linux_old1/fs/proc/generic.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* proc/fs/generic.c --- generic routines for the proc-fs
*
* This file contains generic proc-fs routines for handling
* directories and files.
*
* Copyright (C) 1991, 1992 Linus Torvalds.
* Copyright (C) 1997 Theodore Ts'o
*/
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
include cleanup: Update gfp.h and slab.h includes to prepare for breaking implicit slab.h inclusion from percpu.h percpu.h is included by sched.h and module.h and thus ends up being included when building most .c files. percpu.h includes slab.h which in turn includes gfp.h making everything defined by the two files universally available and complicating inclusion dependencies. percpu.h -> slab.h dependency is about to be removed. Prepare for this change by updating users of gfp and slab facilities include those headers directly instead of assuming availability. As this conversion needs to touch large number of source files, the following script is used as the basis of conversion. http://userweb.kernel.org/~tj/misc/slabh-sweep.py The script does the followings. * Scan files for gfp and slab usages and update includes such that only the necessary includes are there. ie. if only gfp is used, gfp.h, if slab is used, slab.h. * When the script inserts a new include, it looks at the include blocks and try to put the new include such that its order conforms to its surrounding. It's put in the include block which contains core kernel includes, in the same order that the rest are ordered - alphabetical, Christmas tree, rev-Xmas-tree or at the end if there doesn't seem to be any matching order. * If the script can't find a place to put a new include (mostly because the file doesn't have fitting include block), it prints out an error message indicating which .h file needs to be added to the file. The conversion was done in the following steps. 1. The initial automatic conversion of all .c files updated slightly over 4000 files, deleting around 700 includes and adding ~480 gfp.h and ~3000 slab.h inclusions. The script emitted errors for ~400 files. 2. Each error was manually checked. Some didn't need the inclusion, some needed manual addition while adding it to implementation .h or embedding .c file was more appropriate for others. This step added inclusions to around 150 files. 3. The script was run again and the output was compared to the edits from #2 to make sure no file was left behind. 4. Several build tests were done and a couple of problems were fixed. e.g. lib/decompress_*.c used malloc/free() wrappers around slab APIs requiring slab.h to be added manually. 5. The script was run on all .h files but without automatically editing them as sprinkling gfp.h and slab.h inclusions around .h files could easily lead to inclusion dependency hell. Most gfp.h inclusion directives were ignored as stuff from gfp.h was usually wildly available and often used in preprocessor macros. Each slab.h inclusion directive was examined and added manually as necessary. 6. percpu.h was updated not to include slab.h. 7. Build test were done on the following configurations and failures were fixed. CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL was turned off for all tests (as my distributed build env didn't work with gcov compiles) and a few more options had to be turned off depending on archs to make things build (like ipr on powerpc/64 which failed due to missing writeq). * x86 and x86_64 UP and SMP allmodconfig and a custom test config. * powerpc and powerpc64 SMP allmodconfig * sparc and sparc64 SMP allmodconfig * ia64 SMP allmodconfig * s390 SMP allmodconfig * alpha SMP allmodconfig * um on x86_64 SMP allmodconfig 8. percpu.h modifications were reverted so that it could be applied as a separate patch and serve as bisection point. Given the fact that I had only a couple of failures from tests on step 6, I'm fairly confident about the coverage of this conversion patch. If there is a breakage, it's likely to be something in one of the arch headers which should be easily discoverable easily on most builds of the specific arch. Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org> Guess-its-ok-by: Christoph Lameter <cl@linux-foundation.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> Cc: Lee Schermerhorn <Lee.Schermerhorn@hp.com>
2010-03-24 16:04:11 +08:00
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/printk.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/idr.h>
#include <linux/bitops.h>
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
2007-07-16 14:39:00 +08:00
#include <linux/completion.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include "internal.h"
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
static DEFINE_RWLOCK(proc_subdir_lock);
struct kmem_cache *proc_dir_entry_cache __ro_after_init;
void pde_free(struct proc_dir_entry *pde)
{
if (S_ISLNK(pde->mode))
kfree(pde->data);
if (pde->name != pde->inline_name)
kfree(pde->name);
kmem_cache_free(proc_dir_entry_cache, pde);
}
static int proc_match(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry *de, unsigned int len)
{
if (len < de->namelen)
return -1;
if (len > de->namelen)
return 1;
return memcmp(name, de->name, len);
}
static struct proc_dir_entry *pde_subdir_first(struct proc_dir_entry *dir)
{
return rb_entry_safe(rb_first(&dir->subdir), struct proc_dir_entry,
subdir_node);
}
static struct proc_dir_entry *pde_subdir_next(struct proc_dir_entry *dir)
{
return rb_entry_safe(rb_next(&dir->subdir_node), struct proc_dir_entry,
subdir_node);
}
static struct proc_dir_entry *pde_subdir_find(struct proc_dir_entry *dir,
const char *name,
unsigned int len)
{
struct rb_node *node = dir->subdir.rb_node;
while (node) {
struct proc_dir_entry *de = rb_entry(node,
struct proc_dir_entry,
subdir_node);
int result = proc_match(name, de, len);
if (result < 0)
node = node->rb_left;
else if (result > 0)
node = node->rb_right;
else
return de;
}
return NULL;
}
static bool pde_subdir_insert(struct proc_dir_entry *dir,
struct proc_dir_entry *de)
{
struct rb_root *root = &dir->subdir;
struct rb_node **new = &root->rb_node, *parent = NULL;
/* Figure out where to put new node */
while (*new) {
struct proc_dir_entry *this = rb_entry(*new,
struct proc_dir_entry,
subdir_node);
int result = proc_match(de->name, this, de->namelen);
parent = *new;
if (result < 0)
new = &(*new)->rb_left;
else if (result > 0)
new = &(*new)->rb_right;
else
return false;
}
/* Add new node and rebalance tree. */
rb_link_node(&de->subdir_node, parent, new);
rb_insert_color(&de->subdir_node, root);
return true;
}
static int proc_notify_change(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
struct proc_dir_entry *de = PDE(inode);
int error;
error = setattr_prepare(dentry, iattr);
if (error)
return error;
setattr_copy(inode, iattr);
mark_inode_dirty(inode);
proc_set_user(de, inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid);
de->mode = inode->i_mode;
return 0;
}
statx: Add a system call to make enhanced file info available Add a system call to make extended file information available, including file creation and some attribute flags where available through the underlying filesystem. The getattr inode operation is altered to take two additional arguments: a u32 request_mask and an unsigned int flags that indicate the synchronisation mode. This change is propagated to the vfs_getattr*() function. Functions like vfs_stat() are now inline wrappers around new functions vfs_statx() and vfs_statx_fd() to reduce stack usage. ======== OVERVIEW ======== The idea was initially proposed as a set of xattrs that could be retrieved with getxattr(), but the general preference proved to be for a new syscall with an extended stat structure. A number of requests were gathered for features to be included. The following have been included: (1) Make the fields a consistent size on all arches and make them large. (2) Spare space, request flags and information flags are provided for future expansion. (3) Better support for the y2038 problem [Arnd Bergmann] (tv_sec is an __s64). (4) Creation time: The SMB protocol carries the creation time, which could be exported by Samba, which will in turn help CIFS make use of FS-Cache as that can be used for coherency data (stx_btime). This is also specified in NFSv4 as a recommended attribute and could be exported by NFSD [Steve French]. (5) Lightweight stat: Ask for just those details of interest, and allow a netfs (such as NFS) to approximate anything not of interest, possibly without going to the server [Trond Myklebust, Ulrich Drepper, Andreas Dilger] (AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC). (6) Heavyweight stat: Force a netfs to go to the server, even if it thinks its cached attributes are up to date [Trond Myklebust] (AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC). And the following have been left out for future extension: (7) Data version number: Could be used by userspace NFS servers [Aneesh Kumar]. Can also be used to modify fill_post_wcc() in NFSD which retrieves i_version directly, but has just called vfs_getattr(). It could get it from the kstat struct if it used vfs_xgetattr() instead. (There's disagreement on the exact semantics of a single field, since not all filesystems do this the same way). (8) BSD stat compatibility: Including more fields from the BSD stat such as creation time (st_btime) and inode generation number (st_gen) [Jeremy Allison, Bernd Schubert]. (9) Inode generation number: Useful for FUSE and userspace NFS servers [Bernd Schubert]. (This was asked for but later deemed unnecessary with the open-by-handle capability available and caused disagreement as to whether it's a security hole or not). (10) Extra coherency data may be useful in making backups [Andreas Dilger]. (No particular data were offered, but things like last backup timestamp, the data version