linux_old1/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c

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/*
* Implementation of the access vector table type.
*
* Author : Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
*/
/* Updated: Frank Mayer <mayerf@tresys.com> and Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
*
* Added conditional policy language extensions
*
* Copyright (C) 2003 Tresys Technology, LLC
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
* it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
* the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
*
* Updated: Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
* Tuned number of hash slots for avtab to reduce memory usage
*/
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include "avtab.h"
#include "policydb.h"
static struct kmem_cache *avtab_node_cachep;
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
static struct kmem_cache *avtab_xperms_cachep;
/* Based on MurmurHash3, written by Austin Appleby and placed in the
* public domain.
*/
static inline int avtab_hash(struct avtab_key *keyp, u32 mask)
{
static const u32 c1 = 0xcc9e2d51;
static const u32 c2 = 0x1b873593;
static const u32 r1 = 15;
static const u32 r2 = 13;
static const u32 m = 5;
static const u32 n = 0xe6546b64;
u32 hash = 0;
#define mix(input) { \
u32 v = input; \
v *= c1; \
v = (v << r1) | (v >> (32 - r1)); \
v *= c2; \
hash ^= v; \
hash = (hash << r2) | (hash >> (32 - r2)); \
hash = hash * m + n; \
}
mix(keyp->target_class);
mix(keyp->target_type);
mix(keyp->source_type);
#undef mix
hash ^= hash >> 16;
hash *= 0x85ebca6b;
hash ^= hash >> 13;
hash *= 0xc2b2ae35;
hash ^= hash >> 16;
return hash & mask;
}
static struct avtab_node*
avtab_insert_node(struct avtab *h, int hvalue,
struct avtab_node *prev, struct avtab_node *cur,
struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
{
struct avtab_node *newnode;
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
struct avtab_extended_perms *xperms;
newnode = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_node_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (newnode == NULL)
return NULL;
newnode->key = *key;
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
if (key->specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
xperms = kmem_cache_zalloc(avtab_xperms_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
if (xperms == NULL) {
kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
return NULL;
}
*xperms = *(datum->u.xperms);
newnode->datum.u.xperms = xperms;
} else {
newnode->datum.u.data = datum->u.data;
}
if (prev) {
newnode->next = prev->next;
prev->next = newnode;
} else {
newnode->next = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
if (flex_array_put_ptr(h->htable, hvalue, newnode,
GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO)) {
kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, newnode);
return NULL;
}
}
h->nel++;
return newnode;
}
static int avtab_insert(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
{
int hvalue;
struct avtab_node *prev, *cur, *newnode;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
if (!h || !h->htable)
return -EINVAL;
hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
cur;
prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
(specified & cur->key.specified)) {
/* extended perms may not be unique */
if (specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
break;
return -EEXIST;
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
}
if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
break;
}
newnode = avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
if (!newnode)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
/* Unlike avtab_insert(), this function allow multiple insertions of the same
* key/specified mask into the table, as needed by the conditional avtab.
* It also returns a pointer to the node inserted.
*/
struct avtab_node *
avtab_insert_nonunique(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key, struct avtab_datum *datum)
{
int hvalue;
struct avtab_node *prev, *cur;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
if (!h || !h->htable)
return NULL;
hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for (prev = NULL, cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue);
cur;
prev = cur, cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
(specified & cur->key.specified))
break;
if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
break;
}
return avtab_insert_node(h, hvalue, prev, cur, key, datum);
}
struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
{
int hvalue;
struct avtab_node *cur;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
if (!h || !h->htable)
return NULL;
hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue); cur;
cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
(specified & cur->key.specified))
return &cur->datum;
if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
break;
}
return NULL;
}
/* This search function returns a node pointer, and can be used in
* conjunction with avtab_search_next_node()
*/
struct avtab_node*
avtab_search_node(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *key)
{
int hvalue;
struct avtab_node *cur;
u16 specified = key->specified & ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
if (!h || !h->htable)
return NULL;
hvalue = avtab_hash(key, h->mask);
for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, hvalue); cur;
cur = cur->next) {
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
(specified & cur->key.specified))
return cur;
if (key->source_type < cur->key.source_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type < cur->key.target_type)
break;
if (key->source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
key->target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
key->target_class < cur->key.target_class)
break;
}
return NULL;
}
struct avtab_node*
avtab_search_node_next(struct avtab_node *node, int specified)
{
struct avtab_node *cur;
if (!node)
return NULL;
specified &= ~(AVTAB_ENABLED|AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD);
for (cur = node->next; cur; cur = cur->next) {
