Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities
Add documentation for the L1TF vulnerability and the mitigation mechanisms: - Explain the problem and risks - Document the mitigation mechanisms - Document the command line controls - Document the sysfs files Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142323.287429944@linutronix.de
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Thomas Gleixner
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@ -17,6 +17,15 @@ etc.
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kernel-parameters
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devices
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This section describes CPU vulnerabilities and provides an overview of the
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possible mitigations along with guidance for selecting mitigations if they
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are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
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.. toctree::
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:maxdepth: 1
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l1tf
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Here is a set of documents aimed at users who are trying to track down
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problems and bugs in particular.
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@ -0,0 +1,591 @@
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L1TF - L1 Terminal Fault
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========================
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L1 Terminal Fault is a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged
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speculative access to data which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache
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when the page table entry controlling the virtual address, which is used
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for the access, has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set.
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Affected processors
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-------------------
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This vulnerability affects a wide range of Intel processors. The
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vulnerability is not present on:
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- Processors from AMD, Centaur and other non Intel vendors
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- Older processor models, where the CPU family is < 6
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- A range of Intel ATOM processors (Cedarview, Cloverview, Lincroft,
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Penwell, Pineview, Slivermont, Airmont, Merrifield)
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- The Intel Core Duo Yonah variants (2006 - 2008)
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- The Intel XEON PHI family
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- Intel processors which have the ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO bit set in the
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IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. If the bit is set the CPU is not affected
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by the Meltdown vulnerability either. These CPUs should become
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available by end of 2018.
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Whether a processor is affected or not can be read out from the L1TF
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vulnerability file in sysfs. See :ref:`l1tf_sys_info`.
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Related CVEs
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------------
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The following CVE entries are related to the L1TF vulnerability:
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============= ================= ==============================
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CVE-2018-3615 L1 Terminal Fault SGX related aspects
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CVE-2018-3620 L1 Terminal Fault OS, SMM related aspects
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CVE-2018-3646 L1 Terminal Fault Virtualization related aspects
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============= ================= ==============================
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Problem
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-------
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If an instruction accesses a virtual address for which the relevant page
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table entry (PTE) has the Present bit cleared or other reserved bits set,
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then speculative execution ignores the invalid PTE and loads the referenced
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data if it is present in the Level 1 Data Cache, as if the page referenced
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by the address bits in the PTE was still present and accessible.
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While this is a purely speculative mechanism and the instruction will raise
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a page fault when it is retired eventually, the pure act of loading the
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data and making it available to other speculative instructions opens up the
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opportunity for side channel attacks to unprivileged malicious code,
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similar to the Meltdown attack.
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While Meltdown breaks the user space to kernel space protection, L1TF
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allows to attack any physical memory address in the system and the attack
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works across all protection domains. It allows an attack of SGX and also
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works from inside virtual machines because the speculation bypasses the
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extended page table (EPT) protection mechanism.
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Attack scenarios
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----------------
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1. Malicious user space
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Operating Systems store arbitrary information in the address bits of a
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PTE which is marked non present. This allows a malicious user space
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application to attack the physical memory to which these PTEs resolve.
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In some cases user-space can maliciously influence the information
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encoded in the address bits of the PTE, thus making attacks more
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deterministic and more practical.
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The Linux kernel contains a mitigation for this attack vector, PTE
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inversion, which is permanently enabled and has no performance
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impact. The kernel ensures that the address bits of PTEs, which are not
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marked present, never point to cacheable physical memory space.
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A system with an up to date kernel is protected against attacks from
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malicious user space applications.
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2. Malicious guest in a virtual machine
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The fact that L1TF breaks all domain protections allows malicious guest
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OSes, which can control the PTEs directly, and malicious guest user
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space applications, which run on an unprotected guest kernel lacking the
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PTE inversion mitigation for L1TF, to attack physical host memory.
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A special aspect of L1TF in the context of virtualization is symmetric
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multi threading (SMT). The Intel implementation of SMT is called
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HyperThreading. The fact that Hyperthreads on the affected processors
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share the L1 Data Cache (L1D) is important for this. As the flaw allows
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only to attack data which is present in L1D, a malicious guest running
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on one Hyperthread can attack the data which is brought into the L1D by
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the context which runs on the sibling Hyperthread of the same physical
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core. This context can be host OS, host user space or a different guest.
