linux_old1/net/tipc/netlink_compat.c

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/*
* Copyright (c) 2014, Ericsson AB
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the names of the copyright holders nor the names of its
* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from
* this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* Alternatively, this software may be distributed under the terms of the
* GNU General Public License ("GPL") version 2 as published by the Free
* Software Foundation.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "core.h"
#include "bearer.h"
#include "link.h"
#include "name_table.h"
#include "socket.h"
#include "node.h"
#include "net.h"
#include <net/genetlink.h>
#include <linux/tipc_config.h>
/* The legacy API had an artificial message length limit called
* ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN.
*/
#define ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN 32768
#define TIPC_SKB_MAX TLV_SPACE(ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN)
#define REPLY_TRUNCATED "<truncated>\n"
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg {
u16 cmd;
int rep_type;
int rep_size;
int req_type;
int req_size;
struct net *net;
struct sk_buff *rep;
struct tlv_desc *req;
struct sock *dst_sk;
};
struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump {
int (*header)(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *);
int (*dumpit)(struct sk_buff *, struct netlink_callback *);
int (*format)(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg, struct nlattr **attrs);
};
struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit {
int (*doit)(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info);
int (*transcode)(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
struct sk_buff *skb, struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg);
};
static int tipc_skb_tailroom(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int tailroom;
int limit;
tailroom = skb_tailroom(skb);
limit = TIPC_SKB_MAX - skb->len;
if (tailroom < limit)
return tailroom;
return limit;
}
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats syzbot reports following splat: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 CPU: 1 PID: 11057 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats+0x1f0/0x360 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:760 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x457ec9 Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f2557338c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f25573396d4 R13: 00000000004cb478 R14: 00000000004d86c8 R15: 00000000ffffffff Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xb82/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The uninitialised access happened in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats: nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name) This is because name string is not validated before it's used. Reported-by: syzbot+e01d94b5a4c266be6e4c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:25 +08:00
static inline int TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(struct tlv_desc *tlv)
{
return TLV_GET_LEN(tlv) - TLV_SPACE(0);
}
static int tipc_add_tlv(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 type, void *data, u16 len)
{
struct tlv_desc *tlv = (struct tlv_desc *)skb_tail_pointer(skb);
if (tipc_skb_tailroom(skb) < TLV_SPACE(len))
return -EMSGSIZE;
skb_put(skb, TLV_SPACE(len));
tlv->tlv_type = htons(type);
tlv->tlv_len = htons(TLV_LENGTH(len));
if (len && data)
memcpy(TLV_DATA(tlv), data, len);
return 0;
}
static void tipc_tlv_init(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 type)
{
struct tlv_desc *tlv = (struct tlv_desc *)skb->data;
TLV_SET_LEN(tlv, 0);
TLV_SET_TYPE(tlv, type);
skb_put(skb, sizeof(struct tlv_desc));
}
static int tipc_tlv_sprintf(struct sk_buff *skb, const char *fmt, ...)
{
int n;
u16 len;
u32 rem;
char *buf;
struct tlv_desc *tlv;
va_list args;
rem = tipc_skb_tailroom(skb);
tlv = (struct tlv_desc *)skb->data;
len = TLV_GET_LEN(tlv);
buf = TLV_DATA(tlv) + len;
va_start(args, fmt);
n = vscnprintf(buf, rem, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
TLV_SET_LEN(tlv, n + len);
skb_put(skb, n);
return n;
}
static struct sk_buff *tipc_tlv_alloc(int size)
{
int hdr_len;
struct sk_buff *buf;
size = TLV_SPACE(size);
hdr_len = nlmsg_total_size(GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
buf = alloc_skb(hdr_len + size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
skb_reserve(buf, hdr_len);
return buf;
}
static struct sk_buff *tipc_get_err_tlv(char *str)
{
int str_len = strlen(str) + 1;
struct sk_buff *buf;
buf = tipc_tlv_alloc(TLV_SPACE(str_len));
if (buf)
tipc_add_tlv(buf, TIPC_TLV_ERROR_STRING, str, str_len);
return buf;
}
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats syzbot reports following splat: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 CPU: 1 PID: 11057 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats+0x1f0/0x360 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:760 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x457ec9 Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f2557338c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f25573396d4 R13: 00000000004cb478 R14: 00000000004d86c8 R15: 00000000ffffffff Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xb82/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The uninitialised access happened in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats: nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name) This is because name string is not validated before it's used. Reported-by: syzbot+e01d94b5a4c266be6e4c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:25 +08:00
static inline bool string_is_valid(char *s, int len)
{
return memchr(s, '\0', len) ? true : false;
}
static int __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump *cmd,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct sk_buff *arg)
{
struct genl_dumpit_info info;
int len = 0;
int err;
struct sk_buff *buf;
struct nlmsghdr *nlmsg;
struct netlink_callback cb;
struct nlattr **attrbuf;
memset(&cb, 0, sizeof(cb));
cb.nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)arg->data;
cb.skb = arg;
cb.data = &info;
buf = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
buf->sk = msg->dst_sk;
if (__tipc_dump_start(&cb, msg->net)) {
kfree_skb(buf);
return -ENOMEM;
}
tipc: eliminate KMSAN: uninit-value in __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit error syzbot found the following crash on: ===================================================== BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __nlmsg_parse include/net/netlink.h:661 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in nlmsg_parse_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:706 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x553/0x11e0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:215 CPU: 0 PID: 12425 Comm: syz-executor062 Not tainted 5.5.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x1c9/0x220 lib/dump_stack.c:118 kmsan_report+0x128/0x220 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:108 __msan_warning+0x57/0xa0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:245 __nlmsg_parse include/net/netlink.h:661 [inline] nlmsg_parse_deprecated include/net/netlink.h:706 [inline] __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x553/0x11e0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:215 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x761/0x910 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:308 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1252 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x12e9/0x2870 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1311 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x1dd0/0x23a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734 netlink_rcv_skb+0x431/0x620 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xfa0/0x1100 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 netlink_sendmsg+0x11f0/0x1480 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1362/0x13f0 net/socket.c:2330 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x4f0/0x5e0 net/socket.c:2417 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424 do_syscall_64+0xb6/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 RIP: 0033:0x444179 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 1b d8 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffd2d6409c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002e0 RCX: 0000000000444179 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000140 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ce018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002e0 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000401e20 R13: 0000000000401eb0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:149 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x5c/0x110 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:132 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x8a/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:86 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2774 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe47/0x11f0 mm/slub.c:4382 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:141 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa50 net/core/skbuff.c:209 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1049 [inline] nlmsg_new include/net/netlink.h:888 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x6e4/0x910 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:301 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1252 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x12e9/0x2870 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1311 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit net/netlink/genetlink.c:672 [inline] genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:717 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x1dd0/0x23a0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:734 netlink_rcv_skb+0x431/0x620 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:745 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1302 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xfa0/0x1100 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1328 netlink_sendmsg+0x11f0/0x1480 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:639 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:659 [inline] ____sys_sendmsg+0x1362/0x13f0 net/socket.c:2330 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2384 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x4f0/0x5e0 net/socket.c:2417 __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2426 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x97/0xb0 net/socket.c:2424 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2424 do_syscall_64+0xb6/0x160 arch/x86/entry/common.c:295 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9 ===================================================== The complaint above occurred because the memory region pointed by attrbuf variable was not initialized. To eliminate this warning, we use kcalloc() rather than kmalloc_array() to allocate memory for attrbuf. Reported-by: syzbot+b1fd2bf2c89d8407e15f@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2020-01-04 10:48:36 +08:00
attrbuf = kcalloc(tipc_genl_family.maxattr + 1,
sizeof(struct nlattr *), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!attrbuf) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto err_out;
}
info.attrs = attrbuf;
err = nlmsg_parse_deprecated(cb.nlh, GENL_HDRLEN, attrbuf,
tipc_genl_family.maxattr,
tipc_genl_family.policy, NULL);
if (err)
goto err_out;
do {
int rem;
len = (*cmd->dumpit)(buf, &cb);
nlmsg_for_each_msg(nlmsg, nlmsg_hdr(buf), len, rem) {
err = nlmsg_parse_deprecated(nlmsg, GENL_HDRLEN,
attrbuf,
tipc_genl_family.maxattr,
tipc_genl_family.policy,
NULL);
if (err)
goto err_out;
err = (*cmd->format)(msg, attrbuf);
if (err)
goto err_out;
if (tipc_skb_tailroom(msg->rep) <= 1) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto err_out;
}
}
skb_reset_tail_pointer(buf);
buf->len = 0;
} while (len);
err = 0;
err_out:
kfree(attrbuf);
tipc_dump_done(&cb);
kfree_skb(buf);
if (err == -EMSGSIZE) {
/* The legacy API only considered messages filling
* "ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN" to be truncated.
