Freezing user space processes ... <4>------------[ cut here ]------------ > WARNING: at kernel/lockdep.c:2658 check_flags+0x4c/0x127() > Modules linked in: i915 drm ipw2200 sonypi ipv6 autofs4 hidp l2cap bluetooth sunrpc nf_conntrack_netbios_ns ipt_REJECT nf_conntrack_ipv4 xt_state nf_conntrack xt_tcpudp iptable_filter ip_tables x_tables acpi_cpufreq nvram ohci1394 ieee1394 ehci_hcd uhci_hcd sg joydev snd_hda_intel snd_seq_dummy sr_mod snd_seq_oss cdrom snd_seq_midi_event snd_seq snd_seq_device snd_pcm_oss snd_mixer_oss ieee80211 pcspkr ieee80211_crypt snd_pcm i2c_i801 snd_timer i2c_core ide_pci_generic piix snd soundcore snd_page_alloc button ext3 jbd ide_disk ide_core [last unloaded: ipw2200] > Pid: 3250, comm: zsh Not tainted 2.6.26-rc5 #1 > [<c011c5f5>] warn_on_slowpath+0x41/0x6d > [<c01080e6>] ? native_sched_clock+0x82/0x96 > [<c013789c>] ? mark_held_locks+0x41/0x5c > [<c0315688>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x58 > [<c0137a29>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xe6/0x10d > [<c0138637>] ? __lock_acquire+0xae3/0xb2b > [<c0313413>] ? schedule+0x39b/0x3b4 > [<c0135596>] check_flags+0x4c/0x127 > [<c01386b9>] lock_acquire+0x3a/0x86 > [<c0315075>] _spin_lock+0x26/0x53 > [<c0140660>] ? refrigerator+0x13/0xc3 > [<c0140660>] refrigerator+0x13/0xc3 > [<c012684a>] get_signal_to_deliver+0x3c/0x31e > [<c0102fe7>] do_notify_resume+0x91/0x6ee > [<c01359fd>] ? lock_release_holdtime+0x50/0x56 > [<c0315688>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x36/0x58 > [<c0235d24>] ? read_chan+0x0/0x58c > [<c0137a29>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xe6/0x10d > [<c0315694>] ? _spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x42/0x58 > [<c0230afa>] ? tty_ldisc_deref+0x5c/0x63 > [<c0233104>] ? tty_read+0x66/0x98 > [<c014b3f0>] ? audit_syscall_exit+0x2aa/0x2c5 > [<c0109430>] ? do_syscall_trace+0x6b/0x16f > [<c0103a9c>] work_notifysig+0x13/0x1b > ======================= > ---[ end trace 25b49fe59a25afa5 ]--- > possible reason: unannotated irqs-off. > irq event stamp: 58919 > hardirqs last enabled at (58919): [<c0103afd>] syscall_exit_work+0x11/0x26 Joy - I so love entry.S Best I can make of it: syscall_exit_work resume_userspace DISABLE_INTERRUPTS (no TRACE_IRQS_OFF) work_pending work_notifysig do_notify_resume() do_signal() get_signal_to_deliver() try_to_freeze() refrigerator() task_lock() -> check_flags() -> BANG The normal path is: syscall_exit_work resume_userspace DISABLE_INTERRUPTS restore_all TRACE_IRQS_IRET iret No idea why that would not warn.. Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-06-06 16:14:08 +08:00
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax
call prepare_exit_to_usermode
jmp restore_all
END(ret_from_exception)
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT
ENTRY(resume_kernel)
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
need_resched:
cmpl $0, PER_CPU_VAR(__preempt_count)
jnz restore_all
testl $X86_EFLAGS_IF, PT_EFLAGS(%esp) # interrupts off (exception path) ?
jz restore_all
call preempt_schedule_irq
jmp need_resched
END(resume_kernel)
#endif
/*
* SYSENTER_RETURN points to after the SYSENTER instruction
* in the vsyscall page. See vsyscall-sysentry.S, which defines
* the symbol.
*/
# SYSENTER call handler stub
ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32)
movl TSS_sysenter_sp0(%esp), %esp
sysenter_past_esp:
/*
* Interrupts are disabled here, but we can't trace it until
* enough kernel state to call TRACE_IRQS_OFF can be called - but
* we immediately enable interrupts at that point anyway.
*/
pushl $__USER_DS
pushl %ebp
x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotations So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros mixed into some of the most security sensitive code paths of the Linux kernel. These debug info annotations don't even buy the upstream kernel anything: dwarf driven stack unwinding has caused problems in the past so it's out of tree, and the upstream kernel only uses the much more robust framepointers based stack unwinding method. In addition to that there's a steady, slow bitrot going on with these annotations, requiring frequent fixups. There's no tooling and no functionality upstream that keeps it correct. So burn down the sick forest, allowing new, healthier growth: 27 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-) Someone who has the willingness and time to do this properly can attempt to reintroduce dwarf debuginfo in x86 assembly code plus dwarf unwinding from first principles, with the following conditions: - it should be maximally readable, and maximally low-key to 'ordinary' code reading and maintenance. - find a build time method to insert dwarf annotations automatically in the most common cases, for pop/push instructions that manipulate the stack pointer. This could be done for example via a preprocessing step that just looks for common patterns - plus special annotations for the few cases where we want to depart from the default. We have hundreds of CFI annotations, so automating most of that makes sense. - it should come with build tooling checks that ensure that CFI annotations are sensible. We've seen such efforts from the framepointer side, and there's no reason it couldn't be done on the dwarf side. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-28 18:21:47 +08:00
pushfl
orl $X86_EFLAGS_IF, (%esp)
pushl $__USER_CS
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 17:53:50 +08:00
/*
* Push current_thread_info()->sysenter_return to the stack.
* A tiny bit of offset fixup is necessary: TI_sysenter_return
* is relative to thread_info, which is at the bottom of the
* kernel stack page. 4*4 means the 4 words pushed above;
* TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING takes us to the top of the stack;
* and THREAD_SIZE takes us to the bottom.
[PATCH] vdso: randomize the i386 vDSO by moving it into a vma Move the i386 VDSO down into a vma and thus randomize it. Besides the security implications, this feature also helps debuggers, which can COW a vma-backed VDSO just like a normal DSO and can thus do single-stepping and other debugging features. It's good for hypervisors (Xen, VMWare) too, which typically live in the same high-mapped address space as the VDSO, hence whenever the VDSO is used, they get lots of guest pagefaults and have to fix such guest accesses up - which slows things down instead of speeding things up (the primary purpose of the VDSO). There's a new CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO (default=y) option, which provides support for older glibcs that still rely on a prelinked high-mapped VDSO. Newer distributions (using glibc 2.3.3 or later) can turn this option off. Turning it off is also recommended for security reasons: attackers cannot use the predictable high-mapped VDSO page as syscall trampoline anymore. There is a new vdso=[0|1] boot option as well, and a runtime /proc/sys/vm/vdso_enabled sysctl switch, that allows the VDSO to be turned on/off. (This version of the VDSO-randomization patch also has working ELF coredumping, the previous patch crashed in the coredumping code.) This code is a combined work of the exec-shield VDSO randomization code and Gerd Hoffmann's hypervisor-centric VDSO patch. Rusty Russell started this patch and i completed it. [akpm@osdl.org: cleanups] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 2] [akpm@osdl.org: compile fix 3] [akpm@osdl.org: revernt MAXMEM change] Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@suse.de> Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au> Cc: Zachary Amsden <zach@vmware.com> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@muc.de> Cc: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@novell.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
2006-06-27 17:53:50 +08:00
*/
pushl ((TI_sysenter_return) - THREAD_SIZE + TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING + 4*4)(%esp)
pushl %eax
SAVE_ALL
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_NONE)
/*
* Load the potential sixth argument from user stack.
* Careful about security.