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If the processor does not support Extended Page Tables, the attack is
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only possible, when the hypervisor does not sanitize the content of the
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effective (shadow) page tables.
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While solutions exist to mitigate these attack vectors fully, these
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mitigations are not enabled by default in the Linux kernel because they
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can affect performance significantly. The kernel provides several
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mechanisms which can be utilized to address the problem depending on the
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deployment scenario. The mitigations, their protection scope and impact
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are described in the next sections.
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The default mitigations and the rationale for chosing them are explained
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at the end of this document. See :ref:`default_mitigations`.
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.. _l1tf_sys_info:
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L1TF system information
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-----------------------
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The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current L1TF
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status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and which
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mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf
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The possible values in this file are:
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=========================== ===============================
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'Not affected' The processor is not vulnerable
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'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' The host protection is active
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=========================== ===============================
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If KVM/VMX is enabled and the processor is vulnerable then the following
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information is appended to the 'Mitigation: PTE Inversion' part:
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- SMT status:
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===================== ================
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'VMX: SMT vulnerable' SMT is enabled
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'VMX: SMT disabled' SMT is disabled
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===================== ================
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- L1D Flush mode:
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================================ ====================================
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'L1D vulnerable' L1D flushing is disabled
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'L1D conditional cache flushes' L1D flush is conditionally enabled
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'L1D cache flushes' L1D flush is unconditionally enabled
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================================ ====================================
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The resulting grade of protection is discussed in the following sections.
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Host mitigation mechanism
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-------------------------
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The kernel is unconditionally protected against L1TF attacks from malicious
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user space running on the host.
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Guest mitigation mechanisms
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---------------------------
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.. _l1d_flush:
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1. L1D flush on VMENTER
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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To make sure that a guest cannot attack data which is present in the L1D
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the hypervisor flushes the L1D before entering the guest.
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Flushing the L1D evicts not only the data which should not be accessed
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by a potentially malicious guest, it also flushes the guest
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data. Flushing the L1D has a performance impact as the processor has to
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bring the flushed guest data back into the L1D. Depending on the
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frequency of VMEXIT/VMENTER and the type of computations in the guest
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performance degradation in the range of 1% to 50% has been observed. For
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scenarios where guest VMEXIT/VMENTER are rare the performance impact is
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minimal. Virtio and mechanisms like posted interrupts are designed to
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confine the VMEXITs to a bare minimum, but specific configurations and
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application scenarios might still suffer from a high VMEXIT rate.
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The kernel provides two L1D flush modes:
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- conditional ('cond')
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- unconditional ('always')
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The conditional mode avoids L1D flushing after VMEXITs which execute
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only audited code pathes before the corresponding VMENTER. These code
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pathes have beed verified that they cannot expose secrets or other
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interesting data to an attacker, but they can leak information about the
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address space layout of the hypervisor.
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Unconditional mode flushes L1D on all VMENTER invocations and provides
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maximum protection. It has a higher overhead than the conditional
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mode. The overhead cannot be quantified correctly as it depends on the
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work load scenario and the resulting number of VMEXITs.
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The general recommendation is to enable L1D flush on VMENTER. The kernel
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defaults to conditional mode on affected processors.
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**Note**, that L1D flush does not prevent the SMT problem because the
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sibling thread will also bring back its data into the L1D which makes it
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attackable again.
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L1D flush can be controlled by the administrator via the kernel command
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line and sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`
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and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
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.. _guest_confinement:
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2. Guest VCPU confinement to dedicated physical cores
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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To address the SMT problem, it is possible to make a guest or a group of
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guests affine to one or more physical cores. The proper mechanism for
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that is to utilize exclusive cpusets to ensure that no other guest or
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host tasks can run on these cores.
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If only a single guest or related guests run on sibling SMT threads on
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the same physical core then they can only attack their own memory and
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restricted parts of the host memory.
