linux_old1/arch/powerpc/mm/book3s32/mmu.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
/*
* This file contains the routines for handling the MMU on those
* PowerPC implementations where the MMU substantially follows the
* architecture specification. This includes the 6xx, 7xx, 7xxx,
* and 8260 implementations but excludes the 8xx and 4xx.
* -- paulus
*
* Derived from arch/ppc/mm/init.c:
* Copyright (C) 1995-1996 Gary Thomas (gdt@linuxppc.org)
*
* Modifications by Paul Mackerras (PowerMac) (paulus@cs.anu.edu.au)
* and Cort Dougan (PReP) (cort@cs.nmt.edu)
* Copyright (C) 1996 Paul Mackerras
*
* Derived from "arch/i386/mm/init.c"
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994 Linus Torvalds
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/memblock.h>
#include <asm/prom.h>
#include <asm/mmu.h>
#include <asm/machdep.h>
#include <asm/code-patching.h>
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 03:08:49 +08:00
#include <asm/sections.h>
#include <mm/mmu_decl.h>
struct hash_pte *Hash;
static unsigned long Hash_size, Hash_mask;
unsigned long _SDR1;
static unsigned int hash_mb, hash_mb2;
struct ppc_bat BATS[8][2]; /* 8 pairs of IBAT, DBAT */
struct batrange { /* stores address ranges mapped by BATs */
unsigned long start;
unsigned long limit;
phys_addr_t phys;
} bat_addrs[8];
/*
* Return PA for this VA if it is mapped by a BAT, or 0
*/
phys_addr_t v_block_mapped(unsigned long va)
{
int b;
for (b = 0; b < ARRAY_SIZE(bat_addrs); ++b)
if (va >= bat_addrs[b].start && va < bat_addrs[b].limit)
return bat_addrs[b].phys + (va - bat_addrs[b].start);
return 0;
}
/*
* Return VA for a given PA or 0 if not mapped
*/
unsigned long p_block_mapped(phys_addr_t pa)
{
int b;
for (b = 0; b < ARRAY_SIZE(bat_addrs); ++b)
if (pa >= bat_addrs[b].phys
&& pa < (bat_addrs[b].limit-bat_addrs[b].start)
+bat_addrs[b].phys)
return bat_addrs[b].start+(pa-bat_addrs[b].phys);
return 0;
}
static int find_free_bat(void)
{
int b;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_601)) {
for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) {
struct ppc_bat *bat = BATS[b];
if (!(bat[0].batl & 0x40))
return b;
}
} else {
int n = mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_USE_HIGH_BATS) ? 8 : 4;
for (b = 0; b < n; b++) {
struct ppc_bat *bat = BATS[b];
if (!(bat[1].batu & 3))
return b;
}
}
return -1;
}
powerpc/32s: Fix BATs setting with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Serge reported some crashes with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX enabled on a book3s32 machine. Analysis shows two issues: - BATs addresses and sizes are not properly aligned. - There is a gap between the last address covered by BATs and the first address covered by pages. Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc13fffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1400000-0xc23fffff 0x01400000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2400000-0xc43fffff 0x02400000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4400000-0xc83fffff 0x04400000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8400000-0xd03fffff 0x08400000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0400000-0xe03fffff 0x10400000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe1000000-0xefffffff 0x21000000 240M rw present dirty accessed This patch fixes both issues. With the patch, we get the following which is as expected: Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc0ffffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe0000000-0xefffffff 0x20000000 256M rw present dirty accessed Fixes: 63b2bc619565 ("powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX") Reported-by: Serge Belyshev <belyshev@depni.sinp.msu.ru> Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-05-01 00:11:59 +08:00
/*
* This function calculates the size of the larger block usable to map the
* beginning of an area based on the start address and size of that area:
* - max block size is 8M on 601 and 256 on other 6xx.
* - base address must be aligned to the block size. So the maximum block size
* is identified by the lowest bit set to 1 in the base address (for instance
* if base is 0x16000000, max size is 0x02000000).
* - block size has to be a power of two. This is calculated by finding the
* highest bit set to 1.