*/
if ((TIPC_SKB_MAX - msg->rep->len) <= 1) {
char *tail = skb_tail_pointer(msg->rep);
if (*tail != '\0')
sprintf(tail - sizeof(REPLY_TRUNCATED) - 1,
REPLY_TRUNCATED);
}
return 0;
}
return err;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump *cmd,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
int err;
struct sk_buff *arg;
if (msg->req_type && (!msg->req_size ||
!TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type)))
return -EINVAL;
msg->rep = tipc_tlv_alloc(msg->rep_size);
if (!msg->rep)
return -ENOMEM;
if (msg->rep_type)
tipc_tlv_init(msg->rep, msg->rep_type);
tipc: handle the err returned from cmd header function Syzbot found a crash: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x54f/0xcd0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:872 Call Trace: tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x54f/0xcd0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:872 __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x59e/0xda0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:215 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x63a/0x820 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:280 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1226 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1b5f/0x2750 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1265 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x431/0x620 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf3e/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632 [inline] Uninit was created at: __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:208 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1012 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xb82/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632 [inline] It was supposed to be fixed on commit 974cb0e3e7c9 ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump") by checking TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req) in cmd->header()/tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump_header(), which is called ahead of tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump(). However, tipc_nl_compat_dumpit() doesn't handle the error returned from cmd header function. It means even when the check added in that fix fails, it won't stop calling tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump(), and the issue will be triggered again. So this patch is to add the process for the err returned from cmd header function in tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(). Reported-by: syzbot+3ce8520484b0d4e260a5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-31 22:50:10 +08:00
if (cmd->header) {
err = (*cmd->header)(msg);
if (err) {
kfree_skb(msg->rep);
msg->rep = NULL;
return err;
}
}
arg = nlmsg_new(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!arg) {
kfree_skb(msg->rep);
tipc: fix use-after-free syszkaller reported use-after-free in tipc [1] When msg->rep skb is freed, set the pointer to NULL, so that caller does not free it again. [1] ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_push+0xd4/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:1466 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801c6e71e90 by task syz-executor5/4115 CPU: 1 PID: 4115 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #32 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x24e/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 skb_push+0xd4/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:1466 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x833/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1209 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007f3bc8184c08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000718000 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000000020fdb000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004b5e76 R13: 00007f3bc8184b48 R14: 00000000004b5e86 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 4115: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:489 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x13d/0x750 mm/slab.c:3651 __alloc_skb+0xf1/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:219 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:903 [inline] tipc_tlv_alloc+0x26/0xb0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:148 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0xf2/0x3c0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:248 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1130 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x756/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1199 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe Freed by task 4115: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3503 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x77/0x280 mm/slab.c:3763 kfree_skbmem+0x1a1/0x1d0 net/core/skbuff.c:622 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:682 [inline] kfree_skb+0x165/0x4c0 net/core/skbuff.c:699 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x36a/0x3c0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:260 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1130 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x756/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1199 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801c6e71dc0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 The buggy address is located 208 bytes inside of 224-byte region [ffff8801c6e71dc0, ffff8801c6e71ea0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00071b9c40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801c6e71000 index:0x0 flags: 0x200000000000100(slab) raw: 0200000000000100 ffff8801c6e71000 0000000000000000 000000010000000c raw: ffffea0007224a20 ffff8801d98caf48 ffff8801d9e79040 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801c6e71d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8801c6e71e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8801c6e71e80: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff8801c6e71f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8801c6e71f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-17 00:41:54 +08:00
msg->rep = NULL;
return -ENOMEM;
}
err = __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(cmd, msg, arg);
tipc: fix use-after-free syszkaller reported use-after-free in tipc [1] When msg->rep skb is freed, set the pointer to NULL, so that caller does not free it again. [1] ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_push+0xd4/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:1466 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801c6e71e90 by task syz-executor5/4115 CPU: 1 PID: 4115 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #32 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x24e/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 skb_push+0xd4/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:1466 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x833/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1209 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007f3bc8184c08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000718000 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000000020fdb000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004b5e76 R13: 00007f3bc8184b48 R14: 00000000004b5e86 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 4115: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:489 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x13d/0x750 mm/slab.c:3651 __alloc_skb+0xf1/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:219 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:903 [inline] tipc_tlv_alloc+0x26/0xb0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:148 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0xf2/0x3c0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:248 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1130 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x756/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1199 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe Freed by task 4115: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3503 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x77/0x280 mm/slab.c:3763 kfree_skbmem+0x1a1/0x1d0 net/core/skbuff.c:622 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:682 [inline] kfree_skb+0x165/0x4c0 net/core/skbuff.c:699 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x36a/0x3c0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:260 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1130 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x756/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1199 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801c6e71dc0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 The buggy address is located 208 bytes inside of 224-byte region [ffff8801c6e71dc0, ffff8801c6e71ea0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00071b9c40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801c6e71000 index:0x0 flags: 0x200000000000100(slab) raw: 0200000000000100 ffff8801c6e71000 0000000000000000 000000010000000c raw: ffffea0007224a20 ffff8801d98caf48 ffff8801d9e79040 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801c6e71d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8801c6e71e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8801c6e71e80: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff8801c6e71f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8801c6e71f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-17 00:41:54 +08:00
if (err) {
kfree_skb(msg->rep);
tipc: fix use-after-free syszkaller reported use-after-free in tipc [1] When msg->rep skb is freed, set the pointer to NULL, so that caller does not free it again. [1] ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_push+0xd4/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:1466 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8801c6e71e90 by task syz-executor5/4115 CPU: 1 PID: 4115 Comm: syz-executor5 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc4+ #32 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:52 print_address_description+0x73/0x250 mm/kasan/report.c:252 kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351 [inline] kasan_report+0x24e/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:409 __asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430 skb_push+0xd4/0xe0 net/core/skbuff.c:1466 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x833/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1209 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe RIP: 0033:0x4512e9 RSP: 002b:00007f3bc8184c08 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000718000 RCX: 00000000004512e9 RDX: 0000000000000020 RSI: 0000000020fdb000 RDI: 0000000000000006 RBP: 0000000000000086 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: 00000000004b5e76 R13: 00007f3bc8184b48 R14: 00000000004b5e86 R15: 0000000000000000 Allocated by task 4115: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551 kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20 mm/kasan/kasan.c:489 kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x13d/0x750 mm/slab.c:3651 __alloc_skb+0xf1/0x740 net/core/skbuff.c:219 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:903 [inline] tipc_tlv_alloc+0x26/0xb0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:148 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0xf2/0x3c0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:248 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1130 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x756/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1199 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe Freed by task 4115: save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59 save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447 set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459 [inline] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3503 [inline] kmem_cache_free+0x77/0x280 mm/slab.c:3763 kfree_skbmem+0x1a1/0x1d0 net/core/skbuff.c:622 __kfree_skb net/core/skbuff.c:682 [inline] kfree_skb+0x165/0x4c0 net/core/skbuff.c:699 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x36a/0x3c0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:260 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1130 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x756/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1199 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:598 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:623 netlink_rcv_skb+0x216/0x440 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:898 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1743 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:457 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:470 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:518 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:565 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:557 entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1f/0xbe The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801c6e71dc0 which belongs to the cache skbuff_head_cache of size 224 The buggy address is located 208 bytes inside of 224-byte region [ffff8801c6e71dc0, ffff8801c6e71ea0) The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea00071b9c40 count:1 mapcount:0 mapping:ffff8801c6e71000 index:0x0 flags: 0x200000000000100(slab) raw: 0200000000000100 ffff8801c6e71000 0000000000000000 000000010000000c raw: ffffea0007224a20 ffff8801d98caf48 ffff8801d9e79040 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff8801c6e71d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff8801c6e71e00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff8801c6e71e80: fb fb fb fb fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ^ ffff8801c6e71f00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ffff8801c6e71f80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.com> Cc: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2017-08-17 00:41:54 +08:00
