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crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - use clearer variable names 

The new convention for akcipher_alg::verify makes it unclear which
values are the lengths of the signature and digest.  Add local variables
to make it clearer what is going on.

Also rename the digest_size variable in pkcs1pad_sign(), as it is
actually the digest *info* size, not the digest size which is different.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Biggers 2022-01-18 16:13:06 -08:00 committed by Herbert Xu
parent a24611ea35
commit c2a28fdb2f
1 changed files with 16 additions and 15 deletions
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31
crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c
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@ -385,15 +385,15 @@ static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst); struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info; const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
int err; int err;
unsigned int ps_end, digest_size = 0; unsigned int ps_end, digest_info_size = 0;
if (!ctx->key_size) if (!ctx->key_size)
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
if (digest_info) if (digest_info)
digest_size = digest_info->size; digest_info_size = digest_info->size;
if (req->src_len + digest_size > ctx->key_size - 11) if (req->src_len + digest_info_size > ctx->key_size - 11)
return -EOVERFLOW; return -EOVERFLOW;
if (req->dst_len < ctx->key_size) { if (req->dst_len < ctx->key_size) {
@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_sign(struct akcipher_request *req)
if (!req_ctx->in_buf) if (!req_ctx->in_buf)
return -ENOMEM; return -ENOMEM;
ps_end = ctx->key_size - digest_size - req->src_len - 2; ps_end = ctx->key_size - digest_info_size - req->src_len - 2;
req_ctx->in_buf[0] = 0x01; req_ctx->in_buf[0] = 0x01;
memset(req_ctx->in_buf + 1, 0xff, ps_end - 1); memset(req_ctx->in_buf + 1, 0xff, ps_end - 1);
req_ctx->in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00; req_ctx->in_buf[ps_end] = 0x00;
@ -441,6 +441,8 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm); struct akcipher_instance *inst = akcipher_alg_instance(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst); struct pkcs1pad_inst_ctx *ictx = akcipher_instance_ctx(inst);
const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info; const struct rsa_asn1_template *digest_info = ictx->digest_info;
const unsigned int sig_size = req->src_len;
const unsigned int digest_size = req->dst_len;
unsigned int dst_len; unsigned int dst_len;
unsigned int pos; unsigned int pos;
u8 *out_buf; u8 *out_buf;
@ -487,20 +489,19 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
err = 0; err = 0;
if (req->dst_len != dst_len - pos) { if (digest_size != dst_len - pos) {
err = -EKEYREJECTED; err = -EKEYREJECTED;
req->dst_len = dst_len - pos; req->dst_len = dst_len - pos;
goto done; goto done;
} }
/* Extract appended digest. */ /* Extract appended digest. */
sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src, sg_pcopy_to_buffer(req->src,
sg_nents_for_len(req->src, sg_nents_for_len(req->src, sig_size + digest_size),
req->src_len + req->dst_len),
req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size,
req->dst_len, req->src_len); digest_size, sig_size);
/* Do the actual verification step. */ /* Do the actual verification step. */
if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos, if (memcmp(req_ctx->out_buf + ctx->key_size, out_buf + pos,
req->dst_len) != 0) digest_size) != 0)
err = -EKEYREJECTED; err = -EKEYREJECTED;
done: done:
kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf); kfree_sensitive(req_ctx->out_buf);
@ -536,14 +537,15 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req); struct crypto_akcipher *tfm = crypto_akcipher_reqtfm(req);
struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm); struct pkcs1pad_ctx *ctx = akcipher_tfm_ctx(tfm);
struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req); struct pkcs1pad_request *req_ctx = akcipher_request_ctx(req);
const unsigned int sig_size = req->src_len;
const unsigned int digest_size = req->dst_len;
int err; int err;
if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || if (WARN_ON(req->dst) || WARN_ON(!digest_size) ||
WARN_ON(!req->dst_len) || !ctx->key_size || sig_size != ctx->key_size)
!ctx->key_size || req->src_len != ctx->key_size)
return -EINVAL; return -EINVAL;
req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + req->dst_len, GFP_KERNEL); req_ctx->out_buf = kmalloc(ctx->key_size + digest_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!req_ctx->out_buf) if (!req_ctx->out_buf)
return -ENOMEM; return -ENOMEM;
@ -556,8 +558,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify(struct akcipher_request *req)
/* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */ /* Reuse input buffer, output to a new buffer */
akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src, akcipher_request_set_crypt(&req_ctx->child_req, req->src,
req_ctx->out_sg, req->src_len, req_ctx->out_sg, sig_size, ctx->key_size);
ctx->key_size);
err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req); err = crypto_akcipher_encrypt(&req_ctx->child_req);
if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY) if (err != -EINPROGRESS && err != -EBUSY)