linux_old1/include/net/sctp/sm.h

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/* SCTP kernel implementation
* (C) Copyright IBM Corp. 2001, 2004
* Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Cisco, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Motorola, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Intel Corp.
*
* This file is part of the SCTP kernel implementation
*
* These are definitions needed by the state machine.
*
* This SCTP implementation is free software;
* you can redistribute it and/or modify it under the terms of
* the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
* any later version.
*
* This SCTP implementation is distributed in the hope that it
* will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
* ************************
* warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
* See the GNU General Public License for more details.
*
* You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
* along with GNU CC; see the file COPYING. If not, see
* <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*
* Please send any bug reports or fixes you make to the
* email addresses:
* lksctp developers <linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org>
*
* Written or modified by:
* La Monte H.P. Yarroll <piggy@acm.org>
* Karl Knutson <karl@athena.chicago.il.us>
* Xingang Guo <xingang.guo@intel.com>
* Jon Grimm <jgrimm@us.ibm.com>
* Dajiang Zhang <dajiang.zhang@nokia.com>
* Sridhar Samudrala <sri@us.ibm.com>
* Daisy Chang <daisyc@us.ibm.com>
* Ardelle Fan <ardelle.fan@intel.com>
* Kevin Gao <kevin.gao@intel.com>
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/compiler.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <net/sctp/command.h>
#include <net/sctp/sctp.h>
#ifndef __sctp_sm_h__
#define __sctp_sm_h__
/*
* Possible values for the disposition are:
*/
typedef enum {
SCTP_DISPOSITION_DISCARD, /* No further processing. */
SCTP_DISPOSITION_CONSUME, /* Process return values normally. */
SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOMEM, /* We ran out of memory--recover. */
SCTP_DISPOSITION_DELETE_TCB, /* Close the association. */
SCTP_DISPOSITION_ABORT, /* Close the association NOW. */
SCTP_DISPOSITION_VIOLATION, /* The peer is misbehaving. */
SCTP_DISPOSITION_NOT_IMPL, /* This entry is not implemented. */
SCTP_DISPOSITION_ERROR, /* This is plain old user error. */
SCTP_DISPOSITION_BUG, /* This is a bug. */
} sctp_disposition_t;
typedef sctp_disposition_t (sctp_state_fn_t) (struct net *,
const struct sctp_endpoint *,
const struct sctp_association *,
const union sctp_subtype type,
void *arg,
struct sctp_cmd_seq *);
typedef void (sctp_timer_event_t) (unsigned long);
struct sctp_sm_table_entry {
sctp_state_fn_t *fn;
const char *name;
};
/* A naming convention of "sctp_sf_xxx" applies to all the state functions
* currently in use.
*/
/* Prototypes for generic state functions. */
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_not_impl;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_bug;
/* Prototypes for gener timer state functions. */
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_timer_ignore;
/* Prototypes for chunk state functions. */
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_9_1_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_cookie_wait_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_shutdown_sent_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_shutdown_ack_sent_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_5_1E_ca;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_4_C;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_eat_data_6_2;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_eat_data_fast_4_4;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_eat_sack_6_2;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_operr_notify;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_t1_init_timer_expire;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_t1_cookie_timer_expire;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_t2_timer_expire;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_t4_timer_expire;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_t5_timer_expire;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_sendbeat_8_3;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_beat_8_3;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_backbeat_8_3;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_final;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_shutdown;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_shut_ctsn;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_ecn_cwr;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_ecne;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_ootb;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_pdiscard;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_violation;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_discard_chunk;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_1_siminit;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_2_dupinit;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_3_initack;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_unk_chunk;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_8_5_1_E_sa;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_err;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_asconf;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_asconf_ack;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_reconf;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_reshutack;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_eat_fwd_tsn;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_eat_fwd_tsn_fast;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_eat_auth;