msg->rep = NULL;
}
kfree_skb(arg);
return err;
}
static int __tipc_nl_compat_doit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
int err;
struct sk_buff *doit_buf;
struct sk_buff *trans_buf;
struct nlattr **attrbuf;
struct genl_info info;
trans_buf = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!trans_buf)
return -ENOMEM;
treewide: kmalloc() -> kmalloc_array() The kmalloc() function has a 2-factor argument form, kmalloc_array(). This patch replaces cases of: kmalloc(a * b, gfp) with: kmalloc_array(a * b, gfp) as well as handling cases of: kmalloc(a * b * c, gfp) with: kmalloc(array3_size(a, b, c), gfp) as it's slightly less ugly than: kmalloc_array(array_size(a, b), c, gfp) This does, however, attempt to ignore constant size factors like: kmalloc(4 * 1024, gfp) though any constants defined via macros get caught up in the conversion. Any factors with a sizeof() of "unsigned char", "char", and "u8" were dropped, since they're redundant. The tools/ directory was manually excluded, since it has its own implementation of kmalloc(). The Coccinelle script used for this was: // Fix redundant parens around sizeof(). @@ type TYPE; expression THING, E; @@ ( kmalloc( - (sizeof(TYPE)) * E + sizeof(TYPE) * E , ...) | kmalloc( - (sizeof(THING)) * E + sizeof(THING) * E , ...) ) // Drop single-byte sizes and redundant parens. @@ expression COUNT; typedef u8; typedef __u8; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * (COUNT) + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(__u8) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(unsigned char) * COUNT + COUNT , ...) ) // 2-factor product with sizeof(type/expression) and identifier or constant. @@ type TYPE; expression THING; identifier COUNT_ID; constant COUNT_CONST; @@ ( - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_ID) + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_ID + COUNT_ID, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT_CONST) + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT_CONST + COUNT_CONST, sizeof(THING) , ...) ) // 2-factor product, only identifiers. @@ identifier SIZE, COUNT; @@ - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - SIZE * COUNT + COUNT, SIZE , ...) // 3-factor product with 1 sizeof(type) or sizeof(expression), with // redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING; identifier STRIDE, COUNT; type TYPE; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(TYPE)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * (COUNT) * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * (STRIDE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING) * COUNT * STRIDE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, sizeof(THING)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product with 2 sizeof(variable), with redundant parens removed. @@ expression THING1, THING2; identifier COUNT; type TYPE1, TYPE2; @@ ( kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(TYPE2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(TYPE2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(THING1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(THING1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * COUNT + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) | kmalloc( - sizeof(TYPE1) * sizeof(THING2) * (COUNT) + array3_size(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE1), sizeof(THING2)) , ...) ) // 3-factor product, only identifiers, with redundant parens removed. @@ identifier STRIDE, SIZE, COUNT; @@ ( kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * STRIDE * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - (COUNT) * (STRIDE) * (SIZE) + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) | kmalloc( - COUNT * STRIDE * SIZE + array3_size(COUNT, STRIDE, SIZE) , ...) ) // Any remaining multi-factor products, first at least 3-factor products, // when they're not all constants... @@ expression E1, E2, E3; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - (E1) * (E2) * (E3) + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) | kmalloc( - E1 * E2 * E3 + array3_size(E1, E2, E3) , ...) ) // And then all remaining 2 factors products when they're not all constants, // keeping sizeof() as the second factor argument. @@ expression THING, E1, E2; type TYPE; constant C1, C2, C3; @@ ( kmalloc(sizeof(THING) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE) * C2, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2 * C3, ...) | kmalloc(C1 * C2, ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(TYPE) * E2 + E2, sizeof(TYPE) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * (E2) + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - sizeof(THING) * E2 + E2, sizeof(THING) , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - (E1) * (E2) + E1, E2 , ...) | - kmalloc + kmalloc_array ( - E1 * E2 + E1, E2 , ...) ) Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2018-06-13 04:55:00 +08:00
attrbuf = kmalloc_array(tipc_genl_family.maxattr + 1,
sizeof(struct nlattr *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!attrbuf) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto trans_out;
}
doit_buf = alloc_skb(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!doit_buf) {
err = -ENOMEM;
goto attrbuf_out;
}
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.attrs = attrbuf;
tipc: Fix missing RTNL lock protection during setting link properties Currently when user changes link properties, TIPC first checks if user's command message contains media name or bearer name through tipc_media_find() or tipc_bearer_find() which is protected by RTNL lock. But when tipc_nl_compat_link_set() conducts the checking with the two functions, it doesn't hold RTNL lock at all, as a result, the following complaints were reported: audit: type=1400 audit(1514679888.244:9): avc: denied { write } for pid=3194 comm="syzkaller021477" path="socket:[11143]" dev="sockfs" ino=11143 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=netlink_generic_socket permissive=1 Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/tipc/bearer.c:177 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syzkaller021477/3194: #0: (cb_lock){++++}, at: [<00000000d20133ea>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_rcv_msg+0x115/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:622 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3194 Comm: syzkaller021477 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4585 tipc_bearer_find+0x2b4/0x3b0 net/tipc/bearer.c:177 tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x329/0x9f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:729 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:288 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x15b/0x660 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1119 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x112f/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1201 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624 netlink_rcv_skb+0x21e/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2408 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1275 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1301 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1864 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:636 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:646 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:915 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1772 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x54/0x63 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:129 In order to correct the mistake, __tipc_nl_compat_doit() has been protected by RTNL lock, which means the whole operation of setting bearer/media properties is under RTNL protection. Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6345fd433db009b29413@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-14 13:38:04 +08:00
rtnl_lock();
err = (*cmd->transcode)(cmd, trans_buf, msg);
if (err)
goto doit_out;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_deprecated(attrbuf, tipc_genl_family.maxattr,
(const struct nlattr *)trans_buf->data,
trans_buf->len, NULL, NULL);
if (err)
goto doit_out;
doit_buf->sk = msg->dst_sk;
err = (*cmd->doit)(doit_buf, &info);
doit_out:
tipc: Fix missing RTNL lock protection during setting link properties Currently when user changes link properties, TIPC first checks if user's command message contains media name or bearer name through tipc_media_find() or tipc_bearer_find() which is protected by RTNL lock. But when tipc_nl_compat_link_set() conducts the checking with the two functions, it doesn't hold RTNL lock at all, as a result, the following complaints were reported: audit: type=1400 audit(1514679888.244:9): avc: denied { write } for pid=3194 comm="syzkaller021477" path="socket:[11143]" dev="sockfs" ino=11143 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=netlink_generic_socket permissive=1 Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/tipc/bearer.c:177 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syzkaller021477/3194: #0: (cb_lock){++++}, at: [<00000000d20133ea>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_rcv_msg+0x115/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:622 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3194 Comm: syzkaller021477 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4585 tipc_bearer_find+0x2b4/0x3b0 net/tipc/bearer.c:177 tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x329/0x9f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:729 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:288 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x15b/0x660 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1119 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x112f/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1201 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624 netlink_rcv_skb+0x21e/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2408 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1275 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1301 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1864 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:636 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:646 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:915 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1772 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x54/0x63 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:129 In order to correct the mistake, __tipc_nl_compat_doit() has been protected by RTNL lock, which means the whole operation of setting bearer/media properties is under RTNL protection. Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6345fd433db009b29413@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-14 13:38:04 +08:00
rtnl_unlock();
kfree_skb(doit_buf);
attrbuf_out:
kfree(attrbuf);
trans_out:
kfree_skb(trans_buf);
return err;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_doit(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
int err;
if (msg->req_type && (!msg->req_size ||
!TLV_CHECK_TYPE(msg->req, msg->req_type)))
return -EINVAL;
err = __tipc_nl_compat_doit(cmd, msg);
if (err)
return err;
/* The legacy API considered an empty message a success message */
msg->rep = tipc_tlv_alloc(0);
if (!msg->rep)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *bearer[TIPC_NLA_BEARER_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_BEARER])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(bearer, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_BEARER], NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_BEARER_NAME,
nla_data(bearer[TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME]),
nla_len(bearer[TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME]));
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *bearer;
struct tipc_bearer_config *b;
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917 __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440179 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00 R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(). Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions: tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable() tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() tipc_nl_compat_media_set() tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set() Reported-by: syzbot+b33d5cae0efd35dbfe77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:26 +08:00
int len;
b = (struct tipc_bearer_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
bearer = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER);
if (!bearer)
return -EMSGSIZE;
