USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted. Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data. Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory. Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ int usbip_recv_xbuff(struct usbip_device *ud, struct urb *urb)
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if (!(size > 0))
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return 0;
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if (size > urb->transfer_buffer_length) {
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/* should not happen, probably malicious packet */
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if (ud->side == USBIP_STUB) {
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usbip_event_add(ud, SDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
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return 0;
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} else {
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usbip_event_add(ud, VDEV_EVENT_ERROR_TCP);
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return -EPIPE;
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}
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}
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ret = usbip_recv(ud->tcp_socket, urb->transfer_buffer, size);
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if (ret != size) {
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dev_err(&urb->dev->dev, "recv xbuf, %d\n", ret);
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