*/
static unsigned int block_size(unsigned long base, unsigned long top)
{
unsigned int max_size = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_601) ? SZ_8M : SZ_256M;
powerpc/32s: Fix BATs setting with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Serge reported some crashes with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX enabled on a book3s32 machine. Analysis shows two issues: - BATs addresses and sizes are not properly aligned. - There is a gap between the last address covered by BATs and the first address covered by pages. Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc13fffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1400000-0xc23fffff 0x01400000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2400000-0xc43fffff 0x02400000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4400000-0xc83fffff 0x04400000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8400000-0xd03fffff 0x08400000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0400000-0xe03fffff 0x10400000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe1000000-0xefffffff 0x21000000 240M rw present dirty accessed This patch fixes both issues. With the patch, we get the following which is as expected: Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc0ffffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe0000000-0xefffffff 0x20000000 256M rw present dirty accessed Fixes: 63b2bc619565 ("powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX") Reported-by: Serge Belyshev <belyshev@depni.sinp.msu.ru> Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-05-01 00:11:59 +08:00
unsigned int base_shift = (ffs(base) - 1) & 31;
unsigned int block_shift = (fls(top - base) - 1) & 31;
return min3(max_size, 1U << base_shift, 1U << block_shift);
}
/*
* Set up one of the IBAT (block address translation) register pairs.
* The parameters are not checked; in particular size must be a power
* of 2 between 128k and 256M.
* Only for 603+ ...
*/
static void setibat(int index, unsigned long virt, phys_addr_t phys,
unsigned int size, pgprot_t prot)
{
unsigned int bl = (size >> 17) - 1;
int wimgxpp;
struct ppc_bat *bat = BATS[index];
unsigned long flags = pgprot_val(prot);
if (!cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_NEED_COHERENT))
flags &= ~_PAGE_COHERENT;
wimgxpp = (flags & _PAGE_COHERENT) | (_PAGE_EXEC ? BPP_RX : BPP_XX);
bat[0].batu = virt | (bl << 2) | 2; /* Vs=1, Vp=0 */
bat[0].batl = BAT_PHYS_ADDR(phys) | wimgxpp;
if (flags & _PAGE_USER)
bat[0].batu |= 1; /* Vp = 1 */
}
static void clearibat(int index)
{
struct ppc_bat *bat = BATS[index];
bat[0].batu = 0;
bat[0].batl = 0;
}
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 03:08:49 +08:00
static unsigned long __init __mmu_mapin_ram(unsigned long base, unsigned long top)
{
int idx;
while ((idx = find_free_bat()) != -1 && base != top) {
unsigned int size = block_size(base, top);
if (size < 128 << 10)
break;
setbat(idx, PAGE_OFFSET + base, base, size, PAGE_KERNEL_X);
base += size;
}
return base;
}
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 03:08:49 +08:00
unsigned long __init mmu_mapin_ram(unsigned long base, unsigned long top)
{
powerpc/32s: Fix BATs setting with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Serge reported some crashes with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX enabled on a book3s32 machine. Analysis shows two issues: - BATs addresses and sizes are not properly aligned. - There is a gap between the last address covered by BATs and the first address covered by pages. Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc13fffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1400000-0xc23fffff 0x01400000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2400000-0xc43fffff 0x02400000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4400000-0xc83fffff 0x04400000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8400000-0xd03fffff 0x08400000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0400000-0xe03fffff 0x10400000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe1000000-0xefffffff 0x21000000 240M rw present dirty accessed This patch fixes both issues. With the patch, we get the following which is as expected: Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc0ffffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe0000000-0xefffffff 0x20000000 256M rw present dirty accessed Fixes: 63b2bc619565 ("powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX") Reported-by: Serge Belyshev <belyshev@depni.sinp.msu.ru> Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-05-01 00:11:59 +08:00
unsigned long done;
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 03:08:49 +08:00
unsigned long border = (unsigned long)__init_begin - PAGE_OFFSET;
if (__map_without_bats) {
pr_debug("RAM mapped without BATs\n");
return base;
}
if (!strict_kernel_rwx_enabled() || base >= border || top <= border)
return __mmu_mapin_ram(base, top);
done = __mmu_mapin_ram(base, border);