number and the DOS archive bit would come into this category). (11) Allow the filesystem to indicate what it can/cannot provide: A filesystem can now say it doesn't support a standard stat feature if that isn't available, so if, for instance, inode numbers or UIDs don't exist or are fabricated locally... (This requires a separate system call - I have an fsinfo() call idea for this). (12) Store a 16-byte volume ID in the superblock that can be returned in struct xstat [Steve French]. (Deferred to fsinfo). (13) Include granularity fields in the time data to indicate the granularity of each of the times (NFSv4 time_delta) [Steve French]. (Deferred to fsinfo). (14) FS_IOC_GETFLAGS value. These could be translated to BSD's st_flags. Note that the Linux IOC flags are a mess and filesystems such as Ext4 define flags that aren't in linux/fs.h, so translation in the kernel may be a necessity (or, possibly, we provide the filesystem type too). (Some attributes are made available in stx_attributes, but the general feeling was that the IOC flags were to ext[234]-specific and shouldn't be exposed through statx this way). (15) Mask of features available on file (eg: ACLs, seclabel) [Brad Boyer, Michael Kerrisk]. (Deferred, probably to fsinfo. Finding out if there's an ACL or seclabal might require extra filesystem operations). (16) Femtosecond-resolution timestamps [Dave Chinner]. (A __reserved field has been left in the statx_timestamp struct for this - if there proves to be a need). (17) A set multiple attributes syscall to go with this. =============== NEW SYSTEM CALL =============== The new system call is: int ret = statx(int dfd, const char *filename, unsigned int flags, unsigned int mask, struct statx *buffer); The dfd, filename and flags parameters indicate the file to query, in a similar way to fstatat(). There is no equivalent of lstat() as that can be emulated with statx() by passing AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW in flags. There is also no equivalent of fstat() as that can be emulated by passing a NULL filename to statx() with the fd of interest in dfd. Whether or not statx() synchronises the attributes with the backing store can be controlled by OR'ing a value into the flags argument (this typically only affects network filesystems): (1) AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT tells statx() to behave as stat() does in this respect. (2) AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC will require a network filesystem to synchronise its attributes with the server - which might require data writeback to occur to get the timestamps correct. (3) AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC will suppress synchronisation with the server in a network filesystem. The resulting values should be considered approximate. mask is a bitmask indicating the fields in struct statx that are of interest to the caller. The user should set this to STATX_BASIC_STATS to get the basic set returned by stat(). It should be noted that asking for more information may entail extra I/O operations. buffer points to the destination for the data. This must be 256 bytes in size. ====================== MAIN ATTRIBUTES RECORD ====================== The following structures are defined in which to return the main attribute set: struct statx_timestamp { __s64 tv_sec; __s32 tv_nsec; __s32 __reserved; }; struct statx { __u32 stx_mask; __u32 stx_blksize; __u64 stx_attributes; __u32 stx_nlink; __u32 stx_uid; __u32 stx_gid; __u16 stx_mode; __u16 __spare0[1]; __u64 stx_ino; __u64 stx_size; __u64 stx_blocks; __u64 __spare1[1]; struct statx_timestamp stx_atime; struct statx_timestamp stx_btime; struct statx_timestamp stx_ctime; struct statx_timestamp stx_mtime; __u32 stx_rdev_major; __u32 stx_rdev_minor; __u32 stx_dev_major; __u32 stx_dev_minor; __u64 __spare2[14]; }; The defined bits in request_mask and stx_mask are: STATX_TYPE Want/got stx_mode & S_IFMT STATX_MODE Want/got stx_mode & ~S_IFMT STATX_NLINK Want/got stx_nlink STATX_UID Want/got stx_uid STATX_GID Want/got stx_gid STATX_ATIME Want/got stx_atime{,_ns} STATX_MTIME Want/got stx_mtime{,_ns} STATX_CTIME Want/got stx_ctime{,_ns} STATX_INO Want/got stx_ino STATX_SIZE Want/got stx_size STATX_BLOCKS Want/got stx_blocks STATX_BASIC_STATS [The stuff in the normal stat struct] STATX_BTIME Want/got stx_btime{,_ns} STATX_ALL [All currently available stuff] stx_btime is the file creation time, stx_mask is a bitmask indicating the data provided and __spares*[] are where as-yet undefined fields can be placed. Time fields are structures with separate seconds and nanoseconds fields plus a reserved field in case we want to add even finer resolution. Note that times will be negative if before 1970; in such a case, the nanosecond fields will also be negative if not zero. The bits defined in the stx_attributes field convey information about a file, how it is accessed, where it is and what it does. The following attributes map to FS_*_FL flags and are the same numerical value: STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED File is compressed by the fs STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE File is marked immutable STATX_ATTR_APPEND File is append-only STATX_ATTR_NODUMP File is not to be dumped STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED File requires key to decrypt in fs Within the kernel, the supported flags are listed by: KSTAT_ATTR_FS_IOC_FLAGS [Are any other IOC flags of sufficient general interest to be exposed through this interface?] New flags include: STATX_ATTR_AUTOMOUNT Object is an automount trigger These are for the use of GUI tools that might want to mark files specially, depending on what they are. Fields in struct statx come in a number of classes: (0) stx_dev_*, stx_blksize. These are local system information and are always available. (1) stx_mode, stx_nlinks, stx_uid, stx_gid, stx_[amc]time, stx_ino, stx_size, stx_blocks. These will be returned whether the caller asks for them or not. The corresponding bits in stx_mask will be set to indicate whether they actually have valid values. If the caller didn't ask for them, then they may be approximated. For example, NFS won't waste any time updating them from the server, unless as a byproduct of updating something requested. If the values don't actually exist for the underlying object (such as UID or GID on a DOS file), then the bit won't be set in the stx_mask, even if the caller asked for the value. In such a case, the returned value will be a fabrication. Note that there are instances where the type might not be valid, for instance Windows reparse points. (2) stx_rdev_*. This will be set only if stx_mode indicates we're looking at a blockdev or a chardev, otherwise will be 0. (3) stx_btime. Similar to (1), except this will be set to 0 if it doesn't exist. ======= TESTING ======= The following test program can be used to test the statx system call: samples/statx/test-statx.c Just compile and run, passing it paths to the files you want to examine. The file is built automatically if CONFIG_SAMPLES is enabled. Here's some example output. Firstly, an NFS directory that crosses to another FSID. Note that the AUTOMOUNT attribute is set because transiting this directory will cause d_automount to be invoked by the VFS. [root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx -A /warthog/data statx(/warthog/data) = 0 results=7ff Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory Device: 00:26 Inode: 1703937 Links: 125 Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041 Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000 Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Attributes: 0000000000001000 (-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ---m---- --------) Secondly, the result of automounting on that directory. [root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx /warthog/data statx(/warthog/data) = 0 results=7ff Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory Device: 00:27 Inode: 2 Links: 125 Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041 Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000 Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-02-01 00:46:22 +08:00
static int proc_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat,
u32 request_mask, unsigned int query_flags)
{
statx: Add a system call to make enhanced file info available Add a system call to make extended file information available, including file creation and some attribute flags where available through the underlying filesystem. The getattr inode operation is altered to take two additional arguments: a u32 request_mask and an unsigned int flags that indicate the synchronisation mode. This change is propagated to the vfs_getattr*() function. Functions like vfs_stat() are now inline wrappers around new functions vfs_statx() and vfs_statx_fd() to reduce stack usage. ======== OVERVIEW ======== The idea was initially proposed as a set of xattrs that could be retrieved with getxattr(), but the general preference proved to be for a new syscall with an extended stat structure. A number of requests were gathered for features to be included. The following have been included: (1) Make the fields a consistent size on all arches and make them large. (2) Spare space, request flags and information flags are provided for future expansion. (3) Better support for the y2038 problem [Arnd Bergmann] (tv_sec is an __s64). (4) Creation time: The SMB protocol carries the creation time, which could be exported by Samba, which will in turn help CIFS make use of FS-Cache as that can be used for coherency data (stx_btime). This is also specified in NFSv4 as a recommended attribute and could be exported by NFSD [Steve French]. (5) Lightweight stat: Ask for just those details of interest, and allow a netfs (such as NFS) to approximate anything not of interest, possibly