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Host memory is attackable, when one of the sibling SMT threads runs in
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host OS (hypervisor) context and the other in guest context. The amount
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of valuable information from the host OS context depends on the context
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which the host OS executes, i.e. interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel
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threads. The amount of valuable data from these contexts cannot be
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declared as non-interesting for an attacker without deep inspection of
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the code.
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**Note**, that assigning guests to a fixed set of physical cores affects
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the ability of the scheduler to do load balancing and might have
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negative effects on CPU utilization depending on the hosting
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scenario. Disabling SMT might be a viable alternative for particular
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scenarios.
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For further information about confining guests to a single or to a group
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of cores consult the cpusets documentation:
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https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/cgroup-v1/cpusets.txt
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.. _interrupt_isolation:
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3. Interrupt affinity
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Interrupts can be made affine to logical CPUs. This is not universally
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true because there are types of interrupts which are truly per CPU
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interrupts, e.g. the local timer interrupt. Aside of that multi queue
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devices affine their interrupts to single CPUs or groups of CPUs per
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queue without allowing the administrator to control the affinities.
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Moving the interrupts, which can be affinity controlled, away from CPUs
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which run untrusted guests, reduces the attack vector space.
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Whether the interrupts with are affine to CPUs, which run untrusted
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guests, provide interesting data for an attacker depends on the system
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configuration and the scenarios which run on the system. While for some
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of the interrupts it can be assumed that they wont expose interesting
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information beyond exposing hints about the host OS memory layout, there
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is no way to make general assumptions.
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Interrupt affinity can be controlled by the administrator via the
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/proc/irq/$NR/smp_affinity[_list] files. Limited documentation is
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available at:
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https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/IRQ-affinity.txt
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.. _smt_control:
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4. SMT control
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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To prevent the SMT issues of L1TF it might be necessary to disable SMT
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completely. Disabling SMT can have a significant performance impact, but
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the impact depends on the hosting scenario and the type of workloads.
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The impact of disabling SMT needs also to be weighted against the impact
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of other mitigation solutions like confining guests to dedicated cores.
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The kernel provides a sysfs interface to retrieve the status of SMT and
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to control it. It also provides a kernel command line interface to
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control SMT.
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The kernel command line interface consists of the following options:
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=========== ==========================================================
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nosmt Affects the bring up of the secondary CPUs during boot. The
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kernel tries to bring all present CPUs online during the
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boot process. "nosmt" makes sure that from each physical
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core only one - the so called primary (hyper) thread is
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activated. Due to a design flaw of Intel processors related
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to Machine Check Exceptions the non primary siblings have
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to be brought up at least partially and are then shut down
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again. "nosmt" can be undone via the sysfs interface.
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nosmt=force Has the same effect as "nosmt' but it does not allow to
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undo the SMT disable via the sysfs interface.
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=========== ==========================================================
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The sysfs interface provides two files:
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- /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
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- /sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control:
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This file allows to read out the SMT control state and provides the
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ability to disable or (re)enable SMT. The possible states are:
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============== ===================================================
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on SMT is supported by the CPU and enabled. All
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logical CPUs can be onlined and offlined without
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restrictions.
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off SMT is supported by the CPU and disabled. Only
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the so called primary SMT threads can be onlined
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and offlined without restrictions. An attempt to
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online a non-primary sibling is rejected
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forceoff Same as 'off' but the state cannot be controlled.
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Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
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notsupported The processor does not support SMT. It's therefore
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not affected by the SMT implications of L1TF.
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Attempts to write to the control file are rejected.
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============== ===================================================
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The possible states which can be written into this file to control SMT
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state are:
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- on
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- off
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- forceoff
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/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active:
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This file reports whether SMT is enabled and active, i.e. if on any
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physical core two or more sibling threads are online.
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SMT control is also possible at boot time via the l1tf kernel command
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line parameter in combination with L1D flush control. See
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:ref:`mitigation_control_command_line`.
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5. Disabling EPT
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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Disabling EPT for virtual machines provides full mitigation for L1TF even
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with SMT enabled, because the effective page tables for guests are
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managed and sanitized by the hypervisor. Though disabling EPT has a
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significant performance impact especially when the Meltdown mitigation
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KPTI is enabled.