powerpc/32s: Fix BATs setting with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Serge reported some crashes with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX enabled on a book3s32 machine. Analysis shows two issues: - BATs addresses and sizes are not properly aligned. - There is a gap between the last address covered by BATs and the first address covered by pages. Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc13fffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1400000-0xc23fffff 0x01400000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2400000-0xc43fffff 0x02400000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4400000-0xc83fffff 0x04400000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8400000-0xd03fffff 0x08400000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0400000-0xe03fffff 0x10400000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe1000000-0xefffffff 0x21000000 240M rw present dirty accessed This patch fixes both issues. With the patch, we get the following which is as expected: Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc0ffffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe0000000-0xefffffff 0x20000000 256M rw present dirty accessed Fixes: 63b2bc619565 ("powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX") Reported-by: Serge Belyshev <belyshev@depni.sinp.msu.ru> Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-05-01 00:11:59 +08:00
if (done != border)
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 03:08:49 +08:00
return done;
powerpc/32s: Fix BATs setting with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Serge reported some crashes with CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX enabled on a book3s32 machine. Analysis shows two issues: - BATs addresses and sizes are not properly aligned. - There is a gap between the last address covered by BATs and the first address covered by pages. Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc13fffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1400000-0xc23fffff 0x01400000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2400000-0xc43fffff 0x02400000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4400000-0xc83fffff 0x04400000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8400000-0xd03fffff 0x08400000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0400000-0xe03fffff 0x10400000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe1000000-0xefffffff 0x21000000 240M rw present dirty accessed This patch fixes both issues. With the patch, we get the following which is as expected: Memory mapped with DBATs: 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0bfffff 0x00800000 Kernel RO coherent 2: 0xc0c00000-0xc0ffffff 0x00c00000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent Memory mapped with pages: 0xe0000000-0xefffffff 0x20000000 256M rw present dirty accessed Fixes: 63b2bc619565 ("powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX") Reported-by: Serge Belyshev <belyshev@depni.sinp.msu.ru> Acked-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-05-01 00:11:59 +08:00
return __mmu_mapin_ram(border, top);
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 03:08:49 +08:00
}
void mmu_mark_initmem_nx(void)
{
int nb = mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_USE_HIGH_BATS) ? 8 : 4;
int i;
unsigned long base = (unsigned long)_stext - PAGE_OFFSET;
unsigned long top = (unsigned long)_etext - PAGE_OFFSET;
unsigned long size;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_601))
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 03:08:49 +08:00
return;
for (i = 0; i < nb - 1 && base < top && top - base > (128 << 10);) {
size = block_size(base, top);
setibat(i++, PAGE_OFFSET + base, base, size, PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT);
base += size;
}
if (base < top) {
size = block_size(base, top);
size = max(size, 128UL << 10);
if ((top - base) > size) {
if (strict_kernel_rwx_enabled())
pr_warn("Kernel _etext not properly aligned\n");
size <<= 1;
}
setibat(i++, PAGE_OFFSET + base, base, size, PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT);
base += size;
}
for (; i < nb; i++)
clearibat(i);
update_bats();
for (i = TASK_SIZE >> 28; i < 16; i++) {
/* Do not set NX on VM space for modules */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULES) &&
(VMALLOC_START & 0xf0000000) == i << 28)
break;
mtsrin(mfsrin(i << 28) | 0x10000000, i << 28);
}
}
void mmu_mark_rodata_ro(void)
{
int nb = mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_USE_HIGH_BATS) ? 8 : 4;
int i;
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_601))