without going to the server [Trond Myklebust, Ulrich Drepper, Andreas Dilger] (AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC). (6) Heavyweight stat: Force a netfs to go to the server, even if it thinks its cached attributes are up to date [Trond Myklebust] (AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC). And the following have been left out for future extension: (7) Data version number: Could be used by userspace NFS servers [Aneesh Kumar]. Can also be used to modify fill_post_wcc() in NFSD which retrieves i_version directly, but has just called vfs_getattr(). It could get it from the kstat struct if it used vfs_xgetattr() instead. (There's disagreement on the exact semantics of a single field, since not all filesystems do this the same way). (8) BSD stat compatibility: Including more fields from the BSD stat such as creation time (st_btime) and inode generation number (st_gen) [Jeremy Allison, Bernd Schubert]. (9) Inode generation number: Useful for FUSE and userspace NFS servers [Bernd Schubert]. (This was asked for but later deemed unnecessary with the open-by-handle capability available and caused disagreement as to whether it's a security hole or not). (10) Extra coherency data may be useful in making backups [Andreas Dilger]. (No particular data were offered, but things like last backup timestamp, the data version number and the DOS archive bit would come into this category). (11) Allow the filesystem to indicate what it can/cannot provide: A filesystem can now say it doesn't support a standard stat feature if that isn't available, so if, for instance, inode numbers or UIDs don't exist or are fabricated locally... (This requires a separate system call - I have an fsinfo() call idea for this). (12) Store a 16-byte volume ID in the superblock that can be returned in struct xstat [Steve French]. (Deferred to fsinfo). (13) Include granularity fields in the time data to indicate the granularity of each of the times (NFSv4 time_delta) [Steve French]. (Deferred to fsinfo). (14) FS_IOC_GETFLAGS value. These could be translated to BSD's st_flags. Note that the Linux IOC flags are a mess and filesystems such as Ext4 define flags that aren't in linux/fs.h, so translation in the kernel may be a necessity (or, possibly, we provide the filesystem type too). (Some attributes are made available in stx_attributes, but the general feeling was that the IOC flags were to ext[234]-specific and shouldn't be exposed through statx this way). (15) Mask of features available on file (eg: ACLs, seclabel) [Brad Boyer, Michael Kerrisk]. (Deferred, probably to fsinfo. Finding out if there's an ACL or seclabal might require extra filesystem operations). (16) Femtosecond-resolution timestamps [Dave Chinner]. (A __reserved field has been left in the statx_timestamp struct for this - if there proves to be a need). (17) A set multiple attributes syscall to go with this. =============== NEW SYSTEM CALL =============== The new system call is: int ret = statx(int dfd, const char *filename, unsigned int flags, unsigned int mask, struct statx *buffer); The dfd, filename and flags parameters indicate the file to query, in a similar way to fstatat(). There is no equivalent of lstat() as that can be emulated with statx() by passing AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW in flags. There is also no equivalent of fstat() as that can be emulated by passing a NULL filename to statx() with the fd of interest in dfd. Whether or not statx() synchronises the attributes with the backing store can be controlled by OR'ing a value into the flags argument (this typically only affects network filesystems): (1) AT_STATX_SYNC_AS_STAT tells statx() to behave as stat() does in this respect. (2) AT_STATX_FORCE_SYNC will require a network filesystem to synchronise its attributes with the server - which might require data writeback to occur to get the timestamps correct. (3) AT_STATX_DONT_SYNC will suppress synchronisation with the server in a network filesystem. The resulting values should be considered approximate. mask is a bitmask indicating the fields in struct statx that are of interest to the caller. The user should set this to STATX_BASIC_STATS to get the basic set returned by stat(). It should be noted that asking for more information may entail extra I/O operations. buffer points to the destination for the data. This must be 256 bytes in size. ====================== MAIN ATTRIBUTES RECORD ====================== The following structures are defined in which to return the main attribute set: struct statx_timestamp { __s64 tv_sec; __s32 tv_nsec; __s32 __reserved; }; struct statx { __u32 stx_mask; __u32 stx_blksize; __u64 stx_attributes; __u32 stx_nlink; __u32 stx_uid; __u32 stx_gid; __u16 stx_mode; __u16 __spare0[1]; __u64 stx_ino; __u64 stx_size; __u64 stx_blocks; __u64 __spare1[1]; struct statx_timestamp stx_atime; struct statx_timestamp stx_btime; struct statx_timestamp stx_ctime; struct statx_timestamp stx_mtime; __u32 stx_rdev_major; __u32 stx_rdev_minor; __u32 stx_dev_major; __u32 stx_dev_minor; __u64 __spare2[14]; }; The defined bits in request_mask and stx_mask are: STATX_TYPE Want/got stx_mode & S_IFMT STATX_MODE Want/got stx_mode & ~S_IFMT STATX_NLINK Want/got stx_nlink STATX_UID Want/got stx_uid STATX_GID Want/got stx_gid STATX_ATIME Want/got stx_atime{,_ns} STATX_MTIME Want/got stx_mtime{,_ns} STATX_CTIME Want/got stx_ctime{,_ns} STATX_INO Want/got stx_ino STATX_SIZE Want/got stx_size STATX_BLOCKS Want/got stx_blocks STATX_BASIC_STATS [The stuff in the normal stat struct] STATX_BTIME Want/got stx_btime{,_ns} STATX_ALL [All currently available stuff] stx_btime is the file creation time, stx_mask is a bitmask indicating the data provided and __spares*[] are where as-yet undefined fields can be placed. Time fields are structures with separate seconds and nanoseconds fields plus a reserved field in case we want to add even finer resolution. Note that times will be negative if before 1970; in such a case, the nanosecond fields will also be negative if not zero. The bits defined in the stx_attributes field convey information about a file, how it is accessed, where it is and what it does. The following attributes map to FS_*_FL flags and are the same numerical value: STATX_ATTR_COMPRESSED File is compressed by the fs STATX_ATTR_IMMUTABLE File is marked immutable STATX_ATTR_APPEND File is append-only STATX_ATTR_NODUMP File is not to be dumped STATX_ATTR_ENCRYPTED File requires key to decrypt in fs Within the kernel, the supported flags are listed by: KSTAT_ATTR_FS_IOC_FLAGS [Are any other IOC flags of sufficient general interest to be exposed through this interface?] New flags include: STATX_ATTR_AUTOMOUNT Object is an automount trigger These are for the use of GUI tools that might want to mark files specially, depending on what they are. Fields in struct statx come in a number of classes: (0) stx_dev_*, stx_blksize. These are local system information and are always available. (1) stx_mode, stx_nlinks, stx_uid, stx_gid, stx_[amc]time, stx_ino, stx_size, stx_blocks. These will be returned whether the caller asks for them or not. The corresponding bits in stx_mask will be set to indicate whether they actually have valid values. If the caller didn't ask for them, then they may be approximated. For example, NFS won't waste any time updating them from the server, unless as a byproduct of updating something requested. If the values don't actually exist for the underlying object (such as UID or GID on a DOS file), then the bit won't be set in the stx_mask, even if the caller asked for the value. In such a case, the returned value will be a fabrication. Note that there are instances where the type might not be valid, for instance Windows reparse points. (2) stx_rdev_*. This will be set only if stx_mode indicates we're looking at a blockdev or a chardev, otherwise will be 0. (3) stx_btime. Similar to (1), except this will be set to 0 if it doesn't exist. ======= TESTING ======= The following test program can be used to test the statx system call: samples/statx/test-statx.c Just compile and run, passing it paths to the files you want to examine. The file is built automatically if CONFIG_SAMPLES is enabled. Here's some example output. Firstly, an NFS directory that crosses to another FSID. Note that the AUTOMOUNT attribute is set because transiting this directory will cause d_automount to be invoked by the VFS. [root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx -A /warthog/data statx(/warthog/data) = 0 results=7ff Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory Device: 00:26 Inode: 1703937 Links: 125 Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041 Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000 Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Attributes: 0000000000001000 (-------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ---m---- --------) Secondly, the result of automounting on that directory. [root@andromeda ~]# /tmp/test-statx /warthog/data statx(/warthog/data) = 0 results=7ff Size: 4096 Blocks: 8 IO Block: 1048576 directory Device: 00:27 Inode: 2 Links: 125 Access: (3777/drwxrwxrwx) Uid: 0 Gid: 4041 Access: 2016-11-24 09:02:12.219699527+0000 Modify: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Change: 2016-11-17 10:44:36.225653653+0000 Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
2017-02-01 00:46:22 +08:00
struct inode *inode = d_inode(path->dentry);
struct proc_dir_entry *de = PDE(inode);
if (de && de->nlink)
set_nlink(inode, de->nlink);
generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
return 0;
}
static const struct inode_operations proc_file_inode_operations = {
.setattr = proc_notify_change,
};
/*
* This function parses a name such as "tty/driver/serial", and
* returns the struct proc_dir_entry for "/proc/tty/driver", and
* returns "serial" in residual.
