linux_old1/fs/proc/array.c

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/*
* linux/fs/proc/array.c
*
* Copyright (C) 1992 by Linus Torvalds
* based on ideas by Darren Senn
*
* Fixes:
* Michael. K. Johnson: stat,statm extensions.
* <johnsonm@stolaf.edu>
*
* Pauline Middelink : Made cmdline,envline only break at '\0's, to
* make sure SET_PROCTITLE works. Also removed
* bad '!' which forced address recalculation for
* EVERY character on the current page.
* <middelin@polyware.iaf.nl>
*
* Danny ter Haar : added cpuinfo
* <dth@cistron.nl>
*
* Alessandro Rubini : profile extension.
* <rubini@ipvvis.unipv.it>
*
* Jeff Tranter : added BogoMips field to cpuinfo
* <Jeff_Tranter@Mitel.COM>
*
* Bruno Haible : remove 4K limit for the maps file
* <haible@ma2s2.mathematik.uni-karlsruhe.de>
*
* Yves Arrouye : remove removal of trailing spaces in get_array.
* <Yves.Arrouye@marin.fdn.fr>
*
* Jerome Forissier : added per-CPU time information to /proc/stat
* and /proc/<pid>/cpu extension
* <forissier@isia.cma.fr>
* - Incorporation and non-SMP safe operation
* of forissier patch in 2.1.78 by
* Hans Marcus <crowbar@concepts.nl>
*
* aeb@cwi.nl : /proc/partitions
*
*
* Alan Cox : security fixes.
* <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
*
* Al Viro : safe handling of mm_struct
*
* Gerhard Wichert : added BIGMEM support
* Siemens AG <Gerhard.Wichert@pdb.siemens.de>
*
* Al Viro & Jeff Garzik : moved most of the thing into base.c and
* : proc_misc.c. The rest may eventually go into
* : base.c too.
*/
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/kernel_stat.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/mman.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/signal.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/times.h>
#include <linux/cpuset.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/delayacct.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/string_helpers.h>
#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <asm/pgtable.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include "internal.h"
static inline void task_name(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
{
char *buf;
char tcomm[sizeof(p->comm)];
get_task_comm(tcomm, p);
seq_puts(m, "Name:\t");
buf = m->buf + m->count;
/* Ignore error for now */
lib/string_helpers.c: change semantics of string_escape_mem The current semantics of string_escape_mem are inadequate for one of its current users, vsnprintf(). If that is to honour its contract, it must know how much space would be needed for the entire escaped buffer, and string_escape_mem provides no way of obtaining that (short of allocating a large enough buffer (~4 times input string) to let it play with, and that's definitely a big no-no inside vsnprintf). So change the semantics for string_escape_mem to be more snprintf-like: Return the size of the output that would be generated if the destination buffer was big enough, but of course still only write to the part of dst it is allowed to, and (contrary to snprintf) don't do '\0'-termination. It is then up to the caller to detect whether output was truncated and to append a '\0' if desired. Also, we must output partial escape sequences, otherwise a call such as snprintf(buf, 3, "%1pE", "\123") would cause printf to write a \0 to buf[2] but leaving buf[0] and buf[1] with whatever they previously contained. This also fixes a bug in the escaped_string() helper function, which used to unconditionally pass a length of "end-buf" to string_escape_mem(); since the latter doesn't check osz for being insanely large, it would happily write to dst. For example, kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "something and then %pE", ...); is an easy way to trigger an oops. In test-string_helpers.c, the -ENOMEM test is replaced with testing for getting the expected return value even if the buffer is too small. We also ensure that nothing is written (by relying on a NULL pointer deref) if the output size is 0 by passing NULL - this has to work for kasprintf("%pE") to work. In net/sunrpc/cache.c, I think qword_add still has the same semantics. Someone should definitely double-check this. In fs/proc/array.c, I made the minimum possible change, but longer-term it should stop poking around in seq_file internals. [andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: simplify qword_add] [andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com: add missed curly braces] Signed-off-by: Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk> Acked-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-04-16 07:17:28 +08:00
buf += string_escape_str(tcomm, buf, m->size - m->count,
ESCAPE_SPACE | ESCAPE_SPECIAL, "\n\\");
m->count = buf - m->buf;
seq_putc(m, '\n');
}
/*
* The task state array is a strange "bitmap" of
* reasons to sleep. Thus "running" is zero, and
* you can test for combinations of others with
* simple bit tests.