if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
node->key.target_class == cur->key.target_class &&
(specified & cur->key.specified))
return cur;
if (node->key.source_type < cur->key.source_type)
break;
if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
node->key.target_type < cur->key.target_type)
break;
if (node->key.source_type == cur->key.source_type &&
node->key.target_type == cur->key.target_type &&
node->key.target_class < cur->key.target_class)
break;
}
return NULL;
}
void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
{
int i;
struct avtab_node *cur, *temp;
if (!h || !h->htable)
return;
for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, i);
while (cur) {
temp = cur;
cur = cur->next;
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
if (temp->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)
kmem_cache_free(avtab_xperms_cachep,
temp->datum.u.xperms);
kmem_cache_free(avtab_node_cachep, temp);
}
}
flex_array_free(h->htable);
h->htable = NULL;
h->nslot = 0;
h->mask = 0;
}
int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
{
h->htable = NULL;
h->nel = 0;
return 0;
}
int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
{
u32 mask = 0;
u32 shift = 0;
u32 work = nrules;
u32 nslot = 0;
if (nrules == 0)
goto avtab_alloc_out;
while (work) {
work = work >> 1;
shift++;
}
if (shift > 2)
shift = shift - 2;
nslot = 1 << shift;
if (nslot > MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS)
nslot = MAX_AVTAB_HASH_BUCKETS;
mask = nslot - 1;
h->htable = flex_array_alloc(sizeof(struct avtab_node *), nslot,
GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO);
if (!h->htable)
return -ENOMEM;
avtab_alloc_out:
h->nel = 0;
h->nslot = nslot;
h->mask = mask;
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %d avtab hash slots, %d rules.\n",
h->nslot, nrules);
return 0;
}
void avtab_hash_eval(struct avtab *h, char *tag)
{
int i, chain_len, slots_used, max_chain_len;
unsigned long long chain2_len_sum;
struct avtab_node *cur;
slots_used = 0;
max_chain_len = 0;
chain2_len_sum = 0;
for (i = 0; i < h->nslot; i++) {
cur = flex_array_get_ptr(h->htable, i);
if (cur) {
slots_used++;
chain_len = 0;
while (cur) {
chain_len++;
cur = cur->next;
}
if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
max_chain_len = chain_len;
chain2_len_sum += chain_len * chain_len;
}
}
printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: %s: %d entries and %d/%d buckets used, "
"longest chain length %d sum of chain length^2 %llu\n",
tag, h->nel, slots_used, h->nslot, max_chain_len,
chain2_len_sum);
}
static uint16_t spec_order[] = {
AVTAB_ALLOWED,
AVTAB_AUDITDENY,
AVTAB_AUDITALLOW,
AVTAB_TRANSITION,
AVTAB_CHANGE,
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
AVTAB_MEMBER,
AVTAB_XPERMS_ALLOWED,
AVTAB_XPERMS_AUDITALLOW,
AVTAB_XPERMS_DONTAUDIT
};
int avtab_read_item(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol,
int (*insertf)(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k,
struct avtab_datum *d, void *p),
void *p)
{
__le16 buf16[4];
u16 enabled;
u32 items, items2, val, vers = pol->policyvers;
struct avtab_key key;
struct avtab_datum datum;
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
struct avtab_extended_perms xperms;
__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p)];
int i, rc;
unsigned set;
memset(&key, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_key));
memset(&datum, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_datum));
if (vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_AVTAB) {
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
items2 = le32_to_cpu(buf32[0]);
if (items2 > ARRAY_SIZE(buf32)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry overflow\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*items2);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
items = 0;
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.source_type = (u16)val;
if (key.source_type != val) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated source type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_type = (u16)val;
if (key.target_type != val) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
key.target_class = (u16)val;
if (key.target_class != val) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated target class\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
val = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
enabled = (val & AVTAB_ENABLED_OLD) ? AVTAB_ENABLED : 0;
if (!(val & (AVTAB_AV | AVTAB_TYPE))) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: null entry\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((val & AVTAB_AV) &&
(val & AVTAB_TYPE)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has both access vectors and types\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
if (val & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry has extended permissions\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
if (val & spec_order[i]) {
key.specified = spec_order[i] | enabled;
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(buf32[items++]);
rc = insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
}
if (items != items2) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: entry only had %d items, expected %d\n", items2, items);
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
rc = next_entry(buf16, fp, sizeof(u16)*4);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
items = 0;
key.source_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
key.target_type = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
key.target_class = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
key.specified = le16_to_cpu(buf16[items++]);
if (!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.source_type) ||
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, key.target_type) ||
!policydb_class_isvalid(pol, key.target_class)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type or class\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
set = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(spec_order); i++) {
if (key.specified & spec_order[i])
set++;
}