powerpc/mm/32s: Use BATs for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX Today, STRICT_KERNEL_RWX is based on the use of regular pages to map kernel pages. On Book3s 32, it has three consequences: - Using pages instead of BAT for mapping kernel linear memory severely impacts performance. - Exec protection is not effective because no-execute cannot be set at page level (except on 603 which doesn't have hash tables) - Write protection is not effective because PP bits do not provide RO mode for kernel-only pages (except on 603 which handles it in software via PAGE_DIRTY) On the 603+, we have: - Independent IBAT and DBAT allowing limitation of exec parts. - NX bit can be set in segment registers to forbit execution on memory mapped by pages. - RO mode on DBATs even for kernel-only blocks. On the 601, there is nothing much we can do other than warn the user about it, because: - BATs are common to instructions and data. - BAT do not provide RO mode for kernel-only blocks. - segment registers don't have the NX bit. In order to use IBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns _etext to BAT block sizes (128kb) - Set NX bit in kernel segment register (Except on vmalloc area when CONFIG_MODULES is selected) - Maps kernel text with IBATs. In order to use DBAT for exec protection, this patch: - Aligns RW DATA to BAT block sizes (4M) - Maps kernel RO area with write prohibited DBATs - Maps remaining memory with remaining DBATs Here is what we get with this patch on a 832x when activating STRICT_KERNEL_RWX: Symbols: c0000000 T _stext c0680000 R __start_rodata c0680000 R _etext c0800000 T __init_begin c0800000 T _sinittext ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/block_address_translation ---[ Instruction Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc03fffff 0x00000000 Kernel EXEC coherent 1: 0xc0400000-0xc05fffff 0x00400000 Kernel EXEC coherent 2: 0xc0600000-0xc067ffff 0x00600000 Kernel EXEC coherent 3: - 4: - 5: - 6: - 7: - ---[ Data Block Address Translation ]--- 0: 0xc0000000-0xc07fffff 0x00000000 Kernel RO coherent 1: 0xc0800000-0xc0ffffff 0x00800000 Kernel RW coherent 2: 0xc1000000-0xc1ffffff 0x01000000 Kernel RW coherent 3: 0xc2000000-0xc3ffffff 0x02000000 Kernel RW coherent 4: 0xc4000000-0xc7ffffff 0x04000000 Kernel RW coherent 5: 0xc8000000-0xcfffffff 0x08000000 Kernel RW coherent 6: 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff 0x10000000 Kernel RW coherent 7: - ~# cat /sys/kernel/debug/segment_registers ---[ User Segments ]--- 0x00000000-0x0fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa085d0 0x10000000-0x1fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa086e1 0x20000000-0x2fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa087f2 0x30000000-0x3fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08903 0x40000000-0x4fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08a14 0x50000000-0x5fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08b25 0x60000000-0x6fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08c36 0x70000000-0x7fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08d47 0x80000000-0x8fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08e58 0x90000000-0x9fffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa08f69 0xa0000000-0xafffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0907a 0xb0000000-0xbfffffff Kern key 1 User key 1 VSID 0xa0918b ---[ Kernel Segments ]--- 0xc0000000-0xcfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ccc 0xd0000000-0xdfffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000ddd 0xe0000000-0xefffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000eee 0xf0000000-0xffffffff Kern key 0 User key 1 No Exec VSID 0x000fff Aligning _etext to 128kb allows to map up to 32Mb text with 8 IBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 2Mb + 1Mb + 512kb + 256kb + 128kb (+ 128kb) = 32Mb (A 9th IBAT is unneeded as 32Mb would need only a single 32Mb block) Aligning data to 4M allows to map up to 512Mb data with 8 DBATs: 16Mb + 8Mb + 4Mb + 4Mb + 32Mb + 64Mb + 128Mb + 256Mb = 512Mb Because some processors only have 4 BATs and because some targets need DBATs for mapping other areas, the following patch will allow to modify _etext and data alignment. Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2019-02-22 03:08:49 +08:00
return;
for (i = 0; i < nb; i++) {
struct ppc_bat *bat = BATS[i];
if (bat_addrs[i].start < (unsigned long)__init_begin)
bat[1].batl = (bat[1].batl & ~BPP_RW) | BPP_RX;
}
update_bats();
}
/*
* Set up one of the I/D BAT (block address translation) register pairs.
* The parameters are not checked; in particular size must be a power
* of 2 between 128k and 256M.
* On 603+, only set IBAT when _PAGE_EXEC is set
*/
void __init setbat(int index, unsigned long virt, phys_addr_t phys,
unsigned int size, pgprot_t prot)
{
unsigned int bl;
int wimgxpp;
struct ppc_bat *bat;
unsigned long flags = pgprot_val(prot);
if (index == -1)
index = find_free_bat();
if (index == -1) {
pr_err("%s: no BAT available for mapping 0x%llx\n", __func__,
(unsigned long long)phys);
return;
}
bat = BATS[index];
if ((flags & _PAGE_NO_CACHE) ||
(cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_NEED_COHERENT) == 0))
flags &= ~_PAGE_COHERENT;
bl = (size >> 17) - 1;
if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_601)) {
/* 603, 604, etc. */
/* Do DBAT first */
wimgxpp = flags & (_PAGE_WRITETHRU | _PAGE_NO_CACHE
| _PAGE_COHERENT | _PAGE_GUARDED);
wimgxpp |= (flags & _PAGE_RW)? BPP_RW: BPP_RX;
bat[1].batu = virt | (bl << 2) | 2; /* Vs=1, Vp=0 */
bat[1].batl = BAT_PHYS_ADDR(phys) | wimgxpp;
if (flags & _PAGE_USER)
bat[1].batu |= 1; /* Vp = 1 */
if (flags & _PAGE_GUARDED) {
/* G bit must be zero in IBATs */
flags &= ~_PAGE_EXEC;
}
if (flags & _PAGE_EXEC)
bat[0] = bat[1];
else
bat[0].batu = bat[0].batl = 0;
} else {
/* 601 cpu */
if (bl > BL_8M)
bl = BL_8M;
wimgxpp = flags & (_PAGE_WRITETHRU | _PAGE_NO_CACHE
| _PAGE_COHERENT);
wimgxpp |= (flags & _PAGE_RW)?
