linux_old1/security/keys/big_key.c

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/* Large capacity key type
*
* Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
* Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
* modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
* as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
* 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
*/
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-10-26 22:02:01 +08:00
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "big_key: "fmt
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <keys/big_key-type.h>
#include <crypto/rng.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
/*
* Layout of key payload words.
*/
enum {
big_key_data,
big_key_path,
big_key_path_2nd_part,
big_key_len,
};
/*
* Crypto operation with big_key data
*/
enum big_key_op {
BIG_KEY_ENC,
BIG_KEY_DEC,
};
/*
* If the data is under this limit, there's no point creating a shm file to
* hold it as the permanently resident metadata for the shmem fs will be at
* least as large as the data.
*/
#define BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD (sizeof(struct inode) + sizeof(struct dentry))
/*
* Key size for big_key data encryption
*/
#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 16
/*
* big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an
* arbitrary blob of data as the payload
*/
struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
.name = "big_key",
.preparse = big_key_preparse,
.free_preparse = big_key_free_preparse,
.instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.revoke = big_key_revoke,
.destroy = big_key_destroy,
.describe = big_key_describe,
.read = big_key_read,
};
/*
* Crypto names for big_key data encryption
*/
static const char big_key_rng_name[] = "stdrng";
static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "ecb(aes)";
/*
* Crypto algorithms for big_key data encryption
*/
static struct crypto_rng *big_key_rng;
static struct crypto_skcipher *big_key_skcipher;
/*
* Generate random key to encrypt big_key data
*/
static inline int big_key_gen_enckey(u8 *key)
{
return crypto_rng_get_bytes(big_key_rng, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE);
}
/*
* Encrypt/decrypt big_key data
*/
static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key)
{
int ret = -EINVAL;
struct scatterlist sgio;
SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, big_key_skcipher);
if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(big_key_skcipher, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
goto error;
}
skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, big_key_skcipher);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
NULL, NULL);
sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, NULL);
if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC)
ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
else
ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
error:
return ret;
}
/*
* Preparse a big key
*/
int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
u8 *enckey;
u8 *data = NULL;
ssize_t written;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 1024 * 1024 || !prep->data)
goto error;
/* Set an arbitrary quota */
prep->quotalen = 16;
prep->payload.data[big_key_len] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
/* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
* to be swapped out if needed.
*
* File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key.
*/
size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher));
/* prepare aligned data to encrypt */
data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen);
memset(data + datalen, 0x00, enclen - datalen);
/* generate random key */
enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!enckey) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto error;
}
ret = big_key_gen_enckey(enckey);
if (ret)
goto err_enckey;
/* encrypt aligned data */
ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, enclen, enckey);
if (ret)
goto err_enckey;
/* save aligned data to file */
file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", enclen, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
goto err_enckey;
}
written = kernel_write(file, data, enclen, 0);
if (written != enclen) {
ret = written;
if (written >= 0)
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err_fput;
}
/* Pin the mount and dentry to the key so that we can open it again
* later
*/
prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = enckey;
*path = file->f_path;
path_get(path);
fput(file);
kfree(data);
} else {
/* Just store the data in a buffer */
void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
prep->payload.data[big_key_data] = data;
memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
}
return 0;
err_fput:
fput(file);
err_enckey:
kfree(enckey);
error:
kfree(data);
return ret;
}
/*
* Clear preparsement.
*/
void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload.data[big_key_path];
path_put(path);
}
kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]);
}
/*
* dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
* - called with the key sem write-locked
*/
void big_key_revoke(struct key *key)
{
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
/* clear the quota */
key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
if (key_is_instantiated(key) &&
(size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD)
vfs_truncate(path, 0);
}
/*
* dispose of the data dangling from the corpse of a big_key key
*/
void big_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
path_put(path);
path->mnt = NULL;
path->dentry = NULL;
}
kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]);
key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL;
}
/*
* describe the big_key key
*/
void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
seq_puts(m, key->description);
if (key_is_instantiated(key))
seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]",
datalen,
datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff");
}
/*
* read the key data
* - the key's semaphore is read-locked
*/
long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen)
{
size_t datalen = (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len];
long ret;
if (!buffer || buflen < datalen)
return datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data[big_key_path];
struct file *file;
u8 *data;
u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data];
size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher));
data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!data)
return -ENOMEM;
file = dentry_open(path, O_RDONLY, current_cred());
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
goto error;
}
/* read file to kernel and decrypt */
ret = kernel_read(file, 0, data, enclen);
if (ret >= 0 && ret != enclen) {
ret = -EIO;
goto err_fput;
}
ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_DEC, data, enclen, enckey);
if (ret)
goto err_fput;
ret = datalen;
/* copy decrypted data to user */
if (copy_to_user(buffer, data, datalen) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
err_fput:
fput(file);
error:
kfree(data);
} else {
ret = datalen;
if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data],
datalen) != 0)
ret = -EFAULT;
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Register key type
*/
static int __init big_key_init(void)
{
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-10-26 22:02:01 +08:00
struct crypto_skcipher *cipher;
struct crypto_rng *rng;
int ret;
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-10-26 22:02:01 +08:00
rng = crypto_alloc_rng(big_key_rng_name, 0, 0);
if (IS_ERR(rng)) {
pr_err("Can't alloc rng: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(rng));
return PTR_ERR(rng);
}
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-10-26 22:02:01 +08:00
big_key_rng = rng;
/* seed RNG */
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-10-26 22:02:01 +08:00
ret = crypto_rng_reset(rng, NULL, crypto_rng_seedsize(rng));
if (ret) {
pr_err("Can't reset rng: %d\n", ret);
goto error_rng;
}
/* init block cipher */
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-10-26 22:02:01 +08:00
cipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
if (IS_ERR(cipher)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(cipher);
pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret);
goto error_rng;
}
big_key_skcipher = cipher;
ret = register_key_type(&key_type_big_key);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Can't register type: %d\n", ret);
goto error_cipher;
}
return 0;
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-10-26 22:02:01 +08:00
error_cipher:
crypto_free_skcipher(big_key_skcipher);
error_rng:
crypto_free_rng(big_key_rng);
return ret;
}
KEYS: Sort out big_key initialisation big_key has two separate initialisation functions, one that registers the key type and one that registers the crypto. If the key type fails to register, there's no problem if the crypto registers successfully because there's no way to reach the crypto except through the key type. However, if the key type registers successfully but the crypto does not, big_key_rng and big_key_blkcipher may end up set to NULL - but the code neither checks for this nor unregisters the big key key type. Furthermore, since the key type is registered before the crypto, it is theoretically possible for the kernel to try adding a big_key before the crypto is set up, leading to the same effect. Fix this by merging big_key_crypto_init() and big_key_init() and calling the resulting function late. If they're going to be encrypted, we shouldn't be creating big_keys before we have the facilities to do the encryption available. The key type registration is also moved after the crypto initialisation. The fix also includes message printing on failure. If the big_key type isn't correctly set up, simply doing: dd if=/dev/zero bs=4096 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key a @s ought to cause an oops. Fixes: 13100a72f40f5748a04017e0ab3df4cf27c809ef ('Security: Keys: Big keys stored encrypted') Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Peter Hlavaty <zer0mem@yahoo.com> cc: Kirill Marinushkin <k.marinushkin@gmail.com> cc: Artem Savkov <asavkov@redhat.com> cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2016-10-26 22:02:01 +08:00
late_initcall(big_key_init);