*/
static const char * const task_state_array[] = {
"R (running)", /* 0 */
"S (sleeping)", /* 1 */
"D (disk sleep)", /* 2 */
"T (stopped)", /* 4 */
"t (tracing stop)", /* 8 */
"X (dead)", /* 16 */
"Z (zombie)", /* 32 */
};
static inline const char *get_task_state(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
unsigned int state = (tsk->state | tsk->exit_state) & TASK_REPORT;
BUILD_BUG_ON(1 + ilog2(TASK_REPORT) != ARRAY_SIZE(task_state_array)-1);
return task_state_array[fls(state)];
}
static inline void task_state(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *p)
{
struct user_namespace *user_ns = seq_user_ns(m);
struct group_info *group_info;
int g;
struct task_struct *tracer;
const struct cred *cred;
pid_t ppid, tpid = 0, tgid, ngid;
unsigned int max_fds = 0;
rcu_read_lock();
ppid = pid_alive(p) ?
task_tgid_nr_ns(rcu_dereference(p->real_parent), ns) : 0;
tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
if (tracer)
tpid = task_pid_nr_ns(tracer, ns);
tgid = task_tgid_nr_ns(p, ns);
ngid = task_numa_group_id(p);
CRED: Fix get_task_cred() and task_state() to not resurrect dead credentials It's possible for get_task_cred() as it currently stands to 'corrupt' a set of credentials by incrementing their usage count after their replacement by the task being accessed. What happens is that get_task_cred() can race with commit_creds(): TASK_1 TASK_2 RCU_CLEANER -->get_task_cred(TASK_2) rcu_read_lock() __cred = __task_cred(TASK_2) -->commit_creds() old_cred = TASK_2->real_cred TASK_2->real_cred = ... put_cred(old_cred) call_rcu(old_cred) [__cred->usage == 0] get_cred(__cred) [__cred->usage == 1] rcu_read_unlock() -->put_cred_rcu() [__cred->usage == 1] panic() However, since a tasks credentials are generally not changed very often, we can reasonably make use of a loop involving reading the creds pointer and using atomic_inc_not_zero() to attempt to increment it if it hasn't already hit zero. If successful, we can safely return the credentials in the knowledge that, even if the task we're accessing has released them, they haven't gone to the RCU cleanup code. We then change task_state() in procfs to use get_task_cred() rather than calling get_cred() on the result of __task_cred(), as that suffers from the same problem. Without this change, a BUG_ON in __put_cred() or in put_cred_rcu() can be tripped when it is noticed that the usage count is not zero as it ought to be, for example: kernel BUG at kernel/cred.c:168! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP last sysfs file: /sys/kernel/mm/ksm/run CPU 0 Pid: 2436, comm: master Not tainted 2.6.33.3-85.fc13.x86_64 #1 0HR330/OptiPlex 745 RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff81069881>] [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45 RSP: 0018:ffff88019e7e9eb8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff880161514480 RCX: 00000000ffffffff RDX: 00000000ffffffff RSI: ffff880140c690c0 RDI: ffff880140c690c0 RBP: ffff88019e7e9eb8 R08: 00000000000000d0 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000040 R12: ffff880140c690c0 R13: ffff88019e77aea0 R14: 00007fff336b0a5c R15: 0000000000000001 FS: 00007f12f50d97c0(0000) GS:ffff880007400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f8f461bc000 CR3: 00000001b26ce000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Process master (pid: 2436, threadinfo ffff88019e7e8000, task ffff88019e77aea0) Stack: ffff88019e7e9ec8 ffffffff810698cd ffff88019e7e9ef8 ffffffff81069b45 <0> ffff880161514180 ffff880161514480 ffff880161514180 0000000000000000 <0> ffff88019e7e9f28 ffffffff8106aace 0000000000000001 0000000000000246 Call Trace: [<ffffffff810698cd>] put_cred+0x13/0x15 [<ffffffff81069b45>] commit_creds+0x16b/0x175 [<ffffffff8106aace>] set_current_groups+0x47/0x4e [<ffffffff8106ac89>] sys_setgroups+0xf6/0x105 [<ffffffff81009b02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b Code: 48 8d 71 ff e8 7e 4e 15 00 85 c0 78 0b 8b 75 ec 48 89 df e8 ef 4a 15 00 48 83 c4 18 5b c9 c3 55 8b 07 8b 07 48 89 e5 85 c0 74 04 <0f> 0b eb fe 65 48 8b 04 25 00 cc 00 00 48 3b b8 58 04 00 00 75 RIP [<ffffffff81069881>] __put_cred+0xc/0x45 RSP <ffff88019e7e9eb8> ---[ end trace df391256a100ebdd ]--- Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2010-07-29 19:45:49 +08:00
cred = get_task_cred(p);
task_lock(p);
if (p->files)
max_fds = files_fdtable(p->files)->max_fds;
task_unlock(p);
