netfilter: add back stackpointer size checks
The rationale for removing the check is only correct for rulesets
generated by ip(6)tables.
In iptables, a jump can only occur to a user-defined chain, i.e.
because we size the stack based on number of user-defined chains we
cannot exceed stack size.
However, the underlying binary format has no such restriction,
and the validation step only ensures that the jump target is a
valid rule start point.
IOW, its possible to build a rule blob that has no user-defined
chains but does contain a jump.
If this happens, no jump stack gets allocated and crash occurs
because no jumpstack was allocated.
Fixes: 7814b6ec6d
("netfilter: xtables: don't save/restore jumpstack offset")
Reported-by: syzbot+e783f671527912cd9403@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
This commit is contained in:
parent
01ea306f2a
commit
57ebd808a9
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@ -252,6 +252,10 @@ unsigned int arpt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
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}
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if (table_base + v
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!= arpt_next_entry(e)) {
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if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
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verdict = NF_DROP;
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break;
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}
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jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
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}
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@ -330,8 +330,13 @@ ipt_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
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continue;
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}
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if (table_base + v != ipt_next_entry(e) &&
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!(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO))
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!(e->ip.flags & IPT_F_GOTO)) {
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if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
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verdict = NF_DROP;
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break;
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}
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jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
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}
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e = get_entry(table_base, v);
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continue;
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@ -352,6 +352,10 @@ ip6t_do_table(struct sk_buff *skb,
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}
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if (table_base + v != ip6t_next_entry(e) &&
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!(e->ipv6.flags & IP6T_F_GOTO)) {
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if (unlikely(stackidx >= private->stacksize)) {
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verdict = NF_DROP;
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break;
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}
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jumpstack[stackidx++] = e;
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}
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