sg_write()/bsg_write() is not fit to be called under KERNEL_DS
Both damn things interpret userland pointers embedded into the payload; worse, they are actually traversing those. Leaving aside the bad API design, this is very much _not_ safe to call with KERNEL_DS. Bail out early if that happens. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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@ -655,6 +655,9 @@ bsg_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
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dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
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dprintk("%s: write %Zd bytes\n", bd->name, count);
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if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
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return -EINVAL;
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bsg_set_block(bd, file);
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bsg_set_block(bd, file);
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bytes_written = 0;
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bytes_written = 0;
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@ -581,6 +581,9 @@ sg_write(struct file *filp, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t * ppos)
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sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
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sg_io_hdr_t *hp;
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unsigned char cmnd[SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE];
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unsigned char cmnd[SG_MAX_CDB_SIZE];
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if (unlikely(segment_eq(get_fs(), KERNEL_DS)))
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return -EINVAL;
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if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
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if ((!(sfp = (Sg_fd *) filp->private_data)) || (!(sdp = sfp->parentdp)))
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return -ENXIO;
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return -ENXIO;
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SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
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SCSI_LOG_TIMEOUT(3, sg_printk(KERN_INFO, sdp,
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