rcu_read_unlock();
seq_printf(m,
"State:\t%s\n"
"Tgid:\t%d\n"
"Ngid:\t%d\n"
"Pid:\t%d\n"
"PPid:\t%d\n"
"TracerPid:\t%d\n"
"Uid:\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\n"
"Gid:\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\n"
"FDSize:\t%d\nGroups:\t",
get_task_state(p),
tgid, ngid, pid_nr_ns(pid, ns), ppid, tpid,
from_kuid_munged(user_ns, cred->uid),
from_kuid_munged(user_ns, cred->euid),
from_kuid_munged(user_ns, cred->suid),
from_kuid_munged(user_ns, cred->fsuid),
from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->gid),
from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->egid),
from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->sgid),
from_kgid_munged(user_ns, cred->fsgid),
max_fds);
group_info = cred->group_info;
for (g = 0; g < group_info->ngroups; g++)
seq_printf(m, "%d ",
from_kgid_munged(user_ns, GROUP_AT(group_info, g)));
put_cred(cred);
#ifdef CONFIG_PID_NS
seq_puts(m, "\nNStgid:");
for (g = ns->level; g <= pid->level; g++)
seq_printf(m, "\t%d",
task_tgid_nr_ns(p, pid->numbers[g].ns));
seq_puts(m, "\nNSpid:");
for (g = ns->level; g <= pid->level; g++)
seq_printf(m, "\t%d",
task_pid_nr_ns(p, pid->numbers[g].ns));
seq_puts(m, "\nNSpgid:");
for (g = ns->level; g <= pid->level; g++)
seq_printf(m, "\t%d",
task_pgrp_nr_ns(p, pid->numbers[g].ns));
seq_puts(m, "\nNSsid:");
for (g = ns->level; g <= pid->level; g++)
seq_printf(m, "\t%d",
task_session_nr_ns(p, pid->numbers[g].ns));
#endif
seq_putc(m, '\n');
}
void render_sigset_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header,
sigset_t *set)
{
int i;
seq_puts(m, header);
i = _NSIG;
do {
int x = 0;
i -= 4;
if (sigismember(set, i+1)) x |= 1;
if (sigismember(set, i+2)) x |= 2;
if (sigismember(set, i+3)) x |= 4;
if (sigismember(set, i+4)) x |= 8;
seq_printf(m, "%x", x);
} while (i >= 4);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
}
static void collect_sigign_sigcatch(struct task_struct *p, sigset_t *ign,
sigset_t *catch)
{
struct k_sigaction *k;
int i;
k = p->sighand->action;
for (i = 1; i <= _NSIG; ++i, ++k) {
if (k->sa.sa_handler == SIG_IGN)
sigaddset(ign, i);
else if (k->sa.sa_handler != SIG_DFL)
sigaddset(catch, i);
}
}
static inline void task_sig(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
{
unsigned long flags;
sigset_t pending, shpending, blocked, ignored, caught;
int num_threads = 0;
unsigned long qsize = 0;
unsigned long qlim = 0;
sigemptyset(&pending);
sigemptyset(&shpending);
sigemptyset(&blocked);
sigemptyset(&ignored);
sigemptyset(&caught);
if (lock_task_sighand(p, &flags)) {
pending = p->pending.signal;
shpending = p->signal->shared_pending.signal;
blocked = p->blocked;
collect_sigign_sigcatch(p, &ignored, &caught);
num_threads = get_nr_threads(p);
rcu_read_lock(); /* FIXME: is this correct? */
qsize = atomic_read(&__task_cred(p)->user->sigpending);
rcu_read_unlock();
qlim = task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_SIGPENDING);
unlock_task_sighand(p, &flags);
}
seq_printf(m, "Threads:\t%d\n", num_threads);
seq_printf(m, "SigQ:\t%lu/%lu\n", qsize, qlim);
/* render them all */
render_sigset_t(m, "SigPnd:\t", &pending);
render_sigset_t(m, "ShdPnd:\t", &shpending);
render_sigset_t(m, "SigBlk:\t", &blocked);
render_sigset_t(m, "SigIgn:\t", &ignored);
render_sigset_t(m, "SigCgt:\t", &caught);
}
static void render_cap_t(struct seq_file *m, const char *header,
kernel_cap_t *a)
{
unsigned __capi;
seq_puts(m, header);
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(__capi) {
seq_printf(m, "%08x",
CAPABILITIES: remove undefined caps from all processes This is effectively a revert of 7b9a7ec565505699f503b4fcf61500dceb36e744 plus fixing it a different way... We found, when trying to run an application from an application which had dropped privs that the kernel does security checks on undefined capability bits. This was ESPECIALLY difficult to debug as those undefined bits are hidden from /proc/$PID/status. Consider a root application which drops all capabilities from ALL 4 capability sets. We assume, since the application is going to set eff/perm/inh from an array that it will clear not only the defined caps less than CAP_LAST_CAP, but also the higher 28ish bits which are undefined future capabilities. The BSET gets cleared differently. Instead it is cleared one bit at a time. The problem here is that in security/commoncap.c::cap_task_prctl() we actually check the validity