x86/sev: Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default stacks storage
The size of the exception stacks was increased by the commit in Fixes,
resulting in stack sizes greater than a page in size. The #VC exception
handling was only mapping the first (bottom) page, resulting in an
SEV-ES guest failing to boot.
Make the #VC exception stacks part of the default exception stacks
storage and allocate them with a CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT=y .config. Map
them only when a SEV-ES guest has been detected.
Rip out the custom VC stacks mapping and storage code.
[ bp: Steal and adapt Tom's commit message. ]
Fixes: 7fae4c24a2
("x86: Increase exception stack sizes")
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Tested-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YVt1IMjIs7pIZTRR@zn.tnic
This commit is contained in:
parent
c7419a6e1a
commit
541ac97186
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@ -10,6 +10,12 @@
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#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
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#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
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#define VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ EXCEPTION_STKSZ
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#else
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#define VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ 0
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#endif
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/* Macro to enforce the same ordering and stack sizes */
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#define ESTACKS_MEMBERS(guardsize, optional_stack_size) \
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char DF_stack_guard[guardsize]; \
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@ -28,7 +34,7 @@
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/* The exception stacks' physical storage. No guard pages required */
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struct exception_stacks {
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ESTACKS_MEMBERS(0, 0)
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ESTACKS_MEMBERS(0, VC_EXCEPTION_STKSZ)
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};
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/* The effective cpu entry area mapping with guard pages. */
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@ -46,16 +46,6 @@ static struct ghcb __initdata *boot_ghcb;
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struct sev_es_runtime_data {
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struct ghcb ghcb_page;
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/* Physical storage for the per-CPU IST stack of the #VC handler */
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char ist_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
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/*
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* Physical storage for the per-CPU fall-back stack of the #VC handler.
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* The fall-back stack is used when it is not safe to switch back to the
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* interrupted stack in the #VC entry code.
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*/
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char fallback_stack[EXCEPTION_STKSZ] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
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/*
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* Reserve one page per CPU as backup storage for the unencrypted GHCB.
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* It is needed when an NMI happens while the #VC handler uses the real
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@ -99,27 +89,6 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(sev_es_enable_key);
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/* Needed in vc_early_forward_exception */
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void do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr);
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static void __init setup_vc_stacks(int cpu)
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{
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struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
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struct cpu_entry_area *cea;
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unsigned long vaddr;
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phys_addr_t pa;
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data = per_cpu(runtime_data, cpu);
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cea = get_cpu_entry_area(cpu);
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/* Map #VC IST stack */
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vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC);
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pa = __pa(data->ist_stack);
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cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL);
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/* Map VC fall-back stack */
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vaddr = CEA_ESTACK_BOT(&cea->estacks, VC2);
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pa = __pa(data->fallback_stack);
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cea_set_pte((void *)vaddr, pa, PAGE_KERNEL);
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}
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static __always_inline bool on_vc_stack(struct pt_regs *regs)
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{
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unsigned long sp = regs->sp;
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@ -787,7 +756,6 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)
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for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
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alloc_runtime_data(cpu);
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init_ghcb(cpu);
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setup_vc_stacks(cpu);
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}
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sev_es_setup_play_dead();
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@ -110,6 +110,13 @@ static void __init percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu)
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cea_map_stack(NMI);
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cea_map_stack(DB);
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cea_map_stack(MCE);
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if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
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if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) {
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cea_map_stack(VC);
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cea_map_stack(VC2);
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}
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}
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}
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#else
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static inline void percpu_setup_exception_stacks(unsigned int cpu)
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