diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 04545725f187..c8bad1762cba 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -5462,6 +5462,18 @@ See Documentation/admin-guide/mm/transhuge.rst for more details. + trusted.source= [KEYS] + Format: + This parameter identifies the trust source as a backend + for trusted keys implementation. Supported trust + sources: + - "tpm" + - "tee" + If not specified then it defaults to iterating through + the trust source list starting with TPM and assigns the + first trust source as a backend which is initialized + successfully during iteration. + tsc= Disable clocksource stability checks for TSC. Format: [x86] reliable: mark tsc clocksource as reliable, this diff --git a/include/keys/trusted-type.h b/include/keys/trusted-type.h index b2d87ad21714..d89fa2579ac0 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted-type.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted-type.h @@ -11,6 +11,12 @@ #include #include +#ifdef pr_fmt +#undef pr_fmt +#endif + +#define pr_fmt(fmt) "trusted_key: " fmt + #define MIN_KEY_SIZE 32 #define MAX_KEY_SIZE 128 #define MAX_BLOB_SIZE 512 @@ -42,6 +48,53 @@ struct trusted_key_options { uint32_t policyhandle; }; +struct trusted_key_ops { + /* + * flag to indicate if trusted key implementation supports migration + * or not. + */ + unsigned char migratable; + + /* Initialize key interface. */ + int (*init)(void); + + /* Seal a key. */ + int (*seal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); + + /* Unseal a key. */ + int (*unseal)(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob); + + /* Get a randomized key. */ + int (*get_random)(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len); + + /* Exit key interface. */ + void (*exit)(void); +}; + +struct trusted_key_source { + char *name; + struct trusted_key_ops *ops; +}; + extern struct key_type key_type_trusted; +#define TRUSTED_DEBUG 0 + +#if TRUSTED_DEBUG +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ + pr_info("key_len %d\n", p->key_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); + pr_info("bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); + print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, + 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); + pr_info("migratable %d\n", p->migratable); +} +#else +static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ +} +#endif + #endif /* _KEYS_TRUSTED_TYPE_H */ diff --git a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h index a56d8e1298f2..7769b726863a 100644 --- a/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h +++ b/include/keys/trusted_tpm.h @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ #define LOAD32N(buffer, offset) (*(uint32_t *)&buffer[offset]) #define LOAD16(buffer, offset) (ntohs(*(uint16_t *)&buffer[offset])) +extern struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops; + struct osapsess { uint32_t handle; unsigned char secret[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; @@ -52,30 +54,19 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, #if TPM_DEBUG static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { - pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); - pr_info("trusted_key: sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); - pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); - pr_info("trusted_key: pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); + pr_info("sealing key type %d\n", o->keytype); + pr_info("sealing key handle %0X\n", o->keyhandle); + pr_info("pcrlock %d\n", o->pcrlock); + pr_info("pcrinfo %d\n", o->pcrinfo_len); print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "pcrinfo ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len, 0); } -static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) -{ - pr_info("trusted_key: key_len %d\n", p->key_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "key ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->key, p->key_len, 0); - pr_info("trusted_key: bloblen %d\n", p->blob_len); - print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "blob ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, - 16, 1, p->blob, p->blob_len, 0); - pr_info("trusted_key: migratable %d\n", p->migratable); -} - static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "trusted-key: handle ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, &s->handle, 4, 0); - pr_info("trusted-key: secret:\n"); + pr_info("secret:\n"); print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, &s->secret, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0); pr_info("trusted-key: enonce:\n"); @@ -87,7 +78,7 @@ static inline void dump_tpm_buf(unsigned char *buf) { int len; - pr_info("\ntrusted-key: tpm buffer\n"); + pr_info("\ntpm buffer\n"); len = LOAD32(buf, TPM_SIZE_OFFSET); print_hex_dump(KERN_INFO, "", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1, buf, len, 0); } @@ -96,10 +87,6 @@ static inline void dump_options(struct trusted_key_options *o) { } -static inline void dump_payload(struct trusted_key_payload *p) -{ -} - static inline void dump_sess(struct osapsess *s) { } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile index 1e17ab7bf3c5..04113f788025 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/Makefile @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ # obj-$(CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS) += trusted.o +trusted-y += trusted_core.o trusted-y += trusted_tpm1.o $(obj)/trusted_tpm2.o: $(obj)/tpm2key.asn1.h diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0db86b44605d --- /dev/null +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -0,0 +1,354 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation + * Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Linaro Limited + * + * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static char *trusted_key_source; +module_param_named(source, trusted_key_source, charp, 0); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(source, "Select trusted keys source (tpm or tee)"); + +static const struct trusted_key_source trusted_key_sources[] = { +#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM) + { "tpm", &trusted_key_tpm_ops }, +#endif +}; + +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_init, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->init); +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_seal, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->seal); +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_unseal, + *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->unseal); +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_get_random, + *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->get_random); +DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(trusted_key_exit, *trusted_key_sources[0].ops->exit); +static unsigned char migratable; + +enum { + Opt_err, + Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, +}; + +static const match_table_t key_tokens = { + {Opt_new, "new"}, + {Opt_load, "load"}, + {Opt_update, "update"}, + {Opt_err, NULL} +}; + +/* + * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the + * payload structure + * + * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. + */ +static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p) +{ + substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; + long keylen; + int ret = -EINVAL; + int key_cmd; + char *c; + + /* main command */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args); + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_new: + /* first argument is key size */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen); + if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + p->key_len = keylen; + ret = Opt_new; + break; + case Opt_load: + /* first argument is sealed blob */ + c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); + if (!c) + return -EINVAL; + p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2; + if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) + return -EINVAL; + ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len); + if (ret < 0) + return -EINVAL; + ret = Opt_load; + break; + case Opt_update: + ret = Opt_update; + break; + case Opt_err: + return -EINVAL; + } + return ret; +} + +static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL; + int ret; + + ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof(*p)); + if (ret < 0) + return p; + p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL); + + p->migratable = migratable; + + return p; +} + +/* + * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key + * + * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a + * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key, + * adding it to the specified keyring. + * + * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. + */ +static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, + struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + int key_cmd; + size_t key_len; + + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + + payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!payload) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload); + if (key_cmd < 0) { + ret = key_cmd; + goto out; + } + + dump_payload(payload); + + switch (key_cmd) { + case Opt_load: + ret = static_call(trusted_key_unseal)(payload, datablob); + dump_payload(payload); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + case Opt_new: + key_len = payload->key_len; + ret = static_call(trusted_key_get_random)(payload->key, + key_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; + + if (ret != key_len) { + pr_info("key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); + ret = -EIO; + goto out; + } + + ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(payload, datablob); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + break; + default: + ret = -EINVAL; + } +out: + kfree_sensitive(datablob); + if (!ret) + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload); + else + kfree_sensitive(payload); + return ret; +} + +static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + + p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); + kfree_sensitive(p); +} + +/* + * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values + */ +static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) +{ + struct trusted_key_payload *p; + struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; + size_t datalen = prep->datalen; + char *datablob; + int ret = 0; + + if (key_is_negative(key)) + return -ENOKEY; + p = key->payload.data[0]; + if (!p->migratable) + return -EPERM; + if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) + return -EINVAL; + + datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!datablob) + return -ENOMEM; + + new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key); + if (!new_p) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out; + } + + memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); + datablob[datalen] = '\0'; + ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p); + if (ret != Opt_update) { + ret = -EINVAL; + kfree_sensitive(new_p); + goto out; + } + + /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ + new_p->migratable = p->migratable; + new_p->key_len = p->key_len; + memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len); + dump_payload(p); + dump_payload(new_p); + + ret = static_call(trusted_key_seal)(new_p, datablob); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + kfree_sensitive(new_p); + goto out; + } + + rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p); + call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); +out: + kfree_sensitive(datablob); + return ret; +} + +/* + * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. + * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. + */ +static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, + size_t buflen) +{ + const struct trusted_key_payload *p; + char *bufp; + int i; + + p = dereference_key_locked(key); + if (!p) + return -EINVAL; + + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + bufp = buffer; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + } + return 2 * p->blob_len; +} + +/* + * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload + */ +static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) +{ + kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]); +} + +struct key_type key_type_trusted = { + .name = "trusted", + .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, + .update = trusted_update, + .destroy = trusted_destroy, + .describe = user_describe, + .read = trusted_read, +}; +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); + +static int __init init_trusted(void) +{ + int i, ret = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(trusted_key_sources); i++) { + if (trusted_key_source && + strncmp(trusted_key_source, trusted_key_sources[i].name, + strlen(trusted_key_sources[i].name))) + continue; + + static_call_update(trusted_key_init, + trusted_key_sources[i].ops->init); + static_call_update(trusted_key_seal, + trusted_key_sources[i].ops->seal); + static_call_update(trusted_key_unseal, + trusted_key_sources[i].ops->unseal); + static_call_update(trusted_key_get_random, + trusted_key_sources[i].ops->get_random); + static_call_update(trusted_key_exit, + trusted_key_sources[i].ops->exit); + migratable = trusted_key_sources[i].ops->migratable; + + ret = static_call(trusted_key_init)(); + if (!ret) + break; + } + + /* + * encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if + * trusted key implementation is not found. + */ + if (ret == -ENODEV) + return 0; + + return ret; +} + +static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +{ + static_call(trusted_key_exit)(); +} + +late_initcall(init_trusted); +module_exit(cleanup_trusted); + +MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c index 713b79576840..798dc7820084 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c @@ -1,29 +1,22 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Copyright (C) 2010 IBM Corporation - * - * Author: - * David Safford + * Copyright (c) 2019-2021, Linaro Limited * * See Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst */ #include -#include -#include #include #include #include #include #include -#include #include #include -#include #include #include #include -#include #include #include @@ -63,7 +56,7 @@ static int TSS_sha1(const unsigned char *data, unsigned int datalen, sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); return PTR_ERR(sdesc); } @@ -83,7 +76,7 @@ static int TSS_rawhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, sdesc = init_sdesc(hmacalg); if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); + pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hmac_alg); return PTR_ERR(sdesc); } @@ -136,7 +129,7 @@ int TSS_authhmac(unsigned char *digest, const unsigned char *key, sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); return PTR_ERR(sdesc); } @@ -212,7 +205,7 @@ int TSS_checkhmac1(unsigned char *buffer, sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); return PTR_ERR(sdesc); } ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); @@ -305,7 +298,7 @@ static int TSS_checkhmac2(unsigned char *buffer, sdesc = init_sdesc(hashalg); if (IS_ERR(sdesc)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); + pr_info("can't alloc %s\n", hash_alg); return PTR_ERR(sdesc); } ret = crypto_shash_init(&sdesc->shash); @@ -597,12 +590,12 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, /* sessions for unsealing key and data */ ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle1, enonce1); if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); return ret; } ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle2, enonce2); if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); return ret; } @@ -612,7 +605,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, return ret; if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { - pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); return -EIO; } ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata1, keyauth, TPM_NONCE_SIZE, @@ -641,7 +634,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); return ret; } @@ -653,7 +646,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, *datalen, TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), 0, 0); if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("TSS_checkhmac2 failed (%d)\n", ret); return ret; } memcpy(data, tb->data + TPM_DATA_OFFSET + sizeof(uint32_t), *datalen); @@ -680,7 +673,7 @@ static int key_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, p->key, p->key_len + 1, p->blob, &p->blob_len, o->blobauth, o->pcrinfo, o->pcrinfo_len); if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("srkseal failed (%d)\n", ret); tpm_buf_destroy(&tb); return ret; @@ -702,7 +695,7 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, ret = tpm_unseal(&tb, o->keyhandle, o->keyauth, p->blob, p->blob_len, o->blobauth, p->key, &p->key_len); if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); + pr_info("srkunseal