*/
cmpl $__PAGE_OFFSET-3, %ebp
jae syscall_fault
ASM_STAC
1: movl (%ebp), %ebp
ASM_CLAC
movl %ebp, PT_EBP(%esp)
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, syscall_fault)
GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY, TI_flags(%ebp)
jnz syscall_trace_entry
sysenter_do_call:
cmpl $(NR_syscalls), %eax
jae sysenter_badsys
call *sys_call_table(, %eax, 4)
sysenter_after_call:
movl %eax, PT_EAX(%esp)
LOCKDEP_SYS_EXIT
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl TI_flags(%ebp), %ecx
testl $_TIF_ALLWORK_MASK, %ecx
jnz syscall_exit_work_irqs_off
sysenter_exit:
/* if something modifies registers it must also disable sysexit */
movl PT_EIP(%esp), %edx
movl PT_OLDESP(%esp), %ecx
xorl %ebp, %ebp
TRACE_IRQS_ON
1: mov PT_FS(%esp), %fs
PTGS_TO_GS
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS_SYSEXIT
.pushsection .fixup, "ax"
2: movl $0, PT_FS(%esp)
jmp 1b
.popsection
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 2b)
PTGS_TO_GS_EX
ENDPROC(entry_SYSENTER_32)
# system call handler stub
ENTRY(entry_INT80_32)
ASM_CLAC
pushl %eax # save orig_eax
SAVE_ALL
GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
# system call tracing in operation / emulation
testl $_TIF_WORK_SYSCALL_ENTRY, TI_flags(%ebp)
jnz syscall_trace_entry
cmpl $(NR_syscalls), %eax
jae syscall_badsys
syscall_call:
call *sys_call_table(, %eax, 4)
x86_32, entry: Store badsys error code in %eax Commit 554086d ("x86_32, entry: Do syscall exit work on badsys (CVE-2014-4508)") introduced a regression in the x86_32 syscall entry code, resulting in syscall() not returning proper errors for undefined syscalls on CPUs supporting the sysenter feature. The following code: > int result = syscall(666); > printf("result=%d errno=%d error=%s\n", result, errno, strerror(errno)); results in: > result=666 errno=0 error=Success Obviously, the syscall return value is the called syscall number, but it should have been an ENOSYS error. When run under ptrace it behaves correctly, which makes it hard to debug in the wild: > result=-1 errno=38 error=Function not implemented The %eax register is the return value register. For debugging via ptrace the syscall entry code stores the complete register context on the stack. The badsys handlers only store the ENOSYS error code in the ptrace register set and do not set %eax like a regular syscall handler would. The old resume_userspace call chain contains code that clobbers %eax and it restores %eax from the ptrace registers afterwards. The same goes for the ptrace-enabled call chain. When ptrace is not used, the syscall return value is the passed-in syscall number from the untouched %eax register. Use %eax as the return value register in syscall_badsys and sysenter_badsys, like a real syscall handler does, and have the caller push the value onto the stack for ptrace access. Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LNX.2.11.1407221022380.31021@titan.int.lan.stealer.net Reviewed-and-tested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # If 554086d is backported Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2014-07-22 16:26:06 +08:00
syscall_after_call:
movl %eax, PT_EAX(%esp) # store the return value
syscall_exit:
jmp syscall_exit_work
restore_all:
i386: fix return to 16-bit stack from NMI handler Returning to a task with a 16-bit stack requires special care: the iret instruction does not restore the high word of esp in that case. The espfix code fixes this, but currently is not invoked on NMIs. This means that a running task gets the upper word of esp clobbered due intervening NMIs. To reproduce, compile and run the following program with the nmi watchdog enabled (nmi_watchdog=2 on the command line). Using gdb you can see that the high bits of esp contain garbage, while the low bits are still correct. This patch puts the espfix code back into the NMI code path. The patch is slightly complicated due to the irqtrace infrastructure not being NMI-safe. The NMI return path cannot call TRACE_IRQS_IRET. Otherwise, the tail of the normal iret-code is correct for the nmi code path too. To be able to share this code-path, the TRACE_IRQS_IRET was move up a bit. The espfix code exists after the TRACE_IRQS_IRET, but this code explicitly disables interrupts. This short interrupts-off section is now not traced anymore. The return-to-kernel path now always includes the preliminary test to decide if the espfix code should be called. This is never the case, but doing it this way keeps the patch as simple as possible and the few extra instructions should not affect timing in any significant way. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <asm/ldt.h> int modify_ldt(int func, void *ptr, unsigned long bytecount) { return syscall(SYS_modify_ldt, func, ptr, bytecount); } /* this is assumed to be usable */ #define SEGBASEADDR 0x10000 #define SEGLIMIT 0x20000 /* 16-bit segment */ struct user_desc desc = { .entry_number = 0, .base_addr = SEGBASEADDR, .limit = SEGLIMIT, .seg_32bit = 0, .contents = 0, /* ??? */ .read_exec_only = 0, .limit_in_pages = 0, .seg_not_present = 0, .useable = 1 }; int main(void) { setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); /* map a 64 kb segment */ char *pointer = mmap((void *)SEGBASEADDR, SEGLIMIT+1, PROT_EXEC|PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (pointer == NULL) { printf("could not map space\n"); return 0; } /* write ldt, new mode */ int err = modify_ldt(0x11, &desc, sizeof(desc)); if (err) { printf("error modifying ldt: %i\n", err); return 0; } for (int i=0; i<1000; i++) { asm volatile ( "pusha\n\t" "mov %ss, %eax\n\t" /* preserve ss:esp */ "mov %esp, %ebp\n\t" "push $7\n\t" /* index 0, ldt, user mode */ "push $65536-4096\n\t" /* esp */ "lss (%esp), %esp\n\t" /* switch to new stack */ "push %eax\n\t" /* save old ss:esp on new stack */ "push %ebp\n\t" "add $17*65536, %esp\n\t" /* set high bits */ "mov %esp, %edx\n\t" "mov $10000000, %ecx\n\t" /* wait... */ "1: loop 1b\n\t" /* ... a bit */ "cmp %esp, %edx\n\t" "je 1f\n\t" "ud2\n\t" /* esp changed inexplicably! */ "1:\n\t" "sub $17*65536, %esp\n\t" /* restore high bits */ "lss (%esp), %esp\n\t" /* restore old ss:esp */ "popa\n\t"); printf("\rx%ix", i); } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Acked-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@aknet.ru> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-06-18 06:35:57 +08:00
TRACE_IRQS_IRET
restore_all_notrace:
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
movl PT_EFLAGS(%esp), %eax # mix EFLAGS, SS and CS
/*
* Warning: PT_OLDSS(%esp) contains the wrong/random values if we
* are returning to the kernel.
* See comments in process.c:copy_thread() for details.
*/
movb PT_OLDSS(%esp), %ah
movb PT_CS(%esp), %al
andl $(X86_EFLAGS_VM | (SEGMENT_TI_MASK << 8) | SEGMENT_RPL_MASK), %eax
cmpl $((SEGMENT_LDT << 8) | USER_RPL), %eax
je ldt_ss # returning to user-space with LDT SS
#endif
restore_nocheck:
RESTORE_REGS 4 # skip orig_eax/error_code
irq_return:
INTERRUPT_RETURN
.section .fixup, "ax"
ENTRY(iret_exc )
pushl $0 # no error code
pushl $do_iret_error
jmp error_code
.previous
_ASM_EXTABLE(irq_return, iret_exc)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
ldt_ss:
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
/*
* The kernel can't run on a non-flat stack if paravirt mode
* is active. Rather than try to fixup the high bits of
* ESP, bypass this code entirely. This may break DOSemu
* and/or Wine support in a paravirt VM, although the option
* is still available to implement the setting of the high
* 16-bits in the INTERRUPT_RETURN paravirt-op.
