linux_old1/samples/seccomp/dropper.c

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Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Documents how system call filtering using Berkeley Packet Filter programs works and how it may be used. Includes an example for x86 and a semi-generic example using a macro-based code generator. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - added acked by - update no new privs numbers v17: - remove @compat note and add Pitfalls section for arch checking (keescook@chromium.org) v16: - v15: - v14: - rebase/nochanges v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - comment on the ptrace_event use - update arch support comment - note the behavior of SECCOMP_RET_DATA when there are multiple filters (keescook@chromium.org) - lots of samples/ clean up incl 64-bit bpf-direct support (markus@chromium.org) - rebase to linux-next v11: - overhaul return value language, updates (keescook@chromium.org) - comment on do_exit(SIGSYS) v10: - update for SIGSYS - update for new seccomp_data layout - update for ptrace option use v9: - updated bpf-direct.c for SIGILL v8: - add PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to the samples. v7: - updated for all the new stuff in v7: TRAP, TRACE - only talk about PR_SET_SECCOMP now - fixed bad JLE32 check (coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com) - adds dropper.c: a simple system call disabler v6: - tweak the language to note the requirement of PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS being called prior to use. (luto@mit.edu) v5: - update sample to use system call arguments - adds a "fancy" example using a macro-based generator - cleaned up bpf in the sample - update docs to mention arguments - fix prctl value (eparis@redhat.com) - language cleanup (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v4: - update for no_new_privs use - minor tweaks v3: - call out BPF <-> Berkeley Packet Filter (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - document use of tentative always-unprivileged - guard sample compilation for i386 and x86_64 v2: - move code to samples (corbet@lwn.net) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:48:04 +08:00
/*
* Naive system call dropper built on seccomp_filter.
*
* Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium OS Authors <chromium-os-dev@chromium.org>
* Author: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
*
* The code may be used by anyone for any purpose,
* and can serve as a starting point for developing
* applications using prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, ...).
*
* When run, returns the specified errno for the specified
* system call number against the given architecture.
*
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static int install_filter(int nr, int arch, int error)
{
struct sock_filter filter[] = {
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, arch, 0, 3),
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, nr, 0, 1),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K,
SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(error & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),
};
struct sock_fprog prog = {
.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(filter)/sizeof(filter[0])),
.filter = filter,
};
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
perror("prctl(NO_NEW_PRIVS)");
return 1;
}
Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Documents how system call filtering using Berkeley Packet Filter programs works and how it may be used. Includes an example for x86 and a semi-generic example using a macro-based code generator. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - added acked by - update no new privs numbers v17: - remove @compat note and add Pitfalls section for arch checking (keescook@chromium.org) v16: - v15: - v14: - rebase/nochanges v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - comment on the ptrace_event use - update arch support comment - note the behavior of SECCOMP_RET_DATA when there are multiple filters (keescook@chromium.org) - lots of samples/ clean up incl 64-bit bpf-direct support (markus@chromium.org) - rebase to linux-next v11: - overhaul return value language, updates (keescook@chromium.org) - comment on do_exit(SIGSYS) v10: - update for SIGSYS - update for new seccomp_data layout - update for ptrace option use v9: - updated bpf-direct.c for SIGILL v8: - add PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to the samples. v7: - updated for all the new stuff in v7: TRAP, TRACE - only talk about PR_SET_SECCOMP now - fixed bad JLE32 check (coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com) - adds dropper.c: a simple system call disabler v6: - tweak the language to note the requirement of PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS being called prior to use. (luto@mit.edu) v5: - update sample to use system call arguments - adds a "fancy" example using a macro-based generator - cleaned up bpf in the sample - update docs to mention arguments - fix prctl value (eparis@redhat.com) - language cleanup (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v4: - update for no_new_privs use - minor tweaks v3: - call out BPF <-> Berkeley Packet Filter (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - document use of tentative always-unprivileged - guard sample compilation for i386 and x86_64 v2: - move code to samples (corbet@lwn.net) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:48:04 +08:00
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, 2, &prog)) {
perror("prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP)");
Documentation: prctl/seccomp_filter Documents how system call filtering using Berkeley Packet Filter programs works and how it may be used. Includes an example for x86 and a semi-generic example using a macro-based code generator. Acked-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> Acked-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> v18: - added acked by - update no new privs numbers v17: - remove @compat note and add Pitfalls section for arch checking (keescook@chromium.org) v16: - v15: - v14: - rebase/nochanges v13: - rebase on to 88ebdda6159ffc15699f204c33feb3e431bf9bdc v12: - comment on the ptrace_event use - update arch support comment - note the behavior of SECCOMP_RET_DATA when there are multiple filters (keescook@chromium.org) - lots of samples/ clean up incl 64-bit bpf-direct support (markus@chromium.org) - rebase to linux-next v11: - overhaul return value language, updates (keescook@chromium.org) - comment on do_exit(SIGSYS) v10: - update for SIGSYS - update for new seccomp_data layout - update for ptrace option use v9: - updated bpf-direct.c for SIGILL v8: - add PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to the samples. v7: - updated for all the new stuff in v7: TRAP, TRACE - only talk about PR_SET_SECCOMP now - fixed bad JLE32 check (coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com) - adds dropper.c: a simple system call disabler v6: - tweak the language to note the requirement of PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS being called prior to use. (luto@mit.edu) v5: - update sample to use system call arguments - adds a "fancy" example using a macro-based generator - cleaned up bpf in the sample - update docs to mention arguments - fix prctl value (eparis@redhat.com) - language cleanup (rdunlap@xenotime.net) v4: - update for no_new_privs use - minor tweaks v3: - call out BPF <-> Berkeley Packet Filter (rdunlap@xenotime.net) - document use of tentative always-unprivileged - guard sample compilation for i386 and x86_64 v2: - move code to samples (corbet@lwn.net) Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2012-04-13 05:48:04 +08:00
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
if (argc < 5) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n"
"dropper <syscall_nr> <arch> <errno> <prog> [<args>]\n"
"Hint: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: 0x%X\n"
" AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: 0x%X\n"
"\n", AUDIT_ARCH_I386, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64);
return 1;
}
if (install_filter(strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0), strtol(argv[2], NULL, 0),
strtol(argv[3], NULL, 0)))
return 1;
execv(argv[4], &argv[4]);
printf("Failed to execv\n");
return 255;
}