Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux
Pull s390 bug fixes from Martin Schwidefsky: "A couple of s390 bug fixes. The PCI segment boundary issue is a nasty one as it can lead to data corruption" * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/s390/linux: s390/cio: Fix missing subchannels after CHPID configure on s390/pci/dma: use correct segment boundary size s390/compat: fix sys_sched_getattr compat wrapper s390/zcrypt: additional check to avoid overflow in msg-type 6 requests
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commit
335d08b86f
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@ -1421,5 +1421,5 @@ ENTRY(sys_sched_setattr_wrapper)
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ENTRY(sys_sched_getattr_wrapper)
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lgfr %r2,%r2 # pid_t
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llgtr %r3,%r3 # const char __user *
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llgfr %r3,%r3 # unsigned int
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llgfr %r4,%r4 # unsigned int
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jg sys_sched_getattr
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@ -206,11 +206,13 @@ static void dma_cleanup_tables(struct zpci_dev *zdev)
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zdev->dma_table = NULL;
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}
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static unsigned long __dma_alloc_iommu(struct zpci_dev *zdev, unsigned long start,
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int size)
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static unsigned long __dma_alloc_iommu(struct zpci_dev *zdev,
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unsigned long start, int size)
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{
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unsigned long boundary_size = 0x1000000;
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unsigned long boundary_size;
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boundary_size = ALIGN(dma_get_seg_boundary(&zdev->pdev->dev) + 1,
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PAGE_SIZE) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
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return iommu_area_alloc(zdev->iommu_bitmap, zdev->iommu_pages,
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start, size, 0, boundary_size, 0);
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}
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@ -610,6 +610,7 @@ void chsc_chp_online(struct chp_id chpid)
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css_wait_for_slow_path();
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for_each_subchannel_staged(__s390_process_res_acc, NULL,
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&link);
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css_schedule_reprobe();
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}
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}
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@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ static int XCRB_msg_to_type6CPRB_msgX(struct zcrypt_device *zdev,
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} __packed * msg = ap_msg->message;
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int rcblen = CEIL4(xcRB->request_control_blk_length);
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int replylen;
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int replylen, req_sumlen, resp_sumlen;
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char *req_data = ap_msg->message + sizeof(struct type6_hdr) + rcblen;
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char *function_code;
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@ -321,12 +321,34 @@ static int XCRB_msg_to_type6CPRB_msgX(struct zcrypt_device *zdev,
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xcRB->request_data_length;
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if (ap_msg->length > MSGTYPE06_MAX_MSG_SIZE)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Overflow check
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sum must be greater (or equal) than the largest operand */
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req_sumlen = CEIL4(xcRB->request_control_blk_length) +
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xcRB->request_data_length;
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if ((CEIL4(xcRB->request_control_blk_length) <=
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xcRB->request_data_length) ?
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(req_sumlen < xcRB->request_data_length) :
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(req_sumlen < CEIL4(xcRB->request_control_blk_length))) {
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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replylen = sizeof(struct type86_fmt2_msg) +
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CEIL4(xcRB->reply_control_blk_length) +
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xcRB->reply_data_length;
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if (replylen > MSGTYPE06_MAX_MSG_SIZE)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Overflow check
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sum must be greater (or equal) than the largest operand */
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resp_sumlen = CEIL4(xcRB->reply_control_blk_length) +
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xcRB->reply_data_length;
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if ((CEIL4(xcRB->reply_control_blk_length) <= xcRB->reply_data_length) ?
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(resp_sumlen < xcRB->reply_data_length) :
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(resp_sumlen < CEIL4(xcRB->reply_control_blk_length))) {
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/* prepare type6 header */
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msg->hdr = static_type6_hdrX;
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memcpy(msg->hdr.agent_id , &(xcRB->agent_ID), sizeof(xcRB->agent_ID));
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