tipc: check bearer name with right length in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable Syzbot reported the following crash: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:961 memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:961 string_is_valid net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:176 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x2c4/0x910 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:401 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:321 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:354 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1162 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1ae7/0x2750 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1265 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x431/0x620 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf3e/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632 [inline] Uninit was created at: __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:208 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1012 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xb82/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:622 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:632 [inline] It was triggered when the bearer name size < TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME, it would check with a wrong len/TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req), which also includes priority and disc_domain length. This patch is to fix it by checking it with a right length: 'TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req) - offsetof(struct tipc_bearer_config, name)'. Reported-by: syzbot+8b707430713eb46e1e45@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-03-31 22:50:08 +08:00
len = TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req);
len -= offsetof(struct tipc_bearer_config, name);
if (len <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
len = min_t(int, len, TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917 __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440179 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00 R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(). Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions: tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable() tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() tipc_nl_compat_media_set() tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set() Reported-by: syzbot+b33d5cae0efd35dbfe77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:26 +08:00
if (!string_is_valid(b->name, len))
return -EINVAL;
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, b->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (nla_put_u32(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_DOMAIN, ntohl(b->disc_domain)))
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (ntohl(b->priority) <= TIPC_MAX_LINK_PRI) {
prop = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_PROP);
if (!prop)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (nla_put_u32(skb, TIPC_NLA_PROP_PRIO, ntohl(b->priority)))
return -EMSGSIZE;
nla_nest_end(skb, prop);
}
nla_nest_end(skb, bearer);
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
char *name;
struct nlattr *bearer;
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917 __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440179 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00 R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(). Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions: tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable() tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() tipc_nl_compat_media_set() tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set() Reported-by: syzbot+b33d5cae0efd35dbfe77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:26 +08:00
int len;
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
bearer = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER);
if (!bearer)
return -EMSGSIZE;
tipc: check msg->req data len in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable This patch is to fix an uninit-value issue, reported by syzbot: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:981 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x191/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x130/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:622 __msan_warning+0x75/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:310 memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:981 string_is_valid net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:176 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable+0x2a1/0x480 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:449 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:327 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3ac/0xb00 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:360 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1178 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1b1b/0x27b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1281 TLV_GET_DATA_LEN() may return a negtive int value, which will be used as size_t (becoming a big unsigned long) passed into memchr, cause this issue. Similar to what it does in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(), this fix is to return -EINVAL when TLV_GET_DATA_LEN() is negtive in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable(), as well as in tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() and tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats(). v1->v2: - add the missing Fixes tags per Eric's request. Fixes: 0762216c0ad2 ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable") Fixes: 8b66fee7f8ee ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats") Reported-by: syzbot+30eaa8bf392f7fafffaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-25 00:28:19 +08:00
len = TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req);
if (len <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
len = min_t(int, len, TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917 __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440179 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00 R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(). Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions: tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable() tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() tipc_nl_compat_media_set() tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set() Reported-by: syzbot+b33d5cae0efd35dbfe77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:26 +08:00
if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
return -EINVAL;
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
nla_nest_end(skb, bearer);
return 0;
}
static inline u32 perc(u32 count, u32 total)
{
return (count * 100 + (total / 2)) / total;
}
static void __fill_bc_link_stat(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr *prop[], struct nlattr *stats[])
{
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " Window:%u packets\n",
nla_get_u32(prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_WIN]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" RX packets:%u fragments:%u/%u bundles:%u/%u\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_INFO]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_FRAGMENTS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_FRAGMENTED]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_BUNDLES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_BUNDLED]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" TX packets:%u fragments:%u/%u bundles:%u/%u\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_INFO]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_FRAGMENTS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_FRAGMENTED]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_BUNDLES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_BUNDLED]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " RX naks:%u defs:%u dups:%u\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_NACKS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_DEFERRED]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_DUPLICATES]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " TX naks:%u acks:%u dups:%u\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_NACKS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_ACKS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RETRANSMITTED]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" Congestion link:%u Send queue max:%u avg:%u",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_LINK_CONGS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX_QUEUE]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_AVG_QUEUE]));
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
char *name;
struct nlattr *link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX + 1];
int err;
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917 __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440179 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00 R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(). Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions: tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable() tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() tipc_nl_compat_media_set() tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set() Reported-by: syzbot+b33d5cae0efd35dbfe77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:26 +08:00
int len;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(link, TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK], NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
if (!link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_PROP])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(prop, TIPC_NLA_PROP_MAX,
link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_PROP], NULL,
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
if (!link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_STATS])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(stats, TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX,
link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_STATS], NULL,
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917 __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440179 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00 R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(). Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions: tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable() tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() tipc_nl_compat_media_set() tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set() Reported-by: syzbot+b33d5cae0efd35dbfe77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:26 +08:00
tipc: check msg->req data len in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable This patch is to fix an uninit-value issue, reported by syzbot: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:981 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x191/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x130/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:622 __msan_warning+0x75/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:310 memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:981 string_is_valid net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:176 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable+0x2a1/0x480 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:449 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:327 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3ac/0xb00 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:360 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1178 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1b1b/0x27b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1281 TLV_GET_DATA_LEN() may return a negtive int value, which will be used as size_t (becoming a big unsigned long) passed into memchr, cause this issue. Similar to what it does in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(), this fix is to return -EINVAL when TLV_GET_DATA_LEN() is negtive in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable(), as well as in tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() and tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats(). v1->v2: - add the missing Fixes tags per Eric's request. Fixes: 0762216c0ad2 ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable") Fixes: 8b66fee7f8ee ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats") Reported-by: syzbot+30eaa8bf392f7fafffaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-25 00:28:19 +08:00
len = TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req);
if (len <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
len = min_t(int, len, TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 CPU: 1 PID: 6371 Comm: syz-executor652 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917 __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:484 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1011 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable+0x238/0x7b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:389 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x39f/0xae0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x147c/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440179 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007fffef7beee8 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00 R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The root cause is that we don't validate whether bear name is a valid string in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(). Meanwhile, we also fix the same issue in the following functions: tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable() tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() tipc_nl_compat_media_set() tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set() Reported-by: syzbot+b33d5cae0efd35dbfe77@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:26 +08:00
if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
return -EINVAL;
if (strcmp(name, nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME])) != 0)
return 0;
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\nLink <%s>\n",
nla_data(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME]));