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EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
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There is ongoing research and development for new mitigation mechanisms to
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address the performance impact of disabling SMT or EPT.
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.. _mitigation_control_command_line:
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Mitigation control on the kernel command line
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---------------------------------------------
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The kernel command line allows to control the L1TF mitigations at boot
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time with the option "l1tf=". The valid arguments for this option are:
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============ =============================================================
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full Provides all available mitigations for the L1TF
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vulnerability. Disables SMT and enables all mitigations in
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the hypervisors, i.e. unconditional L1D flushing
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SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
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is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
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warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
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insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
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disabled.
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full,force Same as 'full', but disables SMT and L1D flush runtime
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control. Implies the 'nosmt=force' command line option.
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(i.e. sysfs control of SMT is disabled.)
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flush Leaves SMT enabled and enables the default hypervisor
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mitigation, i.e. conditional L1D flushing
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SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
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is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
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warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
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insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
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disabled.
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flush,nosmt Disables SMT and enables the default hypervisor mitigation,
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i.e. conditional L1D flushing.
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SMT control and L1D flush control via the sysfs interface
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is still possible after boot. Hypervisors will issue a
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warning when the first VM is started in a potentially
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insecure configuration, i.e. SMT enabled or L1D flush
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disabled.
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flush,nowarn Same as 'flush', but hypervisors will not warn when a VM is
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started in a potentially insecure configuration.
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off Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't emit any
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warnings.
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============ =============================================================
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The default is 'flush'. For details about L1D flushing see :ref:`l1d_flush`.
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.. _mitigation_control_kvm:
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Mitigation control for KVM - module parameter
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-------------------------------------------------------------
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The KVM hypervisor mitigation mechanism, flushing the L1D cache when
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entering a guest, can be controlled with a module parameter.
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The option/parameter is "kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush=". It takes the
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following arguments:
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============ ==============================================================
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always L1D cache flush on every VMENTER.
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cond Flush L1D on VMENTER only when the code between VMEXIT and
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VMENTER can leak host memory which is considered
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interesting for an attacker. This still can leak host memory
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which allows e.g. to determine the hosts address space layout.
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never Disables the mitigation
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============ ==============================================================
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The parameter can be provided on the kernel command line, as a module
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parameter when loading the modules and at runtime modified via the sysfs
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file:
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/sys/module/kvm_intel/parameters/vmentry_l1d_flush
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The default is 'cond'. If 'l1tf=full,force' is given on the kernel command
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line, then 'always' is enforced and the kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush
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module parameter is ignored and writes to the sysfs file are rejected.
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Mitigation selection guide
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--------------------------
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1. No virtualization in use
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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The system is protected by the kernel unconditionally and no further
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action is required.
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2. Virtualization with trusted guests
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^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
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If the guest comes from a trusted source and the guest OS kernel is
|
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guaranteed to have the L1TF mitigations in place the system is fully
|
||||
protected against L1TF and no further action is required.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the overhead of the default L1D flushing on VMENTER the
|
||||
administrator can disable the flushing via the kernel command line and
|
||||
sysfs control files. See :ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
3. Virtualization with untrusted guests
|
||||
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
|
||||
|
||||
3.1. SMT not supported or disabled
|
||||
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
|
||||
|
||||
If SMT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the BIOS or by
|
||||
the kernel, it's only required to enforce L1D flushing on VMENTER.
|
||||
|
||||
Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
|
||||
|
||||
3.2. EPT not supported or disabled
|
||||
""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
|
||||
|
||||
If EPT is not supported by the processor or disabled in the hypervisor,
|
||||
the system is fully protected. SMT can stay enabled and L1D flushing on
|
||||
VMENTER is not required.
|
||||
|
||||
EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept' parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
3.3. SMT and EPT supported and active
|
||||
"""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""""
|
||||
|
||||
If SMT and EPT are supported and active then various degrees of
|
||||
mitigations can be employed:
|
||||
|
||||
- L1D flushing on VMENTER:
|
||||
|
||||
L1D flushing on VMENTER is the minimal protection requirement, but it
|
||||
is only potent in combination with other mitigation methods.