*/
cmpl $0, pv_info+PARAVIRT_enabled
jne restore_nocheck
#endif
i386: fix/simplify espfix stack switching, move it into assembly The espfix code triggers if we have a protected mode userspace application with a 16-bit stack. On returning to userspace, with iret, the CPU doesn't restore the high word of the stack pointer. This is an "official" bug, and the work-around used in the kernel is to temporarily switch to a 32-bit stack segment/pointer pair where the high word of the pointer is equal to the high word of the userspace stackpointer. The current implementation uses THREAD_SIZE to determine the cut-off, but there is no good reason not to use the more natural 64kb... However, implementing this by simply substituting THREAD_SIZE with 65536 in patch_espfix_desc crashed the test application. patch_espfix_desc tries to do what is described above, but gets it subtly wrong if the userspace stack pointer is just below a multiple of THREAD_SIZE: an overflow occurs to bit 13... With a bit of luck, when the kernelspace stackpointer is just below a 64kb-boundary, the overflow then ripples trough to bit 16 and userspace will see its stack pointer changed by 65536. This patch moves all espfix code into entry_32.S. Selecting a 16-bit cut-off simplifies the code. The game with changing the limit dynamically is removed too. It complicates matters and I see no value in it. Changing only the top 16-bit word of ESP is one instruction and it also implies that only two bytes of the ESPFIX GDT entry need to be changed and this can be implemented in just a handful simple to understand instructions. As a side effect, the operation to compute the original ESP from the ESPFIX ESP and the GDT entry simplifies a bit too, and the remaining three instructions have been expanded inline in entry_32.S. impact: can now reliably run userspace with ESP=xxxxfffc on 16-bit stack segment Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Acked-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@aknet.ru> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-06-18 06:35:58 +08:00
/*
* Setup and switch to ESPFIX stack
*
* We're returning to userspace with a 16 bit stack. The CPU will not
* restore the high word of ESP for us on executing iret... This is an
* "official" bug of all the x86-compatible CPUs, which we can work
* around to make dosemu and wine happy. We do this by preloading the
* high word of ESP with the high word of the userspace ESP while
* compensating for the offset by changing to the ESPFIX segment with
* a base address that matches for the difference.
*/
#define GDT_ESPFIX_SS PER_CPU_VAR(gdt_page) + (GDT_ENTRY_ESPFIX_SS * 8)
mov %esp, %edx /* load kernel esp */
mov PT_OLDESP(%esp), %eax /* load userspace esp */
mov %dx, %ax /* eax: new kernel esp */
sub %eax, %edx /* offset (low word is 0) */
shr $16, %edx
mov %dl, GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 4 /* bits 16..23 */
mov %dh, GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 7 /* bits 24..31 */
pushl $__ESPFIX_SS
pushl %eax /* new kernel esp */
/*
* Disable interrupts, but do not irqtrace this section: we
i386: fix return to 16-bit stack from NMI handler Returning to a task with a 16-bit stack requires special care: the iret instruction does not restore the high word of esp in that case. The espfix code fixes this, but currently is not invoked on NMIs. This means that a running task gets the upper word of esp clobbered due intervening NMIs. To reproduce, compile and run the following program with the nmi watchdog enabled (nmi_watchdog=2 on the command line). Using gdb you can see that the high bits of esp contain garbage, while the low bits are still correct. This patch puts the espfix code back into the NMI code path. The patch is slightly complicated due to the irqtrace infrastructure not being NMI-safe. The NMI return path cannot call TRACE_IRQS_IRET. Otherwise, the tail of the normal iret-code is correct for the nmi code path too. To be able to share this code-path, the TRACE_IRQS_IRET was move up a bit. The espfix code exists after the TRACE_IRQS_IRET, but this code explicitly disables interrupts. This short interrupts-off section is now not traced anymore. The return-to-kernel path now always includes the preliminary test to decide if the espfix code should be called. This is never the case, but doing it this way keeps the patch as simple as possible and the few extra instructions should not affect timing in any significant way. #define _GNU_SOURCE #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/types.h> #include <sys/mman.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h> #include <asm/ldt.h> int modify_ldt(int func, void *ptr, unsigned long bytecount) { return syscall(SYS_modify_ldt, func, ptr, bytecount); } /* this is assumed to be usable */ #define SEGBASEADDR 0x10000 #define SEGLIMIT 0x20000 /* 16-bit segment */ struct user_desc desc = { .entry_number = 0, .base_addr = SEGBASEADDR, .limit = SEGLIMIT, .seg_32bit = 0, .contents = 0, /* ??? */ .read_exec_only = 0, .limit_in_pages = 0, .seg_not_present = 0, .useable = 1 }; int main(void) { setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); /* map a 64 kb segment */ char *pointer = mmap((void *)SEGBASEADDR, SEGLIMIT+1, PROT_EXEC|PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); if (pointer == NULL) { printf("could not map space\n"); return 0; } /* write ldt, new mode */ int err = modify_ldt(0x11, &desc, sizeof(desc)); if (err) { printf("error modifying ldt: %i\n", err); return 0; } for (int i=0; i<1000; i++) { asm volatile ( "pusha\n\t" "mov %ss, %eax\n\t" /* preserve ss:esp */ "mov %esp, %ebp\n\t" "push $7\n\t" /* index 0, ldt, user mode */ "push $65536-4096\n\t" /* esp */ "lss (%esp), %esp\n\t" /* switch to new stack */ "push %eax\n\t" /* save old ss:esp on new stack */ "push %ebp\n\t" "add $17*65536, %esp\n\t" /* set high bits */ "mov %esp, %edx\n\t" "mov $10000000, %ecx\n\t" /* wait... */ "1: loop 1b\n\t" /* ... a bit */ "cmp %esp, %edx\n\t" "je 1f\n\t" "ud2\n\t" /* esp changed inexplicably! */ "1:\n\t" "sub $17*65536, %esp\n\t" /* restore high bits */ "lss (%esp), %esp\n\t" /* restore old ss:esp */ "popa\n\t"); printf("\rx%ix", i); } return 0; } Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Acked-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@aknet.ru> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-06-18 06:35:57 +08:00
* will soon execute iret and the tracer was already set to
* the irqstate after the IRET:
*/
DISABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_EAX)
lss (%esp), %esp /* switch to espfix segment */
jmp restore_nocheck
#endif
ENDPROC(entry_INT80_32)
# perform syscall exit tracing
ALIGN
syscall_trace_entry:
movl $-ENOSYS, PT_EAX(%esp)
movl %esp, %eax
call syscall_trace_enter
/* What it returned is what we'll actually use. */
cmpl $(NR_syscalls), %eax
jnae syscall_call
jmp syscall_exit
END(syscall_trace_entry)
# perform syscall exit tracing
ALIGN
syscall_exit_work_irqs_off:
TRACE_IRQS_ON
ENABLE_INTERRUPTS(CLBR_ANY)
syscall_exit_work:
movl %esp, %eax
call syscall_return_slowpath
jmp restore_all
END(syscall_exit_work)
syscall_fault:
ASM_CLAC
GET_THREAD_INFO(%ebp)
movl $-EFAULT, PT_EAX(%esp)
jmp resume_userspace
END(syscall_fault)
syscall_badsys:
movl $-ENOSYS, %eax
jmp syscall_after_call
END(syscall_badsys)
sysenter_badsys:
movl $-ENOSYS, %eax
jmp sysenter_after_call
END(sysenter_badsys)
.macro FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK
i386: fix/simplify espfix stack switching, move it into assembly The espfix code triggers if we have a protected mode userspace application with a 16-bit stack. On returning to userspace, with iret, the CPU doesn't restore the high word of the stack pointer. This is an "official" bug, and the work-around used in the kernel is to temporarily switch to a 32-bit stack segment/pointer pair where the high word of the pointer is equal to the high word of the userspace stackpointer. The current implementation uses THREAD_SIZE to determine the cut-off, but there is no good reason not to use the more natural 64kb... However, implementing this by simply substituting THREAD_SIZE with 65536 in patch_espfix_desc crashed the test application. patch_espfix_desc tries to do what is described above, but gets it subtly wrong if the userspace stack pointer is just below a multiple of THREAD_SIZE: an overflow occurs to bit 13... With a bit of luck, when the kernelspace stackpointer is just below a 64kb-boundary, the overflow then ripples trough to bit 16 and userspace will see its stack pointer changed by 65536. This patch moves all espfix code into entry_32.S. Selecting a 16-bit cut-off simplifies the code. The game with changing the limit dynamically is removed too. It complicates matters and I see no value in it. Changing only the top 16-bit word of ESP is one instruction and it also implies that only two bytes of the ESPFIX GDT entry need to be changed and this can be implemented in just a handful simple to understand instructions. As a side effect, the operation to compute the original ESP from the ESPFIX ESP and the GDT entry simplifies a bit too, and the remaining three instructions have been expanded inline in entry_32.S. impact: can now reliably run userspace with ESP=xxxxfffc on 16-bit stack segment Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Acked-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@aknet.ru> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-06-18 06:35:58 +08:00
/*
* Switch back for ESPFIX stack to the normal zerobased stack
*
* We can't call C functions using the ESPFIX stack. This code reads
* the high word of the segment base from the GDT and swiches to the
* normal stack and adjusts ESP with the matching offset.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
i386: fix/simplify espfix stack switching, move it into assembly The espfix code triggers if we have a protected mode userspace application with a 16-bit stack. On returning to userspace, with iret, the CPU doesn't restore the high word of the stack pointer. This is an "official" bug, and the work-around used in the kernel is to temporarily switch to a 32-bit stack segment/pointer pair where the high word of the pointer is equal to the high word of the userspace stackpointer. The current implementation uses THREAD_SIZE to determine the cut-off, but there is no good reason not to use the more natural 64kb... However, implementing this by simply substituting THREAD_SIZE with 65536 in patch_espfix_desc crashed the test application. patch_espfix_desc tries to do what is described above, but gets it subtly wrong if the userspace stack pointer is just below a multiple of THREAD_SIZE: an overflow occurs to bit 13... With a bit of luck, when the kernelspace stackpointer is just below a 64kb-boundary, the overflow then ripples trough to bit 16 and userspace will see its stack pointer changed by 65536. This patch moves all espfix code into entry_32.S. Selecting a 16-bit cut-off simplifies the code. The game with changing the limit dynamically is removed too. It complicates matters and I see no value in it. Changing only the top 16-bit word of ESP is one instruction and it also implies that only two bytes of the ESPFIX GDT entry need to be changed and this can be implemented in just a handful simple to understand instructions. As a side effect, the operation to compute the original ESP from the ESPFIX ESP and the GDT entry simplifies a bit too, and the remaining three instructions have been expanded inline in entry_32.S. impact: can now reliably run userspace with ESP=xxxxfffc on 16-bit stack segment Signed-off-by: Alexander van Heukelum <heukelum@fastmail.fm> Acked-by: Stas Sergeev <stsp@aknet.ru> Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