if (link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_BROADCAST]) {
__fill_bc_link_stat(msg, prop, stats);
return 0;
}
if (link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_ACTIVE])
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " ACTIVE");
else if (link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_UP])
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " STANDBY");
else
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " DEFUNCT");
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " MTU:%u Priority:%u",
nla_get_u32(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MTU]),
nla_get_u32(prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_PRIO]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " Tolerance:%u ms Window:%u packets\n",
nla_get_u32(prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_TOL]),
nla_get_u32(prop[TIPC_NLA_PROP_WIN]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" RX packets:%u fragments:%u/%u bundles:%u/%u\n",
nla_get_u32(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_RX]) -
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_INFO]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_FRAGMENTS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_FRAGMENTED]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_BUNDLES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_BUNDLED]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" TX packets:%u fragments:%u/%u bundles:%u/%u\n",
nla_get_u32(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_TX]) -
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_INFO]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_FRAGMENTS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_FRAGMENTED]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_BUNDLES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_BUNDLED]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" TX profile sample:%u packets average:%u octets\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_CNT]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_TOT]) /
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" 0-64:%u%% -256:%u%% -1024:%u%% -4096:%u%% ",
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P0]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P1]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P2]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P3]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "-16384:%u%% -32768:%u%% -66000:%u%%\n",
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P4]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P5]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])),
perc(nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_LEN_P6]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MSG_PROF_TOT])));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" RX states:%u probes:%u naks:%u defs:%u dups:%u\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_STATES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_PROBES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_NACKS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RX_DEFERRED]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_DUPLICATES]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" TX states:%u probes:%u naks:%u acks:%u dups:%u\n",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_STATES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_PROBES]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_NACKS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_TX_ACKS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_RETRANSMITTED]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep,
" Congestion link:%u Send queue max:%u avg:%u",
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_LINK_CONGS]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_MAX_QUEUE]),
nla_get_u32(stats[TIPC_NLA_STATS_AVG_QUEUE]));
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_link_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX + 1];
struct tipc_link_info link_info;
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(link, TIPC_NLA_LINK_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_LINK], NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
link_info.dest = nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_DEST]);
link_info.up = htonl(nla_get_flag(link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_UP]));
nla_strlcpy(link_info.str, link[TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME],
TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_LINK_INFO,
&link_info, sizeof(link_info));
}
static int __tipc_add_link_prop(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct tipc_link_config *lc)
{
switch (msg->cmd) {
case TIPC_CMD_SET_LINK_PRI:
return nla_put_u32(skb, TIPC_NLA_PROP_PRIO, ntohl(lc->value));
case TIPC_CMD_SET_LINK_TOL:
return nla_put_u32(skb, TIPC_NLA_PROP_TOL, ntohl(lc->value));
case TIPC_CMD_SET_LINK_WINDOW:
return nla_put_u32(skb, TIPC_NLA_PROP_WIN, ntohl(lc->value));
}
return -EINVAL;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_media_set(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *media;
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
media = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA);
if (!media)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_NAME, lc->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
prop = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_PROP);
if (!prop)
return -EMSGSIZE;
__tipc_add_link_prop(skb, msg, lc);
nla_nest_end(skb, prop);
nla_nest_end(skb, media);
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *bearer;
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
bearer = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER);
if (!bearer)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_NAME, lc->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
prop = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_BEARER_PROP);
if (!prop)
return -EMSGSIZE;
__tipc_add_link_prop(skb, msg, lc);
nla_nest_end(skb, prop);
nla_nest_end(skb, bearer);
return 0;
}
static int __tipc_nl_compat_link_set(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
struct nlattr *prop;
struct nlattr *link;
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
link = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK);
if (!link)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, lc->name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
prop = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_PROP);
if (!prop)
return -EMSGSIZE;
__tipc_add_link_prop(skb, msg, lc);
nla_nest_end(skb, prop);
nla_nest_end(skb, link);
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_link_set(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
struct tipc_link_config *lc;
struct tipc_bearer *bearer;
struct tipc_media *media;
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_set syzbot reports following splat: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 CPU: 1 PID: 9306 Comm: syz-executor172 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline] __tipc_nl_compat_link_set net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:708 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x929/0x1220 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:744 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The uninitialised access happened in nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, lc->name) This is because lc->name string is not validated before it's used. Reported-by: syzbot+d78b8a29241a195aefb8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:27 +08:00
int len;
lc = (struct tipc_link_config *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
len = TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req);
len -= offsetof(struct tipc_link_config, name);
if (len <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
len = min_t(int, len, TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_set syzbot reports following splat: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 CPU: 1 PID: 9306 Comm: syz-executor172 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:313 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline] __tipc_nl_compat_link_set net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:708 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x929/0x1220 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:744 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The uninitialised access happened in nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, lc->name) This is because lc->name string is not validated before it's used. Reported-by: syzbot+d78b8a29241a195aefb8@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:27 +08:00
if (!string_is_valid(lc->name, len))
return -EINVAL;
media = tipc_media_find(lc->name);
if (media) {
tipc: Fix missing RTNL lock protection during setting link properties Currently when user changes link properties, TIPC first checks if user's command message contains media name or bearer name through tipc_media_find() or tipc_bearer_find() which is protected by RTNL lock. But when tipc_nl_compat_link_set() conducts the checking with the two functions, it doesn't hold RTNL lock at all, as a result, the following complaints were reported: audit: type=1400 audit(1514679888.244:9): avc: denied { write } for pid=3194 comm="syzkaller021477" path="socket:[11143]" dev="sockfs" ino=11143 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=netlink_generic_socket permissive=1 Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/tipc/bearer.c:177 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syzkaller021477/3194: #0: (cb_lock){++++}, at: [<00000000d20133ea>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_rcv_msg+0x115/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:622 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3194 Comm: syzkaller021477 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4585 tipc_bearer_find+0x2b4/0x3b0 net/tipc/bearer.c:177 tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x329/0x9f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:729 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:288 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x15b/0x660 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1119 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x112f/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1201 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624 netlink_rcv_skb+0x21e/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2408 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1275 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1301 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1864 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:636 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:646 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:915 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1772 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x54/0x63 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:129 In order to correct the mistake, __tipc_nl_compat_doit() has been protected by RTNL lock, which means the whole operation of setting bearer/media properties is under RTNL protection. Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6345fd433db009b29413@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-14 13:38:04 +08:00
cmd->doit = &__tipc_nl_media_set;
return tipc_nl_compat_media_set(skb, msg);
}
bearer = tipc_bearer_find(msg->net, lc->name);
if (bearer) {
tipc: Fix missing RTNL lock protection during setting link properties Currently when user changes link properties, TIPC first checks if user's command message contains media name or bearer name through tipc_media_find() or tipc_bearer_find() which is protected by RTNL lock. But when tipc_nl_compat_link_set() conducts the checking with the two functions, it doesn't hold RTNL lock at all, as a result, the following complaints were reported: audit: type=1400 audit(1514679888.244:9): avc: denied { write } for pid=3194 comm="syzkaller021477" path="socket:[11143]" dev="sockfs" ino=11143 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=netlink_generic_socket permissive=1 Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/tipc/bearer.c:177 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syzkaller021477/3194: #0: (cb_lock){++++}, at: [<00000000d20133ea>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_rcv_msg+0x115/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:622 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3194 Comm: syzkaller021477 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4585 tipc_bearer_find+0x2b4/0x3b0 net/tipc/bearer.c:177 tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x329/0x9f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:729 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:288 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x15b/0x660 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1119 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x112f/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1201 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624 netlink_rcv_skb+0x21e/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2408 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1275 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1301 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1864 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:636 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:646 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:915 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1772 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x54/0x63 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:129 In order to correct the mistake, __tipc_nl_compat_doit() has been protected by RTNL lock, which means the whole operation of setting bearer/media properties is under RTNL protection. Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6345fd433db009b29413@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-14 13:38:04 +08:00
