diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm index 9578247e1792..d12cb2eae9ee 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/evm @@ -14,30 +14,46 @@ Description: generated either locally or remotely using an asymmetric key. These keys are loaded onto root's keyring using keyctl, and EVM is then enabled by - echoing a value to /evm: + echoing a value to /evm made up of the + following bits: - 1: enable HMAC validation and creation - 2: enable digital signature validation - 3: enable HMAC and digital signature validation and HMAC - creation + Bit Effect + 0 Enable HMAC validation and creation + 1 Enable digital signature validation + 2 Permit modification of EVM-protected metadata at + runtime. Not supported if HMAC validation and + creation is enabled. + 31 Disable further runtime modification of EVM policy - Further writes will be blocked if HMAC support is enabled or - if bit 32 is set: + For example: - echo 0x80000002 >/evm + echo 1 >/evm - will enable digital signature validation and block - further writes to /evm. + will enable HMAC validation and creation - Until this is done, EVM can not create or validate the - 'security.evm' xattr, but returns INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. - Loading keys and signaling EVM should be done as early - as possible. Normally this is done in the initramfs, - which has already been measured as part of the trusted - boot. For more information on creating and loading - existing trusted/encrypted keys, refer to: + echo 0x80000003 >/evm - Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both dracut - (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via + will enable HMAC and digital signature validation and + HMAC creation and disable all further modification of policy. + + echo 0x80000006 >/evm + + will enable digital signature validation, permit + modification of EVM-protected metadata and + disable all further modification of policy + + Note that once a key has been loaded, it will no longer be + possible to enable metadata modification. + + Until key loading has been signaled EVM can not create + or validate the 'security.evm' xattr, but returns + INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN. Loading keys and signaling EVM + should be done as early as possible. Normally this is + done in the initramfs, which has already been measured + as part of the trusted boot. For more information on + creating and loading existing trusted/encrypted keys, + refer to: + Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst. Both + dracut (via 97masterkey and 98integrity) and systemd (via core/ima-setup) have support for loading keys at boot time. diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index 241aca315b0c..3d05250e8313 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -23,9 +23,12 @@ #define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001 #define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002 -#define EVM_SETUP 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */ +#define EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES 0x0004 +#define EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */ -#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP) +#define EVM_KEY_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509) +#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE | \ + EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) extern int evm_initialized; extern char *evm_hmac; diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 9826c02e2db8..ba89c2468298 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ static void __init evm_init_config(void) pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs); } +static bool evm_key_loaded(void) +{ + return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); +} + static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); @@ -241,7 +246,7 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { - if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; if (!iint) { @@ -265,7 +270,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - if (!evm_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) return 0; return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } @@ -299,6 +304,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, return 0; goto out; } + evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -345,6 +351,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; + /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though + * there's no HMAC key loaded + */ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) + return 0; + if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { if (!xattr_value_len) return -EINVAL; @@ -365,6 +377,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { + /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though + * there's no HMAC key loaded + */ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) + return 0; + return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } @@ -393,8 +411,8 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { - if (!evm_initialized || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) - && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) + && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -414,7 +432,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -431,6 +449,12 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; enum integrity_status evm_status; + /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though + * there's no HMAC key loaded + */ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) + return 0; + if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); @@ -456,7 +480,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { - if (!evm_initialized) + if (!evm_key_loaded()) return; if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) @@ -473,7 +497,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; int rc; - if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) return 0; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index 319cf16d6603..feba03bbedae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, if (*ppos != 0) return 0; - sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP)); + sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)); rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp)); return rc; @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, { int i, ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) return -EPERM; ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); @@ -75,16 +75,30 @@ static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0) return -EINVAL; + /* Don't allow a request to freshly enable metadata writes if + * keys are loaded. + */ + if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) && + ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) && + !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) + return -EPERM; + if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) { ret = evm_init_key(); if (ret != 0) return ret; /* Forbid further writes after the symmetric key is loaded */ - i |= EVM_SETUP; + i |= EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE; } evm_initialized |= i; + /* Don't allow protected metadata modification if a symmetric key + * is loaded + */ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) + evm_initialized &= ~(EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES); + return count; }