/* Prototypes for primitive event state functions. */
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_prm_asoc;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_prm_send;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_prm_shutdown;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_shutdown;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_prm_shutdown;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_9_1_prm_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_cookie_wait_prm_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_cookie_echoed_prm_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_shutdown_pending_prm_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_shutdown_sent_prm_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_shutdown_ack_sent_prm_abort;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_error_closed;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_error_shutdown;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_ignore_primitive;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_prm_requestheartbeat;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_prm_asconf;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_prm_reconf;
/* Prototypes for other event state functions. */
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_no_pending_tsn;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_start_shutdown;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_9_2_shutdown_ack;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_ignore_other;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_cookie_wait_icmp_abort;
/* Prototypes for timeout event state functions. */
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_6_3_3_rtx;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_send_reconf;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_do_6_2_sack;
sctp_state_fn_t sctp_sf_autoclose_timer_expire;
/* Prototypes for utility support functions. */
__u8 sctp_get_chunk_type(struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
const struct sctp_sm_table_entry *sctp_sm_lookup_event(
struct net *net,
enum sctp_event event_type,
enum sctp_state state,
union sctp_subtype event_subtype);
int sctp_chunk_iif(const struct sctp_chunk *);
struct sctp_association *sctp_make_temp_asoc(const struct sctp_endpoint *,
struct sctp_chunk *,
gfp_t gfp);
__u32 sctp_generate_verification_tag(void);
void sctp_populate_tie_tags(__u8 *cookie, __u32 curTag, __u32 hisTag);
/* Prototypes for chunk-building functions. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_bind_addr *,
gfp_t gfp, int vparam_len);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_init_ack(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *,
const gfp_t gfp,
const int unkparam_len);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_cookie_echo(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_cookie_ack(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_cwr(const struct sctp_association *,
const __u32 lowest_tsn,
const struct sctp_chunk *);
struct sctp_chunk * sctp_make_datafrag_empty(struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo,
int len, const __u8 flags,
__u16 ssn, gfp_t gfp);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_ecne(const struct sctp_association *,
const __u32);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_sack(const struct sctp_association *);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_shutdown(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_shutdown_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_shutdown_complete(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *);
void sctp_init_cause(struct sctp_chunk *, __be16 cause, size_t);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *,
const size_t hint);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_no_data(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *,
__u32 tsn);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_user(const struct sctp_association *,
struct msghdr *, size_t msg_len);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_abort_violation(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *,
const __u8 *,
const size_t );
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_violation_paramlen(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *,
struct sctp_paramhdr *);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_violation_max_retrans(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_heartbeat(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_transport *);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_heartbeat_ack(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *,
const void *payload,
const size_t paylen);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_op_error(const struct sctp_association *,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
__be16 cause_code,
const void *payload,
size_t paylen,
size_t reserve_tail);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_update_ip(struct sctp_association *,
union sctp_addr *,
struct sockaddr *,
int, __be16);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_asconf_set_prim(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_addr *addr);
net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks Commit 6f4c618ddb0 ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however, it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels: skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768 head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950 end:0x440 dev:<NULL> ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129! [...] Call Trace: <IRQ> [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70 [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp] [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20 [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp] [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0 [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp] [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter] [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120 [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0 [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0 [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440 [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350 [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750 [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60 This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for example, ... -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] -------------> <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------ -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO --------------------> <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK --------------------- ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------> ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ... 1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16) 2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255) ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too. This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks could be used just as well. The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account. In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP address that is also the source address of the packet containing the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given skb. When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed with ... length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length); asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length; ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time, which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length. Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and* in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over, that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and missized addresses. Joint work with Vlad Yasevich. Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2014-10-10 04:55:31 +08:00
bool sctp_verify_asconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk, bool addr_param_needed,
struct sctp_paramhdr **errp);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_asconf(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf);
int sctp_process_asconf_ack(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *asconf_ack);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_fwdtsn(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u32 new_cum_tsn, size_t nstreams,
struct sctp_fwdtsn_skip *skiplist);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_auth(const struct sctp_association *asoc);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_req(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u16 stream_num, __u16 *stream_list,
bool out, bool in);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_tsnreq(
const struct sctp_association *asoc);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_addstrm(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u16 out, __u16 in);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_resp(
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u32 result, __u32 sn);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_strreset_tsnresp(
struct sctp_association *asoc,
__u32 result, __u32 sn,
__u32 sender_tsn, __u32 receiver_tsn);
bool sctp_verify_reconf(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
struct sctp_paramhdr **errp);
void sctp_chunk_assign_tsn(struct sctp_chunk *);
void sctp_chunk_assign_ssn(struct sctp_chunk *);
/* Prototypes for stream-processing functions. */
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset_outreq(
struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
struct sctp_ulpevent **evp);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset_inreq(
struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
struct sctp_ulpevent **evp);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset_tsnreq(
struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
struct sctp_ulpevent **evp);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset_addstrm_out(
struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
struct sctp_ulpevent **evp);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset_addstrm_in(
struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
struct sctp_ulpevent **evp);
struct sctp_chunk *sctp_process_strreset_resp(
struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
struct sctp_ulpevent **evp);
/* Prototypes for statetable processing. */
int sctp_do_sm(struct net *net, enum sctp_event event_type,
union sctp_subtype subtype, enum sctp_state state,
struct sctp_endpoint *ep, struct sctp_association *asoc,
void *event_arg, gfp_t gfp);
/* 2nd level prototypes */
void sctp_generate_t3_rtx_event(unsigned long peer);
void sctp_generate_heartbeat_event(unsigned long peer);
void sctp_generate_reconf_event(unsigned long peer);
sctp: Fix a race between ICMP protocol unreachable and connect() ICMP protocol unreachable handling completely disregarded the fact that the user may have locked the socket. It proceeded to destroy the association, even though the user may have held the lock and had a ref on the association. This resulted in the following: Attempt to release alive inet socket f6afcc00 ========================= [ BUG: held lock freed! ] ------------------------- somenu/2672 is freeing memory f6afcc00-f6afcfff, with a lock still held there! (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<c122098a>] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c 1 lock held by somenu/2672: #0: (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.+.}, at: [<c122098a>] sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c stack backtrace: Pid: 2672, comm: somenu Not tainted 2.6.32-telco #55 Call Trace: [<c1232266>] ? printk+0xf/0x11 [<c1038553>] debug_check_no_locks_freed+0xce/0xff [<c10620b4>] kmem_cache_free+0x21/0x66 [<c1185f25>] __sk_free+0x9d/0xab [<c1185f9c>] sk_free+0x1c/0x1e [<c1216e38>] sctp_association_put+0x32/0x89 [<c1220865>] __sctp_connect+0x36d/0x3f4 [<c122098a>] ? sctp_connect+0x13/0x4c [<c102d073>] ? autoremove_wake_function+0x0/0x33 [<c12209a8>] sctp_connect+0x31/0x4c [<c11d1e80>] inet_dgram_connect+0x4b/0x55 [<c11834fa>] sys_connect+0x54/0x71 [<c103a3a2>] ? lock_release_non_nested+0x88/0x239 [<c1054026>] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c [<c1054026>] ? might_fault+0x42/0x7c [<c11847ab>] sys_socketcall+0x6d/0x178 [<c10da994>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_thunk+0xc/0x10 [<c1002959>] syscall_call+0x7/0xb This was because the sctp_wait_for_connect() would aqcure the socket lock and then proceed to release the last reference count on the association, thus cause the fully destruction path to finish freeing the socket. The simplest solution is to start a very short timer in case the socket is owned by user. When the timer expires, we can do some verification and be able to do the release properly. Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2010-05-06 15:56:07 +08:00
void sctp_generate_proto_unreach_event(unsigned long peer);
void sctp_ootb_pkt_free(struct sctp_packet *packet);
struct sctp_association *sctp_unpack_cookie(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
gfp_t gfp, int *err,
struct sctp_chunk **err_chk_p);
/* 3rd level prototypes */
__u32 sctp_generate_tag(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep);
__u32 sctp_generate_tsn(const struct sctp_endpoint *ep);
/* Extern declarations for major data structures. */
extern sctp_timer_event_t *sctp_timer_events[SCTP_NUM_TIMEOUT_TYPES];
/* Get the size of a DATA chunk payload. */
static inline __u16 sctp_data_size(struct sctp_chunk *chunk)
{
__u16 size;
size = ntohs(chunk->chunk_hdr->length);
size -= sizeof(struct sctp_data_chunk);
return size;
}
/* Compare two TSNs */
sctp: improve how SSN, TSN and ASCONF serial are compared Make it similar to time_before() macros: - easier to understand - make use of typecheck() to avoid working on unexpected variable types (made the issue on previous patch visible) - for _[lg]te versions, slighly faster, as the compiler used to generate a sequence of cmp/je/cmp/js instructions and now it's sub/test/jle (for _lte): Before, for sctp_outq_sack: if (primary->cacc.changeover_active) { 1f01: 80 b9 84 02 00 00 00 cmpb $0x0,0x284(%rcx) 1f08: 74 6e je 1f78 <sctp_outq_sack+0xe8> u8 clear_cycling = 0; if (TSN_lte(primary->cacc.next_tsn_at_change, sack_ctsn)) { 1f0a: 8b 81 80 02 00 00 mov 0x280(%rcx),%eax return ((s) - (t)) & TSN_SIGN_BIT; } static inline int TSN_lte(__u32 s, __u32 t) { return ((s) == (t)) || (((s) - (t)) & TSN_SIGN_BIT); 1f10: 8b 7d bc mov -0x44(%rbp),%edi 1f13: 39 c7 cmp %eax,%edi 1f15: 74 25 je 1f3c <sctp_outq_sack+0xac> 1f17: 39 f8 cmp %edi,%eax 1f19: 78 21 js 1f3c <sctp_outq_sack+0xac> primary->cacc.changeover_active = 0; After: if (primary->cacc.changeover_active) { 1ee7: 80 b9 84 02 00 00 00 cmpb $0x0,0x284(%rcx) 1eee: 74 73 je 1f63 <sctp_outq_sack+0xf3> u8 clear_cycling = 0; if (TSN_lte(primary->cacc.next_tsn_at_change, sack_ctsn)) { 1ef0: 8b 81 80 02 00 00 mov 0x280(%rcx),%eax 1ef6: 2b 45 b4 sub -0x4c(%rbp),%eax 1ef9: 85 c0 test %eax,%eax 1efb: 7e 26 jle 1f23 <sctp_outq_sack+0xb3> primary->cacc.changeover_active = 0; *_lt() generated pretty much the same code. Tested with gcc (GCC) 6.1.1 20160621. This patch also removes SSN_lte as it is not used and cleanups some comments. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 05:19:14 +08:00
#define TSN_lt(a,b) \
(typecheck(__u32, a) && \
typecheck(__u32, b) && \
((__s32)((a) - (b)) < 0))