*/
static int __xlate_proc_name(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry **ret,
const char **residual)
{
const char *cp = name, *next;
struct proc_dir_entry *de;
unsigned int len;
de = *ret;
if (!de)
de = &proc_root;
while (1) {
next = strchr(cp, '/');
if (!next)
break;
len = next - cp;
de = pde_subdir_find(de, cp, len);
if (!de) {
WARN(1, "name '%s'\n", name);
return -ENOENT;
}
cp += len + 1;
}
*residual = cp;
*ret = de;
return 0;
}
static int xlate_proc_name(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry **ret,
const char **residual)
{
int rv;
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
read_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
rv = __xlate_proc_name(name, ret, residual);
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
read_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
return rv;
}
static DEFINE_IDA(proc_inum_ida);
#define PROC_DYNAMIC_FIRST 0xF0000000U
/*
* Return an inode number between PROC_DYNAMIC_FIRST and
* 0xffffffff, or zero on failure.
*/
int proc_alloc_inum(unsigned int *inum)
{
int i;
i = ida_simple_get(&proc_inum_ida, 0, UINT_MAX - PROC_DYNAMIC_FIRST + 1,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (i < 0)
return i;
*inum = PROC_DYNAMIC_FIRST + (unsigned int)i;
return 0;
}
void proc_free_inum(unsigned int inum)
{
ida_simple_remove(&proc_inum_ida, inum - PROC_DYNAMIC_FIRST);
}
static int proc_misc_d_revalidate(struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
if (flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
return -ECHILD;
if (atomic_read(&PDE(d_inode(dentry))->in_use) < 0)
return 0; /* revalidate */
return 1;
}
static int proc_misc_d_delete(const struct dentry *dentry)
{
return atomic_read(&PDE(d_inode(dentry))->in_use) < 0;
}
static const struct dentry_operations proc_misc_dentry_ops = {
.d_revalidate = proc_misc_d_revalidate,
.d_delete = proc_misc_d_delete,
};
/*
* Don't create negative dentries here, return -ENOENT by hand
* instead.
*/
struct dentry *proc_lookup_de(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
struct proc_dir_entry *de)
{
struct inode *inode;
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
read_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
de = pde_subdir_find(de, dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len);
if (de) {
pde_get(de);
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
read_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
inode = proc_get_inode(dir->i_sb, de);
if (!inode)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
d_set_d_op(dentry, de->proc_dops);
return d_splice_alias(inode, dentry);
}
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
read_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
}
[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3) Current /proc/net is done with so called "shadows", but current implementation is broken and has little chances to get fixed. The problem is that dentries subtree of /proc/net directory has fancy revalidation rules to make processes living in different net namespaces see different entries in /proc/net subtree, but currently, tasks see in the /proc/net subdir the contents of any other namespace, depending on who opened the file first. The proposed fix is to turn /proc/net into a symlink, which points to /proc/self/net, which in turn shows what previously was in /proc/net - the network-related info, from the net namespace the appropriate task lives in. # ls -l /proc/net lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Mar 5 15:17 /proc/net -> self/net In other words - this behaves like /proc/mounts, but unlike "mounts", "net" is not a file, but a directory. Changes from v2: * Fixed discrepancy of /proc/net nlink count and selinux labeling screwup pointed out by Stephen. To get the correct nlink count the ->getattr callback for /proc/net is overridden to read one from the net->proc_net entry. To make selinux still work the net->proc_net entry is initialized properly, i.e. with the "net" name and the proc_net parent. Selinux fixes are Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Changes from v1: * Fixed a task_struct leak in get_proc_task_net, pointed out by Paul. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-03-08 03:08:40 +08:00
struct dentry *proc_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int flags)
[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3) Current /proc/net is done with so called "shadows", but current implementation is broken and has little chances to get fixed. The problem is that dentries subtree of /proc/net directory has fancy revalidation rules to make processes living in different net namespaces see different entries in /proc/net subtree, but currently, tasks see in the /proc/net subdir the contents of any other namespace, depending on who opened the file first. The proposed fix is to turn /proc/net into a symlink, which points to /proc/self/net, which in turn shows what previously was in /proc/net - the network-related info, from the net namespace the appropriate task lives in. # ls -l /proc/net lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Mar 5 15:17 /proc/net -> self/net In other words - this behaves like /proc/mounts, but unlike "mounts", "net" is not a file, but a directory. Changes from v2: * Fixed discrepancy of /proc/net nlink count and selinux labeling screwup pointed out by Stephen. To get the correct nlink count the ->getattr callback for /proc/net is overridden to read one from the net->proc_net entry. To make selinux still work the net->proc_net entry is initialized properly, i.e. with the "net" name and the proc_net parent. Selinux fixes are Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Changes from v1: * Fixed a task_struct leak in get_proc_task_net, pointed out by Paul. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-03-08 03:08:40 +08:00
{
return proc_lookup_de(dir, dentry, PDE(dir));
[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3) Current /proc/net is done with so called "shadows", but current implementation is broken and has little chances to get fixed. The problem is that dentries subtree of /proc/net directory has fancy revalidation rules to make processes living in different net namespaces see different entries in /proc/net subtree, but currently, tasks see in the /proc/net subdir the contents of any other namespace, depending on who opened the file first. The proposed fix is to turn /proc/net into a symlink, which points to /proc/self/net, which in turn shows what previously was in /proc/net - the network-related info, from the net namespace the appropriate task lives in. # ls -l /proc/net lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Mar 5 15:17 /proc/net -> self/net In other words - this behaves like /proc/mounts, but unlike "mounts", "net" is not a file, but a directory. Changes from v2: * Fixed discrepancy of /proc/net nlink count and selinux labeling screwup pointed out by Stephen. To get the correct nlink count the ->getattr callback for /proc/net is overridden to read one from the net->proc_net entry. To make selinux still work the net->proc_net entry is initialized properly, i.e. with the "net" name and the proc_net parent. Selinux fixes are Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Changes from v1: * Fixed a task_struct leak in get_proc_task_net, pointed out by Paul. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-03-08 03:08:40 +08:00
}
/*
* This returns non-zero if at EOF, so that the /proc
* root directory can use this and check if it should
* continue with the <pid> entries..
*
* Note that the VFS-layer doesn't care about the return
* value of the readdir() call, as long as it's non-negative
* for success..