cmd->doit = &__tipc_nl_bearer_set;
return tipc_nl_compat_bearer_set(skb, msg);
}
return __tipc_nl_compat_link_set(skb, msg);
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
char *name;
struct nlattr *link;
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats syzbot reports following splat: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 CPU: 1 PID: 11057 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats+0x1f0/0x360 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:760 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x457ec9 Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f2557338c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f25573396d4 R13: 00000000004cb478 R14: 00000000004d86c8 R15: 00000000ffffffff Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xb82/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The uninitialised access happened in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats: nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name) This is because name string is not validated before it's used. Reported-by: syzbot+e01d94b5a4c266be6e4c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:25 +08:00
int len;
name = (char *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
link = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK);
if (!link)
return -EMSGSIZE;
tipc: check msg->req data len in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable This patch is to fix an uninit-value issue, reported by syzbot: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:981 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x191/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x130/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:622 __msan_warning+0x75/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:310 memchr+0xce/0x110 lib/string.c:981 string_is_valid net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:176 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable+0x2a1/0x480 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:449 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:327 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3ac/0xb00 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:360 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1178 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1b1b/0x27b0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1281 TLV_GET_DATA_LEN() may return a negtive int value, which will be used as size_t (becoming a big unsigned long) passed into memchr, cause this issue. Similar to what it does in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable(), this fix is to return -EINVAL when TLV_GET_DATA_LEN() is negtive in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable(), as well as in tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump() and tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats(). v1->v2: - add the missing Fixes tags per Eric's request. Fixes: 0762216c0ad2 ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable") Fixes: 8b66fee7f8ee ("tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats") Reported-by: syzbot+30eaa8bf392f7fafffaf@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-06-25 00:28:19 +08:00
len = TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req);
if (len <= 0)
return -EINVAL;
len = min_t(int, len, TIPC_MAX_LINK_NAME);
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats syzbot reports following splat: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 CPU: 1 PID: 11057 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.20.0-rc7+ #2 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x173/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x12e/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:613 __msan_warning+0x82/0xf0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:295 strlen+0x3b/0xa0 lib/string.c:486 nla_put_string include/net/netlink.h:1154 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats+0x1f0/0x360 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:760 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:311 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x3aa/0xaf0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:344 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1107 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x14d7/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185f/0x1a60 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x444/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2477 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1310 [inline] netlink_unicast+0xf40/0x1020 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1336 netlink_sendmsg+0x127f/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1917 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x457ec9 Code: 6d b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 3b b7 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007f2557338c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 0000000000457ec9 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000200001c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 000000000073bf00 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f25573396d4 R13: 00000000004cb478 R14: 00000000004d86c8 R15: 00000000ffffffff Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:204 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0x92/0x150 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:158 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa6/0x130 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:176 kmsan_slab_alloc+0xe/0x10 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:185 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2759 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xe18/0x1030 mm/slub.c:4383 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:137 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x309/0xa20 net/core/skbuff.c:205 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:998 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1182 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xb82/0x1300 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1892 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xdb9/0x11b0 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x305/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0xf0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 The uninitialised access happened in tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats: nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name) This is because name string is not validated before it's used. Reported-by: syzbot+e01d94b5a4c266be6e4c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:25 +08:00
if (!string_is_valid(name, len))
return -EINVAL;
if (nla_put_string(skb, TIPC_NLA_LINK_NAME, name))
return -EMSGSIZE;
nla_nest_end(skb, link);
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump_header(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
int i;
u32 depth;
struct tipc_name_table_query *ntq;
static const char * const header[] = {
"Type ",
"Lower Upper ",
"Port Identity ",
"Publication Scope"
};
ntq = (struct tipc_name_table_query *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
tipc: fix uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump syzbot reported: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in __fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x4a8/0xba0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:826 CPU: 0 PID: 6290 Comm: syz-executor848 Not tainted 4.19.0-rc8+ #70 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline] dump_stack+0x306/0x460 lib/dump_stack.c:113 kmsan_report+0x1a2/0x2e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:917 __msan_warning+0x7c/0xe0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_instr.c:500 __arch_swab32 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/swab.h:10 [inline] __fswab32 include/uapi/linux/swab.h:59 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump+0x4a8/0xba0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:826 __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x59e/0xdb0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:205 tipc_nl_compat_dumpit+0x63a/0x820 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:270 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1151 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x1402/0x2760 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1210 genl_family_rcv_msg net/netlink/genetlink.c:601 [inline] genl_rcv_msg+0x185c/0x1a20 net/netlink/genetlink.c:626 netlink_rcv_skb+0x394/0x640 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2454 genl_rcv+0x63/0x80 net/netlink/genetlink.c:637 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1317 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x166d/0x1720 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1343 netlink_sendmsg+0x1391/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1908 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 RIP: 0033:0x440179 Code: 18 89 d0 c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 fb 13 fc ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 RSP: 002b:00007ffecec49318 EFLAGS: 00000213 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000004002c8 RCX: 0000000000440179 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000100 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000006ca018 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000004002c8 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000213 R12: 0000000000401a00 R13: 0000000000401a90 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 Uninit was created at: kmsan_save_stack_with_flags mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:255 [inline] kmsan_internal_poison_shadow+0xc8/0x1d0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:180 kmsan_kmalloc+0xa4/0x120 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:104 kmsan_slab_alloc+0x10/0x20 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:113 slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:446 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2727 [inline] __kmalloc_node_track_caller+0xb43/0x1400 mm/slub.c:4360 __kmalloc_reserve net/core/skbuff.c:138 [inline] __alloc_skb+0x422/0xe90 net/core/skbuff.c:206 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:996 [inline] netlink_alloc_large_skb net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1189 [inline] netlink_sendmsg+0xcaf/0x1420 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1883 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:621 [inline] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:631 [inline] ___sys_sendmsg+0xe47/0x1200 net/socket.c:2116 __sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2154 [inline] __do_sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2163 [inline] __se_sys_sendmsg+0x307/0x460 net/socket.c:2161 __x64_sys_sendmsg+0x4a/0x70 net/socket.c:2161 do_syscall_64+0xbe/0x100 arch/x86/entry/common.c:291 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xe7 We cannot take for granted the thing that the length of data contained in TLV is longer than the size of struct tipc_name_table_query in tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump(). Reported-by: syzbot+06e771a754829716a327@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-01-14 17:22:28 +08:00
if (TLV_GET_DATA_LEN(msg->req) < sizeof(struct tipc_name_table_query))
return -EINVAL;
depth = ntohl(ntq->depth);
if (depth > 4)
depth = 4;
for (i = 0; i < depth; i++)
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, header[i]);
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\n");
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
char port_str[27];
struct tipc_name_table_query *ntq;
struct nlattr *nt[TIPC_NLA_NAME_TABLE_MAX + 1];
struct nlattr *publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_MAX + 1];
u32 node, depth, type, lowbound, upbound;
static const char * const scope_str[] = {"", " zone", " cluster",
" node"};
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_NAME_TABLE])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(nt, TIPC_NLA_NAME_TABLE_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_NAME_TABLE], NULL,
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
if (!nt[TIPC_NLA_NAME_TABLE_PUBL])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(publ, TIPC_NLA_PUBL_MAX,
nt[TIPC_NLA_NAME_TABLE_PUBL], NULL,
NULL);
if (err)
return err;
ntq = (struct tipc_name_table_query *)TLV_DATA(msg->req);
depth = ntohl(ntq->depth);
type = ntohl(ntq->type);
lowbound = ntohl(ntq->lowbound);
upbound = ntohl(ntq->upbound);
if (!(depth & TIPC_NTQ_ALLTYPES) &&
(type != nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_TYPE])))
return 0;
if (lowbound && (lowbound > nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_UPPER])))
return 0;
if (upbound && (upbound < nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_LOWER])))
return 0;
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "%-10u ",
nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_TYPE]));
if (depth == 1)
goto out;
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "%-10u %-10u ",
nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_LOWER]),
nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_UPPER]));
if (depth == 2)
goto out;
node = nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_NODE]);