if (!set || set > 1) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: more than one specifier\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
if ((vers < POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL) &&
(key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: policy version %u does not "
"support extended permissions rules and one "
"was specified\n", vers);
return -EINVAL;
} else if (key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
memset(&xperms, 0, sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms));
rc = next_entry(&xperms.specified, fp, sizeof(u8));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
rc = next_entry(&xperms.driver, fp, sizeof(u8));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32)*ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(xperms.perms.p); i++)
xperms.perms.p[i] = le32_to_cpu(buf32[i]);
datum.u.xperms = &xperms;
} else {
rc = next_entry(buf32, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated entry\n");
return rc;
}
datum.u.data = le32_to_cpu(*buf32);
}
if ((key.specified & AVTAB_TYPE) &&
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
!policydb_type_isvalid(pol, datum.u.data)) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: invalid type\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return insertf(a, &key, &datum, p);
}
static int avtab_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k,
struct avtab_datum *d, void *p)
{
return avtab_insert(a, k, d);
}
int avtab_read(struct avtab *a, void *fp, struct policydb *pol)
{
int rc;
__le32 buf[1];
u32 nel, i;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc < 0) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: truncated table\n");
goto bad;
}
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
if (!nel) {
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: table is empty\n");
rc = -EINVAL;
goto bad;
}
rc = avtab_alloc(a, nel);
if (rc)
goto bad;
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = avtab_read_item(a, fp, pol, avtab_insertf, NULL);
if (rc) {
if (rc == -ENOMEM)
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: out of memory\n");
else if (rc == -EEXIST)
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: avtab: duplicate entry\n");
goto bad;
}
}
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
bad:
avtab_destroy(a);
goto out;
}
int avtab_write_item(struct policydb *p, struct avtab_node *cur, void *fp)
{
__le16 buf16[4];
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
__le32 buf32[ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p)];
int rc;
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
unsigned int i;
buf16[0] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.source_type);
buf16[1] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_type);
buf16[2] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.target_class);
buf16[3] = cpu_to_le16(cur->key.specified);
rc = put_entry(buf16, sizeof(u16), 4, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
if (cur->key.specified & AVTAB_XPERMS) {
rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->specified, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
rc = put_entry(&cur->datum.u.xperms->driver, sizeof(u8), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p); i++)
buf32[i] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p[i]);
rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32),
ARRAY_SIZE(cur->datum.u.xperms->perms.p), fp);
} else {
buf32[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur->datum.u.data);
rc = put_entry(buf32, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
}
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp)
{
unsigned int i;
int rc = 0;
struct avtab_node *cur;
__le32 buf[1];
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(a->nel);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
for (i = 0; i < a->nslot; i++) {
for (cur = flex_array_get_ptr(a->htable, i); cur;
cur = cur->next) {
rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
}
return rc;
}
void avtab_cache_init(void)
{
avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_node",
sizeof(struct avtab_node),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avtab_extended_perms",
sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms),
0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
}
void avtab_cache_destroy(void)
{
kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_node_cachep);
selinux: extended permissions for ioctls Add extended permissions logic to selinux. Extended permissions provides additional permissions in 256 bit increments. Extend the generic ioctl permission check to use the extended permissions for per-command filtering. Source/target/class sets including the ioctl permission may additionally include a set of commands. Example: allowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl unpriv_app_socket_cmds auditallowxperm <source> <target>:<class> ioctl priv_gpu_cmds Where unpriv_app_socket_cmds and priv_gpu_cmds are macros representing commonly granted sets of ioctl commands. When ioctl commands are omitted only the permissions are checked. This feature is intended to provide finer granularity for the ioctl permission that may be too imprecise. For example, the same driver may use ioctls to provide important and benign functionality such as driver version or socket type as well as dangerous capabilities such as debugging features, read/write/execute to physical memory or access to sensitive data. Per-command filtering provides a mechanism to reduce the attack surface of the kernel, and limit applications to the subset of commands required. The format of the policy binary has been modified to include ioctl commands, and the policy version number has been incremented to POLICYDB_VERSION_XPERMS_IOCTL=30 to account for the format change. The extended permissions logic is deliberately generic to allow components to be reused e.g. netlink filters Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com> Acked-by: Nick Kralevich <nnk@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
2015-07-11 05:19:56 +08:00
kmem_cache_destroy(avtab_xperms_cachep);
}