*/
int proc_readdir_de(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx,
struct proc_dir_entry *de)
{
int i;
if (!dir_emit_dots(file, ctx))
return 0;
i = ctx->pos - 2;
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
read_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
de = pde_subdir_first(de);
for (;;) {
if (!de) {
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
read_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
return 0;
}
if (!i)
break;
de = pde_subdir_next(de);
i--;
}
do {
struct proc_dir_entry *next;
pde_get(de);
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
read_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
if (!dir_emit(ctx, de->name, de->namelen,
de->low_ino, de->mode >> 12)) {
pde_put(de);
return 0;
}
ctx->pos++;
read_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
next = pde_subdir_next(de);
pde_put(de);
de = next;
} while (de);
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
read_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
return 1;
}
int proc_readdir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3) Current /proc/net is done with so called "shadows", but current implementation is broken and has little chances to get fixed. The problem is that dentries subtree of /proc/net directory has fancy revalidation rules to make processes living in different net namespaces see different entries in /proc/net subtree, but currently, tasks see in the /proc/net subdir the contents of any other namespace, depending on who opened the file first. The proposed fix is to turn /proc/net into a symlink, which points to /proc/self/net, which in turn shows what previously was in /proc/net - the network-related info, from the net namespace the appropriate task lives in. # ls -l /proc/net lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Mar 5 15:17 /proc/net -> self/net In other words - this behaves like /proc/mounts, but unlike "mounts", "net" is not a file, but a directory. Changes from v2: * Fixed discrepancy of /proc/net nlink count and selinux labeling screwup pointed out by Stephen. To get the correct nlink count the ->getattr callback for /proc/net is overridden to read one from the net->proc_net entry. To make selinux still work the net->proc_net entry is initialized properly, i.e. with the "net" name and the proc_net parent. Selinux fixes are Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Changes from v1: * Fixed a task_struct leak in get_proc_task_net, pointed out by Paul. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-03-08 03:08:40 +08:00
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3) Current /proc/net is done with so called "shadows", but current implementation is broken and has little chances to get fixed. The problem is that dentries subtree of /proc/net directory has fancy revalidation rules to make processes living in different net namespaces see different entries in /proc/net subtree, but currently, tasks see in the /proc/net subdir the contents of any other namespace, depending on who opened the file first. The proposed fix is to turn /proc/net into a symlink, which points to /proc/self/net, which in turn shows what previously was in /proc/net - the network-related info, from the net namespace the appropriate task lives in. # ls -l /proc/net lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Mar 5 15:17 /proc/net -> self/net In other words - this behaves like /proc/mounts, but unlike "mounts", "net" is not a file, but a directory. Changes from v2: * Fixed discrepancy of /proc/net nlink count and selinux labeling screwup pointed out by Stephen. To get the correct nlink count the ->getattr callback for /proc/net is overridden to read one from the net->proc_net entry. To make selinux still work the net->proc_net entry is initialized properly, i.e. with the "net" name and the proc_net parent. Selinux fixes are Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Changes from v1: * Fixed a task_struct leak in get_proc_task_net, pointed out by Paul. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-03-08 03:08:40 +08:00
return proc_readdir_de(file, ctx, PDE(inode));
[NET]: Make /proc/net a symlink on /proc/self/net (v3) Current /proc/net is done with so called "shadows", but current implementation is broken and has little chances to get fixed. The problem is that dentries subtree of /proc/net directory has fancy revalidation rules to make processes living in different net namespaces see different entries in /proc/net subtree, but currently, tasks see in the /proc/net subdir the contents of any other namespace, depending on who opened the file first. The proposed fix is to turn /proc/net into a symlink, which points to /proc/self/net, which in turn shows what previously was in /proc/net - the network-related info, from the net namespace the appropriate task lives in. # ls -l /proc/net lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 8 Mar 5 15:17 /proc/net -> self/net In other words - this behaves like /proc/mounts, but unlike "mounts", "net" is not a file, but a directory. Changes from v2: * Fixed discrepancy of /proc/net nlink count and selinux labeling screwup pointed out by Stephen. To get the correct nlink count the ->getattr callback for /proc/net is overridden to read one from the net->proc_net entry. To make selinux still work the net->proc_net entry is initialized properly, i.e. with the "net" name and the proc_net parent. Selinux fixes are Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Changes from v1: * Fixed a task_struct leak in get_proc_task_net, pointed out by Paul. Signed-off-by: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2008-03-08 03:08:40 +08:00
}
/*
* These are the generic /proc directory operations. They
* use the in-memory "struct proc_dir_entry" tree to parse
* the /proc directory.
*/
static const struct file_operations proc_dir_operations = {
.llseek = generic_file_llseek,
.read = generic_read_dir,
.iterate_shared = proc_readdir,
};
/*
* proc directories can do almost nothing..
*/
static const struct inode_operations proc_dir_inode_operations = {
.lookup = proc_lookup,
.getattr = proc_getattr,
.setattr = proc_notify_change,
};
/* returns the registered entry, or frees dp and returns NULL on failure */
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_register(struct proc_dir_entry *dir,
struct proc_dir_entry *dp)
{
if (proc_alloc_inum(&dp->low_ino))
goto out_free_entry;
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
dp->parent = dir;
if (pde_subdir_insert(dir, dp) == false) {
WARN(1, "proc_dir_entry '%s/%s' already registered\n",
dir->name, dp->name);
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
goto out_free_inum;
}
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
return dp;
out_free_inum:
proc_free_inum(dp->low_ino);
out_free_entry:
pde_free(dp);
return NULL;
}
proc: fix ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip Typical PDE creation code looks like: pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL); if (pde) pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops; Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to final value. This is a problem because right after creation a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below). The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like: pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops); if (!pde) return -ENOMEM; Fix most networking users for a start. In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000024 printing eip: c1188c1b *pdpt = 000000002929e001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC last sysfs file: /sys/block/sda/sda1/dev Modules linked in: foo af_packet ipv6 cpufreq_ondemand loop serio_raw psmouse k8temp hwmon sr_mod cdrom Pid: 24679, comm: cat Not tainted (2.6.24-rc3-mm1 #2) EIP: 0060:[<c1188c1b>] EFLAGS: 00210002 CPU: 0 EIP is at mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d EAX: 000006fe EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00001000 EDX: e9340570 ESI: 00000020 EDI: 00200246 EBP: e9340570 ESP: e8ea1ef8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process cat (pid: 24679, ti=E8EA1000 task=E9340570 task.ti=E8EA1000) Stack: 00000000 c106f7ce e8ee05b4 00000000 00000001 458003d0 f6fb6f20 fffffffb 00000000 c106f7aa 00001000 c106f7ce 08ae9000 f6db53f0 00000020 00200246 00000000 00000002 00000000 00200246 00200246 e8ee05a0 fffffffb e8ee0550 Call Trace: [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c10818b8>] proc_reg_read+0x60/0x73 [<c1081858>] proc_reg_read+0x0/0x73 [<c105a34f>] vfs_read+0x6c/0x8b [<c105a6f3>] sys_read+0x3c/0x63 [<c10025f2>] sysenter_past_esp+0x5f/0xa5 [<c10697a7>] destroy_inode+0x24/0x33 ======================= INFO: lockdep is turned off. Code: 75 21 68 e1 1a 19 c1 68 87 00 00 00 68 b8 e8 1f c1 68 25 73 1f c1 e8 84 06 e9 ff e8 52 b8 e7 ff 83 c4 10 9c 5f fa e8 28 89 ea ff <f0> fe 4e 04 79 0a f3 90 80 7e 04 00 7e f8 eb f0 39 76 34 74 33 EIP: [<c1188c1b>] mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d SS:ESP 0068:e8ea1ef8 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 20:18:37 +08:00
static struct proc_dir_entry *__proc_create(struct proc_dir_entry **parent,
const char *name,
umode_t mode,
nlink_t nlink)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *ent = NULL;
const char *fn;
struct qstr qstr;
if (xlate_proc_name(name, parent, &fn) != 0)
goto out;
qstr.name = fn;
qstr.len = strlen(fn);
if (qstr.len == 0 || qstr.len >= 256) {
WARN(1, "name len %u\n", qstr.len);
return NULL;
}
if (qstr.len == 1 && fn[0] == '.') {
WARN(1, "name '.'\n");
return NULL;
}
if (qstr.len == 2 && fn[0] == '.' && fn[1] == '.') {
WARN(1, "name '..'\n");
return NULL;
}
if (*parent == &proc_root && name_to_int(&qstr) != ~0U) {
WARN(1, "create '/proc/%s' by hand\n", qstr.name);
return NULL;
}
if (is_empty_pde(*parent)) {
WARN(1, "attempt to add to permanently empty directory");
return NULL;
}
ent = kmem_cache_zalloc(proc_dir_entry_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ent)
goto out;
if (qstr.len + 1 <= SIZEOF_PDE_INLINE_NAME) {
ent->name = ent->inline_name;
} else {
ent->name = kmalloc(qstr.len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ent->name) {
pde_free(ent);
return NULL;
}
}
memcpy(ent->name, fn, qstr.len + 1);
ent->namelen = qstr.len;
ent->mode = mode;
ent->nlink = nlink;
ent->subdir = RB_ROOT;
refcount_set(&ent->refcnt, 1);
2007-07-16 14:39:00 +08:00
spin_lock_init(&ent->pde_unload_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ent->pde_openers);
proc_set_user(ent, (*parent)->uid, (*parent)->gid);
ent->proc_dops = &proc_misc_dentry_ops;
out:
return ent;
}
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_symlink(const char *name,
struct proc_dir_entry *parent, const char *dest)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *ent;
proc: fix ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip Typical PDE creation code looks like: pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL); if (pde) pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops; Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to final value. This is a problem because right after creation a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below). The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like: pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops); if (!pde) return -ENOMEM; Fix most networking users for a start. In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000024 printing eip: c1188c1b *pdpt = 000000002929e001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC last sysfs file: /sys/block/sda/sda1/dev Modules linked in: foo af_packet ipv6 cpufreq_ondemand loop serio_raw psmouse k8temp hwmon sr_mod cdrom Pid: 24679, comm: cat Not tainted (2.6.24-rc3-mm1 #2) EIP: 0060:[<c1188c1b>] EFLAGS: 00210002 CPU: 0 EIP is at mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d EAX: 000006fe EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00001000 EDX: e9340570 ESI: 00000020 EDI: 00200246 EBP: e9340570 ESP: e8ea1ef8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process cat (pid: 24679, ti=E8EA1000 task=E9340570 task.ti=E8EA1000) Stack: 00000000 c106f7ce e8ee05b4 00000000 00000001 458003d0 f6fb6f20 fffffffb 00000000 c106f7aa 00001000 c106f7ce 08ae9000 f6db53f0 00000020 00200246 00000000 00000002 00000000 00200246 00200246 e8ee05a0 fffffffb e8ee0550 Call Trace: [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c10818b8>] proc_reg_read+0x60/0x73 [<c1081858>] proc_reg_read+0x0/0x73 [<c105a34f>] vfs_read+0x6c/0x8b [<c105a6f3>] sys_read+0x3c/0x63 [<c10025f2>] sysenter_past_esp+0x5f/0xa5 [<c10697a7>] destroy_inode+0x24/0x33 ======================= INFO: lockdep is turned off. Code: 75 21 68 e1 1a 19 c1 68 87 00 00 00 68 b8 e8 1f c1 68 25 73 1f c1 e8 84 06 e9 ff e8 52 b8 e7 ff 83 c4 10 9c 5f fa e8 28 89 ea ff <f0> fe 4e 04 79 0a f3 90 80 7e 04 00 7e f8 eb f0 39 76 34 74 33 EIP: [<c1188c1b>] mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d SS:ESP 0068:e8ea1ef8 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 20:18:37 +08:00
ent = __proc_create(&parent, name,
(S_IFLNK | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO | S_IXUGO),1);
if (ent) {
ent->data = kmalloc((ent->size=strlen(dest))+1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (ent->data) {
strcpy((char*)ent->data,dest);
ent->proc_iops = &proc_link_inode_operations;
ent = proc_register(parent, ent);
} else {
pde_free(ent);
ent = NULL;
}
}
return ent;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_symlink);
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_mkdir_data(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct proc_dir_entry *parent, void *data)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *ent;
if (mode == 0)
mode = S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
proc: fix ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip Typical PDE creation code looks like: pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL); if (pde) pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops; Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to final value. This is a problem because right after creation a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below). The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like: pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops); if (!pde) return -ENOMEM; Fix most networking users for a start. In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000024 printing eip: c1188c1b *pdpt = 000000002929e001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC last sysfs file: /sys/block/sda/sda1/dev Modules linked in: foo af_packet ipv6 cpufreq_ondemand loop serio_raw psmouse k8temp hwmon sr_mod cdrom Pid: 24679, comm: cat Not tainted (2.6.24-rc3-mm1 #2) EIP: 0060:[<c1188c1b>] EFLAGS: 00210002 CPU: 0 EIP is at mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d EAX: 000006fe EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00001000 EDX: e9340570 ESI: 00000020 EDI: 00200246 EBP: e9340570 ESP: e8ea1ef8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process cat (pid: 24679, ti=E8EA1000 task=E9340570 task.ti=E8EA1000) Stack: 00000000 c106f7ce e8ee05b4 00000000 00000001 458003d0 f6fb6f20 fffffffb 00000000 c106f7aa 00001000 c106f7ce 08ae9000 f6db53f0 00000020 00200246 00000000 00000002 00000000 00200246 00200246 e8ee05a0 fffffffb e8ee0550 Call Trace: [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c10818b8>] proc_reg_read+0x60/0x73 [<c1081858>] proc_reg_read+0x0/0x73 [<c105a34f>] vfs_read+0x6c/0x8b [<c105a6f3>] sys_read+0x3c/0x63 [<c10025f2>] sysenter_past_esp+0x5f/0xa5 [<c10697a7>] destroy_inode+0x24/0x33 ======================= INFO: lockdep is turned off. Code: 75 21 68 e1 1a 19 c1 68 87 00 00 00 68 b8 e8 1f c1 68 25 73 1f c1 e8 84 06 e9 ff e8 52 b8 e7 ff 83 c4 10 9c 5f fa e8 28 89 ea ff <f0> fe 4e 04 79 0a f3 90 80 7e 04 00 7e f8 eb f0 39 76 34 74 33 EIP: [<c1188c1b>] mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d SS:ESP 0068:e8ea1ef8 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 20:18:37 +08:00
ent = __proc_create(&parent, name, S_IFDIR | mode, 2);
if (ent) {
ent->data = data;
ent->proc_fops = &proc_dir_operations;
ent->proc_iops = &proc_dir_inode_operations;
parent->nlink++;
ent = proc_register(parent, ent);
if (!ent)
parent->nlink--;
}
return ent;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(proc_mkdir_data);
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_mkdir_mode(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct proc_dir_entry *parent)
{
return proc_mkdir_data(name, mode, parent, NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_mkdir_mode);
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_mkdir(const char *name,
struct proc_dir_entry *parent)
{
return proc_mkdir_data(name, 0, parent, NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_mkdir);
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_create_mount_point(const char *name)
{
umode_t mode = S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO;
struct proc_dir_entry *ent, *parent = NULL;
ent = __proc_create(&parent, name, mode, 2);
if (ent) {
ent->data = NULL;
ent->proc_fops = NULL;
ent->proc_iops = NULL;
parent->nlink++;
ent = proc_register(parent, ent);
if (!ent)
parent->nlink--;
}
return ent;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_create_mount_point);
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_create_reg(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct proc_dir_entry **parent, void *data)
proc: fix ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip Typical PDE creation code looks like: pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL); if (pde) pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops; Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to final value. This is a problem because right after creation a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below). The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like: pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops); if (!pde) return -ENOMEM; Fix most networking users for a start. In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000024 printing eip: c1188c1b *pdpt = 000000002929e001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC last sysfs file: /sys/block/sda/sda1/dev Modules linked in: foo af_packet ipv6 cpufreq_ondemand loop serio_raw psmouse k8temp hwmon sr_mod cdrom Pid: 24679, comm: cat Not tainted (2.6.24-rc3-mm1 #2) EIP: 0060:[<c1188c1b>] EFLAGS: 00210002 CPU: 0 EIP is at mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d EAX: 000006fe EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00001000 EDX: e9340570 ESI: 00000020 EDI: 00200246 EBP: e9340570 ESP: e8ea1ef8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process cat (pid: 24679, ti=E8EA1000 task=E9340570 task.ti=E8EA1000) Stack: 00000000 c106f7ce e8ee05b4 00000000 00000001 458003d0 f6fb6f20 fffffffb 00000000 c106f7aa 00001000 c106f7ce 08ae9000 f6db53f0 00000020 00200246 00000000 00000002 00000000 00200246 00200246 e8ee05a0 fffffffb e8ee0550 Call Trace: [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c10818b8>] proc_reg_read+0x60/0x73 [<c1081858>] proc_reg_read+0x0/0x73 [<c105a34f>] vfs_read+0x6c/0x8b [<c105a6f3>] sys_read+0x3c/0x63 [<c10025f2>] sysenter_past_esp+0x5f/0xa5 [<c10697a7>] destroy_inode+0x24/0x33 ======================= INFO: lockdep is turned off. Code: 75 21 68 e1 1a 19 c1 68 87 00 00 00 68 b8 e8 1f c1 68 25 73 1f c1 e8 84 06 e9 ff e8 52 b8 e7 ff 83 c4 10 9c 5f fa e8 28 89 ea ff <f0> fe 4e 04 79 0a f3 90 80 7e 04 00 7e f8 eb f0 39 76 34 74 33 EIP: [<c1188c1b>] mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d SS:ESP 0068:e8ea1ef8 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 20:18:37 +08:00
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
if ((mode & S_IFMT) == 0)
mode |= S_IFREG;
if ((mode & S_IALLUGO) == 0)
mode |= S_IRUGO;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!S_ISREG(mode)))
return NULL;
p = __proc_create(parent, name, mode, 1);
if (p) {
p->proc_iops = &proc_file_inode_operations;
p->data = data;
proc: fix ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip Typical PDE creation code looks like: pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL); if (pde) pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops; Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to final value. This is a problem because right after creation a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below). The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like: pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops); if (!pde) return -ENOMEM; Fix most networking users for a start. In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000024 printing eip: c1188c1b *pdpt = 000000002929e001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC last sysfs file: /sys/block/sda/sda1/dev Modules linked in: foo af_packet ipv6 cpufreq_ondemand loop serio_raw psmouse k8temp hwmon sr_mod cdrom Pid: 24679, comm: cat Not tainted (2.6.24-rc3-mm1 #2) EIP: 0060:[<c1188c1b>] EFLAGS: 00210002 CPU: 0 EIP is at mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d EAX: 000006fe EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00001000 EDX: e9340570 ESI: 00000020 EDI: 00200246 EBP: e9340570 ESP: e8ea1ef8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process cat (pid: 24679, ti=E8EA1000 task=E9340570 task.ti=E8EA1000) Stack: 00000000 c106f7ce e8ee05b4 00000000 00000001 458003d0 f6fb6f20 fffffffb 00000000 c106f7aa 00001000 c106f7ce 08ae9000 f6db53f0 00000020 00200246 00000000 00000002 00000000 00200246 00200246 e8ee05a0 fffffffb e8ee0550 Call Trace: [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c10818b8>] proc_reg_read+0x60/0x73 [<c1081858>] proc_reg_read+0x0/0x73 [<c105a34f>] vfs_read+0x6c/0x8b [<c105a6f3>] sys_read+0x3c/0x63 [<c10025f2>] sysenter_past_esp+0x5f/0xa5 [<c10697a7>] destroy_inode+0x24/0x33 ======================= INFO: lockdep is turned off. Code: 75 21 68 e1 1a 19 c1 68 87 00 00 00 68 b8 e8 1f c1 68 25 73 1f c1 e8 84 06 e9 ff e8 52 b8 e7 ff 83 c4 10 9c 5f fa e8 28 89 ea ff <f0> fe 4e 04 79 0a f3 90 80 7e 04 00 7e f8 eb f0 39 76 34 74 33 EIP: [<c1188c1b>] mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d SS:ESP 0068:e8ea1ef8 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 20:18:37 +08:00
}
return p;
}
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_create_data(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct proc_dir_entry *parent,
const struct file_operations *proc_fops, void *data)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
proc: fix ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip Typical PDE creation code looks like: pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL); if (pde) pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops; Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to final value. This is a problem because right after creation a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below). The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like: pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops); if (!pde) return -ENOMEM; Fix most networking users for a start. In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000024 printing eip: c1188c1b *pdpt = 000000002929e001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC last sysfs file: /sys/block/sda/sda1/dev Modules linked in: foo af_packet ipv6 cpufreq_ondemand loop serio_raw psmouse k8temp hwmon sr_mod cdrom Pid: 24679, comm: cat Not tainted (2.6.24-rc3-mm1 #2) EIP: 0060:[<c1188c1b>] EFLAGS: 00210002 CPU: 0 EIP is at mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d EAX: 000006fe EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00001000 EDX: e9340570 ESI: 00000020 EDI: 00200246 EBP: e9340570 ESP: e8ea1ef8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process cat (pid: 24679, ti=E8EA1000 task=E9340570 task.ti=E8EA1000) Stack: 00000000 c106f7ce e8ee05b4 00000000 00000001 458003d0 f6fb6f20 fffffffb 00000000 c106f7aa 00001000 c106f7ce 08ae9000 f6db53f0 00000020 00200246 00000000 00000002 00000000 00200246 00200246 e8ee05a0 fffffffb e8ee0550 Call Trace: [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c10818b8>] proc_reg_read+0x60/0x73 [<c1081858>] proc_reg_read+0x0/0x73 [<c105a34f>] vfs_read+0x6c/0x8b [<c105a6f3>] sys_read+0x3c/0x63 [<c10025f2>] sysenter_past_esp+0x5f/0xa5 [<c10697a7>] destroy_inode+0x24/0x33 ======================= INFO: lockdep is turned off. Code: 75 21 68 e1 1a 19 c1 68 87 00 00 00 68 b8 e8 1f c1 68 25 73 1f c1 e8 84 06 e9 ff e8 52 b8 e7 ff 83 c4 10 9c 5f fa e8 28 89 ea ff <f0> fe 4e 04 79 0a f3 90 80 7e 04 00 7e f8 eb f0 39 76 34 74 33 EIP: [<c1188c1b>] mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d SS:ESP 0068:e8ea1ef8 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 20:18:37 +08:00
BUG_ON(proc_fops == NULL);
p = proc_create_reg(name, mode, &parent, data);
if (!p)
return NULL;
p->proc_fops = proc_fops;
return proc_register(parent, p);
proc: fix ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip Typical PDE creation code looks like: pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL); if (pde) pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops; Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to final value. This is a problem because right after creation a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below). The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like: pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops); if (!pde) return -ENOMEM; Fix most networking users for a start. In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000024 printing eip: c1188c1b *pdpt = 000000002929e001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC last sysfs file: /sys/block/sda/sda1/dev Modules linked in: foo af_packet ipv6 cpufreq_ondemand loop serio_raw psmouse k8temp hwmon sr_mod cdrom Pid: 24679, comm: cat Not tainted (2.6.24-rc3-mm1 #2) EIP: 0060:[<c1188c1b>] EFLAGS: 00210002 CPU: 0 EIP is at mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d EAX: 000006fe EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00001000 EDX: e9340570 ESI: 00000020 EDI: 00200246 EBP: e9340570 ESP: e8ea1ef8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process cat (pid: 24679, ti=E8EA1000 task=E9340570 task.ti=E8EA1000) Stack: 00000000 c106f7ce e8ee05b4 00000000 00000001 458003d0 f6fb6f20 fffffffb 00000000 c106f7aa 00001000 c106f7ce 08ae9000 f6db53f0 00000020 00200246 00000000 00000002 00000000 00200246 00200246 e8ee05a0 fffffffb e8ee0550 Call Trace: [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c10818b8>] proc_reg_read+0x60/0x73 [<c1081858>] proc_reg_read+0x0/0x73 [<c105a34f>] vfs_read+0x6c/0x8b [<c105a6f3>] sys_read+0x3c/0x63 [<c10025f2>] sysenter_past_esp+0x5f/0xa5 [<c10697a7>] destroy_inode+0x24/0x33 ======================= INFO: lockdep is turned off. Code: 75 21 68 e1 1a 19 c1 68 87 00 00 00 68 b8 e8 1f c1 68 25 73 1f c1 e8 84 06 e9 ff e8 52 b8 e7 ff 83 c4 10 9c 5f fa e8 28 89 ea ff <f0> fe 4e 04 79 0a f3 90 80 7e 04 00 7e f8 eb f0 39 76 34 74 33 EIP: [<c1188c1b>] mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d SS:ESP 0068:e8ea1ef8 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 20:18:37 +08:00
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_create_data);
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_create(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct proc_dir_entry *parent,
const struct file_operations *proc_fops)
{
return proc_create_data(name, mode, parent, proc_fops, NULL);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_create);
static int proc_seq_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *de = PDE(inode);
if (de->state_size)
return seq_open_private(file, de->seq_ops, de->state_size);
return seq_open(file, de->seq_ops);
}
static int proc_seq_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *de = PDE(inode);
if (de->state_size)
return seq_release_private(inode, file);
return seq_release(inode, file);
}
static const struct file_operations proc_seq_fops = {
.open = proc_seq_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = proc_seq_release,