2009-06-18 06:35:58 +08:00
/* fixup the stack */
mov GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 4, %al /* bits 16..23 */
mov GDT_ESPFIX_SS + 7, %ah /* bits 24..31 */
shl $16, %eax
addl %esp, %eax /* the adjusted stack pointer */
pushl $__KERNEL_DS
pushl %eax
lss (%esp), %esp /* switch to the normal stack segment */
#endif
.endm
.macro UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
movl %ss, %eax
/* see if on espfix stack */
cmpw $__ESPFIX_SS, %ax
jne 27f
movl $__KERNEL_DS, %eax
movl %eax, %ds
movl %eax, %es
/* switch to normal stack */
FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK
27:
#endif
.endm
/*
x86/asm/entry/irq: Simplify interrupt dispatch table (IDT) layout Interrupt entry points are handled with the following code, each 32-byte code block contains seven entry points: ... [push][jump 22] // 4 bytes [push][jump 18] // 4 bytes [push][jump 14] // 4 bytes [push][jump 10] // 4 bytes [push][jump 6] // 4 bytes [push][jump 2] // 4 bytes [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] // 8 bytes [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] [padding_2] common_interrupt: And there is a table which holds pointers to every entry point, IOW: to every push. In cold cache, two jumps are still costlier than one, even though we get the benefit of them residing in the same cacheline. This change replaces short jumps with near ones to 'common_interrupt', and pads every push+jump pair to 8 bytes. This way, each interrupt takes only one jump. This change replaces ".p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT" before dispatch table with ".align 8" - we do not need anything stronger than that. The table of entry addresses (the interrupt[] array) is no longer necessary, the address of entries can be easily calculated as (irq_entries_start + i*8). text data bss dec hex filename 12546 0 0 12546 3102 entry_64.o.before 11626 0 0 11626 2d6a entry_64.o The size decrease is because 1656 bytes of .init.rodata are gone. That's initdata, though. The resident size does go up a bit. Run-tested (32 and 64 bits). Acked-and-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1428090553-7283-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-04-04 03:49:13 +08:00
* Build the entry stubs with some assembler magic.
* We pack 1 stub into every 8-byte block.
*/
x86/asm/entry/irq: Simplify interrupt dispatch table (IDT) layout Interrupt entry points are handled with the following code, each 32-byte code block contains seven entry points: ... [push][jump 22] // 4 bytes [push][jump 18] // 4 bytes [push][jump 14] // 4 bytes [push][jump 10] // 4 bytes [push][jump 6] // 4 bytes [push][jump 2] // 4 bytes [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] // 8 bytes [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] [padding_2] common_interrupt: And there is a table which holds pointers to every entry point, IOW: to every push. In cold cache, two jumps are still costlier than one, even though we get the benefit of them residing in the same cacheline. This change replaces short jumps with near ones to 'common_interrupt', and pads every push+jump pair to 8 bytes. This way, each interrupt takes only one jump. This change replaces ".p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT" before dispatch table with ".align 8" - we do not need anything stronger than that. The table of entry addresses (the interrupt[] array) is no longer necessary, the address of entries can be easily calculated as (irq_entries_start + i*8). text data bss dec hex filename 12546 0 0 12546 3102 entry_64.o.before 11626 0 0 11626 2d6a entry_64.o The size decrease is because 1656 bytes of .init.rodata are gone. That's initdata, though. The resident size does go up a bit. Run-tested (32 and 64 bits). Acked-and-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1428090553-7283-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-04-04 03:49:13 +08:00
.align 8
ENTRY(irq_entries_start)
x86/asm/entry/irq: Simplify interrupt dispatch table (IDT) layout Interrupt entry points are handled with the following code, each 32-byte code block contains seven entry points: ... [push][jump 22] // 4 bytes [push][jump 18] // 4 bytes [push][jump 14] // 4 bytes [push][jump 10] // 4 bytes [push][jump 6] // 4 bytes [push][jump 2] // 4 bytes [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] // 8 bytes [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] [padding_2] common_interrupt: And there is a table which holds pointers to every entry point, IOW: to every push. In cold cache, two jumps are still costlier than one, even though we get the benefit of them residing in the same cacheline. This change replaces short jumps with near ones to 'common_interrupt', and pads every push+jump pair to 8 bytes. This way, each interrupt takes only one jump. This change replaces ".p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT" before dispatch table with ".align 8" - we do not need anything stronger than that. The table of entry addresses (the interrupt[] array) is no longer necessary, the address of entries can be easily calculated as (irq_entries_start + i*8). text data bss dec hex filename 12546 0 0 12546 3102 entry_64.o.before 11626 0 0 11626 2d6a entry_64.o The size decrease is because 1656 bytes of .init.rodata are gone. That's initdata, though. The resident size does go up a bit. Run-tested (32 and 64 bits). Acked-and-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1428090553-7283-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-04-04 03:49:13 +08:00
vector=FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR
.rept (FIRST_SYSTEM_VECTOR - FIRST_EXTERNAL_VECTOR)
pushl $(~vector+0x80) /* Note: always in signed byte range */
x86/asm/entry/irq: Simplify interrupt dispatch table (IDT) layout Interrupt entry points are handled with the following code, each 32-byte code block contains seven entry points: ... [push][jump 22] // 4 bytes [push][jump 18] // 4 bytes [push][jump 14] // 4 bytes [push][jump 10] // 4 bytes [push][jump 6] // 4 bytes [push][jump 2] // 4 bytes [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] // 8 bytes [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump] [push][jump common_interrupt][padding] [padding_2] common_interrupt: And there is a table which holds pointers to every entry point, IOW: to every push. In cold cache, two jumps are still costlier than one, even though we get the benefit of them residing in the same cacheline. This change replaces short jumps with near ones to 'common_interrupt', and pads every push+jump pair to 8 bytes. This way, each interrupt takes only one jump. This change replaces ".p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT" before dispatch table with ".align 8" - we do not need anything stronger than that. The table of entry addresses (the interrupt[] array) is no longer necessary, the address of entries can be easily calculated as (irq_entries_start + i*8). text data bss dec hex filename 12546 0 0 12546 3102 entry_64.o.before 11626 0 0 11626 2d6a entry_64.o The size decrease is because 1656 bytes of .init.rodata are gone. That's initdata, though. The resident size does go up a bit. Run-tested (32 and 64 bits). Acked-and-Tested-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> Signed-off-by: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@plumgrid.com> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> Cc: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1428090553-7283-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.com Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-04-04 03:49:13 +08:00
vector=vector+1
jmp common_interrupt
.align 8
.endr
END(irq_entries_start)
/*
* the CPU automatically disables interrupts when executing an IRQ vector,
* so IRQ-flags tracing has to follow that:
*/
.p2align CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT
common_interrupt:
ASM_CLAC
addl $-0x80, (%esp) /* Adjust vector into the [-256, -1] range */
SAVE_ALL
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax
call do_IRQ
jmp ret_from_intr
ENDPROC(common_interrupt)
#define BUILD_INTERRUPT3(name, nr, fn) \
ENTRY(name) \
ASM_CLAC; \
pushl $~(nr); \
SAVE_ALL; \
TRACE_IRQS_OFF \
movl %esp, %eax; \
call fn; \
jmp ret_from_intr; \
ENDPROC(name)
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints [Purpose of this patch] As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors are useful. http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html <snip> The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently running processes. There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space, which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events. The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state. <snip> On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and getting a value of instruction pointer. I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before. But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap. So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now. [Patch Description] Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events. But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events. In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events. So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit. so that we can enable them independently. - local_timer_vector - reschedule_vector - call_function_vector - call_function_single_vector - irq_work_entry_vector - error_apic_vector - thermal_apic_vector - threshold_apic_vector - spurious_apic_vector - x86_platform_ipi_vector Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows. - Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq(). - Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to _set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table. - Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers. - Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt(). This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons. - Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled. - On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging is disabled. In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being used for other purposes. Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 23:46:53 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