sprintf(port_str, "<%u.%u.%u:%u>", tipc_zone(node), tipc_cluster(node),
tipc_node(node), nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_REF]));
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "%-26s ", port_str);
if (depth == 3)
goto out;
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "%-10u %s",
nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_KEY]),
scope_str[nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_SCOPE])]);
out:
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\n");
return 0;
}
static int __tipc_nl_compat_publ_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
u32 type, lower, upper;
struct nlattr *publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_PUBL])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(publ, TIPC_NLA_PUBL_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_PUBL], NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
type = nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_TYPE]);
lower = nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_LOWER]);
upper = nla_get_u32(publ[TIPC_NLA_PUBL_UPPER]);
if (lower == upper)
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " {%u,%u}", type, lower);
else
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " {%u,%u,%u}", type, lower, upper);
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_publ_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg, u32 sock)
{
int err;
void *hdr;
struct nlattr *nest;
struct sk_buff *args;
struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump dump;
args = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!args)
return -ENOMEM;
hdr = genlmsg_put(args, 0, 0, &tipc_genl_family, NLM_F_MULTI,
TIPC_NL_PUBL_GET);
if (!hdr) {
kfree_skb(args);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
nest = nla_nest_start_noflag(args, TIPC_NLA_SOCK);
if (!nest) {
kfree_skb(args);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
if (nla_put_u32(args, TIPC_NLA_SOCK_REF, sock)) {
kfree_skb(args);
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
nla_nest_end(args, nest);
genlmsg_end(args, hdr);
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_publ_dump;
dump.format = __tipc_nl_compat_publ_dump;
err = __tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg, args);
kfree_skb(args);
return err;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_sk_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
int err;
u32 sock_ref;
struct nlattr *sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_MAX + 1];
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_SOCK])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(sock, TIPC_NLA_SOCK_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_SOCK], NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
sock_ref = nla_get_u32(sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_REF]);
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "%u:", sock_ref);
if (sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_CON]) {
u32 node;
struct nlattr *con[TIPC_NLA_CON_MAX + 1];
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(con, TIPC_NLA_CON_MAX,
sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_CON],
NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
node = nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_NODE]);
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " connected to <%u.%u.%u:%u>",
tipc_zone(node),
tipc_cluster(node),
tipc_node(node),
nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_SOCK]));
if (con[TIPC_NLA_CON_FLAG])
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " via {%u,%u}\n",
nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_TYPE]),
nla_get_u32(con[TIPC_NLA_CON_INST]));
else
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\n");
} else if (sock[TIPC_NLA_SOCK_HAS_PUBL]) {
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, " bound to");
err = tipc_nl_compat_publ_dump(msg, sock_ref);
if (err)
return err;
}
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "\n");
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_media_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct nlattr *media[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(media, TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA], NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_MEDIA_NAME,
nla_data(media[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_NAME]),
nla_len(media[TIPC_NLA_MEDIA_NAME]));
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_node_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
struct tipc_node_info node_info;
struct nlattr *node[TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(node, TIPC_NLA_NODE_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_NODE], NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
node_info.addr = htonl(nla_get_u32(node[TIPC_NLA_NODE_ADDR]));
node_info.up = htonl(nla_get_flag(node[TIPC_NLA_NODE_UP]));
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_NODE_INFO, &node_info,
sizeof(node_info));
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_net_set(struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit *cmd,
struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
u32 val;
struct nlattr *net;
val = ntohl(*(__be32 *)TLV_DATA(msg->req));
net = nla_nest_start_noflag(skb, TIPC_NLA_NET);
if (!net)
return -EMSGSIZE;
if (msg->cmd == TIPC_CMD_SET_NODE_ADDR) {
if (nla_put_u32(skb, TIPC_NLA_NET_ADDR, val))
return -EMSGSIZE;
} else if (msg->cmd == TIPC_CMD_SET_NETID) {
if (nla_put_u32(skb, TIPC_NLA_NET_ID, val))
return -EMSGSIZE;
}
nla_nest_end(skb, net);
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_net_dump(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
__be32 id;
struct nlattr *net[TIPC_NLA_NET_MAX + 1];
int err;
if (!attrs[TIPC_NLA_NET])
return -EINVAL;
netlink: make validation more configurable for future strictness We currently have two levels of strict validation: 1) liberal (default) - undefined (type >= max) & NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted - garbage at end of message accepted 2) strict (opt-in) - NLA_UNSPEC attributes accepted - attribute length >= expected accepted Split out parsing strictness into four different options: * TRAILING - check that there's no trailing data after parsing attributes (in message or nested) * MAXTYPE - reject attrs > max known type * UNSPEC - reject attributes with NLA_UNSPEC policy entries * STRICT_ATTRS - strictly validate attribute size The default for future things should be *everything*. The current *_strict() is a combination of TRAILING and MAXTYPE, and is renamed to _deprecated_strict(). The current regular parsing has none of this, and is renamed to *_parse_deprecated(). Additionally it allows us to selectively set one of the new flags even on old policies. Notably, the UNSPEC flag could be useful in this case, since it can be arranged (by filling in the policy) to not be an incompatible userspace ABI change, but would then going forward prevent forgetting attribute entries. Similar can apply to the POLICY flag. We end up with the following renames: * nla_parse -> nla_parse_deprecated * nla_parse_strict -> nla_parse_deprecated_strict * nlmsg_parse -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated * nlmsg_parse_strict -> nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict * nla_parse_nested -> nla_parse_nested_deprecated * nla_validate_nested -> nla_validate_nested_deprecated Using spatch, of course: @@ expression TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_deprecated(TB, MAX, HEAD, LEN, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_parse_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_parse_deprecated_strict(NLH, HDRLEN, TB, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_parse_nested(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) +nla_parse_nested_deprecated(TB, MAX, NLA, POL, EXT) @@ expression START, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nla_validate_nested(START, MAX, POL, EXT) +nla_validate_nested_deprecated(START, MAX, POL, EXT) @@ expression NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT; @@ -nlmsg_validate(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) +nlmsg_validate_deprecated(NLH, HDRLEN, MAX, POL, EXT) For this patch, don't actually add the strict, non-renamed versions yet so that it breaks compile if I get it wrong. Also, while at it, make nla_validate and nla_parse go down to a common __nla_validate_parse() function to avoid code duplication. Ultimately, this allows us to have very strict validation for every new caller of nla_parse()/nlmsg_parse() etc as re-introduced in the next patch, while existing things will continue to work as is. In effect then, this adds fully strict validation for any new command. Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2019-04-26 20:07:28 +08:00
err = nla_parse_nested_deprecated(net, TIPC_NLA_NET_MAX,
attrs[TIPC_NLA_NET], NULL, NULL);
if (err)
return err;
id = htonl(nla_get_u32(net[TIPC_NLA_NET_ID]));
return tipc_add_tlv(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_UNSIGNED, &id, sizeof(id));
}
static int tipc_cmd_show_stats_compat(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
msg->rep = tipc_tlv_alloc(ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN);
if (!msg->rep)
return -ENOMEM;
tipc_tlv_init(msg->rep, TIPC_TLV_ULTRA_STRING);
tipc_tlv_sprintf(msg->rep, "TIPC version " TIPC_MOD_VER "\n");
return 0;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_handle(struct tipc_nl_compat_msg *msg)
{
struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_dump dump;
struct tipc_nl_compat_cmd_doit doit;
memset(&dump, 0, sizeof(dump));
memset(&doit, 0, sizeof(doit));
switch (msg->cmd) {
case TIPC_CMD_NOOP:
msg->rep = tipc_tlv_alloc(0);
if (!msg->rep)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
case TIPC_CMD_GET_BEARER_NAMES:
msg->rep_size = MAX_BEARERS * TLV_SPACE(TIPC_MAX_BEARER_NAME);
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_bearer_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_bearer_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_ENABLE_BEARER:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_BEARER_CONFIG;
tipc: Fix missing RTNL lock protection during setting link properties Currently when user changes link properties, TIPC first checks if user's command message contains media name or bearer name through tipc_media_find() or tipc_bearer_find() which is protected by RTNL lock. But when tipc_nl_compat_link_set() conducts the checking with the two functions, it doesn't hold RTNL lock at all, as a result, the following complaints were reported: audit: type=1400 audit(1514679888.244:9): avc: denied { write } for pid=3194 comm="syzkaller021477" path="socket:[11143]" dev="sockfs" ino=11143 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=netlink_generic_socket permissive=1 Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/tipc/bearer.c:177 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syzkaller021477/3194: #0: (cb_lock){++++}, at: [<00000000d20133ea>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_rcv_msg+0x115/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:622 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3194 Comm: syzkaller021477 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4585 tipc_bearer_find+0x2b4/0x3b0 net/tipc/bearer.c:177 tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x329/0x9f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:729 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:288 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x15b/0x660 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1119 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x112f/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1201 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624 netlink_rcv_skb+0x21e/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2408 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1275 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1301 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1864 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:636 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:646 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:915 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1772 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x54/0x63 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:129 In order to correct the mistake, __tipc_nl_compat_doit() has been protected by RTNL lock, which means the whole operation of setting bearer/media properties is under RTNL protection. Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6345fd433db009b29413@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-14 13:38:04 +08:00
doit.doit = __tipc_nl_bearer_enable;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_bearer_enable;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_DISABLE_BEARER:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_BEARER_NAME;