((flags & _PAGE_USER)? PP_RWRW: PP_RWXX): PP_RXRX;
bat->batu = virt | wimgxpp | 4; /* Ks=0, Ku=1 */
bat->batl = phys | bl | 0x40; /* V=1 */
}
bat_addrs[index].start = virt;
bat_addrs[index].limit = virt + ((bl + 1) << 17) - 1;
bat_addrs[index].phys = phys;
}
/*
* Preload a translation in the hash table
*/
void hash_preload(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long ea)
{
pmd_t *pmd;
powerpc/sparse: Fix plain integer as NULL pointer warning Trivial fix to remove the following sparse warnings: arch/powerpc/kernel/module_32.c:112:74: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/kernel/module_32.c:117:74: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:1155:28: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:1230:20: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:1385:36: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:1752:23: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:2084:19: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:2110:32: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:2167:19: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:2183:19: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:277:20: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/setup.c:155:67: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/setup.c:247:27: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/setup.c:249:27: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/setup.c:252:37: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:127:21: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:148:21: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:44:21: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:57:21: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:87:21: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c:160:31: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c:167:22: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c:274:21: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c:285:31: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/include/asm/hugetlb.h:204:16: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/mm/ppc_mmu_32.c:170:21: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/pci.c:1227:23: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/pci.c:65:24: warning: Using plain integer as NULL pointer Also use `--fix` command line option from `script/checkpatch --strict` to remove the following: CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!dispDeviceBase" #72: FILE: arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c:160: + if (dispDeviceBase == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!vbase" #80: FILE: arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c:167: + if (vbase == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!base" #89: FILE: arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c:274: + if (base == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!dispDeviceBase" #98: FILE: arch/powerpc/kernel/btext.c:285: + if (dispDeviceBase == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "strstr" #117: FILE: arch/powerpc/kernel/module_32.c:117: + if (strstr(secstrings + sechdrs[i].sh_name, ".debug") != NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!Hash" #130: FILE: arch/powerpc/mm/ppc_mmu_32.c:170: + if (Hash == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "Hash" #143: FILE: arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:44: + if (Hash != NULL) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!Hash" #152: FILE: arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:57: + if (Hash == NULL) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!Hash" #161: FILE: arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:87: + if (Hash == NULL) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!Hash" #170: FILE: arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:127: + if (Hash == NULL) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!Hash" #179: FILE: arch/powerpc/mm/tlb_hash32.c:148: + if (Hash == NULL) { ERROR: space required after that ';' (ctx:VxV) #192: FILE: arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/pci.c:65: + for (; node != NULL;node = node->sibling) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "node" #192: FILE: arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/pci.c:65: + for (; node != NULL;node = node->sibling) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!region" #201: FILE: arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/pci.c:1227: + if (region == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "of_get_property" #214: FILE: arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/setup.c:155: + if (of_get_property(np, "cache-unified", NULL) != NULL && dc) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!np" #223: FILE: arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/setup.c:247: + if (np == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "np" #226: FILE: arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/setup.c:249: + if (np != NULL) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "l2cr" #230: FILE: arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/setup.c:252: + if (l2cr != NULL) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "via" #243: FILE: drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:277: + if (via != NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "current_req" #252: FILE: drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:1155: + if (current_req != NULL) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!req" #261: FILE: drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:1230: + if (req == NULL || pmu_state != idle CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!req" #270: FILE: drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:1385: + if (req == NULL) { CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!pp" #288: FILE: drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:2084: + if (pp == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!pp" #297: FILE: drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:2110: + if (count < 1 || pp == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "!pp" #306: FILE: drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:2167: + if (pp == NULL) CHECK: Comparison to NULL could be written "pp" #315: FILE: drivers/macintosh/via-pmu.c:2183: + if (pp != NULL) { Link: https://github.com/linuxppc/linux/issues/37 Signed-off-by: Mathieu Malaterre <malat@debian.org> Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
2018-04-14 02:41:43 +08:00
if (!Hash)
return;
pmd = pmd_offset(pud_offset(pgd_offset(mm, ea), ea), ea);
if (!pmd_none(*pmd))
add_hash_page(mm->context.id, ea, pmd_val(*pmd));
}
/*
* This is called at the end of handling a user page fault, when the
* fault has been handled by updating a PTE in the linux page tables.