of a capability being read. So any task which attempts to 'read all things set in bset' followed by 'unset all things set in bset' will not even attempt to unset the undefined bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So the 'parent' will look something like: CapInh: 0000000000000000 CapPrm: 0000000000000000 CapEff: 0000000000000000 CapBnd: ffffffc000000000 All of this 'should' be fine. Given that these are undefined bits that aren't supposed to have anything to do with permissions. But they do... So lets now consider a task which cleared the eff/perm/inh completely and cleared all of the valid caps in the bset (but not the invalid caps it couldn't read out of the kernel). We know that this is exactly what the libcap-ng library does and what the go capabilities library does. They both leave you in that above situation if you try to clear all of you capapabilities from all 4 sets. If that root task calls execve() the child task will pick up all caps not blocked by the bset. The bset however does not block bits higher than CAP_LAST_CAP. So now the child task has bits in eff which are not in the parent. These are 'meaningless' undefined bits, but still bits which the parent doesn't have. The problem is now in cred_cap_issubset() (or any operation which does a subset test) as the child, while a subset for valid cap bits, is not a subset for invalid cap bits! So now we set durring commit creds that the child is not dumpable. Given it is 'more priv' than its parent. It also means the parent cannot ptrace the child and other stupidity. The solution here: 1) stop hiding capability bits in status This makes debugging easier! 2) stop giving any task undefined capability bits. it's simple, it you don't put those invalid bits in CAP_FULL_SET you won't get them in init and you won't get them in any other task either. This fixes the cap_issubset() tests and resulting fallout (which made the init task in a docker container untraceable among other things) 3) mask out undefined bits when sys_capset() is called as it might use ~0, ~0 to denote 'all capabilities' for backward/forward compatibility. This lets 'capsh --caps="all=eip" -- -c /bin/bash' run. 4) mask out undefined bit when we read a file capability off of disk as again likely all bits are set in the xattr for forward/backward compatibility. This lets 'setcap all+pe /bin/bash; /bin/bash' run Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Andrew Vagin <avagin@openvz.org> Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Cc: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
2014-07-24 03:36:26 +08:00
a->cap[CAP_LAST_U32 - __capi]);
}
seq_putc(m, '\n');
}
static inline void task_cap(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
{
const struct cred *cred;
kernel_cap_t cap_inheritable, cap_permitted, cap_effective, cap_bset;
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(p);
cap_inheritable = cred->cap_inheritable;
cap_permitted = cred->cap_permitted;
cap_effective = cred->cap_effective;
cap_bset = cred->cap_bset;
rcu_read_unlock();
render_cap_t(m, "CapInh:\t", &cap_inheritable);
render_cap_t(m, "CapPrm:\t", &cap_permitted);
render_cap_t(m, "CapEff:\t", &cap_effective);
render_cap_t(m, "CapBnd:\t", &cap_bset);
}
static inline void task_seccomp(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *p)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP
seq_printf(m, "Seccomp:\t%d\n", p->seccomp.mode);
#endif
}
static inline void task_context_switch_counts(struct seq_file *m,
struct task_struct *p)
{
seq_printf(m, "voluntary_ctxt_switches:\t%lu\n"
"nonvoluntary_ctxt_switches:\t%lu\n",
p->nvcsw,
p->nivcsw);
}
static void task_cpus_allowed(struct seq_file *m, struct task_struct *task)
{
seq_printf(m, "Cpus_allowed:\t%*pb\n",
cpumask_pr_args(&task->cpus_allowed));
seq_printf(m, "Cpus_allowed_list:\t%*pbl\n",
cpumask_pr_args(&task->cpus_allowed));
}
int proc_pid_status(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(task);
task_name(m, task);
task_state(m, ns, pid, task);
if (mm) {
task_mem(m, mm);
mmput(mm);
}
task_sig(m, task);
task_cap(m, task);
task_seccomp(m, task);
task_cpus_allowed(m, task);
cpuset_task_status_allowed(m, task);
task_context_switch_counts(m, task);
return 0;
}
static int do_task_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task, int whole)
{
unsigned long vsize, eip, esp, wchan = ~0UL;
int priority, nice;