# define TRACE_BUILD_INTERRUPT(name, nr) BUILD_INTERRUPT3(trace_##name, nr, smp_trace_##name)
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints [Purpose of this patch] As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors are useful. http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html <snip> The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently running processes. There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space, which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events. The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state. <snip> On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and getting a value of instruction pointer. I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before. But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap. So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now. [Patch Description] Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events. But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events. In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events. So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit. so that we can enable them independently. - local_timer_vector - reschedule_vector - call_function_vector - call_function_single_vector - irq_work_entry_vector - error_apic_vector - thermal_apic_vector - threshold_apic_vector - spurious_apic_vector - x86_platform_ipi_vector Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows. - Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq(). - Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to _set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table. - Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers. - Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt(). This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons. - Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled. - On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging is disabled. In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being used for other purposes. Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 23:46:53 +08:00
#else
# define TRACE_BUILD_INTERRUPT(name, nr)
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints [Purpose of this patch] As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors are useful. http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html <snip> The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently running processes. There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space, which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events. The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state. <snip> On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and getting a value of instruction pointer. I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before. But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap. So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now. [Patch Description] Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events. But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events. In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events. So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit. so that we can enable them independently. - local_timer_vector - reschedule_vector - call_function_vector - call_function_single_vector - irq_work_entry_vector - error_apic_vector - thermal_apic_vector - threshold_apic_vector - spurious_apic_vector - x86_platform_ipi_vector Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows. - Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq(). - Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to _set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table. - Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers. - Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt(). This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons. - Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled. - On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging is disabled. In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being used for other purposes. Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 23:46:53 +08:00
#endif
#define BUILD_INTERRUPT(name, nr) \
BUILD_INTERRUPT3(name, nr, smp_##name); \
x86, trace: Add irq vector tracepoints [Purpose of this patch] As Vaibhav explained in the thread below, tracepoints for irq vectors are useful. http://www.spinics.net/lists/mm-commits/msg85707.html <snip> The current interrupt traces from irq_handler_entry and irq_handler_exit provide when an interrupt is handled. They provide good data about when the system has switched to kernel space and how it affects the currently running processes. There are some IRQ vectors which trigger the system into kernel space, which are not handled in generic IRQ handlers. Tracing such events gives us the information about IRQ interaction with other system events. The trace also tells where the system is spending its time. We want to know which cores are handling interrupts and how they are affecting other processes in the system. Also, the trace provides information about when the cores are idle and which interrupts are changing that state. <snip> On the other hand, my usecase is tracing just local timer event and getting a value of instruction pointer. I suggested to add an argument local timer event to get instruction pointer before. But there is another way to get it with external module like systemtap. So, I don't need to add any argument to irq vector tracepoints now. [Patch Description] Vaibhav's patch shared a trace point ,irq_vector_entry/irq_vector_exit, in all events. But there is an above use case to trace specific irq_vector rather than tracing all events. In this case, we are concerned about overhead due to unwanted events. So, add following tracepoints instead of introducing irq_vector_entry/exit. so that we can enable them independently. - local_timer_vector - reschedule_vector - call_function_vector - call_function_single_vector - irq_work_entry_vector - error_apic_vector - thermal_apic_vector - threshold_apic_vector - spurious_apic_vector - x86_platform_ipi_vector Also, introduce a logic switching IDT at enabling/disabling time so that a time penalty makes a zero when tracepoints are disabled. Detailed explanations are as follows. - Create trace irq handlers with entering_irq()/exiting_irq(). - Create a new IDT, trace_idt_table, at boot time by adding a logic to _set_gate(). It is just a copy of original idt table. - Register the new handlers for tracpoints to the new IDT by introducing macros to alloc_intr_gate() called at registering time of irq_vector handlers. - Add checking, whether irq vector tracing is on/off, into load_current_idt(). This has to be done below debug checking for these reasons. - Switching to debug IDT may be kicked while tracing is enabled. - On the other hands, switching to trace IDT is kicked only when debugging is disabled. In addition, the new IDT is created only when CONFIG_TRACING is enabled to avoid being used for other purposes. Signed-off-by: Seiji Aguchi <seiji.aguchi@hds.com> Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/51C323ED.5050708@hds.com Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com> Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
2013-06-20 23:46:53 +08:00
TRACE_BUILD_INTERRUPT(name, nr)
/* The include is where all of the SMP etc. interrupts come from */
#include <asm/entry_arch.h>
ENTRY(coprocessor_error)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_coprocessor_error
jmp error_code
END(coprocessor_error)
ENTRY(simd_coprocessor_error)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INVD_BUG
/* AMD 486 bug: invd from userspace calls exception 19 instead of #GP */
ALTERNATIVE "pushl $do_general_protection", \
"pushl $do_simd_coprocessor_error", \
X86_FEATURE_XMM
#else
pushl $do_simd_coprocessor_error
#endif
jmp error_code
END(simd_coprocessor_error)
ENTRY(device_not_available)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $-1 # mark this as an int
pushl $do_device_not_available
jmp error_code
END(device_not_available)
#ifdef CONFIG_PARAVIRT
ENTRY(native_iret)
iret
_ASM_EXTABLE(native_iret, iret_exc)
END(native_iret)
ENTRY(native_irq_enable_sysexit)
sti
sysexit
END(native_irq_enable_sysexit)
#endif
ENTRY(overflow)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_overflow
jmp error_code
END(overflow)
ENTRY(bounds)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_bounds
jmp error_code
END(bounds)
ENTRY(invalid_op)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_invalid_op
jmp error_code
END(invalid_op)
ENTRY(coprocessor_segment_overrun)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_coprocessor_segment_overrun
jmp error_code
END(coprocessor_segment_overrun)
ENTRY(invalid_TSS)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_invalid_TSS
jmp error_code
END(invalid_TSS)
ENTRY(segment_not_present)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_segment_not_present
jmp error_code
END(segment_not_present)
ENTRY(stack_segment)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_stack_segment
jmp error_code
END(stack_segment)
ENTRY(alignment_check)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_alignment_check
jmp error_code
END(alignment_check)
[PATCH] x86: error_code is not safe for kprobes This patch moves the entry.S:error_entry to .kprobes.text section, since code marked unsafe for kprobes jumps directly to entry.S::error_entry, that must be marked unsafe as well. This patch also moves all the ".previous.text" asm directives to ".previous" for kprobes section. AK: Following a similar i386 patch from Chuck Ebbert AK: Also merged Jeremy's fix in. +From: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@goop.org> KPROBE_ENTRY does a .section .kprobes.text, and expects its users to do a .previous at the end of the function. Unfortunately, if any code within the function switches sections, for example .fixup, then the .previous ends up putting all subsequent code into .fixup. Worse, any subsequent .fixup code gets intermingled with the code its supposed to be fixing (which is also in .fixup). It's surprising this didn't cause more havok. The fix is to use .pushsection/.popsection, so this stuff nests properly. A further cleanup would be to get rid of all .section/.previous pairs, since they're inherently fragile. +From: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com> Because code marked unsafe for kprobes jumps directly to entry.S::error_code, that must be marked unsafe as well. The easiest way to do that is to move the page fault entry point to just before error_code and let it inherit the same section. Also moved all the ".previous" asm directives for kprobes sections to column 1 and removed ".text" from them. Signed-off-by: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com> Signed-off-by: Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
2006-09-26 16:52:34 +08:00
ENTRY(divide_error)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0 # no error code
pushl $do_divide_error
jmp error_code
END(divide_error)
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
ENTRY(machine_check)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl machine_check_vector
jmp error_code
END(machine_check)
#endif
ENTRY(spurious_interrupt_bug)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $0
pushl $do_spurious_interrupt_bug
jmp error_code
END(spurious_interrupt_bug)
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_XEN
/*
* Xen doesn't set %esp to be precisely what the normal SYSENTER
* entry point expects, so fix it up before using the normal path.