};
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_create_seq_private(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct proc_dir_entry *parent, const struct seq_operations *ops,
unsigned int state_size, void *data)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
p = proc_create_reg(name, mode, &parent, data);
if (!p)
return NULL;
p->proc_fops = &proc_seq_fops;
p->seq_ops = ops;
p->state_size = state_size;
return proc_register(parent, p);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_create_seq_private);
static int proc_single_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *de = PDE(inode);
return single_open(file, de->single_show, de->data);
}
static const struct file_operations proc_single_fops = {
.open = proc_single_open,
.read = seq_read,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
.release = single_release,
};
struct proc_dir_entry *proc_create_single_data(const char *name, umode_t mode,
struct proc_dir_entry *parent,
int (*show)(struct seq_file *, void *), void *data)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *p;
p = proc_create_reg(name, mode, &parent, data);
if (!p)
return NULL;
p->proc_fops = &proc_single_fops;
p->single_show = show;
return proc_register(parent, p);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_create_single_data);
void proc_set_size(struct proc_dir_entry *de, loff_t size)
{
de->size = size;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_set_size);
void proc_set_user(struct proc_dir_entry *de, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
{
de->uid = uid;
de->gid = gid;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_set_user);
proc: fix ->open'less usage due to ->proc_fops flip Typical PDE creation code looks like: pde = create_proc_entry("foo", 0, NULL); if (pde) pde->proc_fops = &foo_proc_fops; Notice that PDE is first created, only then ->proc_fops is set up to final value. This is a problem because right after creation a) PDE is fully visible in /proc , and b) ->proc_fops are proc_file_operations which do not have ->open callback. So, it's possible to ->read without ->open (see one class of oopses below). The fix is new API called proc_create() which makes sure ->proc_fops are set up before gluing PDE to main tree. Typical new code looks like: pde = proc_create("foo", 0, NULL, &foo_proc_fops); if (!pde) return -ENOMEM; Fix most networking users for a start. In the long run, create_proc_entry() for regular files will go. BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000024 printing eip: c1188c1b *pdpt = 000000002929e001 *pde = 0000000000000000 Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC last sysfs file: /sys/block/sda/sda1/dev Modules linked in: foo af_packet ipv6 cpufreq_ondemand loop serio_raw psmouse k8temp hwmon sr_mod cdrom Pid: 24679, comm: cat Not tainted (2.6.24-rc3-mm1 #2) EIP: 0060:[<c1188c1b>] EFLAGS: 00210002 CPU: 0 EIP is at mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d EAX: 000006fe EBX: fffffffb ECX: 00001000 EDX: e9340570 ESI: 00000020 EDI: 00200246 EBP: e9340570 ESP: e8ea1ef8 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 0033 SS: 0068 Process cat (pid: 24679, ti=E8EA1000 task=E9340570 task.ti=E8EA1000) Stack: 00000000 c106f7ce e8ee05b4 00000000 00000001 458003d0 f6fb6f20 fffffffb 00000000 c106f7aa 00001000 c106f7ce 08ae9000 f6db53f0 00000020 00200246 00000000 00000002 00000000 00200246 00200246 e8ee05a0 fffffffb e8ee0550 Call Trace: [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c106f7ce>] seq_read+0x24/0x28a [<c106f7aa>] seq_read+0x0/0x28a [<c10818b8>] proc_reg_read+0x60/0x73 [<c1081858>] proc_reg_read+0x0/0x73 [<c105a34f>] vfs_read+0x6c/0x8b [<c105a6f3>] sys_read+0x3c/0x63 [<c10025f2>] sysenter_past_esp+0x5f/0xa5 [<c10697a7>] destroy_inode+0x24/0x33 ======================= INFO: lockdep is turned off. Code: 75 21 68 e1 1a 19 c1 68 87 00 00 00 68 b8 e8 1f c1 68 25 73 1f c1 e8 84 06 e9 ff e8 52 b8 e7 ff 83 c4 10 9c 5f fa e8 28 89 ea ff <f0> fe 4e 04 79 0a f3 90 80 7e 04 00 7e f8 eb f0 39 76 34 74 33 EIP: [<c1188c1b>] mutex_lock_nested+0x75/0x25d SS:ESP 0068:e8ea1ef8 [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru> Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@tv-sign.ru> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-02-08 20:18:37 +08:00
void pde_put(struct proc_dir_entry *pde)
{
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&pde->refcnt)) {
proc_free_inum(pde->low_ino);
pde_free(pde);
}
}
/*
* Remove a /proc entry and free it if it's not currently in use.
*/
void remove_proc_entry(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry *parent)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *de = NULL;
const char *fn = name;
unsigned int len;
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
if (__xlate_proc_name(name, &parent, &fn) != 0) {
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
return;
}
len = strlen(fn);
de = pde_subdir_find(parent, fn, len);
if (de)
rb_erase(&de->subdir_node, &parent->subdir);
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
if (!de) {
WARN(1, "name '%s'\n", name);
return;
}
proc_entry_rundown(de);
if (S_ISDIR(de->mode))
parent->nlink--;
de->nlink = 0;
WARN(pde_subdir_first(de),
"%s: removing non-empty directory '%s/%s', leaking at least '%s'\n",
__func__, de->parent->name, de->name, pde_subdir_first(de)->name);
pde_put(de);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_proc_entry);
int remove_proc_subtree(const char *name, struct proc_dir_entry *parent)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *root = NULL, *de, *next;
const char *fn = name;
unsigned int len;
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
if (__xlate_proc_name(name, &parent, &fn) != 0) {
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
return -ENOENT;
}
len = strlen(fn);
root = pde_subdir_find(parent, fn, len);
if (!root) {
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
return -ENOENT;
}
rb_erase(&root->subdir_node, &parent->subdir);
de = root;
while (1) {
next = pde_subdir_first(de);
if (next) {
rb_erase(&next->subdir_node, &de->subdir);
de = next;
continue;
}
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_unlock(&proc_subdir_lock);
proc_entry_rundown(de);
next = de->parent;
if (S_ISDIR(de->mode))
next->nlink--;
de->nlink = 0;
if (de == root)
break;
pde_put(de);
proc: change proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock The proc_subdir_lock spinlock is used to allow only one task to make change to the proc directory structure as well as looking up information in it. However, the information lookup part can actually be entered by more than one task as the pde_get() and pde_put() reference count update calls in the critical sections are atomic increment and decrement respectively and so are safe with concurrent updates. The x86 architecture has already used qrwlock which is fair and other architectures like ARM are in the process of switching to qrwlock. So unfairness shouldn't be a concern in that conversion. This patch changed the proc_subdir_lock to a rwlock in order to enable concurrent lookup. The following functions were modified to take a write lock: - proc_register() - remove_proc_entry() - remove_proc_subtree() The following functions were modified to take a read lock: - xlate_proc_name() - proc_lookup_de() - proc_readdir_de() A parallel /proc filesystem search with the "find" command (1000 threads) was run on a 4-socket Haswell-EX box (144 threads). Before the patch, the parallel search took about 39s. After the patch, the parallel find took only 25s, a saving of about 14s. The micro-benchmark that I used was artificial, but it was used to reproduce an exit hanging problem that I saw in real application. In fact, only allow one task to do a lookup seems too limiting to me. Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <Waiman.Long@hp.com> Acked-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com> Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Scott J Norton <scott.norton@hp.com> Cc: Douglas Hatch <doug.hatch@hp.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2015-09-10 06:35:57 +08:00
write_lock(&proc_subdir_lock);
de = next;
}
pde_put(root);
return 0;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(remove_proc_subtree);
void *proc_get_parent_data(const struct inode *inode)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *de = PDE(inode);
return de->parent->data;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(proc_get_parent_data);
void proc_remove(struct proc_dir_entry *de)
{
if (de)
remove_proc_subtree(de->name, de->parent);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(proc_remove);
void *PDE_DATA(const struct inode *inode)
{
return __PDE_DATA(inode);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(PDE_DATA);
/*
* Pull a user buffer into memory and pass it to the file's write handler if
* one is supplied. The ->write() method is permitted to modify the
* kernel-side buffer.
*/
ssize_t proc_simple_write(struct file *f, const char __user *ubuf, size_t size,
loff_t *_pos)
{
struct proc_dir_entry *pde = PDE(file_inode(f));
char *buf;
int ret;
if (!pde->write)
return -EACCES;
if (size == 0 || size > PAGE_SIZE - 1)
return -EINVAL;
buf = memdup_user_nul(ubuf, size);
if (IS_ERR(buf))
return PTR_ERR(buf);
ret = pde->write(f, buf, size);
kfree(buf);
return ret == 0 ? size : ret;
}