sctp: improve how SSN, TSN and ASCONF serial are compared Make it similar to time_before() macros: - easier to understand - make use of typecheck() to avoid working on unexpected variable types (made the issue on previous patch visible) - for _[lg]te versions, slighly faster, as the compiler used to generate a sequence of cmp/je/cmp/js instructions and now it's sub/test/jle (for _lte): Before, for sctp_outq_sack: if (primary->cacc.changeover_active) { 1f01: 80 b9 84 02 00 00 00 cmpb $0x0,0x284(%rcx) 1f08: 74 6e je 1f78 <sctp_outq_sack+0xe8> u8 clear_cycling = 0; if (TSN_lte(primary->cacc.next_tsn_at_change, sack_ctsn)) { 1f0a: 8b 81 80 02 00 00 mov 0x280(%rcx),%eax return ((s) - (t)) & TSN_SIGN_BIT; } static inline int TSN_lte(__u32 s, __u32 t) { return ((s) == (t)) || (((s) - (t)) & TSN_SIGN_BIT); 1f10: 8b 7d bc mov -0x44(%rbp),%edi 1f13: 39 c7 cmp %eax,%edi 1f15: 74 25 je 1f3c <sctp_outq_sack+0xac> 1f17: 39 f8 cmp %edi,%eax 1f19: 78 21 js 1f3c <sctp_outq_sack+0xac> primary->cacc.changeover_active = 0; After: if (primary->cacc.changeover_active) { 1ee7: 80 b9 84 02 00 00 00 cmpb $0x0,0x284(%rcx) 1eee: 74 73 je 1f63 <sctp_outq_sack+0xf3> u8 clear_cycling = 0; if (TSN_lte(primary->cacc.next_tsn_at_change, sack_ctsn)) { 1ef0: 8b 81 80 02 00 00 mov 0x280(%rcx),%eax 1ef6: 2b 45 b4 sub -0x4c(%rbp),%eax 1ef9: 85 c0 test %eax,%eax 1efb: 7e 26 jle 1f23 <sctp_outq_sack+0xb3> primary->cacc.changeover_active = 0; *_lt() generated pretty much the same code. Tested with gcc (GCC) 6.1.1 20160621. This patch also removes SSN_lte as it is not used and cleanups some comments. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 05:19:14 +08:00
#define TSN_lte(a,b) \
(typecheck(__u32, a) && \
typecheck(__u32, b) && \
((__s32)((a) - (b)) <= 0))
/* Compare two SSNs */
sctp: improve how SSN, TSN and ASCONF serial are compared Make it similar to time_before() macros: - easier to understand - make use of typecheck() to avoid working on unexpected variable types (made the issue on previous patch visible) - for _[lg]te versions, slighly faster, as the compiler used to generate a sequence of cmp/je/cmp/js instructions and now it's sub/test/jle (for _lte): Before, for sctp_outq_sack: if (primary->cacc.changeover_active) { 1f01: 80 b9 84 02 00 00 00 cmpb $0x0,0x284(%rcx) 1f08: 74 6e je 1f78 <sctp_outq_sack+0xe8> u8 clear_cycling = 0; if (TSN_lte(primary->cacc.next_tsn_at_change, sack_ctsn)) { 1f0a: 8b 81 80 02 00 00 mov 0x280(%rcx),%eax return ((s) - (t)) & TSN_SIGN_BIT; } static inline int TSN_lte(__u32 s, __u32 t) { return ((s) == (t)) || (((s) - (t)) & TSN_SIGN_BIT); 1f10: 8b 7d bc mov -0x44(%rbp),%edi 1f13: 39 c7 cmp %eax,%edi 1f15: 74 25 je 1f3c <sctp_outq_sack+0xac> 1f17: 39 f8 cmp %edi,%eax 1f19: 78 21 js 1f3c <sctp_outq_sack+0xac> primary->cacc.changeover_active = 0; After: if (primary->cacc.changeover_active) { 1ee7: 80 b9 84 02 00 00 00 cmpb $0x0,0x284(%rcx) 1eee: 74 73 je 1f63 <sctp_outq_sack+0xf3> u8 clear_cycling = 0; if (TSN_lte(primary->cacc.next_tsn_at_change, sack_ctsn)) { 1ef0: 8b 81 80 02 00 00 mov 0x280(%rcx),%eax 1ef6: 2b 45 b4 sub -0x4c(%rbp),%eax 1ef9: 85 c0 test %eax,%eax 1efb: 7e 26 jle 1f23 <sctp_outq_sack+0xb3> primary->cacc.changeover_active = 0; *_lt() generated pretty much the same code. Tested with gcc (GCC) 6.1.1 20160621. This patch also removes SSN_lte as it is not used and cleanups some comments. Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2016-09-21 05:19:14 +08:00
#define SSN_lt(a,b) \
(typecheck(__u16, a) && \
typecheck(__u16, b) && \
((__s16)((a) - (b)) < 0))
/* ADDIP 3.1.1 */
#define ADDIP_SERIAL_gte(a,b) \
(typecheck(__u32, a) && \
typecheck(__u32, b) && \
((__s32)((b) - (a)) <= 0))
/* Check VTAG of the packet matches the sender's own tag. */
static inline int
sctp_vtag_verify(const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
const struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
/* RFC 2960 Sec 8.5 When receiving an SCTP packet, the endpoint
* MUST ensure that the value in the Verification Tag field of
* the received SCTP packet matches its own Tag. If the received
* Verification Tag value does not match the receiver's own
* tag value, the receiver shall silently discard the packet...
*/
if (ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag) == asoc->c.my_vtag)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Check VTAG of the packet matches the sender's own tag and the T bit is
* not set, OR its peer's tag and the T bit is set in the Chunk Flags.
*/
static inline int
sctp_vtag_verify_either(const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
const struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
/* RFC 2960 Section 8.5.1, sctpimpguide Section 2.41
*
* B) The receiver of a ABORT MUST accept the packet
* if the Verification Tag field of the packet matches its own tag
* and the T bit is not set
* OR
* it is set to its peer's tag and the T bit is set in the Chunk
* Flags.
* Otherwise, the receiver MUST silently discard the packet
* and take no further action.
*
* C) The receiver of a SHUTDOWN COMPLETE shall accept the packet
* if the Verification Tag field of the packet matches its own tag
* and the T bit is not set
* OR
* it is set to its peer's tag and the T bit is set in the Chunk
* Flags.
* Otherwise, the receiver MUST silently discard the packet
* and take no further action. An endpoint MUST ignore the
* SHUTDOWN COMPLETE if it is not in the SHUTDOWN-ACK-SENT state.
*/
if ((!sctp_test_T_bit(chunk) &&
(ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag) == asoc->c.my_vtag)) ||
(sctp_test_T_bit(chunk) && asoc->c.peer_vtag &&
(ntohl(chunk->sctp_hdr->vtag) == asoc->c.peer_vtag))) {
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* __sctp_sm_h__ */