*/
ENTRY(xen_sysenter_target)
addl $5*4, %esp /* remove xen-provided frame */
jmp sysenter_past_esp
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
ENTRY(xen_hypervisor_callback)
pushl $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
SAVE_ALL
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
/*
* Check to see if we got the event in the critical
* region in xen_iret_direct, after we've reenabled
* events and checked for pending events. This simulates
* iret instruction's behaviour where it delivers a
* pending interrupt when enabling interrupts:
*/
movl PT_EIP(%esp), %eax
cmpl $xen_iret_start_crit, %eax
jb 1f
cmpl $xen_iret_end_crit, %eax
jae 1f
jmp xen_iret_crit_fixup
ENTRY(xen_do_upcall)
1: mov %esp, %eax
call xen_evtchn_do_upcall
#ifndef CONFIG_PREEMPT
call xen_maybe_preempt_hcall
#endif
jmp ret_from_intr
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
ENDPROC(xen_hypervisor_callback)
/*
* Hypervisor uses this for application faults while it executes.
* We get here for two reasons:
* 1. Fault while reloading DS, ES, FS or GS
* 2. Fault while executing IRET
* Category 1 we fix up by reattempting the load, and zeroing the segment
* register if the load fails.
* Category 2 we fix up by jumping to do_iret_error. We cannot use the
* normal Linux return path in this case because if we use the IRET hypercall
* to pop the stack frame we end up in an infinite loop of failsafe callbacks.
* We distinguish between categories by maintaining a status value in EAX.
*/
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
ENTRY(xen_failsafe_callback)
pushl %eax
movl $1, %eax
1: mov 4(%esp), %ds
2: mov 8(%esp), %es
3: mov 12(%esp), %fs
4: mov 16(%esp), %gs
xen/x86: don't corrupt %eip when returning from a signal handler In 32 bit guests, if a userspace process has %eax == -ERESTARTSYS (-512) or -ERESTARTNOINTR (-513) when it is interrupted by an event /and/ the process has a pending signal then %eip (and %eax) are corrupted when returning to the main process after handling the signal. The application may then crash with SIGSEGV or a SIGILL or it may have subtly incorrect behaviour (depending on what instruction it returned to). The occurs because handle_signal() is incorrectly thinking that there is a system call that needs to restarted so it adjusts %eip and %eax to re-execute the system call instruction (even though user space had not done a system call). If %eax == -514 (-ERESTARTNOHAND (-514) or -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK (-516) then handle_signal() only corrupted %eax (by setting it to -EINTR). This may cause the application to crash or have incorrect behaviour. handle_signal() assumes that regs->orig_ax >= 0 means a system call so any kernel entry point that is not for a system call must push a negative value for orig_ax. For example, for physical interrupts on bare metal the inverse of the vector is pushed and page_fault() sets regs->orig_ax to -1, overwriting the hardware provided error code. xen_hypervisor_callback() was incorrectly pushing 0 for orig_ax instead of -1. Classic Xen kernels pushed %eax which works as %eax cannot be both non-negative and -RESTARTSYS (etc.), but using -1 is consistent with other non-system call entry points and avoids some of the tests in handle_signal(). There were similar bugs in xen_failsafe_callback() of both 32 and 64-bit guests. If the fault was corrected and the normal return path was used then 0 was incorrectly pushed as the value for orig_ax. Signed-off-by: David Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
2012-10-20 00:29:07 +08:00
/* EAX == 0 => Category 1 (Bad segment)
EAX != 0 => Category 2 (Bad IRET) */
testl %eax, %eax
popl %eax
lea 16(%esp), %esp
jz 5f
jmp iret_exc
5: pushl $-1 /* orig_ax = -1 => not a system call */
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
SAVE_ALL
jmp ret_from_exception
.section .fixup, "ax"
6: xorl %eax, %eax
movl %eax, 4(%esp)
jmp 1b
7: xorl %eax, %eax
movl %eax, 8(%esp)
jmp 2b
8: xorl %eax, %eax
movl %eax, 12(%esp)
jmp 3b
9: xorl %eax, %eax
movl %eax, 16(%esp)
jmp 4b
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
.previous
_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 6b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 7b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(3b, 8b)
_ASM_EXTABLE(4b, 9b)
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
ENDPROC(xen_failsafe_callback)
BUILD_INTERRUPT3(xen_hvm_callback_vector, HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR,
xen_evtchn_do_upcall)
#endif /* CONFIG_XEN */
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
BUILD_INTERRUPT3(hyperv_callback_vector, HYPERVISOR_CALLBACK_VECTOR,
hyperv_vector_handler)
#endif /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
xen: Core Xen implementation This patch is a rollup of all the core pieces of the Xen implementation, including: - booting and setup - pagetable setup - privileged instructions - segmentation - interrupt flags - upcalls - multicall batching BOOTING AND SETUP The vmlinux image is decorated with ELF notes which tell the Xen domain builder what the kernel's requirements are; the domain builder then constructs the address space accordingly and starts the kernel. Xen has its own entrypoint for the kernel (contained in an ELF note). The ELF notes are set up by xen-head.S, which is included into head.S. In principle it could be linked separately, but it seems to provoke lots of binutils bugs. Because the domain builder starts the kernel in a fairly sane state (32-bit protected mode, paging enabled, flat segments set up), there's not a lot of setup needed before starting the kernel proper. The main steps are: 1. Install the Xen paravirt_ops, which is simply a matter of a structure assignment. 2. Set init_mm to use the Xen-supplied pagetables (analogous to the head.S generated pagetables in a native boot). 3. Reserve address space for Xen, since it takes a chunk at the top of the address space for its own use. 4. Call start_kernel() PAGETABLE SETUP Once we hit the main kernel boot sequence, it will end up calling back via paravirt_ops to set up various pieces of Xen specific state. One of the critical things which requires a bit of extra care is the construction of the initial init_mm pagetable. Because Xen places tight constraints on pagetables (an active pagetable must always be valid, and must always be mapped read-only to the guest domain), we need to be careful when constructing the new pagetable to keep these constraints in mind. It turns out that the easiest way to do this is use the initial Xen-provided pagetable as a template, and then just insert new mappings for memory where a mapping doesn't already exist. This means that during pagetable setup, it uses a special version of xen_set_pte which ignores any attempt to remap a read-only page as read-write (since Xen will map its own initial pagetable as RO), but lets other changes to the ptes happen, so that things like NX are set properly. PRIVILEGED INSTRUCTIONS AND SEGMENTATION When the kernel runs under Xen, it runs in ring 1 rather than ring 0. This means that it is more privileged than user-mode in ring 3, but it still can't run privileged instructions directly. Non-performance critical instructions are dealt with by taking a privilege exception and trapping into the hypervisor and emulating the instruction, but more performance-critical instructions have their own specific paravirt_ops. In many cases we can avoid having to do any hypercalls for these instructions, or the Xen implementation is quite different from the normal native version. The privileged instructions fall into the broad classes of: Segmentation: setting up the GDT and the GDT entries, LDT, TLS and so on. Xen doesn't allow the GDT to be directly modified; all GDT updates are done via hypercalls where the new entries can be validated. This is important because Xen uses segment limits to prevent the guest kernel from damaging the hypervisor itself. Traps and exceptions: Xen uses a special format for trap entrypoints, so when the kernel wants to set an IDT entry, it needs to be converted to the form Xen expects. Xen sets int 0x80 up specially so that the trap goes straight from userspace into the guest kernel without going via the hypervisor. sysenter isn't supported. Kernel stack: The esp0 entry is extracted from the tss and provided to Xen. TLB operations: the various TLB calls are mapped into corresponding Xen hypercalls. Control registers: all the control registers are privileged. The most important is cr3, which points to the base of the current pagetable, and we handle it specially. Another instruction we treat specially is CPUID, even though its not privileged. We want to control what CPU features are visible to the rest of the kernel, and so CPUID ends up going into a paravirt_op. Xen implements this mainly to disable the ACPI and APIC subsystems. INTERRUPT FLAGS Xen maintains its own separate flag for masking events, which is contained within the per-cpu vcpu_info structure. Because the guest kernel runs in ring 1 and not 0, the IF flag in EFLAGS is completely ignored (and must be, because even if a guest domain disables interrupts for itself, it can't disable them overall). (A note on terminology: "events" and interrupts are effectively synonymous. However, rather than using an "enable flag", Xen uses a "mask flag", which blocks event delivery when it is non-zero.) There are paravirt_ops for each of cli/sti/save_fl/restore_fl, which are implemented to manage the Xen event mask state. The only thing worth noting is that when events are unmasked, we need to explicitly see if there's a pending event and call into the hypervisor to make sure it gets delivered. UPCALLS Xen needs a couple of upcall (or callback) functions to be implemented by each guest. One is the event upcalls, which is how events (interrupts, effectively) are delivered to the guests. The other is the failsafe callback, which is used to report errors in either reloading a segment register, or caused by iret. These are implemented in i386/kernel/entry.S so they can jump into the normal iret_exc path when necessary. MULTICALL BATCHING Xen provides a multicall mechanism, which allows multiple hypercalls to be issued at once in order to mitigate the cost of trapping into the hypervisor. This is particularly useful for context switches, since the 4-5 hypercalls they would normally need (reload cr3, update TLS, maybe update LDT) can be reduced to one. This patch implements a generic batching mechanism for hypercalls, which gets used in many places in the Xen code. Signed-off-by: Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xensource.com> Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ian Pratt <ian.pratt@xensource.com> Cc: Christian Limpach <Christian.Limpach@cl.cam.ac.uk> Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
2007-07-18 09:37:04 +08:00
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER
#ifdef CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE
ENTRY(mcount)
ret
END(mcount)
ENTRY(ftrace_caller)
pushl %eax
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
pushl $0 /* Pass NULL as regs pointer */
movl 4*4(%esp), %eax
movl 0x4(%ebp), %edx
movl function_trace_op, %ecx
subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax
.globl ftrace_call
ftrace_call:
call ftrace_stub
addl $4, %esp /* skip NULL pointer */
popl %edx
popl %ecx
popl %eax
ftrace_ret:
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
.globl ftrace_graph_call
ftrace_graph_call:
jmp ftrace_stub
#endif
.globl ftrace_stub
ftrace_stub:
ret
END(ftrace_caller)
ENTRY(ftrace_regs_caller)
pushf /* push flags before compare (in cs location) */
/*
* i386 does not save SS and ESP when coming from kernel.
* Instead, to get sp, &regs->sp is used (see ptrace.h).
* Unfortunately, that means eflags must be at the same location
* as the current return ip is. We move the return ip into the
* ip location, and move flags into the return ip location.
*/
pushl 4(%esp) /* save return ip into ip slot */
pushl $0 /* Load 0 into orig_ax */
pushl %gs
pushl %fs
pushl %es
pushl %ds
pushl %eax
pushl %ebp
pushl %edi
pushl %esi
pushl %edx
pushl %ecx
pushl %ebx
movl 13*4(%esp), %eax /* Get the saved flags */
movl %eax, 14*4(%esp) /* Move saved flags into regs->flags location */
/* clobbering return ip */
movl $__KERNEL_CS, 13*4(%esp)
movl 12*4(%esp), %eax /* Load ip (1st parameter) */
subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax /* Adjust ip */
movl 0x4(%ebp), %edx /* Load parent ip (2nd parameter) */
movl function_trace_op, %ecx /* Save ftrace_pos in 3rd parameter */
pushl %esp /* Save pt_regs as 4th parameter */
GLOBAL(ftrace_regs_call)
call ftrace_stub
addl $4, %esp /* Skip pt_regs */
movl 14*4(%esp), %eax /* Move flags back into cs */
movl %eax, 13*4(%esp) /* Needed to keep addl from modifying flags */
movl 12*4(%esp), %eax /* Get return ip from regs->ip */
movl %eax, 14*4(%esp) /* Put return ip back for ret */
popl %ebx
popl %ecx
popl %edx
popl %esi
popl %edi
popl %ebp
popl %eax
popl %ds
popl %es
popl %fs
popl %gs
addl $8, %esp /* Skip orig_ax and ip */
popf /* Pop flags at end (no addl to corrupt flags) */
jmp ftrace_ret
popf
jmp ftrace_stub
#else /* ! CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE */
ENTRY(mcount)
cmpl $__PAGE_OFFSET, %esp
jb ftrace_stub /* Paging not enabled yet? */
cmpl $ftrace_stub, ftrace_trace_function
jnz trace
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
cmpl $ftrace_stub, ftrace_graph_return
jnz ftrace_graph_caller
cmpl $ftrace_graph_entry_stub, ftrace_graph_entry
jnz ftrace_graph_caller
#endif
.globl ftrace_stub
ftrace_stub:
ret
/* taken from glibc */
trace:
pushl %eax
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
movl 0xc(%esp), %eax
movl 0x4(%ebp), %edx
subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax
call *ftrace_trace_function
popl %edx
popl %ecx
popl %eax
jmp ftrace_stub
END(mcount)
#endif /* CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE */
#endif /* CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER */
#ifdef CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER
ENTRY(ftrace_graph_caller)
pushl %eax
pushl %ecx
pushl %edx
movl 0xc(%esp), %eax
lea 0x4(%ebp), %edx
movl (%ebp), %ecx
subl $MCOUNT_INSN_SIZE, %eax
call prepare_ftrace_return
popl %edx
popl %ecx
popl %eax
tracing/function-return-tracer: support for dynamic ftrace on function return tracer This patch adds the support for dynamic tracing on the function return tracer. The whole difference with normal dynamic function tracing is that we don't need to hook on a particular callback. The only pro that we want is to nop or set dynamically the calls to ftrace_caller (which is ftrace_return_caller here). Some security checks ensure that we are not trying to launch dynamic tracing for return tracing while normal function tracing is already running. An example of trace with getnstimeofday set as a filter: ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (2283 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1396 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1382 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1825 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1426 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1464 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1524 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1382 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1382 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1434 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1464 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1502 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1404 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1397 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1051 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1314 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1344 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1163 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1390 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1374 ns) Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-16 13:02:06 +08:00
ret
END(ftrace_graph_caller)
.globl return_to_handler
return_to_handler:
pushl %eax
pushl %edx
movl %ebp, %eax
call ftrace_return_to_handler
movl %eax, %ecx
popl %edx
popl %eax
jmp *%ecx
tracing/function-return-tracer: support for dynamic ftrace on function return tracer This patch adds the support for dynamic tracing on the function return tracer. The whole difference with normal dynamic function tracing is that we don't need to hook on a particular callback. The only pro that we want is to nop or set dynamically the calls to ftrace_caller (which is ftrace_return_caller here). Some security checks ensure that we are not trying to launch dynamic tracing for return tracing while normal function tracing is already running. An example of trace with getnstimeofday set as a filter: ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (2283 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1396 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1382 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1825 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1426 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1464 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1524 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1382 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1382 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1434 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1464 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1502 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1404 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1397 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1051 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1314 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1344 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1163 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1390 ns) ktime_get_ts+0x22/0x50 -> getnstimeofday (1374 ns) Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
2008-11-16 13:02:06 +08:00
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TRACING
ENTRY(trace_page_fault)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $trace_do_page_fault
jmp error_code
END(trace_page_fault)
#endif
ENTRY(page_fault)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_page_fault
ALIGN
error_code:
/* the function address is in %gs's slot on the stack */
pushl %fs
pushl %es
pushl %ds
pushl %eax
pushl %ebp
pushl %edi
pushl %esi
pushl %edx
pushl %ecx
pushl %ebx
cld
movl $(__KERNEL_PERCPU), %ecx
movl %ecx, %fs
UNWIND_ESPFIX_STACK
GS_TO_REG %ecx
movl PT_GS(%esp), %edi # get the function address
movl PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp), %edx # get the error code
movl $-1, PT_ORIG_EAX(%esp) # no syscall to restart
REG_TO_PTGS %ecx
SET_KERNEL_GS %ecx
movl $(__USER_DS), %ecx
movl %ecx, %ds
movl %ecx, %es
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
call *%edi
jmp ret_from_exception
END(page_fault)
/*
* Debug traps and NMI can happen at the one SYSENTER instruction
* that sets up the real kernel stack. Check here, since we can't
* allow the wrong stack to be used.
*
* "TSS_sysenter_sp0+12" is because the NMI/debug handler will have
* already pushed 3 words if it hits on the sysenter instruction:
* eflags, cs and eip.
*
* We just load the right stack, and push the three (known) values
* by hand onto the new stack - while updating the return eip past
* the instruction that would have done it for sysenter.
*/
.macro FIX_STACK offset ok label
cmpw $__KERNEL_CS, 4(%esp)
jne \ok
\label:
movl TSS_sysenter_sp0 + \offset(%esp), %esp
x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotations So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros mixed into some of the most security sensitive code paths of the Linux kernel. These debug info annotations don't even buy the upstream kernel anything: dwarf driven stack unwinding has caused problems in the past so it's out of tree, and the upstream kernel only uses the much more robust framepointers based stack unwinding method. In addition to that there's a steady, slow bitrot going on with these annotations, requiring frequent fixups. There's no tooling and no functionality upstream that keeps it correct. So burn down the sick forest, allowing new, healthier growth: 27 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-) Someone who has the willingness and time to do this properly can attempt to reintroduce dwarf debuginfo in x86 assembly code plus dwarf unwinding from first principles, with the following conditions: - it should be maximally readable, and maximally low-key to 'ordinary' code reading and maintenance. - find a build time method to insert dwarf annotations automatically in the most common cases, for pop/push instructions that manipulate the stack pointer. This could be done for example via a preprocessing step that just looks for common patterns - plus special annotations for the few cases where we want to depart from the default. We have hundreds of CFI annotations, so automating most of that makes sense. - it should come with build tooling checks that ensure that CFI annotations are sensible. We've seen such efforts from the framepointer side, and there's no reason it couldn't be done on the dwarf side. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-28 18:21:47 +08:00
pushfl
pushl $__KERNEL_CS
pushl $sysenter_past_esp
.endm
ENTRY(debug)
ASM_CLAC
cmpl $entry_SYSENTER_32, (%esp)
jne debug_stack_correct
FIX_STACK 12, debug_stack_correct, debug_esp_fix_insn
debug_stack_correct:
pushl $-1 # mark this as an int
SAVE_ALL
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
xorl %edx, %edx # error code 0
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
call do_debug
jmp ret_from_exception
END(debug)
/*
* NMI is doubly nasty. It can happen _while_ we're handling
* a debug fault, and the debug fault hasn't yet been able to
* clear up the stack. So we first check whether we got an
* NMI on the sysenter entry path, but after that we need to
* check whether we got an NMI on the debug path where the debug
* fault happened on the sysenter path.
*/
ENTRY(nmi)
ASM_CLAC
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
pushl %eax
movl %ss, %eax
cmpw $__ESPFIX_SS, %ax
popl %eax
je nmi_espfix_stack
#endif
cmpl $entry_SYSENTER_32, (%esp)
je nmi_stack_fixup
pushl %eax
movl %esp, %eax
/*
* Do not access memory above the end of our stack page,
* it might not exist.
*/
andl $(THREAD_SIZE-1), %eax
cmpl $(THREAD_SIZE-20), %eax
popl %eax
jae nmi_stack_correct
cmpl $entry_SYSENTER_32, 12(%esp)
je nmi_debug_stack_check
nmi_stack_correct:
pushl %eax
SAVE_ALL
xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
call do_nmi
jmp restore_all_notrace
nmi_stack_fixup:
FIX_STACK 12, nmi_stack_correct, 1
jmp nmi_stack_correct
nmi_debug_stack_check:
cmpw $__KERNEL_CS, 16(%esp)
jne nmi_stack_correct
cmpl $debug, (%esp)
jb nmi_stack_correct
cmpl $debug_esp_fix_insn, (%esp)
ja nmi_stack_correct
FIX_STACK 24, nmi_stack_correct, 1
jmp nmi_stack_correct
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX32
nmi_espfix_stack:
x86/debug: Remove perpetually broken, unmaintainable dwarf annotations So the dwarf2 annotations in low level assembly code have become an increasing hindrance: unreadable, messy macros mixed into some of the most security sensitive code paths of the Linux kernel. These debug info annotations don't even buy the upstream kernel anything: dwarf driven stack unwinding has caused problems in the past so it's out of tree, and the upstream kernel only uses the much more robust framepointers based stack unwinding method. In addition to that there's a steady, slow bitrot going on with these annotations, requiring frequent fixups. There's no tooling and no functionality upstream that keeps it correct. So burn down the sick forest, allowing new, healthier growth: 27 files changed, 350 insertions(+), 1101 deletions(-) Someone who has the willingness and time to do this properly can attempt to reintroduce dwarf debuginfo in x86 assembly code plus dwarf unwinding from first principles, with the following conditions: - it should be maximally readable, and maximally low-key to 'ordinary' code reading and maintenance. - find a build time method to insert dwarf annotations automatically in the most common cases, for pop/push instructions that manipulate the stack pointer. This could be done for example via a preprocessing step that just looks for common patterns - plus special annotations for the few cases where we want to depart from the default. We have hundreds of CFI annotations, so automating most of that makes sense. - it should come with build tooling checks that ensure that CFI annotations are sensible. We've seen such efforts from the framepointer side, and there's no reason it couldn't be done on the dwarf side. Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com> Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com> Cc: Frédéric Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> Cc: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
2015-05-28 18:21:47 +08:00
/*
* create the pointer to lss back
*/
pushl %ss
pushl %esp
addl $4, (%esp)
/* copy the iret frame of 12 bytes */
.rept 3
pushl 16(%esp)
.endr
pushl %eax
SAVE_ALL
FIXUP_ESPFIX_STACK # %eax == %esp
xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code
call do_nmi
RESTORE_REGS
lss 12+4(%esp), %esp # back to espfix stack
jmp irq_return
#endif
END(nmi)
ENTRY(int3)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $-1 # mark this as an int
SAVE_ALL
TRACE_IRQS_OFF
xorl %edx, %edx # zero error code
movl %esp, %eax # pt_regs pointer
call do_int3
jmp ret_from_exception
END(int3)
ENTRY(general_protection)
pushl $do_general_protection
jmp error_code
END(general_protection)
#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
ENTRY(async_page_fault)
ASM_CLAC
pushl $do_async_page_fault
jmp error_code
END(async_page_fault)
#endif