ovl: check the capability before cred overridden
We found that it return success when we set IMMUTABLE_FL flag to a file in docker even though the docker didn't have the capability CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE. The commitd1d04ef857
("ovl: stack file ops") anddab5ca8fd9
("ovl: add lsattr/chattr support") implemented chattr operations on a regular overlay file. ovl_real_ioctl() overridden the current process's subjective credentials with ofs->creator_cred which have the capability CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE so that it will return success in vfs_ioctl()->cap_capable(). Fix this by checking the capability before cred overridden. And here we only care about APPEND_FL and IMMUTABLE_FL, so get these information from inode. [SzM: move check and call to underlying fs inside inode locked region to prevent two such calls from racing with each other] Signed-off-by: Jiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
parent
d989903058
commit
98487de318
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
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#include <linux/mount.h>
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#include <linux/xattr.h>
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#include <linux/uio.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include "overlayfs.h"
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static char ovl_whatisit(struct inode *inode, struct inode *realinode)
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@ -408,10 +409,68 @@ static long ovl_real_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
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return ret;
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}
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static long ovl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
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static unsigned int ovl_get_inode_flags(struct inode *inode)
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{
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unsigned int flags = READ_ONCE(inode->i_flags);
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unsigned int ovl_iflags = 0;
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if (flags & S_SYNC)
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ovl_iflags |= FS_SYNC_FL;
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if (flags & S_APPEND)
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ovl_iflags |= FS_APPEND_FL;
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if (flags & S_IMMUTABLE)
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ovl_iflags |= FS_IMMUTABLE_FL;
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if (flags & S_NOATIME)
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ovl_iflags |= FS_NOATIME_FL;
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return ovl_iflags;
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}
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static long ovl_ioctl_set_flags(struct file *file, unsigned long arg)
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{
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long ret;
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struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
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unsigned int flags;
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unsigned int old_flags;
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
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return -EACCES;
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if (get_user(flags, (int __user *) arg))
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return -EFAULT;
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ret = mnt_want_write_file(file);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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inode_lock(inode);
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/* Check the capability before cred override */
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ret = -EPERM;
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old_flags = ovl_get_inode_flags(inode);
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if (((flags ^ old_flags) & (FS_APPEND_FL | FS_IMMUTABLE_FL)) &&
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!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE))
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goto unlock;
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ret = ovl_maybe_copy_up(file_dentry(file), O_WRONLY);
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if (ret)
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goto unlock;
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ret = ovl_real_ioctl(file, FS_IOC_SETFLAGS, arg);
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ovl_copyflags(ovl_inode_real(inode), inode);
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unlock:
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inode_unlock(inode);
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mnt_drop_write_file(file);
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return ret;
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}
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static long ovl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
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{
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long ret;
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switch (cmd) {
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case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
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@ -419,23 +478,7 @@ static long ovl_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
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break;
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case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
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if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
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return -EACCES;
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ret = mnt_want_write_file(file);
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if (ret)
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return ret;
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ret = ovl_maybe_copy_up(file_dentry(file), O_WRONLY);
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if (!ret) {
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ret = ovl_real_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
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inode_lock(inode);
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ovl_copyflags(ovl_inode_real(inode), inode);
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inode_unlock(inode);
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}
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mnt_drop_write_file(file);
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ret = ovl_ioctl_set_flags(file, arg);
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break;
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default:
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