Smack: handle zero-length security labels without panic
Zero-length security labels are invalid but kernel should handle them. This patch fixes kernel panic after setting zero-length security labels: # attr -S -s "SMACK64" -V "" file And after writing zero-length string into smackfs files syslog and onlycp: # python -c 'import os; os.write(1, "")' > /smack/syslog The problem is caused by brain-damaged logic in function smk_parse_smack() which takes pointer to buffer and its length but if length below or equal zero it thinks that the buffer is zero-terminated. Unfortunately callers of this function are widely used and proper fix requires serious refactoring. Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <k.khlebnikov@samsung.com>
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@ -923,7 +923,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
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rc = -EPERM;
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if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
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skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
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skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
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if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
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(skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
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rc = -EINVAL;
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@ -1677,7 +1677,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
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if (smack_onlycap != NULL && smack_onlycap != skp)
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return -EPERM;
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data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
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data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (data == NULL)
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return -ENOMEM;
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@ -2228,7 +2228,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
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if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
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return -EPERM;
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data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
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data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
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if (data == NULL)
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return -ENOMEM;
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