int tty_pgrp = -1, tty_nr = 0;
sigset_t sigign, sigcatch;
char state;
pid_t ppid = 0, pgid = -1, sid = -1;
int num_threads = 0;
int permitted;
struct mm_struct *mm;
unsigned long long start_time;
unsigned long cmin_flt = 0, cmaj_flt = 0;
unsigned long min_flt = 0, maj_flt = 0;
cputime_t cutime, cstime, utime, stime;
cputime_t cgtime, gtime;
unsigned long rsslim = 0;
char tcomm[sizeof(task->comm)];
unsigned long flags;
state = *get_task_state(task);
vsize = eip = esp = 0;
permitted = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ | PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT);
mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
vsize = task_vsize(mm);
if (permitted) {
eip = KSTK_EIP(task);
esp = KSTK_ESP(task);
}
}
get_task_comm(tcomm, task);
sigemptyset(&sigign);
sigemptyset(&sigcatch);
cutime = cstime = utime = stime = 0;
cgtime = gtime = 0;
if (lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
struct signal_struct *sig = task->signal;
if (sig->tty) {
struct pid *pgrp = tty_get_pgrp(sig->tty);
tty_pgrp = pid_nr_ns(pgrp, ns);
put_pid(pgrp);
tty_nr = new_encode_dev(tty_devnum(sig->tty));
}
num_threads = get_nr_threads(task);
collect_sigign_sigcatch(task, &sigign, &sigcatch);
cmin_flt = sig->cmin_flt;
cmaj_flt = sig->cmaj_flt;
cutime = sig->cutime;
cstime = sig->cstime;
cgtime = sig->cgtime;
rsslim = ACCESS_ONCE(sig->rlim[RLIMIT_RSS].rlim_cur);
/* add up live thread stats at the group level */
if (whole) {
struct task_struct *t = task;
do {
min_flt += t->min_flt;
maj_flt += t->maj_flt;
gtime += task_gtime(t);
} while_each_thread(task, t);
min_flt += sig->min_flt;
maj_flt += sig->maj_flt;
thread_group_cputime_adjusted(task, &utime, &stime);
gtime += sig->gtime;
}
sid = task_session_nr_ns(task, ns);
ppid = task_tgid_nr_ns(task->real_parent, ns);
pgid = task_pgrp_nr_ns(task, ns);
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
}
if (permitted && (!whole || num_threads < 2))
wchan = get_wchan(task);
if (!whole) {
min_flt = task->min_flt;
maj_flt = task->maj_flt;
task_cputime_adjusted(task, &utime, &stime);
gtime = task_gtime(task);
}
/* scale priority and nice values from timeslices to -20..20 */
/* to make it look like a "normal" Unix priority/nice value */
priority = task_prio(task);
nice = task_nice(task);
/* convert nsec -> ticks */
start_time = nsec_to_clock_t(task->real_start_time);
seq_printf(m, "%d (%s) %c", pid_nr_ns(pid, ns), tcomm, state);
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', ppid);
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', pgid);
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', sid);
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', tty_nr);
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', tty_pgrp);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', task->flags);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', min_flt);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', cmin_flt);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', maj_flt);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', cmaj_flt);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', cputime_to_clock_t(utime));
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', cputime_to_clock_t(stime));
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', cputime_to_clock_t(cutime));
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', cputime_to_clock_t(cstime));
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', priority);
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', nice);
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', num_threads);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', 0);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', start_time);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', vsize);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm ? get_mm_rss(mm) : 0);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', rsslim);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm ? (permitted ? mm->start_code : 1) : 0);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm ? (permitted ? mm->end_code : 1) : 0);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', (permitted && mm) ? mm->start_stack : 0);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', esp);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', eip);
/* The signal information here is obsolete.