failed (%d)\n", ret); else /* pull migratable flag out of sealed key */ p->migratable = p->key[--p->key_len]; @@ -713,7 +706,6 @@ static int key_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, enum { Opt_err, - Opt_new, Opt_load, Opt_update, Opt_keyhandle, Opt_keyauth, Opt_blobauth, Opt_pcrinfo, Opt_pcrlock, Opt_migratable, Opt_hash, @@ -722,9 +714,6 @@ enum { }; static const match_table_t key_tokens = { - {Opt_new, "new"}, - {Opt_load, "load"}, - {Opt_update, "update"}, {Opt_keyhandle, "keyhandle=%s"}, {Opt_keyauth, "keyauth=%s"}, {Opt_blobauth, "blobauth=%s"}, @@ -842,7 +831,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) return -EINVAL; if (!tpm2 && i != HASH_ALGO_SHA1) { - pr_info("trusted_key: TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n"); + pr_info("TPM 1.x only supports SHA-1.\n"); return -EINVAL; } break; @@ -871,71 +860,6 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, return 0; } -/* - * datablob_parse - parse the keyctl data and fill in the - * payload and options structures - * - * On success returns 0, otherwise -EINVAL. - */ -static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, struct trusted_key_payload *p, - struct trusted_key_options *o) -{ - substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS]; - long keylen; - int ret = -EINVAL; - int key_cmd; - char *c; - - /* main command */ - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); - if (!c) - return -EINVAL; - key_cmd = match_token(c, key_tokens, args); - switch (key_cmd) { - case Opt_new: - /* first argument is key size */ - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); - if (!c) - return -EINVAL; - ret = kstrtol(c, 10, &keylen); - if (ret < 0 || keylen < MIN_KEY_SIZE || keylen > MAX_KEY_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - p->key_len = keylen; - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = Opt_new; - break; - case Opt_load: - /* first argument is sealed blob */ - c = strsep(&datablob, " \t"); - if (!c) - return -EINVAL; - p->blob_len = strlen(c) / 2; - if (p->blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE) - return -EINVAL; - ret = hex2bin(p->blob, c, p->blob_len); - if (ret < 0) - return -EINVAL; - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = Opt_load; - break; - case Opt_update: - /* all arguments are options */ - ret = getoptions(datablob, p, o); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - ret = Opt_update; - break; - case Opt_err: - return -EINVAL; - break; - } - return ret; -} - static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) { struct trusted_key_options *options; @@ -956,252 +880,99 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) return options; } -static struct trusted_key_payload *trusted_payload_alloc(struct key *key) +static int trusted_tpm_seal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) { - struct trusted_key_payload *p = NULL; - int ret; - - ret = key_payload_reserve(key, sizeof *p); - if (ret < 0) - return p; - p = kzalloc(sizeof *p, GFP_KERNEL); - if (p) - p->migratable = 1; /* migratable by default */ - return p; -} - -/* - * trusted_instantiate - create a new trusted key - * - * Unseal an existing trusted blob or, for a new key, get a - * random key, then seal and create a trusted key-type key, - * adding it to the specified keyring. - * - * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno. - */ -static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, - struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -{ - struct trusted_key_payload *payload = NULL; struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; - size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - char *datablob; int ret = 0; - int key_cmd; - size_t key_len; int tpm2; tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; - - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!datablob) - return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); - datablob[datalen] = '\0'; - options = trusted_options_alloc(); - if (!options) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - payload = trusted_payload_alloc(key); - if (!payload) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } + if (!options) + return -ENOMEM; - key_cmd = datablob_parse(datablob, payload, options); - if (key_cmd < 0) { - ret = key_cmd; + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); + if (ret < 0) goto out; - } + dump_options(options); if (!options->keyhandle && !tpm2) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } - dump_payload(payload); + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, p, options); + else + ret = key_seal(p, options); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + + if (options->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); + goto out; + } + } +out: + kfree_sensitive(options); + return ret; +} + +static int trusted_tpm_unseal(struct trusted_key_payload *p, char *datablob) +{ + struct trusted_key_options *options = NULL; + int ret = 0; + int tpm2; + + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(chip); + if (tpm2 < 0) + return tpm2; + + options = trusted_options_alloc(); + if (!options) + return -ENOMEM; + + ret = getoptions(datablob, p, options); + if (ret < 0) + goto out; dump_options(options); - switch (key_cmd) { - case Opt_load: - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_unseal(payload, options); - dump_payload(payload); - dump_options(options); - if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); - break; - case Opt_new: - key_len = payload->key_len; - ret = tpm_get_random(chip, payload->key, key_len); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - - if (ret != key_len) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); - ret = -EIO; - goto out; - } - if (tpm2) - ret = tpm2_seal_trusted(chip, payload, options); - else - ret = key_seal(payload, options); - if (ret < 0) - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); - break; - default: + if (!options->keyhandle) { ret = -EINVAL; goto out; } - if (!ret && options->pcrlock) - ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); -out: - kfree_sensitive(datablob); - kfree_sensitive(options); - if (!ret) - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, payload); + + if (tpm2) + ret = tpm2_unseal_trusted(chip, p, options); else - kfree_sensitive(payload); - return ret; -} + ret = key_unseal(p, options); + if (ret < 0) + pr_info("key_unseal failed (%d)\n", ret); -static void trusted_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu) -{ - struct trusted_key_payload *p; - - p = container_of(rcu, struct trusted_key_payload, rcu); - kfree_sensitive(p); -} - -/* - * trusted_update - reseal an existing key with new PCR values - */ -static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) -{ - struct trusted_key_payload *p; - struct trusted_key_payload *new_p; - struct trusted_key_options *new_o; - size_t datalen = prep->datalen; - char *datablob; - int ret = 0; - - if (key_is_negative(key)) - return -ENOKEY; - p = key->payload.data[0]; - if (!p->migratable) - return -EPERM; - if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) - return -EINVAL; - - datablob = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!datablob) - return -ENOMEM; - new_o = trusted_options_alloc(); - if (!new_o) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - new_p = trusted_payload_alloc(key); - if (!new_p) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - - memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen); - datablob[datalen] = '\0'; - ret = datablob_parse(datablob, new_p, new_o); - if (ret != Opt_update) { - ret = -EINVAL; - kfree_sensitive(new_p); - goto out; - } - - if (!new_o->keyhandle) { - ret = -EINVAL; - kfree_sensitive(new_p); - goto out; - } - - /* copy old key values, and reseal with new pcrs */ - new_p->migratable = p->migratable; - new_p->key_len = p->key_len; - memcpy(new_p->key, p->key, p->key_len); - dump_payload(p); - dump_payload(new_p); - - ret = key_seal(new_p, new_o); - if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: key_seal failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree_sensitive(new_p); - goto out; - } - if (new_o->pcrlock) { - ret = pcrlock(new_o->pcrlock); + if (options->pcrlock) { + ret = pcrlock(options->pcrlock); if (ret < 0) { - pr_info("trusted_key: pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); - kfree_sensitive(new_p); + pr_info("pcrlock failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } } - rcu_assign_keypointer(key, new_p); - call_rcu(&p->rcu, trusted_rcu_free); out: - kfree_sensitive(datablob); - kfree_sensitive(new_o); + kfree_sensitive(options); return ret; } -/* - * trusted_read - copy the sealed blob data to userspace in hex. - * On success, return to userspace the trusted key datablob size. - */ -static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char *buffer, - size_t buflen) +static int trusted_tpm_get_random(unsigned char *key, size_t key_len) { - const struct trusted_key_payload *p; - char *bufp; - int i; - - p = dereference_key_locked(key); - if (!p) - return -EINVAL; - - if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { - bufp = buffer; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - } - return 2 * p->blob_len; + return tpm_get_random(chip, key, key_len); } -/* - * trusted_destroy - clear and free the key's payload - */ -static void trusted_destroy(struct key *key) -{ - kfree_sensitive(key->payload.data[0]); -} - -struct key_type key_type_trusted = { - .name = "trusted", - .instantiate = trusted_instantiate, - .update = trusted_update, - .destroy = trusted_destroy, - .describe = user_describe, - .read = trusted_read, -}; - -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_trusted); - static void trusted_shash_release(void) { if (hashalg) @@ -1216,14 +987,14 @@ static int __init trusted_shash_alloc(void) hmacalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hmac_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hmacalg)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n", hmac_alg); return PTR_ERR(hmacalg); } hashalg = crypto_alloc_shash(hash_alg, 0, 0); if (IS_ERR(hashalg)) { - pr_info("trusted_key: could not allocate crypto %s\n", + pr_info("could not allocate crypto %s\n", hash_alg); ret = PTR_ERR(hashalg); goto hashalg_fail; @@ -1251,16 +1022,13 @@ static int __init init_digests(void) return 0; } -static int __init init_trusted(void) +static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void) { int ret; - /* encrypted_keys.ko depends on successful load of this module even if - * TPM is not used. - */ chip = tpm_default_chip(); if (!chip) - return 0; + return -ENODEV; ret = init_digests(); if (ret < 0) @@ -1281,7 +1049,7 @@ static int __init init_trusted(void) return ret; } -static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) +static void trusted_tpm_exit(void) { if (chip) { put_device(&chip->dev); @@ -1291,7 +1059,11 @@ static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) } } -late_initcall(init_trusted); -module_exit(cleanup_trusted); - -MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); +struct trusted_key_ops trusted_key_tpm_ops = { + .migratable = 1, /* migratable by default */ + .init = trusted_tpm_init, + .seal = trusted_tpm_seal, + .unseal = trusted_tpm_unseal, + .get_random = trusted_tpm_get_random, + .exit = trusted_tpm_exit, +};