tipc: Fix missing RTNL lock protection during setting link properties Currently when user changes link properties, TIPC first checks if user's command message contains media name or bearer name through tipc_media_find() or tipc_bearer_find() which is protected by RTNL lock. But when tipc_nl_compat_link_set() conducts the checking with the two functions, it doesn't hold RTNL lock at all, as a result, the following complaints were reported: audit: type=1400 audit(1514679888.244:9): avc: denied { write } for pid=3194 comm="syzkaller021477" path="socket:[11143]" dev="sockfs" ino=11143 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=netlink_generic_socket permissive=1 Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/tipc/bearer.c:177 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syzkaller021477/3194: #0: (cb_lock){++++}, at: [<00000000d20133ea>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_rcv_msg+0x115/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:622 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3194 Comm: syzkaller021477 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4585 tipc_bearer_find+0x2b4/0x3b0 net/tipc/bearer.c:177 tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x329/0x9f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:729 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:288 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x15b/0x660 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1119 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x112f/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1201 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624 netlink_rcv_skb+0x21e/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2408 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1275 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1301 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1864 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:636 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:646 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:915 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1772 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x54/0x63 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:129 In order to correct the mistake, __tipc_nl_compat_doit() has been protected by RTNL lock, which means the whole operation of setting bearer/media properties is under RTNL protection. Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6345fd433db009b29413@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-14 13:38:04 +08:00
doit.doit = __tipc_nl_bearer_disable;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_bearer_disable;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SHOW_LINK_STATS:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_LINK_NAME;
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
msg->rep_type = TIPC_TLV_ULTRA_STRING;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_node_dump_link;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_link_stat_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_GET_LINKS:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_NET_ADDR;
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_node_dump_link;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_link_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SET_LINK_TOL:
case TIPC_CMD_SET_LINK_PRI:
case TIPC_CMD_SET_LINK_WINDOW:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_LINK_CONFIG;
doit.doit = tipc_nl_node_set_link;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_link_set;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_RESET_LINK_STATS:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_LINK_NAME;
doit.doit = tipc_nl_node_reset_link_stats;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_link_reset_stats;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SHOW_NAME_TABLE:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_NAME_TBL_QUERY;
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
msg->rep_type = TIPC_TLV_ULTRA_STRING;
dump.header = tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump_header;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_name_table_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_name_table_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SHOW_PORTS:
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
msg->rep_type = TIPC_TLV_ULTRA_STRING;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_sk_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_sk_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_GET_MEDIA_NAMES:
msg->rep_size = MAX_MEDIA * TLV_SPACE(TIPC_MAX_MEDIA_NAME);
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_media_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_media_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_GET_NODES:
msg->rep_size = ULTRA_STRING_MAX_LEN;
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_node_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_node_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SET_NODE_ADDR:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_NET_ADDR;
tipc: Fix missing RTNL lock protection during setting link properties Currently when user changes link properties, TIPC first checks if user's command message contains media name or bearer name through tipc_media_find() or tipc_bearer_find() which is protected by RTNL lock. But when tipc_nl_compat_link_set() conducts the checking with the two functions, it doesn't hold RTNL lock at all, as a result, the following complaints were reported: audit: type=1400 audit(1514679888.244:9): avc: denied { write } for pid=3194 comm="syzkaller021477" path="socket:[11143]" dev="sockfs" ino=11143 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=netlink_generic_socket permissive=1 Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/tipc/bearer.c:177 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syzkaller021477/3194: #0: (cb_lock){++++}, at: [<00000000d20133ea>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_rcv_msg+0x115/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:622 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3194 Comm: syzkaller021477 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4585 tipc_bearer_find+0x2b4/0x3b0 net/tipc/bearer.c:177 tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x329/0x9f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:729 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:288 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x15b/0x660 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1119 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x112f/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1201 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624 netlink_rcv_skb+0x21e/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2408 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1275 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1301 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1864 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:636 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:646 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:915 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1772 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x54/0x63 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:129 In order to correct the mistake, __tipc_nl_compat_doit() has been protected by RTNL lock, which means the whole operation of setting bearer/media properties is under RTNL protection. Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6345fd433db009b29413@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-14 13:38:04 +08:00
doit.doit = __tipc_nl_net_set;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_net_set;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SET_NETID:
msg->req_type = TIPC_TLV_UNSIGNED;
tipc: Fix missing RTNL lock protection during setting link properties Currently when user changes link properties, TIPC first checks if user's command message contains media name or bearer name through tipc_media_find() or tipc_bearer_find() which is protected by RTNL lock. But when tipc_nl_compat_link_set() conducts the checking with the two functions, it doesn't hold RTNL lock at all, as a result, the following complaints were reported: audit: type=1400 audit(1514679888.244:9): avc: denied { write } for pid=3194 comm="syzkaller021477" path="socket:[11143]" dev="sockfs" ino=11143 scontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=unconfined_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=netlink_generic_socket permissive=1 Reviewed-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com> ============================= WARNING: suspicious RCU usage 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Not tainted ----------------------------- net/tipc/bearer.c:177 suspicious rcu_dereference_protected() usage! other info that might help us debug this: rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1 2 locks held by syzkaller021477/3194: #0: (cb_lock){++++}, at: [<00000000d20133ea>] genl_rcv+0x19/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:634 #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_lock net/netlink/genetlink.c:33 [inline] #1: (genl_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<00000000fcc5d1bc>] genl_rcv_msg+0x115/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:622 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 PID: 3194 Comm: syzkaller021477 Not tainted 4.15.0-rc5+ #152 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:17 [inline] dump_stack+0x194/0x257 lib/dump_stack.c:53 lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x123/0x170 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4585 tipc_bearer_find+0x2b4/0x3b0 net/tipc/bearer.c:177 tipc_nl_compat_link_set+0x329/0x9f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:729 __tipc_nl_compat_doit net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:288 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_doit+0x15b/0x660 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:335 tipc_nl_compat_handle net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1119 [inline] tipc_nl_compat_recv+0x112f/0x18f0 net/tipc/netlink_compat.c:1201 genl_family_rcv_msg+0x7b7/0xfb0 net/netlink/genetlink.c:599 genl_rcv_msg+0xb2/0x140 net/netlink/genetlink.c:624 netlink_rcv_skb+0x21e/0x460 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2408 genl_rcv+0x28/0x40 net/netlink/genetlink.c:635 netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1275 [inline] netlink_unicast+0x4e8/0x6f0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1301 netlink_sendmsg+0xa4a/0xe60 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1864 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:636 [inline] sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:646 sock_write_iter+0x31a/0x5d0 net/socket.c:915 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:1772 [inline] new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:469 [inline] __vfs_write+0x684/0x970 fs/read_write.c:482 vfs_write+0x189/0x510 fs/read_write.c:544 SYSC_write fs/read_write.c:589 [inline] SyS_write+0xef/0x220 fs/read_write.c:581 do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:327 [inline] do_fast_syscall_32+0x3ee/0xf9d arch/x86/entry/common.c:389 entry_SYSENTER_compat+0x54/0x63 arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S:129 In order to correct the mistake, __tipc_nl_compat_doit() has been protected by RTNL lock, which means the whole operation of setting bearer/media properties is under RTNL protection. Signed-off-by: Ying Xue <ying.xue@windriver.com> Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+6345fd433db009b29413@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
2018-02-14 13:38:04 +08:00
doit.doit = __tipc_nl_net_set;
doit.transcode = tipc_nl_compat_net_set;
return tipc_nl_compat_doit(&doit, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_GET_NETID:
msg->rep_size = sizeof(u32);
dump.dumpit = tipc_nl_net_dump;
dump.format = tipc_nl_compat_net_dump;
return tipc_nl_compat_dumpit(&dump, msg);
case TIPC_CMD_SHOW_STATS:
return tipc_cmd_show_stats_compat(msg);
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
static int tipc_nl_compat_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info)
{
int err;
int len;
struct tipc_nl_compat_msg msg;
struct nlmsghdr *req_nlh;
struct nlmsghdr *rep_nlh;
struct tipc_genlmsghdr *req_userhdr = info->userhdr;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
req_nlh = (struct nlmsghdr *)skb->data;
msg.req = nlmsg_data(req_nlh) + GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN;
msg.cmd = req_userhdr->cmd;
msg.net = genl_info_net(info);
msg.dst_sk = skb->sk;
if ((msg.cmd & 0xC000) && (!netlink_net_capable(skb, CAP_NET_ADMIN))) {
msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_NOT_NET_ADMIN);
err = -EACCES;
goto send;
}
msg.req_size = nlmsg_attrlen(req_nlh, GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
if (msg.req_size && !TLV_OK(msg.req, msg.req_size)) {
msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_NOT_SUPPORTED);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto send;
}
err = tipc_nl_compat_handle(&msg);
if ((err == -EOPNOTSUPP) || (err == -EPERM))
msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_NOT_SUPPORTED);
else if (err == -EINVAL)
msg.rep = tipc_get_err_tlv(TIPC_CFG_TLV_ERROR);
send:
if (!msg.rep)
return err;
len = nlmsg_total_size(GENL_HDRLEN + TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN);
skb_push(msg.rep, len);
rep_nlh = nlmsg_hdr(msg.rep);
memcpy(rep_nlh, info->nlhdr, len);
rep_nlh->nlmsg_len = msg.rep->len;
genlmsg_unicast(msg.net, msg.rep, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
return err;
}
static const struct genl_ops tipc_genl_compat_ops[] = {
{
.cmd = TIPC_GENL_CMD,
.validate = GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_STRICT | GENL_DONT_VALIDATE_DUMP,
.doit = tipc_nl_compat_recv,
},
};
static struct genl_family tipc_genl_compat_family __ro_after_init = {
.name = TIPC_GENL_NAME,
.version = TIPC_GENL_VERSION,
.hdrsize = TIPC_GENL_HDRLEN,
.maxattr = 0,
.netnsok = true,
.module = THIS_MODULE,
.ops = tipc_genl_compat_ops,
.n_ops = ARRAY_SIZE(tipc_genl_compat_ops),
};
int __init tipc_netlink_compat_start(void)
{
int res;
res = genl_register_family(&tipc_genl_compat_family);
if (res) {
pr_err("Failed to register legacy compat interface\n");
return res;
}
return 0;
}
void tipc_netlink_compat_stop(void)
{
genl_unregister_family(&tipc_genl_compat_family);
}