|
||||
|
||||
Conditional L1D flushing is the default behaviour and can be tuned. See
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and :ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
|
||||
|
||||
- Guest confinement:
|
||||
|
||||
Confinement of guests to a single or a group of physical cores which
|
||||
are not running any other processes, can reduce the attack surface
|
||||
significantly, but interrupts, soft interrupts and kernel threads can
|
||||
still expose valuable data to a potential attacker. See
|
||||
:ref:`guest_confinement`.
|
||||
|
||||
- Interrupt isolation:
|
||||
|
||||
Isolating the guest CPUs from interrupts can reduce the attack surface
|
||||
further, but still allows a malicious guest to explore a limited amount
|
||||
of host physical memory. This can at least be used to gain knowledge
|
||||
about the host address space layout. The interrupts which have a fixed
|
||||
affinity to the CPUs which run the untrusted guests can depending on
|
||||
the scenario still trigger soft interrupts and schedule kernel threads
|
||||
which might expose valuable information. See
|
||||
:ref:`interrupt_isolation`.
|
||||
|
||||
The above three mitigation methods combined can provide protection to a
|
||||
certain degree, but the risk of the remaining attack surface has to be
|
||||
carefully analyzed. For full protection the following methods are
|
||||
available:
|
||||
|
||||
- Disabling SMT:
|
||||
|
||||
Disabling SMT and enforcing the L1D flushing provides the maximum
|
||||
amount of protection. This mitigation is not depending on any of the
|
||||
above mitigation methods.
|
||||
|
||||
SMT control and L1D flushing can be tuned by the command line
|
||||
parameters 'nosmt', 'l1tf', 'kvm-intel.vmentry_l1d_flush' and at run
|
||||
time with the matching sysfs control files. See :ref:`smt_control`,
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_command_line` and
|
||||
:ref:`mitigation_control_kvm`.
|
||||
|
||||
- Disabling EPT:
|
||||
|
||||
Disabling EPT provides the maximum amount of protection as well. It is
|
||||
not depending on any of the above mitigation methods. SMT can stay
|
||||
enabled and L1D flushing is not required, but the performance impact is
|
||||
significant.
|
||||
|
||||
EPT can be disabled in the hypervisor via the 'kvm-intel.ept'
|
||||
parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
.. _default_mitigations:
|
||||
|
||||
Default mitigations
|
||||
-------------------
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel default mitigations for vulnerable processors are:
|
||||
|
||||
- PTE inversion to protect against malicious user space. This is done
|
||||
unconditionally and cannot be controlled.
|
||||
|
||||
- L1D conditional flushing on VMENTER when EPT is enabled for
|
||||
a guest.
|
||||
|
||||
The kernel does not by default enforce the disabling of SMT, which leaves
|
||||
SMT systems vulnerable when running untrusted guests with EPT enabled.
|
||||
|
||||
The rationale for this choice is:
|
||||
|
||||
- Force disabling SMT can break existing setups, especially with
|
||||
unattended updates.
|
||||
|
||||
- If regular users run untrusted guests on their machine, then L1TF is
|
||||
just an add on to other malware which might be embedded in an untrusted
|
||||
guest, e.g. spam-bots or attacks on the local network.
|
||||
|
||||
There is no technical way to prevent a user from running untrusted code
|
||||
on their machines blindly.
|
||||
|
||||
- It's technically extremely unlikely and from today's knowledge even
|
||||
impossible that L1TF can be exploited via the most popular attack
|
||||
mechanisms like JavaScript because these mechanisms have no way to
|
||||
control PTEs. If this would be possible and not other mitigation would
|
||||
be possible, then the default might be different.
|
||||
|
||||
- The administrators of cloud and hosting setups have to carefully
|
||||
analyze the risk for their scenarios and make the appropriate
|
||||
mitigation choices, which might even vary across their deployed
|
||||
machines and also result in other changes of their overall setup.
|
||||
There is no way for the kernel to provide a sensible default for this
|
||||
kind of scenarios.
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue