2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#ifndef _ASM_SOCKET_H
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#define _ASM_SOCKET_H
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#include <asm/sockios.h>
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/* For setsockopt(2) */
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/*
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* Note: we only bother about making the SOL_SOCKET options
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* same as OSF/1, as that's all that "normal" programs are
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* likely to set. We don't necessarily want to be binary
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* compatible with _everything_.
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*/
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#define SOL_SOCKET 0xffff
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#define SO_DEBUG 0x0001
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#define SO_REUSEADDR 0x0004
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#define SO_KEEPALIVE 0x0008
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#define SO_DONTROUTE 0x0010
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#define SO_BROADCAST 0x0020
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#define SO_LINGER 0x0080
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#define SO_OOBINLINE 0x0100
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/* To add :#define SO_REUSEPORT 0x0200 */
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#define SO_TYPE 0x1008
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#define SO_ERROR 0x1007
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#define SO_SNDBUF 0x1001
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#define SO_RCVBUF 0x1002
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2005-08-10 10:30:51 +08:00
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#define SO_SNDBUFFORCE 0x100a
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#define SO_RCVBUFFORCE 0x100b
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#define SO_RCVLOWAT 0x1010
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#define SO_SNDLOWAT 0x1011
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#define SO_RCVTIMEO 0x1012
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#define SO_SNDTIMEO 0x1013
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#define SO_ACCEPTCONN 0x1014
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2009-08-04 15:28:28 +08:00
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#define SO_PROTOCOL 0x1028
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2009-08-04 15:28:29 +08:00
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#define SO_DOMAIN 0x1029
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/* linux-specific, might as well be the same as on i386 */
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#define SO_NO_CHECK 11
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#define SO_PRIORITY 12
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#define SO_BSDCOMPAT 14
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#define SO_PASSCRED 17
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#define SO_PEERCRED 18
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#define SO_BINDTODEVICE 25
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/* Socket filtering */
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#define SO_ATTACH_FILTER 26
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#define SO_DETACH_FILTER 27
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#define SO_PEERNAME 28
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#define SO_TIMESTAMP 29
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#define SCM_TIMESTAMP SO_TIMESTAMP
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#define SO_PEERSEC 30
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[AF_UNIX]: Datagram getpeersec
This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.
Patch purpose:
This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket. The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.
Patch design and implementation:
The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets. Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message). To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.
An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:
toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);
setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
}
}
sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.
Testing:
We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications. We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: Catherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2006-06-30 03:27:47 +08:00
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#define SO_PASSSEC 34
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2007-03-26 13:14:49 +08:00
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#define SO_TIMESTAMPNS 35
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#define SCM_TIMESTAMPNS SO_TIMESTAMPNS
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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/* Security levels - as per NRL IPv6 - don't actually do anything */
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#define SO_SECURITY_AUTHENTICATION 19
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#define SO_SECURITY_ENCRYPTION_TRANSPORT 20
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#define SO_SECURITY_ENCRYPTION_NETWORK 21
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2008-01-31 11:08:16 +08:00
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#define SO_MARK 36
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2009-02-12 13:03:36 +08:00
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#define SO_TIMESTAMPING 37
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#define SCM_TIMESTAMPING SO_TIMESTAMPING
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net: Generalize socket rx gap / receive queue overflow cmsg
Create a new socket level option to report number of queue overflows
Recently I augmented the AF_PACKET protocol to report the number of frames lost
on the socket receive queue between any two enqueued frames. This value was
exported via a SOL_PACKET level cmsg. AFter I completed that work it was
requested that this feature be generalized so that any datagram oriented socket
could make use of this option. As such I've created this patch, It creates a
new SOL_SOCKET level option called SO_RXQ_OVFL, which when enabled exports a
SOL_SOCKET level cmsg that reports the nubmer of times the sk_receive_queue
overflowed between any two given frames. It also augments the AF_PACKET
protocol to take advantage of this new feature (as it previously did not touch
sk->sk_drops, which this patch uses to record the overflow count). Tested
successfully by me.
Notes:
1) Unlike my previous patch, this patch simply records the sk_drops value, which
is not a number of drops between packets, but rather a total number of drops.
Deltas must be computed in user space.
2) While this patch currently works with datagram oriented protocols, it will
also be accepted by non-datagram oriented protocols. I'm not sure if thats
agreeable to everyone, but my argument in favor of doing so is that, for those
protocols which aren't applicable to this option, sk_drops will always be zero,
and reporting no drops on a receive queue that isn't used for those
non-participating protocols seems reasonable to me. This also saves us having
to code in a per-protocol opt in mechanism.
3) This applies cleanly to net-next assuming that commit
977750076d98c7ff6cbda51858bb5a5894a9d9ab (my af packet cmsg patch) is reverted
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2009-10-13 04:26:31 +08:00
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#define SO_RXQ_OVFL 40
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2011-11-09 17:15:42 +08:00
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#define SO_WIFI_STATUS 41
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#define SCM_WIFI_STATUS SO_WIFI_STATUS
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flag parameters: paccept
This patch is by far the most complex in the series. It adds a new syscall
paccept. This syscall differs from accept in that it adds (at the userlevel)
two additional parameters:
- a signal mask
- a flags value
The flags parameter can be used to set flag like SOCK_CLOEXEC. This is
imlpemented here as well. Some people argued that this is a property which
should be inherited from the file desriptor for the server but this is against
POSIX. Additionally, we really want the signal mask parameter as well
(similar to pselect, ppoll, etc). So an interface change in inevitable.
The flag value is the same as for socket and socketpair. I think diverging
here will only create confusion. Similar to the filesystem interfaces where
the use of the O_* constants differs, it is acceptable here.
The signal mask is handled as for pselect etc. The mask is temporarily
installed for the thread and removed before the call returns. I modeled the
code after pselect. If there is a problem it's likely also in pselect.
For architectures which use socketcall I maintained this interface instead of
adding a system call. The symmetry shouldn't be broken.
The following test must be adjusted for architectures other than x86 and
x86-64 and in case the syscall numbers changed.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pthread.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#ifndef __NR_paccept
# ifdef __x86_64__
# define __NR_paccept 288
# elif defined __i386__
# define SYS_PACCEPT 18
# define USE_SOCKETCALL 1
# else
# error "need __NR_paccept"
# endif
#endif
#ifdef USE_SOCKETCALL
# define paccept(fd, addr, addrlen, mask, flags) \
({ long args[6] = { \
(long) fd, (long) addr, (long) addrlen, (long) mask, 8, (long) flags }; \
syscall (__NR_socketcall, SYS_PACCEPT, args); })
#else
# define paccept(fd, addr, addrlen, mask, flags) \
syscall (__NR_paccept, fd, addr, addrlen, mask, 8, flags)
#endif
#define PORT 57392
#define SOCK_CLOEXEC O_CLOEXEC
static pthread_barrier_t b;
static void *
tf (void *arg)
{
pthread_barrier_wait (&b);
int s = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
struct sockaddr_in sin;
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (INADDR_LOOPBACK);
sin.sin_port = htons (PORT);
connect (s, (const struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof (sin));
close (s);
pthread_barrier_wait (&b);
s = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
sin.sin_port = htons (PORT);
connect (s, (const struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof (sin));
close (s);
pthread_barrier_wait (&b);
pthread_barrier_wait (&b);
sleep (2);
pthread_kill ((pthread_t) arg, SIGUSR1);
return NULL;
}
static void
handler (int s)
{
}
int
main (void)
{
pthread_barrier_init (&b, NULL, 2);
struct sockaddr_in sin;
pthread_t th;
if (pthread_create (&th, NULL, tf, (void *) pthread_self ()) != 0)
{
puts ("pthread_create failed");
return 1;
}
int s = socket (AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
int reuse = 1;
setsockopt (s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &reuse, sizeof (reuse));
sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
sin.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl (INADDR_LOOPBACK);
sin.sin_port = htons (PORT);
bind (s, (struct sockaddr *) &sin, sizeof (sin));
listen (s, SOMAXCONN);
pthread_barrier_wait (&b);
int s2 = paccept (s, NULL, 0, NULL, 0);
if (s2 < 0)
{
puts ("paccept(0) failed");
return 1;
}
int coe = fcntl (s2, F_GETFD);
if (coe & FD_CLOEXEC)
{
puts ("paccept(0) set close-on-exec-flag");
return 1;
}
close (s2);
pthread_barrier_wait (&b);
s2 = paccept (s, NULL, 0, NULL, SOCK_CLOEXEC);
if (s2 < 0)
{
puts ("paccept(SOCK_CLOEXEC) failed");
return 1;
}
coe = fcntl (s2, F_GETFD);
if ((coe & FD_CLOEXEC) == 0)
{
puts ("paccept(SOCK_CLOEXEC) does not set close-on-exec flag");
return 1;
}
close (s2);
pthread_barrier_wait (&b);
struct sigaction sa;
sa.sa_handler = handler;
sa.sa_flags = 0;
sigemptyset (&sa.sa_mask);
sigaction (SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL);
sigset_t ss;
pthread_sigmask (SIG_SETMASK, NULL, &ss);
sigaddset (&ss, SIGUSR1);
pthread_sigmask (SIG_SETMASK, &ss, NULL);
sigdelset (&ss, SIGUSR1);
alarm (4);
pthread_barrier_wait (&b);
errno = 0 ;
s2 = paccept (s, NULL, 0, &ss, 0);
if (s2 != -1 || errno != EINTR)
{
puts ("paccept did not fail with EINTR");
return 1;
}
close (s);
puts ("OK");
return 0;
}
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: make it compile]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: add sys_ni stub]
Signed-off-by: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Davide Libenzi <davidel@xmailserver.org>
Cc: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@googlemail.com>
Cc: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@mcmartin.ca>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2008-07-24 12:29:20 +08:00
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/* O_NONBLOCK clashes with the bits used for socket types. Therefore we
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* have to define SOCK_NONBLOCK to a different value here.
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*/
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#define SOCK_NONBLOCK 0x40000000
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2005-04-17 06:20:36 +08:00
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#endif /* _ASM_SOCKET_H */
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