* We use it to preload an HPTE into the hash table corresponding to
* the updated linux PTE.
*
* This must always be called with the pte lock held.
*/
void update_mmu_cache(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address,
pte_t *ptep)
{
if (!mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_HPTE_TABLE))
return;
/*
* We don't need to worry about _PAGE_PRESENT here because we are
* called with either mm->page_table_lock held or ptl lock held
*/
/* We only want HPTEs for linux PTEs that have _PAGE_ACCESSED set */
if (!pte_young(*ptep) || address >= TASK_SIZE)
return;
/* We have to test for regs NULL since init will get here first thing at boot */
if (!current->thread.regs)
return;
/* We also avoid filling the hash if not coming from a fault */
if (TRAP(current->thread.regs) != 0x300 && TRAP(current->thread.regs) != 0x400)
return;
hash_preload(vma->vm_mm, address);
}
/*
* Initialize the hash table and patch the instructions in hashtable.S.
*/
void __init MMU_init_hw(void)
{
unsigned int n_hpteg, lg_n_hpteg;
if (!mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_HPTE_TABLE))
return;
if ( ppc_md.progress ) ppc_md.progress("hash:enter", 0x105);
#define LG_HPTEG_SIZE 6 /* 64 bytes per HPTEG */
#define SDR1_LOW_BITS ((n_hpteg - 1) >> 10)
#define MIN_N_HPTEG 1024 /* min 64kB hash table */
/*
* Allow 1 HPTE (1/8 HPTEG) for each page of memory.
* This is less than the recommended amount, but then
* Linux ain't AIX.
*/
n_hpteg = total_memory / (PAGE_SIZE * 8);
if (n_hpteg < MIN_N_HPTEG)
n_hpteg = MIN_N_HPTEG;
lg_n_hpteg = __ilog2(n_hpteg);
if (n_hpteg & (n_hpteg - 1)) {
++lg_n_hpteg; /* round up if not power of 2 */
n_hpteg = 1 << lg_n_hpteg;
}
Hash_size = n_hpteg << LG_HPTEG_SIZE;
/*
* Find some memory for the hash table.
*/
if ( ppc_md.progress ) ppc_md.progress("hash:find piece", 0x322);
arch: simplify several early memory allocations There are several early memory allocations in arch/ code that use memblock_phys_alloc() to allocate memory, convert the returned physical address to the virtual address and then set the allocated memory to zero. Exactly the same behaviour can be achieved simply by calling memblock_alloc(): it allocates the memory in the same way as memblock_phys_alloc(), then it performs the phys_to_virt() conversion and clears the allocated memory. Replace the longer sequence with a simpler call to memblock_alloc(). Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1546248566-14910-6-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> Cc: Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jonas Bonn <jonas@southpole.se> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com> Cc: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Stefan Kristiansson <stefan.kristiansson@saunalahti.fi> Cc: Vincent Chen <deanbo422@gmail.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-08 08:31:06 +08:00
Hash = memblock_alloc(Hash_size, Hash_size);
treewide: add checks for the return value of memblock_alloc*() Add check for the return value of memblock_alloc*() functions and call panic() in case of error. The panic message repeats the one used by panicing memblock allocators with adjustment of parameters to include only relevant ones. The replacement was mostly automated with semantic patches like the one below with manual massaging of format strings. @@ expression ptr, size, align; @@ ptr = memblock_alloc(size, align); + if (!ptr) + panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n", __func__, size, align); [anders.roxell@linaro.org: use '%pa' with 'phys_addr_t' type] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131161046.21886-1-anders.roxell@linaro.org [rppt@linux.ibm.com: fix format strings for panics after memblock_alloc] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548950940-15145-1-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com [rppt@linux.ibm.com: don't panic if the allocation in sparse_buffer_init fails] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190131074018.GD28876@rapoport-lnx [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix xtensa printk warning] Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1548057848-15136-20-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Guo Ren <ren_guo@c-sky.com> [c-sky] Acked-by: Paul Burton <paul.burton@mips.com> [MIPS] Acked-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> [s390] Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com> [Xen] Reviewed-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> [m68k] Acked-by: Max Filippov <jcmvbkbc@gmail.com> [xtensa] Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com> Cc: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr> Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net> Cc: Dennis Zhou <dennis@kernel.org> Cc: Greentime Hu <green.hu@gmail.com> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Cc: Guan Xuetao <gxt@pku.edu.cn> Cc: Guo Ren <guoren@kernel.org> Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com> Cc: Matt Turner <mattst88@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au> Cc: Michal Simek <monstr@monstr.eu> Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com> Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Cc: Rich Felker <dalias@libc.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh+dt@kernel.org> Cc: Rob Herring <robh@kernel.org> Cc: Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk> Cc: Stafford Horne <shorne@gmail.com> Cc: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com> Cc: Vineet Gupta <vgupta@synopsys.com> Cc: Yoshinori Sato <ysato@users.sourceforge.jp> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2019-03-12 14:30:31 +08:00
if (!Hash)
panic("%s: Failed to allocate %lu bytes align=0x%lx\n",
__func__, Hash_size, Hash_size);
_SDR1 = __pa(Hash) | SDR1_LOW_BITS;
pr_info("Total memory = %lldMB; using %ldkB for hash table\n",
(unsigned long long)(total_memory >> 20), Hash_size >> 10);
Hash_mask = n_hpteg - 1;
hash_mb2 = hash_mb = 32 - LG_HPTEG_SIZE - lg_n_hpteg;
if (lg_n_hpteg > 16)
hash_mb2 = 16 - LG_HPTEG_SIZE;
/*
* When KASAN is selected, there is already an early temporary hash
* table and the switch to the final hash table is done later.
*/
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN))
return;
MMU_init_hw_patch();
}
void __init MMU_init_hw_patch(void)
{
unsigned int hmask = Hash_mask >> (16 - LG_HPTEG_SIZE);
if (ppc_md.progress)
ppc_md.progress("hash:patch", 0x345);
if (ppc_md.progress)
ppc_md.progress("hash:done", 0x205);
/* WARNING: Make sure nothing can trigger a KASAN check past this point */
/*
* Patch up the instructions in hashtable.S:create_hpte
*/
modify_instruction_site(&patch__hash_page_A0, 0xffff,
((unsigned int)Hash - PAGE_OFFSET) >> 16);
modify_instruction_site(&patch__hash_page_A1, 0x7c0, hash_mb << 6);
modify_instruction_site(&patch__hash_page_A2, 0x7c0, hash_mb2 << 6);
modify_instruction_site(&patch__hash_page_B, 0xffff, hmask);
modify_instruction_site(&patch__hash_page_C, 0xffff, hmask);
/*
* Patch up the instructions in hashtable.S:flush_hash_page
*/
modify_instruction_site(&patch__flush_hash_A0, 0xffff,
((unsigned int)Hash - PAGE_OFFSET) >> 16);
modify_instruction_site(&patch__flush_hash_A1, 0x7c0, hash_mb << 6);
modify_instruction_site(&patch__flush_hash_A2, 0x7c0, hash_mb2 << 6);
modify_instruction_site(&patch__flush_hash_B, 0xffff, hmask);
}
void setup_initial_memory_limit(phys_addr_t first_memblock_base,
phys_addr_t first_memblock_size)
{
/* We don't currently support the first MEMBLOCK not mapping 0
* physical on those processors
*/
BUG_ON(first_memblock_base != 0);
/* 601 can only access 16MB at the moment */
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_601))
memblock_set_current_limit(min_t(u64, first_memblock_size, 0x01000000));
else /* Anything else has 256M mapped */
memblock_set_current_limit(min_t(u64, first_memblock_size, 0x10000000));
}
void __init print_system_hash_info(void)
{
pr_info("Hash_size = 0x%lx\n", Hash_size);
if (Hash_mask)
pr_info("Hash_mask = 0x%lx\n", Hash_mask);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_KUEP
void __init setup_kuep(bool disabled)
{
pr_info("Activating Kernel Userspace Execution Prevention\n");
if (disabled)
pr_warn("KUEP cannot be disabled yet on 6xx when compiled in\n");
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_KUAP
void __init setup_kuap(bool disabled)
{
pr_info("Activating Kernel Userspace Access Protection\n");
if (disabled)
pr_warn("KUAP cannot be disabled yet on 6xx when compiled in\n");
}
#endif