* It must be decimal for Linux 2.0 compatibility.
* Use /proc/#/status for real-time signals.
*/
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', task->pending.signal.sig[0] & 0x7fffffffUL);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', task->blocked.sig[0] & 0x7fffffffUL);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', sigign.sig[0] & 0x7fffffffUL);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', sigcatch.sig[0] & 0x7fffffffUL);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', wchan);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', 0);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', 0);
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', task->exit_signal);
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', task_cpu(task));
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', task->rt_priority);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', task->policy);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', delayacct_blkio_ticks(task));
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', cputime_to_clock_t(gtime));
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', cputime_to_clock_t(cgtime));
if (mm && permitted) {
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm->start_data);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm->end_data);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm->start_brk);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm->arg_start);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm->arg_end);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm->env_start);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', mm->env_end);
} else
seq_printf(m, " 0 0 0 0 0 0 0");
if (permitted)
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', task->exit_code);
else
seq_put_decimal_ll(m, ' ', 0);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
if (mm)
mmput(mm);
return 0;
}
int proc_tid_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
return do_task_stat(m, ns, pid, task, 0);
}
int proc_tgid_stat(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
return do_task_stat(m, ns, pid, task, 1);
}
int proc_pid_statm(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
{
unsigned long size = 0, resident = 0, shared = 0, text = 0, data = 0;
struct mm_struct *mm = get_task_mm(task);
if (mm) {
size = task_statm(mm, &shared, &text, &data, &resident);
mmput(mm);
}
/*
* For quick read, open code by putting numbers directly
* expected format is
* seq_printf(m, "%lu %lu %lu %lu 0 %lu 0\n",
* size, resident, shared, text, data);
*/
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, 0, size);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', resident);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', shared);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', text);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', 0);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', data);
seq_put_decimal_ull(m, ' ', 0);
seq_putc(m, '\n');
return 0;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE
static struct pid *
get_children_pid(struct inode *inode, struct pid *pid_prev, loff_t pos)
{
struct task_struct *start, *task;
struct pid *pid = NULL;
read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
start = pid_task(proc_pid(inode), PIDTYPE_PID);
if (!start)
goto out;
/*
* Lets try to continue searching first, this gives
* us significant speedup on children-rich processes.
*/
if (pid_prev) {
task = pid_task(pid_prev, PIDTYPE_PID);
if (task && task->real_parent == start &&
!(list_empty(&task->sibling))) {
if (list_is_last(&task->sibling, &start->children))
goto out;
task = list_first_entry(&task->sibling,
struct task_struct, sibling);
pid = get_pid(task_pid(task));
goto out;
}
}
/*
* Slow search case.
*
* We might miss some children here if children
* are exited while we were not holding the lock,
* but it was never promised to be accurate that
* much.
*
* "Just suppose that the parent sleeps, but N children
* exit after we printed their tids. Now the slow paths
* skips N extra children, we miss N tasks." (c)
*
* So one need to stop or freeze the leader and all
* its children to get a precise result.
*/
list_for_each_entry(task, &start->children, sibling) {
if (pos-- == 0) {
pid = get_pid(task_pid(task));
break;
}
}
out:
read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
return pid;
}
static int children_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
struct inode *inode = seq->private;
pid_t pid;
pid = pid_nr_ns(v, inode->i_sb->s_fs_info);
return seq_printf(seq, "%d ", pid);
}
static void *children_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *pos)
{
return get_children_pid(seq->private, NULL, *pos);
}
static void *children_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *pos)
{
struct pid *pid;
pid = get_children_pid(seq->private, v, *pos + 1);
put_pid(v);
++*pos;
return pid;
}
static void children_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
{
put_pid(v);
}
static const struct seq_operations children_seq_ops = {
.start = children_seq_start,
.next = children_seq_next,
.stop = children_seq_stop,
.show = children_seq_show,
};
static int children_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct seq_file *m;
int ret;
ret = seq_open(file, &children_seq_ops);
if (ret)
return ret;
m = file->private_data;
m->private = inode;
return ret;
}
int children_seq_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
seq_release(inode, file);
return 0;
}
const struct file_operations proc_tid_children_operations = {
.open = children_seq_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = children_seq_release,
};
#endif /* CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE */